

Handwritten Minutes of Meeting with Bashir Gemayel
Kimche, Tamir

1. Bashir was satisfied with the equipment he received from us heretofore.

2. He was interested to know what would happen to the Palestinians in Lebanon following the PLO's evacuation-- what he terms "the demographic problem".

We responded that the problem of the civilian population is theirs (they invited them in and they have to get rid of them).

By comparison the PLO problem is a joint one: either they withdraw according to a political agreement or would be forced out.

(Bashir) raised the well-known argument that time is running out and that time is working against us and nothing would be gained by the political process.

Said that if the camps were conquered or cut off that the city would fall like a ripe fruit, because Sunni neighborhoods would surrender and the Christians will also apply pressure.

[A handwritten note with no title of 10 July 1982: Bashir Gemayel proposes to add a Saudi force to the international force slated to enter Beirut.]

August 21, 1982

Minutes of a Meeting Between the Defense Minister
and Pierre and Bashir Gemayel in Bashir's Office

Present: Bashir's men, Mossad's representatives,
Uri Dan, Major Shamir.

The DM: Here we've established the background, we
are in Beirut as we had agreed in January of this year. How
are you organized for a strong and stable government?

Pierre: God had sent you to us. During the last
seven to eight years everybody had let us down. The
Americans and the Europeans were afraid of burning their
hands here. It was necessary for you to act the way you
did. You've come and you saved us. During the last two
years we had waited almost in desperation. Without your
help we would have vanished.

I feel that you are dissatisfied with our position.
Perhaps you'd expected greater expressions of joy and
excitement on your arrival. Although we have not expressed
this externally, I'd like you to know that our hearts are
overflowing with joy. Even if you acted according to your
own interests, you've also served ours. As we understand
you, you should also understand us. For the sake of both of
our interests. Lebanon is the best bridge you could have to
to the Arab world. This is in your interest as well. It is
impossible to go on living and carry arms forever. Israel

has to survive forever and a solution must be found for peaceful existence. You are new in the region. Our struggle for independence has been going on for 400 years. I think we've succeeded in this. Therefore--it is my hope that you understand--our joy is great even if no external expression has been evident. We understand better the Arab world, thus we think that a public display of joy would be harmful.

(Bashir whispers in his ear, then) You've returned after hundreds of years. We have stayed here but we are grappling with virtually the same problems. We can survive and remain here thanks to your presence in the region.

I wish to thank you again and stress our recognition of everything you've done for us. Without you Lebanon would have disintegrated. We are your true friends, and our interests are identical. If you have any comments regarding our conduct it is important that you convey them to us, since your friendship is necessary to us.

The DM: Thanks for coming. As a boy I remember you in your struggle for the establishment of a free Lebanon. I had to come and see you and am grateful that you've come here.

Pierre: I visited Israel several times. I was very impressed. During one of my visits I was shown a school which greatly impressed me. They taught children there of the beauty of life.

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The DM: How to create power and how to convey its presence is the great test. We were 18 million, six million were exterminated. After 40 years we are close to 15 million. We learned how to use the power we have, but we are still not ourselves. The use of power is what I want to discuss with you. I'd like to refer to the special circumstances at hand. We understand your problems, together with other people, and reach a better understanding. I have a warm and friendly feeling toward you and I believe in establishing relations between free Lebanon and Israel. However, you must understand that for us to be able to continue and help you, we need your participation--this needs to be insisted upon. Maneuvers and games lead nowhere. There were several opportunities. Two months ago there was an opportunity for you to act to liberate your capital. This did not happen. It was easier for us. It did not happen but we had understood why. In my opinion, your situation would have been better if you had acted.

Pierre: Permit me to interrupt. What could we do? It would have been disturbing rather than helpful. I am not a military man but I think that our position served the mutual goal better than had we become involved.

The DM: You've got to understand that Israel is a democracy. There are people here who are serving for 60 days already, and they are being ruined economically.

Pressure in Israel is building up. The content of the pressure [is] like this: "We achieved what we've achieved, let's go home. The soldiers here are civilians. They had left their families and jobs. This has created pressure on Israeli public opinion. In a few days we'll be faced with international pressure which will say--you wanted to drive the terrorists out of Beirut. Here, they're out. Now vacate the premises." We won't have a response to this. We've got a response to why we are holding a strip of 40-50 Kms in the south of Lebanon. This is a security belt. However we won't have an answer for appeasing domestic and international public opinion. What could help is an unequivocal position asserting that we (the Christians) will conclude a peace agreement with Israel. Otherwise we've nothing to explain. Unless it is stated in the clearest of terms that a peace agreement would be signed by Israel, we wouldn't be able to stay in the Beirut area. In the Sinai we waited for years until peace arrived, but to sit down here without it being said by the liberated leadership that a peace agreement with Israel is to be established, would create a difficult problem for us.

A question was raised before, what would happen to the Palestinian camps once the terrorists withdraw. If you won't organize in order to enter this place, you'll be faced with the same problem. It is inconceivable that you would

come back to us and say we made a mistake, we need to go into the camps and handle them. Once the evacuation of the terrorists is over, we won't be able to do a thing, and it would be wrong to ask us to. You've got to act.

So that we can publicly withstand the pressure in Israel, you've got to immediately proclaim the conclusion of a peace treaty with Israel, [and] so that there be no terrorists you've got to clean the camps.

So that it would be possible to establish with you creditable relations based on mutual respect. After we suffer 2500 casualties you've got to do something: Ring the bells! Declare declarations. A people is standing up after suffering 2500 casualties and cannot comprehend this dummy (golem)! It might be that I said difficult things but these came from the heart, between friends. This is the way I feel and believe. I said those things knowing the internal situation in Israel, and the international situation.

Pierre: I have understood your statement completely and I thank you for your words. We are well aware of the reactions inside Israel. It is important that the people of Israel understand we are on their side. We duly noted your statement. I'd like you to understand our political diplomatic position. We are in the midst of a political process of presidential elections, and believe that everything will change. Bashir is the nominee. Once

Bashir is elected it will usher in a new period in the region. The Arabs have to understand that we wish to be Lebanese. Our entire policy will change. We are Lebanese first and Arabs second. When a new Republic emerges everything will change, everything will be possible. Once we enter this new phase we would like to reach a complete agreement with you. We are in the midst of the election campaign. It is very important that calm is kept. Our interests are identical.

The DM: Thank you very much for your statement. I understand you. It is critically important that you appreciate the domestic and international problems facing us.

Pierre: You have to understand our position also. Our interests are identical. I again request that whenever you have comments, it is important for us to listen to them in complete frankness.

Pierre bids farewell and a short conversation with Bashir followed.

The DM: What about the Americans?

Bashir: There is complete understanding now. You arranged it for us about a year ago. ✓

The DM: And the Saudis? Are they getting involved?

Bashir: No, they have used their leverage vis-a-vis the Muslims in Beirut. The Americans are exploiting this even more. The Americans are doing it. Habib told Sa'ib Salam, on several occasions, that he was playing with fire.

The Syrians had prevented the arrival of members of Parliament. Thus, there was a danger that there be no quorum. I wanted to raise with you what should be done if such was the case? Should I ask Sarris to resign? What about the civilians under Syrian control? How would the political process proceed? But we shall discuss this after Monday.

The DM: What would you (plural) do about the refugee camps?

Bashir: We are planning a real zoo.

The DM: Are you planning on going into West Beirut?

Bashir: A problem exists regarding the Murabitun. They have just offered 40,000 Kalashnikovs for sale. Imagine what would be found in the city. Regarding a visit to Israel, if we fail, we need to discuss it. Perhaps this is not the time. There is nothing urgent on the agenda. If I am elected on Monday we would manage the matters of state.

Nahik: We are again asking that you do nothing which could complicate the evacuation (of the terrorists).

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Your timetable allows delaying the activities to after the evacuation.

The DM: Don't take any action without coordinating it with us.

Bashir: I promise. ✓

September 15, 1982

Mosad Notes of Karantina Meeting

SHARON: "The situation is critical. You ought to act immediately. . . . You ought to guarantee your full control over the Lebanese Army. You can do that directly or with our assistance. . . . Decisions you ought to take today. We are with you with all the needed support, the cooperation and friendship that developed in the last years. I'm sorry we lost the man; we had so many expectations of him. Now the people in West Beirut might have second thoughts and therefore you ought to act immediately. . . . My policy with Bashir Gemayel was that I never kept secrets from him. We always talked with Sheikh Bashir before we dealt with Americans and we did so even after dealing with them. This must continue. There is no other way to come out from this crime without your full control. . . . I'm not pressuring you now to carry on with the [peace] talks but to determine that you ought to act immediately in order to guarantee continuity. We can see the dangers en route. I want to stress the need for an immediate action now. . . . We will take over all of Beirut, but we do need your assistance. We will gain control over strongpoints and junctures but your army should move and enter right after ours."

ZAHY BUSTANI: "We shall try to achieve the legal cover but if we fail, will we [the Phalangists] still be effective for the plan?

SHARON: "Make every effort to achieve legitimacy. Even if you fail [to achieve legitimacy] we will still back you up. . . . Make use of every legal way [but], if you fail we'll back you up."

The Minister of Defense informed the Phalangist council that the Israeli intelligence community has information that the PLO is showing interest in the location and timing of Bashir's funeral.

Responding to the Minister's question, Fadi Frem stated that his troops are being mobilized and that another part of his troops "will be ready for assignments".

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Urgent. 15 September 1982, 14:00

To: HQ/Lebanon Dept.

From: Liaison-Lebanon

Top Secret: 4023

Re: Meeting of the Defense Minister with the Top Political
and Military Leadership--15 September 1982.

Participants: Josef Krameh, Zahi Bustani, Eli Hobeika, Fadi
Frem, Antuan Breidi, Walid Fars, Asam Shaftri,
Chief of Aman, Head of Shin Beit, Mosad
representatives.

1. The Defense Minister reviewed the military plans: the DM stressed that no one would be able to guarantee for them the governmental arrangements but they themselves have to, according to the constitution. The President can nominate a Maronite Prime Minister. This one has to be a Maronite. Continuing the DM said this has to be done immediately, otherwise everybody would come up with proposals and exploit the situation. We don't see anyone capable of bringing the old situation back but one of you, you've got to act immediately, it is a critical situation.

2. You've got to assure your complete control over the Lebanese Army. You could do that directly or with our assistance via Gen. Drori.
3. Decisions have to be made today. We are with you with all the necessary help. [With] the coordination and the friendship developed over the years, it's a pity we lost the man (Bashir). We had so many expectations.
4. Now people in West Beirut may have second thoughts and therefore immediate action is necessary. How do you see it?
5. The Defense Minister went on to say--I had a policy toward Sheikh Bashir of not keeping secrets from him ever. We always talked with Bashir first before as well as after we talked to the Americans, and this has to continue that way. There is no way to emerge from this crime without your control.
6. Zahi Bustani--we've got to continue Sheikh Bashir's policy. The discussion you held with him on (12 September 1982) Sunday evening is understood by and acceptable to us. We will continue his policy but don't pressure us to hurry and conclude matters.

7. The DM--we don't pressure you to continue the talks now but to determine that you must act immediately, to insure continuation, we see the dangers down the road, I would like to stress the importance of taking action now.
8. Zahi Bustani--We are talking as if there is only one possibility, but there are more. Perhaps [there will be] elections or perhaps a legal vacuum. We wish to do that under no pressure.
9. The DM--I talked with the Prime Minister who was asked by the Americans, and we wish to know what do you think.
10. Zahi--Formally we've got to discuss this with Pierre Gemayel. Substantively there are three possibilities:
- (a) A government headed by a Maronite. This could be a good solution but it is noteworthy that the problem is the structural weakness of the Presidency.
 - (b) Perhaps it is preferable that elections would be held.
 - (c) A new idea--if no new President is elected by 23 Sept. the present President would carry on. The

advantage is that this provides for a legal vacuum while power is in our hands.

11. The DM--the problem is that Shafik al-Wazan could come up with various demands similarly to the way he behaved following the elections. This situation whereby Sarkis is President and Wazan is Prime Minister could be most dangerous for us. I'd like to stress another thing, the Americans could come and ask what about President Shamaoun, we are not getting involved but this is a possibility.
12. You know well their interests--you are entering Beirut now, it is important that you take control over all of Beirut.
13. The DM--we'll do it but we need your help. We will seize dominant points and intersections, but your army must also go in, possibly after our army, following us. Establish contact with Gen. Drori and decide on how to go about doing it.
14. Zahi Bustani--another point--we will try and get the legal cover; however, failing this, will we be "effective" for the purposes of the plan? We--the Lebanese forces.

15. The DM--Do everything possible to acquire legitimacy. If you do not succeed we will support you anyway. The Americans were talking this morning about three possibilities:

- (a) Sarkis continues;
- (b) a Maronite Prime Minister;
- (c) Camille Shamoun.

Employ every legal avenue, [but] if you don't succeed we will support you.

16. The DM informed the council that we have information about the PLO being interested in finding out the place and timing of the funeral.

17. Responding to the DM question, Fadi Frem said he was mobilizing his forces and had positioned forces in points which will prevent surprises. Another part of his forces would be ready for missions.

September 16, 1982

Minutes of a Meeting Between the Defense Minister
and Pierre and Amin Gemayel

The DM accompanied by the Head of Aman, Head of Shin Beit and Head of Tevel visited the home of Sheikh Pierre Gemayel to convey their condolences to him and to Amin on the murder of Bashir. The father was moved by the gesture.

The DM informed Pierre of the Cabinet's decision to continue providing full assistance in order to realize the mutual objectives. "Bashir was assassinated and it is a great loss for all of us, but the mission has to be carried out."

The DM informed Pierre of the essence of his earlier discussion with several members of the political/military leadership of the "Lebanese Forces", the necessity of immediate action to prevent establishment of new facts by the present government in its final days, and the danger that hostile elements would try and modify political processes desirable to us.

Pierre responded by conveying his thanks for Israel's support for the Christians in Lebanon, who were abandoned by everyone else. Israel had acted and via its military achievements brought about the prospects of changing the face of Lebanon and the Middle East. Amin Gemayel

was acquainted with the final discussion held with Bashir, and especially the last one (12 September 1982).

Pierre Gemayel expressed his great satisfaction with the results of the last discussion between the DM and Bashir on Sunday of this week. The DM repeated the great importance and positiveness of this last conversation.

September 16, 1982

Notes from a Discussion Between Mr. R [Navot],
Joseph Abu Halil and Alfred Madi
After the Decision of the Phalange Party

"The Lebanese Forces are ready to continue because in all the processes and cooperative efforts, including meetings of the leadership of Mosad with Amin Gemayel and with the delegation which was supposed to come on 16 September."

-He announced that the delegation is now invited to Lebanon on Sunday evening, September 19.

-On the issue of the possibility of appointing a Christian prime minister, in the opinion of Charles Malik, Sarkis is not enthusiastic about that. He fears a reaction of the Muslims and one needs to remember that he is a Shihabist and they are always sensitive to the reaction of the Muslims. Charles Malik and his colleagues are full of anxiety because there is no time to think and plan on a solution such as this or another.

September 16, 1982

Notes of Meeting Between the Representative of Mosad
and the Lebanese Forces

-The leadership of the Phalange Party has decided definitely to nominate Amin Gemayel as candidate for president.

-Elections would take place before 23 September. At present they are scheduled for Tuesday 21 September.

-The Lebanese Forces are awaiting the return of Kamal al-Asad, the head of Parliament the evening of the 16 of September.

-Decision of the Phalange Party on the subject of Amin Gemayel's candidacy. Sarkis was informed of this.

-(illegible)

-The "Lebanese Forces" have the feeling that the murder has aroused sentimental feelings toward the Gemayel family and that has improved Amin's chances.

(Page 2 of this document is illegible. It deals with Camille Chamoun, Pierre Gemayel and the differences between the younger and older generations of the Lebanese Forces.)

[partial translation only]

September 16, 1982

Extracts from Sharon's Comments at Cabinet Meeting

General discussion and description that 2000 P.L.O. terrorists remain in Beirut and the implications.

Description of what an "open city" is.

Sharon: "A day before yesterday we offered to enter Fakhani, Sabra, and mop up and finish off the terrorists. Why should we do that? The Lebanese Army borders this neighborhood. We are ready after tomorrow morning to give them all the details on these neighborhoods."

Description of role of new president.

Description of entrance into Beirut--Estimate of 2000 terrorists left, believed there would be little resistance. Hours passed and resistance increased. Fire from tanks (which should not be there) and anti-tank weapons. It was clear that they did not turn the weapons in and that they were keeping them in various places especially in Fakhani, Sabra and Shatilla which are the centers of operation.

Information on the exchange of fire between Marines and the IDF.

Description of meeting with Draper and Lewis. Subject was withdrawal of forces from West Beirut.

Sharon complained that the terrorists cheated Israel and the United States by leaving weapons and terrorists in the city.

"I said, 'Do you want the neighborhood of Fakhani and Sabra, please enter'".

"We will help them to enter and we will see what happens."

Description of the level of preparedness of the Lebanese Army.


Ben Porat and Sharon discuss security measures in the south.

Sharon: "The terrorists have cheated." He stressed the concept of an open and safe city. Refuses to answer on how many terrorists were killed or captured.

Sharon: "It is important to remember all the time what the head of the Internal Security Dept. of Israel said--that a situation would not be created where the security forces will not be able to operate. What they need now is time with no interference. We have an opportunity to get rid of a large number of terrorists."

"I prefer not to answer on the number captured and killed. When the operation is over I will report."

(How long?)



"Probably a few weeks. We have to go and search for thousands of terrorists. You have to understand that these thousands of terrorists are hiding amongst a population of a few hundred thousand people."


"What we have to do now is to finish the terrorists. In Beirut our services are after them. They will finish off whomever they will finish off and arrest whomever they arrest."

"Now, we have received a message that a big Phalange unit has entered the Sabra camps and is conducting searches."

"No, this is our information. This will be publicity by itself and the results will speak for themselves. From Sabra they will go to another one. Therefore, give us those days which are necessary to finish the terrorists off."

Stressed need for open city.

[partial translation only]



September 17, 1982

The Mosad--Intelligence and Special Services [4124]

Office of the head of Mosad

Foreign Minister, Defense Minister (Sharon), Chief-of-staff,
head of the Intelligence Branch, Deputy Chief-of-staff,
Ma'il Navo

1. Picture of the situation in Lebanon after Mr. R's discussions
2. Meeting of Fadi Frem with Mr. R September 17, 1982

Top Secret

Picture of the situation in Lebanon according to Mr. R
following his conversations the morning of September 17.

-Discussions took place between different groups within the Phalange Party and within the Lebanese Forces with Amin Gemayel, Pierre Gemayel concerning the policies of Amin before the various elements decide finally to support him.

-Head of the Parliament Kamal Asad announced his support for Amin's candidacy. (It is clear that this is connected to the obligation that was settled upon, apparently, in financing the election of Bashir.)

-Last night it became known that Camille Chamoun decided to present his candidacy (before it was publicized . . . Illegible)

-On September 17, 1982 in the afternoon the leadership of the Lebanese Forces including representatives of all the parties (was) about to meet with Pierre Gemayel and after that with Amin Gemayel.

-In this situation, what is liable to happen is that--if the elections are actually held on Tuesday Sept. 21, there will not be a decision. There is a danger that after Sept. 23 the only element remaining with legitimate sovereignty will be Prime Minister Shafik al-Wazan. From this it can be promised that before Sept. 23 President Sarkis will nominate a new government. If the evaluation is correct--that Sarkis will do what the Phalange tells him--this could be a solution of the lesser of two evils.

Top Secret

September 19, 1982

Meeting Between Amin Gemayel and Mr. R

(The meeting took place in Amin's house with the participation of Fadi Frem, George Farha and Walid Farim)

-Amin pointed out that he wanted to set up the first working meeting in his house in order to fulfill the tradition of eating a piece of bread and salt together.

-Amin repeated his "I believe" as the bond of his father and his desire to continue Bashir's line and to establish good relations and close working contacts with us because he recognized their importance to Lebanon. He added that to his great sadness he is not an expert on the details of different subjects regarding coordination and he will try to prepare himself for expected discussions with him.

-He accepts all of Bashir's obligations, but he points out that on the question of formal relations, it is necessary to accept decisions that (are agreed to) by most of his government. And it is necessary to work on this.

-Amin raised two problems:

1. Why did Kol Yisrael announce that the Phalange carried out the massacre in the refugee camps? Furthermore why did they publicize this and why didn't the IDF control activities of the forces

and it is known what the militias do in situations such as these.

2. The leak of the meeting of the Prime Minister and Bashir. He is not able to take upon himself such risks. They will accuse him of betrayal.

-Concerning the camps, Mr. R explained that we did not publicize it and that we have no control over press sources. The damage caused us in Israel and in the world is beyond repair. Leaks happen. But they are nothing compared to the scope of our secret activities that are not publicized and are not revealed.

-Mr. R surveyed the special relations which were built over the last 8 years--the high points being:

1. building the Lebanese Forces as a military power that became political,
2. war plans, planning political and military coordination for operation (Peace for Galilee) since January 1982, a process which does not occur in relations between states.

-Afterward Mr. R described the meeting of the Defense Minister (Sharon) with Bashir and the subjects which were

raised and (those) expected to be raised in the upcoming
meeting with Amin:


1. entering the peace process in the course of normalization,
2. establishing direct connections between the governments and their armies in every subject that requires (it); without coordination of a third party,
3. discussions on the next stage--total withdrawal of Syrians and Palestinians from Lebanon,
4. the problem of the South,
5. continuation of the IDF presence and their request that we not evacuate without coordination with them,
6. defense of the Christians in areas under Syrian control,
7. shared interest of preventing the presence of a multi-national force or a UN force on Lebanese soil,
8. need for political coordination on issues of mutual interest,

9. continuation of intelligence cooperation,
10. continuation of security cooperation--training and materials,
11. preserving direct lines of communication with him (Amin) when he becomes president,
12. preserving the technique of rapid communications.

-Amin asked what was with Mt. Tzanin and remembered that he read in the list of the last conversations (of Bashir) about the possibility of an operation there.

-He again pointed out that the scale of his expertise on subjects was not sufficient and he wanted very much to hope that we not go away disappointed from the expected meeting with him.

-It was accepted by Amin that the goal of the meeting was twofold:

1. personal recognition and establishment of intimate working relationship,
 2. creation of a basis of understanding for a shared position and the beginning of taking immediate care of different subjects.
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-Mr. R directed his attention to practical matters with which he had dealt in the previous two days--Sarkis sent (to President Reagan) the subject of the refugee camps and the defense of the Christian villages in the north. [word such as "letter" apparently missing here]

[Last two paragraphs of page 3 of this document could not be read]

September 19, 1982

Meeting Between Chief of Staff,
Commander of the Northern District with
Toto, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Forces

C-of-S: The Lebanese Army enters the refugee camps and in this the problems will be finished. The IDF must quickly collect all the available arms and ammunition (and the great quantities). This is what will take place in the next few days. In my opinion, there will not be shootings or battles in the next few days.

 The world is outraged by what happened in Shatilla and your representatives must go and explain to the media what happened there because everyone is pointing an accusing finger at Israel and what is liable to happen is that Israel will be compelled to leave Beirut and therefore someone of you must explain the subject--and quickly. The version must be such that they take part of the guilt and that what happened was beyond your control.

Commander, Northern District: At the same (time) mention what happened in Damour--to clarify also that this is not your policy. (You) should mention that in the places they entered there were battles between camps--inside the camps and not only with the Phalange.

C-of-S: For your future, you must clarify this subject in a diligent manner. Are you able to arrange a press conference?

Toto: Abu Halil will arrange it.

Mr. R: Please include Abu Halil on the matter of the announcement to the media. Explain [to him] the request of the C-of-S and the importance of explaining the subject quickly.

The problem is that it is true that the Phalange entered there, in my opinion, and this is what they must explain--that it is not policy. They must explain that this is an exceptional case and after the murder of Bashir this is what happened. I think this is what is correct and it is impossible that we--Israel--will not fight in this matter. Because if we alone need to explain--we will explain what we want.

Abu Halil: In fact, what you want is that we take the matter upon ourselves. In the present political situation it is impossible but tell us and we will do it.

C-of-S: What do you suggest?

Abu Halil: Do not accuse us--brief your own media.

C-of-S: The fact is that everyone knows that it was carried out by the Phalange.

Abu Halil: I request that you brief your own media and do not throw the responsibility on the Phalange, at least in the next few days.

Commander, Northern District: (You) must explain that this is not their policy and what happened was not carried out only by the Phalange but also that (there was) a war of factions inside the camps.

C-of-S: The fact is that everyone knows they were the Phalange and they must explain that this is not policy and what happened was a lack of control. And therefore, the moment that they knew what was happening they stopped it. That, you must explain. Our media is free and they can say what they want but everyone knows the Phalange did it, so explain that this is not your policy. What happened was an outburst of anger on the part of the soldiers after Bashir's murder. If you have another suggestion let's have it.

Abu Halil: (We) must handle this on a daily basis--in a vague manner according to what happens in the media. We cannot say that the Phalange did it.

C-of-S: How do you want to explain that?

Abu Halil: To continue to deny it.

C-of-S: How is it possible with the camps full of journalists?

Abu Halil: How did the journalists enter the camps?

Commander ND: All of Beirut is full of journalists--they are running around everywhere.

Abu Halil: Do what you understand and we will check how to react. We have never accused Israel. Yesterday on T.V. some Israeli person blamed the Phalange.

C-of-S: I do not know how this influences the political situation but everyone knows the facts--that they did it and that we made it possible for them to enter. Thus it must be explained to the world and the Lebanese public that this is not policy and it was an outburst of rage. No one blames the IDF in this.

Abu Halil: O.K. we will take care of the matter but do not blame us. Deny that the IDF did it.

C-of-S: No one blames the IDF and everyone knows that it is them.

Abu Halil: That is our problem.

Mr. R: It is not only an internal problem of yours.
It is also our problem.

Abu Halil: We will study the matter and take care of it
but don't blame us.

C-of-S: If they say these things honestly it will
have a positive impact because today everyone fears them.

Abu Halil: Announcing it will hurt us politically.

Commander ND: They must explain the matter only partially.

C-of-S: Our problem is with the world and not in
Israel because many questions (are being asked).

Commander ND: They are liable to hurt us because of the
Muslims. Therefore, they must explain the matter partially.

C-of-S": We have made clear our opinion and they will
weigh the matter and decide, but the facts are known.

(The aforementioned was a transcript of a conversation
recorded by an aide to the Commander of the Northern
District.)

-On the question of relations with the Arab countries, Amin
added that he will not cut his ties with the Arab world and
he would not bring hostility to the relationship with them.

-With conversations with Amin the approaches to the subject of the Palestinians and relations with Syria were not clarified.

-The Lebanese Forces did not promise their unequivocal support for Amin.

-They must reach an agreement concerning the candidates, with the hope that there will be only one candidate until midnight, because the newspapers must publish tomorrow the names of the candidates for the election on Tuesday.

-(evaluation of Chamoun and Amin)

-Two candidates without coordination have brought splits in the Christian alignment. This is an expression of political corruption.

-Concerning the presentation of one candidate, Malik fears that the Phalange will not concede on the candidacy of Amin--thus there is no alternative.

-Concerning the possibility of postponing elections, Charles Malik knows that the Americans are against this and want to see the matter closed.

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[This is another translation of the preceding document]

Minutes of Mosad (4222) of a Meeting Between
Israeli Chief of Staff and Gen. Drori with Toto
(Fadi Frem's Deputy) That Took Place
on September 19, 1982 at noon

Participants: Gen. Eitan; Gen. Drori; Mr. Navot;
Drori's aide-de-camp; Toto; and Joseph Abu-Halil.

GEN EITAN: The world is upset from what happened in Shatilla and your representative has to come out and explain to the media what happened there. Everybody points an accusing finger at Israel and the outcome might be that the IDF will be forced to withdraw from Beirut. Therefore some of you have to explain the subject and immediately. The formula should be that they [the Phalangists] took part in an assignment and that whatever occurred was out of their control.

GEN. DRORI: On this occasion you should mention also what happened at Damour. Also to mention the fact that this is not your policy. You could mention that in the places that they [the Phalangists] entered there were battles between rival sides inside the camps and not only with the Phalangists.

CHIEF OF STAFF: For your own future, you have to explain the subject constantly. Can you arrange a press conference?

TOTO: Positive. Abu-Halil is organizing that.

NAVOT: Explain the Chief of Staff demand and the importance of explaining the whole matter immediately. The problem is that it is accurate that the Phalangists entered there but in my opinion they [the Phalangists] should explain that this is not a policy. They should explain that this was an exceptional incident and it occurred after the assassination of Bashir. I think this is right because you cannot expect us [Israel] to fight off that matter. Because if only we will explain it, we will do whatever we choose.

ABU-HALIL: Actually what you want is that we take the whole matter on ourselves. In the present political situation it is impossible. You tell us and we will carry out.

GEN. EITAN: What do you suggest?

ABU-HALIL: Don't accuse us. Brief your media.

GEN. EITAN: The fact is that everybody knows that it was carried out by the Phalangists.

ABU-HALIL: I want you to brief your media not to put the blame on the Phalangists for at least the coming days in order to gain political time-out.

GEN. DRORI: You ought to explain that this is not your policy and whatever happened was not carried out only by the Phalangists but was an outcome of a war of rival camps within the [refugee] camps.

EITAN: The fact is that everybody knows that these were the Phalangists. You ought to explain that this is not a policy and whatever happened was lack of control. Therefore in the moment you realized what happened you stopped it. Our media is free to say whatever they want. But everyone knows that Phalangists carried that out and therefore you should explain that this is not your policy. Whatever happened was an outburst of anger of soldiers after the assassination of Bashir. If you have any other idea, tell me.

ABU-HALIL: We ought to take care of it on a daily matter and maintain a vague form of explanation, playing by ear according to what will happen in the media. We cannot admit that the Phalangists carried it out.

EITAN: How do you want to explain it?

ABU-HALIL: To carry on and deny it.

CHIEF OF STAFF: How can you? The camps are full of journalists.

ABU-HALIL: How did the journalists get into the camps?

DRORI: All of Beirut is loaded with journalists and they are free to move everywhere.

ABU-HALIL: Do whatever you understand and we will check how to respond. We never accused Israel [for whatever

happened]. Yesterday on TV an Israeli official was quoted accusing the Phalangists.

EITAN: I don't know how this influences the political situation but everybody knows the fact that Phalangists [carried it out] and that we enabled them to enter. Therefore we ought to explain to the world and the Lebanese public that this is no policy but an outburst of rage. Nobody accuses the IDF for whatever happened.

ABU-HALIL: O.K. We will take care of the matter but don't accuse us. Deny that the IDF did it.

EITAN: Nobody accuses the IDF and everybody knows that it is them. [Phalangists?]

ABU-HALIL: It's our problem.

NAVOT: It's not only your internal problem, it's also ours.

ABU-HALIL: We will study the matter and take care of it, but don't accuse us.

EITAN: If the statements will be honest, it will have a positive impact because today everybody is scared of them.

ABU-HALIL: An admission of the matter will damage us politically.

GEN. DRORI: They should explain it at least partially.

EITAN: Our problem is in the world and not in Israel as many questions will disappear once they admit.

GEN. DRORI: They might be hurt because of the Moslems; therefore they should explain it partially.

EITAN: We stated our point of view and they will have to evaluate and make a decision, but the facts are known.

September 21, 1982

Meeting in Bashir's House Between Pierre
and Mr. R [Navot]

In the meeting in Bashir's House on September 21 Pierre Gemayel emphasized his intention to continue the policies of Bashir. Therefore we have mutual problems. He repeated and requested that we demonstrate our understanding for problems in Lebanon and not to increase pressure.

In a meeting of the president-elect with the Mossad representative after the election, the president-elect said only one thing: "I am obliged to see to it that there are no changes."

The father, Pierre Gemayel, was of the same opinion as were the leadership of the Lebanese Forces.

-(Fuad?) Butros suggested on 20 September (to the government) that the Lebanese invite a multinational force for a month. The Lebanese government instructed him to write a formula or program.

-In the text what was written (among other things) "in order to assist in keeping peace and order in Lebanon". The word "Beirut" was not mentioned in the text.

-The French Ambassador in Lebanon announced that France was prepared to send its forces as soon as possible.

-Mr. R expressed his surprise at the lack of coordination in activities with the President and demanded immediate intervention to block the implementation of this decision.

September 24, 1982

Meeting of Knesset Committee
on Foreign and Defense Affairs

-A discussion on the evacuation of the P.L.O. from West Beirut and the IDF's entrance into the city.

Victor Chem Tov (Member of Knesset from the Alignment):

Where was the decision to enter the city reached?

Sharon: Begin, the Chief-of-Staff and I consulted at half past midnight after the assassination of Bashir. We reached the conclusion that in order to prevent the reoccurrence of a situation which we succeeded to prevent--we have to act at once.

The action started early in the morning. The resistance was growing, they fired at us from a tank and other weapons. The areas of Fakhani, Sabra and Shatilla were the strongholds of the terrorists. Our bombardments were concentrated on these areas.

Around 11:00 General Drori visited the commander of one of the divisions following information that something was wrong. This was on Friday morning. General Drori immediately notified the Chief-of-Staff who said that he would be arriving immediately. Also, Drori told the contact office of the Phalange to stop the action at once. Thus he prevented the entrance of another unit which was waiting at the airport.

72
September 25, 1982

Message Transmitted by Fadi Frem
to Deputy Chief of Mosad, Navot
Through the Mosad Station in Beirut

The declarations of a number of top-ranking Israeli officials putting the responsibility for the massacre in the camps on the Lebanese forces, and the leaking of the name of Eli Hobeika--as the one who gave the orders--start causing tremendous damage to your image here, especially when all other forces put the full responsibility on Sa'ad Hadad's militia.

I instructed that a thorough investigation regarding the massacre be carried out, but I would like to remind you of some facts:

(a) Our forces entered Sabra (while coming in) east to the stadium and north to the Kuwait Embassy. Our forces did not enter Shatilla or West Beirut.

(b) During a meeting with Chief of Staff Eitan, Gen. Drori, Gen. Yaron and yourself, the Chief of Staff congratulated us for a 'clean job' we carried out. During that meeting I stated that I will pull out our forces during that night because of the American pressure on Sheikh Amin and so it was. From that moment none of our soldiers stayed in the area of the camps.

(c) After we left the area of the camps, many observers reported that they saw members of a Lebanese militia in the area of the camps in West Beirut while arresting people and establishing roadblocks. From our inquiries it emerges--as well as from other observers and Moslem political leaders--that those militiamen came from south Lebanon. Sa'ab Salam contacted President Sarkis and the American ambassador told them that, and asked that the Lebanese Army protect West Beirut and the camps from 'the Hadad men'.

77
September 29, 1982

Minutes of Meeting Between Mosad and
the Leadership of the Phalangists

Participants: Joseph Abu-Halil; Fadi Frem; Eli Hobeika; Walid Faras; Alfred Madi; the Mosad representative in Beirut.

"Eli Hobeika said that we should not mention and publish their names while investigating the events at the camps. He added that when we put this kind of pressure on them, we push them to seek Amin Gemayel's protection, who was until recently in their debt. Now we push them to be in his debt.

"Josef Abu-Halil accused us for our attacks on them and for the fact that in the light of the attacks they have had a lot of problems maintaining secret ties with us. He said that everything gets exposed and that Bashir Gemayel had a lot of problems because of the leaking of the meeting at Nahariyyah and added that Amin Gemayel fears a similar situation."

48
September 29, 1982

Meeting of the Leadership of the Lebanese Forces
With the Representative of Mosad

Eli Hobeika said that we must not mention and publicize their names in our investigation into events in the camps. He added that with our pressure on them we push them to request defense of Amin Gemayel who is, until now indebted to them and we push them to be in his debt.

Joseph Abu Halil pleaded vigorously against our attacks upon them and on the many difficulties in establishing secret contacts with us. He said that things were revealed and that Bashir Gemayel had difficulties after the publicity of the meeting in Nahariya. He added that Amin Gemayel fears a similar situation.

Representatives of the Lebanese Forces suggested at this stage a meeting with people of the preparatory committee (whose reps are men from the Lebanese Forces) by power of the decision of Amin Gemayel in a meeting with the Defense Minister. They announced that Amin Gemayel ordered Joseph Abu Halil and Boustani to arrange contacts with us in the framework of this council. They repeatedly claimed that this council is more important than the military-political committee. They pointed out the reasoning that if there is

no understanding we will be disappointed about the inability of the political-military committee to move things.

Representatives of the Lebanese Forces explained that Amin Gemayel repeatedly expressed himself in recent days that the process toward a peace treaty with Israel is unavoidable. He gave Joseph Abu Halil and Boustani (instructions?) to head up contacts with us. He continued and lent his hand to activities that Bashir initiated in this direction.

Joseph Abu Halil said that he was ready to come to Israel to remove fears and to renew trust and to discuss Shatilla, Sabra, a peace treaty and other subjects.

[Note: This is another translation of the preceding document.]

September 30, 1982

Minutes of Meeting in Beirut Between
the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry,
David Kimche; and Antoine Sa'ade; Fadi Frem;
Eli Hobeika; Joseph Abu-Halil; Alfred Madi;
Yitzak Leor (Israeli Foreign Ministry);
and Amnon Shaked (Mosad)

"Sa'ade raised the subject whether Israel has a proper plan to strengthen the relationship (after what happened). He also pointed to the fact that no force would have relieved them from the Palestinians. . . . There are in Lebanon many Palestinian pockets and therefore they need more time. . . . The means [the road] is less important; crucial is the target."

Abu-Halil stated: "The issue of the Phalangists [their involvement in the massacre] is causing a lot of anger among them and they would like to ask why are they being accused."

Sa'ade stated: "While doing so we put them in the very uncomfortable position even in the eyes of the Arab world."

Kimche explained that the publicity is not under Israel's control and on top of the internal ramifications, Israel [we] "face a very difficult international situation. But now we ought to act and hammer down facts."

October 4, 1982

Minutes of Meeting Between Defense Minister Sharon;
Chief of Mosad, Uri Dan; Major Shamir; and Mr. Dudai;
Joseph Abu-Halil; Antoine Nagem; and Walid Faras

The meeting took place at the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv in the evening hours of October 4, 1982.

"The Lebanese forces [Phalangists] are asking to prepare a joint plan in order to preserve the joint achievements which were reached before Bashir's assassination. They are determined that there will be no withdrawal from those achievements. The affair in the camps is putting a lot of pressure on them and they would like to consult with us and reach a joint policy in order to avoid further damage. Abu-Halil suggested a joint inquiry commission."

December 13, 1982

Meeting Between Sharon
and Special Envoy from Lebanon

1. Special envoy claims that Lebanese public opinion favors negotiations with Israel. However, he points out that unless the negotiations bear fruit, Israel's image would suffer. He claims that Syria does not want to leave Lebanon.
2. He suggests that the agreement should entail a clause whereby Lebanese goods would be allowed to be shipped via Israel to Jordan and the Arab world.
3. Regarding the Shouf mountains, he claims that the Lebanese view it as an Israeli ploy to pressure Lebanon into conducting negotiations.
4. The envoy favors a cantonization of Lebanon as a final goal.

Discussion with Sharon

1. Sharon rules out a step-by-step approach and emphasizes security arrangements. Two problems:
 - A) a Lebanese problem--the interests are identical and the problems could be solved within a short time
 - B) the Americans don't view the situation like us and we have a disagreement over this.

2. Discussion on a site to conduct negotiations. The envoy suggests the US, Sharon wants a neutral place.

December 13, 1982

Meeting With David Kimche, Draper
Antoine Fatal, Fouzi Abu Farhat

Kimche--We do not wish to complicate your life; however, full normalization between our countries remains our hope and aspiration.

Fatal--Peace is not possible at the moment. The Syrians are a problematic neighbor.

Kimche--Stresses the need for a treaty with Lebanon. "We should declare that we have opened a new chapter, just like with Egypt." The Arab world changed, we are cooperating even with Jordan in a variety of ways.

Fatal--Our economy is dependent on the Arab world and we cannot sacrifice it because of a peace treaty.

December 14, 1982

Meeting With Amin Gemayel

-asked that the question of Lebanese neutrality remain secret.

-complained about the Israeli campaign against him in the media.

-asked that Israel stop all its contact with Lebanon.

-called for a solution to the Shouf mountains problem.

-stated that he intends to announce in the UN that Lebanon was occupied by Israel.

-claimed that the Americans are his only friends and he will allow them to conduct negotiations.

-Israeli: "reminded him that the negotiations would be between Israel and Lebanon and the Americans were invited to attend the meetings."

Characteristics of the Phalange according to statements by the Minister of Defense (Sharon) in closed meetings and according to information from the Mosad/the Americans.

Negative characteristics

1. Statements by Sharon in assessing the situation in the northern district--14 [June or July is written in longhand] '82: "[We] must stop demanding that they (the Christians) take part in operational activities. Leave them alone--they will not do anything. Perhaps afterward when it will be possible to curtail (them), when everything will not exist, it will make it possible to plunder, murder, and rape--yes, they will rape, plunder and murder. They will not do anything."
2. A Mosad document from 23 June 1982--"In recent days the Christians have detained approximately 500 men and after the search they were liquidated."
3. Meeting of Sharon, Bashir on 24 June 1982: to the question of the Chief-of-Staff on what happened at the time of the conquering of the university, Bashir answered, "The reaction was immediate. Hell was upon us. We needed to say that these are the Israelis that did this. We looked for 17 people from Al Amal and they were forced to kill them."

4. In a meeting between the Chief-of-Staff and Bashir 27 June, the Chief-of-Staff claimed that Bashir's men were behaving in a wild manner in the area--expelling citizens, looting stores and that the IDF is not able to permit this while it is responsible for what goes on in the area. As a reaction to the Chief-of-Staff's suggestion that Bashir's men man the barricades, Bashir answered, that "his soldiers are not better [here the meaning is concerning moral standards] and they are not honest."
5. Statements by the Minister of Defense (Sharon) in his meeting with Bashir 6 July 1982: "[We] must prevent a number of ugly things that are occurring in the area--murders, rape, looting, by a number of your men. This thing negatively influences public opinion in Israel as well as the forces in the area."
6. In a meeting of the Mosad representative and the representatives of the Lebanese Forces one of the leaders of the Phalange (Joseph) mentioned that Eli Hobeika's staff will take care of the matter of the real unification of Beirut. Nachum reacted [saying] that toward the Palestinians we should not act with the generosity of the victor.
7. In the Sharon-Draper meeting 24 August, Ambassador Lewis pointed out that [probably reads] PLO does

not agree to hand over to the Lebanese army, the points which they hold without the participation of [acronym unknown] because they fear that it will create an opportunity for the Phalange to enter and the Lebanese Army will not defend it.

8. In the Sharon-Draper [meeting] 5 September Draper said: "The Palestinians are apprehensive and request that the Lebanese army units enter the camps. There were cases of harassment of the Palestinians. Draper gave details on an incident in which a group of Palestinian women were harassed.
9. In Sharon-Mosad meeting the Minister (Sharon) reported on his meeting with Bashir and on the information that was passed to him regarding the disappearance of 1200 men from Beirut as a result of Eli Hobeika's activities.
10. Draper-Sharon meeting 16 September--Draper warned that the entrance of the Phalange into points evacuated by the IDF was forbidden.

Positive Characteristics

11. In a meeting in mid June (Ambassador Lewis with the Foreign Minister) Kimche reported that Bashir's men entered a number of places in order to assist us.

12. Sharon-Habib meeting 25 August--Sharon said he knows that Gemayel promised that the Phalange will not attack the Lebanese army and [as written] why Gemayel (to Habib) that the Phalange will not "enter and kill innocent people". Habib said that there are (assurances) from Gemayel that his forces will exercise restraint and that they have no interest in killing people.
13. In a meeting between the Chief-of-Staff and the council of the Lebanese Forces September 15, 1982 it was decided that a fixed contact person be set up near the Chief-of-Staff of the Lebanese Forces, Fadi Frem, to communicate and coordinate with him.
14. In an evaluation of the situation from 19 August 1982 the Defense Minister (Sharon) justified IDF officers that prevented the Phalange from entering various places because "[We] are not ready to see [what will happen] when we defend the area--they come and slaughter there." (as written)

"Who Decided To Enter West Beirut And What Were the Reasons". [Meeting of the government on September 16, 1982.]

1. The reasons understood from Defense Minister's statements.

a. In the city there remains approximately 2,000 terrorists and another 7,000 men of various organizations.

b. The possibility to stop them by coordinated activities of our defense service with the Lebanese.

c. The desire to arrive at a situation of "a secure and open city" in order to realize this.

d. There exists a fear that the terrorists will capture anew their positions and thus we will stand again before a situation of a divided city.

e. Fear of the creation of a "new situation" in Beirut which would send us far afield.

f. "Our objective today in West Beirut is to take care of the terrorists that remain in West Beirut."

g. "The attempt to set up relations on the political level in light of the current situation."

h. A completely new situation has been created. The terrorists have breached the agreement and cheated the Israelis and the Americans.

2

i. The request that the security forces be able to "act in Beirut".

j. The agreement to evacuate the terrorists-- which shamelessly breached--instead of giving up their arms, the terrorists didn't turn over anything.

2. The decision to enter.

"This was our evaluation according to what the Prime Minister said--he maintained contact with the Chief of Staff and with me the day before yesterday and the evening, at 12:30 in the evening and it was decided that we would take key positions in the city which would enable us to continue our activities and to prevent a terrible situation which was possible to be created. We wanted to take control of a line of key points which would make it possible afterward--would make free movement in the city possible. Then we could carry out our goals. That is to say, the objective was to seize a number of points--I do not want to enter into details--the Chief of Staff will present them afterwards. These points, the length of them on the Boulevard Misrau, this would sever the terrorist camps in the south. We also need to seize a number of controlling positions and a number of tall houses and buildings that there are in West Beirut, also to capture the area of the beaches in a number of points which stretch from the port to West Beirut.³

At 6:30, when the activities ceased, apparently the Defense Minister saw a number of critical buildings that were not seized. "I turned to the Prime Minister again and we decided on the capturing of a number of additional houses. As I said, the activities would be completed within two hours and within two hours the activities were completed." "I want to say that sometimes, and this does not happen very often, we come across situations where there is critical moments in which it is necessary to make an immediate decision and in my opinion in this situation in which we find ourselves, it was a turning point which would again place us in the position that West Beirut would again be defended by militias and terrorists which would reestablish themselves and turn to what was in West Beirut and therefore, in my opinion, this decision was a decision not only vital but also it was truly a decision of the last moment." An additional statement by the Defense Minister on reasons for the entrance to Beirut and the decision. "Following the murder of Bashir Gemayel, according to the decision which we accepted that evening, the IDF entered West Beirut and seized a number of key positions. They did not enter the terrorist camps. Even this was clarified at the government meeting."

Contacts with the Lebanese Government and the
Lebanese Army [not a complete translation].

"Why didn't the Lebanese Army enter?" [Statements of Ariel Sharon in Cabinet meetings.]

1. "We have good relations with the Lebanese Army but we know what it is capable of doing. We suggested to them to enter the residential area to Fakahani, Sabra or Shatilla. They will enter, they will purify and they will wipe out the terrorists. They will remove their weapons and we will be very happy. Why will we do this? The Lebanese Army sits at the border or at edge of these areas--these residential areas. There is no partition between them. We are ready even tomorrow in the morning to give them all the details on these neighborhoods or quarters for close contacts exist between the forces." It was made clear that among the military echelon there are direct contacts between the Israelis and the Lebanese. There are also direct political contacts and thus it was made clear that the goal also in the future was to maintain this direct format.

[2. Pages 11 and 12 emphasize the need to clarify cooperation with the Lebanese Army if the desire of the Lebanese Army is to "purify the neighborhood". If they want to do it "please do it". "This does not bother us." "I said do you want the Sabra neighborhood? Do you want Fakahani? Please enter it. Go in. We will help you to

enter and we will see what will happen. (Page 12.) In sum, we clarified the matter unequivocally." That the commanders of the Lebanese Army did everything they could do to avoid this responsibility. The Defense Minister made it clear to them that there is no possibility to accept their reasons "on account of the lives of my soldiers", "on account of the thousands of terrorists that remain in West Beirut in contradiction to the agreement."]

[3. Page 15 makes clear that the Lebanese Army will not be able to carry out the task of locating and looking for the thousands of terrorists by themselves. Only the integration of the Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Army would be able to promise results or success. Mention here that Bashir Gemayel, when he was alive believed that this operation would take about a month, but in essence this operation could be completed in two days. Bashir is dead and the Lebanese Army is not ready to move without authorized instructions. This army was also not ready to move with instructions from Bashir as long as he had not assumed his position as President.]

[This section is also from statements by Sharon in Cabinet meetings--September 16, 1982:]

4. It was that many days we tried "to pressure the Lebanese Army adjacent to the camps on the east to enter

them". On Thursday afternoon, Sharon pressured Draper to bring about the entrance of the Lebanese Army. The army did not move, it seems, because of directions it received from the Americans to abstain from direct contacts with the Israelis.

5. Following the massacre, contacts quickened and pressure upon the Lebanese to introduce their forces to the street banks intensified and with a very strong effort we succeeded in convincing them to enter the camps. "This evening with very strong efforts we succeeded to convince them to enter this morning the camps."

Statements by the Defense Minister Sharon in
Cabinet Meetings--dated September 21.

6. "On Thursday, 2300 hours, the entering, that is of the troops was between 2300 hours and 2400 hours in the evening between Thursday and Friday. On Friday when it was noon, it became clear what was happening and it was stopped."

7. Statements by the Defense Minister at Cabinet Meetings. "Only today did the details arrive on what happened. The government has not yet the detailed reports. These are the reports of the commander of the northern sector after he approached the matter. After it arrives, it is placed on the table of the government and the government is able to read it. They have not yet read it."

Additional statements by the Defense Minister at
Cabinet Meeting, September 16, 1982 [not a complete trans-
lation].

1. In Sharon's meeting with Draper "I made it clear to him that today in fact there is only one factor that will guard against the complete collapse of Beirut and that factor is us". And he asked, apparently this is a reference to Draper, "If that's so, you will always be the guard of Lebanon or the policeman of Lebanon?" I said "no, absolutely not". (But the Israeli Army will distance itself from there when Beirut will be a secure and open city.)

2. In connection with the time needed to implement activities in Beirut. "We spoke about a couple of weeks. We need to go and look for thousands of terrorists. We need to understand that these thousands of terrorists are found amidst the population of hundreds of thousands of people."

3. Following the entrance to West Beirut "it must be pointed out that almost no one was injured among the citizens. It is impossible to say that nobody at all was injured but we can say almost none were injured."

4. In every place that the IDF has found in the city life is going on as usual. There are no riots and order is preserved.

[Sharon also mentions that the meaning of an open and secure city is when the Israeli security forces are able to operate in an open or free fashion.))]

[(An additional reference to the Draper meeting-- it says on the 16 of September in a discussion with Draper the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff were informed of the possibility of revenge on the part of the Phalangists.))]

[(In another reference to the Draper/Sharon meeting of September 16, Draper warns that it is forbidden for the Phalangists to enter positions evacuated by the Israel defense forces.))]

Data on the Nature of the Phalange
and the Apprehension they Caused

(No date. Apparently Staff note of the Kahan Commission)

1. The Phalanges are cleaning out the area better than we would do it. They are much superior to us in this regard. I don't want to add anything, but they are locating the terrorists and are cleaning the area of them.

2. If a situation arises whereby we would enter Beirut, those who will have to go from house to house and search for hiding terrorists and clean them out, would be them (the Phalangists), and their concepts are "markedly different from ours" (DM Sharon in the Cabinet meeting of 27 June 1982, p. 5)

3. Referring to a Shia request that the IDF would enter the Chai Aslum neighborhood, Sharon remarks that "they fear the Phalanges". The Defense Minister adds that if the Phalangists enter a neighborhood under the control of Al-Amal, apprehensions exist that "fire will break out" (meaning fighting). Since those are Shia while those are Christians, adding that the situation has reached a point of blind hatred and envy.

4. Referring to the introduction of Phalangist forces into a Druze village northeast of Bahamdun, the Defense Minister says: till now it was our custom not to disarm the Druze of their personal weapons, so that the

Phalange will not massacre them. Since their fear of the Phalange is greater than their fear of us, we did not touch their personal arms for defense, so that they won't be massacred. This is the way we operate in all locations. (The DM in the Cabinet meeting of 29 June 1982. pp. 2-3, 6, 12).

5. It refers to more than 100,000 dead in all the wars. The apprehensions, the fears, the vendettas, all which happened throughout these years, is not of the sort of things that you can tell somebody to attack a terrorist position, and you arrive immediately". (The DM in the Cabinet meeting, 30 June 1982)

(Underlines are in original)