

Meeting between the DM and Bashir Jumail at
the Lebanese Forces HQs in Beirut,
8 July 1982

Present: The DM, Gen. (ret.) Yariv,
Gen. Tamir, Uri Dan, Mosad's
representative, Director General of
Foreign Ministry, Bashir,
Jan Nader, Lebanon's Minister of
Construction, Eli Habayka

Note: The Mosad's representative wrote down the entire
conversation. The following are notes only.

1. Bashir spoke of an impressive meeting he had
just held with a delegation of Muslim dignitaries from
Sidon. They recounted the horrible deeds which the PLO had
committed in Sidon and elsewhere.

2. The DM reiterated our position with regard to
a political settlement: objection to a PLO office and any
military presence, etc. As for the MLF, the DM objected to
Bahir's and Johnny Abdu's suggestion that they will torpedo
the whole idea of introducing the Force. Such a move could
undermine the entire political process, and while this
process has created many problems, as far as we are
concerned it is preferable to a military action. At the
same time, we would be happy if the French were pulled out
of the Force. We, however, do not object to the idea of the
MLF. Perhaps it would allow for the expulsion of several
thousand terrorists from Beirut, which is of supreme
importance.

3. The DM clarified for the benefit of Bashir what should be done were the political process to succeed or to fail. In each of those eventualities Bashir would have a key role to play. In any case it is important that they (Phalangists) enter as deep as possible the Sunni area, into Ras Beirut to unify this sector with the eastern city and isolate the southern part where the camps are situated. The DM stressed that in case Habib fails, we would act. We won't leave so long as the terrorists are in place.

4. Bashir inquired whether we would object if he introduces bulldozers into the refugee camps in the south in order to remove them, so that the refugees will not remain in the south. The DM responded that this is not our business: we do not wish to deal with Lebanon's internal affairs.

5. The DM expressed his hope that following the establishment of a strong government in Lebanon a peace agreement would be concluded. Meantime, though there are no relationships with Jordan more than 1.2 people have crossed the two bridges in the past year. He asked whether a similar arrangement should be instituted with regard to Lebanon--two-way movement of residents between Israel and Lebanon could create momentum for peace. Bashir conveyed his support in principle for this idea and it was agreed that it would be examined.

Addition to summit meeting between Head of
Tevel and Josefh Abu Halil, Phadi Fram and
Antoine Najem, 12 October 1982

The Head of Tevel delivered a specific request of the DM to Phadi Fram to order his people to stop attacking the Druze in the Alei District.

The Head of Tevel stressed to Phadi that the IDF is present in the area and will defend the Christian families, thus they should not heat up the atmosphere.

Note: These remarks were also made to Fuad Abu Nader, the new C-o-S of the "Lebanese Forces".

From the Meeting between the C-o-S and
Bashir Jumail 13 July 1982

Participants: Gen. Moshe Levi,
Brig. Uri Sagi, Col. Ze'ev and two Mosad
representatives
On the Lebanese side: Bashir Jumail and
Phadi Fram

The C-o-S explained that planning for the capture of Beirut is underway and a part of the plan has to be action by the "Lebanese Forces". Its location would be selected according to their disposition. Bashir reacted by saying that the plan is already ready and in fact had been executed in the Gallery Sama'an area.

The C-o-S asked for the planning not being relegated to the lower echelons and without leaks. It has to be strict in order to achieve maximum results. The C-o-S would arrive at a time to be determined to survey the area with Phadi Fram and also to approve the plan.

The C-o-S explained that the IDF would provide all the necessary support: artillery, air etc. as if they were regular IDF units. Phadi has to contact Gen. Drori and coordinate with him before the C-o-S arrives. The "Lebanese Forces" would be alerted well ahead of time. The C-o-S explained to Bashir that one of the elements complicating the negotiations is that the terrorists have nowhere to go. He proposed that Bashir contacts Habib and check whether Iran would admit them. Bashir explained that relations

between Iran and the PLO are not as good because of the latter's support for Iraq. However, the C-o-S asked that the idea would be tried anyhow--there is nothing to lose.

Bashir explained the plans of the "Lebanese Forces" for expelling the Palestinian establishment from Lebanon. Bashir thanked the IDF for its support during the entering into Beit A-Din. He sees it as a very positive development.

The C-o-S arranged that Bashir would meet Major Hadad on Friday, 16 July at the Damur pad. He informed Bashir that on 14 July 1982, a Cabinet meeting would be held to deal with issues linked to the situation in Beirut.

Bashir and Phadi requested weapons and ammunition:

- supply of 2,000 Kalashnikovs with two magazines for each;
- the IDF to leave 5 Rio trucks at their disposal;
- communication equipment.

The C-o-S approves the request free of charge.

Noted that the billing would be done when the war is over.

Meeting between Bashir Jumail and Johnny Abdu
with the DM (1 August 1982)

Place: The meeting was held at the DM's house from 312300 (31 July 1982, 11:00 p.m.) until 010130 (1 August 1982, 1:30 a.m.)

Participants: DM, N. Admoni, Gen. Sagi, Gen. Tamir, R. Vardi, U. Dan, A. Shamir

On the guests' side: Bashir Jumail, Johnny Abdu, Zahi Bustani, Phadi Fram

The DM:

I'd like to discuss several points.

We do not believe that they (terrorists) would leave, unless you request several things we want you to insist on.

There are some 1,500 terrorists who can go nowhere as they are on the blacklist. It takes us time to act because we are encountering problems. From our point of view the most dangerous thing would be if the present Lebanese government would agree to steps which could produce an unpleasant situation for us.

Johnny:

For example?

The DM:

If the Lebanese government accepts the terrorists' conditions, we

would have our hands tied. For us the most dangerous thing would be a Lebanese government agreement to the leaving of 1,000-1,500 terrorists in W. Beirut. From the beginning this number pops up every time. Now there is a "story" that these men have nowhere to go--the Lebanese government cannot accept any presence in Beirut or in Lebanon.

The position taken by your representative at the U.N. is a burden. He cannot go on doing this. Perhaps he is under threat. He said he would call in ships of the superpowers to ferry food, water and fuel if we continue our checks. We have heard nothing about the Syrians withdrawing from Beirut. They refuse to withdraw (the Palestinians).

Johnny:

Bashir:

If Johnny would allow me I'd say that we have never entertained such a thought (to request that the IDF

withdraw from the Beirut-Damascus road).

The DM:

Not you. The Lebanese government is in control presently and it makes us worry that one day Sarkis could request this. I am concerned in this respect.

Bashir & Johnny:

Don't worry.

The DM:

There should be no withdrawal to the Bekka, and no terrorist left in Beirut. Tell Sarkis to be strong and reject a withdrawal to the Bekka, leaving of terrorists behind, offices, and not to request us to withdraw from Beirut as long as they (terrorists) are there. As long as the terrorists were not eliminated. Eliminating them takes us time because we have problems. However, for us there should be no concessions made by the President (of Lebanon). There should be no agreement with Habib, no acceptance of the introduction of the MLF before the terrorists withdraw. I

don't believe they will withdraw and if the (Lebanese) government says something we would reject it and you should reject it as well.

Johnny:

In the Bekka there are some 10-12,000 terrorists.

Sagi:

There are 3,000 plus 2,000 volunteers some of whom are unarmed. They are sitting with the Syrians in Yanta, Ba'al Bek.

Johnny:

Only some of them. We did not accept the issue of the staging areas--the government did not agree. There are more than 1,500 terrorists which no Arab country would accept. The Syrians would admit no armed terrorists. Only the leaders would be admitted and they are unarmed. Khaddam said in Jedda that they will admit the leaders without arms. There is no certainty that they will admit the others. Only the PLA and Khitin, while Yarmuk and the Sa'ika (all

are brigades of PLO army) won't be admitted.

Sagi:

The Jordanians have agreed to admit (the Palestinians) as they know that the Syrians would refuse admitting any of the brigades.

Johnny:

There is a unit named "Bader" which the Jordanians are ready to admit (800 men). The Karameh brigade won't go to Jordan. I hear that Prince Hasan had promised amnesty to those men (who were tried in absentia there). In Jedda I understood that the PLO would send the PLA and Bader in order to gain time.

The DM:

We know they won't move.

Bashir:

So what would you do?

The DM:

We'll do. It will take about a month. I read your report (i.e., Johnny's report about the Jedda conference). We understand the danger. What is going on inside the city currently, following five days of fighting?

Johnny:

The situation is tense.

Sagi:

What concerns them are not the bombardments but the electricity, water and the disagreements between the population.

The DM:

Can you add something?

Johnny:

Rest assured that there will be no withdrawal into the Bekka. In Jedda, Kadumi had stressed that no Arab country would admit them.

The DM:

So which are the Arab countries which had pronounced their readiness to admit the Palestinians?

Johnny:

The Syrians will admit the PLA and will later discuss the Al-Sa'ika. But it does not seem that they will admit them. The Jordanians would take 2,000-3,000 but this is also not final. According to Habib the Egyptians would admit Ein Jalut? (Jallud?)

Sagi:

They are playing the game waiting to see what would the Syrians do. If the Syrians won't admit the Egyptians will do likewise.

Nahum:

Why won't they go to Libya?

Johnny:

I asked Kadumi why aren't you going around to find what can be done with the Palestinians. He responded by saying that he asked to see Asad and waited for eight days then had a meeting with a committee.

Nahum:

Why won't they take the 1,500 besieged there?

Johnny:

I had asked Kadumi about it. I asked what about the leaders and he did not answer. The Syrians stated that they will not discuss the fate of the Syrian soldiers (in Beirut) in conjunction with the Palestinian issue, but subsequent to it and with the Lebanese government.

The DM:

I would like to request that when it expires the mandate of UNIFIL won't be extended.

Sagi:

It is not in the hands of the Lebanese government but in the hands of the U.N. Security Council.

Johnny:

I think the Lebanese government has to request it. We'll check it.

The DM:

I'd like to raise an issue which you may prefer not to comment on or even deny. We are going to insist on a peace agreement with the Lebanese government, when it is formed. This will be our demand.

Johnny:

Khaddam expects this. He informed everybody that in the future, they should know, Lebanon won't participate in the (Arab) League's meetings.

The DM:

We are facing the problem of the Beirut evacuation and that of the Syrians. We won't be offended if you ask that everybody, including Israel, leaves the country.

Johnny:

You should not tie the withdrawal of the Palestinians with that of your forces. Perhaps it should be linked to the Syrians, but that's all.

The DM:

There is a direct link between existence of a peace agreement and

security arrangements. If no agreement is reached there would be a change in the status of southern Lebanon. Our interest is that Lebanon would stay united with a central government--that a peace agreement may be concluded. If the Syrians stay--we stay. If everyone leaves and no peace had been signed we would leave but establish a special status in southern Lebanon which would be influenced by Lebanese-Israeli relations--we desire a peace agreement and normalization but barring this we will have to insure a special status in southern Lebanon. Please think about this, and don't be surprised if we talk about it. We have to prepare such a scenario. When I attempted to raise it with Habib he jumped out of his chair. They said here that I had caused him a heart attack no matter my denials. . . .

The DM:

As for the refugees. . . .

Rehavia:

The Lebanese masters do not want to attend to their needs. We have three weeks and then we would have to take care of them. The world will not permit that no care would be given them. We have to wait for their agreement.

The DM:

We would be accused if nothing is done.

Vardi:

We'll help you.

Bashir:

We'll take care of everything and we'll let you know soon.

Sagi:

The time has come for Bashir's men to prepare a plan to deal with the Palestinians. I understand you are getting ready to deal with it and you need to prepare a plan.

The DM:

The Jews are weird but you must agree about the issue--we don't wish to stay there and take care of the issue.

Meeting of the Director General with
Bashir Jumail--23 July 1982(?)

Present: Gen. Tamir
Gen. Sagi
N. Navot
Moshe Arad
Major Hevroni

Place: House of Johnny Abdu, Beirut

Present apart from Bashir were Zahi Bustani and another adviser to Bashir.

Bashir opened by saying that the current situation in Beirut reminds him of an Italian war movie: the terrorists maneuver us (Israelis) and the Americans skillfully. The solution to the Beirut problem is now a must. For many years we had sufficient experience with the terrorists: all the cease fires which were abrogated. In his opinion there is a need to discuss what will be done with the Palestinians after it becomes clear that there is no MLF and after the Beirut problem had been solved.

If we solve the military problem the Palestinian problem would persist and there is a need to seriously consider the demographic problem. Gen. Sagi noted that a distinction needs to be made between two groups of Palestinians:

1. Those terrorists captured by us and those about to be captured--15-16,000. If we are forced we

could bring them to the Golan Heights point towards Kuneitra and tell them to march.

2. The refugee problem--some 200,000 are still living in Lebanon.

At this point a discussion evolved regarding the actual number of Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. Bashir estimated them to number 400,000 compared with Gens. Tamir and Sagi's estimate of 200,000.

Gen. Tamir noted that the demographic problem--the refugee problem--has to be solved by the Lebanese government. Regarding the terrorists either they come out of the city alive or would have to fight: we will not lift the siege until they come out of Beirut.

The Director General indicated that as for the civilian problem there is a need to insure that all the privileges of the Palestinians maintenance of economic organizations, welfare organizations, medical services, information agency etc.) are abolished and they be integrated into the services of the Lebanese government.

In the second phase--a phase of the settling of the problem discussion of the entire spectrum of issues could be held. Assuming Jordan and possibly Lebanon join in the Camp David process a comprehensive discussion of the Palestinian question could be held.

Bashir responded that no one was currently speaking of solving the general problem; however, it is now clear that without a fight over Beirut, the problem of the Bekka and the Palestinian problem in the North would persist. Referring to the possibility of the IDF entering southwest Beirut, Bashir indicated that if the refugee camps located in this sector are destroyed it won't cause great sorrow among local Muslims residing in the northwestern part of the city and some would even cooperate.

Bustani indicated that Habib was preparing the grounds for the terrorists and the Syrians to remain in the Bekka, and they (Christians) were concerned about this.

Bashir conveyed his appreciation for the support the IDF had extended in calming the situation in Beit Al-Din and pledged no cruel or ugly deeds toward the Druze. Noted satisfactorily that in the last few days Christians were able to return to villages which they had evacuated before the war. Walid Junblatt can read the new "signs" and understands the new reality.

The rest (two paras) is irrelevant.

4 July 1982--Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 65

"It is true that execution of deeds which should not be committed by the Christians impacts negatively on our forces. It has brought, without doubt, our soldiers' ill attitude towards the Christians, since when such acts were carried out in areas held and controlled by the IDF it triggered much annoyance among our forces.

"This matter had been terminated. The C-o-S stopped it, but lets not involve the Druze in this affair. . . ." (Original underlines)

18 July 1982--Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 68 (pp. 2, 3)

"But we need to remember one thing that in all of the contacts held by the terrorists, through the Lebanese Prime Minister and other politicians, with the Americans, they have consistently demanded, all the time, one thing: that the MLF would surround and protect the terrorists' camps." The DM (in p. 3) explains this demand in the context of the terrorists' intention to reestablish an infrastructure under the MLF's sponsorship, and in contrast to American clarifications, he does not assume real fears existing between the populations. (Original underlines)

"Let's assume that in the wake of this phase, a request for the evacuation of the terrorists was made. There is a tremendous difference to whether the IDF is

stationed in the camps area and can identify the terrorists. One of the main problems is who could identify, afterwards, whether terrorists were left behind between all of those people, who would search for the weapons stores etc.? Who would dare to enter those camps? Even if the terrorists fled from this sector to the northern part, there is a marked difference between later evacuating them from the sector lacking an infrastructure, to a place where such an infrastructure has been prepared for years."

Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 72, 1 August 1982 (p. 15)

"The announcements publicized about the number of casualties among the Palestinian civilians (have been fabricated), since we don't strike at the area where the Lebanese Sunni population resides. We have the most reliable information about it, and when announcements are made of casualties the truth is that there is not a living soul in those neighborhoods. I want you to know that the Burj al-Brajneh and Shatillah neighborhoods and their vicinity, and other similar places, are total ghost towns. It is not according to our reports but those of the terrorists. At the same time they are reporting of strikes because it is convenient for them, and our radio also. . . [missing]."

Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 66, 7 July 1982 (p. 2)

"Therefore, whether the terrorist remain or not, would be the outcome of our dealing with the issue of West Beirut, following their evacuation, if such an evacuation takes place. Nobody could assume that we won't launch some operation in its aftermath--and we will present this to the cabinet--with the Lebanese Army, in such or other way, in which our men could enter the Western sector to uncover weapons stores etc." (Original Underlines)

Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 76, 12 August 1982

". . . the terrorists had left Beirut, there is no doubt about that, they have no other escape. But we currently have information that some 2,000-2,500 terrorists were able to furnish themselves with foreign IDs, among them some of the terrorists' leaders. Although not of the top leadership, nevertheless of their leaders, names known to us." (Original Underlines)

Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 77, 15 August 1982

"Habib had passed an ultimatum to the terrorists, according to which they must respond (between 12-13 August) to his demand that the MLF would reach Beirut only after at least one half of the terrorists had been withdrawn under the supervision of the Lebanese Army, and without the

intervention of the MLF to protect them and the refugee camps." (Original Underlines)

Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 79, 22 August 1982

"For example our soldiers intervened in the Mia-Mia camp near Sidon. Naturally, our soldiers don't like to see one segment of the population acting against another and that's why they've intervened. But I am saying that we need to be very careful in this respect, the Lebanese Government has to be informed that it is responsible for this matter and it can act as it sees fit. . . "

Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 77, 15 August 1982

"What was their claim with regard to the evacuation of the terrorists? That the population of W. Beirut fears the introduction of the Lebanese Army, because they think it contains elements of the Phalangists. . . "

Subject: ?

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 June 1982,
p. 10.

MK Rozolio:

What do we know about the activities of Bashir's forces in Lebanon? You've just said, in my words, that there is a political timetable till about 12 midnight. Can you tell us what would you see accomplished militarily by ceasefire time? Do you see it possible that, once the shooting died down and the political process has begun, that we would have cleaned the area within the 40 Kms range from terrorists (by that time)? This does not mean that the same would apply to the Syrians, in regard to whom we might agree that they would stay in order for a ceasefire to take place. On Sunday you projected a Sidon-Lake Karoun line, south of which there was a Syrian unit and north of which the majority of the Syrian posture was deployed. Is it possible that, as for a settlement, the Syrian posture would remain provided that it is guaranteed that there were no more terrorists? I mean within the 40 Kms?

MK Rom:

Since we are fast approaching a ceasefire, it is important that we discuss what kind of an infrastructure we need to prepare for a post-ceasefire settlement. Thus, I have several questions:

Regarding the PLO's Headquarters in Beirut--I accept the fact that because of many reasons we should not go into Beirut. But there is a problem which I see as a central one. This is the issue of the terrorists' headquarters which could serve as a nucleus for reemergence of a terrorist center, and I'd like to hear what you think about this including the possibility of having the Christians join in to solve this problem.

Are we going to limit the settlement regarding the buffer zone to 40 Kms or are we going to talk about the entire area? In my opinion it looks weird because then we are leaving a substantial area for the terrorists to reorganize and redeploy in.

Are there still any pockets of resistance in Sidon? The triangle in the UNIFIL area was mentioned. Somewhere in the area which was cleaned out, are there pockets or organized resistance which they could later claim, after the ceasefire, went into effect, that they have occupied and were fighting from all along?

DM Sharon:

Regarding MK Drukman's question--I do not think that there is a clear-cut demand for a ceasefire. Messages or cables were exchanged, and now a visit of the U.S. Ambassador with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and

myself has taken place. I think it definitely needs to be seen as an approaching ceasefire. But in my opinion this should not be viewed as a clear-cut demand with a definite time set for a ceasefire to start. In the morning it seemed more urgent, but today I'd say that they wish there was a ceasefire and so do we. I told the American Ambassador it was us after all who offered the ceasefire, so that in my estimate, though there is no pressure, there is certainly a desire for a ceasefire to take place.

MK Drukman:

I.e., we would have the opportunity to accomplish our objectives?

DM Sharon:

Yes. The ceasefire pertains to the Syrians only, not the terrorists. The ceasefire currently under discussion is with the Syrians, although we would be glad if a total ceasefire could be arranged.

(Missing Pages)

Subject: ?

Source: Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee,
30 June 1982, p. 3.

Prime Minister Begin:

Let it be that Bashir is elected, since then there is a real basis for assuming that shortly after we would

conclude a peace agreement, with him. But it is impossible to be certain about it. In the meantime they (Christians) have successfully carried out several military operations against the Syrians. They took over several villages on their own and without our help. We helped them by providing them with arms and we supplied them with more now, even from the arms just uncovered.

The Shi'as are leaning toward joining us militarily as well, and their armed organization, Al Amal, is ready to cooperate with us. This is still in progress, and it is not something which one could say is entirely new. Also, a division of opinions (among the Shi'as) persists.

MK Shem-Tov:

Information has reached us that Bashir's men had acted against the Druse in Alei, causing unrest there. Is it possible to check it?

PM Begin:

I have asked the Defense Minister this question last night. There were no vendettas, but the Druse and Christians are at war with each other, and once the Christians entered (the village) the Druse told them: Over our dead bodies. We had to separate between the two.

Subject: ?

Source: Knessets Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee,
25 July 1982, p. 19.

MK Rozolio:

I wish i could be relaxed that these things are not taking place.

DM Sharon:

I am acquainted with the subject at hand. If someone, a local guy or a local echelon, is trying to commit such a thing we would locate it and end it. Till now, every time it was located it was stopped. What do we need it for? Later we would be involved between Shi'as and Sunnis, then Maronites and Orthodox, then with Catholics, etc.

MK Sarid:

It is an illusion to think that being present in the area could mean staying uninvolved.

DM Sharon:

MK Sarid, in areas under our control we will not allow brutalities to be committed. We made it clear the moment we saw things beginning to occur. We made it clear, and we are aware of the trouble spot in the area and have secured it. In no way do I suggest that in the future we be involved somehow in this issue. We have no such intention,

we have no interest in this. I hope you (Rafael) are not recommending we deal with it.

Is there any thought given to taking care of the Palestinian refugees--I had spoken with one of the Lebanese Ministers responsible for this issue, and strongly recommended that they handle the matter. I don't think we should be preoccupied with laying out structures (houses). They have the means, they have the budgets, if they lack momentum we should help them. But the activity has to be theirs. At the same time, it is impossible, in my opinion, to entirely ignore the problem. And if there are 20,000 homeless living in public buildings and schools, it needs to be remembered that the schools have to be reopened and we've got to find a solution. I would like the Lebanese government to provide the solution, with us helping. At the same time, we will not neglect this problem. If we realize that nobody was taking care (of the problem), we won't leave those families outside for the winter. I wouldn't like us having to take the blame for not tending to their needs. There is a government, it has the means, the funds, we are not the ones to determine where will the refugees be settled. Are we to decide? There is a government.

MK Rozolio:

Would you recommend opening an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue?

DM Sharon:

For many years I have recommended an Arab-Israeli dialogue and because of that was severely criticized from every direction. I am for talking with the Arabs. I don't think this war is being waged against the Palestinian people. This war was aimed against the terrorist organizations and we have witnessed the dangers which could result when such an element is being permitted to gain military strength. Once I was asked while in the U.S. what could such a small Palestinian state do, so we've seen what it can, how it could grow stronger and get organized. I do not think that our dialogue with Israeli Arabs has to be done through the refugees of Tyre and Ein Hilwa. We need to talk with the Israeli Arabs. We have differences of opinion regarding what should be the solution but with those arguing that a solution should be found we have no argument, only what kind of a solution. I don't think the refugee is the address. We need to talk to the Israeli Arabs. Although everybody continuously prophesied that a collapse would occur in the Judea, Samaria and Gaza district, it is my opinion that willingness to talk is growing and it is my opinion that in this regard there would be further developments.

Are the Syrians interested in us acting in Beirut--yes they are. They had an interest that the

terrorists fight in Beirut. None of the Arab countries would like to have them. If they do, it's because of these and other promises, or these and other pressures. But none of them wants the terrorists on their territory.

Are there indications that the terrorists were only helped by locals--we certainly have had information that the local level was directly involved in supporting the terrorists. . . .

(Missing pages)

Statements of Defense Minister Sharon
in Cabinet Sessions--July 1982

Subject 13: Cabinet sessions and procedures.

Source: Sharon in Cabinet Session, 4 July 1982.

"Since till now the government has sought to limit its involvement in Beirut as much as possible. This was the stated course of the government. We have surrounded Beirut but stated that we will not intervene in Lebanon's internal affairs. This was the gist of the cabinet's decision. As the negotiations entered an advanced stage our assessment was that the participants would like some help in conducting the negotiations and, since Friday, we've acted accordingly". (p. 3)

"We informed the Shi'as that the government had decided that it will not be dragged into a military operation in West Beirut; but Dr. Burg in line with the cabinet's limitations [said] we won't go beyond the cabinet's decisions. If the government desires--it will so decide." (p. 4)

Source: Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 86, 7 July 1982,
p. 1.

"I treat very seriously what was said by the PM that these are delicate times, but in my opinion it is totally unacceptable that the terrorists fire at us and we are limited as to which weapons we can use in retaliation,

and we pay the price for it daily. I have requested from the PM the option of using the air force, in limited areas. It was not my intention to employ the IAF in the city's center, but in those areas from where we are fired upon. Because, in my opinion, there is absolutely no justification for risking even one soldier of ours as a consequence of us being limited as to the use of weapons at our possession and which could adequately respond to this problem." (p. 1)

"The Prime Minister has stated--and rightly so--that this issue, is one of those which should be brought to the attention of the cabinet. Therefore, he had indicated that he will summon a cabinet session this morning to discuss the subject matter. This is the subject I wanted to raise. I would like to propose that in such circumstances, authorization would be granted to a small group--the PM, the FM and myself--to decide whether the IAF would be used, since this is a subject requiring immediate decision and does not lend itself to convening a cabinet session every time. In my opinion, the IDF has to be provided with the option of employing means adequate (for effectively handling the problem?)."

"I'd like to stress, I am not suggesting here any attack on Beirut, no movement into Beirut, not the limited plan nor the comprehensive (grand) plan, but actions utilizing the best means at our possession against those

locations from which fire has been directed against our forces. It is a proposal limited in scope but powerful in its effect." (p. 4)

"I have not proposed, I am stressing this, I did not suggest launching an attack by land on Beirut." (p. 6)

"Dr. Burg, it was not my intention that the committee of three would be authorized to take decisions, instead of the government. I had proposed that the government decide that the IDF be allowed to use those weapons in its possession, to neutralize the terrorists' fire, in certain limited areas. This is what the government's decision should be. This is why I turned to the PM last night. I do not recall if I had told him it involved air strikes, but it is enough that I have so informed the cabinet. The PM had justifiably convened the cabinet. What I have said was, that if indeed such a decision was made, finding all the cabinet's members and asking them, if the government's decision may be realized in case, for example, heavy fire has been directed against our soldiers from Burj al-Barajneh, is impossible. With regard to the (committee) of three, my intention was limited only to executing the (above) cabinet's decision. (In principle approving provision of an extended option for retaliation to the IDF.)"

Source: Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 67, 11 July 1982.

"There is a strict order to our forces to respond only with necessary fire. A detailed breakdown exists as to what fire could be authorized in response by which echelon. For instance, artillery retaliation requires the approval of the C-o-S. Thus, with the opening of this session, I got a message from the C-o-S that, in light of the shooting which we started at 0300 (3:00 a.m.), he had authorized flat trajectory artillery fire be directed against the terrorists' positions. Thus, opening fire on our side is not an automatic thing, but rather a very constrained response. However, ceasefire violations by the terrorists occur without fail, and according to the record of recent days, it cannot be expected that a ceasefire would last for more than a few hours, if at all". (p. 3)

Source: Sharon in Cabinet Session, No. 69, 22 July 1982.

"We feel like we are chained, and today we are indeed chained, by the cabinet's decision, which was made by all of us. Therefore, as we are about to request government's approval for a retaliatory strike in the eastern sector against the Syrians to make them understand that they have to stop terrorists' operations from their territory, we will, similarly request approval today of activity against selective, and I am stressing selective, targets located in an area south of Beirut and away from the

civilian population, in order to terminate a situation whereby we have the means and an absolute superiority in every respect but have our hands tied." (p. 2)

Source: Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 70, 25 July 1982.

"It was then agreed, according to the proposal made by the C-o-S who introduced the plan, to strike by tank fire, a helicopter anti-tank strike and a limited air activity against targets in the Bekka area. The C-o-S indicated that the intention was to hit some 50 armored vehicles. (p. 2) As for Beirut, we've suggested that we act against selected targets, located far from population centers." (p. 2)

"It was decided by the government that strikes against selective military targets in Beirut be carried out. This action had been carried out and I'd like to ask the C-o-S and Head of Aman to present the results." (p. 3)

DM Sharon:

"I am speaking of the Bekka. In Beirut there are only limited targets. I won't go into details. Let's hear the C-o-S, Chief of Aman and Commander of the Air Force." (p. 3)

Subject 6: Attitude towards the Palestinians.

Source: Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 70, 25 July 1982.

"This is a very unsympathetic point. I too did not like the reportage of the television on Friday which ignored the reconstruction activity carried out by us in south Lebanon, how did 100,000 refugees who returned to south Lebanon after 7 years were absorbed, through an extraordinary activity carried out by the government, the C-o-S and the other elements handling this issue. They chose to highlight only the destroyed camp, in which there was perhaps the greatest concentration of terrorists, and again pictures of women and children have appeared. This time these were pictures of women and children not on American television, but on Israeli television." (p. 2)

Sharon in Cabinet Session (No. 65)--4 July 1982.

"We would set aside ten hotels on the beach and announce that these would constitute refuge places under Red Cross supervision where the civilians could assemble. But the terrorists won't let them go in. Instead the terrorists would enter (the hotels) and enjoy the protection rather than the civilians." (p. 6)

Subject 1: Christians (Phalangists).

Source: Sharon in Cabinet Session No. 65, 4 July 1982.

"We and the Phalangists will have to do it, otherwise it would be used for rearming the terrorists." (p. 2)

"Our Druse would start to apply pressure regarding political solutions in Lebanon. It is true that there should be no such things as acts which need not be committed, and these have had a harsh impact on our forces. Without doubt it brought negative feelings on the part of our troops toward the Christians, since when such acts were carried out in areas captured and held by the IDF, it caused much bitterness among our forces. This (conduct of the Christians) was stopped. The C-o-S had stopped it, but let's not insert our Druse into this matter." (p. 5)

Source: Sharon in Cabinet Session, No. 68, 18 July 1982.

"As for the involvement of the Christians, they have their own operational sector and are actively involved in combat. Giving out more details is undesirable. The issue is not the military aspect--this is not what matters here--but what counts is their involvement in the fighting. This is a moral step and a step significant to international politics, and in my opinion, they have to take part in the fighting. This is what was explained to them by the Prime Minister at the time." (p. 7)

Subject (?): The terrorists' camps.

Source: Sharon in Cabinet Session, No. 68, 18 July 1982.

"The terrorists would flee to this part during the

operation. But one thing has to be remembered. That in all the contacts held by the terrorists with the Americans through the Lebanese Prime Minister and other Lebanese politicians, regarding the MLF, they continuously insist on one thing--i.e., that the MLF surround and protect the terrorists' camps." (p. 1)

"Arafat has appeared in the vicinity of the stadium, the Fakahani neighborhood and also at the house of Sa'ad Salam Wazan in West Beirut. They are constantly changing their location. Their headquarters, including their communication systems and their international communication network, are located in this area. This is the area, which in the final analysis, we will destroy. The commanders and the headquarters are all located here." (p. 4)

"The Western sector is in fact the prettier part of Beirut. In contrast, the area of the camps is deserted, destroyed and almost nothing moves (there). You see people passing on foot, some terrorists and very little vehicles. But nobody has asserted that there was no civilian population there. The large majority of the 400,000 people are found in the city and a minority in the camps. This is the answer. (p. 8)

Meeting between Mossad's Representative and
Bashir Gemayel, Jan Nader, Zahi Bustani,
Joseph Abu Halil and Karim Phakarduni, 13 July 1982

Bashir Gemayel sought to clarify that the "Spark" which was discussed with the C-o-S is substantially different from the "Spark" discussed with the Defense Minister.

In the C-o-S conception, "Spark" means total (Christian) involvement, in an IDF operation, which leaves no political option for the Phalangists. In this case they (the "Lebanese Forces") would burn all their bridges to the rest of Lebanon's communities, and would have to activate the idea of a narrow government (based only?) on Christians with all its implications: a peace agreement and a defense pact, including defense of Zahla and the north.

Bashir reiterated that either way, he was not going back on his agreement to "Spark". He was only seeking to clarify the various consequences of the two approaches.

Asked why hasn't he raised these questions with the C-o-S, Bashir responded that:

1. The C-o-S is not particularly interested in the political aspects.

2. The "Lebanese Forces" reached these conclusions only in the aftermath of analyzing it themselves.

Fadi Frem had started the preparations and planning as required and would meet with General Drori prior to the planned tour of the C-o-S next week.

Meeting between Leadership of the "Lebanese Forces"
and Mossad's Representatives, 29 September 1982

(Present: Joseph Abu Halil, Fadi Frem, Elie Hobeika,
Walid Fars and Alfred Ma'adi).

Elie Hobeika said we should not mention or publicize their names during our investigation of the incident at the camps. He added that our pressure had forced them to ask for Amin Gemayel's protection, who up to now was in their debt, thus forcing them to be in his debt.

Joseph Abu Halil strongly protested our attacks (criticism) of them, and the many difficulties in holding secret contacts with us. He indicated that there were many leaks and that Bashir encountered difficulties in the wake of learning of the Nahariyah meeting. He added that Amin was concerned over emergence of a similar situation.

The representatives of the "Lebanese Forces" have then proposed to hold a meeting with the preparation committee (whose members belong to the "Lebanese Forces") which was acting under Amin's decision (at the meeting with the Defense Minister and Foreign Minister). They informed us that Amin Gemayel has reappointed Joseph Abu Halil and Zahi Bustani to hold contacts with him within the committee's format. They reiterated that this committee is more important than the military political committee, and argued that without a proper understanding of its value, we are in

for a disappointment regarding the military/political committee inability to move things.

The representatives of the "Lebanese Forces" indicated that in recent days Amin Gemayel again stated that the move toward a peace agreement with Israel was inevitable. He again granted Joseph Abu Halil and Zahi Bustani authority to conduct negotiations with us, and has approved of the activity which Bashir had initiated in this direction.

Joseph Abu Halil said he was prepared to come to Israel to ease the apprehensions, reinstate mutual confidence and discuss the issue of Sabra, Shatilla, the peace agreement, as well as other topics.

(Apparently this is a transcript of Sharon's Remarks at
the 16 September 1982 Cabinet Session)

DM Sharon:

At 16:45 (4:45 p.m.), the day before yesterday, while in my car, I received a call from the head of Mossad to contact him. Still on my way, I've reached him and received a message regarding the blast. Two hours later, around 19:00 (7:00 p.m.) I held a consultation with the C-o-S, Chief of Aman, Chief of Mossad and Chief of Shin Bet. There was no immediate information as to whether Bashir was still alive or not. We had our doubts as none of our people saw him alive, and therefore we discussed and analyzed the grave implications which could ensue if indeed Bashir had been killed.

The Cabinet needs to know what was the state of relations and the variety of issues which were handled jointly. I hope this session is indeed being held in the format of the Ministerial Committee for Defense matters. Though I won't go into all the details, several things, in my opinion, need to be brought to the government's attention.

We had coordination with Bashir Gemayel pertaining to several issues. One topic was the order of entry by the Lebanese Army into West Beirut, which progressed in a rather lazy pace, requiring much Israeli assistance. To say that

our commanders in the field had led each of the Lebanese officers by hand, would not be an exaggeration. Our officers meditated between the various organizations present in West Beirut. We had agreed on a certain timetable calling for the IDF to enter in the wake of the Lebanese Army.

Another topic of coordination involved the activities of our security services. It has to be remembered, as we informed the Cabinet, that the terrorists have left some 2,000 men behind in clear violation of the agreement, and in spite of us repeatedly warning the Americans of that (plan). We had also reported about this to the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee. ✓

What was our thinking regarding this issue? That our security services, in an operation coordinated with the Lebanese, would search for these men, detain them or hit them according to the circumstances. Such an operation could have only been carried out on condition that the city was open and secure. This is the term I have also used in the meeting with Habib and Draper, while discussing the need for the city to be open and secure. //

The Cabinet has to be reminded also that in contrast to the agreement, the terrorists who were to turn over their heavy weapons into the hands of the Lebanese Army on 22 August, have not done so, and we have warned the Americans about that as well. —

In my opinion we are facing a very grave problem. It has to be recalled that some 2,000 armed terrorists together with some 7,000 members of leftist organizations stayed in West Beirut. The latter, members of some 27 organizations from the Mourabitoun, the biggest of them all, and up to small organizations comprising only a few dozen members, were all carrying arms. The danger facing us was that in light of the total confusion which has emerged--and it needs to be realized that in Beirut total confusion has taken place, and even yesterday when I had spent all day in Beirut the total confusion was apparent--the terrorists will retake their positions and we would be faced anew with a divided city.

We were not preoccupied with the question of how would a divided city influence the Lebanese regime. Our concern was one, that in the context of reestablishing the wall, and the terrorist and leftist militia mens' presence in areas where arms caches have been left, a renewed situation would confront us which although compared to the one before (as 15,000 armed terrorists had been withdrawn from Beirut) nevertheless would constitute a new situation with perhaps far-reaching consequences.

This was our assessment, and as indicated by the Prime Minister, he held contacts with me and the C-o-S the night before yesterday, at midnight and a half, in which it

was concluded that we would seize key points inside the city. This is to allow us continuation of our activity and prevention of the grave situation which could have emerged as I have just described. This was not a simple thing. It has to be recalled that we are maintaining only very limited contingents inside Beirut. We had to assemble our forces--and here I've got to praise the speedy action of the GHQ. An airlift into Beirut's international airport was organized--and anyone remembering the demands made against us to ^had over the airport could well understand why it shouldn't have been done--and within a few hours, using Hercules transports, we concentrated forces to carry out the mission.

What was our plan? (Points to a map.) Let me remind you--this was more or less the line dividing between East and West Beirut. The line went around Burj-al-Barajneh, we were sitting in Uzai and were also holding this group of buildings, north of Uzai, near Bir Hasan. We wanted to seize a series of key positions which would later allow us freedom of maneuver inside the city--i.e., so that we could move freely in the city and carry out our missions. As indicated, the intention was to take over several key points--I wouldn't like to go into detail as the C-o-S will later present those points--along the well-known street of "Mzra'a Blvd.", which cuts off the terrorists' camps in the

south, seize several dominant positions, tall buildings located in West Beirut, seize the area of the beach in several locations, extending from the port to Ras Beirut.

It was our estimate that although there were some 2,000 terrorists as well as armed militias, resistance would be relatively light, if at all. Thus, in the first few hours--as I have reported to the Prime Minister around 8:30 (8:30 p.m.?) after I had studied the situation and saw the units advancing--everything was calm. However, as time went by the resistance grew stronger, including fire from a tank, which, according to the agreement, was certainly not supposed to be in the hands of the terrorists and up to anti-tank guns, heavy machine guns, mortars, as well as loaded Katyushas which were found. It was absolutely clear that the terrorists who did not turn over their weapons, were still holding several places, especially in the area of terrorist centers of the Fakahani, Sabra and Shatilla.

In my opinion the mission was carried out in an extraordinary fashion. At 06:30 in the morning I informed the Prime Minister that this operation was in fact over. However, subsequently I had found out that several additional buildings which were vital were still not taken. I turned to the Prime Minister and again we agreed that several more buildings would be seized. I had indicated this operation would be over within two hours and indeed this was the case.

I'd like to state that sometimes, and this doesn't happen too often, critical moments arise in which one must take an immediate decision. In my opinion the situation confronted by us amounted to a turnover point which could have led to Beirut again being protected by terrorist forces and militias, while behind them a reemergence of the old situation would have started.

Therefore, in my opinion, this decision was not only vital but in fact a last minute decision.

Some countries have boasted of their interventionary forces. I am not aware of what others possess, but the IDF has proved here that it possesses an immediate interventionary capability and an extraordinary ability to organize, brief, assemble and transfer forces--all in a matter of a few hours.

All the activities which were carried out were coordinated with the Mossad and the security services, since they were the ones operating in the field. Today our mission is to take care of the terrorists remaining in West Beirut, and therefore this was a combined operation involving all the elements: Aman, Shin Bet (illegible).

I hope it stays inside. I was the last person to hold talks with him (Bashir). I met him on Sunday night, 12 September, two days before he was assassinated. That night a discussion was held which lasted from 21:30

(9:30 p.m.) till 0:45 (12:45 a.m.) in which detailed agreements were reached. This in the wake of a meeting held by Rafal with regard to all of the joint operations and the need to zero in on the security aspect, namely mopping up the remaining terrorists.

I can say today, after I have visited yesterday with Bashir's father, though we held face to face talks, notes of the discussion were taken and issues have been concluded and agreed to. Bashir's approach, like ours, stemmed from his understanding that his rule would be in doubt, if one of them (terrorists) remained in Beirut. This was his point of origin. Ours was from a different perspective but linked to the terrorists leaving their system behind, including the possibility of it being revamped.

Unfortunately over the years we have learned that such a thing could happen assuming they have an ability to survive.

We had information about a possible hit during the funeral. This had necessitated also readying airplanes in case of an artillery strike, as the funeral was being held within the range of the terrorists' artillery.

No. We don't know since we had information regarding similar intentions before and we have briefed them (the Phalangists?) We did not know whether the hit would be carried out by the terrorists, by shooting or via an

artillery bombardment. As for the latter, we had kept planes in the air to deter terrorist artillery fire, as the (Gemayels') home town is situated in close proximity to the border and to the Syrians and the terrorists.

We knew about the 2,000 who stayed behind.

We are holding key points, the junctions.

The Lebanese government. From the moment Bashir was killed, Wazan is doing whatever he wants.

Ambassador Draper came to see me today accompanied by Ambassador Lewis. We held a discussion in the presence of representatives of the Foreign Ministry, Mossad, C-o-S, Chief of Aman and Gen. Tamir. He made one demand--pull back the forces from West Beirut. I must say with extraordinary impudence. He indicated that Israel had in fact created a very difficult situation for the U.S. There were only one of two possibilities--either they were misled or will be suspected of collusion with us. The Lebanese Army has to be provided with an opportunity to solve the problem. Our presence there brought stiff opposition by Prime Minister Wazan who has demanded immediate withdrawal of the IDF. I explained that in fact what had happened was that we had rescued the situation. I told him it was the second time we have rescued the situation: once when we went in, the other when everything was about to collapse. I described what was about to develop barring our action, and said that we are

not the one to be blamed for any violation of the agreement which might have occurred. He repeated the words which appeared in the message, that we abrogated what we had promised--(namely) that we won't enter West Beirut. I responded that it was not our intention then to go in, and indeed we didn't, but the situation then was one where the terrorists were about to leave (anyway). Now a completely new situation has emerged. There was indeed a violation of the agreement, I said, but this was committed by the terrorists, who tricked both you and us.

I said that they have tricked both them and us in this regard, and that we had warned them about that. The terrorists were to hand over their heavy weapons by 22 August. They did not turn it over and we had turned to the Americans and warned them of it. Thus, a no-choice situation has been created. In reality we are not looking for anybody's praise. But if praise is due, then it's ours as we had saved Beirut from total anarchy. We maintain good relations with the Lebanese Army and we are aware of its capabilities. We offered them to go into some neighborhood--into Fakahani, Sabra, Shatilla--to go in, mop up and eliminate the terrorists or disarm them. We would be very happy. Why should we do it? Lo and behold, the Lebanese Army is stationed on the border of these neighborhoods, there is no fence in between. We are ready even tomorrow morning to provide them with all the data about the

neighborhoods, as there is close contacts between the forces.

I explained to him that in our dealings with the Lebanese we are holding direct contacts on two levels:

1. On the military level a direct contact exists between the commanders, and was working well.

2. On the political level. We have direct contacts on the political level.

The agreement we had with the one who was the President elect was reached last Sunday night via direct talks. All the contacts are direct. The Americans are there and are helping, but the contacts are carried directly. Therefore, when a new president is elected, and problems emerge, the contacts would be direct--with or without a Cabinet, army to army. This in my opinion is an important point. Under no circumstances should the Americans be permitted to appear as mediators between the Lebanese and us, as long as direct contacts are maintained between us. ✓

I told him about my visit with the leaders of the Phalangists and with Pierre Gemayel, and indicated that in spite of this being a condolence visit in the Prime Minister's name, the political issue did come up. In both our dealings with the leaders of the Phalangists and with Pierre Gemayel we would continue holding direct contacts.

When he referred to the Lebanese position I asked

him what was the Lebanese position? Was it the one of Sarkis--who is about to end his term on the 23rd of this month, or that of Wazan, who did not utter a word until Bashir's assassination? Or perhaps it was the position of the would-be president? I made it clear to him that today there is only one element in fact which could safeguard against a total collapse in Beirut and this was us. He responded by asking: "Thus you'll always be Lebanon's policeman?" I said: "Absolutely not. But Israel's position is that we do not distinguish between Beirut and the rest of Lebanon when it comes to withdrawal of forces, and never had we accepted their opinion, in none of the discussions". I added that it was true that I myself, on numerous occasions stated that it was our interest that no Israeli Army would be in Beirut. I'd like to pull it back from there. When? When Beirut becomes an open and secure city. This is the same terminology I heard in previous discussions with them. That is: when our security services are capable of freely operating there (in Beirut).

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✓

Once a new president is elected we will hold direct discussions with him regarding this issue, the same way I had talks with the one who was elected president only to be murdered. That's what we'll do and with him we shall decide.

In my opinion the point of freedom of action for our security services is a key point insofar as eliminating the terrorists currently in Beirut is concerned. I can already state that significant achievements have been made by us in this regard, but won't go into details. The security services will do that when the time comes. As a result, the fact is that already today it is possible to move about freely in the city. Everything seems open and easier in West Beirut.

I have explained what was our conception: direct contacts, an open and secure city. Once the President is elected, we would discuss how to continue.

What we must do is to coordinate with the Lebanese Army whether they'd like to clean out some neighborhood and if they do--welcome. Draper had suggested a meeting between him, a Lebanese General and a senior commander of ours. But I told him that this is not how we operate, and that he cannot meet with our military echelons. But then it was said that all four of us would meet--Draper, myself, a Lebanese commander and an IDF commander, perhaps the C-o-S, if he'd like to, and if they wanted to handle one neighborhood--then they were welcome to it. It won't interfere with us.

I said: You want Sabra or the Fakahani neighborhood? Please go in. We will assist their entry and

see what happens.

We are coordinating with the Lebanese Army to continue its introduction and mopping up of the city.

Yes. If they so wish, they will be given one neighborhood to deal with. In conclusion, we made it unequivocally clear to them (Americans?).

I believe that, in the wake of this meeting, they have understood the matter.

At 5 o'clock ending at a quarter to seven. We, the C-o-S, head of Aman and myself, made our position abundantly clear. They said the Lebanese Army needs training and exercising. (But) I said, the Lebanese Army cannot train at the expense of our soldiers' lives. They said, it (Army) needs to gain confidence. I said, please not at the expense of thousands of terrorists who have remained in West Beirut, in violation of the agreement.

It is impossible.

It is impossible to carry out this mission with the Lebanese Army alone deployed in Beirut. This operation could be executed when the Lebanese Army is inside Beirut and the IDF is there too.

Earlier there was a commander who had issued orders to the Lebanese Army. The Cabinet needs to know--and please don't publicize it--that when I saw Bashir on Sunday night I asked him how long would it take for the Lebanese

Army to go in. He responded: We will finish in mid-October. That is, Bashir had indicated a period of more than a month, when, in the final analysis, it could have been accomplished within two days--and this while the Lebanese Army was to be under his command. Even when Bashir was still alive, they talked about a protracted process, then.

Don't be angry with me. But it was me who conducted those negotiations for hours. The arrangement was as follows: when the Lebanese Army moves forward we will follow, since when the Lebanese Army is advancing alone, it interferes with the activity of our security services. Thus, the Lebanese Army moves forward and we are following.

The Lebanese Army was ready to follow Bashir's orders only once he was elected. Before that, the Lebanese Army was unwilling to take one step forward. Now Bashir is no more. This means there is absolutely nobody to order the Lebanese Army around, and the latter sits in the same positions it has occupied, with its APCs, its tanks and its forces.

Heaven forbid. The timing of the introduction of the Lebanese Army is of our business. We presently have a great opportunity to eliminate a substantial number of terrorists. We are ready to coordinate with the Lebanese Army. If it wishes to handle a neighborhood, it will

certainly get one.

As for the question how long are we going to stay in Beirut, the answer is twofold: first, nowhere was it stated that withdrawal of the IDF from Beirut is dependent on other things than its withdrawal from other areas in Lebanon depends on.

We are in Beirut all the time.

We have never committed ourselves. But I have said that in my opinion the Army needs to be pulled out of all of Beirut, including the Eastern section, as soon as possible. When I was asked by the Americans when in our estimate was it "as soon as possible", I responded: As far as I am concerned as soon as possible is once the city is open and secure.

When you, Israel's Minister of Education, can drive in your car from one end to another, this means that the city is open and secure. As each of us can drive his car anywhere in East Beirut, the same should apply in West Beirut. This is not in order to accomplish some prestigious feat, but in order that the people who need to handle the issue of the terrorists could operate freely. This could last several weeks. ✓

As for the question of the legitimacy of killing the Mourabitoun--we have no such intention. Our problem is that they won't attack our forces. As long as they do not

attack our forces, we have no interest in harming them. If they occupy some block, let them. It is not our problem.

Let us eliminate the terrorists in Beirut, their commanders, headquarters and weapons are there.

Do you suppose that Israel would conclude security arrangements which won't guarantee that? Seeing what happened to the President-elect, demonstrates how important it is to have signed agreements, not just personal ties. <

Yesterday I spoke with Amin Gemayel. Luckily a record of the meeting between me and Bashir was kept, and they were aware of its details. What is the meaning of having a signed agreement? When a signed agreement exists it means that if one side violates it, the other could realize certain privileges granted it by the agreement. ✓

Minister Ben Porat, do you really believe we would agree to security arrangements which would not specifically prohibit reemergence of a terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon? Will we do such a thing?

There was an agreement on evacuating the terrorists from Beirut but it turns out that it was flagrantly violated. Instead of the terrorists handing over their weapons as agreed, nothing was turned over.

Already on 23 (of August) we reported (this) to the Americans, who said: "We admit they have not turned over their arms". The agreement was brazenly violated and

all of the heavy weaponry, which was to be handed over to the Lebanese Army, was not turned in. In addition, the terrorists have left behind--commanders, headquarters, communication systems and caches of weapons. Therefore, once the agreement was abrogated, Israel is staying in place, until the danger is removed. There is no other factor which could remove this danger. I have told Draper today: "we are serious people. I hope you also see yourself as serious people. We know what is the Lebanese Army".

There is no problem. We are our own worst enemy. Tomorrow when the words spoken here about there being no decision to go into Beirut get out--a problem would be created.

What is needed now is to eliminate the terrorists present in Beirut. Our services are chasing them . . .

We have just received information that a large Phalangist unit entered the Sabra camp and has been combing it.

No, this information is ours. It will become public by itself. The results will speak for themselves. From Sabra they will proceed to another. Thus, let us have the number of days necessary for destroying the terrorists.

What else is there in Beirut for us?

We are not dictating the government. It is

necessary that Beirut stays an open and secure city, and no new terrorist center emerges there.

We did not go in because of that. Did we go in because there was no address?

We are talking about a few weeks. We need to search for several thousand terrorists. It needs to be understood that these thousands of terrorists are found among a population of hundreds of thousands.

Transcript of Defense & Foreign Affairs
Committee Session of 16 August 1982 (Excerpts)

p. 11

MK Rozolio:

We were told at a certain stage that the Christians intend, or that we have permitted them, to operate inside Beirut. Later we were told that they have not acted. What's the meaning of that?

Brig. Ya'ari:

They offered--to those acquainted with their mentality--that the Lebanese Army will take control of West Beirut. For two days we had information that they were about to realize this, but they haven't. They did not move . . .

It was only when we were about to reach Beirut, that cautious contacts and statements were made about the need to reestablish the Army of independent Lebanon, with no foreign forces. No one had issued such a statement yet, save for Camille Chamoun who declared that this was an opportunity to form an independent Lebanon free of foreign presence.

MK Rozolio: (p. 19)

What's the population of Beirut?

Brig. Ya'ari:

The number of Palestinians estimated in the various regions in 1982 is as follows:

- some 70,000 in the Beirut area;
- 26,000 in the Lebanese mountain area;
- 75,000 in the Sidon area;
- 20,000 in the Tyre area;
- 53,000 in the Tripoli area;
- 26,000 in the Bekka.

All together--270,000. You will receive more information about this.

MK Ulmart:

Yesterday we were told by the C-o-S unequivocally--and I'd like to make it clear, so that there be no misunderstandings, that this is not an attempt to verify which of the versions, that of the C-o-S or that of Brig. Ya'ari, is correct--that we have no desire to enter Beirut, and are not planning for it operationally, either.

MK Ben Elisar:

That there were no preparations?

MK Ulmart:

This is what I have in mind. He said: We don't want to, we are not planning. I am not talking about some

plan in a drawer. You, Brig. Ya'ari have spoken of some movements. I'd like to understand what is the meaning of these movements which have caused the shooting. Is this simply warming up of engines or is this something else, what is the nature of these movements?

Brig. Ya'ari:

Let me explain. There are two hot points where shooting has erupted. One in the Bekka, the other in Beirut. . .

MK Zeigerman: (p. 23)

I heard that the Defense Minister had said that the airport won't be taken and no forces would be deployed there, but I gather the reality is rather different.

Dan Semana (of Israel Radio) is with the IDF on the Christian side of Beirut. In my opinion the political echelon needs to report to us about that as well. Since what we have been given and what is said on the street are two different things. And it was certainly said by the Defense Minister, as well as by the Prime Minister, that entering of Beirut would cause political damage to Israel. The Defense Minister said: Beirut is a capital city. The U.S. is opposed, the Soviet Union is opposed. Many things were said, but the feeling is that in the field things are different.

In my opinion, this process could cause us harm. Now is the time for a political achievement as we have determined--40-45 Kms--and in my opinion the political level must report on what was really taking place. If the situation persists we would one day face a severe damage to the country.

MK Melamed: (p. 36)

How did it happen that the terrorists cooperated with us? It was said we had only responded to their provocations. How could it be that they only provoked us until we linked up with the Christians, and once we did link up they have stopped their provocations? How did this political cooperation between us and the PLO come about? Without any agreement, I would really like to know this. (Refers cynically to government's explanations of advances in Lebanon beyond the 40-45 Kms range).

Brig. Ya'ari: (p. 41)

An ultimatum issued by the field commanders had been delivered to the Syrians by the Lebanese to evacuate until yesterday at 12:00 (p.m.). This was in the framework of our attempt to create a situation which could lead them to decide to leave Beirut on their own. Concluding that this means we were closing Beirut down, is a false conclusion.

As for the current situation in the field--I have marked on the map the lines representing the most up-to-date information; that is, we are deployed in the southern part of the airport through the neighborhoods situated on the hills around Beirut, thus blocking the two main access routes: the route proceeding from the airport via Alei into Suk al-Arb and from the middle of Beirut through Babda to Alei via Gomhur, Shuafat, Babda and Kefar Shima. These positions overlook Beirut but are not the city's neighborhoods. To what degree these belong to grand Beirut is a matter of commentary. The Muslim and Christian neighborhoods start from the airport via Burj al-Barajneh, the refugee camps and the main Beirut neighborhoods. Those are not where our lines are.

That these positions control Beirut--we and the Christians are indeed surrounding Beirut. As far as I know the siege is designed to prevent reinforcements from getting into Beirut. It is not designed to starve the population or prohibit exit by those who would like to get out. But I am not familiar with the orders in the field, I know of the overall guidelines issued.

Meeting between Defense Minister Sharon and Bashir Gemayel
at the Lebanese Forces' Headquarters in Beirut 8 July, 1982

Present: DM, General (retired) Yariv, General Tamir,
U. Dan, Mossad's representative, Director General
of Foreign Ministry.

Bashir, Jan Nader, Lebanon's Minister of
Construction, Elie Hobeika.

Note: The Mossad's representative wrote down the entire
discussion. These are notes only.

1. Bashir talked about a visit of Muslim
dignataries from Sidon. They have recited horrifying
stories about the PLO and the atrocities committed by PLO
terrorists in Sidon. (We asked that Bashir publicize those
stories.)

2. The DM reiterated our position with regard to
the political settlement: objection to a PLO office, and to
any military presence whatsoever, etc. Regarding the MLF,
the DM expressed his objection to Bashir's proposal that
they torpedo the entire move of introducing the Force. Such
a move could undermine the entire political process, and
although the latter has caused numerous problems, it was
preferable over a military operation in so far as we were
concerned. At the same time we would welcome it if they get
the French out of the Force. However, as for the idea of
the MLF itself, we are not objecting to it. Perhaps it would
permit the expulsion of several thousand terrorists from
Beirut, which is of supreme importance.

3. The DM explained what was in his opinion the role of Bashir's forces whether the political move succeeds or fails. In either case Bashir has a key role. In either case it is incumbent that they penetrate as deep as possible in the Sunni area in order to unify it with the Eastern sector and isolate the city's southern part where the camps are located. The DM indicated that in case Habib fails, we would act. We will not leave as long as the terrorists stay in place.

4. Bashir inquired whether we would object to him moving bulldozers into the refugee camps in the south, to remove them, so that the refugees won't stay in the south. The DM responded by saying that it was none of our business. We do not wish to handle Lebanon's internal affairs.

Meeting between the DM and Bashir Gemayel in Beirut
5 July 1982

Present on Israel's side: DM; Director General of Foreign Ministry, Major Oded; U. Dan; Mossad's rep.

Present on Lebanese side: Bashir Gemayel; Zahi Bustani (senior adviser); Elie Hobeika (Chief of Intelligence of the Lebanese Forces); Jan Nader (senior political adviser); Johnny Abdu (Chief of Intelligence--the Lebanese Army).

DM Sharon:

Regarding the relations between us and the problems caused by the Druse issue, things look complicated while in fact they are simple. We will solve the problems burdening you. I have already issued orders to immediately halt the withdrawal of your forces from Jezzin, Sidon. Our Druse officers will be pulled out of the area. I suggest you meet with a delegation of Israeli Druse to explain your position and the situation. I had indicated during the Cabinet session yesterday that we should not let Israeli Druse intermingle with their Lebanese community. This would constitute a problem not just for you but for us as well. At the same time it is incumbent that we prevent several ugly things which have occurred--murders, rapes, and stealing by some of your men. I agree that we do not comprehend the specific structure of Lebanon. I am aware of the significance of (the Shouf) Mountains to the unification

of the country and its influence on the future situation in Beirut. On the other hand, you do not understand the (mentality) of our men serving in this area. Each and every one of them comes here with a different background. They report every item which they do not like back home. They had severely criticized the conduct of some of your men. We do not wish to see this kind of conduct. It has a negative impact on Israeli public opinion. You've got to avoid these phenomena. I am interested in you acting in the area with regard to civilian issues, but I am requesting that you make any conceivable effort to put order among your men. We've got to be careful as these things influence negatively Israeli public opinion as well as (our) forces in the area. ✓

Bashir:

I apologize for interrupting. Please give me concrete examples of my men's conduct. The whole issue was blown by the Palestinian and Communist propaganda. The things which were reported in your media were incorrect. You've got a distorted impression of reality. Aside from it, and I'd like to apologize for bringing this up, IDF soldiers have also misbehaved. Since we've entered the school (note: reference to the Divisional Headquarters) all the computers, radios and television sets have disappeared. ✓

DM Sharon:

We are ready to pay for any damage caused.

Bashir:

This is not the issue. These are secondary things. Regarding our men: we would pull them out of all the areas if we didn't know how to behave--how could such things be said. Take for example our enclave--it's free of crime and more secure than any other area in the country. I challenge everybody to come forward with proof for our misconduct. I apologize for my style but the tension has been caused by the Palestinian propaganda which has convinced you. Already we've suffered this week 10 dead. You were misled by the propaganda. We are not barbarians--and we wish to avoid the parting of our ways.

DM Sharon:

Please take it easy. We will not deal with a list of names or incidents.

Bashir:

We suffered four killed in the Shua'fat area the day before yesterday, and we have been unable to evacuate the bodies still. The IDF had only imposed a curfew. Four others were killed at Beit ad-Din. Nobody has detained those responsible for the attacks. It is not in my interest that we both continue lobbying for each other.

DM Sharon:

I'd like to conclude this topic. As you well know we do not control our media. We've got to get used to living with criticism. At the same time, if you feel insecure when using the access routes, this has to immediately change. I would discuss this with General Drori. I'd like to get the full information about the population which has collaborated with the terrorists and we'll examine how to deal with them. This entire issue is risky for relations between us and the mutual interests. The above difficulties must disappear. I will personally handle it.

Bashir:

I regret to say that among the Christian community people are already talking about me having made a mistake by trusting Israel. Your activities in the area are not perceived as constituting help, and the (Christian) population does not believe we've become allies of Israel. There is no sense of the territory being liberated and of the country about to be unified. This damages your and our image severely.

DM Sharon:

I suggest you display more control. I will take care of the problem. We have problems but solutions could

be found. We've got to find a way which would halt the negative public opinion in Israel. You've got to find a way for your men to exercise more control. ✓

Bashir:

Please let me know how I can help you in this regard.

DM Sharon:

Each side has to better control its forces in the field in order to ease tensions. I had made a decision to cut off electricity, water and the access routes into West Beirut so that you won't be directly involved. This has brought great pressures. The American Ambassador, Habib and others had already protested to us. We are not opposed to Shafik Wazan moving between the two parts of the city.

Bashir:

He could go into the western sector via the gates to the port.

DM Sharon:

He could rest assured that we won't harm him. You don't have to be the bad guy, we will.

Bashir:

(Illegible). They have already appealed to the Security Council. This harms you as well. Nevertheless, we should carry on if you think of some big operation soon.

DM Sharon:

We will find a solution. Nothing has changed with regard to our basic approach. I'd like to know if the terrorists are thinking of withdrawing, or is that just a deception. Will the Lebanese Army move in? It will have to conduct a mopping up operation. There are large arms caches in the city.

Bashir:

I don't have a clear cut answer for this (illegible). Arafat is a liar, constantly maneuvering and tricking us in order to gain time, every time another 48 hours. The terrorists have the feeling that you've finished your operation. . . . I suggest for you not to trust what they say. They won't leave. Only a military operation would bring them out. In the meantime they are waiting for Habib. Nothing would come out of it.

Director General of FM:

Don't misunderstand us. When we say that the PLO will withdraw from Lebanon we precisely mean that. There is

a timing problem. We will bring them out of Lebanon. The question is when and how. We need to use our brain and might. We will do that somehow and with minimum political cost and until it becomes clear that Habib is tricking us. . .

Johnny Abdu:

There is no Arab country which will accept (note in text: apparently reference to the terrorists' presence in Lebanon).

DM Sharon:

Perhaps by the time the 48-hour ceasefire had passed, intelligence would arrive, indicating that they are only playing. In the meantime we have to wait.

(Illegible)

DM Sharon:

(To Johnny Abdu) I suggest you join the committee.

Abdu:

I do not wish to look like a fool, since everybody knows the truth about this committee.

DM Sharon:

The terrorists maintain that they are ready to withdraw only after (illegible) . . . It is very important that we know precisely what was happening (illegible) . . . who will supervise what was going in (illegible). Are you mobilizing?

Bashir:

We have already mobilized Christians, the C-o-S promised to send equipment for them.

Director General of FM:

We've got to think on a joint and coordinated plan. We should not wait until Habib declares "Halas" (Over in Arabic). We can wait till the weekend. We have to jointly discuss two options. Also, we have to consider the situation in light of the forthcoming elections.

Abdu:

We are speaking on two levels: political and military. If you succeed in solving 80% of the problem by political means, the remaining 20% won't be enough for activating the military option. We have to realize that most Lebanese would agree to a symbolic PLO representation.

DM Sharon:

Would you agree to that?

Abdu:

Yes. (If they stay like?) in Egypt (illegible). ✓

DM Sharon:

(Illegible)

Abdu:

What would happen if the Muslims ask Bashir's approval for that?

DM Sharon:

We did not want the MLF. We wanted you to do the job. It depends on the government. |

Abdu:

If Lebanon operates legally and I hope Bashir would receive the required legitimacy, and if the Muslims agree to a symbolic PLO presence, we would come under heavy pressure of the world public opinion to agree. Even if they (terrorists) do all get out, they'll stay six months in Syria then start infiltrating back. Thus, it is important that the MLF is deployed along all the borders. ✓

DM Sharon:

Would you agree for a symbolic military presence of some 300/350 in (illegible)?

Bashir:

We've already responded to this.

Abdu:

It all depends on your military operation. Somebody has to say no. If you satisfy yourself with a 90% solution, the remaining 10% won't justify a military operation. The remaining 10% would mean a symbolic political representation of the PLO and a symbolic presence in the Bekka.

DM Sharon:

Let's assume that Arafat has agreed to a 90% solution by political means. Is it possible for Bashir to introduce his forces to get the Syrians and the remaining terrorists out. You have once indicated that to accomplish the mission would require at least 6 weeks. Can you enter West Beirut? ✓

Bashir:

It all depends on how we would solve the problems raised at the start of today's meeting.

Abdu:

Your position causes the population to doubt that you are supporting the Lebanese forces.

Shout

Bashir:

If we rectify the situation in the other areas, we could carry out Beirut.

Abdu:

If the day to day security situation in areas under your control deteriorates, your image and glory may be harmed. You've got to collect all the arms there. You've got to collect all the arms there. You've got to know that Walid Jumblatt does not control the entire area. This is for your benefit as well.

DM Sharon:

What is the military situation in West Beirut?

Abdu:

Not even one Lebanese will fight. (Illegible) Together with the Syrians and the PLO there are some 7,000 men there. Two-thirds of them are not (illegible). They are scattered along the junctions and are busy mining them.

Bashir:

The longer we wait and give them time (illegible). Time is working in their favor--moreover, a political solution would not allow the launching of a military one.

Director General of FM:

We will wait until the weekend. We are waiting for a positive answer and the start of the withdrawal.

Abdu:

Where will they go to? Jordan has refused, Egypt refused. Habib would ask for more time to look for a place (for them).

Director General:

If they won't withdraw we would expel them.

DM Sharon:

It is possible that they withdraw to Tripoli (Lebanon).

Bashir:

There is no such prospect.

DM Sharon:

We agree with that as well.

Bashir:

We have no knowledge of their making preparations to leave.

Director General:

In the political area, we've got to reach an understanding. There is talk of a defense pact, peace agreement, reorganization of the Army, the Americans are ready to pay for it.