

DOUBTS

Was There Awareness of the Possibility of a Massacre?
Validity of the Decision to Introduce
the Phalangists into the Camps? 1/

1. A. In the Cabinet sessions which decided activation of the Phalangists--there was an assumption that the IDF was not inside Beirut. It is possible that the very presence of the IDF in West Beirut would have been " a new intervening element" undermining the basis for the government's decisions.

B. On 16 September 1982, during the discussion with Draper both the Defense Minister and the C-o-S were aware of the possibility of a vendetta by the Phalangists. The Prime Minister, in his meeting with Draper (15 Sept. 1982) is also of the opinion that it is impossible to predict the Phalangists commanders' conduct, save for Bashir's. (Original underline).

C. In the meeting between the DM and Jumail on 12 September 1982, Bashir states that conditions should be created which would lead the Palestinians to leave Lebanon. Information exists that as a consequence of Eli Hubeika's activity 1200 persons had disappeared.

1/ These are apparently notes of the Staff of the Kahan Commission.

D. In an operational discussion in the Defense Minister's office on 16 September 1982--the C-o-S talks about sentiments of revenge in connection with the decision that we would not enter the camps.

E. Aman's Review of 15 September 1982, deals with the entering of West Beirut by the IDF providing protection to the Muslims against possible Phalangists' vendetta.

F. In the Intelligence Collection of 8 September 1982--the PLO expresses concern over the harming of civilian Palestinian population in the wake of the withdrawal of the MLF. The U.S. pledged that there won't be "settling of accounts" following the evacuation of Beirut.

G. A Mosad report dated 23 June 1982, talks of the murder of 500 people by the Christians manning road-blocks.

H. The C-o-S in the Cabinet session of 19 September 1982, p. 23, confirms that in the morning hours of Friday (17 September 1982) he knew about killings of civilians, but that at noon time "still there was no knowledge what was happening there". It could be concluded that the killing of civilians--at some level (number)--was predictable, in contrast to a large scale massacre.

2. A. The government decision of early August 1982, conditioned any ground operation on government's authorization.

B. The Source of the Prime Minister and Defense Minister's authority to approve urgent ground operation is uncertain--the entering into West Beirut itself. (In light of the government decision of 15 June regarding the need for specific government decision on this issue.) ✓

Subject 1: The Link between the IDF and the Phalangists.

Source: Sharon in the Cabinet 16 September 1982, pp. 1, 4.

1. Following Bashir's assassination Sharon reports that we had coordination with him on several issues: order of introduction of the Lebanese Army into West Beirut, including time-table; activities of Israeli security services (p. 1).

2. Following Bashir's assassination "in contacts with leaders of the Phalangists as well as with Pierre Jumail we will continue direct contacts". Reports of his visit with the Phalangists' leaders and with Pierre Jumail. Although this was a consolation visit "the political subject did come up" (p. 9).

Source: Sharon in Cabinet, 19 September 1982, p. 2.

3. The report of the C-o-S which was delivered to the government on 16 September 1982 is mentioned. In it the C-o-S reported of his contacts with the commanders of the Phalangists and on mobilization of their forces.

Source: Sharon in Cabinet, 21 September 1982,
p. 12.

4. "For many weeks the question was heard around this table--why aren't the Phalangists going in? Why won't they enter?"

Subject 7: Who decided on entering into West Beirut and what were the reasons?

Source: Cabinet Session of 16 September 1982, pp. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 14, 18, 19.

1. The considerations implicit in Sharon's statements:

(a) 2000 terrorists remained in the city together with some 7000 members of other organizations.

(b) Possibility exists of detaining them by a joint operation of the Israeli and Lebanese security services.

(c) A desire to arrive at a situation of "an open and secure City", in order to realize the above.

(d) A concern persists that "the terrorists will recapture their positions and we'll be faced anew with a divided city".

(e) (in this context) apprehension over reemergence of "a new situation" in Beirut with "far reaching implications".

(f) "Our mission currently is to deal with the terrorists who have remained in West Beirut".

(g) (And) "to attempt to maintain political relations in the wake of the situation which has emerged".

(h) A completely new situation surfaced. The terrorists abrogated the agreement, deceived the Israelis and the Americans.

(i) The Head of Shin Beit demanded that the security services be able to operate in Beirut.

(j) The agreement on the terrorists' evacuation was blatantly abrogated. Instead of handing over their weapons, they had simply avoided doing so. (To a large extent, this became clear after the entering into the city.)

2. The decision to enter: "This was our estimate, and as the Prime Minister has stated, he held contacts with me and the C-o-S the night before yesterday, at midnight and a half. It was agreed that we seize key positions inside the city which would allow us to continue our activity and prevent the serious situation which could have emerged as I had just described" (p. 3). "We wished to capture a series of key points which would later allow free movement inside the city; i.e., to be possible to move freely and carry out our missions" (p. 3). "As stated, the aim was to seize several points. I wouldn't like to expand on this, as the C-o-S will later dwell on it. These points, along the well known 'Mazra'a Boulevard' (French), which cuts off the terrorists camps from the south, seize several dominant positions and high buildings located in West Beirut,

seize the beach area at several points from the port to Ras Beirut." (p. 3)

At 6:30 when in fact the operation was over, the C-o-S had realized that several vital buildings were not seized: "Again, I turned to the Prime Minister and we agreed on capturing several additional houses. I indicated that the operation would be over in two hours and indeed within two hours it was over."

(Apparently responding to a question) "I'd like to say that sometimes--and this does not happen too often--one is faced with critical moments, in which an immediate decision has to be made. In my opinion, we were in such a situation, there was a point of turnover, which could have put us in a new situation, in which West Beirut would once again be protected by terrorists and militia forces, and behind them the same infrastructure which was once in place would have sprung. Therefore, this decision was not only vital, but in fact was a last minute decision." (p. 4)

Source: Sharon in Cabinet session A, 1982, p. 1.

3. The reasons for entering Beirut and the decision: "In the wake of the assassination of Bashir Jumail, according to a decision reached that night, the IDF entered West Beirut and seized key positions while avoiding

entry of the terrorists' camps--and we have clarified this in the Cabinet session as well."

Subject 13: Detail the types of military activity in the Peace for Galilee in terms of their approval.

Source: Sharon in Cabinet, 16 September 1982, pp. 3, 4.

1. See Subject 7: reference to approval of entry into Beirut.

Source: Sharon in Cabinet 21 September 1982.

2. (p. 6) The DM notes that he often hears in the Cabinet that "the government is unaware of what our objectives in Lebanon are". This "in spite of the fact that the objectives are clear cut", since the "government had discussed and decided these on countless times". Still the DM wishes to recount and goes on to enumerate the objectives on p. 6.

3. Approval for introduction of the Phalangists on the basis of Sharon's statement in Cabinet session of 21 September 1982: "Do you imagine for one moment that if the Chief of the (Northern) Command, the C-o-S or the Cabinet had thought that this would happen, it would have permitted introduction of such a force into the camps? Is this the way that an Israeli government would have acted?"

Subject 8: Awareness of the Security of the Civilian Population in East Beirut.

Source: Sharon in the Cabinet, 1 August 1982.

1. "The information publicized regarding casualties among Palestinian civilians is false because we do not hit the areas where the Sunni population resides." The information about civilian casualties originates with the terrorists, since the areas under bombardment are ghost-areas. "We have the most reliable material about this. While they report of casualties, there is not a living soul in these neighborhoods. I want you to realize that the neighborhoods like Burj al Barajneh and its vicinity and the area of Shatillah and similar places are all absolute ghost-towns." (p. 15)

Source: Sharon in Cabinet, 15 August 1982, p. 10.

2. In a meeting between DM and P. Habib regarding the introduction of the MLF into Beirut: "I made a proposal, which in my opinion is excellent, pertaining to the evacuation of the terrorists. What was their argument? That the population of West Beirut was concerned over the introduction of the Lebanese Army, since they think it contains elements of the Phalangists" (p. 10). The DM details his proposal and observes "thus the Lebanese population in West Beirut need not be afraid" (p. 10).

Source: Sharon in Cabinet, 19 August 1982, p. 1.

3. The DM reports that Israel's demands regarding the terrorists' evacuation were accepted including the demand: "There won't be a concentration of terrorists in their camps and there won't be MLF protection for them". This in contrast to their (terrorists') demand that they be permitted to assemble in their camps.

Subject 8: Awareness of the Security of the Population of West Beirut.

Source: Sharon in the Cabinet, 16 September 1982, p. 10.

1. At the meeting of Sharon with Draper: "I made it clear to him that today there is in fact only one element which can safeguard against a total collapse in West Beirut and this is us. And he asked: So you'll always be Lebanon's policeman? I replied--absolutely not . . ."
(p. 10). (The IDF will be pulled back once Beirut becomes "an open and secure" city, i.e., "once our security services could operate there freely" (p. 10). ✓

2. (p. 14) (Regarding the duration of activity inside Beirut.) "We are talking about several weeks. We need to look for thousands of terrorists. It is important to understand that these terrorists are situated among a population of several hundred thousands."

Source: Sharon in Cabinet, 19 September 1982, p. 1.

3. In the wake of the entry into West Beirut: "It needs to be mentioned that there were almost no casualties among the civilians, it cannot be said that there were no casualties at all, but for the sake of caution I'd say there were almost none." (p. 1)

4. "Wherever the IDF is present, life is going on ordinarily. There are no disturbances and order is being maintained." (p. 3)

Subject 17: Cooperation with Jumail regarding
Entering of West Beirut.

Source: Sharon in the Cabinet session of
16 September 1982, pp. 1, 5, 10, 15.

1. "We had coordination with Jumail on several subjects. One was the order of introduction of the Lebanese Army into West Beirut", including a timetable. (p. 1)

2. In spite of the fact that Bashir was to take office only on 23 September, "orders to the Lebanese Army were, in fact, given by him already".

3. Reports that he "was the last person" to hold discussions with Bashir. "I met him on Sunday night, the 12 of September, two days before he was murdered." On that night, a discussion was held which lasted from 11:30 PM to 0:45 AM, in which detailed agreements were reached. "This following many meeting held by Rafal regarding all the joint operations and security activities designed to clean the city of terrorists." (p. 5)

4. "Bashir, like us, understood that if any remnants of theirs (terrorists) were left behind in Beirut, his rule would be put in question. This was his point of origin. Ours was different, but linked to the terrorists leaving behind an infrastructure, which could reemerge." (p. 5)

5. "The agreement we've reached with Bashir before the assassination opened up incredible opportunities for us inside Beirut." (p. 10)

6. In talking to the DM, Bashir had argued that it would take about a month for the Lebanese Army to enter Beirut (p. 15). The Army was ready to fulfill Bashir's orders only from the day of his assuming office. In the wake of his death, the Lebanese Army was refusing to take any action.

Source: Sharon in the Cabinet Session,
19 September 1982, p. 7.

Notes that one or two days before Bashir's assassination coordination and a schedule were reached on how the security services of both (Israelis and Phalangists) would enter, following the Lebanese Army.

Subject 19: What was the precise agreement which was reached with the Phalangists or any other foreign forces (Hadad)?

Source: Sharon in the Cabinet, 19 September 1982, p. 2.

1. "The C-o-S while reporting to the cabinet on 16 September recounted his contacts with the Phalangists and their mobilization. On the night between 16 and 17 of this month, i.e., on the night between Thursday and Friday, the Phalangists entered looking orderly--they did not look like a wild and disorderly gang--into the same area we entered, in order to search for terrorists."

Source: Sharon in the Cabinet, 21 September 1982, p. 11.

2. "We are discussing the stenogram. Neither the C-o-S nor the Chief of the Northern Command or the Division's Commander had thought that this would happen in the field."

Subject 19: (of Kahan Commission's investigation)

Source: The Knesset's Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 24 September 1982, Protocol 118.

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MK Y. Rom: They did not reveal the whole truth.

The DM Sharon: When I presented in the government, what brought me and the Prime Minister on that night, following Bashir's assassination, to enter West Beirut, I reported it in the Cabinet session on 16 September and explained it. I did not use even once this subject of "prevention of bloodshed, maintaining order and calm", etc. What was the problem facing us? I am willing to talk frankly, and I hope that it is possible to talk frankly here: there was an arrangement between us and the Lebanese--and I will not go into detail--which was to provide a solution to a severe problem we were confronting. What was the problem? An agreement had been reached and it talked about the evacuation of all the terrorists and the handing over of their heavy weapons to the Lebanese Army on 22 August 1982. Still in the first phases of the evacuation, even before it started, we noticed that the terrorists intended to leave behind a force we then thought, and we told the Committee, of 2500 terrorists. They decided who would stay and who won't. They appointed commanders, not from the first or second echelons, but from the third. They

left enough money for the payment of some six payrolls (six months of salary). They did not hand their weapons over to the Lebanese Army. We repeatedly warned the Americans of this plan. The Americans knew they were staying. We grappled with how to deal with this situation. Our problem was to make sure that Beirut won't be turned back into what it once was. I told the Americans, that Beirut must be an open and secure city. (Original underlines.) Perhaps you'd invite the Head of the Shin Beit, he is better in knowing what to divulge and what not in this regard. In its severity our problem was of the first order: how to insure that they were not there. How to insure that anyone who was there would be hit or detained. For this purpose we made an arrangement. The arrangement was concluded in a protocol on the night of 12 September 1982. On that night I had spent most of this night with Bashir, two days before he was assassinated. Perhaps when everything calms down I will talk about this important and interesting meeting. It had an aspect of this awful drama. The issues were summarized in a protocol, how and when we would deal. On that night he insisted on taking me somewhere. Later I got out of there. And since this was a meeting we did not wish to publicize, and it was not. (Original underlines.)

MK Y. Rom: It will be made public now.

Sharon: We all knew and followed not only people who stayed there, but also means of communication which began operating from there. We saw there the start of the reorganization, which given time, would have brought back the terrorists' infrastructure, as they once said: "We are giving West Beirut to the Lebanese on loan, until we're back". (Original underlines.) We held a number of serious discussions on how to overcome this problem. We tried through direct contact with the Lebanese Army to advance its forces. This dragged on. In general, whenever the Lebanese Army was introduced, it was through our mediation. Our officers would approach the area where the Murabituns had control, and by risking their own lives, would persuade the Murabitun's commanders, or any other organization, that it concerns a unit which won't harm them. Slowly, actually "by the hand", we would lead the Lebanese Army inside, and everything was done incredibly slowly. On that night of Bashir's assassination, it was clear to us that the terrorists' infrastructure was about to be reorganized. The decision was then reached that we would seize key positions inside the City.

MK V. Shem-Tov: Is it possible to know where was this decision reached?

Sharon: Absolutely. In a consultation between the PM and myself, and in line with the government decisions. This was after midnight. I'd say it was midnight and a half. The consultation was held between the PM, myself and the C-o-S.

MK Shem-Tov: After Bashir's assassination?

Sharon: Yes, he was murdered that night. When it became clear around 11:00 PM that this was an assassination, between 11:30 PM-12:00 PM, the PM asked to consult with me. I was very close to home, in the meantime he talked with the C-o-S, and when I got home I called him. We reached the conclusion that we need to prevent a reemergence of a situation which we worked so hard to block, we must act immediately. What was our plan? First, we had very few forces there. We brought them out for training, we thinned our forces there. We launched an airlift into the Khalda airfield near Beirut, we assembled and lifted equipment, the aim was to seize key points. Everything was to be carried out quickly because it was impossible to check one house after the other. The second reason for the speedy reaction was to save lives. The operation began in the morning. At first it went quickly, apparently because of the surprise, later the resistance grew. We were fired on by a tank, mortars, machine-guns etc. The strongholds of the terrorists were in the Phakhani, Sabra and Shatilah. In these

areas we also concentrated our bombardments. Anybody who travels through West Beirut would see the city intact except those areas where the terrorists were concentrated.

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Sharon: Around 11:00 AM the Chief of Northern Command visited one of the Divisions' commanders, in the wake of a message sent by the latter, which stated that we are unsure that things were progressing ordinarily. This was on Friday morning. Amir Drori arrived there immediately. When he heard about it he immediately informed the C-o-S and the latter told him he was coming. Secondly, he instructed the liaison officer of the Phalangists stationed at the Divisional HQ, to immediately stop the operation. This way he prevented the introduction of another Phalangist force which was assembled in the airfield. When the C-o-S arrived they immediately went to the Phalangists' HQ.

MK P. Goldstein: Was the force we've seen on TV the one which was not introduced?

Sharon: According to my estimate, most of this force was not introduced.

MK Rabin: Most of it?

Sharon: He blocked introduction of further forces which were poised for entering After Drori talked with the C-o-S the latter informed him he was on his way.

They went out immediately on Friday night to the Phalangists HQ. They talked with the senior command, trying to find out what was happening there, they were told that they (the commanders) had a feeling it was not executed as instructed.

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MK Y. Sarid: What is Friday night? What time?

Sharon: The meeting of the C-o-S with the commanders of the Phalangists took place on Friday 4:30 PM. An order was given to stop, an order was given to evacuate the forces and it was agreed that they would get their forces out. The C-o-S went back home. On that day, 17 September 1982, I'd like you to know that we knew nothing, no one knew. It is possible that someone in the field knew or heard, but we didn't know. At that time between 12:00-2:00 PM we were sitting with Ambassador Draper at the Foreign Minister's Office. I took out a map and told him the same things I had told him the previous evening: introduce the Lebanese forces. We knew they went into Shatilah (the Phalangists?), but there were still Phakhani and Sabra.

MK Shem-Tov: When did Tzipori call the Foreign Minister?

Sharon: Ask him. On his returning home on Friday night, the evening of Rosh Hashana, the C-o-S called me on

the phone. He informed me that he ordered the operation stopped, the withdrawal of the Phalangists and not to allow introduction of additional forces. This is what we knew at the time. On Saturday, at 3:30 PM, an intelligence report of ours was issued, and it talked, if I am not mistaken, of 120 casualties or 120 dead in the Shatilah camp. This was at 3:30 p.m. I repeat we did not know.

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MK S. Peres: Did you know about 120 dead?

Sharon: MK Peres, believe me, during this war I visited every possible place. I am making this run quite often. I'd like you to know that I went out and interrogated the Lebanese commanders. I asked them, Why have you done it? They looked into my eyes, as I am looking at you, and their eyes did not twitch. They said: We did not do this, it is not us. I am not talking about bums, we are talking about people among whom there are engineers and lawyers, the entire young elite, an intelligentsia, and they are looking into my eyes saying: We did not do (it). These are people whom I knew intimately. One of them told me (and he is really a serious man, not from a military viewpoint): "You are crazy, you are crazy." Only these two words. The smile did not leave his lips and his eyes did not twitch.

Source: Knesset's Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 June 1982, Protocol 92, p. 3.

MK Shem Tov: Information arrived that the Christians conducted attacks on Druze in the Village of Alei. Is it possible to check it?

PM Begin: I asked the DM last night about this. There were no vendettas, but the Druze and the Christians are in a state of war and when they went in the Druze told them, over our dead bodies. We had to separate them.

Source: Knesset's Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 20 July 1982, Protocol 98, p. 11.

C-o-S: The Christians approached us and said: "We would like to enter the Beit A-Din barracks and establish a training base there. The Christian population is apprehensive over Druze intentions and the latter are all armed while the Christians had been disarmed when the terrorists and the Syrians were in control. We had many discussions with them if to let them in or not. I personally handled it. Finally, following a pledge of honor, if it is possible to write such a commitment, perhaps yes, and under our supervision, we agreed that a Christian force would enter. This force was introduced and it strictly follows regulations, even though it has been 10 days since (it entered), there were no incidents between the

two. The Druze in the Shouf also had heavy weapons, they all have light arms, but they had heavy weapons of all kinds. Mortars, up to 160mm, we left them with their light weapons and took away and heavy arms. Beit A-Din is thus an example of the Christians being introduced and heretofore there was no incident. What will happen--is impossible to know. With them revenge could simmer like ashes for entire generations. In other places, in our absence, we don't know. We keep watch wherever we are present and there are no problems. What will happen afterwards--we can say in "street language"--"it will be fun". Because there are such intercommunal problems, that I don't know if any central government could mediate between all. In other words, to share power with others, while at the same time keep watch against them avenging each other. And this is not only among different communities but also intra-communal. For instance, the Maronites are divided between Pharanjeih, Jumail and Shamoun. There will be trouble there, even today there is shooting on every occasion.

Subject 22: Contacts with the Lebanese Government, or its Army, regarding the entry into West Beirut's camps? Why had the Lebanese Army not entered?

Source: Sharon in Cabinet, 16 September 1982, pp. 9, 11, 12, 15.

1. "We have good relations with the Lebanese Army, but we are aware of what it can perform. We offered to let them to enter one of the neighborhoods, into Phak-hani, Sabra or Shatillah--to go in, clean it out and eliminate the terrorists.. If they disarmed them, we would be very glad. Why should we do it? After all it is the Lebanese Army which is deployed on these neighborhoods' borders, there is no separation between it and the camps. We are ready, even tomorrow morning, to provide them with all the data about the neighborhoods, since there exists close contacts between the forces." (Sharon) makes it clear that on the military level there exists direct contact "which operates well" between "the commanders in the field" (Israelis and Lebanese). Direct contacts are also being held on the political level. Further, (he) makes it clear that the intention is to maintain this framework of direct contacts.

2. On pp. 11-12 repeats the need to coordinate with the Lebanese Army, in case the latter plans to "clean out the neighborhoods". If they want to (they are) "welcome

to it". "It won't interfere with our activities." "I said: You want Sabra, Phakahani? Please you can go in. We will assist them and will see what would happens" (p. 12). "In conclusion, we made it absolutely clear to them. However, the commanders of the Lebanese Army undertook various tricks to evade this responsibility." The DM makes it clear to them that their arguments are unacceptable: "At the expense of the lives of our soldiers", and "at the expense of thousands of terrorists who stayed in West Beirut, contrary to the agreement".

3. On p. 15 clarifies that the Lebanese Army won't be capable of executing the mission (of searching and locating thousands of terrorists) by itself. Only a combination of the IDF and the Lebanese Army could assure success. Even in Bashir's terms (while he was still alive) such an operation was a long process of about a month (insofar as the Lebanese Army was concerned). While, in fact, the operation could be carried out within two days. Moreover, Bashir is no more and the Lebanese Army is unwilling to advance without an authorized instruction. This Army was unwilling to move even when ordered to do so by Bashir, so long as the latter had not assumed office.

Source: Sharon in Cabinet, 14 September 1982.

4. Reports that "for many days we attempted to pressure the Lebanese Army bordering on the camps from the east, to enter it". On Thursday afternoon, Sharon had pressured Draper to cause the introduction of the Lebanese Army. However this Army did not move, apparently because of guidelines given by the Americans to avoid direct contacts with the Israelis (p. 2).

5. Conflicts were stepped up in the wake of the massacre. The contacts and pressure had been intensified on the Lebanese to introduce their forces (which went in on 18 September 1982), into the Banks St., and "after protracted efforts we persuaded them to enter the camps" ("tonight, following very difficult efforts they were persuaded to enter the camps in the morning" (apparently missing pages)).

Subject 26: Detail the Events of the Massacre

Source: The DM's statement at the Cabinet Session, 16 September 1983, p. 19.

1. "We have just received information that a large force of Phalangists has entered Sabra Camp . . . from Sabra they'll go to another . . ."

Source: Statement of DM at Cabinet Session, 19 September 1982, pp. 2, 3.

2. "On the night between the 16 and 17 of this month, i.e., on the night between Thursday and Friday, the Phalangist forces, which seemed orderly and organized, had entered the area which we stayed out of, to search for terrorists. They did not look like a wild disorderly bunch" (p. 2).

3. "The Phalangists entered but we do not know for sure what happened. It is our assessment that the commanders lost control of their men. However, the next day, when it became known what had occurred, the IDF intervened immediately, and took those forces out . . . Haddad's men were not involved at all, and the matter evolved in such a way that our paratroopers opened fire and killed one of them, wounding others, but did evacuate these forces from the refugee camps" (p. 2).

4. "What happened did certainly seem very serious. Nobody thought that this could be done by the Phalangists. The minute it became known, the IDF intervened and got them out . . . The attempt to accuse us of somebody else's guilt, when it is precisely known, who did it--the people themselves are not hiding it and acknowledge that they were there, and everybody knows they are guilty . . ." (p. 3).

5. "From the moment it was disclosed, all steps which could have been taken were taken with great speed, and we should not blame ourselves for anything, in my opinion."

6. Sharon (apparently referring to an American proposal) addressing the CO's: "It is worthwhile that you talk about their proposal, to put the blame on Haddad."

Source: Statement of the DM at the Cabinet Session, 21 September 1982.

7. "We prevented a large-scale bloodbath (p. 11)." "Can you imagine for one minute that if the Chief of Northern Command, the CO's, or the Cabinet had for one second thought that this would happen, it would have allowed introduction of this kind of force? This is how the government of Israel would act" (p. 12)?

8. "Since Thursday, at 23:00, the introduction occurred between 23:00 and 24:00, on the night between

Thursday and Friday. What had happened became known on Friday around noon and it was stopped."

Subject 29: Detailed information received in the IDF, in the intelligence community and/or the executive branch, including any Israeli personality, regarding the events inside the camps.

Source: The DM's Statement in the Cabinet session of 16 September 1982, p. 19.

1. "We have just received information that a large Phalangists' force has entered the Sabra camp and is combing it (p. 19)."

2. "No, this is our information. From Sabra they'll go on to another. Therefore give us a few days which are needed to eliminating the terrorists" (p. 19).

"We need to assure that Beirut is an open city in which every security man of ours can move freely and a reemergence of another terrorists center is prevented. No, no terrorists organization would be established there. If we establish such a starting line such a base will not reemerge, and we have the opportunity to do that. Give us the peace to finish this issue."

Source: Sharon in Cabinet meeting, 19 September 1982, p. 2.

3. On the night between the 16 and 17 of this month, i.e., on the night between Thursday and Friday, the Phalangist forces, which seemed orderly and organized, had

entered the area which we stayed out of, to search for terrorists. They did not look like a wild disorderly bunch" (p. 2).

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5. "What happened did certainly seems as very serious. Nobody thought, that this could be done by the Phalangists. The minute it became known, the IDF intervened and got them out . . . The attempt to accuse us of somebody else's guilt, when it is precisely known, who did it--the people themselves are not hiding it and acknowledge that they were there, and everybody knows they are guilty . . . (p. 3)."

6. "Since Thursday 23:00, the entry occurred between 23:00 and 24:00 on the night between Thursday and Friday. What had happened became clear on Friday about noon time and it was terminated."

7. Sharon on p. 14: "The detailed report of what had happened arrived only today. The government has not read the detailed report yet; it is a report by the Chief of Northern Command following his study of the issue. It will be tabled after arrival, and the government can study it. It was not read yet."

Subject 31: (Of Kahan Commission's investigation?) The DM Statement in the Knesset, 22 September 1982.

I am citing a formal report of ours and I'd like to stress that, as soon as the horrible event became known, I requested that detailed reports be prepared on what had happened. We have testimonies about what took place. And so I'd like to report to you what had happened on our side according to an authorized military report regarding the Beirut Camps:

A. The Phalangists entered the Shatilla camp on the night between the 16-17 September 1982, and their activity was stopped by the IDF on Friday, 17 September 1982, around noon, after rumors reached us about what had taken place in the camp, and were totally withdrawn on Saturday, 18 September 1982, before noon.

B. Following Bashir's assassination a decision was made that the IDF will take control of key positions in West Beirut. The order was for the Northern Command to seize key areas in the West of the city and this was done on 15 September 1982, at 00:30.

C. This operation was carried out beginning on Wednesday, 15 September 1982 at 05:00 (AM) and ended on Thursday, 16 September 1982, at noon. The emphasis was on preventing harm to civilians and their property. In fact,

there was almost no harm inflicted on civilians and property.

D. In the order received by the Command regarding the seizure of West Beirut, it was stated among other things: "Entry into the refugee camps is prohibited. Search and cleaning-out operations would be carried out by the Phalangists or the Lebanese Army."

E. On Wednesday, 15 September 1982, following Bashir's assassination, at 3:30 AM a meeting was held with the Phalangists HQ in which the CO's, and the Chief of Northern Command discussed their activity in connection with what happened and the introduction of the IDF into West Beirut. The introduction of the Phalangists into the camps was discussed in principle.

F. On Wednesday, 15 September 1982, an absolute negative response was received from the Lebanese Army regarding our demand that they enter the refugee camps.

G. On Wednesday, 15 September 1982, the Chief of Northern Command met with the Commander of the Phalangists and Col. Micelle On, the Commander of the Lebanese Army's units operating in West Beirut. The Chief of Northern Command appealed for his help in persuading the political levels (of Lebanon) to authorize introduction of the Lebanese Army into the camps.

H. After checking it out, these officers argued it was impossible and added that in a meeting with the Lebanese Prime Minister he was ordered to open fire on IDF forces which entered West Beirut. He was threatened with court martial

I. On Thursday, 16 September 1982, the Lebanese Army again delivered a negative response regarding possible introduction into the camps.

J. On Thursday, 16 September 1982, a meeting was held between the Chief of Northern Command and the Commander of the Phalangists regarding various issues, and on the same day, around noon, a meeting between the Division's Commander and a representative of the Phalangists took place to coordinate their introduction into the Shatilla camp.

K. The agreement was that a military force would enter Shatilla in a south and westernly direction, searching and cleaning out terrorists. It was stressed that the operation was aimed against terrorists and there should be no harm to the civilian population, especially women, the elderly and children.

L. On the night of 16-17 September, a force of Phalangists entered the Shatilla camp. On request it received flaring from 81mm mortars and airplanes. This were later terminated.

M. The IDF prevented introduction of this force to continue operation inside the camps.

N. On Friday, 17 September 1982, around noon--about 11:00 AM--a meeting was held between the Chief of Northern Command and the Division's Commander. The latter voiced concern over the way the Phalangists were operating. There was no knowledge then on what had happened inside the Shatilla camp. The Chief of Northern Command thought the Phalangists' liaison officer, stationed at the Division's Forward Command Group, immediately ordered that the Phalangists' operation be terminated.

O. On Friday, 17 September 1982, on 16:30 a meeting was held with the Phalangists HQ, in the presence of the CO's and Chief of Northern Command. It was agreed that the Phalangists would leave the camp on Saturday, 18 September 1982, in the morning. It was further agreed that no additional forces be introduced. In this meeting, it was likewise unknown as to what had taken place inside the Shatillah camp.

P. On Friday, 17 September 1982, in the evening a formal message from the Lebanese Army was received, following a meeting of the Lebanese political level, that the Lebanese Army would not enter the camps.

Q. The Phalangists withdrew from the camp on the morning of Saturday, 18 September 1982, and it was then that

information started reaching out about the events inside the camp. As a consequence, the Chief of Northern Command ordered the IDF to enter Phakahani, and on Sunday, 19 September 1982, before noon, also into Sabra to protect and assure the residents who welcomed the IDF. The Chief of Northern Command issued further instructions not to enter Shatilla in order for the IDF not to be associated with what had happened there.

Subject 3: (1) (Including the calculations of the
Phalangists irrespective of the
Israeli government's interest).

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 9 June 1982,
protocol 77. p. ?

General Saguy:

We asked Bashir not to seize the opportunity and
not to take the initiative but sit still. We have not
requested his assistance, no activity, we have not asked him
for any action. We were concerned that otherwise he would
get embroiled, since none of us knows what would happen
later . . . (Original underlines.)

MK Peres:

Was such a request addressed to Hadad as well? He
announced his intention to annex villages.

General Saguy:

A similar request was made to Hadad. He did not
say that he would annex villages. The Bufur was placed
under his command, so he may raise the flag there. What's
wrong with that? There were no contacts with Bashir; only
one whereby he was informed of the above and was asked to
sit still.

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 13 June 1982,
protocol 81, p. 3.

Defense Minister Sharon:

I want you to know that throughout the operation we were not assisted by the Christians, we have not asked for their help. I was there on Friday to see for myself what was going on, what was the mood among them, to try and see what changes in the Lebanese government may be possible, since such changes could occur. These were the main topics. I repeat, we did not turn to, we had not asked, we were not assisted by (the Christians). I want you to know that we were not assisted by them throughout the operation, we didn't even turn to (them for help). One meeting was held on which I have reported, when he came to us and there was another, and I would say there is contact. I left an artillery liaison officer there since it is so close that they could get hurt. And I also took a liaison officer of theirs and stationed him with our forces so that they won't be fired at. The distance is only a few hundred meters. But nothing else has transpired. We were not assisted, we were not asked and did not seek (help). In this operation we have decided not to tie ourselves to them at all, save for the commitment made by the government. This commitment pledges that if the Syrians attack (the Christians) with an aim to liquidate them we would intervene. Under no circumstances did I wish, after I had consulted with the Prime and Foreign Ministers, that we would be committed to, or involved with, anybody and we were not assisted.

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 June 1982,
p. 18.

Defense Minister Sharon:

Regarding the siege of Beirut. There is no such siege pertaining to the civilian sector of Beirut. Even citizens are surprised about this. Israeli journalists and local civilians can go in and out through the crossings. This is amazing. On the one hand a terrible war and on the other everything flourishes and the crossings operate, people are passing through on all sides. When one gets there for the first time he asks: how do you find your hands and legs in this mess?

The siege is against the terrorists. A terrorist who gets out today is immediately detained. They are identifying the terrorists. They sit with us and they are much better than us in this respect.

MK Sarid:

Every Palestinian has the same accent. What if he is a teacher?

Defense Minister Sharon:

We are not dealing with this. I am talking about our road blocks. Believe me I would suggest to any POW in the world to be a prisoner of ours. An initial identification is carried out immediately and anyone who's not a terrorist is released. In my opinion Israel's was the most fair and humanitarian conduct possible in this matter.

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 12 July 1982,
protocol 82, p. 8.

Brigadier General Ya'ari:

I'd like to report about Lebanese issues. In terms of the Lebanese domestic scene it is possible to assert that those taking advantage of the situation, also in terms of willingness to demonstrate their political power internally, are the Phalangists, of course. Sometimes they are not very cautious about that, but there are two sides to the issue: on the one hand they would like our help so that they seize more and better power positions in areas of Lebanon. On the other, their political interests regarding the future of the Lebanese regime is of importance. Here their interest is to:

(a) Prove that they have a common language with a large variety of Lebanese citizens.

(b) That they are not completely identified with us. Bashir's statement of yesterday that even if he is fired at he won't respond or participate, derives from this interest.

Contacts, which may be politically fruitless, are being held with a large variety of Lebanese Sunnis headed by Sa'ib Salam, and with the Shi'as, Druze and others.

MK S. Hilel:

Are we aware of the Phalangists' intention regarding operating in Beirut? The Defense Minister told us that in case of fighting in Beirut the Phalangists would certainly join in. Do we know what would happen if tomorrow the ceasefire collapses and there was some activity, will the Phalangists stand outside and cheer or will they join in the fighting?

p. 18.

Brigadier General Ya'ari:

Up to now we know that because of political developments and certainly because of the shootings, the Christians, although unwilling to act, in Beirut, if we attack I assume that they will join us in order to realize their claim for power. Without doubt, their tendency, as well as many other Lebanese, is to have the terrorists out of there, or that somebody expels them.

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 15 July 1982, protocol 96, p. 9.

MK S. Hilel:

One last question regarding the Phalangists. Allegedly, this was our ally upon which we had built mountains of expectations and assessments. My impression is that many important Lebanese, Shi'as as well as Christians, do not see kindly the taking over by the Phalangists. They are strongly opposed to this. We cannot seek a situation that, even if enforcing it was possible, was doubtful to last.

Defense Minister Sharon:

In this regard we are very cautious. We have no interest in enforcing it, God forbid.

MK S. Hilel:

It could be seen. I am not saying that we would enforce them, but rather make it possible. It is my growing impression that authentic Lebanese factors, both Christians and Muslims, are not viewing it kindly. Not to mention the Druze. Moreover, the recent announcements of Bashir stating that the terrorists are firing at us (Christians) in order to force us (Christians) to join in the war, would be undermined--if this is our approach. Aren't we building there upon a shaky basis?

Defense Minister Sharon:

This assumes that we are forcing them on others. Regarding their (Christians) firing I have instructed them unequivocally not to fire as we have no interest (that they do so). Were they to respond (to the terrorists) the fighting would have flared up along the entire front. I personally had instructed them unequivocally and clearly that without an explicit order they should not open fire, and they won't be the ones to entangle us in a skirmish in Beirut or anywhere else. (Original underlines.)

MK S. Hilel:

It is my impression that when they are instructed to hold their fire, the instruction is being carried out. But when they are told to fire--they do not. In one of our sessions we were told that an expectation, perhaps even readiness, had prevailed that at a certain stage the Christians would enter Beirut to occupy their capital but this has not happened.

Defense Minister Sharon:

Sorry for interrupting. It was said with regard to a possible attack on West Beirut. No one has ever expected them to enter West Beirut, and they were told explicitly not to try, unless the IDF itself attacks West Beirut. Never was there a suggestion made in the Cabinet to attack West Beirut. Not till today. From time to time somebody calls for an attack and another opposes it. However, not even once have I--as the one responsible for the subject matter--introduced a proposal to attack West Beirut in practice. I would have seen it as a very grave matter if we were expected to go into West Beirut.

MK Sarid:

Two weeks ago you described their active role in the Lebanese war.

MK S. Hilel:

In a previous session you have stated unequivocally, in a clearcut manner, that you have no doubt that if fighting erupts in Beirut, the Christians will take part in it. There was an earlier stage when we reached the gates to the city, and the question was raised what next? We were told here that in effect the Christian activity in Lebanon had already started through encounters with the terrorists, but this did not take place.

p. 10.

Defense Minister Sharon:

It did take place. They went in and took over a neighborhood and the college. But beyond this we've absolutely no interest in this. We have no interest in their going in even today. No interest whatsoever.

MK S. Hilel:

I suggest that we check this issue very carefully. I am not saying that we should force the Phalangists on all of Lebanon, but that we check the fundamental approach which sees the Phalangists in Lebanon as a factor which could be leaned upon vis-a-vis the new situation about to emerge in Lebanon. In my opinion, all their moves, their effort to mobilize the support of all the elements in order to secure the Presidency, requires that we reexamine whether our expectations of this force have not been exaggerated, and harmful to the prospects of a settlement. I am bothered by our continued reliance on their ability, on the Christian basis, in a way which far exceeds its ability to rule Lebanon and cooperate with us if it ever reaches its desired status in Lebanon.

p. 22

Defense Minister Sharon:

As for the Christian ally, MK Hilel made his statement on the basis of an incorrect basic assumption. First, we don't want to force them on others. We think it is possible to force, but we wouldn't like to force. If fighting erupts in Beirut they will take active part,--if it erupts. (Original underlines.) Today I don't want them to conduct fire fights. Do I need them to dictate to us when would a flareup occur in Beirut? Not at all. We are examining very thoroughly the various factors, we are studying that. In my opinion the government did not err in its support, in 1975 and 1976, of the Christians and the Phalangists. The government did not err. It made the right move, and likewise we (current government) have not erred by continuing and developing those links. The government had not erred then, nor have the governments since 1977 erred in their approach.

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 9 August 1982, protocol 105, p. ?

MK Shem-Tov:

We are now in the 63rd day of the war. A war which was to last a day or two, if the framework of its declared objectives was kept. I would like to state that, irrespective of the solution in Beirut, if the terrorists withdraw this or other way, the getting to Beirut itself, the deviation from the stated objectives of operation "Peace for Galilee", appears as one of the gravest errors and mistakes of this government, from an Israeli point of view Mr. Foreign Minister not from the viewpoint and interests of Lebanon--The Phalangists' interests are that we get the terrorists out of Beirut, and they have not paid with even one lost life for that. Not from the American viewpoint whose interest is that we serve as their policeman and form a Lebanese government on their behalf. But from the angle of Israeli interests this is one of the gravest errors.

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 August 1982, protocol 106.
p. 14.

C-o-S:

Hadad is not going to fight in Beirut. The Phalangists are holding a line in Beirut, the same way they've done until we arrived there. It is possible that they be assigned missions fitting their capabilities. Everything we or they are thinking about, is coordinated.

Subject 6 (Interest in intimidating and frightening the
Palestinians).

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 June 1982,
protocol 78, p. 13.

Defense Minister Sharon:

MK Me'ir Cohen has asked about Beirut as a refuge for terrorists--this is the last thing we wish to see. That's why we are not saying anything. For example, I have just heard on radio Beirut, the Phalangists' radio, that leaflets were dropped by us calling for the terrorists to leave Beirut, or we would attack it. But in other places we've seen that a flight has immediately begun. We have dropped leaflets. If we wanted to take control no dropping of leaflets would have been necessary although we would have done so. But if others wish to take control, they certainly need that there will be less of them there (terrorists in the city).

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 16 June 1982,
protocol 83

Defense Minister Sharon: (?)

Regarding the ultimatum--we are checking again. There was an ultimatum issued by the commanders in the field and delivered to the Syrians via the Lebanese, to withdraw until yesterday at 12:00 noon. I have said that this was within the framework of our efforts to create a situation which would lead them (Syrians) to perhaps evacuate Beirut by themselves. Anyone who understood it as an indication that we are closing Beirut down--this is not the (right) conclusion.

Subject 8: The Issue of West Beirut and the Civilian
Population--General.

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 13 June
1982, protocol 81, p. 5.

MK Sarid:

I'd like to go back to the issue of the bombardments of Beirut, as I am concerned. I got the impression--and if anybody got a different one please say so--that earlier when we dealt with the large population concentration along the western axis, specifically with regard to Tyre and Sidon, my impression was that war is war and so harm (to the civilian population) could simply be expected. However, if there is a member of the Committee which thought we were dealing with the total destruction of these two cities . . .

DM Sharon:

Not only have these cities not been destroyed but we have paid a very heavy price, save for certain locations of terrorists' resistance. By the way this (resistance) is still going on. I am not sure that we would've had to call in the IAF. But we have not touched the cities. We paid the price mostly during search and destroy operations against terrorists in the cities.

p. 8

MK Shalita:

It is my assumption that the snake's head lies in Beirut. Sometimes until you crush the head you've not killed it. It's O.K. that Beirut is cut off, and we need to consider that a significant terrorist infrastructure exists there which we may have to destroy. It is possible that from this area, from this infrastructure, a more elaborate infrastructure would spread into other areas.

p. 10

DM Sharon:

I don't have here precise data regarding air strikes against Beirut and its vicinity. The air strikes were conducted only against absolutely necessary targets, otherwise the city would have looked differently. The hits are on terrorists' Hqs, terrorists' concentrations and their positions, and nothing more.

Regarding the question--is there an intention to enter Beirut, the answer is negative. I have said this from the operation's first day, and have reiterated time and again--there's no intention to go into Beirut.

p. 14

We stand ready to provide data regarding casualties and destruction, it cannot be concealed. Unlike a previous operation in which whole villages were removed from the face of the earth, I am not speaking now about whether this was necessary or not, there are presently hundreds of Lebanese villages where no sign of shooting is evident, they are functioning and alive and you can go in and talk with the people and everything is progressing normally. Even in Tyre and Sidon we have not activated the IAF during the first phase, and I have already dwelt on the discussion and decisions we had reached. We have not modified these until there was no choice and the price we paid is heavy. Even then we had operated in specific locations, we called on the population to leave for the beach so that identification between terrorists continuing to resist and others would be possible. We put unparalleled efforts into this, but I believe this was worthwhile, that's the way we should have conducted ourselves.

Were we overcautious with regard to the civilian population--we acted very prudently toward the civilian population. Anyone who accuses us regarding this issue commits the most severe act possible. Such efforts were invested in this aspect that no other army in the world has ever done. I'd like to see the army that leaves behind its lines a city whereby mopping up combat is still underway without bombing it or destroying it? We have accomplished the mission differently.

MK Shem Tov:

How many civilians were on the beach?

DM Sharon:

I presume they are returning. We have nominated Brig. Gen. Maimon to Governor. He is well versed in the customs of the civilian population, we are providing all the help. Life is returning to normal. We are letting those organizations which wish to go in to do so. However, we won't let UNIFIL extend its area of responsibility, there is no reason for this. But the Red Cross is welcome. We will not allow the formation of a terrorist concentration ala the Iron Triangle under UNIFIL's aegis. However, with regard to the specific question, I am ready to check it. Do we have the same targets? Absolutely. Exactly like those we had from the start. However, if terrorists are present in Beirut and it is possible to hit them, why not? I think it is a duty to hit them. The cutting off of the Beirut-Damascus route was done for strategic bargaining purposes. By cutting it off the Syrians have been deprived of their influencing the regime in Lebanon. This is the central point. They are continuing to hold certain areas in Lebanon but their ability to form a puppet government in Beirut is gone. That's why they are sensitive when "disengagement" is being talked about. Since "disengagement" means the

relinquishing of our positions along the route and they would reenter Beirut. That's why we've refused. There is no need for "disengagement" between the forces, the Syrian sector is calm, not a single shot has been fired there.

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 7 July 1982, protocol 94, p. 4.

FM Shamir:

They (MLF?) won't descend on the beach until the withdrawal begins. In the meantime, during the negotiations with their ups and downs, several problems have emerged which, due to the exchange of fire, have been difficult to resolve. As far as I know, what happened yesterday involved firing by the terrorists while we exercised restraint as we wish to avoid harming civilians.

There were water and electricity problems, because we have tightened the siege. There are demands from Lebanese, not the government, but Lebanese circles, as well as the United States, which is very sensitive regarding humanitarian issues, to avoid causing suffering among the civilian population. The problem is how to deal with the issue of accelerating the withdrawal of the terrorists if we sit idle.

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 15 July
1982, protocol 96, p. 2.

DM Sharon:

We have three main reasons why in my opinion we should do everything possible to resolve the matter politically, through negotiations. First, casualties among our forces. Without a doubt in an operation of this sort there will be casualties among our forces. Secondly, the continued interest in avoiding casualties among the civilian population, and there is no doubt that there will be civilian casualties in an operation of this sort. Throughout we've made great efforts to minimize harm to the civilian population, however, such an operation could certainly result in civilian casualties, even if we took all the precautions and tried to prevent it. This is also an important reason for attempting to resolve it via political means.

Source: Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 August
1982, protocol 106. p. 19

C-o-S:

Regarding the Katyushas (MLRs), these belonged to the terrorists. We've manned a Katyusha battalion and fired them along a strip stretching from the stadium to the beach. It is true that this is an inaccurate weapon, depending on the range. The ones we had fired landed in this strip in which some of the heavier weapons of the terrorists and the Syrians were located, mortars, etc. We have never fired it elsewhere and never for close support for our forces.

As for the gun placed near the hospital. If its a memorial, let it stay. But if it fires at us and kills our men we would destroy it. If they placed it near the hospital on purpose, it won't be me telling some parent "this gun is firing at your children because I am concerned that we would hit the hospital". Today one can look at Beirut and see big buildings bearing Red Cross markings, and we know this is a hospital and are taking strict precautions so nothing would land in its vicinity. However, anything which could kill our sons will be destroyed no matter where it's placed.

A Message from Commander of the "Lebanese Forces"
Fadi Frem to Head of Tevel

(The message arrived on 25 September 1982 at night)

Statements by several Israeli officials who blamed the "Lebanese Forces" as responsible for the massacre in the camps, and the leaking of Elie Hobeika's name as the one giving the order, are beginning to cause severe damage to your (Israel) image here, especially as all the other sources are blaming Hadad's militia.

I ordered a thorough investigation of the massacre, but would like to remind you of several facts:

A. Our forces entered Sabra east of the Stadium and north of the Kuwaiti Embassy. Our forces did not enter Shatilla or West Beirut.

B. In the meeting held with the C-o-S, Amir Drori and Amos Yaron, in which you were present as well, the C-o-S congratulated us on the "clean job" we had carried out. I had said in the same meeting that I would pull out my forces the same night, because of the American pressure on Sheikh Amin, and this was in fact done. From that time not even one soldier of ours has remained in the camps' area.

C. After we had left the camps' area, it was reported by many observers that members of a Lebanese militia were seen in the vicinity of the camps and in West Beirut erecting road blocks and conducting arrests. It turns out, from our investigation as well as from statements made by other observers as well as Muslim political leaders, that these militia men came from south Lebanon. Sa'ib Salam had contacted President Sarkis and the American Ambassador and informed them of this while asking that the Lebanese Army protect West Beirut and the camps from "Hadad's men".

Cabinet Discussions and Meetings with Lebanese
Elements Concerning Participation of Lebanese Forces
in the Military Moves in Lebanon

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Reference Detailed</u>
1.	15 June 1982	Cabinet Session.	The cabinet has decided to have the Lebanese Army and the Phalangists participate in the entering of Beirut.
2.	15 June 1982	Meeting between Mossad representative and Bashir.	Bashir expresses readiness to launch a military move into Beirut, with the Lebanese Army and our support at the flank.
3.	16 June 1982	C-o-S meeting with Bashir and Abdu.	Abdu presents a plan according to which the Lebanese Army and the Phalangists would enter West Beirut and surround the camps.
4.	17 June 1982	Cabinet Session.	DM reports that the Christians are ready to attack in Beirut and could start action the next day.
5.	19 June 1982	DM meeting with Abdu and Bashir.	The DM informs the Phalangists that introduction of the IDF into West Beirut necessitates their participation.
6.	20 June 1982	DM meeting with representatives of the Lebanese forces.	Coordinating the launching of Operation "Spark" on the night of 22-23 June 1982.
7.	21 June 1982	Meeting of Mossad's representative with Bashir and his advisors.	The DM's approach which asks that Bashir takes a step, even a symbolic one, toward Beirut, was explained to Bashir.
8.	22-23 June 1982	DM meeting with Bashir.	Bashir is ready to carry out "Spark" but explains its political complexity.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Reference Detailed</u>
9.	24 June 1982	PM meeting with Bashir.	Conclusion that "Spark" would be launched on 28 June.
10.	24 June 1982	DM meeting with Bashir.	Bashir requests that "Spark" be postponed for 2-3 weeks.
11.	26 June 1982	Mossad's rep. meeting with Bashir.	Bashir states that the Phalangists are interested in "Spark", and that entry into West Beirut is necessary so as not to give up the achievements made till now.
12.	27 June 1982	Cabinet Session.	DM reports that in the event the IDF enters Beirut, the Phalangists would go in with our forces to mop up the terrorists from the city. The PM presents a plan that in case the terrorists violate the cease fire, the Christians would launch an attack on West Beirut and the IDF will join it. The C-o-S reports about specific coordination with the Phalangists.
13.	29 June 1982	Cabinet Session.	Cabinet's decision: the government proposes that the Lebanese Army enter West Beirut.
14.	3-4 July 1982	Meeting of General Drori and Bashir.	The issue of coordinating every military move with the IDF is raised.
15.	4 July 1982	Cabinet Session.	DM states that Israel and the Phalangists would have to deal with uncovering arms caches in Beirut.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Reference Detailed</u>
16.	5 July 1982	DM meeting with Bashir and his advisors.	The importance of an early entry by the Phalangists into West Beirut to mop up with IDF's support, is raised.
17.	18 July 1982	Cabinet Session.	DM reports that, at the time, the PM made it clear to the Phalangists that they would have to be involved in the fighting.
18.	21 Aug. 1982	DM meeting with Pierre and Bashir Gemayel.	The DM stresses that introduction of the Phalangists into West Beirut requires coordination with the IDF.
19.	21 Aug. 1982	Meeting of C-o-S with Bashir.	The C-o-S notes that the mopping up has to start as the withdrawal of the terrorists and the MLF ends. Bashir indicates that the planning for the operation, scheduled for 23 September, would start the next day. (22 Aug.)
20.	27 Aug. 1982	Meeting of Head of Mossad with leaders of the Phalangists.	Coordination of Phalangists' activity regarding the Palestinian issue in West Beirut. Notice of the activity of Elie Hobeika's apparatus.
21.	1 Sept. 1982	Meeting of PM-Bashir.	The PM raises the issue of Operation "Spark". Bashir expresses readiness to enter Beirut and indicates the difficulties involved in it.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Reference Detailed</u>
22.	3 Sept. 1982	Meeting of General Drori and Fadi Frem.	Fadi Frem reports that the Lebanese Army will start entering West Beirut and the refugee camps on 5-6 Sept. Drori promises IDF's support and intervention if necessary.
23.	8 Sept. 1982	Meeting of General Drori and Fadi Frem.	Fadi Frem indicates that the Lebanese Forces would start operating only after Bashir has taken the office of President (23 September).
24.	12 Sept. 1982	Meeting of DM-Bashir.	The joint operations for mopping up the remaining terrorists were agreed upon (Report to Cabinet Session, 16 Sept. 1982).
25.	15 Sept. 1982	C-o-S & Head of Tevel meeting with leaders of the Lebanese Forces.	The Phalangists received THE IDF's plans to enter Beirut and expressed readiness to cooperate. An Israeli liaison man was placed by the C-o-S of the Lebanese Forces (Army?).
26.	15 Sept. 1982	DM meeting with the leadership of the Khatib Party.	Coordination with the Phalangists to affect their entry into West Beirut following the IDF.
27.	15 Sept. 1982	Meeting of General Drori and staff officers of Northern Command with Fade Frem and Elie Hobeika.	It was agreed that the Phalangists would enter the camps on Friday afternoon.
28.	16 Sept. 1982	Meeting of General Drori with the commanders of the Phalangists.	The Phalangists report that they will be ready for introduction by evening.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Reference Detailed</u>
29.	16 Sept. 1982	Meeting of Brigadier Yaron with commanders of the Phalangists.	Coordination of the entry points into the camps, as well as additional issues relevant to their entry into the camps.
30.	16 Sept. 1982	Cabinet Session.	The DM reports about the introduction of the Phalangists into Sabra and the intention to continue into Shatilla.

Meeting between the C-o-S, Johnny Abdu and
Bashir Gemayel, 16 June 1982 afternoon
(Also participating: Chief of Northern Command,
the Division's commander, Mossad's representatives
and two advisors to Bashir: Zahi Bustani, and Jean Nader)

Bashir presented his well known position: We are fighting to liberate Lebanon against the common enemy, and this is the first official contact between Israel and the formal Lebanese establishment. They (Christians) would like to maintain direct contact rather than in Ras al Nakurah or via UNIFIL.

Johnny Abdu presented the operational plan desired by them. He noted that the IDF has to continue besieging Beirut and apply pressure in order to help find a political solution and the political process itself.

Our (Israeli) declarations that we won't go in are unhelpful since they reinforce esprit de corps of the Palestinians and Muslims and interfere with the political process. In his opinion the IDF has to continue its air strikes on the city as the artillery bombardments are of little effect, given that the terrorists have become used to it.

It is important that we refrain from pressing for too fast a progress in the internal political area. The process has its own momentum and it needs to go through the necessary stages so that Bashir could become president of Lebanon legally and with the support of the Muslim community.

Johnny Abdu is aware of the discussions about the MLF, but no one believes this is a good solution. The country would once again be divided since the Arab countries are still motivated and have not yet digested the transformation in Lebanon in the wake of the IDF's invasion. Lebanon is a country which renders services, therefore it is incumbent that it has a strong President and that Bashir could undertake this mission. Abdu believes Bashir needs Muslim support otherwise he will be unable to handle the affairs of the state and the contacts with moderate Arab countries. He dwelt on the difficulties inherent in the political system of Lebanon.

The C-o-S asked where was the point of origin and stated that there was no need to dwell on the past, because we had passed this point already. Beirut should not remain in the present situation, and he agrees with Abdu's assessment that the military pressure should continue--in order to undermine the morale of the terrorists and Muslims. We are ready to provide the necessary support. At the same time, we are ready to let the Syrians and terrorists get out. The Syrians could even withdraw northward with their arms.

Abdu explained that the Syrians do not trust us (Israelis), since we hit tank convoys of theirs, thus they prefer to fortify for defense. They prefer to be killed in this position rather than be done with on the roads.

The C-o-S asserted that the Syrians in Beirut are of secondary importance only as they were not a military factor.

Abdu concurred and argued that the bigger problem is that of the Palestinians. We (Israel) have to find a way to finish the Palestinian problem in West Beirut. Israel should not withdraw before all the Syrians were evacuated and before a strong central government has emerged, including a strong Lebanese Army. Abdu knows the Syrians well and expects them to begin terrorist and infiltration activity.

Abdu proposed a plan of action consisting of three stages:

A. Formation of a "National Salvation Council" which could politically represent the Lebanese Army and would enter Beirut in cooperation with Bashir's forces. It would be a mistake not to seek the support of the Muslims, as the impression would be created that the new government was formed because of Israeli pressure. Israel had erred when it stated even before such a statement was made in Lebanon itself, that a strong government has to be established.

B. The Lebanese Army together with Bashir's forces would enter Beirut, following military pressure to undermine the morale of its population, in order to take control of the main centers.

C. The new government would ask the Palestinians not to walk the streets armed while promising political freedom for the PLO: this freedom it will limit by laws (press and other) and would demand that the Palestinians act in conformity with Lebanon's interests. If a Palestinian carries weapons he would be shot by the Army. But in order to shoot him the Army needs a political cover. Abdu said he knows this formula would be rejected by us and might seem superficial, but he is also aware of how one should act in Lebanon: There are things which might seem insignificant but rather important in Lebanon. It is important to persuade the Muslim community to support every step of the government. The new government needs to acquire an image that it saved Beirut from destruction and the hands of the IDF.

Abdu explained that in the wake of every Israeli retaliation or foray into Lebanon inter-communal fighting has erupted. Thus, if the IDF withdraws from Lebanon, in the wake of an operation of this magnitude, without solving the problem--it would have a negative impact on the Muslims. It is difficult for the Lebanese Army to conduct a massacre in the refugee camps, since many Muslims (some 70%) are serving in it. (This point is apparently explanation of point B. of Abdu's plan: urging introduction of the

Lebanese Army into the city as a relatively safe operation: no massacre likely because of the internal composition of the Army).

Abdu added that the Lebanese Army would take control of the main axis leading into the camps thus surrounding them militarily and politically. A strong government would be able to handle them forcefully, given the complexities of Lebanese politics.

The C-o-S inquired as to how long would all of those stages take. He would be ready to thin out IDF forces around Beirut if Abdu requests this and it serves his (Abdu's) interest.

Abdu reiterated his request that we continue the military pressure and professed no interest in us leaving. He is aware that we are under pressure, primarily economic and is ready to ask the U.S. to help us in this respect.

Abdu added that in the new cabinet Bashir would serve as an Interior Minister. Thus he needs Muslim support to establish the legal basis for him becoming President. He cannot afford to be seen as an Israeli puppet.

The C-o-S mentioned Haig's telling our ambassador that the terrorists in West Beirut have to be eliminated. We are ready that the terrorists withdraw by sea or on land. The C-o-S promised that we would keep any pledge given by the Christians and will not harm their national honor. If the Lebanese government commits itself we would accept it.

Abdu explained it was difficult to fix a timetable for a political clock. In the meantime it was incumbent that the "Lebanese Forces" won't be exposed to negative criticism by the Muslims.

The C-o-S proposed that the "Lebanese Forces" undertake small military operations with IDF support.