

Handwritten pages under the heading: Notes
(Apparently prepared by Kahan Commissions Staff)

1. On 4 July 1982 the Defense Minister has reported on the need for a joint operation with the Phalanges in order to prevent reequipment of the terrorists. (His statement at the Cabinet meeting No. 65, 1982, 4 July 1982, p. 2.)
2. The Defense Minister, in his statement at the Cabinet meeting of 18 July 1982, refers again to the Christian involvement. According to his estimate at the meeting "the Christians are involved in actual combat". He stresses that what counts is their actual involvement rather than military utility stemming from it (i.e., the political rather than military dimension). In his view "it signifies a moral and political step, and thus they should be involved in the fighting. That is what was made clear to them by the Prime Minister." (DM in Cabinet Meeting No. 68 of 18 July 1982, p. 7.)

At the Cabinet meeting of 21 September 1982, p. 12 Sharon reiterates the consensus existing between the ministers regarding the introduction of the Phalangists into the camps--"for many weeks the question was raised around this desk--why aren't the Phalanges entering, why won't they go in there?".

3. In the Cabinet meeting No. 77 from the 15 August 1982, the Defense Minister reports about terrorist preparations to leave behind massive bodies in Beirut (pp. 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11).

In the Cabinet meeting No. 76 of 12 August 1982 the DM reports "we have information that 2000-2500 terrorist were able to equip themselves with identity cards. Some of them are terrorist leaders, though not top leaders, but still of their leaders". (Ibid. pp. 8, 9)

4. See attached paper: cooperation with Jumail regarding entering into Beirut, according to Cabinet meetings from 16 September 1982, and 19 September 1982.
5. See attached paper, who decided on the entering into Beirut. Cabinet meeting of 16 September 1982.
6. In the Cabinet meeting No. 84 of 16 September 1982, the Defense Minister reports that in the absence of a clean out operation against the terrorists, we will not accomplish our goal of establishing "an open and secure city", and there is concern that the terrorist will return and recapture their positions. We will then face again a divided city. Necessary to prevent a situation whereby Beirut would once again become a divided city. The DM statement at the Knesset's session of 22 September 1982, "It was clear that those

terrorists who did not hand over their weapons were holding various positions especially in the Phakahani area, Sabra/Shatilah--the terrorist centers." And this in the context of increased opposition.

7. At the Knesset's session of 22 September 1982, the Defense Minister reports that a discussion was held with the staff of the Phalanges in which the C-o-S took part and in which "the principle of their entering into the camps was talked about".
8. The Defense Minister confirms this fact in his statement to the Knesset on 22 September 1982 as follows:
"In the order received by the Command (apparently the Northern Command of the IDF) regarding the capturing of the City's West it was said among other things: Entry into the camps is forbidden. Combing and cleaning out by the Phalangists or the Lebanese Army".
9. In the Cabinet session of 19 September 1982, p. 9 the Defense Minister clarifies that at the time of the IDF's entry into Beirut it was made clear to the Government that "It won't enter the terrorists camps, and we made this plain at the Cabinet meeting as well".
10. The statement of the Defense Minister at the Knesset's session of 22 September 1982 makes a reference to the

considerable terrorist force in these camps. In the Cabinet session of 16 September 1982, p. 12 the DM says, regarding his demand from the Lebanese Army to enter Beirut, that it is impossible to accept their argument "at the expense of the lives of our soldiers". Similarly, the C-o-S at the Knesset's Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee on 14 September 1982, states: "In Lebanon we conducted combat in buildup areas only in the refugee camps . . . What was well organized and fortified were the refugee camps, and there was no intention to enter these in Beirut".

11. The Defense Minister speaking at the Knesset's Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee on June 1982, p. 18: "A terrorist who gets out today is immediately apprehended. They identify the terrorists. They sit with us. They are much better than us in this regard". Similarly, the DM in the same forum of 27 June 1982, p. 6: "I prefer that the cleaning out of terrorists would be carried out by them. They identify them better than us. He recognizes him by the dialect, whether he is new or not, Palestinian or not, they deal with it all the time".

12. Knesset's Defense & Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 June 1982, p. 11, the C-o-S we gave our consent to the introduction of the Phalangists into Beit Adin, following their word of honor and under our supervision. They are characterized by "order and obedience". (Gen.) Sagi in the same forum 9 June 1982, "We asked Bashir to refrain from seizing the opportunity, not to take the initiative and to sit quietly". Same forum, the DM on 15 July 1982, p. 9 reports that he personally gave the Phalange an unequivocal order not to open fire in Beirut "without a clearcut instruction from us". In his statement at the Knesset on 22 September 1982, the DM stresses the good experience with the Phalangists in the past, and goes on to argue that in general (. . . . missing)
13. Close contacts with the Phalangists continued following the assassination of Bashir. The DM in the Cabinet meeting No. 84, 16 September 1982, p. 9.
14. In the Knesset session of 22 September 1982, the DM reiterates the sharp and unmistakable warnings given to the Phalangists.

15. See attached pages on the information received by the IDF and the intelligence community and description of events: statements by the DM on 16, 19, 21 September 1982 and his statement in the Knesset on 22 September 1982.

A Schematic Look at the Evolution of
Developments Pertaining to West Beirut

(Prepared by Kahan Commission Staff?)

1. The cooperation with the Phalangists and the idea of encouraging them to act to liberate Lebanon is a concept existing for many years and part of an overall political plan designed to bring establishment of a free Lebanon under Christian rule. (Need to base this assertion on Mosad's documents.)
2. Within the framework of the "Pines" plan (presented fully in December 1981 and in May 1982) the cooperation with the Phalangists and their activation against the terrorists in Beirut was assumed. ✓
3. The plan to have the Phalangists join in against the terrorist has two aspects--political and military.
4. In the Cabinet meeting of 15 June 1982 the issue of the activation of the Phalangists against the terrorists in Beirut was thoroughly discussed; a unanimous Cabinet authorization had been obtained and the IDF was instructed to act to realize this decision. |
5. In Cabinet sessions after the 15 June 1982 (apparently on 27 June 1982 and possibly in other sessions as well) the idea of activating the Phalangists against the

terrorists in Beirut resurfaces because of political and military considerations (the "Spark" concept).

6. During the months of June to mid-September 1982 intensive activity took place in both the political and operational level (political--meetings of the Prime Minister/Defense Minister with Bashir; operational--the meeting of the Defense Minister/IDF officers and Mosad representatives with Jumail and others) in order to encourage the Phalangists to act against the terrorists in Beirut.

At the conclusion of those meetings, in the wake of much hesitation, Bashir apparently agreed to start acting immediately following his taking the office of the President of Lebanon.

Throughout this period the following picture emerges: incessant pressure by military and political elements in Israel on the Phalangists to act, while the latter hesitate and use various evasive excuses--at the beginning due to military considerations and later on because of Lebanese domestic political reasons, i.e., Bashir's wish (close to his election and following it) to win pan-Lebanese support.

7. Bashir's assassination was threatening to bring down the entire political structure and undermine the

military plan which was years in preparation and operationally was put together over long months.

8. In West Beirut a military/political vacuum has been created and the danger emerged that it would be fulfilled by hostile forces; simultaneously blood feuds between opposing factions have erupted in Beirut. It should be remembered that we had information that in West Beirut a terrorist nucleus was still in existence as well as hostile leftist forces armed with heavy weapons which were not handed over to the Lebanese Army--thus abrogating the agreement with Habib. It might be recalled that Bashir's plan was to enter West Beirut anyway and capture the terrorists and their weapons so as to control the two parts of the city. However, with Bashir's assassination an urgent need emerged to deal with the terrorist nucleus and to seize dominant positions to control West Beirut. This in order to achieve the following objectives:

A. Preventing blood feuds which threatened to throw the city back into chaos.

B. Cleaning the city out of terrorists and heavy weapons to follow the political/military plan which

still in place and which remained unquestioned throughout that period.

9. Immediately following Bashir's assassination a Christian agreement to act against the terrorists was established since Bashir's hesitations regarding the Lebanese domestic political scene have vanished and the Christians have also understood that time was running out.
10. It is necessary to add that the need to act against the camps was a direct result of the decision to enter into West Beirut, which was made for two reasons:
 - A. Because of the principal need to clean out the camps of terrorists and heavy weapons which could serve as an infrastructure for a hostile control of West Beirut.
 - B. Because of an immediate military consideration (one of the existing possibilities) to stop the constant fire directed against IDF soldiers and which threatened their lives.
11. When we come to summarize the issue of the introduction of the Phalangists into the camps, we need to note:
 - A. The decision (in handwrite a question mark had been added) was reached in the most senior forum

of the State of Israel--the general Cabinet session including the participation of all the relevant advisors--deputy head of Mosad, Chief of Aman, Chief of Shin Beit, the Prime Minister's Advisor for Combatting Terrorism, the C-o-S.

B. The decision was part of an overall political plan.

C. The military was incessantly acting to put this decision into practice, including with the cooperation of the political level.

D. Execution of the decision was facilitated by emergence of a political/military opportunity, simultaneously with a political/military need to carry out the decision.

E. The start of the execution of the decision was reported by the DM and the C-o-S to the Cabinet and at the same session no decision was taken to modify the earlier one regarding this issue (however one reservation was made by David Levi).

In the Cabinet Session of 19 September 1982, the Prime Minister asserted that the Government had not taken issue with the report it received in real time, and none of the ministers had proposed to put the issue to vote, to get an operational

decision which would stop the chain of events about which reports were made.

12. It thus seems that the reports delivered to the Cabinet by the C-o-S and the DM were reports indicating achievements, i.e., reports indicating that the Government's instruction to the IDF to activate the Phalangists had been carried out.

13. There is no doubt that the operational forum which decided about the timing of the Phalangists' introduction into the camps (the DM, C-o-S, Chief of Aman, Chief of Northern Command, a Mosad representative, the Shin Beit and others) was aware of the possibility that the Phalangists' cleaning out operation could be associated with hits on civilians; however the occurrence of such deeds was deemed of low probability, and on a very limited scope--if at all. This because of the following reasons:

A. The Phalangists command and some of their soldiers benefited--for a relatively long period--from Israeli military instruction and education; the Phalangists' command and their soldiers were persons of high caliber and well known personally to IDF command and the security elements. Seemingly, acquaintance with the

individual personalities and their cultural nature, did not leave room for an assumption that they were capable of such horrifying deeds which occurred. (A handwritten note: the Chief of Aman and the C-o-S--this is the natural norm of fighting in Lebanon.)

B. The security elements had information that during independent Phalangists operations they were not strict about preventing hits on civilians; however such occurrences did not take place when the Phalangists operated in conjunction with and/or under Israeli command. In all operations which were coordinated and/or under Israeli command the Phalangists conducted themselves as a military unit in every respect, including strict observance of military conduct and obedience, full compliance with IDF orders and pedantic execution of agreements on joint missions which were made with the IDF and other security elements. (A handwritten note: what operations? there were no joint operations)

C. The considerable chance which Amin Jumail had to succeed his brother was likely to moderate the attitude of the Phalangists toward the other communities in Lebanon; Amin was known for not

being an extremist leader, part of the central stream and a man of compromise and in those days he was aspiring for a national consensus and intersectorian support for his forthcoming nomination.

14. Due to the above consideration a recognition that the probability of hitting civilians was low, or--if at all--on a very limited scope, has been formed. Intelligence experts and elements which specialized in holding contacts with the Phalangists and in knowing them, did not find it appropriate to draw the forum's attention to a different, or another, probability rate or to a different scope of expectant hits on civilians, and the decision-making forum weighed its moves based on the assumption that there was a low probability of hits on civilians, and if at all, on a very limited scope. (Underlined in original)
15. Against this assumption the immediate political/military need was weighed regarding the introduction of the Phalangists and so it was decided.
16. As a precautionary step designed to prevent hits on civilians--based on the above assumption--regarding the probability and scope of such deeds--the IDF found it

appropriate to warn the Phalangists' HQ several times about strict safeguarding of the safety of civilians and other nonfighting forces, and a pledge from the Phalange HQ regarding such strict observance was obtained.

A pledge which, based on past experience, it could have been assumed would be kept.

17. The Phalangists entered the camps on Thursday 16 September 1982 around sunset; we do not possess formal military information (original underline) as to when IDF units found about the ongoing massacre, what actions did they take to stop it and when were these actions undertaken. All our information on this issue comes from indirect sources and from discussions among officers.
18. Briefly, the information coming from this sources indicates that still on Thursday night (16 Sept.) and on Friday (17 Sept.)--during the night information had reached the Chief of Northern Command and senior IDF Officers in the area, rumors--from soldiers--on horrifying deeds in the camps; the Chief of Northern Command met twice during that Friday (17 Sept.), around noon (about 12:00PM) and in the afternoon, about 16:00 (4:00PM)--together with the C-o-S--and in those

meetings it was alleged that it was demanded that the Phalangists would immediately cease fire and get out of the camps the next day, Saturday 18 September 1982, during morning hours.

19. The fact that something wrong happened in the camps was brought to the attention of the Defense Minister on Friday 17 September 1982, by the C-o-S.

20. During the evening hours or night, reportage of this fact was accompanied by a message that these inappropriate deeds were stopped. Later on--during the same night--the Defense Minister was informed by a television reporter that a massacre had been--or was being--committed in the camps. Apparently, based on the information currently in our possession, it would seem that IDF elements:

A. Did not draw immediate conclusions from the information provided about the massacre and delayed--in an unreasonable manner--the handling that such information necessitates.

B. Did not take reasonable measures to stop immediately the horrifying deeds.

(These could be notes of prepared testimony of some senior IDF commander (the C-o-S?) or perhaps Sharon? or the Kahan Commission's Staff itself.)

Document

1. The "Lebanese Forces" is the name for the military arm of the Lebanese Kataib Party; a party in which there is a political leadership and a military force which is controlled by it. In the beginning there were forces of the Lebanese armed militia that served the political goals of the Maronite Christian faction in Lebanon under the leadership of the Gemayel family. According to the following description, the "Lebanese Forces" attempted to improve in order [that] the political leadership be crystalized and institutionalized in possessing a clear and purposeful political understanding and under which the well-controlled and disciplined military body will be used to realize political goals desirable to the same leadership.

During the years 1975-1982 two components of the Lebanese Forces were improved: the family leadership developed into a political organization in which there was a clear division of sovereignty [responsibility] between different people [illegible] fostering good ties inside Lebanon and with clear effects of "a government". [They] also improved the military wing of government: the armed militia solidified itself with organizational and functional characteristics of a regular army [footnote, Defense minister, session 6 p.11, session 7, p.1]

2. At the beginning of 1975 the first of the connections between Israel and the "Lebanese Forces" began. The first were arms deals and secret meetings. Political and military coordination developed. Israel, in recent years, found that the alliance between it and the "Lebanese Forces" was capable, in the future, of bringing peaceful relations with Lebanon and the investment in such a great pumping of money, equipment, in thought and action in the name of nurturing the "Lebanese Forces" and their altering th central political and military power in Lebanon. [was worthwhile]

To this end military equipment equalling approx. \$118.5 million was supplied to them. 1300 of them received military training in Israel. Political meetings [took place] with key people in Israel and the Kataib leadership joined together and the military-political link was a matter of process. [fn. c-of-s]

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3. The same processes of cultivating and investing in the "Lebanese Forces" led to their acquiring the military standards of th IDF. Their men were trained, based on Israeli military education from the basic level of preparing

fighters up to the high command level at the IDF's Command College. The personal contacts between IDF commanders and the Lebanese Forces commanders accelerated the level of acquaintance among the people and the "alliance in principle" was materialized due to the informal work relationship between IDF soldiers and officers and the Lebanese Forces' soldiers and officers.

This cooperation reached its zenith January 1982 when Israel formed a political-strategic alliance with the political leadership of the Kataib which included far reaching political agreements and military coordination for future military action. At the same time the Kataib assumed the characteristics of a "future leadership" which meant a political leadership possessing a national outlook and a disciplined military force, well trained, which has an adequate infrastructure and has the qualities for a future Lebanese Army. [fn. Defense Minister, session 7, pp. 3-5, and Foreign Minister, session 45, p. 1226]

4. The development of the Kataib from a patrimonial-type leadership which has a militia at its disposal into a national political leadership which has a central military power fundamentally changed the relationship of the Kataib to the rest of the Lebanese population. The feelings shared by the Kataib leadership that in the near future they would become the leaders of Lebanon strengthened their desire to enlist the support of the entire Lebanese population. It was clear to them that without the wide support of the population with its various factions they wouldn't be able to form a stable regime. This feeling caused a sense of responsibility regarding the entire Lebanese population, including the large Palestinian minority which supported the Arab world in general and the Lebanese Moslems in particular. Therefore despite their hostility towards the Palestinians they had to succumb to the idea of accepting the presence of the Palestinian population in Lebanon and at the same time to find a reasonable modus vivendi with the Arab world and the international community

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5. The aforementioned communal development was detected in the personal style of Bashir Gemayel who started as an emotional leader of a gang, full of hatred [evolving] to a relatively prudent and cautious political leader. As time went on his actions, despite his rhetoric, became moderate. His political prudence grew and his impulses were checked by a realistic outlook of a leader of "all Lebanese". The same process of "new galvanization" also characterized the entire Kataib leadership. Pierre Gemayel and his son Amin developed a pan-Moslem orientation-typically Arab which

did not match Bashir's outlook. [fn. Defense Minister, session 6, p. 22, session 7; Admoni, session 4 p. 19, session 51, p. 1138; Navot, session 12, pp. 33-36]

6. The political military alliance between Israel and the Kataib materialized in the "Peace for Galilee" war. During the planning stages of the war the possibility was raised that the Lebanese Forces would have a part in the war parallel to the IDF or under it. Fighting duties were assigned in the Beirut region, and circumstances under which the IDF did not want to get involved directly. This idea of involving the Lebanese forces received a "national consensus" by all parts of the Israeli government. During the "Peace for Galilee" operation the Phalange were activated to fight in duties spelled out by the IDF. During the first part of the war the IDF refrained from using the Lebanese forces because of operative considerations. But when the war reached the Beirut area, the need arose for urban warfare, a greater use was made of the Lebanese Forces, including the neighborhoods of Rihan, Science College, Gamhour Junction, Hamdoun, Alei, Souk al Gharb, and Beit ad-Din. In all these areas the Lebanese Forces acted in coordination with and close to IDF units. The IDF soldiers and officers had ample opportunity to get acquainted with the standard of fighting of the Lebanese Forces and to note that while they fight according to IDF instructions or near IDF units, they act like a regular army including fair treatment of civilian population even if the civilian population consists of hostile elements.

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- A. That their political leadership has total control over their forces.
- B. That the forces themselves are acting in a manner of restraint towards the non fighting civilian population and are adapting themselves, more or less, to the IDF's standards of fighting to which they are well acquainted.
- C. That they obey the IDF's orders and instructions and follow up on the arrangement reached with the IDF command concerning the manner of operation.

7. Despite this the IDF did not get much benefit from the Lebanese Forces. They proved to be of a lower military capability than previously attributed to them and especially their hesitation to fight shoulder to shoulder with the "Jewish side" as a result of that pragmatic view described above and in light of those instructions received by their political leadership. [fn. Hupl, session 1, pp. 28-30; chief-of-staff, session 57, p. 1691]

8. Such hesitation in the level of cooperation led to their Israeli partners feeling that they were ungrateful and demanded that they continue to fulfill their part of the deal. This was especially true in the urban region of Beirut. The sum total of observations which was held by the IDF in relation to the Lebanese Forces' performance was:
- A. doubt concernin the operative ability and their willingness to fight.
 - B. a reasonable level of keeping with normal fighting standards concening civilian populations.

Indeed, a review of the material before this committee will show that those who knew about the fighting standards of the Lebanese Forces while cooperating with the IDF testified that not even in a single case did the Lebanese Forces violate IDF standards of conduct regarding civilian population as long as they fought in coordination with the IDF or near it.

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Excerpts from witnesses.

"...since that same meeting of 15 July, the Phalange carried out certain military activities with our agreement and they gave no reason to complain. We saw in them disciplined military units..."

Prime Minister, session 21 pp. 7-10

"...and in addition to that I should say that in every action in which Lebanese Forces units were brought in under IDF guidance and by IDF permission they acted as military units in every way in keeping with behavior. I should say more or less [it is] accepted, I would even define it as reasonable in Lebanese terms..."

The Defense Minister, session 6, p. 16; session 7. p. 63.

"...he had in (his) conscience that because of the closeness of our forces they could not resort to acts like these..."

"...our forces were around and when we were with them they always behaved very well..."

Chief-of-staff, session 57, p. 1659

"...they were our partner in operations that they did in coordination with us - they carried them out well - in the same scope and in the same approach and extent of corroboration that they have from the standpoint of activities of a military force, but definetly without any hint in this direction..."

Chief-of-staff, Levy, session 30, p. 949

"...together with this I must say about all our behavior - I must point out that during operation "Peace for Galilee" when the Phalange operated under the aegis of the IDF, that is to say under the control of the IDF in the field, there were no

Incidents of massacre..."
Sagui, session 4, p. 11.

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"...in those places where they cooperated with us or coordinated their actions during the "Peace for Galilee" operation, no unusual incidents occurred regarding the behavior of civilians..."
Chief, Northern Command, meeting 9, p. 8.

"...They agreed to take Israeli standards of conduct because they worked with us and accepted our authority in this regard..."
General Yaron, session 10, p. 13.

"...and the second thing which was part of our operation, was that in prior events they took part in the fighting. During the war there were 10 such incidents if I remember correctly. They behaved like a normal military unit, with uniforms, communications, orders, etc, and acted according to acceptable standards..."
Sagui, session 2, p. 24.

"...therefore, there is a separation between given situations whereby a Christian system is at work, fueled by feelings of revenge... when nobody is near by [on one hand]... and a restricted system which is coordinated by the IDF for the purpose of executing a mission [on the other]..."
Gilboa, meeting 39, p. 1120.

"...usually in our operations they acted according to our standards and it worked throughout the war..."
Gilboa

"...in the operation 'peace for Galilee' they operated under our supervision indeed there were cases where we had to intervene but no action was serious..."
Intelligence commander, Northern Command, Tsorich Moshe.

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"...but during this war we didn't know that they acted like this (like murderers)..."
Tsorich Moshe, session 51, p. 2.

"...during past joint operations we did not face such a problem (harming civilian populations)..."
Commander 35th Battalion, Yair, session 35, p. 1010.

"...I worked with the Phalange during the war in the Sidon area for two months and they were orderly. We had a good experience with them..."

Amnon Shaked, Mossad.

And so is the testimony of Lt. General Naftali Bahiri, Micha Tamir and many other witnesses.

9. What emerges out of the collection, is that until the murder of Bashir on Sept 14, 1982 in the evening, (the time of the murder is taken here only as an indicator), it became an accepted notice to the Israeli government, the High Command and the intelligence community that deploying the Christian forces does not cause a problem of revenge or bloodshed vis-a-vis the civilian population. Such a possibility (the massacre) - in the context of intra Lebanese developments - were regarded as unacceptable. One has to pay attention to the fact that on the eve of Bashir's murder, he was the elected president of Lebanon who was going to assume office within a few days as the president of "all Lebanese". The same measure of responsibility which the Christians exhibited in the past toward the civilian population, if nothing else, had to grow because of their expected status as the basis of the Lebanese Army.

10. Was there, after Bashir's murder, a danger of revenge or bloodshed to the Palestinian community? Was there a change as a result of the murder in the behavior of the Lebanese Forces vis-a-vis the civilian population? Examining this question is required -in a pressing way- because the circumstances requiring the IDF's entrance into West Beirut are specified below:

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A. When Israel saw that, despite the agreement concerning the evacuation of the terrorists, there remained in West Beirut at the refugee camps about 2000 armed terrorists disguised as civilians who could be the base for the reorganization of the the terrorist force in Beirut, the mission was given to the Lebanese Army or to the Lebanese Forces under the command of Bashir Gemayel (who was the official president of Lebanon), to remove the terrorist strongholds. Such was the agreement reached between Israel and Bashir and was supposed to be executed following Bashir's assuming the presidency. [fn. Defense Minister, session 7, p. 21; chief-of-staff, session 5, p. 17, 26; Admoni, session 51, pp. 1430-1432, Yoal, announcement 141]

B. When Bashir was murdered it became clear to Israel that a doubt was raised as to who will execute the mission of removing the remaining terrorist strongholds in Beirut. Bashir was no longer present. The future of the Lebanese Forces as a body which could carry out this mission was also in doubt. Therefore, the Israeli government instructed the

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IDF to enter West Beirut and position itself around key points which will entail controlling West Beirut in general and around the refugee camps in particular. In the second stage - but as early as possible - to deploy a military force into the refugee camps to remove the terrorists and to execute what Gemayel was going to do had he been alive as a president. [fn. Defense Minister, session 7, pp. 53,62; Admoni, session 4, pp. 12,15]

C. Executing this mission was seen as an immediate necessity since the murder created a military and political vacuum. Whomever takes advantage of this could have achieved a decisive political victory. The fate of one of the main objectives of the "Peace for Galilee" namely the removal of the terrorists from Beirut, the destruction of their infrastructure and the preparation of the city for a sovereign Lebanese government, sympathetic to Israel--all this was in danger of being lost. [fn. Defense Minister, session 7, p. 58]

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Therefore, it was immediately decided that:

1. The IDF will assume key positions around West Beirut and will position itself to deploy a military force into central West Beirut and into the terrorist strongholds - the refugee camps.

2. A force will be chosen as soon as possible to enter the camps for cleansing them as stated above.

D. The choice of the military force which would be deployed in the refugee camps was dictated by several factors:

1. The character of the mission--which required a systematic search of the camps, identifying terrorists disguised as civilians, locating bunkers, tunnels, weapons caches and capturing military equipment. The force which will have a decisive advantage in this regard would be the one that knows the inhabitants of the camps, knows their existence and can distinguish between a terrorist and a civilian.

2. The desire not to complicate the IDF in such an operation which meant fighting in a dense urban, highly populated region which would lead to a high number of casualties.

3. Another consideration, to a lesser extent though, was the desire to cooperate with Lebanese in the fight for their city.

11. The Lebanese Army was the most suited candidate for this mission because of its military ability to execute this mission without prior preparation for mobilization and early evaluations. In spite of the positive experience with the Lebanese Army in a similar action in the refugee camp of Burs al Barajna as well as the political achievement entailed in

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such a move, the Lebanese Army consistently refused to participate, among other reasons, because of the American intervention--and there was no real chance of moving it from its negative position in the time limit set for the urgent mission.

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It remained, therefore, that the Lebanese Forces, was the most desirable candidate for this mission, to participate in the war to conquer West Beirut and to cleanse it of terrorists--if there would be a need for a measure such as this - it is a matter which was discussed at various levels and decided upon by the government of Israel, among other things, on 6/15/82. [fn. cabinet meetings on 6/15/82; testimony of the Prime Minister, session 20, pp. 3-6] The military application of the gov. decision was put forward.

12. Therefore, because of the aforementioned reasons, an opportunity presented itself for executing the mission. When the Lebanese Army refused to enter into the refugee camps, the chief-of-staff contacted the Lebanese Forces early in the morning of 15 September and asked, or instructed, according to his definition, that they mobilize their troops and get ready to enter into the refugee camps for the purpose of executing the above-stated mission. They agreed and announced that they would deploy within 24 hours following an operational coordination with the Northern Command headquarter and the division.

The chief-of-staff's orders were the military application of a few-months-old political decision agreed upon and accepted by all. Namely, in the expected scenario of cleansing West Beirut of the terrorists a possible use be made of the Lebanese Army or the Lebanese Forces.

The chief-of-staff claims that he raised for the first time the possibility of deploying the Lebanese Forces in an informal meeting with the Defense Minister on Monday 14 September 1982. "...in the meeting with the Defense Minister, I do not know or me the Defense Minister cannot say I am willing to take what I have said..." [sic] [fn. chief-of-staff, session 4, p. 40]

Contrary to this, the Defense Minister says that such a possibility was raised for the first time in his meeting with the chief-of-staff in the headquarters of the 96th division on 15 September 1982, when the chief-of-staff reported to him on the agreement of the Lebanese Forces to execute the mission, as stated above. He, the Minister, approved what was agreed by someone else one way or other. Even if the chief of staff got the consent of the Lebanese Forces

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Prior to his meeting with the Minister, the chief-of-staff violated an agreement and principles accepted by the Israeli

government and the entire defense system.

13. Let the date of mentioning this idea as it is, it becomes clear that until the Lebanese Forces agreed, it was only an idea. But once they agreed to execute the plan it became a fact. The chief-of-staff reported about it to the Defense Minister in the headquarters of the 96th Division on the details of the agreement which was reached:

A. putting a curfew on the sections of the city which were controlled by them.

B. general mobilization of all the forces.

C. entering - the following day, after consultation with the headquarters and the division of the refugee camps. Following the discussion of this subject--and other subjects during the same meeting--the Minister summarizes the deliberations and approves, inter alia, that the Lebanese Forces enter into the refugee neighborhoods and instructs that they will do so under the supervision of the IDF. This agreement was put into writing the following day in a document which is called "The agreement of the Defense Minister of 15 September 1982" it was signed by the Minister's aide.

Document
(end of P.11)

14. When the Defense Minister approved in principle the deployment of the Lebanese Forces into the refugee neighborhoods to wipe out the refugee strongholds, it had to be coordinated and controlled by the Northern Command and the 96th division. By doing so, the chief of staff activates the military "battle procedure" even in the area of the general staff's work--namely the examination of the various aspects of the above stated order--even on the tactical-operational level by the instructions of the chief of Northern Command to meet in the headquarters of the Lebanese Forces in order to examine the plans and to approve them. [fn. Chief of staff, session 5, p. 42]

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15. At the general staff level the Chief of Staff instructed his deputy, Gen. Moshe Levy, to return to the headquarters in Tel Aviv and organize a forum which was previously known as the "forum of division chiefs" which included among others the heads of all divisions in the high command as well as professional officers according to need. This constitutes the largest and the most senior forum of the IDF in the areas of deliberation and planning. The military plans for continuing activities in West Beirut area are presented to those who were present and among other topics, the plan to deploy the Lebanese Forces in the refugee camps for the purpose of searching and cleansing them of terrorists was presented. Among the participants General Moshe Gilboa, in charge of Intelligence, Research, and Estimates in the Military Intelligence of the IDF was present. That officer prepared, during the early morning of that day, a special intelligence report dealing with the consequences of Bashir's murder (M-25) and it was assured that he was aware, at that time, of the possible consequences of such an event (the murder). When the plan to deploy the Lebanese Forces into the camps was presented to him he did not raise even a hint or a fear of revenge or bloodshed by the Lebanese Forces on the civilian population. This was not in vain since the person in charge of Military Research, and Estimates had a definite opinion on this matter.

"A second thing--I separate--these are the types of actions that they do with our forces. Throughout the period from June onward, there were joint plans with the Phalange to conquer one place or another, a block of buildings in Burg el-Barasna, in Tilay, Beirut. Therefore, there is a Christian system which was motivated, at that time, by feelings of

revenge--such driving motives or others, past experiences, when no one is near and it faces other factors--such as a limited system, more or less, coordinated under the supervision of the IDF to execute a mission" Amos Gilboa 39th session, p. 1120

One should not suspect, however, that General Gilboa did not properly pay attention to the above presented plan, as it happened from time to time in his direct command--since when he returned that same day from the forum he updated the division chiefs in the Intelligence Headquarters for research. In a meeting which took place at night he reported that tonight, Sept. 15, 1982 the Lebanese Forces would enter into the camps. By doing so, this update which was "totally guaranteed" (was reported by) major Aharon Boneh, head of division in military intelligence and research, that he took part in that meeting.

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Deputy Chief of Intelligence for research takes an active role in the deliberation of the division chiefs at the general staff meetings and states his opinion on a variety of matters which were discussed. He does not voice any hesitation, warning, or anything else which would present a certain danger emanating from the activities of the Lebanese Forces. Also, he does not raise the necessity of convening a special deliberation or assessment of the situation which would be solely devoted to that despite the power and the duty to do so, had he seen a need to do that [Chief of staff, session 57, p. 1687]:

"In the meeting with the division chiefs we deliberated on what we are doing, what is the plan, and among others, the Phalange entering the camps. The IDF's plan is this and that--and the phalange are entering the camps. Whoever wants to discuss this subject, like any other subject, had ample opportunity. Whoever was there, for example, whoever was not satisfied on any subject in the deliberations could have come directly and told him, even without permission. This did not happen to anyone. [Chief of staff session 57 pp. 1681-1683.]

As stated above, the deputy chief of intelligence for research coordinates all the research and estimates of the intelligence branch. In fact he is the man who is in charge of "National intelligence estimates"; to his division comes all the information, conclusions, feelings, and even sensitivities, which are rooted in the entire national intelligence community and he is the man that knows, more than anyone else, that he has the duty to disagree, warn, and to object when plans which entail certain "danger" are presented to him. This is so because of the uniqueness of his expertise among other things, is to feel the existence of

such a danger in a place where others cannot do so.

The evaluation of deputy chief of intelligence for research [was] that Bashir Gemayel's murder does not constitute "a new circumstance" which requires abstaining from deploying the Lebanese Forces into the camps or even setting up a special session to deliberate the subject. The estimate of the IDF's intelligence branch and chief of intelligence General Yehoshua Sagui confirms that Bashir's murder did not bring to the world a "new Phalange" but rather caused "softer Phalange". In his additional testimony he repeats and confirms that indeed a "new Phalange" never came to light as a result of the murder and that the danger from the Lebanese Forces to the Palestinian Population did not increase as a result of the murder--

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but rather, "in the general estimates" even decreased. The main danger which that murder caused was particularly to the Murabitoun people, meaning the Lebanese leftist militias who were suspected, at that time, of committing the murder. The authoritative evaluation of the chief of Intelligence, which was expressed by deputy chief of intelligence for research in the meeting of chiefs on Sept 15, that there is no danger of revenge and bloodshed to the camps' inhabitants while the Lebanese Forces were active led the "clients" of the intelligence branch, (meaning the Prime minister and members of the Cabinet, including the Defense Minister, Chief of staff, the general staff and the entire command) to understand that Bashir's murder did not constitute a sufficient reason to reexamine a principle which was agreed on by everybody--the action of the Lebanese Forces linked to the IDF does not endanger an unarmed population; and indeed this evaluation was accepted by all those who took part or had a part in the decision to deploy the Lebanese Forces and its realization which will be specified below. The other IDF commanders who were present at the forum of the division chiefs including deputy chief of staff and head of operations who chaired the meeting, despite the fact they do not belong to the intelligence community, undoubtedly they were imbued with information, understanding and comprehensive experience of every aspect of the joint activity with the Lebanese Forces. Most of them or all of them knew throughout the years those forces, their officers, their manner of fighting, and could properly estimate their possible reactions. All these people did not find that this "new circumstance" meaning, the murder of Bashir Gemayel should become a factor to prevent the deployment the Lebanese Forces into the camps or even a reason for reevaluation. By the same token, even those tens of officers, despite the fact that they do not belong to that forum, agreed with that decision and

implemation. It should be said, even at this stage, that that joint estimate of the intelligence and research, chief of divisions' forum, the northern command, and the entire IDF had a correct evaluation, reasonable and properly rooted in the data which they possessed at that time; in the manner which will be specified below, the atrocities which occurred in the camps were so unexpected and unbelievable that all those on that respectable list of military personnel did not forecast and could not have forecasted such an occurrence.

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16. In the area of tactical/operational coordination: even here the military procedure of battle is being executed, chief of northern command leaves on Sept 15 in the late morning hours to the Headquarters of the Lebanese Forces in order to examine their operational plans and to approve them; since this plan did not satisfy them he told them that he will meet them again in the evening. Finally it was agreed that their officers will show up for final coordination of the specifics of the operation in the Headquarters of 96 division. The next day in the morning, in order that the operation would start around noontime. At the same time, the general staff's forum was convened. The next day (16 Sept) the leaders of the Phalange showed up at the Headquarters of the 96th division and presented their operational plans before the division chief. He, based on the orders which he received, examined the operational plans of the Lebanese Forces and changed them to achieve maximum utility while linking them to the IDF plans and to IDF's control over the entire operation, everything in a way that will be specified below. When the final approval for their operational plan was received the Lebanese Forces entered the camps on Monday Sept. 16 during the hours of 1800-1900. At that stage, a relatively small force entered the neighborhoods while mobilizing and preparing other forces which were supposed to enter the following day.

17. At the same time, in addition to the evaluation, procedure, planning and execution of the IDF, which were functioning properly, the Defense Minister took extra measures to examine and to evaluate the situation since in his opinion he had to take those steps: The Minister, accompanied by the chief of Intelligence and head of Shabak (general internal security) and later on Mr. Nahum Navot director of Tevel (world-Mossad) who coordinated the Lebanese subjects in the Mossad, left to area of operations to get a personal impression. In the Headquarters of the 96 division the chief of staff reports to the Defense minister that the Lebanese Forces agreed to enter into the neighborhoods. This

report was given to the minister while the chief of intelligence was present, who, based on his evaluation of the intelligence branch, as stated above, did not bring up any doubts, warning, or hesitation, of the planned activities. He does not raise the possibility of revenge and does not feel that there is a need for reevaluation of that plan.

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18. From there the minister and those who accompanied him, returned to the Headquarters of the Lebanese Forces. The minister reiterated to the officers (Lebanese Forces) the principles of the Israel government's position regarding political/military cooperation and again went over the main points of the plan to enter the camps, the way that they were instructed earlier by the chief of staff. The minister had the opportunity to get an impression of the commanders' moods, their level of control of their forces, and especially the absence of stormy feelings or revenge warnings. Had such warnings been voiced, they could have aroused a suspicion concerning the plan to enter the camps. From there the group goes to the house of Pierre Gemayel in Bekfaya. The minister and those who accompany him saw that despite the murder the political leadership of the Kataib maintains its composure and self restraint, especially Amin Gemayel who sits to the right of his father and in a conversation with him it became evident that he was well acquainted with the details of the political agreement reached with Bashir on 14 Sept 82. The conclusion is self evident. The political continuity remained [when] Amin inherited his brother position in the Kataib leadership, the forces are in total control and the entire system continued to function based on those principles and interests which guided it previously. The minister and those who accompanied him had every reason to assume that the murder affected them very severely but it could not change anything in the world view and the operational plans of the Kataib leadership. And since Amin Gemayel who is much softer toward the Palestinians than his brother was, should not introduce a new element of danger to the Palestinian population as a result of the activities of the Lebanese Forces.

19. While traveling in the city the minister and his entourage could observe the Lebanese Forces in the various road blockades and in other places and got an impression of the discipline, order, quite and controlled behavior of the Lebanese Forces, especially the total control of the officers over their men. It is important to note that such a visit which was conducted by the minister of Defense in the area of activities where he had a chance to get first hand experience

of them, their manner of speech, the state of their emotions, their manner of organization--such a visit was the best way to evaluate the situation following the murder and to study directly, not from others, the nature of the developments.

20. The next day on Sept 16 10:00am the minister convened in his office, the chief of staff, director of military intelligence, and other officers to discuss a variety of topics which are related to the operations in West Beirut. At the outset of the meeting the Chief of staff reviewed the situation and stated that "the entire city is in our hands, there is total silence, the camps are surrounded and closed and the Phalange are going to enter around 11:00 or 12:00--yesterday this was discussed with them (the Phalange)."

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Later on the minister reiterates the announcement of the chief of staff, "to the refugee camps I would deploy the Phalange"; the chief of staff announces that they have to arrive at 11 for coordination; the director of military intelligence takes an active part in the deliberations and states his opinion concerning the subjects that were discussed there. According to his version "he does not hear" the chief of staff's version at the beginning of the meeting and the minister's statement later on. But this is not so. Chief of military intelligence heard the things and agreed without any hesitation to the plan since his agreement, as stated earlier, properly represents the position of the military intelligence as well as his personal opinion as director of military intelligence according to which there is no reason not to allow the deployment of the Lebanese Forces into the camps since there is no danger of revenge or bloodshed to the population of the neighborhoods and there was no need to reevaluate.

21. In addition to the director of military intelligence, the defense minister incorporated, in his examination process, during the 15 of Sept. 2 senior representatives of the intelligence community--head of Shabak and head of Tevel (world) in the Mossad. This was done so all the evaluations and recommendations of the entire national intelligence were put forward to him. The head of Tevel, the witness, Nahom Navot accompanied the chief of staff in his meeting with the commanders of the Lebanese Forces on 15 Sept and even translated the chief of staff's instructions to them. Among others the order to deploy themselves and to enter into the neighborhoods. The witness, Navot, who is the highest authority in the Mossad when it comes to the subject of the Lebanese Forces, and his positions in this subject are the Mossad's position (and he) did not object, nor warn of a danger of revenge as a result of the planned activity and did not think that the murder of Bashir changed the existing

constellation with regard to the behavior of the Lebanese Forces toward the civilian population. When witness Navot was asked especially on this matter, whether any suspicion arose that after the murder of Bashir Gemayel the Lebanese Forces will slaughter in the camps, he answered decisively "absolutely not". He explained his answer very succinctly based on all the reasons which were mentioned above. The witness Navot accompanies the Defense Minister in his trips to Lebanese Forces headquarters and to Bekfaya, he heard-and even took minutes of the main points and brought to the knowledge of the minister his support of all the future plans. The director of Mossad himself despite the fact that he did not take part in the examination processes repeatedly confirms that the estimate

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of witness Navot of the planned activity reflected and still reflects the position of Mossad.

22. Concerning the position of director of Military intelligence in this regard- Unfortunately, the director of military intelligence hangs on to a greatly imprecise position in his stubbornness that he "did not know" about the plan to deploy the Lebanese Forces into the refugee camps. It emerges out of the evidence clearly that the director of military intelligence knew and heard about the plan in at least the following circumstances:

- A. in the headquarters of 96th division 15 Sept 1982 director of military intelligence was beside the Defense Minister while the chief of staff reported to the minister about the agreement which was reached in Lebanese Forces headquarters a few hours earlier about their deployment into the refugee camps; as it emerges out of the chief of staff's testimony it seems unreasonable that the chief of staff was not heard by the director of military intelligence.
- B. in the Lebanese Forces headquarters and later in the house of Pierre Gemayel in Bekfaya the defense minister updated those who were present including director of military intelligence concerning the agreement which was reached between the chief of staff and the commanders of the Lebanese Forces in the morning of that day.
- C. in the accidental meeting between the defense minister and his entourage and commander of the Northern command, updated the minister including the chief of military intelligence concerning the plan of operations - including the plans for the deployment of Lebanese Forces into the refugee camps; the head of military intelligence was in the company of the officers who were examining the maps and Gen. Drori in his testimony confirms clearly that indeed during that time the plan to deploy the Lebanese Forces into the refugee camps was raised.
- D. In the operations forum of the defense minister on 16

Sept. the director of military intelligence was present when the chief of staff announced unequivocally and clearly that the Lebanese Forces are going to enter into the camps in the next few hours. It seems very unreasonable that such an explicit message was not received by the chief of military intelligence.

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E. on Friday 17 Sept 06:15 the chief of military intelligence knew, based on his testimony, that the Lebanese Forces are in the camps and there is fear, based on information given him that they are harming the civilian population; the manner in which the head of military intelligence behaved when he received this information does not point to the fact that the director of military intelligence was "surprised" by this information; the fact that he did not examine throughout Friday, this matter with the defense minister--such as "what are they doing in the refugee camps?" shows very clearly that he previously knew the plan to deploy them into the camp and the realization of the plan came to him as natural. The explanation which the director of military intelligence supplied concerning his unexpected silence is unacceptable.

23. The position of the director of military intelligence regarding the substantive matters is also strange: on the one hand chief of military intelligence repeatedly confirms in his testimony that the activity of the Lebanese Forces linked to the IDF throughout, were conducted without any irregularities. After the murder of Bashir, "New Phalange" did not emerge but rather the contrary "softer Phalange". The danger to the Palestinians following the murder decreased while for the Murabitoun it increased; the presence of the Lebanese Forces in the camps after the murder does not create any possibility of a massacre as long as they are under the supervision or coordination of the IDF; the warnings of military intelligence were not meant to warn against the massacre which occurred, especially not under the command of the IDF. On the other hand, the chief of military intelligence tries to hint as if his documents, which were presented to the committee, constituted "a constant warning" against cooperation with the Lebanese Forces, are not true. The examination of all those documents reveals that they have nothing to do with revenge or bloodshed in the camps. Especially the most important message is the view of military intelligence regarding the character of the Lebanese Forces as the political and military ally of Israel. Even those 2 special intelligence documents which they tried to present as a "warning" have absolutely no relation to the discussed matter and the evidence is, among others, that deputy chief of intelligence for research, Amnon Gilboa, did not think so during the hearings in the forum of the division chiefs regarding the intention to employ the Lebanese Forces into the camps.

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It is important to note that had the director of military intelligence thought seriously that there was a need to warn against a danger of revenge or bloodshed to the inhabitants of neighborhoods by the Lebanese Forces under the given time frame he could have pursued one of the channels of "immediate warnings" which he has. Furthermore, since the intention, in principle, to deploy the Lebanese Forces into Beirut "behind us" to "cleanse", was well known to him for a long time, he had ample opportunity to warn against it including on 17 Sept. when he supposedly heard about the operation for the first time.

24. In his testimony the director of military intelligence states that the evaluation which was never undertaken should have been done. Even here he is not accurate since what had to be done was to present to him the plan and he could have evaluated its significance and voiced his opinion in another manner; "all this is required, the deliberation and evaluation in any forum, on a roof or near a jeep whatever you are going to say, meaning, that there is

going to be a presentation of the situation, they will come and say, we are entering the camps, please, or Phalangists are entering the camps, please, what force, what strength...".

While presenting such a plan he had at least 6 opportunities. Who would have assumed that his silence would not imply agreement and approval but rather lack of attention. But one cannot accuse the director of military intelligence of lack of attention; the plan to deploy the Lebanese Forces was indeed presented to him a few times since his views and opinions concerning that plan were specified by himself--approval and consent --he did not find it fitting to remark at all about it and did not think that the forum has to be convened for deliberations.

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25. This and more--the reason for the need for such an evaluation according to him is the "new situation" which was created; and what is this new situation? This is not the situation which was present following the murder of Gemayel but rather "this is a situation where th Phalange have to do the job by themselves [evolving] to a new situation where they have to do it under the umbrella of the IDF in a region which was not taken yet by the IDF". "A new situation" whereby the Lebanese Forces will be deployed under the umbrella of the IDF compared to the "previous situation" where the Lebanese Forces acted by themselves this had the ingredients, based on the opinion of the head of military intelligence, of the ability to relieve and decrease a danger compared to the previous situation. This was the situation which was previously tried very successfully and had no problems and was accepted and known to the entire system as lacking any risks.

26. What would have happened in that "requested" forum? The description of the chief of military intelligence raises the fact that the question itself (that whether to conduct the operation following the murder of Bashir would not have been raised at all and that fear of danger, revenge, and bloodshed) would not have been discussed. But rather the plan would have been presented and [with] the supervision and coordination of IDF - the way it happened in reality, the chief of military intelligence would have been satisfied. The additional intelligence output which was prevented supposedly because of the lack of success at the forum, is a list of certain additional control measures which he specifies:

- a. increasing eavesdropping.
- b. bringing interrogators of prisoners.
- c. meetings in the camps' peripheries in order to receive information.

d. material for the Phalange regarding where to go (this has no bearing on the subject since it has nothing to do with the supervision of the Lebanese Forces.

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Those additional measures which would have been introduced as a result of that discussion were tried in reality: eavesdropping was tried (unit 8200) which did not come up with anything but rather an amateur and improvised eavesdropping by an officer of the 96th division brought some important information. The presence of the interrogators of prisoners in the place had nothing to add or detract. Instead of meeting on the periphery of the camps with the commanders of the Lebanese Forces the headquarters of the Lebanese Forces was placed in the headquarters of 96th division. The important and immediate informations which was received from the commanders of the Lebanese Forces in the command post of the 96th division was not received through the channels of military intelligence.

27. Finally, as a general remark, the head of military intelligence knew very well about the plan to deploy the Lebanese Forces into the refugee camps and did not contest it. Such a plan was viewed by him, as by other seniors of responsible positions, as a welcomed plan, a correct and riskless course of action under the circumstances which prevailed. But in principle the question of his personal knowledge does not make any difference since the plan was presented as a normal and orderly battle procedure in front of his deputy, the deputy of military intelligence for research in the forum of the division chiefs in the high command. Had that officer thought that some aspect of that plan needed discussion or deliberation he had the duty! to demand this; but rather, because all of the reasons which were presented, he did not do so since the plan was accepted by the system of which he was in charge. Especially if the director of military intelligence at that time is on vacation abroad or does not occupy any position because of any other reason.

28. On Wednesday 16 Sept. at 8:30 pm the chief of staff brings to the knowledge of the Prime Minister that the Lebanese Forces, at those moments, were entering the camps. The Prime Minister and the rest of the cabinet ministers present at the meeting listened to the chief of staff's report and additional reports regarding the Lebanese Forces. In total the Lebanese Forces were mentioned throughout the meeting 7 times in relation to operation "metal brain". Those who were present did not think that such an action entails--as a result of Bashir's murder--a danger of revenge

or bloodshed to the Palestinian population. Members of the Israeli government were updated throughout the previous months concerning the cooperation with Lebanese Forces and on the lessons and consequences of Joint Israeli-Lebanese Forces actions. Undoubtedly they were equipped with the ability to assess whether a "danger" existed. At least one of the members of the Israeli cabinet was well acquainted and even sensitive to the overall complexity with regard to Israeli-Lebanese Forces relations, Minister Mordechai Zippori who was with the security establishment for a long time and who testifies (a Vet) about himself as one of those who opposed such cooperation. Despite his extreme sensitivity, according to his own words, to the character of the Lebanese Forces he does not find a base to feel such a danger and to warn against it. While listening to the report of the Chief of Staff according to his words: "...now when they are saying that they cannot pretend to be wise with us and 2- now, when the city is under our control meaning there is total control and there are no red warning signs in the government" continuing "...the [illegible] citizen, under new circumstances, had red warning signals been lit the way that it was in that meeting [?]

29. Here we should discuss and evaluate the minister, David Levy's "reservations" and place it in the proper context. During that meeting a long time after the Chief of Staff finished his report about the deployment of the Lebanese Forces into the camps, the cabinet was working on drafting a statement which was going to be issued at the end of the meeting. One should remember that the entrance to West Beirut, and not necessarily to the refugee camps, according to Minister Levy, are directed not as a reservation about entering Beirut or the refugee camps but rather as a reservation from the proposed draft of the government's statement. And he says: "...I am satisfied with the argument of our entrance to Beirut... but this argument could be shaky and we could be perceived as unreliable when I hear that the Phalange are already entering a certain neighborhood and I know what revenge means for them-what kind of slaughter.... therefore I think that we might put ourselves into a situation where we will be accused and our argument will not hold.

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[first line illegible] The warning, which was entailed in his words, had it been that way in the proper context where it was said, did not arouse the proper attention. The evidence is that the personalities who took part in that cabinet meeting and appeared in front of this committee did not perceive the alleged "warning" in Levy's words. Had the minister wanted to warn against the deployment of the Lebanese Forces into the refugee neighborhoods he could have done so

following the chief of staff's report and then all who were present at that meeting would have known what he meant and possibly that they would have even discussed it. Anyway one has to remark that since all the members of the cabinet, the Prime minister and those who occupy office who took part in the decision to deploy the Lebanese Forces had a consensus that this action does not entail a danger to the Palestinian population. One should not assume that had Minister Levy raised this issue in the government this should have been sufficient to stop the action or change it.

30. During the discussion of the deployment of the Lebanese Forces into the refugee camps, during the military procedure, and the personal examination-additional or parallel-which were conducted by the Defense Minister from his initiative without any relations or intervention in the military procedure it was found that:

A. the death of Bashir did not create a vacuum, embarrassment or loss of control in the Lebanese Forces, on the contrary the political leadership was immediately transferred to Amin Gemayel with the affirmation of the head of the family. The general staff of the Lebanese Forces controlled its soldiers and the orders of the general staff to the forces in the field were properly executed.

B. the members of the Lebanese Forces command-the commanders and the officers were quite calm and self confident. The intensive contact which was conducted between them and the leadership of the IDF and Minister of Defense during the 36 hours following the murder was business-like and one could not perceive a wave of emotions, revenge, or emotional impulses which could have caused any fear.

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C. the soldiers of the Lebanese Forces in the streets, in the junctions, in the bunkers, and in the camps were seen to be quiet, disciplined and well mannered both in speech and action.

D. the soldiers of the Lebanese Forces were seen near or among the hostile Moslem population not under the IDF control nor near IDF forces throughout those 36 hours and there were no reports of any extraordinary behavior.

E. The Lebanese forces did not "ask or volunteer" to enter the refugee camps out of their own initiative. It was the chief of staff of the IDF who gave them orders to do so and they agreed.

F. the Lebanese Forces executed, according to the IDF instructions, part of plan to take over vital junctions, certain missions, and did them well without harming the civilian population. In addition, the Lebanese Forces acted throughout Lebanon to prevent revenge.

G. the political control exercised by Pierre Gemayel and the transfer of control to Amin Gemayel were obvious

characteristics of political continuity and could also be seen as a new page in the relationship to the Muslims in general and the Palestinians in particular. Amin, from the beginning, was known as holding an appeasing line toward the Palestinians and their allies, and this opportunity to be the president of "all Lebanese" increased his political circumspection and decreased the possibility of harming the Palestinian population. The first information which was collected immediately following the murder pointed toward a militia of the Lebanese Left and the Murabitoun as possible murderers and not toward Palestinian terrorists or Lebanese Palestinians.

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H. The IDF evaluation was that in the refugee neighborhoods there were a few hundred well-armed terrorists dressed as civilians. In the course of the hours from the moment of the beginning of the operation to take control of West Beirut, there was incessant fire, fire inside the camps to all sides and it is fair to assume that indeed in the neighborhoods there was an armed force - [illegible] foundation for that same force that will enter the neighborhoods will be entangled in a difficult battle. Usually in such circumstances as these such forces do not [have] time to attack the population but rather are occupied with fighting. [fn. Admoni, the Defense Minister, chief of staff, ?.]

31. According to the above description it was known in the IDF and in political echelons that the action of the Lebanese Forces which was coordinated with the IDF or was carried out next to the IDF did not [constitute] a danger of death to the civilian population which did not fight. Generally, the information and impression that circulates since the murder of Bashir Gemayel, according to what was detailed above, there was no basis to assume that any change in principle had taken place. Therefore members of the Israeli government and its leader, including those of positions of responsibility in the IDF at every level, in the intelligence community and all those who took part in the action or was aware of the entrance of the "Lebanese Forces" into refugee neighborhoods - linked to the IDF - did not expect the danger of revenge or bloodshed for the residence of the refugee areas. "...it did not come to mind, your honor, to think that the Phalange, if they entered the camps in order to fight terrorists that they would do such acts of horror and slaughter... We saw them as military units disciplined and with every intention that they would fight the terrorists and it didn't even occur to me that there would be any reasonable [chance] that they would engage in massacring the civilian population..." [The Prime Minister]
 "...the massacre and horrors of this type that were revealed

to our eyes later--it did not occur to us and (it is clear) that those participating in different discussions, it did not come up. No one spoke. No one warned. I begin with myself - it did not occur to me that this is what would happen. It did not occur to me..." [The Defense Minister]

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"...when we entered he said to me, 'can it be a massacre?' I said 'we [guided] them, they did not, until now, do things such as this when we are next to them and aside from this we warned them and spoke with them on this matter, and we hope, and assume that his will not happen...' [Drori]

"...Q...Did you think it was possible to rely on their statements in spite of the fact that Basir was murdered? A. Yes" [Yaron]

"...the fact that Bashir was murdered did not signal a red light regarding their behavior. Not to the extent that it prevented their entering...." [Saguy]

"...I should say, in other words, I would not automatically make a connection between entering the camps. I would not immediately connect this automatically with the massacre - definitely not..." [Amos Gilboa]

"...I did not believe they could do something like this. I did not think they would massacre - to kill women and children in the way they did..." [Asmon]

"...from the standpoint of background data I had no indication that the Phalange entering the refugee camps would mean widespread murder and massacre. It was not clear to me, logically. I did not think of it. And no one (?) to explain to me that something like this was liable to develop in the area..." [Yossi Ben Ari]

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"...I explained why these things (?) this a small note of his (of Minister David Levy) special thoughts were not aroused because, after all, the Phalange did not enter there in order to carry out acts of revenge but to fight..." [Foreign Minister Shamir]

"...now that they say to us how they are not able to trick us and 2, when the situation calmed down and the city was in our hands, meaning it is [under] our complete control, and there are no red lights to the government..." [Zipori]

"...in this situation I expected a tough battle - and (given

this) it did not occur to me that they would carry out killings..." [Chief of Staff]

"...Q But you did not think about a massacre? A. Absolutely not..." [Deputy chief of staff]

"...data that were in our hands at the time of the cabinet meeting, it did not indicate or warn about the direction the horror would take in the camps..." [Head of Mossad]

"...in the morning I receive Dodai's document and "steelbrain 6" in spite of this I did not expect a massacre because it was clear from the document that the Phalange would enter the camps in coordination with the IDF..." [Saguy]

"...Q..from your familiarity with the Phalange on their relations with the Palestinians, fears in you were not aroused that after the murder of Bashir they would enter the camps and slaughter? A. clearly no. Clearly I did not think so. I did not have an organized debate, but I did not think..." [Head of world affairs, Mossad]

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"...I did not fear a massacre. Q: Why not? According to your evaluation there was a fear of bloodshed after the death of Basir? A: First of all, they did not work when the IDF was not at their side...again, in my view I was happy that they worked and I did not deduce that from this [would come] a slaughter..." [Moshe Hebron]

"...I really did not ask. But in my opinion it is good that the Phalange will enter the camps in order to save the lives of our soldiers therefore I thought then and I think today that that was the right decision..." [Yossi Artzi, Mossad]

"...I saw in our duties to include them in the war in order to save the lives of our soldiers. I did not think about a massacre or killing..." [Sakad-Mossad]

The survey of the material of testimonies that was brought before the commission will bring out that to all the witnesses, apparently, that were surveyed on this matter, responded almost unanimously that the data that prevailed then - after the murder of Bashir Gemayel - no one expected and it did not occur to anyone (that there would be) a danger of "revenge or bloodshed" with the entrance of the Lebanese Forces into the refugee neighborhoods under the supervision of the IDF and that a danger such as this was not expected:

"...it did not occur to me that this was liable to happen, they did not enter. It was possible then that we needed to encircle the camps, to attack them or to bring them to (?) from the air and artillery, but if it was expected what happened or there was a warning - they would not go in..." [Chief of Staff]

Among the many same witnesses to which the danger of revenge and bloodshed did not occur-are experts of the people of Israel on these matters: - Head of Mossad, Head of "the World" in Mossad, head of the intelligence branch and assistant to the head of the Intelligence Branch for research, Chief of Staff, his deputy, IDF General Drori, Barak, Simhoni, and others. Those experts believed then as they do today, that danger of revenge or bloodshed from the Lebanese Forces was not imminent for the population of the neighborhoods,

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and supported, therefore, the prepared actions to preserve the lives of the IDF soldiers.

The Defense Minister lives by the experts on this subject and on every other subject. The Defense Minister does not have a collection network or his own intelligence network. This is not allowed. As the rest of the members of the Israeli cabinet and its leader rely on information and analyses supplied by the intelligence community and by the IDF. Upon these they rely without hesitation in decisions and in actions. The Defense Minister was innocent-and not responsible-to assume as a matter of fact that there was no danger of revenge or bloodshed to the population of the neighborhoods.

Also, in the personal opinion of the Defense Minister, on the basis of information and impressions accumulated in additional examinations that were set up in accordance with procedures of the conduct of war and military examination, [he was] supported his opinion by the opinion of the experts.

33. Therefore, the danger of revenge and bloodshed to the population of the neighborhoods from the Lebanese Forces was not seen. Defense Minister, on the basis of the analysis of a variety of experts and his evaluation, he did not know or expect a danger such as this and anyway did not "neglect" or "ignore" a danger that did not exist. To the best of his knowledge, then, and on the basis of the data that existed, and according to what was raised with the experts, no Defense Minister would think differently, to expect a danger such as this, that is it was shown that all these people of quality, of background and of ability to hold positions, on the basis of the same view of the situation, they as well did not

expect it nor did such an awful danger occur to them.

34. According to the above elucidation it was agreed by all that the Lebanese Forces insisted upon a manner of acceptable warfare, namely that which does not lead to revenge or bloodshed among the population that does not fight - when the IDF controls, inspects or coordinates their activities or is even found next to them in localized action]. In order to permit the action of the Lebanese Forces in the refugee neighborhoods, operational efficiency was required by the IDF, to establish in their hands maximum control in the Lebanese Forces, their progress, their approach to actions and the manner of fighting. [Regarding] means of control as it is said, despite designation of operational goals, naturally their allies granted to the controlling force, namely the IDF, the capability to prevent or to stop the Lebanese Forces not only because operational difficulties but also unexpected irregularities in their relations to the non-fighting population; and in addition, the establishment of these means was a precondition to the [illegible] of the same general principle, the result of past experience, according to the behavior of the Lebanese Forces among the civilian population in a suitable manner. [Illegible]

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35. And these were the means of command and control that were implemented in the 96th division on the morning of 15 September 1982 instructed the Minister of Defense, because the IDF "will command" all the forces in the area including the Lebanese Forces. In saying "command" the minister do not mean the notion that is used in the IDF but those means of command achievable in relation to a military force that is not a part of the IDF. But the Defense Minister's instruction are clear: the IDF will command the Lebanese Forces with the required changes - keeping in mind they are a foreign military unit. The chief of staff had a different understanding of the word(s) "will command". In the same instructions the IDF will control Israeli forces found in the area such as the general security services and the Mossad.

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It is difficult to assume that this was the meaning of the concept since the "quantity" of the general security services and Mossad people in the field does not "necessitate command" and they act under the areas of their responsibilities in coordination with the IDF but are not subject to "its command". One way or the other the chief of staff behaved according to the literal interpretation of the minister's instructions and despite that according to his version he did not understand it in such a way--and caused that the instruction would be enacted based on its meaning that all those instruments of control and command were enacted since: A. the Lebanese Forces were asked to coordinate their action with the Commander of the northern command and after that with the commander of the 96th division and they have done so; their officers presented operational plans to be approved by the chief of Northern Command and the division commander. The division commander changed the plans defining the way of access of movement concerning the taking over of houses and even instructed not to continue fighting after a certain hour: namely, the IDF set the mission the Lebanese Forces, the mode of operation, the parameters of the operation techniques of taking over as well as essential timing.

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b. Medical services and [illegible] were given to the Lebanese Forces
 c. instructions were given to IDF unit to deploy itself in case the Lebanese would need help.
 d. the Lebanese Forces were ordered to place a liaison officer in the HQ of the 96th division and so they did. Following the action it was found that they had the entire higher command in the HQ of the 96th division. In addition to that, liaison officer, Jesse, also present was one of the commanders of the unit which entered into the camps - Michele- who commanded in reality, his men inside the neighborhoods. In the manner which will be specified below, both the commander of the operation and the liaison officer continuously received updated information and about the happenings in the camps as well.
 E. professional eavesdropping was conducted on the operational lines of these units which were operating inside the camps. In addition to that, one of the intelligence officers of the 96th division conducted improvised eavesdropping on the conversations of the Lebanese Forces officer in the communication device in the 96th division HQ.
 35. [36] These control devices worked well in the manner which were directed by the minister and executed by the chief of staff.

A. the commanders of the Lebanese Forces which were present in the HQ of the 96th division were totally obedient to the 96th division's commander. When the 96th division commander instructed them, among other orders, in the early hours of Friday to cease fire, the firing stopped. The overall examination of the evidence which was brought in front of this committee points to the fact that the Lebanese Forces stopped firing from the early noon hours of Friday until the evacuation of the neighborhoods on Saturday morning.

B. when the chief of northern command and chief of staff prohibited the Lebanese Forces, on Friday 17 Sept. around noon and in the afternoon from deploying additional forces in the camps despite the fact that those units were ready to go and waiting at the entrance to the camps, the Lebanese Forces obeyed this order without any hesitation and replaced forces afterwards only based on specific permission received by the commander of the 96th division.

C. the liaison of the Lebanese Forces, that same Jesse, reported to some officers of the 96th division, in total honesty, a few hours after the deployment of the unit into the camps, on some occurrences which seem extraordinary inside the camp. (information "300") In addition, the officers of the 96th division received additional information about harming civilians ("information 45")

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was immediately transmitted to the general staff/intelligence in Tel Aviv; information 45 was also brought to the proper authorities but both pieces of information did not cause that system of control of the Lebanese Forces to act immediately to stop the action for reasons which were explained by the commanders of the operation. The means of reporting and controlling including the liaison officer, Jesse, who acted properly and fast and proved himself by supplying immediate, reliable information supplied an accurate picture of what was happening which should have led to certain operational conclusions emanating from the information based on the consideration of the commanders in the field.

36. [37] As stated earlier, the murder of Bashir Gemayel created the immediate need to enter West Beirut and to enter into terrorist neighborhoods to execute all those plans which were supposed to be executed under the command of Bashir Gemayel. The central question which was raised on those circumstances was (not the need) to enter the refugee camps but rather the (identity) of the entering force. The two possibilities were the IDF or a Lebanese military force-the Lebanese Army or the Lebanese Forces. The expected nature of the fighting in the camps did not arouse much enthusiasm for the deployment of the IDF inside the camps. Difficult fighting which would result in a lot of bloodshed in a densely populated area when terrorists who have to be located are disguised as civilians in a hostile population. Such an action required a large number of casualties and the IDF command had no wish or interest to complicate the IDF in such

an unpleasant but necessary military move.

37. [38] At that stage of the war toward this end, the public sensitivity inside Israel regarding the number of casualties in the war increased. The Israeli government and the command of the IDF regarded then (and today) the number of casualties as of greatest concern. Under these circumstances when the deployment into the neighborhoods was not wanted and even not necessary, the possibility was raised that a force which is not Israeli should take upon itself this mission. Since then, the IDF command did not spare any effort to convince a Lebanese force to conduct the mission. The contacts were conducted in parallel. The chief of staff as stated above instructed the Lebanese Forces to do so and he received their approval. At the same time negotiations with the Lebanese Army continued under the disturbing intervention of American mediation-this in order to convince it to take this mission upon itself.

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the time dimension was very vital in this operation. When the Lebanese Army responded negatively the Lebanese Forces were deployed into the camps. This despite the fact that negotiations with the Lebanese Army continued up to the evening hours of Friday 17 Sept. The deployment of Lebanese Forces into the camps caused a great relief to the military as well as the civilian elements which had a bearing or knowledge of this operation. Soldiers and commanders were happy that they were not going to take upon itself this unpleasant and dangerous mission and the political level regarded the continuous cooperation with the Lebanese Forces as positive especially since, for the first time, the Lebanese Forces agreed to conduct an integrated mission which was part of the overall operational plans of the IDF. And that old idea of "spark" namely the Lebanese fighting for the liberation of their own capital seemed to be materializing. But as stated above the supreme value which governed in the decision not to deploy the IDF into the camps but rather the Lebanese Forces was rooted in the desire not to cause additional IDF casualties.

38. In the overall examination regarding the reasonability of the decision to deploy the Lebanese Forces into the camps, one has to properly examine the dimensions of this activity in relation to the overall activity which was occurring at that time on the Beirut front. The deployment of the Lebanese Forces into the refugee camps is an activity which has two aspects-military and political. From the military operational point of view one could regard this operation as secondary despite its purposeful importance as part of the overall effort; the political aspects, as stated

above, was a continuation and a breakthrough; continuing the cooperation with the Lebanese Forces which was regarded as doubtful following the murder of Bashir Gemayel and a breakthrough because of the willingness of the Lebanese Forces to completely integrate themselves in a complex Israeli operation and to fulfil the role of an Israeli military unit for doing everything that is necessary in those camps.

This is why this operation received such "treatment"; had an IDF unit been deployed into the camps it is doubtful whether this topic would have been presented at the forum of the division chiefs of the high command as well as in the operations forum in the defense ministry and a personal examination by the defense minister during 15-16 Sept. and report to the Israeli government. It is plausible to assume that the decision to execute such an operation would have been agreed on in a lower military rank.

page 36 [illegible]

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fault in that decision and the manner of its implementation; the terrible consequence should be regarded as an unexpected and inexplicable accident until today. Therefore, one should not say that the defense minister did not fulfil or obey a duty which was part of his responsibility during the fulfilment of his duty.

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Summary of the Defense Minister's version in the commission of inquiry (first page of longer document)

1. The history of cooperation with the Phalange.

a. in order to build and cultivate a focus of an internal Lebanese political power which could be used in the future to serve Israeli interests the state of Israel decided in the years 1975-76 to initiate aid and support contacts with the Phalange.

b. the Phalange, or ~~the~~ later the Lebanese Forces, are a political framework of the Lebanese Maronite Christians who have a military militia. The polarization of relations between them and the Moslem environment and their status as a minority in Lebanon with all dangers entailed in it, created a natural environment for dialogue with Israel.

c. Cooperation which began in 1975 grew and flourished and expressed itself in, among other ways:

1. the supply of military equipment, weapons, communications, worth about \$118.5 million.
2. instruction and training of about 130 Phalange from 1978 on.
3. Aid and advice regarding military planning, organization

of chain of command , intelligence, and other professional military fields.

d. During the last two years while the relations with the Phalange grew, as their forces strengthened, plans were formed to incorporate the Phalange in future military efforts of Israel in Lebanon - and all this with the agreement of the leadership of the Phalange who expressed willingness for such operations.

e. In the context of the "pine" plan which was presented and approved by the government on May 10, 1982 a link up with the Phalange was planned. A joint operation to take over the city of Beirut was also presented.

(Continuation of Sharon's Testimony
at the Kahan Commission)

23. The substance of the Chief of Aman's position is also amazing: on the one hand Aman's Chief reconfirms that operations carried by the Lebanese forces in conjunction with the IDF--throughout the war--were executed without a hitch 1/. In the wake of Bashir's assassination no new Phalanges were born, but on the contrary "softer Phalanges" emerged, 2/ the risk facing the Palestinians following the assassination decreased--as a general estimate--and that of the Murabitum increased 3/, "presence of the Lebanese forces in the camps--following the assassination--does not raise a concern for a massacre as long as these are coordinated and under IDF's supervision 4/". Aman's warning was not intended to caution against a massacre of the kind which took place, certainly not while under IDF command 5/. On the other hand, Aman's Chief again tries to hint that the documents, which he presented to the Commission in their

1/ Chief of Aman, Session No. 55, p. 1526

2/ Aman's Chief, Session No. 3, p. 46.

3/ Ibid. Session No. 55, p. 1552

4/ Ibid. p. 1525.

5/ Ibid. p. 1552.

tents, were a sort of a "continuous warning" against cooperation with the Lebanese forces. There is no truth to that; analysis of those documents reveals that they have nothing to do with the danger of a vendetta or bloodshed among the inhabitants of the neighborhoods, and the main message therein is Aman's view about the nature of the Lebanese forces as an ally and a politico/military partner. Even those two special intelligence documents 6/ which, by implications, an attempt was made to represent them as this "warning"--contain nothing relevant to the issue at hand, and the proof, among other things, is that Assistant Chief of Aman for Research, Brig. Gen. Amos Gilbo'a, did not think so while he heard in the Forum of the Branch Chiefs about the intention to introduce the Lebanese Forces into the camps. . . . Needless to say, if the Chief of Aman had thought in earnest that it was necessary to warn against the danger of a vendetta or bloodshed among the neighborhoods' residents, he could and must have taken in the given time frame, one of the following methods of immediate warning available to him. 7/ Moreover as the intention in principle to introduce the Lebanese forces into Beirut "following (the

6/ Exhibit 23.

7/ Session 55, p. 1553.

IDF" to "clean out" the city was well known to him--for a long time 8/, he could have "warned" against it on countless instances, including on 17 September 1982, when he was allegedly first informed of the ongoing operation. (Original underlines)

24. In his testimony the Chief of Aman comes out against the non-existence of that discussion--or situation estimate--pertaining to the introduction of the Lebanese forces into the neighborhoods. According to him there was a need for such a discussion. Even here he is inaccurate. First of all, according to him, all which was needed, in his opinion, was to present to him the plan and he would have assessed its implications or react to it in some other way:

" . . . all this necessitated a discussion of the situation estimate--in any forum: on the roof's top of, or beside, a pickup (truck)--but say it, come and say that a situation estimate discussion would be presented, come and say--we are entering the camps, or the Phalangists are entering, O.K. what type of force, what magnitude. . . ." 9/

However, such a presentation was made at least on 6 occasions: who should have guessed that his silence was due to inattentiveness rather than agreement?

8/ Ibid., p. 1575.

9/ Session 55, p. 1586.

However, we should not suspect the Chief of Aman of being inattentive; the plan to introduce the Lebanese forces was indeed presented to him on several occasions and since his opinion and assessments regarding this plan were detailed by him personally--agreement and confirmation--he did not find it necessary to react to it, and never thought among other things, that some "forum" should be summoned to discuss it. Moreover, the reason given for the need for a further discussion or situation estimate, was the "new situation" which emerged. And what was this "new situation"? It was not the situation which emerged in the wake of Jumail's assassination, but:

" . . . it is from a situation that the Phalangists have to do the job by themselves to a situation in which they have do so under the IDF's sponsorship in an area which was not yet conquered by the IDF. . . ." 10/

A "new situation" whereby the Lebanese forces would act under IDF's sponsorship, in comparison with a "prior situation" in which they had operated independently was, in the opinion of Aman's head as well, in order to decrease and ease the risk compared to the "prior" situation. It was a situation which was very successfully tested, and without a

10/ Ibid.

hitch, in the past, and was accepted and recognized by all the system as risk-free.

26. What would have happened at this "wanted" forum? The description provided by the Chief of Aman of its expected course reveals that the question of whether to launch the operation following Bashir's assassination would not have been raised even, and all of that concern over the danger of vendetta or bloodshed would not have been discussed. Rather, a plan would have been presented, and the coordination with and the supervision of the IDF would have been assured--as was the case actually--the Chief of Aman would have been reassured. 11/ The additional intelligence "output" which was allegedly because of the lack of such a discussion, is a series of "additional" supervisory measures which he (Sagi) goes on to detail:

- A. Intensification of electronic eavesdropping
- B. Summoning of POWs interrogators
- C. Meetings at the camps' outskirts to collect additional information

11/ Session 55, p. 1857.

D. Material for the Phalangist (about) "where to go to"--(irrelevant because it is not related to the issue of supervising the Lebanese forces). 12/

Those "additional" measures which would have been taken as a consequence of that discussion--were actually in place, as will be detailed below. Actually eavesdropping was conducted and had yielded nothing. (In fact, amateur eavesdropping by an officer of the 96th Division yielded important information.) Existence of lack of POWs interrogators would have contributed nothing, and instead of conducting "meetings at the camps' outskirts", the Lebanese forces' HQ was deployed inside the Forward Command Group of the Division itself, and the important and urgent information which was obtained from the commanders of the Lebanese forces--was not handled by the Aman system. . . .

27. Finally, a general remark--Aman's Chief knew very well and clearly about the plan to introduce the Lebanese forces into the refugees' neighborhoods and had not reacted to it at all, because the plan seemed to him--as it did to other functionaries--desirable, correct and risk-free under the circumstances which prevailed at the time. In principle, however, the question of his personal knowledge

12/ Ibid., p. 1858.

does not add or detract, because the plan was presented--in accordance with correct military procedures--to his deputy, Assistant Head of Aman for Research, at the Forum of the Head of Branches of the GHQ. If this officer had thought that any item of this plan necessitated discussion or clarification, it was his duty to demand it. (Original underlines) However, because of all of the reasons enumerated, he had not done so since the plan was in accordance with the opinions of the system under his command, irrespective of the Chief of Aman being at that time on vacation, abroad or unavailable for some reason.

28. On Thursday, 16 September 1984, around 20:30 (8:30 PM) the C-o-S had brought to the attention of the Cabinet that at these very moments, the Lebanese forces were entering the refugees' neighborhoods. The Prime Minister and other Ministers listened to the briefing of the C-o-S and to other briefings regarding the Lebanese forces. In all these forces were mentioned 7 times during that meeting in connection with operation "Iron Brain 6". 13/ None of those present thought that the operation--in the wake of Bashir's assassination--involved a danger of vendetta or bloodshed to the Palestinian population. Members of the

13/ Cabinet meeting of 16 September 1982.

Cabinet were briefed incessantly throughout the previous months about the methods of cooperation with the Lebanese forces, the lessons and conclusions drawn from these joint operations 14/, and were undoubtedly equipped with basic assessment ability which could allow the "sensing" of such a danger, if it existed. At least one of the Cabinet members--the Minister Mordekhai Tzipori--himself a veteran security personality and one who characterizes himself as an ardent opponent of such cooperation--despite his strong sensitivity, as he puts it, to the nature of the Lebanese forces, did not find any base for sensing such a "danger", and to warn against it. While listening to the C-o-S, as he states: 15/

"... now when it is said how could they trick us, and secondly--presently when the city is in our hands, it means we have absolute control and the Cabinet has no red lights".

And later on:

"... The alert citizen no way could a red light lit in the picture which was drawn at that meeting".

29. Here it is appropriate that we discuss and highlight the precise meaning of Deputy Prime Minister David

14/ The DM, Session No. 7, p. 36.

15/ (Missing).

Levi's reservation and place it in the proper context in which it was raised. Long after the C-o-S finished his briefing about the introduction of the Lebanese forces into the camps, the Cabinet was working hard on the formulation of the announcement to be released at the end of the session. The topic of this announcement, it should be recalled, was the entry into West Beirut generally, not just into the refugees' neighborhoods. David Levi's statement, verbatim, is aimed not against the entering into Beirut or the refugee camps, but as a reservation raised against the formula proposed for the Cabinet's announcement. And so he states:

" . . . I agree with the argument about our entering Beirut . . . But this argument could be undermined and we could be seen as unreliable, when I hear that the Phalangists are already entering a specific neighborhood and I know what is the meaning of vendetta for them, some slaughtering . . . that is why I think that we could be found in a situation whereby we'll be accused and our argument won't stand on its feet". 16/

David Levi's concern is centered on the possibility that the government's announcement would be found unreliable. The warning included therein, if there was one, in the general context in which it was raised, did not draw the appropriate concern, it would so seem. The proof for this is in the

16/ Foreign Minister Shamir, Session 45, pp. 21-2.

fact that all the personalities which took part in this session--and those which appeared before the commission--did not sense an alleged "chord" of warning, in the statement of David Levi. 17/ 18/ 19/ 20/ 21/ If the Minister (Levi) was indeed seeking to warn against the introduction of the Lebanese forces into the camps, he should have done so right next to the briefing of the C-o-S, then those present would have known what was the aim of his talk, and it is possible that more attention would have been accorded it. At any rate it is noteworthy that as all Cabinet members, including the Prime Minister and the various functionaries, which took part in deciding the introduction of Lebanese forces were unanimous in their opinion that this operation carried no danger to the Palestinian population. Therefore, there is nothing to suggest that even if Minister Levi would have accentuated his objection, by raising it as an issue to be voted on by the government, this would have prevented or modified the operation.

17/ PM M. Begin, Session No. 21, p. 13(A).

18/ The DM, Session 6, p. 48; Session 7, p. 32.

19/ Foreign Minister Shamir, Session 45, pp. 21-2.

20/ Minister Tzipori, Session 48, p. (?).

21/ C-o-S, Session 5, p. 53.

30. During the discussion and preparations for the introduction of the Lebanese forces into the refugee camps, through his personal inspections and via the military procedures--additional or in parallel--which the Defense Minister carried on his own initiative, irrespective of the military procedures, it was found that:

A. Bashir's death did not leave a "vacuum", confusion or loss of control among the Lebanese forces. On the contrary: the political control was transferred--in line with the head of the family's opinion--to Amin Jumail. The GHQ of the Lebanese forces kept tight control over its soldiers, and the GHQ's orders were carried out in full by the forces in the field. 22/ 23/

B. Members of the Lebanese forces' Command--commanders and officers--were seen relaxed, calm and under self-control; the intensive contact maintained by them with the top IDF command and with the DM during the 36 hours which elapsed from Bashir's assassination was businesslike, restrained and without a sign that some emotional outburst,

22/ The DM, Session No. 6, pp. 44-45.

23/ Navot, Session No. 12, pp. 27-8.

desire for vengeance or some other emotional drive, which could have caused concern, was about to take over. 24/ 25/

C. Lebanese forces' soldiers in the street, intersections, road blocks and in their positions, were seen calm, orderly obedient both in their talk and actions. 26/ 27/ 28/

D. Soldiers of the Lebanese forces were in proximity to hostile Muslim population, far from IDF forces and not under their supervision, throughout those 36 hours, and there was no information that the population was harmed or that some other abnormal conduct took place.

E. The Lebanese forces did not "request" or "volunteered" to enter the camps on their own

24/ (Missing).

25/ (Missing).

26/ Zachrin. Message 30 (collectors of material), Session 31, p. 975.

27/ Deputy C-o-S, Session No. 30, p. 949.

28/ Admoni, Session 51, pp. 1421, 1428.

initiative. It was the IDF C-o-S which "ordered" them to do so, and they responded to the task. 29/

F. The Lebanese forces, according to IDF's instructions, and within the plan of taking control over vital intersections, carried out several missions, and did so correctly and without harming the non-combatant population; 30/ in addition, the Lebanese forces acted throughout Lebanon to prevent acts of vendetta.

G. The turning back of the political rule into the hands of Pierre Jumail, and its transfer to Amin were a clear indication of political continuation and even the turning over of a new leaf in the "Khatib", relations with the Moslem population in general and the Palestinians in particular. From the start Amin was known as adopting an appeasing line toward the Palestinians and their allies, and the immediate chance which fell into his hands to become President of all the Lebanese increased his political hesitation, and reduced any possible fear of harming the Palestinian

29/ C-o-S, Session 5, p. 26.

30/ Deputy C-o-S, Session 30, p. 949.

population. 31/ The initial information collected as to the perpetrators of the murder, indicated the possibility that it was the Lebanese leftist militia (Murabitum) and not Palestinian terrorists or Lebanese Palestinians. 32/ 33/

31. (Missing pages . . . then the following citations)

" . . . when we entered he told me there could be (a massacre), I responded--we know them, till today they have not acted this way and when we are by them, and aside from it we are hoping, estimating, that such a thing wouldn't happen . . ."
(Gen. Drori, Session 9, p. 20B)

" . . . Question. . . . Did you think you could trust their word in spite of the fact that in the meantime Bashir was assassinated?

"Answer. Yes. . . ." (Brig. Gen. Yaron, Session 19, p. 13)

" . . . the fact of Bashir's assassination did not lit a red light regarding their conduct, not in such a way that we prevented their introduction. . . ." (Brig. Gen. A. Sagi, Session 2, p. 25)

" . . . in other words, I'd like to say that I would not have automatically made, in my mind, the connection between entering the camps and a massacre, absolutely not". (Brig. Gen. Amos Gilbo'a, Session 39, p. 1121)

" . . . I did not believe that they would do such a thing. I did not think that they would massacre,

31/ Admoni, Session 51, pp. 1117, 1121.

32/ Y. Sagi.

33/ Missing.

they would kill women and children the way they've done" (Col. Agmon, Session . . . p. 846 and statement 23 to the collectors).

" . . . in terms of background data I did not have any indication that introduction of the Phalangists into the camps would mean mass murder and a massacre, it was not clear to me, logically, I did not deduce it that way, and no one bothered to explain to me that such a thing could develop in the field . . ." (Lt. Col. Yossi Ben-Ari, Session 15, p. 4)

" . . . I explained why (Minister Levi's) brief remark had not provoked special thoughts because, in the final analysis, the Phalangists were not introduced to commit vendetta but to fight . . ." (Foreign Minister Shamir, Session 45, p. 1231)

" . . . in this case--I expected difficult fighting . . . and under those circumstances it didn't occur to me that they would act out of line. . . ." (C-o-S, Session 57, p. 1677)

" . . . Question: But didn't you think of a massacre?

"Answer: Absolutely not . . ." (Deputy C-o-S, Session 30, p. 948)

"The data in our possession had not indicated and did not warn of a trend toward (committing) atrocities in the camps . . ." (Mosad's Chief, Admoni, Session 51, p. 1428)

" . . . in the morning I receive the Dudai document and 'Iron Brain 6' and still am not expecting a massacre, because it is clear from the document that the Phalangists will enter in coordination with the IDF" (Aman's Chief, Y. Sagi, Session 55, p. 1253).

" . . . Question: Based on your knowledge of the Phalangists regarding their attitude towards the Palestinians, had any concern surfaced in your mind that following Bashir's assassination they will enter the camps and commit a massacre?

"Answer: Explicitly not . . . I explicitly did not think. I did not conduct an orderly consideration--but I did not think. . . ." (Navot, Session 12, p. 28)

A survey of the various testimonies reveals that in fact all the witnesses who were questioned on the subject, replied, almost unanimously that, under the circumstances which prevailed at the time--following Bashir's assassination--no one predicted or thought of the danger of a vendetta or bloodshed which could result from the introduction of the Phalangists under IDF's command, and that if such a danger had been predicted:

" . . . if it occurred to me that this could happen . . . they would not have been introduced. It may have been that we would then have to attack the camps, or make them surrender by air strikes and artillery, but if what happened had been predicted, or such a warning would have been issued, they would not have entered . . ."
(C-o-S, Session 57, p. 1677)

32. Among those many witnesses which the danger of a vendetta had not occurred to them were Israel's best experts on these subjects: The Head of Mosad, Head of Aman, Assistant Chief of Aman for Research, the C-o-S, Deputy C-o-S, IDF Generals: Drori, Barak, Simchoni and others. These experts assumed then as now that there was no danger to the residents of the neighborhoods from introduction of the Lebanese Forces, and therefore backed the planned operation in order to save lives of IDF's soldiers.

The Defense Minister--in this and every other issue--lives by the experts; The Defense Minister does not possess an independent intelligence collection system, and he is prohibited from possessing one. Like the rest of the Cabinet members and the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister is fed by the information and assessments provided by the intelligence community and the IDF, and since these supported, without reservation, the decision and the operation, the Defense Minister was permitted--in fact must have--assumed, as a matter of fact, that no danger of vendetta or bloodshed to the neighborhoods' residents existed. Moreover, the personal opinion of the Defense Minister--based on his own impressions of information gathered during the additional inspections he had conducted in parallel to ordinary combat regulation and military procedures--fully supported the experts' opinions, and in turn was supported by theirs. (Original underlines)

33. There was, therefore, no danger to the neighborhood's residents of vendetta or bloodshed from the Lebanese Forces. The Defense Minister--on the basis of the experts' estimates--and his own assessment--did not know or predict such a danger and automatically could not have "disregarded" or "diverted his attention" from a danger which did not exist, to the best of his knowledge at the time. On the basis of the data on hand--which were

highlighted and explained by the experts, no other reasonable Defense Minister could have predicted such a danger, and the proof is that all those personalities, possessing the ability, knowledge and qualifications to hold this same office, have not predicted or imagined the danger either, based on the same situation estimate.

34. As was detailed at length earlier, there was a consensus that the Lebanese Forces strictly observe accepted fighting norms, i.e.--they do not cause bloodshed or vendetta to a non-combatant population--when under IDF control, supervision or when the IDF is coordinating their activities, or is even deployed in proximity to the location of the operation. In order to enhance the operational effectiveness of the Lebanese Forces' operation in the neighborhoods, the IDF had to have maximum control over the Lebanese forces, their advance and method of fighting. The control measures--although designed for operational purposes--did grant the controller--i.e. the IDF, the capability to prevent or stop the Lebanese Forces not just in case of an operational malfunction but also due to sudden abnormal conduct towards the non-combatant population; in addition, these measures of control were a pre-condition--proved by past experience--for the Lebanese Forces to act correctly toward the civilian population so long as the IDF's control has been secured.

35. These are the command & control measures which were adopted: at the Forward Command Group of the 96 Division, the Defense Minister on the morning of September 15, 1982, instructed that the IDF will "command" all the forces in the field, including the Lebanese Forces. In using the term "command" the Defense Minister did not intend it to be applied as within the IDF, but those means of command which are feasible regarding relations with a military force which is not part of the IDF forces. However, the Defense Minister's instruction is clear: the IDF will command the Lebanese forces, but for the modifications deemed necessary because of them constituting a foreign military unit. The C-o-S has provided a different explanation to the word "will command": an order that IDF will (also) command other Israeli forces deployed in the area such as the Mosad and the Shin Beit. It is difficult to assume that this is the meaning of the term, since the "number" of the Shin Beit and Mosad people in the area hardly required "command" and they operate in their own areas of responsibilities, in coordination with, but not under IDF's "command". At any rate, the C-o-S acted according to the DM's verbatim instruction--even if he claims that he did not understand it this way. Thus he provided for all of the C&C measures which the originator of

the instruction intended, to be actually carried out as follows:

A. The Lebanese Forces were required to coordinate their operation with the Chief of Northern Command and subsequently with the commander of the 96 Division, and so they did; their commanders laid out their operational plans for the authorization of the Chief of Northern Command and the commander of the 96 Division. The Division's commander modified the plan by defining another route of advance, the method of seizing and taking control of houses and had also instructed not to continue fighting past a certain hour that is: The IDF determined the Lebanese Forces' mission, main methods of operation, the borderlines of the sections, major timings of the operation and the techniques of taking control.

B. The Lebanese Forces were allocated means of support like flaring and medical service.

C. Instructions were issued to the IDF to be ready to rescue the Lebanese Forces, if necessary.

D. The Lebanese Forces were ordered to maintain a liaison officer in the Forward Command Group of the 96th Division, and they had done so. In retrospect, it was found that they went beyond that and stationed the entire command of the operation at the Forward Command

Group of the 96th Division, and in addition to the liaison officer--Jessy--mentioned above, one of the commanders of the units which entered the neighborhoods--Michelle--was present at the Forward Command Group and he actually led his men inside the neighborhoods. As will be detailed subsequently both the commander of the operation and the liaison officer provided continuous up-to-date, and apparently true, information about the ongoings in the camps.

E. Professional electronic listening to the communication network of the units operating inside the camps was maintained, and in addition one of the Division's intelligence officers improvised listening to the conversations of the Lebanese Forces' officer through the Division's Forward Command Group transmitter. ✓

35(?) In both theory and practice, these command means worked well just the way they were designed to by the instruction of the Defense Minister and via its implementation by the C-o-S:

A. The commanders of the Lebanese Forces present at the Division's Forward Command Group were totally subservient to the Division's commander; and when this commander instructed them, among other things, in the early noon hours of Friday, to cease fire--they stopped

shooting. Examination of the entire material brought before this esteemed commission reveals that indeed the Lebanese Forces had stopped firing in the early noon hours of Friday up to their evacuation from the neighborhoods on Saturday morning.

B. When ordered by the Chief of Northern Command and the C-o-S on Friday, 17 September 1982, around noon and in the afternoon, to stop introducing additional units of the Lebanese Forces into the camps, although these forces were poised and equipped to do so, the Lebanese Forces obeyed these instruction without question, and have thereafter rotated troops only after the explicit permission of the Division's commander.

C. The liaison officer of the Lebanese Forces, this same Jessy, in complete frankness reported to several officers of the 96th Division, few hours after the unit entered the neighborhoods on apparently abnormal occurrences within the camps compound (the "300" message). In addition, further information was gathered among the Division's officers, through him, about hits on civilians (message "45"). Message "300" was transferred expeditiously to the GHQ/Aman in Tel Aviv; Message "45" was also brought to the attention of the appropriate levels, however both messages did not cause the control system of the Lebanese Forces to act

immediately to stop the operation because of reasons explained by the operation's commanders. It is beyond doubt that the means of control and reporting, as well as the liaison officer (Jessy) acted appropriately and quickly as an immediate means of reliable or effective information, which provided a true picture of what was taking place on the basis of which the necessary operational conclusions could have been drawn, in line with the opinions of the field commanders.

36. As indicated, the assassination of Bashir created an immediate need for entering into West Beirut and the neighborhoods in order to realize all of those plans which were supposed to have been carried out under Bashir's command. Under the circumstances, the central question which emerged was not the actual need to go into the camps in the coming hours, but the identity of the force which would be introduced. (Original underlines). The two alternatives were the IDF or a Lebanese military force--the Lebanese Army or the Lebanese Forces. The nature of the expected fight in the refugee camps did not give rise to much enthusiasm over introduction of the IDF into them--difficult and bloody fighting in a densely built and heavily populated area with the terrorist, still to be located, camouflaged as civilians because of the hostile population was expected. Such an operation would cost many

casualties and dead among IDF soldiers--and needless to say--there was no interest in embroiling the IDF in an unpleasant but necessary military move.

37. In this phase of the war--towards its end--there was an increased public sensitivity to the growing number of war casualties. The Israeli government and the IDF command viewed as today the issue of casualties as the highest value and under the circumstances, when introduction of the IDF into the camps was undesirable and unneeded, and the possibility emerged that a non-Israeli force will take upon itself to carry out the mission--the command of the IDF did not spare effort to persuade and encourage some Lebanese force to execute the operation.

The contacts held for this purpose followed two-tracks. As indicated, the C-o-S "ordered" the Lebanese Forces to do so, and had obtained their consent. At the same time, negotiations with the Lebanese Army continued--under the impact of disruptive "mediationary" American intervention--to persuade it to carry out the mission. The time element was a vital aspect of this operation, and when a de facto negative reply was received from the Lebanese Army, the Lebanese Forces were introduced into the camps, although the negotiations with the Lebanese Army continued even afterwards till the evening hours of Friday, September 17. The introduction of the Lebanese

Forces brought relief to all elements--military or political--which were involved or had knowledge about the operation. Soldiers and commanders were glad that they won't be carrying out a dangerous and unpleasant mission, while the political level reacted positively to continue cooperation with the Lebanese Forces, and especially because these Forces have agreed to carry out a mission which was intertwined immediately and directly with operational plans of the IDF, and that old ideas of the "Spark"--i.e. the Lebanese Forces fighting to liberate their capital city--was seen as beginning to materialize. However, the highest value which was at the base of the decision not to introduce the IDF into the camps, but instead use the Lebanese Forces, was the desire to avoid further loss of lives among IDF's soldiers.

38. In a thorough examination of how reasonable was the decision to introduce the Lebanese Forces into the camps, attention should be paid to the true dimensions of this operation relative to the rest of the activity which took place in the Beirut front at that time. The introduction of the Lebanese Forces into the camps is an operations which has two aspects--military and political. From a military-operational point of view it could be termed--secondary--in spite of its important purpose--to the overall effort. From the political aspect, as indicated, this

operation could be perceived as a continuation and a breakthrough: continuation of cooperation with the Lebanese Forces which was momentarily put in doubt in the wake of Bashir's assassination, and a breakthrough because of these Forces' readiness to totally link themselves in a complex Israeli military operation, and to, in effect, take the place of an Israeli unit in order to carry out what was a necessary mission in those camps.

Thus, the "special" treatment awarded this operation: were an Israel unit introduced into the camps, it is highly doubtful that this subject would have been presented before the GHQ's Heads of Branches Forum, in the operational forum of the Defense Minister, the Defense Minister's inspection during the 15-16 September, and in Cabinet briefings. It may be assumed--almost certainly--that the decision and its execution would have been made at a relatively low military level.

Those examining how reasonable was the decision and the way it was reached need to imagine the vast and all-encompassing activity which took place during those hours in Beirut. The decision to enter West Beirut was made on the midnight between the 14 and 15 September (missing) (We mobilized?) troops from four corners of the country to rush to Beirut, to seize intersections and dominant positions in West Beirut. (At the same time?) the troops

were continuing to fight, in these or other areas (and we had to speed up these?) missions because of the international political pressure which was expected, whatever its duration(?) (This page was xeroxed in such a way that only half of it is legible. The rest is intelligent(?) guesswork.)

39. Amidst the large span of difficult and pressing activities which faced the Israeli government--beginning with solving simple operational problems and ending up with an intense international political struggle--the decision about the introduction of the Lebanese Forces into the camps could not have been accorded greater attention that the one granted it, and this dealing was . . . (missing). The vast collection of diaries, documents schedules and conversations in the possession of this commission, reflects the activity of the decision-making levels from the moment this decision was reached until the operation had started and testifies that this operation was accorded maximum attention within the complex of intricate problems facing these levels at the time (??)(guesswork)

40. In conclusion: a military operation which has a political aspect was discussed (due to) a sudden military necessity, and the decision-making level had an opportunity to involve Lebanese (missing) . . . and also to save Israeli lives This operation, in spite of it

being secondary from a military viewpoint, was discussed and analyzed according to decision-making norms prevalent in the IDF, and in addition was accorded the personal attention of the Defense Minister both in the field and in the discussion-room, it was authorized--while in progress--by the Cabinet and its Head, and every possible precaution was applied under the circumstances. (guesswork)

And in essence, it should be recalled, that none of those who participated in reaching this decision and its execution had predicted a vendetta or a bloodbath, and (none had?) cast doubt on that decision and the way it was carried out. The terrible outcome which occurred is an unforeseen mishap which remains unexplained till these very days. It is not to be said, therefore, that the Defense Minister had failed in fulfilling any of his duties as part of executing his office.

(LOOKS LIKE ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY BY DEFENSE

MINISTER SHARON) (missing pages then . . .)

E. On Friday, at 21:30, the officer on duty in the situation room called the DM and reported to him about eight subjects, among them:

1. Major Haddad's men had arrived in West Beirut and begun killing local residents. The 50th regiment killed one of Haddad's men and took two prisoners. The issue is under study.

2. Another complaint was received by the representative of the Foreign Ministry in Beirut via its communication center. Movement by Khatib forces stationed in the area of Shatilla camp was noticed. The Americans were complaining that according to the agreement we were responsible for keeping order.

F. The message regarding Haddad's men reinforced the DM's feeling that in fact killing of civilians inside the camps did occur, and that this killing was stopped and, anyway, the IDF reacted in an extreme way, including firing on the killers. No doubt, that based on the contents of this message, the DM was satisfied that the matter which was reported by the CO's was taken care of appropriately and was laid to rest. The second message, on its face, does not relate to the subject matter and at that time seemed,

reasonably, a minor affair. What's more, the Minister was aware of the Phalangists being in the camps' vicinity.

G. At 23:30, the journalist Ron Ben-Yishai called the DM. The latter does not recall the contents of this conversation. (From Yishai's letter to the Prime Minister) claims he had relayed to the Minister "all of the information he was privy to". This information contained accounts by officers serving in the vicinity of the camps of the brutal killings of civilians there, reported to the journalist at 23:00.

H. Ben-Yishai claims he told the DM it was necessary to do something to stop the killings and that the Minister listened without comment and asked for further details.

I. The DM was not surprised by Ben-Yishai's story, as he had already known, from the CO's, that indeed killings did happen in the camps, but he was certain that the COS' report--confirmed by another message--indicating the operation was terminated was correct, and as far as he was concerned there was no need for further action. The DM did not think that in light of an explicit report by the CO's, he had to address the CO's on this matter again.

J. On Saturday, 18 September, 15 08:30 AM the DM held a telephone conversation with the C-o-S. In it the matter of the French destroyer was raised. He (the DM) does

not recall for sure if the issue of the Phalangists was discussed in this conversation. To the best of his recollection, the CO's repeated his message of Friday night.

K. Between 08:45 and 12:30 the DM received various reports from the situation room pertaining to a variety of issues unrelated to the camps.

L. At 12:10 a report by the representative of the Red Cross in Israel is received in the situation room indicating the Phalangists were conducting a massacre. The report was transferred to the Assistant to the Minister.

M. At 12:45 a message is received in the situation room according to which Ambassador Draper was complaining of a massacre carried out by the Phalangists in the camps. In the same message another complaint talks of attempts to ransack banks. ✓

N. The DM reacts to the Draper complaint by telling the reporting officer that he had already talked with the CO's about this issue, because he was thinking of his previous conversation or conversations with the CO's through which he had known that the Phalangists "exaggerated" in harming civilians. However, since the source of this information was different from the first one--i.e., that of the CO's--the DM wondered whether the Director General of the Foreign Ministry had any information other than the one

he had. Therefore, he asked to be put in contact with the Foreign Ministry.

O. In a conversation held by the DM with the Director General of the Foreign Ministry it became clear that the latter has no information other than what the DM had already known, and at any rate there was nothing in this information which would necessitate some sort of concrete action.

P. At the same time, based on the increasing collection of rumors--and a similar level of certainty--the DM found it appropriate to inform the Prime Minister. It should be recalled that throughout the war, the DM took care to frequently and in detail report to the Prime Minister regarding every significant event.

Q. The Prime Minister's son informed the Defense Minister that the PM was in the synagogue. Based on what he knew at the time--i.e., an abnormal activity which had been stopped the day previously--it was not necessary in the DM's opinion to summon the PM from the synagogue.

R. At 16:00 the situation room reports of the events involving the Soviet Embassy. The DM was updated, did not satisfy himself with it and had dictated several questions for clarification. He demanded a response be made by that evening. This proves the DM has accorded significance to detailed and updated reporting with regard to any

matter, while its absence in the matter of the camps testifies that the DM's concern had long since been satisfied.

S. In later afternoon (between 17:15 to 18:15) the Prime Minister called the DM and informed him of a report he had heard on the BBC. The DM rushed to demand a detailed report of what had happened since it was only now that his suspicion surfaced, that the report of the CO's regarding the extent of the killings and the steps taken to stop it did not correspond with reality.

T. It should be added as a general comment that the Defense Minister does not have an independent information source regarding what is taking place inside the IDF, only the reporting of IDF sources themselves. All versions provided by the DM in the days following the event were based on information supplied to him by the IDF. The DM did not contribute--and could not have contributed--personally to the description of facts occurring in the field (aside from his own activities.) since, as was said, he had no source for acquiring such facts.