

The United States and the Struggle in the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem, 1955–1960

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This article analyzes the influence of the U.S. government on a series of events within the patriarchate of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Jerusalem. Between 1955 and 1960, a struggle took place between two claimants to the position of patriarch. The context and the details of the surrounding events were complicated, involving various factions within the Armenian Church, transnational Armenian political parties, Jordanian government officials in Jerusalem and Amman, and regional and international governments. Local actors pleading their case often sought out the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem, the U.S. embassy in Amman, and other centers of American representation in the Middle East. U.S. officials intervened in these events in a subtle but important way; by initially providing damaging information about one candidate, they created a precedent that local actors could point to again and again to justify decisions that were often taken for entirely different reasons. Thus, the U.S. role was influential, if not decisive, in determining the outcome of the struggle.

The Armenian Apostolic Church and lay community have long constituted an important part of Jerusalem. One of three communities (along with the Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic) enjoying access to Christian holy sites, the Armenian presence in the city can likely be dated back to at least the fifth century AD.¹ The patriarchate of Jerusalem manages the affairs of Armenians in the Holy City, including Armenian access to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, venerated as the site of Jesus's crucifixion and burial. Its headquarters is the Convent of the Brotherhood of St. James, whose seminary produced many Armenian priests. Though the patriarchate acknowledged the authority of the historic spiritual authority of the catholicosate of Etchmiadzin (located at that time in the Soviet Union), it had

traditionally enjoyed an independent status and managed its own affairs.²

From 1948 until 1967, Jordan controlled the section of Jerusalem in which the patriarchate was located. Thus, Jordanian political institutions inevitably played an important role in local ecclesiastical politics. Jordanian laws and courts governed the procedures that led to the selection of religious leaders. Jordanian leaders, including King Husayn and various government ministers and magistrates, made important administrative decisions that impacted the struggle, in particular through their power to investigate alleged crimes, their control over residency permits, and the king's traditional right to approve religious leaders selected by local religious bodies.³

Rival Claims to the Patriarchate

The two claimants to the position of patriarch, Yeghishe Derderian and Tiran Nersoyan, are not easily characterized. Neither was closely associated with any of the three dominant Armenian political parties, which at that time were in deep conflict with one another. The Tashnagsoutioun or Tashnag party sought to take a pro-Western and anti-Soviet line, including opposing the main church in Etchmiadzin, which it argued was under the influence of the Soviet Union. By contrast, the Ramgavar and Hnchak parties tended to argue for preserving connections with the Armenian Church, including maintaining its loyalty to the historic church center in Etchmiadzin, in spite of its connections to the Soviet Union.⁴ In 1956, these parties became embroiled in a conflict over control of another important institution of the Armenian Church, the catholicosate of Cilicia. This catholicosate, located in the town of Antelias outside of Beirut, Lebanon, had traditionally administered to areas that included Lebanon and Syria. However, after the election of a Tashnag-supported candidate for catholicos, Zareh I, the catholicosate began to more explicitly reject the guidance of Etchmiadzin, while in turn seeking to expand its own influence in Greece, Cyprus, Iran, and the United States, among other locations.

Yeghishe Derderian was selected as locum tenens by the Brotherhood of St. James after the death of the previous patriarch in 1949. Although Derderian would normally have been required to hold elections within forty days, he had avoided holding them for reasons that are not entirely clear.⁵ In the early 1950s, Gevork VI, catholicos of Etchmiadzin, in fact named Derderian as his successor, though Derderian was not willing to accept this position. In 1952, Derderian was refused a visa to the United States, supposedly because of his ties to the Soviets.⁶ However, at the same time, Derderian had close relations with a variety of Jordanian government officials, several of whom were poker-playing companions. These connections gave him support inside of the Jordanian government.

Archbishop Tiran Nersoyan was the former head of the Armenian Church of North America. In the eyes of some in the U.S. government, he, too, was seen as a communist sympathizer, in part because of a book he wrote in 1941, entitled (unfortunately, he later claimed) *A Christian Approach to Communism*. The book, written and published in England at a time when the United States and United Kingdom were allied with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, suggested that communism and Christianity shared

some common principles, and later led to Nersoyan being labeled a “clerical apologist for Communism.”⁷ Nersoyan himself, in conversations with American diplomats, always insisted that he was strongly anti-communist.⁸ In 1955, Nersoyan retired from his position as prelate of North America and returned to the Brotherhood of St. James in Jerusalem. There he requested that a variety of administrative and fiscal reforms be made, putting him on a collision course with Derderian.⁹ Expressed simply, Derderian had a somewhat entrenched position, whereas the older Nersoyan was seen as an upstart competitor with a so-called “modern outlook.”¹⁰

Initially, according to U.S. consul reports, both the Tashnag party and its political opponents appear to have “strongly supported” Nersoyan in the dispute.¹¹ However, this changed after the election of Zareh I as catholicos of Antelias. Just prior to the election, Catholicos Vasken of Etchmiadzin, the spiritual leader of the Armenian Church, travelled to Lebanon in an attempt to get a postponement in order to find a compromise candidate acceptable to all factions. After failing to do so, Vasken then attempted to travel to Jerusalem to hold a meeting about the election, but the Jordanian government refused to issue him a visa. Some have alleged that it was Derderian’s personal recommendation to the Jordanian government that resulted in the denial of Vasken’s visa.¹² During this time, Nersoyan had actively encouraged the selection of a compromise candidate for the position, which Zareh and the Tashnags opposed. From this point onward, pro-Tashnag forces in Antelias, including Zareh, appear to have supported Derderian.

During the summer of 1956, the situation in Jerusalem came to a head. Nersoyan pushed for Derderian to hold an election to the patriarchate. Following this, Derderian reported Nersoyan to the ministry of the interior as having communist sympathies. On 28 July, Nersoyan received a deportation order from the Jordanian government. This order was stayed, but another was issued on 19 August.¹³ This time, Nersoyan responded by filing a slander suit in the Supreme Court. He won, resulting in the cancellation of his deportation order. To help resolve the dispute, Catholicos Vasken invited both Derderian and Nersoyan to visit Etchmiadzin. Derderian left for Etchmiadzin, while Nersoyan stayed behind in Jerusalem. In the meantime, yet another deportation order was issued to Nersoyan and in early October he was temporarily deported to Beirut, though he was allowed to return on 15 November following the election of a new Jordanian parliament dominated by a different political coalition.¹⁴ On 17 November, while Derderian was still abroad, the Brotherhood of St. James elected Nersoyan as locum tenens, effectively replacing Derderian, though the latter continued to file legal actions in the hope of displacing his opponent.¹⁵

The United States Intervenes

Thus far, U.S. representatives in Jerusalem and Amman had had little influence on the actions of the Jordanian government. In fact, they seemed suspicious of both candidates.¹⁶ However, in early spring, the crisis flared up again, and the United States became more deeply involved. On 5 March 1957, the general assembly of the Brotherhood of St. James

voted to expel Derderian. Two weeks later, the general assembly elected Nersoyan as patriarch and made an application to King Husayn for his recognition. Derderian countered with a lawsuit, and in addition sent the prime minister a letter he claimed was written by Nersoyan to the Soviet ambassador to Lebanon that spoke of a secret agreement with Vasken I for Nersoyan to facilitate his readmission to Jerusalem. Nersoyan and his defenders argued that this letter was a bad forgery.¹⁷ In May, the Jordanian government requested the views of the United States on Nersoyan. Although the telegram providing this information remains classified, it is clear that the United States passed on potentially negative information regarding Nersoyan, but nothing comparable regarding Derderian. The military governor of Jerusalem and Hebron, Jamal Tuqan, told the U.S. consul William E. Cole that in light of the “telegram listing certain activities of Nersoyan favorable to Communism . . . the Jordan Government quite certainly will not recognize Nersoyan” as patriarch.¹⁸ Subsequent events would reveal that this may not have been the message that the State Department wanted to convey, but it was the message that was received.

Legal maneuverings in the late summer kept the outcome of the situation in doubt. On 1 August, a Jerusalem court ruled that Derderian’s deposition and Nersoyan’s subsequent election had been illegal. Nersoyan indicated his intention to appeal this decision. In the meantime, a representative of the military governor asked the new U.S. consul general, Albert Franklin, if Nersoyan was “still under American protection,” and if the United States would “come to his aid if requested.”¹⁹ The representative claimed to know of the information that the United States had provided to the Jordanian government and seemed to imply that there were plans for action to get rid of Nersoyan. In his report, Franklin noted that the Jordanians had misinterpreted the U.S. attitude, probably because Washington’s message “did not indicate that both Archbishops . . . were undesirable.”²⁰ Since new instructions to make this point to Jordanian officials were still under discussion in Washington, the consul suggested that a demarche be made to King Husayn directly, rather than to the military governor. Thus, the State Department seemed to be considering actively urging the Jordanians not to support either candidate. However, they did not do so.

In October 1957, Jordan’s court of cassation dismissed the lawsuit against Nersoyan, which paved the way for him to assume his duties as patriarch, provided that the king recognized him. By this time, U.S. consul Franklin suggested to the State Department that, if the lawsuit was dismissed, the best case would be for the king to recognize Nersoyan, “which would minimize [the] tendency toward [a] split in [the] Armenian church.”²¹ Franklin had managed to get a copy of *A Christian Approach to Communism* and now argued that it was “anti-Communist in its intent.”²² In several communications to the State Department, the consul general made lengthy and balanced, but still recognizably pro-Nersoyan, arguments. Because of previous statements to the military governor, he maintained, the United States was “now on the side of the Tashnaqs [sic] and of their candidate, Derderian.”²³ He warned of dire consequences if Husayn refused to recognize Nersoyan, including disaffecting the local Armenian community, harming the position of the Armenian church in Soviet Armenia, and causing a “permanent split in the Armenian church and community.” The State Department responded that based on the information that it had, “there is little to choose between [Nersoyan] and Derderian,”

and they now did not want to get involved.²⁴ This response ignored the consul general's point that the United States was in fact already involved in the situation, because it had provided derogatory information regarding Nersoyan. The department did authorize the consul to "deny privately any allegation we [were] supporting Derderian"; at the same time, in response to a query from the U.S. embassy in Amman, it noted that "we believe development [of] opposition to [the] primacy [of the] Soviet dominated Etchmiadzin Catholicos and Armenian world community support for Catholicos Zareh of Antelias are in U.S. interest."²⁵ Since Zareh I appeared to be supporting Derderian and opposing Nersoyan, the State Department therefore seemed happy with its position, which was characterized by ambiguity and deniability on the one hand, and the perception of leaning toward Derderian on the other.

Over the course of 1958, supporters of both candidates and the Jordanian government increasingly sought U.S. involvement in the dispute. At the end of January 1958, the Jordanian ministry of the interior made a second attempt to deport Nersoyan, calling him "undesirable" and cancelling his residency permit. Franklin suggested to Foggy Bottom that bribes were the "real reason" for the attempt at deportation; he warned that if this were successful, it would "support Egypt-Syria propaganda [that King Husayn was] persecuting Christians," while alienating the local Armenian community.²⁶ The governor general of Jerusalem confided to U.S. officials that the main reason for the deportation attempt was a letter sent by President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon (probably at the behest of Tashnag parliamentary deputies, who had become Derderian's political allies) to Husayn asking him to take action against Nersoyan and to support Zareh I and his allies. The governor general therefore sent troops to the Convent of the Brotherhood of St. James to remove Nersoyan. However, after massive protests, these forces were removed.

At this time, in order to avoid bloodshed, members of the Armenian community visited U.S. consul Franklin to request proof that Nersoyan was a communist. Nersoyan, they said, was "ready to recognize Zareh" by publishing a newspaper article that was mildly critical of Vasken I's alleged interference in Antelias's affairs. One Armenian church official and Nersoyan supporter, Torkom Manoogian, who later served as U.S. prelate and then as patriarch of Jerusalem, sought contact with members of the "American Intelligence Service" in Beirut, who "were, in his words, 'responsible for the letter sent by President Chamoun of Lebanon to the King.'"²⁷ This demonstrates how widespread was the viewpoint that the U.S. was behind the machinations within the Jordanian government, even if the only action U.S. officials had taken was the provision of information regarding the two candidates the previous summer. After being visited by a large delegation of Armenians, King Husayn agreed to cancel the deportation order and to receive Nersoyan and others within a few days to allow the latter to answer the charges against him.²⁸

When U.S. *chargé d'affaires* Thomas Wright met with Foreign Minister Samir al-Rifa'i in Amman on 7 February 1958, the latter maintained that Jordan had information that Nersoyan was a communist sympathizer and "therefore unacceptable."²⁹ The foreign minister had proposed to a delegation of Armenians that a new candidate be chosen other than Derderian and Nersoyan, after which Nersoyan would be allowed to stay in the country. However, this apparently was not communicated to the governor general of

Jerusalem, who after speaking with the U.S. consul asked the Americans to ask Rifa'i whether these instructions had actually been sent to him.³⁰ At some point a new message was sent to the governor general, who allowed Nersoyan to stay under the pretext of concerns about his health.³¹

Scandal, Bribery, and Deportation

In the meantime, the dispute erupted into scandal. Derderian's chambers – sealed since his departure from Jerusalem – were opened, and pornography and ladies' lingerie reportedly found. This resulted in rumors that Consul Franklin felt sure would prevent Derderian's return.³² In March, Nersoyan received a new residency permit, but the minister of the interior, Falah al-Madadha, told an Armenian delegation that it now recognized a third priest, Bishop Souren Kembajian, as being in charge of the affairs of the community and wanted the brotherhood to hold new elections. In the meantime, Nersoyan and his supporters hoped for a change in attitude from the Jordanian government. The former prelate was reported to have published articles praising Antelias, and at least one criticizing Etchmiadzin, as part of an effort to placate his critics.³³ This effort failed and, in late August 1958, Nersoyan was deported again, this time permanently.³⁴

After Nersoyan's deportation, he and his supporters appealed to the U.S. government to intervene on his behalf. As Ara Sanjian has revealed, King Husayn had indicated that if Prime Minister al-Rifa'i could be convinced that Nersoyan was not sympathetic to communism, there might be a possibility of return. The prime minister suggested that a letter from the Americans or British might be helpful in this regard.³⁵ During a meeting at the U.S. embassy in Beirut on 9 September 1958, Nersoyan gave several reasons for his deportation, including his refusal to pay bribes; the influence of Derderian's "drinking and poker-playing cronies" in the Jordanian government; and a letter from President Chamoun of Lebanon, who had been persuaded by Tashnag deputies in parliament to contact the Jordanian government. Nersoyan also claimed to know that "the American intelligence agencies' had him in their black books."³⁶ U.S. officials at the meeting insisted that the United States had adopted a neutral position in the dispute, and the following morning they told him that the U.S. government would express concern about his deportation to the Jordanian government.

Shortly thereafter, Nersoyan travelled to Washington to attempt to change minds. In a meeting with Stuart Rockwell and Richard Parker of the State Department's Near East division, he maintained that there were "many indications that the State Department and CIA were supporting the church policies of the Tashnags," thereby alienating many within the Armenian community. Rockwell denied that the U.S. was supporting the Tashnags, stating simply that "the strong opposition of the Tashnags to Communism coincided with our views," and they had been "willing to provide us information and we had no reason to refuse this."³⁷ The Tashnags, Nersoyan said, had bribed government officials in Jordan to secure his deportation. When Nersoyan was asked why he had not tried "the same tactics in order to gain the support of someone higher than [deputy minister of the

interior and Derderian supporter Sa‘d] Jum[‘]a” Nersoyan responded that “he had tried and had almost but not quite succeeded.”³⁸

Nersoyan’s supporters continued to advocate on his behalf. In particular, a group of four pro-Nersoyan Armenian-American clerics in the Jerusalem diocese – including Shnork Kaloustian, who was serving as sacristan for the Brotherhood of St. James, and Torkom Manoogian – reported to American authorities that they had been under heavy pressure from the Jordanian ministry of the interior to hold an election to replace Nersoyan. After their refusal, they were threatened with deportation. The U.S. consul general suggested that the embassy in Amman express concern about its citizens to the government.³⁹ In this case, the State Department authorized the embassy in Amman to tell Prime Minister Rifa‘i that internal Armenian Church affairs were not the concern of the U.S. government and that they were not knowledgeable about the priests involved; however, parts of the American-Armenian community were “already exercised and will be interested and concerned if deportation [of the] four priests occurs.”⁴⁰ Before this message was delivered, the priests involved received letters from the minister of the interior that they could now obtain new residency permits.⁴¹ Several times over the next year, Consul Franklin suggested that a “discreet word” from an American source regarding Nersoyan might actually tip the balance in his favor, but the State Department continued to refuse to get involved.⁴²

The United States Establishes a Policy

At the end of 1958, the State Department finally decided to establish a policy on how to deal with such divisions within minority communities in the Middle East. It was actually a situation concerning another religious institution – the Greek Orthodox Church – that prompted this step. Over the previous few years, Greek Orthodox Church officials and government officials in various pro-Western countries had reported that the Soviet Union was attempting to expand its influence within the church. The election of the patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church had drawn attention to Soviet attempts to influence the church, particularly through financial means. State Department officials feared this development, but also believed that there were limits on how much influence they could bring to bear on religious institutions. Thus, they felt that a “neutral policy of non-involvement” was the best policy, while issues related to minorities would be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. U.S. officials were therefore to “avoid actions that might compromise [this] basic policy of non-involvement with specific minority groups.” Exceptions would only be made when this would not be seen as harming the host government, and were “otherwise clearly in the positive interest of the U.S.”⁴³ This policy was somewhat at odds with what the United States had done in 1958 in Jerusalem with its message regarding Nersoyan and Derderian, but it would be referred to repeatedly in subsequent years.

Later in 1959, National Council of Churches official and Nersoyan supporter Wilbur Parry visited the Holy Land, where he saw a number of Armenian and Jordanian officials. After his return to the United States, Parry sent Shnork Kaloustian a letter with details of

his conversations that contained sensitive details, including mentions of bribes paid by both sides to the Jordanian government. Parry, perhaps out of naiveté, also sent copies of this to various Jordanian officials, including the prime minister.⁴⁴ In January 1960, Jordan deported Kaloustian, Manoogian, and another Armenian Church official.⁴⁵ A U.S. embassy counselor in Amman saw Foreign Minister Musa Nasir, a Jordanian Christian, a few weeks later, and suggested that this “seemed rather harsh and abrupt.”⁴⁶ Nasir promised to provide a document that would clarify matters. Confusingly, the document that he gave to the counselor provided little explanation, but instead struck embassy officials an excellent summary of the issue by a pro-Nersoyan advocate, later revealed to be Canon Edward Every of St. George’s Cathedral in Jerusalem.⁴⁷

Nasir most likely provided this document as an explanation for actions that he did not agree with, but had little power to influence. After the latest expulsions, numerous members of the Brotherhood of St. James were dismissed, giving pro-Derderian forces an advantage. Armenian and British sources told the U.S. consul that the Jordanian government had threatened to arrest other key leaders of the brotherhood if they did not support Derderian.⁴⁸ On 26 March, the scheduled date for the election of a new locum tenens, Jordanian security forces surrounded the monastery and admitted Derderian, who claimed that no elections for this position were necessary, since he was the rightful locum tenens. Although the Jordanian government did not yet recognize this, the elections were nonetheless postponed, and Derderian remained on the grounds of the compound. Shortly thereafter, the ministry of interior appointed a pro-Derderian cleric as chief administrator, who began dismissing anti-Derderian members of the brotherhood. On 6 June, Derderian was officially recognized as locum tenens, and on 8 June 1960, he was elected patriarch of Jerusalem.⁴⁹

Some Jordanian leaders attempted to resist this intervention in the affairs of the church. Considering this an affront to his fellow Christians, Foreign Minister Nasir attempted to resign over the interference in the election, allegedly due to bribery, but then agreed to stay after King Husayn promised an investigation. However, the U.S. embassy in Amman expected that this investigation would be a “whitewash.”⁵⁰ Indeed, nothing was done to reverse Derderian’s election. After the dismissal of a final court case challenging the Jordanian government’s right to intervene, Husayn recognized Derderian as patriarch on 10 August.⁵¹

While the U.S. consulate was not directly involved during these final months, numerous parties assumed that the United States was. U.S. consul Lucien Kinsolving reported that “one of the most exasperating parts of the whole imbroglio has been the conviction, even among the Anglican clergy and our British consular colleagues, that the Department of State in general and this office in particular are in the whole mess up to the armpits.”⁵² After several messages from the consul general to Washington, the State Department referred to its 1958 policy on non-involvement and instructed its representatives to discreetly make this known, as well as to disassociate themselves from King Hussayn’s conduct in order to dispel the impression that the United States was responsible for these events.⁵³ As we saw earlier, sending mixed messages allowed the impression of U.S. involvement to gain currency in the first place, and these denials would do little to dispel it.

Conclusion

The struggle over the patriarchate was by this point at an end, but it would have a lasting impact on the Armenian Apostolic Church. Yeghishe Derderian would serve as the prelate of Jerusalem until his death in 1990, a period of nearly thirty years, making him one of the longest-serving leaders in the history of the patriarchate. Tiran Nersoyan returned to the United States, where he helped found the St. Nersess Armenian Seminary, which aimed to train new generations of Armenian priests, and continued his scholarly activities. In spite of the bitter legacy of the events of this period, in the early 1960s, there was a degree of reconciliation between various factions of the Armenian Church. Nonetheless, some tensions remain today.

During this dispute, U.S. representatives in Jerusalem had to navigate local, regional, and international challenges. All of the consuls discussed in this article seem to have come to the conclusion that the State Department had become part of an effort to influence the internal politics of the Armenian Church by disparaging Tiran Nersoyan. These individuals sought to correct this by moving the position of the United States closer to supporting Nersoyan. They believed that this would have a calming effect on a crisis within the Armenian community in Jerusalem. However, the State Department saw the issue differently. It did not see either candidate as particularly beneficial to U.S. interests, yet it was worried about what it saw as Nersoyan's possible sympathy with communism and was moderately inclined to support his detractors in the catholicosate of Cilicia. Thus, even when presented with evidence to the contrary, the State Department refused to take steps to change its position. It was the difference in perspective, local and international, that explains these differences in position, but ultimately, Foggy Bottom's position trumped that of the U.S. consul in Jerusalem. This lack of willingness to change course made it possible for Yeghishe Derderian to assume the position of patriarch of Jerusalem.

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Endnotes

- 1 Ara Sanjian, "The Armenian Church and Community of Jerusalem," in *The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land: Studies in History, Religion and Politics*, ed. Anthony O'Mahony (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003), 57–58.
- 2 For a discussion of the Armenian Apostolic Church hierarchy, see Jenny Phillips, *Symbol, Myth, and Rhetoric: The Politics of Culture in an Armenian-American Population* (New York: AMS Press, 1989), 49–62.
- 3 On the latter, see the historical brief in Despatch Amman 1, 2 July 1960, 885.413/7-260, Central Decimal File [CDF] 1960–63, Box 2808, Record Group [RG] RG 59, U.S. National Archives [USNA], College Park, MD.
- 4 See, for instance, Tsolin Nalbantian, "Articulating Power through the Parochial: The 1956 Armenian Church Election in Lebanon," *Mashriq & Mahjar* 2 (2013): 45–46.
- 5 Tsimhoni maintains that it was to avoid appealing to either Israeli or Jordanian authorities for recognition. Daphne Tsimhoni, "The Armenians and the Syrians: Ethno-Religious Communities in Jerusalem," *Middle Eastern Studies* 20, no. 3

- (1984): 4. Sanjian confirms that Derderian gave the unresolved status of Jerusalem as a reason for avoiding an appeal to Jordanian or Israeli authorities for recognition. Sanjian, "Armenian Church," 71. However, the possibility of an unfavorable outcome of the election is also a likely reason for Derderian's delay.
- 6 See Despatch Jerusalem 103, 11 December 1957, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 7 Benjamin F. Alexander, "The Armenian Americans' Cold War: The Divided Response to Soviet Armenia," in *Anti-Communist Minorities in the U.S.: Political Activism of Ethnic Refugees*, ed. Ieva Zake (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 78-79.
 - 8 Despatch Jerusalem 50, 17 August 1955, 884.413/8-1755, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 9 Tsimhoni, "The Armenians and the Syrians," 4.
 - 10 Despatch No. 31, 21 August 1956, 884.413/8-2156, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 11 Despatch Jerusalem 103, 11 December 1957, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 12 This and the subsequent paragraph draw heavily on a summary prepared by Canon Edward Every. "The Church of the Armenians," undated, unsigned memo included in Despatch Amman 287, "Background Material on the Armenian Church," 8 February 1960, 884.413/2-860, CDF 1960-63, Box 2799, RG 59, USNA.
 - 13 See Sanjian, "Armenian Church," 73-74.
 - 14 See Sanjian, "Armenian Church," 73-74.
 - 15 Every, "The Church of the Armenians."
 - 16 Despatch No. 31, 21 August 1956, 884.413/8-2156, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA. This cable refers to Despatch 156, which remains classified.
 - 17 Despatch No. 167, May 17, 1957, 884.413/5-1757, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 18 Despatch Jerusalem 176, 3 June 1957, 885.413/6-357 CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA. The State Department's instructions appear to be in Deptel 276 of May 22, 1957, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, 885.413/5-1457, RG 59, USNA.
 - 19 Despatch 19, 8 August 1957, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 20 Despatch 19, 8 August 1957, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 21 Telegram, Jerusalem 154, 6 December 1957, 884.413/12-557, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 22 Despatch 77, 30 October 1957, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 23 Despatch Jerusalem 103, 11 December 1957, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 24 Telegram, State to Jerusalem, 15 January 1958, 884.413/1-958, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 25 Telegram, State to Jerusalem, 15 January 1958, 884.413/1-958, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 26 Telegram, Jerusalem 228, 20 January 1958, 885.413/1-3058, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 27 Telegram, Jerusalem 231, 31 January 1958, 885.413/1-3158, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, CDF 1955-59; Despatch No. 138, Jerusalem, "The Deportation of an Archbishop," 5 February 1958, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 28 Telegram, Jerusalem 240, 5 February 1958, 885.413/2-558, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 29 Despatch Amman 233, 13 February 1958, 884.413/2-1358, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 30 Telegram, Jerusalem 249, 16 February 1958, 884.413/2-1658, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 31 Telegram, Amman 1525, 18 February 1958, 884.413/2-1758, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA; Telegram, Jerusalem 254, 19 February 1958, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 32 Despatch Jerusalem 151, 20 February 1958, 884.413/2-2058, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 33 Despatch Jerusalem 189, 3 April 1958, 884.413/4-358, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 34 Telegram, Amman 698, 30 August 1958, 884.413/3-3058, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
 - 35 See Sanjian, "Armenian Church," 78-79.
 - 36 Memcon, Nersoyan, Dorman, Ramsaur, "Archbishop's Expulsion from Jerusalem; Armenian Church Politics," September 1958, CDF 1955-59, Box 4733, RG 59, USNA.
 - 37 Memcon, Nersoyan, Rockwell, Parker, "Armenian Church Affairs," 19 November 1958, 861.413/11-1958, CDF 1955-59, Box 4733, RG 59, USNA.
 - 38 Memcon, Nersoyan, Rockwell, Parker, "Armenian Church Affairs," 19 November 1958, 861.413/11-1958, CDF 1955-59, Box 4733, RG 59, USNA.
 - 39 Telegram, Jerusalem 48, 19 December 1958, 880.413/12-1858, CDF 1955-59, Box 4893, RG 59, USNA.
 - 40 Telegram, State 1380, 24 December 1958, 880.413/12-1858, CDF 1955-59, Box 4893, RG 59, USNA.
 - 41 Telegram, Jerusalem 224, 24 December 1958, 880.413/12-2458, CDF 1955-59, Box 4893, RG 59, USNA.
 - 42 Telegram, Jerusalem 277, 5 March 1959, 880.413/3-459, CDF 1955-59, Box 4893, RG 59, USNA, referencing Jerusalem 228 [still classified]; Memcon, Nersoyan and Parker, 1 December 1958, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, CDF 1955-59; Despatch Jerusalem No. 11, 21 July 1959, 884.413/7-2159, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.

- 43 Circular, State CA-5459, 24 December 1958, 880.413/7-857, CDF 1955-59, Box 4893, RG 59, USNA.
- 44 Despatch Jerusalem No. 22, 12 August 1959, 884.413/8-1259, CDF 1955-59, Box 4928, RG 59, USNA.
- 45 Sanjian, "Armenian Church," 80.
- 46 Despatch Amman 287, 8 February 1960, 884.413/2-860, CDF 1960-63, Box 2799, RG 59, USNA; Telegram, Jerusalem 220, 19 February 1960, 885.413/2-1960, CDF 1960-63, Box 2808, RG 59, USNA.
- 47 Despatch Amman 287, 8 February 1960, 884.413/2-860, CDF 1960-63, Box 2799, RG 59, USNA; Telegram, Jerusalem 220, 19 February 1960, 885.413/2-1960, CDF 1960-63, Box 2808, RG 59, USNA.
- 48 Telegram, Jerusalem G-26, 31 March 1960, 884.413/3-3160, CDF 1960-63, Box 2799, RG 59, USNA.
- 49 Sanjian, "Armenian Church," 82. See also Telegram, Jerusalem 313, 8 June 1960, CDF 1960-63, Box 2799, RG 59, USNA.
- 50 Despatch, Amman 1, 2 July 1960, 885.413/7-260, CDF 1960-63, Box 2808, RG 59, USNA.
- 51 Telegram, Jerusalem G-2, RG 59, CDF 1960-63, Box 2799, 11 August 1960, RG 59, USNA.
- 52 Despatch, Jerusalem 131, 11 February 1960, 888.413/2-1160, CDF 1960-63, Box 2799, RG 59, USNA. See also Telegram, State 2792, 6 April 1960, 884.413/4-660 CDF 1960-63, Box 2799; Jerusalem 225, 7 April 1960, RG 59, 880.413/(no further info), RG 59, USNA.
- 53 Telegram, State 8159, 884.413, CDF 1960-63, Box 2799, 15 April 1960, RG 59, USNA.