[Editor's note: This report was written after the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Taba in January 2001 and gives us some insights into the background of the negotiations on Jerusalem.]
The Oslo agreements at one level, often forgotten nowadays, were a product of mutual interest, launched by the PLO and the State of Israel to reach a historic reconciliation. In the Middle East negotiations, the so-called second track negotiations contributed positively to move towards progress at the official negotiations.
The Orient House played a leading role in the second track diplomacy as a tool to further enhance the Palestinian position on the negotiating table on the issue of Jerusalem. The second track was initiated in 1994, at a time when the focus was on the implementation of the Oslo agreement in the Palestinian autonomous areas. At that time, the gap between the Palestinian position on Jerusalem and the Israeli side was enormous, if not a taboo. In fact, Jerusalem was postponed for the final status talks in hope that the interim period could build enough confidence measures to tackle the most sensitive issue.
After that, the Orient House took the initiative of establishing second track channels with different Israeli circles linked with the Israeli decision-makers. The nature of the discussions was mostly academic and sponsored by different European capitals. The Europeans sponsored the projects and participated either as observers or facilitators; their objective was to open a political venue for more European involvement in the peace process, hoping that their economic involvement would eventually accompany a more political role. The Dutch and Swedish track sponsored issues related to planning, zoning and infrastructure for the whole city in times of peace, while the British track focused more on the political dimension of the conflict in Jerusalem. The Spanish track sponsored the religious dimension of the Holy City, and the Greek track focused on the discussion of general issues in preparations of the final talks. To maintain the confidentiality of the discussions and the productivity of the atmosphere, the preliminary meetings took place in Europe.
The Palestinian side maintained the main principles stipulated by the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In other words, the 4th of June of 1967 armistice line was the line drawn between the two parts of the city in discussions about any future arrangements for the city, with possible minor adjustments of the border. In addition to this principle, the concept of an open city between its two halves was another point elaborated by the Palestinian teams. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the future state of Palestine and the state of Israel over their respective territories, it was proposed that there shall be no barriers to the free and unimpeded movement of persons inside the Open City or to the Open City from elsewhere within the territory of the State of Palestine and Israel. As a result, Resolution 181 - the Corpus Separatum status, which stated that Jerusalem should be preserved as an integral geographical area accessible to as many persons as possible - would still be valid. Regional and international dimension of the city is another pillar the Palestinian teams took into consideration. The perseverance of the Palestinian teams in emphasizing that East Jerusalem would be the capital of the Palestinian state was a cornerstone of all the discussions.
Basic Assumption
The incremental approach was the strategy both sides adopted in dealing with different subjects related to the issue of Jerusalem. As it was extremely difficult to start talking about an open city within two capitals, it was easier to discuss the zoning and planning for Jerusalem. It was also easier to show the gap between the two parts of the city and the need to bridge such a gap in order to have an open city with party in treatment for citizens of the two nations. Moreover, the Palestinian approach was to talk about autonomous services in East Jerusalem, with an independent municipality at a later stage. This would lead to raising the idea of an umbrella municipality in Jerusalem. The parties agreed on a Jerusalem Cooperation Committee to coordinate on the lower level of municipal interests such as garbage collection, supply of utilities, water, gas, electricity, and infrastructure, along with urban and strategic planning for the whole city. It was unwise to raise the issue of sovereignty at an early stage as it would not have been productive to deal with the concept of sovereignty in a classical rigid method. This needed a creative way of thinking to bring into the table different models and different cases in an attempt to find a common ground acceptable for both sides, and marketable to the decision-makers: i.e., split sovereignty, scattered sovereignty, shared sovereignty, and a condominium model of sovereignty.
Another tactic adopted by both sides was to start from generalities and then proceed in details when dealing with issues, believing that generalities would prepare the ground for further work later. Talking about the concept itself laid the foundation for detailed paperwork done by experts. At a certain point, such an approach led both sides to deal with detailed maps of different layers, diagrams as well as detailed plans, such as security arrangements in the old city.
Different methods were adopted to break the stalemate at some points. Heated discussions with significant differences in position were postponed until the preliminary meeting took place - a time when all issues related to the city would be discussed.
Visiting divided cities such as Belfast and Nicosia was another method adopted by both sides. Such visits showed the necessity of avoiding further segregation and hatred. They intensified the brainstorming sessions with good intentions to come closer in positions. the meetings outside the region contributed in isolating the experts from the bitter realities on the ground, in hope of leading to a higher level of objectivity.
All the work produced at different stages was put on the table of decision-makers. At different times, policy-makers met to evaluate the work of the second track and to design the guidelines for other stages. In other words, the second track allowed the decisions-makers to sit together and discuss the results of the workshops, while opening more opportunities for further discussions thus contributing to breaking down serious hurdles.
It is worth mentioning that, throughout successive Israeli governments, the strategy of the Orient House continues to maintain contacts and channels with the opposition as well as with the government. When the Labor party lost the elections in 1996 against the Likud party, led by former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the second channel activities continued with the Israeli Labor party, while efforts were also made to open channels with those in power in the Israeli government. It proved that the different Israeli circles and think tanks would coordinate among themselves despite their differences, thus proving they have "one system" and are cooperating among themselves in filtering information. Unfortunately, the Palestinians lacked such a strategy, allowing the Israeli side to exploit to the maximum the differences among the Palestinian policy-makers. But still, the Israeli official position moved closer to the Palestinian official stand on Jerusalem with time. The vision and leadership of the Orient House provided its success: five years ago, almost no one believed that East Jerusalem would return to the Palestinian-Arab side. The Camp David Summit and Taba negotiations proved that further progress towards a comprehensive deal happened, although more work was needed. Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of a Palestinian sovereignty in the Arab side of the City and an Israeli one in West Jerusalem, while taking into consideration the interests of both sides. While both sides favored the idea of an open city, they disagreed on the geographical scope, with a soft border regime within Jerusalem between Al Quds and Yerushalaym. Regarding the Old City and its surroundings, the Palestinian side showed readiness to take into consideration the concerns and interests of the Israeli side, provided the latter accepted the Palestinian sovereignty on such an area within the borders of June 1967. In this regard, the issue of a special police force regimen was also discussed; both parties accepted the principle of each controlling and managing its holy sites. Different models of coordination and cooperation between two municipalities of the open city (dealing with sewage, roads, utilities, etc) were discussed.
Often, the results of the second track talks were used in public diplomacy. Both sides would go back to their constituencies and use the methods available to them, mainly the media, to gradually prepare the ground for an expected change or arrangement in the city. This was seen before and after the Camp David summit and then the Taba talks. Many articles were published with different maps that focused on the idea of sharing Jerusalem. While the press was at times instrumental in positively mobilizing the grassroots, it was also often misused and misinterpreted.
Undoubtedly, without the work done during the second track diplomacy, it would have been almost impossible to present all the ideas and suggestions regarding Jerusalem on the table in the Camp David summit and the Taba talks. Although such proposals did not ensure the minimal rights of the Palestinian people, they still proceeded in the right directions. More work in the second track is needed to push the official talks further. Within this context, it would be more beneficial if the Palestinian side agrees to open one channel so that the Israeli side does not exploit the different tracks for their interests.
Amopng the issues the two parties tackled in depth were: sovereignty; the status of the Old City; a model for religious co-existance; arrangements harmonizing the legal system in the future; a municipal organizational system and services; and necessary security arrangements.
The social and economic aspects were another dimension the second track diplomacy discussed. At the social level, the study focused on either providing a separate system of health and social insurance of equal standards or continuing with the present one. The kind of economic policy to adopt, the type of taxes to keep, and how best to encourage tourism, banking, services, high tech and others, were the main economic issues discussed.
The settlement issue was raised almost in each occasion and was the main reason behind the tension and serious differences between both sides. To this day, no common understanding has been reached. The Palestinian position has always been that the settlements are illegal and prevent real coexistence and peace in Jerusalem. Furthermore, the Palestinian side insisted that whatever applies in one side of the city should be applied in the other side. In other words, if Israelis were to live in East Jerusalem, then Palestinians should be eligible to live with Israelis in West Jerusalem freely. The concept of "swapping" is an idea of the second track.
Also raised was the issue of the border regime: What are the basic interests of each party concerning Jerusalem, and how could the border regime realized those interests, are issues raised? Also raised were how many border-crossing points would be established and where the crossing points would be with what security functions.
What remains to reach a comprehensive understanding of all components of Jerusalem and, even if needed, to revisit the material for a content analysis that might help in reaching a comprehensive vision for an acceptable solution for the city. In parallel, public diplomacy should be launched to educate, share, and mobilize the two peoples towards accepting the vision for Jerusalem, as yearned by the late Faisal Husseini - a model for a final and comprehensive agreement between the Palestinian and Israelis peoples for a better chance for future generations to better life in peace, tranquility, and dignity.
Issa Kassisiyyeh is a senior officer in Orient House in charge of the European Desk. He worked for several years as an assistant to the late Faisal Husseini, Minister in Charge of the Jerusalem File.