Elias Nasrallah Haddad: Translating Visions of Palestine
Sarah Irving

The Other Wells: Family History and the Self-Creation of Jabra Ibrahim Jabra
William Tampkin

Gateway to the World: The Golden Age of Jerusalem Airport, 1948-67
Eldad Brin

The Red Priest of Haifa: Rafiq Farah (1921-2020)
Randa Farah

Iron Caging the Palestinian Home: Child Home Arrest in Occupied East Jerusalem as Lawfare
Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Amir Marshi

Farewell to the Habesch—Commercial Printing Press
Samia Naser Khoury

INSTITUTE OF JERUSALEM STUDIES
The Jerusalem Quarterly (JQ) is the leading journal on the past, present, and future of Jerusalem. It documents the current status of the city and its predicaments. It is also dedicated to new and rigorous lines of inquiry by emerging scholars on Palestinian society and culture. Published since 1998 by the Institute for Palestine Studies through its affiliate, the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, the Jerusalem Quarterly is available online in its entirety at www.palestine-studies.org/en/journals/jq/about.

The Jerusalem Quarterly follows a double-blind peer review process for select contributions. Peer reviewed articles are indicated as such in the table of contents.

This journal is produced with the financial assistance of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Palestine/Jordan. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, nor those of the editors or the Institute of Jerusalem Studies.

Email: jq@palestine-studies.org
www.palestine-studies.org

ISSN 2521-9731 (print version)
ISSN 2521-974X (online version)
For submissions to JQ, send email to:
jq@palestine-studies.org

For local subscriptions to JQ, contact:
The Institute of Jerusalem Studies
P.O. Box 21649, Jerusalem 9121501
Tel: 972 2 298 9108, Fax: 972 2 295 0767
E-mail: sales-ijs@palestine-studies.org

For international or U.S. subscriptions, contact:
The Institute for Palestine Studies
3501 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20007

Or subscribe at the IPS website:
www.palestine-studies.org/en/journals/jq/subscription
EDITORIAL
Jerusalem Planning and Land Conquest in the Shadow of COVID-19 .............................................3

* Elias Nasrallah Haddad: Translating Visions of Palestine ..............................................................9
  Sarah Irving

The Other Wells: Family History and the Self-Creation of Jabra Ibrahim Jabra ..................................30
  William Tamplin

Gateway to the World: The Golden Age of Jerusalem Airport, 1948–67 ...........................................61
  Eldad Brin

The Red Priest of Haifa: Rafiq Farah (1921–2020) ............................................................................81
  Randa Farah

Iron Caging the Palestinian Home: Child Home Arrest in Occupied East Jerusalem as Lawfare ........106
  Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Amir Marshi

A “Silicon” Disaster Threatening Wadi al-Jawz ..............................................................................125
  Abd al-Raouf al-Arnaout

LETTER FROM JERUSALEM
Farewell to the Habesch–Commercial Printing Press .................................................................132
  Samia Nasir Khoury

BOOK REVIEWS
A Question of Responsibility ..................................................................................................................137
  Adam Raz, The Looting of Arab Property during the War of Independence
  Review by Rona Sela

Footballmania
  Nicholas Blincoe, More Noble than War: A Soccer History of Israel-Palestine ..............................145
  Review by Roberto Mazza

EXHIBITION REVIEW
Printed in Jerusalem: Meaning, Form, and Vision ...........................................................................148
  Review by Tarteel Muammar and Hasan Safadi

FACTS & FIGURES
Economic and Social Ramifications of the Israeli Zoning Plan for East Jerusalem City Center .........155
  Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS)

Palestine (oPt) 2020 .............................................................................................................................160
  Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)

* Peer reviewed article.
EDITORIAL

Jerusalem Planning and Land Conquest in the Shadow of COVID-19

The year 2020 will be remembered globally as the year of the pandemic. In Jerusalem, the devastation caused by COVID-19 was compounded by a threat from human hands: four Israeli planning schemes in the Jerusalem area whose cumulative impact, while not biologically fatal, may spell the diminishment or death of Palestinian communities in Jerusalem and its environs.

The threat began in February with a plan to erase the old Jerusalem airport in order to expand the nearby Israeli settlement of Atarot by building 11,000 units on the six hundred dunums of the airport area. The plan also aims to establish an area for hotels and an industrial zone for employing Palestinians in the so-called seam area between the Wall and the settlement. This creation of hotels and commercial establishments in this area was a key objective in last year’s Kushner/Trump “Deal of the Century” aimed at “Islamic
tourism” (that is, tourism following the newly normalized relations with the Gulf region) to Jerusalem.² It basically destroys any chance to rejuvenate Jerusalem’s only international airport that had served Palestine as its gateway to the external world during the period of Jordan’s administration.³

A second scheme known as the “Masterplan for the Reorganization of East Jerusalem’s Central Commercial District” was submitted to the municipal council in October 2020, covering an area of 707 dunums, adjacent to the northern wall of the Old City, the heart of the commercial area of Arab Jerusalem, extending from Sultan Sulayman, and Salah al-Din streets. It will allow for a new “development” of 482 units, and will likely demolish or displace 494 existing building units that the municipality has deemed illegal or unauthorized, presumably Palestinian-owned structures.

The third project, known as the “Silicon Valley Scheme” in the Wadi al-Jawz/Musrara area was adopted by the Jerusalem Planning Commission in coordination with the Jerusalem municipality in November 2020. It aims at introducing a hi-tech complex in Wadi al-Jawz that combines commercial establishments, hi-tech companies, and a hotel complex in a 200,000-square-meter area, including the building of nine hundred hotel rooms for tourists. The project includes areas in Musrara, al-Zahra Street, and the industrial zone of Wadi al-Jawz. Here the municipality will reputedly confiscate a large amount of Palestinian private land for commercial development, and will transfer the bulk of Palestinian garages and workshops in Wadi al-Jawz to Umm Tuba and al-‘Isawiyya. Again, Israel is securing Emirati investments to cover developments in this area. Most of these industrial workshops are today registered as public endowments (waqf) and family waqf properties. Tens of garage owners and industrial workshops in Wadi al-Jawz were already given notice to evacuate their properties by the end of 2020, since their workshops are not licensed to operate such businesses.

The fourth planning scheme aims at the final displacement of al-Jahalin Bedouins from their current encampment. Al-Jahalin are the only Bedouin community in the Jerusalem area.⁴ Those in the core area of Jerusalem number around three thousand inhabitants, mostly living today in the area known as al-Jabal (the mountain) on the northern slopes of al-‘Ayzariya. They were expelled there from the area of Tel Arad, Negev, and Bir al-Sab’a in 1948 and since then have occupied grazing grounds in ‘Anata, Khan al-Ahmar, Jericho Road, and al-‘Ayzariya. They were previously expelled from their current locations, on a number of occasions, when Maaleh Adumim was being built in the al-‘Ayzariya area, and are now slated to be forcefully moved to a garbage dump in the Sur Bahir area.⁵

In 2020, the Jerusalem municipal council, in close collaboration with the Israeli government, escalated these displacement schemes in the city under the rubric of planning for neglected neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. It is noteworthy that Emirati investments have been mobilized for two of these schemes (namely, Atarot, and the so-called Silicon Valley development in Wadi al-Jawz) as projects for tourism and real estate investment. They involve direct displacement of Arab businesses (Wadi al-Jawz), population displacement (al-Jahalin), and extension of colonial settlement
(in Qalandiya). Even with the demise of the Trump administration, there is still sadly little hope that the new Biden administration will intervene to end these measures of creeping annexation and displacement, although there is the expectation that the Kushner plan, which gave American diplomatic support to these schemes, will be off the table. In the meantime, it is mainly popular activism in Jerusalem, spearheaded by the owners of industrial workshops in Wadi al-Jawz and the Palestinian Tourism Association in Jerusalem that are raising their voices in opposition.

This issue of *JQ* includes three essays that address the history of these urban gentrification plans: Abd al-Raouf al-Arnaout’s “The Catastrophe of Silicon Valley in Wadi al-Jawz”; Eldad Brin’s “Gateway to the World”; and a briefing paper by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) on Israeli zoning plans for East Jerusalem. The latter differs from the two other reports in that it contains policy proposals that involve local political representation, as well as suggested international interventions by United Nations bodies. It also contains an unexpected reference to the *corpus separatum* scheme in the 1947 partition plan as a “beacon for future planning for the city.”

After some absence this issue resumes its long tradition of examining biography as a window to the social history of Palestine – here we present three such biographies: a life and impact of Elias Nasrallah Haddad, an ethnohistorian who belonged to Tawfiq Canaan’s circle of folklore studies in the 1920s, by Sarah Irving; new light on Jabra Ibrahim Jabra’s layered identity (Arab-Syriac-Palestinian), by William Tamplin; and a political biography of the “Red Priest of Haifa,” the theologian-activist Rafiq Farah, who died this year at the age of ninety-eight years, by Randa Farah.

In “Other Wells: Family History and the Self-Creation of Jabra Ibrahim Jabra,” William Tamplin interrogates the hidden birth records of an icon of modern Palestinian literature:

> Scholars’ assumptions about Jabra’s unshakeable Palestinian identity may take on a different cast when we learn about Jabra’s concomitant concealment of his family history in Tur Abdin, his family’s survival of the Sayfo genocide, his birth in Adana, and his immigration to Palestine with his family in the early 1920s. These facts trouble the tidy, uncomplicated image of the exiled Palestinian intellectual that he presented to the world. Why did Jabra deceive his readers about his family history, birth, and early childhood? What new readings of his work can these revelations generate?

The answer is provocative, and intriguing, if not conclusive.

In “Elias Nasrallah Haddad: Translating Visions of Palestine,” Sarah Irving follows her pioneering study of the work of Stephan Hanna Stephan (“A Young Man of Promise,” *JQ* 73). She examines the work of Haddad on local philology and dialects whose focus was on “representation, identity, translation, colonialism – and touching the work of so many beyond his own output, as a teacher, translator, or advisor on language and customs. His life also highlights the entangled nature of intellectual life.
in Mandate Palestine.” Haddad, according to Irving, “represents an indigenous voice” writing at the turn of the century “delineating and describing the Palestinian dialect,” while his “choice of the word ‘Palestinian [sic]’” indicates that he and his colleagues “considered an identifiable Palestinian Arabic to exist, and, by extension, that they understood there to be an entity called Palestine, inhabited by a specific group of people (speaking a particular dialect).”

Randa Farah’s “The Red Priest of Haifa” is an intimate portrait of the life and work of Rafiq Farah, who was the chairman of the Society for the Defense of Arab Minority Rights in Israel during the period of Israeli military rule in the Galilee (1951–65). Farah was a leading figure in the Palestinian struggle for land rights and equality during the dark period of Israeli military government in the formative years of the state.

“The Gateway to the World: The Golden Age of Jerusalem Airport” by Eldad Brin follows the turbulent history of Qalandiya airport from its inception as a British military airport in 1921 to its current fate as a “runway” for the Ramallah-Jerusalem bus company today, and soon to be a launching pad for an extension to Atarot, the Israeli settlement southwest of Ramallah. It follows Nehad Awad’s essay “In Search of the Jerusalem Airport” published in JQ 35 in 2008. Brin’s essay traces the airport’s history from its origin, when the British army established a military airfield in 1921, four years after their occupation. Its location was chosen for “its relative proximity to Jerusalem” and was regularly used by the military and high-ranking officers. Brin recaptures the significance of Qalandiya airport as the region’s access to the world under conditions of war and dismemberment between the years of 1948 and 1967. He also points out that the extension of Jerusalem’s municipal boundary in 1965 by the Kendall plan, during the Jordanian period, was meant to allow for Jerusalem’s boundaries to include the airport. “Jerusalem Airport,” he concludes:

was vital in restoring, at least to a degree, Jerusalem’s cosmopolitan character after the fateful events of 1948. Naturally it did much to bolster the city’s tourism-related economy and strongly impacted the urban landscape with its resultant wide range of hotels, travel agencies, and related businesses. Regular and frequent flights between Jerusalem and a host of major Arab cultural, economic and political hubs not only offered the occasional respite and business connections to the city’s dwindled elite, but also served to emphasize the city’s pan-Arab relevance after the trauma of war.

Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Amir Marshi introduce, or rather revive, the concept of “unchilding” in the endemic practice of house arrest for children in the occupied territories. In “Iron Caging the Palestinian Home: Child Home Arrest in Occupied East Jerusalem as Lawfare,” they come to the conclusion that

re-scripting children’s homes as prisons and turning their families into prison guards positions colonized children as objects of the settler state’s
legal manipulations, legitimizing the occupation of the home, aiming at hindering dissent. The variegated and unpredictable effects of colonial lawfare “legalities” went beyond governing childhood to governing children’s homes, searing their minds, and building iron walls inside the viscerality of the colonized’s sense of home-ness.

The study narrates the story of several Jerusalem children who experience house arrest together with their family’s reaction (“are we parents or prison guards?”). The practice of house arrest was made famous in the 1970s in Raymonda Tawil’s intimate diary (My Home, My Prison), but here we witness how this military tradition has been developed forty years later to be a poignant tool of control and repression of children.

Just before the United Arab Emirates expressed interest in acquiring the Israeli right-wing Beitar football club, Nicholas Blincoe’s new book More Noble than War: A Soccer History of Israel–Palestine hit the market. Roberto Mazza reviews the book, which looks at the way in which sports activities have manifested themselves in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. We learn that while “Palestinian teams make up 40 percent of Israeli footfall, they are still considered second class and many Israeli teams prefer to hire Jewish players from abroad rather than relying on Palestinian grassroots.” Nevertheless, both the book and its review bring us immense insights into the politicization of the game and its metaphorical reverberations in the nationalist discourse.

In a “Question of Responsibility,” Rona Sela reviews Adam Raz’s The Looting of Arab Property during the War of Independence, published in Hebrew. She examines especially the distinction made by the author between individual and collective looting:

According to Raz, both individual and collective looting are “a personal act – a choice of action made by a person” (297–98), whereas the seizure of Palestinian assets was “only” of real estate by the state acted by laws and regulations. In other words, for Raz, the sovereign’s responsibility is reduced – as if it can be reduced – to the expropriation of houses and lands, a “one-time act” grounded in a political decision and enforced using military and police power. Having been decided by official institutions based on legal procedures, it was and is not seen as a crime.

The reviewer concludes by comparing Israeli attitudes to the looting of private property during the holocaust to the looting that took place during the war in Palestine.

“Printed in Jerusalem” is a review of an exhibit of the same title at the Palestinian Museum curated by Baha al-Ju’beh and Abdel-Rahman Shabane. The reviewers, Tarteel Muammar and Hasan Safadi, write that the exhibit “enables us to view printing as a transition point in modern history. This constitutes an important change in societal culture and the formation of modern identity. Printing also contributes to the acceleration
and spread of knowledge on the global level, as demonstrated by various historical stages of printing in Jerusalem in the exhibit.” In her “Letter of Jerusalem—Goodbye the Commercial Press” Samia Khoury provides a more intimate portrait of a Jerusalem family press whose history extended over the last one hundred years before it was forced to shut down at the end of 2020.

Endnotes
Abstract
Elias Nasrallah Haddad (1878/79–1959) was a teacher, translator, writer, ethnographer, and linguist whose career spanned the final decades of Ottoman rule in Palestine, the whole of the British Mandate period, and the Nakba and after. Based for most of his life at the German-run Syrian Orphanage in Jerusalem, he asserted, in his many books and articles on Palestinian life and language, his adopted country’s right to progress, alongside the importance of recording its traditions. He highlighted the Arab nature of Palestinian society while urging tolerance and coexistence as the foremost of its values and virtues. This article draws on multiple sources and genres to trace Haddad’s life history and his impact on a wide range of fields and people, ranging from the British high commissioners to whom he taught colloquial Arabic, to the storytellers in the villages of pre-World War I Palestine whose memories of Bedouin poetry he transcribed and translated.

Keywords
Elias Haddad; Syrian Orphanage; Jerusalem; translation; ethnography; Nathan der Weise; Nimr ibn ‘Adwan; colloquial Arabic.

Across the Arabic-speaking world, the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century was a period of debate and experimentation in language, literature, and thought, often referred to as the Nahda or Arab renaissance. The impact of this intellectual ferment on
Palestine is increasingly being explored, and the landscape of those inhabitants of Jaffa, Jerusalem, and other Palestinian cities who played their role in *nahdawi* discourses is still being populated. The lives of figures such as Khalil Sakakini or Tawfiq Canaan have been explored in some detail, and this article adds Elias Nasrallah Haddad to the picture. Haddad’s life story evokes many themes, including the nature of intellectual relationships under colonial conditions, Mandate-era conceptions of coexistence and ethnic relations, and the variations between British, German, and other imperialisms in the Middle East. In this article, I focus on Haddad’s portrayals and representations of Palestine and its culture, geography, and society, and how these changed from the late Ottoman to the post-Nakba periods. Although what little scholarly discussion of Haddad exists deals mainly with his ethnographic output, this discussion engages with his wider work, including translation, literature, and language manuals published from the late Ottoman period through the early 1950s. I begin by presenting a brief outline of Elias Haddad’s life story and the significance within it of German intellectual and cultural influences, followed by sections analyzing the main types of publication and scholarly work in which he engaged – language manuals and textbooks, translation and exegesis of the works of the nineteenth-century warrior-poet Nimr ibn ‘Adwan, nativist ethnography, and finally his translation of the German Enlightenment play *Nathan der Weise*.

Haddad was born in 1878 or 1879 to a Protestant family in Khirbat Qanafar, a village in the Baq‘a‘a mountains of what was then Ottoman Greater Syria, and now Lebanon. Elias’s father, Jiryis, died in 1889, leaving his wife Haja to care for their four youngest children. Five older daughters had already married, but three sons (including Elias) and a younger daughter were still dependent on their parents. It was at this time that Elias, showing signs of academic potential, was sent to the Syrische Waisenhaus (Syrian Orphanage), nicknamed the Schneller School, in Jerusalem, an orphanage run by German Lutherans that was established in 1860 to care for victims of conflict in Ottoman Syria.

Elias Haddad remained part of the Schneller institution for most of his life, becoming a senior teacher, head of Arabic instruction, and finally head of the school. In 1907, by which time he was established as a teacher, he married a woman called Astrasia, and later the couple had children, including a son called Theophil. According to his grandson Gabi Haddad, Elias started teaching at the Syrian Orphanage (the Schneller School) in 1899 but briefly moved at the end of World War I to teach at a school in Suq al-Gharb in Lebanon; Gabi also suggests that Elias studied for a BA at the American University of Beirut, although his name does not appear on the student rolls. Other than his publications, we know few details of Elias Haddad’s personal life during the Mandate period. His books and translations indicate that he spent much of his time in the world of the Syrian Orphanage, teaching pupils, developing his ideas on Arabic language and pedagogy (which gave rise to several textbooks for the Palestinian educational system), and playing music – he taught some of his pupils the flute and played the organ in church. Beyond the school, Haddad’s language-teaching skills and interest in colloquial Arabic and village life forged a
broad network among foreign scholars and officials. He helped foreign ethnographers such as Hilma Granqvist, and archaeologists such as W. F. Albright, transliterate and interpret the rural sayings and folktales they collected; the sheer volume of Haddad’s notes in the Granqvist files held at the Palestine Exploration Fund show that this must have occupied a significant amount of time. He was a founding member of the Golden Throne Scottish Freemasons lodge in Jerusalem, which had Arab, Jewish, and British members.\textsuperscript{10} And as a high-ranking teacher of Arabic in Jerusalem during the Mandate era, he taught senior members of the British administration;\textsuperscript{11} family history records that he also helped the future Israeli politician, diplomat, and orientalist Abba Eban with the language.\textsuperscript{12}

Between 1944 and 1948, with the Schneller School closed by the British because of its German links, Elias Haddad worked for the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, an institute of oriental studies established in Jerusalem by the British army during World War II and later transferred to Lebanon.\textsuperscript{13} Employment at the center may have helped him to move to Lebanon at the end of World War II and to move the Syrian Orphanage’s work there, so that he already had a base from which to continue his former work when Zionist forces drove thousands of Palestinians from Jerusalem and assumed control of the side of the city that included the Schneller School in 1948. According to a history of the Middle East Centre, Haddad was one of the instructors who “took the chance to escape” to the center’s new base at Shamlan in southern Lebanon, although he “did not stay,” probably because he left to head the reestablished Schneller School.\textsuperscript{14} Another account numbers Haddad among the Arab teaching staff “requisitioned” during the war, implying that his role at the center was not entirely voluntary – the British may have taken advantage of the wartime vulnerabilities that Haddad’s German connections produced to force him to work there.\textsuperscript{15} But this did mean that, unlike hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, Haddad was already outside the country and had a new home and job before the Nakba or catastrophe of 1948. He remained at the new Schneller School, in his birthplace of Khirbat Qanafar, until his death in 1959, and members of his family remain among the school’s leadership to this day.\textsuperscript{16}

The Syrian Orphanage

Elias Haddad’s career and scholarship needs to be considered in the light of German influences on Palestinian intellectual life and of the differences between German and Anglophone intellectual traditions in relation to the Holy Land. The former offered more space for Palestinians – including Haddad but also Tawfiq Canaan and other nativist ethnographers – to insert themselves into ethnography as a discipline and their culture into the contemporary scholarship in its own right, rather than as a biblical remnant. German scholars were undoubtedly fascinated by Palestine’s biblical associations, but fewer of them were driven by a zeal to prove the Bible’s “truth” than their British and American counterparts. German ethnography of the late nineteenth century did not routinely compare Palestinian peasants with biblical
figures and, influenced by the German tradition of Bible criticism, scholars such as Martin Noth disputed the historicity of the Bible and the possibility, therefore, of “Biblical archaeology.”¹⁷ Noth’s mentor, Albrecht Alt, who shared his skepticism, was head of the German School of Archaeology in Jerusalem in the early 1920s when the American archaeologist W. F. Albright arrived, and the two clashed over this.¹⁸ German archaeology may have been no less colonialist and grasping than that of other Western countries, but it came with a different set of ideological baggage than the Anglophone school.¹⁹

The main German influence in Elias Haddad’s life was the Syrian Orphanage where he was educated and where he worked for almost his entire career. Established in 1860 by a German Lutheran pastor to house children orphaned in Lebanon, the Schneller School became one of the largest educational and training establishments in Jerusalem. Its regime included work in the kitchens and gardens, and trips to the countryside where the children could swim and sleep outdoors, perhaps influenced by Western ideas about exercise and physical fitness. Its alumni became leaders in various fields, from high culture to the Jordanian military, and it played a significant role in religious debates in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Jerusalem, especially the development of an Arab identity among the Lutheran congregation and the use of Arabic for church services and sacred texts. Pupils at the Schneller School learned several languages: the main language of instruction was Arabic, but German, French, Turkish, and Armenian were taught. However, as a German institution, it came under suspicion in 1917, when the British conquered Jerusalem from the Ottomans, and again as relations between Germany and Britain declined in the 1930s. Its buildings were requisitioned for military use during World War II and sections of the school closed down and scattered to Nazareth and Bethlehem, later to be reestablished in Lebanon and Jordan.

Attending the Schneller School in the 1890s and the early years of the twentieth century places Haddad in a major German Lutheran institution offering some of the best educational and vocational opportunities in Jerusalem. It also meant that he grew up in an environment informed by German ideas of the nation but also by comparatively liberal social attitudes. Some students, including Tawfiq Canaan and Elias Haddad, were already Lutherans, but their fellow nativist ethnographer Stephan Stephan was Syrian Orthodox, and the orphanage accepted Muslim children as well as Christians, and both boys and girls.²⁰ Compared to the “proto-Zionist” Templars, the best known of the German communities in Palestine, the Lutheran community (including Schneller’s) had better relations with ordinary Palestinians. The school has been described as “a leading nucleus of modern development, of education and training, of production and technical innovation.”²¹ Indeed, its reputation attracted donations from wealthy Palestinians as well as German Lutherans. It represented the Germans in the complex educational network of Jerusalem, as is visible in the examples of the musician Wasif Jawhariyyeh and his brother, who were sent to Schneller’s but left after ill-treatment by a teacher, moving to Khalil al-Sakakini’s Dusturiyya college.²²
Before World War I, industrial, scientific, and political interests drove German imperialism across the globe, and one of its strongest spheres of influence was the Ottoman Empire. Education was key to this, and “drawing local indigenous elites into German cultural, scientific and economic achievements” was a preferred mode of cultural diplomacy, including the establishment of targeted Propagandaschulen in the Ottoman Empire and Persia. The role of schools in imperial “soft power” in the Middle East is well documented, and the orphanage’s role in Palestine included inculcating German cultural values, encouraging use of the German language, building contacts and loyalties between Germany and an emerging Palestinian professional class, and placing German nationals “on the ground” in the Holy Land. Philippe Bourmaud attributes the presence of early-twentieth-century rationalist ideas about medicine, hygiene, and sexuality in Jerusalem to this German-speaking culture, with its rejection of superstition and popular ritual, illustrating the intellectual and cultural impact of German education. In Haddad’s case, Schneller’s was not the only German intellectual influence in his life: his interests in (especially colloquial) Arabic also took him beyond the confines of the orphanage to collaborate with the German-American scholar Hans Henry Spoer, and to give language lessons and translation help to at least one other German researcher in Palestine, the Orientalist and theologian Friedrich Ulmer.

Teaching Colloquial Arabic

The strongest theme that runs throughout Elias Haddad’s career and writings – his teaching, his ethnographic work, and his series of textbooks for students of Arabic – is a belief in the importance of spoken Arabic, of recording dialects and collecting historical examples of language and literature. This seems to have developed out of his job teaching Arabic at the Syrian Orphanage, which began around the turn of the century, and was perhaps influenced by nahdawi periodicals which arrived in Palestine by post, or by his spell in Beirut, a center of Nahda intellectual production and exchange.

Haddad’s first handbook for learners of colloquial Arabic was the Manual of Palestinean [sic] Arabic for Self-Instruction, written with Spoer, a clergyman and Orientalist scholar based at the American School of Oriental Research (ASOR). At ASOR Spoer mixed with Western and Arab scholars based in Palestine, and learned Arabic from native speakers; he may have been one of the three students there who studied with Farhud Kurban, a Lutheran cleric who served at the German Church of the Redeemer alongside Theodor Schneller. The Manual was published at the Syrian Orphanage in 1909 and in Germany by the Reichsdruckerei in 1910. Spoer’s introduction comments on Haddad’s expertise in different aspects of Arabic even at this early stage in his career:

[Haddad’s] knowledge of the classical language has enabled him to appreciate changes and distinctions which might have escaped even an
Arab whose scholarship was less, while his intimacy with Palestinian and Libanese [sic] Arabic, in various dialects, has given him an insight into his own language, practically unattainable by a European however long his residence, or however profound his observation.32

Haddad’s involvement in this book represents the first in a long career engaging with colloquial Arabic, something that locates Haddad not only in certain intellectual and political contexts in relation to Ottoman Palestine, but also as regards wider Arab nationalisms and linguistic debates. At the time, Nahda figures and early Arab nationalists were divided on whether they should seek to standardize language across the entire Arabic-speaking region, eliminating what many saw as corrupted regional and local ‘āmmiyās in favor of a more literary fusha or Modern Standard Arabic. Haddad’s work places him firmly on the other side of the argument, alongside ethnographers and more local nationalists who perceived value in the diversity of different dialects, and implies that his interests lay with local identities – in Palestine and perhaps also his native Lebanon – rather than broader Arab nationalism.33

In the context of the rise of an understanding of local selfhood in Palestine prior to World War I, Haddad represents an indigenous voice in delineating and describing the Palestinian dialect. Haddad and Spoer’s choice of the word “Palestinian [sic]” indicates that they considered an identifiable Palestinian Arabic to exist, and, by extension, that they understood there to be an entity called Palestine, inhabited by a specific group of people (speaking a particular dialect).34 While the term Palestinian had been used by European scholars to describe the dialect, its use by a Jerusalem-based Levantine intellectual seems to chime with research that places development of a coherent, articulated Palestinian identity in the years preceding the Great War, albeit within the continued framework of an Ottoman state system.35 As Haddad and Spoer state in their preface, they chose for the Manual an educated Jerusalemite dialect.36 The Jerusalem dialect occupied a rough mid-point between Palestine’s north and south, both geographically and linguistically, which may have made it an obvious choice to present in the Manual. If we consider it through the lens of questions of Palestinian identity, the centering of a Jerusalem dialect as representing that of Palestine also places the book in a long tradition which includes the fada’il al-Quds genre of praises for the Holy Land, other Islamicate texts such as fatwa collections, and travel accounts, and that suggests some form of “community of meaning” focused on Jerusalem but extending to areas on all sides of the city.38

Of course, the choice of an educated Jerusalem dialect can partly be explained by practical consideration: both Haddad and Spoer lived there, and the city’s religious, historical, and touristic significance would have made it the most relevant version for their prospective readers. The book’s introduction framed its readership as students of Arabic interested in dialect, but also “passing travellers” who wished to navigate “railways, hotels, and other conveniences of travel.” Recent scholars have followed Spoer in seeing travelers as the main market for the Manual, with other audiences among English-speaking residents of Palestine such as clergy, missionaries, and
The appeal to casual users may have been strengthened by the fact that the text of the *Manual of Palestinean Arabic* contains no Arabic characters, but is entirely transliterated.

Most of the example phrases given by Spoer and Haddad are normal for language handbooks: information for travelers and shoppers, how to order food or book rooms. But others reflect the major political developments in Palestine and the wider Ottoman Empire. Sample sentences include: “Conditions would change if the Pasha would go from here!” juxtaposed with “The liberty which the Sultan gave to the people is a blessing.” Other examples, such as, “This is the second time a Constitution has been granted to the people of Turkey” and, “The newspapers have announced the Osmanli Constitution,” also address major political events, such as the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, which forced Sultan Abdul Hamid II to reinstitute the constitution of 1876–78. The constitutional changes of 1908 were initially greeted with widespread public joy in Palestine and other parts of the Ottoman Empire and the new freedoms saw a burst of newspaper and other publications. The euphoria was, however, short-lived, with an attempted counterrevolution and a turn to Turkic nationalism in the run-up to World War I. But in the brief revolutionary moment, Spoer and Haddad sought to educate their European readers on the political context of Palestine and to espouse the hoped-for freedoms of the new regime.

The content chosen by Spoer and Haddad presents Palestine as a space of religious, social, and technological mixture. A few sample sentences mention tropes such as donkeys and mules, gazelles, Bedouin, the hajj, and incidents from the Qur’an and Islamic history, but, despite the Protestant Christian background of both authors, most of these are Islamic. However, the folktales at the end of the book feature a story entitled “Saint Anthony and the Son of the King,” with a clear Christian point of reference. In contrast to Orientalist stereotypes of the Middle East, religion and “traditional” ways of life are largely absent. Railways, cars, and other markers of modernity are shown as part of normal existence, and characters in the book include a teacher, a judge, a professor, an inventor, a photographer, and a physician. Spoer and Haddad clearly lived the experience that they also wanted to display, a “modern,” diverse Palestine.

**Intellectual Networks under Colonialism**

Haddad’s second foray into Arabic language textbooks was *The Spoken Arabic of Palestine*, co-written with the famous archaeologist W. F. Albright, and first published in 1927. Whereas Haddad’s collaboration with Spoer had been one of only a few such books available before World War I, Haddad and Albright’s volume entered a busier market. An English-speaking colonial administration, as well as Zionist immigration and a growing tourism industry, shaped new markets for language learning, so that while *The Manual of Palestinean Arabic* appears designed for self-study, *The Spoken Arabic of Palestine* is explicitly aimed at those working with teachers. The historical trajectory of Haddad’s later textbooks highlights the intellectual and official networks...
in which he was embedded, which included international scholars based in Jerusalem, members of the British Mandate administration, and fellow Palestinian writers and educators. As such, we can view Elias Haddad as continuing his pre-World War I interest in colloquial Arabic and its dissemination, passing on the version of the language that he first presented in the Manual through later handbooks and through teaching military and government figures during Britain’s presence in Palestine. Though it is beyond the scope of this article, Haddad’s trajectory also evokes themes of intellectual connections beyond Palestine and the nature and role of such networks in colonial settings.

In The Spoken Arabic of Palestine, Elias Haddad’s name is listed first, suggesting that the work is largely his and that perhaps Albright’s main contribution was his famous name. Those thanked in the preface include Jalil Irany, a Palestinian teacher who collaborated with Haddad in later years, and Elias Shihadeh, Haddad’s colleague at the Syrian Orphanage – pointing to the importance of scholarly and professional networks among middle-class Palestinians. Haddad capitalized further on his enterprise with Albright, publishing a parallel edition in German, Arabisch wie es in Palästina gesprochen wird: Ein Leitfaden für Anfänger, issued in 1927 by the Syrian Orphanage. Here, Hermann Schneller (from the founding dynasty of the Syrian Orphanage) is thanked for his help with the text. In his preface, Haddad highlights his practical experience of “many years of language teaching with Englishmen, Americans, and Germans.”

Elias Haddad was also a key figure in Albright’s studies in Palestinian Arabic and folklore and helped to shape some of his early encounters with the local culture and language. In 1920, Albright worked with Haddad on folklore and Arabic, and they made ethnographic trips together around Jerusalem. The tone of Albright’s diaries suggests that his relationships with both Haddad and Tawfiq Canaan were warm, and their shared social circle was broad. On a walking trip from Wadi al-Qilt to the Dead Sea, Albright, two of his colleagues, and their wives “met the rest of the party – Dr and Mrs Canaan, Haddad, Linder and two Swedish ladies from the Swedish mission, the Kelseys from Ramallah, Esch and several more.” Haddad, Omar al-Salih al-Barghuti, and Tawfiq Canaan all attended Albright’s wedding. As discussed below, Haddad also maintained similarly long-lasting professional relationships with the Scandinavian ethnographer Hilma Granqvist, supporting her fieldwork in the village of ’Artas and editing her notes of conversations in colloquial Palestinian.

After the Nakba, and apparently prompted by requests from students of Arabic, Haddad reworked the textbook authored with Albright with the aid of Jalil Irany. Irany, a teacher originally from Tulkarm, moved to Bethlehem in 1942 and, as headmaster of the Boys’ Reformatory School under the Mandate administration, was awarded an Order of the British Empire in 1946. Their “entirely rewritten and enlarged” edition, published in 1955, included new stories, longer written examples for students to practice their Arabic, and occasional mentions of Jordan and Jordanian sites, making the book more relevant to new readers. Palestine was dropped from the title and the preface states that the book met “the needs of a student in any Arabic-
speaking country, with special reference to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.”

This change made commercial sense, conforming to the new political situation, but also seems designed to accommodate Jordanian political sensitivities over the identity of the West Bank and Jerusalem and highlights the shifting images of Palestine presented by Haddad’s various works. Responses to the volume’s publication by scholars who had been based in Palestine during the Mandate period – such as the Reverend Eric Bishop, the Scottish Orientalist R. B. Serjeant, and James Robson, by then professor of Arabic at the University of Manchester – highlight the regard with which Haddad and his work on colloquial Arabic were held, and the extent to which he and Irany had influenced impressions and experiences of Palestine.

Translating “Nimr-lore”

Archaeology and anthropology played a major role in how Western audiences “imagined” Palestine, as a biblical land inhabited by primitive peoples, portrayed as degraded relics of a glorious past, and these visions permeated political imaginaries, determining borders and ownership claims. But in a series of ethnographic articles in English and German, Haddad and his collaborator on the Manual of Palestinean Arabic, Henry Spoer, sketch out a Palestine closely entwined with motifs of Arabic culture (the classical Bedouin, the heroic warrior-poet), in which the dramas are not those of the biblical past but of popular poetry and songs of the nineteenth-century Arab Levant. The most significant of these are a long-running project to collect poetry by Nimr ibn ‘Adwan, a late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century shaykh from the ‘Adwan tribe of the Balqa, on the eastern side of the Jordan River. Transcribing, transliterating, translating, and publishing these poems became a life-long project, particularly for Spoer.

The ‘Adwan were (and still are) one of the main tribes in the Balqa. In present-day Jordanian national narratives, they are linked with this specific area, ruling over sedentary cultivators, making occasional raids, and sporadically clashing with the Ottoman authorities. According to an account taken in the 1880s from an ‘Adwani chief, they arrived in the Balqa from Arabia, their Najdi origins forming the basis for ‘Adwan claims to “pure” or heroic blood. Although Orientalist stereotypes of the “noble savage” desert Bedouin are often applied to the ‘Adwan, by the time of Haddad and Spoer’s expedition to the Balqa significant numbers had become sedentary or registered land with the government, often under pressure from the Ottoman authorities. ‘Adwan raids, according to the British traveler Claude Conder, extended to Jerusalem and Jaffa. Archaeological evidence
underscores the fact that ‘Adwan economic activities did not end with livestock sold in Damascus or Hebron, but were part of trade networks which stretched into the Red Sea region, Greater Syria, and Europe.

Shaykh Nimr was a leader of one of the two main branches of the ‘Adwan. He was born around 1754, spent his life in the Balqa, and died in 1823. Despite stereotypes of the warrior-poet transmitting spoken verse, he was fully literate, and diwans of his poetry are recorded in the mid-nineteenth century. His image as warrior-poet is encapsulated in the title of a recent biography, *The Poet Prince and Arab Knight.* Popular portrayals describe his adoration of his bride Wadha, whom he married after rescuing her from rapacious bandits and to whom many of his love poems are addressed. This image fits auto-expressions of Jordanian/Bedouin identity and its often romanticized and ahistorical use by the Jordanian state.

Henry Spoer started collating and translating work by Nimr Ibn ‘Adwan in 1904, when he collected several dozen poems. Elias Haddad became involved after Spoer’s first expedition, when he first helped to translate the poems Spoer had collected, and later travelled with him back to the Balqa. Haddad and Nimr are given equal credit for the remaining publications (from 1929, 1933–34, 1945, and 1946), though by the 1940s the two were no longer in close contact. Despite this, Spoer emphasized that the collection and translation of the poems were “our joint-work,” the fruits of “several happy years of working together.”

The publications represent only a selection from Spoer and Haddad’s collection, which seems to have consisted of over one hundred examples of Shaykh Nimr’s verse, a considerable achievement in itself. The English translations are accompanied in several publications by Arabic transcriptions of the poems, in others only transliterations of the Arabic, as well as commentaries on their context and content, and paratextual materials which include linguistic and historical notes and comparisons between ‘Adwan’s work and other Arabic literature. Citing their own *Manual of Palestinian Arabic* and scholars such as Alois Musil, Haddad and Spoer call the language used in ‘Adwan’s poems “Palestinian Arabic,” placing his literary production into a context which pays little heed to the Jordan River as a boundary. This is reinforced by ‘Adwan’s history, the identities of those who recited the poems to Spoer and Haddad, and the poems themselves. These all refer to a social and geographical sphere extending to Damascus and the Druze regions of southern Syria, but concentrated on an area with the Ghor (Jordan Valley) at its heart and the ‘Adwan heartlands of the Balqa to its east, but also west to Bisan, Nablus, Jerusalem, and even Hebron and Jaffa. The reciters from whom Spoer and Haddad received their versions of ‘Adwan’s work came from al-Salt but also from al-Qubayba near Jerusalem. An exchange of poems between Nimr Ibn ‘Adwan and one Yusuf Abu Nṣer of the “Nṣērāt Arabs, who are living in the Western Rūr [Ghor],” lamenting the deaths of their beloved wives, also crosses this border. So did the marriage of one of ‘Adwan’s daughters to a shaykh from the Abu Ghosh family (who dominated the Jerusalem–Jaffa road from the village of Qaryat al-‘Inab) and an exchange of insults between ‘Adwan and Musa Bek Tuqan, *mutasallim* of Nablus, after Tuqan jeered ‘Adwan for writing romantic poetry.
Like their *Manual of Palestinian Arabic*, the poems chosen by Spoer and Haddad offer a particular image of social values and mores. Haddad and Spoer translated into English and published Shaykh Nimr’s “debonair” love poetry (as did Musil in 1928 and, in Arabic, al-ʻUzayzi in 1997). His “battle day” poetry has not been reproduced, even though it is much more typical of the ‘Adwani oral tradition. Part of a poetic style dating back to the *jahiliyya*, “battle day poems” celebrate bravery, honor, and loyalty – but also rebelliousness and independence. The poems in Spoer and Haddad’s articles of 1912, 1929, 1933–34, and 1945, however, all consist of lamentations. The five poems that Haddad and Spoer published in 1923 are more varied, including: a poem on Nimr’s loneliness during his exile with the Bani Sakhr, a challenge to a Bani Sakhr warrior who threatened him, a plea to his children to follow good examples in life, a poem on the theft of Nimr’s mare, and a dialogue between the poet and his gun about their plans to kill a leopard. The 1946 text is also slightly varied, although the majority (eight of fifteen) of the poems are lamentations for Nimr’s wife Wadha or the pain of love in general. Another confronts Musa Bey Tuqan of Nablus for his mockery of Shaykh Nimr, and several poems lament the advent of old age and weakness.

Spoer and Haddad thus shape Ibn ‘Adwan’s diwan to present him as a wounded lover, a philosophical thinker on youth and age, and a correspondent with other literati in the region. In choosing which poems to preserve and display, Haddad and Spoer foreground a “civilized,” cultured image of the Balqa Bedouin and their famous poet, sideling those works which prop up the aggressive, warlike stereotypes permeating Western images of the Arab. As in their *Manual of Palestinian Arabic*, written in the same period as their collaboration on collecting and translating the works of Shaykh Nimr, Spoer and Haddad convey a modern, liberal image of Arab society, in which poems of romantic love and contemplations of mortality were more appropriate than exhortations to battle.

In addition to this presentation of a specific image of Arab society and culture in the region, Haddad and Spoer’s publication and exegesis of Nimr’s poetry portray the space in which the poetry was written in a manner that took on increasing political weight over the period when the articles emerged. Prior to World War I, when the first in the series were published, the Jordan Valley was viewed mainly as a minor geographical feature, rather than a national border; in continuing to emphasize this geography as Palestinian in their later articles, Haddad and Spoer increasingly envision Nimr’s life and work in ways that reject the solidification of Mandatory territorial divisions. Their portrait defies political decisions made during and after World War I that linked Transjordan to Britain’s Hashemite allies, as well as spatial imaginaries of the Mandatory system – which established the Jordan River as a rigid border against Arab nationalist aspirations and Jewish settlement – and the Zionist movement, which used biblical narratives (outlined at the 1919 Peace Conference) to lay claim to a state east of the river. The cultural and geographical themes of Haddad and Spoer’s project thus reject both Zionist aspirations and British realpolitik. They do this by reconstructing a life story and a literary corpus in which urban Palestine west of the Jordan is bound up with the Bedouin warrior-poet from the east, a figure of
Arabic culture from the *jahiliyya* onward. In doing so, their narrative transcends the conventional dichotomy between a (culturally and agriculturally) cultivated Palestine—a place of cities, rules, and written texts—and the “wild men” on the other side of the Ghor, the untamed Bedouin warrior-lover-tribesman of both Orientalist fantasy and Arabic literature. In so doing, they reflect a certain local feeling in the late Ottoman period, which saw areas east and west of the Jordan as contiguous, and implicitly resist the regional borders imposed by the Mandate’s regime in later decades.

The Ethnography of Palestine

Until now, Elias Haddad’s best-known writings were his ethnographic articles published in the *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society* alongside those of other nativist anthropologists, such as Tawfiq Canaan and Stephan Hanna Stephan. Haddad’s output in the journal was comparatively small, just four fairly short articles and one book review. They address conventional topics of interest to Orientalist scholars of the period: Qaysi-Yemeni competition in Arab societies, social institutions such as the *madafa* or guesthouse, blood revenge, and education and correction. As such, they are typical of the functionalist anthropology of the period, which used fieldwork to identify the institutions of a society and how they fit into a social whole. Haddad’s article on “blood revenge,” along with Omar al-Barghuthi’s contribution to the journal on Bedouin courts, seem to set the stage for a number of works by Arab ethnographers on Bedouin systems of justice, apparently inspired by a combination of usefulness (to Mandatory authorities attempting to rule semi-nomadic populations) and a concern to stress the presence of rational social systems in traditional Palestinian life. However, Haddad’s contributions were primarily in the first three volumes of the journal (published between 1920 and 1923), suggesting that this kind of mainstream ethnography was not what most engaged his interest. Indeed, Haddad’s strongest influence in the anthropology of Palestine was arguably not through his own writings, but through his interventions—linguistic advice and corrections, interpretation of practices and customs, fixing and arranging—for Western ethnographers who came to study Palestinian rural life, especially the Finnish anthropologist Hilma Granqvist.

Of all his writings, Haddad’s ethnographic writings include the strongest indications of the developmentalist ideas consistent with his German education and mainstream Western understandings of society at the time; practices such as the Bedouin use of blood feuds in the system of justice would, in his view, “if not entirely, at least in large part, vanish in the near future.” While Haddad attributed this to the new British and French Mandatory rule in the region, he clearly saw society as evolutionary and his ethnography was to some extent analogous to rescue archaeology, preserving the details of customs otherwise destined to be lost. Haddad also comments that, even if the new governments “may interfere and make a fair decision, nevertheless a real reconciliation between the two parties can not take place as long as the customs of the people are not satisfied,” suggesting that the practices he describes meet psychological or social needs that will not die out under the pressure of modernity. Haddad’s
assumption that contemporary notions of progress or modernity will benefit Palestine, even if significant elements of its culture disappear in the process, is most robustly stated in another article:

In the past few decades European civilization has entered the country, and though, for the sake of the progress of my native land, I am one of its admirers and supporters, I cannot but be filled with regret at the disappearance of the customs which bring us so close to the spirit and meaning of the Bible.\textsuperscript{99}

On the other hand, in this article Haddad insists that the foreign view of Palestine as a “hot-bed of party strife” based on religion is incorrect. The main divisions in society, he stresses, are “political rather than religious,”\textsuperscript{100} echoing both the focus in the 1909 \textit{Manual of Palestinean Arabic} on politics rather than faith and foreshadowing his future translation of the German Enlightenment play \textit{Nathan der Weise}, with its message of religious coexistence in Jerusalem.

\section*{Nathan al-Hakim}

Elias Haddad’s vision of a peaceable, diverse Arab society is apparent in one of his solo works, the first – and until the 1990s the only – Arabic edition of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s 1779 blank-verse play \textit{Nathan der Weise} (Nathan the Wise) in 1932.\textsuperscript{101} Translating a European play with an “Oriental” setting into Arabic, Haddad conveys specific ideas about his own society and its political trajectory, reclaiming a message of tolerance and religious harmony as indigenous to his people.\textsuperscript{102}

The German Enlightenment thinker and writer Gotthold Ephraim Lessing published \textit{Nathan der Weise} in 1779, toward the end of his career and in response to censorship of his statements on religion.\textsuperscript{103} The play is set in the Jerusalem of a wise and open-minded Islamic ruler, Salah al-Din, a well-established character in Western writings since the medieval period as well as in Islamicate history.\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Nathan der Weise} also features a Jewish central character (Nathan) and his Christian-born adopted daughter Recha, and between these and other representations of Jews, Christians, and Muslims, it is often held up as a model for tolerance and interfaith dialogue, as well as being one of the most widely-performed German plays.\textsuperscript{105}

Haddad’s translation, \textit{Nathan al-Hakim}, followed a period of fluctuating tensions between Palestinian Arabs and Jews, peaking in 1929 with the Western Wall/Buraq riots, during which some 250 individuals, Jews and Arabs, were killed.\textsuperscript{106} In addition to violent outbursts, day-to-day factors reinforced the lines between Jewish and Arab Palestinians. The Zionist nation-building project, the British policy of classifying people according to faith, and an overarching environment of population growth, economic downturn, and rapid urbanization, all created tensions which were exacerbated by European Jewish immigration and political nationalisms.\textsuperscript{107}

In translating \textit{Nathan der Weise} into Arabic, Haddad resisted these social and political trends by showing Palestine, and Jerusalem in particular, as a place in which
Jews, Muslims, and Christians are not just able to live together, but are meant to. The European Crusaders in the play are portrayed as fanatical and duplicitous as they try to regain their hold over the city, emphasizing the fact that no single faith should be dominant, and that those who seek to dominate do not live up to a standard of moral excellence shared by Lessing and Haddad. In his introduction, Haddad excoriates all forms of extremism and stresses religious tolerance and mutual respect, quoting the Qur’an and the New Testament side-by-side and proclaiming: “to you, your religion and to me, mine.”

The Nazis had been trying to suppress Lessing’s play for a decade by the time Haddad published Nathan al-Hakim, and had sought to stop screenings of a 1922 film version, instead promoting Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, with its anti-Semitic themes. Was Elias Haddad aware of these trends, and trying to make a point about their own histories to his German colleagues at the Syrian Orphanage? Members of the Schneller family in Palestine were enthusiastic supporters of the National Socialists later in the 1930s; were they already expressing views which Haddad wanted to counter? The play was completely banned in Germany in 1933, the year after Haddad’s publication, when the Nazis consolidated their rise to power. Perhaps those editions of Nathan al-Hakim which found their way into German university libraries during the 1930s did so under the noses of Nazi officials who could not read Arabic and did not know that they were admitting a banned text.

While ethno-national politics were undoubtedly a major and growing source of conflict in Mandate Palestine, Haddad’s work calls for a different future – a plea not only for tolerance but also for equality between different religions; this disrupts assumptions that all discussions of religious identity in Mandate Palestine revolved around competition and conflict (an outlook which is also in line with his membership of the Freemasons, with their belief in a brotherhood which cut across politics, religion, and ethnicity). And yet Haddad’s account is not a naively idealistic one. He acknowledges the dangers of fanaticism and religious rivalries – in particular within his own religion, Christianity; indeed, it is possible to see the Crusaders of the play – Europeans coming to Palestine with a desire to shape it to their own desires, rather than to integrate into the existing society – as representing Zionist newcomers and Salah al-Din as the inspiring but wise and tolerant leader needed to save Palestine. Haddad’s solution – a call for Enlightenment values, for modernist ideas of rationalism and humanism, for tradition to be swept away in a search for a universal humankind – may seem in some respects dated and colonial. But in his context, Haddad should be seen as proposing a position which seeks to reclaim Palestine as the place in which such values originated and can flourish.

What did translation offer Haddad that authoring his own text could not? Although translating European texts into Arabic is sometimes seen as evidence of the vulnerability of the colonized translator to seduction by colonial ideas, others have interpreted foreign texts as offering a neutral space in which different peoples can find common ground. Translation has also been used by reform and decolonizing movements to discuss or promote specific ideas and values. Lessing’s play offers,
in this light, the triple advantages of being external/foreign; by a representative of values associated (in the 1930s) with ideas of objectivity and proof in the modernist sense; and from a part of Europe not directly linked to the Mandatory powers in the Levant. The ideas expressed did not attract controversy or disagreement in the Arabic-language press. Both the major Arabic magazine al-Hilal and the Palestinian newspaper Mir’at al-Sharq reviewed Nathan al-Hakim in the summer of 1932, mainly summarizing the play’s plot and noting its poetic style, moral position, and message of “longing” for past civilizations, but expressing no surprise, disbelief, or opposition to ideas of coexistence and tolerance. Mir’at al-Sharq’s review was the only reaction to Haddad’s translation I could find in the Palestinian press; however, it made sufficient impact to be included on a 1946 list of “Palestinian Arabic books” compiled by the Committee for Arabic Culture in Palestine.

Conclusion

The surviving writings and photographs of Elias Haddad suggest a modest, unostentatious man, precise and scholarly in his work, and generous with his time and expertise. Although currently little-known in Palestinian history, his life and writings deserve more attention, addressing as they do so many important topics – representation, identity, translation, colonialism – and touching the work of so many beyond his own output, as a teacher, translator, or advisor on language and customs. His life also highlights the entangled nature of intellectual life in Mandate Palestine; Haddad worked with Americans, Europeans, Jews, and fellow Arabs, sometimes as an equal, sometimes in a subordinate role, and sometimes as an authority. To understand his life as entangled is not to dismiss the politics and power differentials of colonial life. The closures and expropriations from the Syrian Orphanage during both world wars, Haddad’s apparently unwilling time at the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies, and his eventual exile from Jerusalem, the city where he spent the vast majority of his life, demonstrate the ways in which colonial power in Palestine affected ordinary people. But seeing Haddad’s life as entwined with those of so many other people also lets us see where he was able to exercise his own will and ability, representing his adopted country in specific ways and to specific audiences, and ensuring that people who came to study it had their errors corrected. Quiet and modest Elias Haddad may have been, but his ethics and beliefs form a strong and continuous thread throughout his long and productive life.

Sarah Irving is Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in History at Edge Hill University in England, currently researching a social and cultural history of the 1927 Jericho earthquake. She is also editor of the Council for British Research in the Levant journal Contemporary Levant.
Endnotes


4 Personal communication from Elias Haddad’s grandson Gabi Haddad, 21 July 2015. Relatives of Elias Haddad who also attended the Schneller School recounted similar life histories for an oral history project on the institution’s past. See: “Mitri Simaan Nehmeh,” online at jlss.org/memoirs_mitri_simaan_nehmeh.aspx (accessed 6 January 2021); “Yousef Mourad Part I,” online at jlss.org/yousef_mourad_memoirs_part_i.aspx (accessed 6 January 2021). Beth Baron’s work on Egypt emphasizes that the parents of children in Middle Eastern orphanages were not necessarily dead. Many “orphans” came from families unable or unwilling to care for them – because of poverty or a new spouse, for instance, or because the child was the result of an illicit relationship or was disabled. Residence in an orphanage was not necessarily permanent; children were often lodged there until the family’s situation improved, showing that, while families who brought their children to orphanages were often poor and marginalized, they were far from passive, often managing these opportunities for education with calculation and insight. Beth Baron, The Orphan Scandal: Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014).


7 Personal communication from Gabi Haddad, 21 July 2015.

8 Personal communication from Gabi Haddad, 21 July 2015.

9 Personal communication from Gabi Haddad, 21 July 2015.


12 Personal communication from Gabi Haddad.

13 Sir James Craig, Shemlan: A History of the Middle East Centre for Arab Studies (London: Palgrave, 1998), 22, 168. Abba Eban also worked for the center, and was for a while Haddad’s senior there.

14 Craig, Shemlan, 32, 38.


16 “New Director Appointed for J.L.S.S.” (summer 2006?), online at jlss.org/new_director_appointed.aspx (accessed 4 September 2020); Buck, “Linguistic...
... Pioneering Work,” 23.
19 Davis, Shifting Sands, 36.
20 “Palestine and Education,” [Adelaide] Register, 24 July 1922, 8.
24 Manz, German Diaspora, 240–41.
27 Krefeld, Germany 1873–1951 USA.
29 For an example of his work, see George A. Barton and Hans H. Spoer, “Traces of the Diatessaron of Tatian in Harclean Syriac Lectionaries,” Journal of Biblical Literature 24, no. 2 (1905): 179–95. The ASOR was renamed in 1970 as the W. F. Albright Institute of Archaeological Research in Jerusalem.
31 The introduction to the Manual also highlights technological changes happening in Palestine, when Spoer writes: “I and my collaborator have to thank Director Pastor Schneller and the Printing-master of the Syrisches Waisenhaus for undertaking the printing of this work under considerable mechanical difficulty, as well as that of the fact that the young printers know nothing of the English language.” H. H. Spoer and E. Nasrallah Haddad, Manual of Palestinian Arabic for Self-Instruction (Jerusalem: Syrisches Waisenhaus, 1909), v.
34 Louis Fishman, “The 1911 Haram al-Sharif Incident: Palestinian Notables Versus the Ottoman Administration”, Journal of Palestine Studies 34, 3 (2005): 7, 12–15, 19; Gelvin, Israel-Palestine Conflict, 23–33. This also overlaps also with the interest in variation among dialects which arose among orientalists in the nineteenth century, as they tried to trace the evolution of Arabic and understand its diversity. Catherine Miller, “Arabic Urban Vernaculars,” in The Semitic Languages: An International Handbook, ed. Stefan Weninger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 984–85.


37 This term, apparently coined by Marshall Hodgson in The Venture of Islam (University of Chicago Press, 1975), denotes the products of cultures in which Islam is the dominant faith and influences much of the culture around it, but which are not themselves religious in nature.


40 Spoer and Haddad, Manual, 80.

41 Spoer and Haddad, Manual, 104, 111, 122.

42 Bedross Der Mattossian, Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 23–47, 149–70.


44 Spoer and Haddad, Manual, 166.


46 Spoer and Haddad, Manual, 92.


48 Haddad and Albright, Spoken Arabic, i.

49 Haddad and Albright, Spoken Arabic, iii.

50 Haddad suggests a gap in the German market, although at least one German manual for learning Palestinian Arabic, Leonhard Bauer’s Das Palästinische Arabisch: Die Dialekte des Städters und des Fellachen, was published (formally in Leipzig but printed in Jerusalem) in 1910, with a reprint in 1926. It seems likely that Elias Haddad’s interest in colloquial Arabic was influenced by Bauer. Leonhard Bauer came to the Syrian Orphanage as a teacher in 1890, married Maria Schneller in 1891, and became senior teacher in 1899, remaining at the School until 1948, so Elias Haddad would have been his student and later colleague. Ulrich Seeger, “Leonhard Bauer (1865–1964), ein Pionier der arabischen Dialektologie,” in Im Dialog bleiben. Sprache und Denken in den Kulturen des Vorderen Orients: Festschrift für Raif Georges Khoury, ed. Frederik Musall and Abdalbary al-Mudarris (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2011), 390–96.

51 Elias Haddad, Arabisch wie es in Palästina gesprochen wird: Ein Leitfaden für Anfänger (Jerusalem: Syrian Orphanage Press, 1927), i.


55 For a full account of Granqvist’s work in the village of Artas, and of Elias Haddad’s editing, comments, and correction of her Arabic field notes, see Rosanna Sirignano, “A Female Anthropologist in the Arab World:

Letter from Albright to Douglas Tushingham, 20 July 1952, ASOR archives Albright 002 box 1, 1952 correspondence.


Letter from Albright to Douglas Tushingham, 20 July 1952, ASOR archives Albright 002 box 1, 1952 correspondence.


Palestine Gazette 1499 (13 June 1946), 573.

Haddad and Irany, Standard Colloquial Arabic, n.p.

Haddad and Irany, Standard Colloquial Arabic, n.p.


The plateau east of the Jordan River and north of the Dead Sea, with the city of al-Salt as the area’s capital. I use the term tribe deliberately, in that most of the people discussed in this section identified themselves in such a way and because, despite modern Anglophone uses of the word in negative ways, the tribal system was a complex and multi-layered social and political system admirably suited to the environment and political economy of the region.


Van den Steen, Near Eastern Tribal Societies, 141.


Palestine Explorer, “Belka Arabs,” 172. Conder repeated this tale in his 1889 account of his travels in what he termed Heth and Moab, the regions’ Biblical names. In both texts he recorded that Shaykh Diab met the explorer’s assurance that the “righteous” British had no imperialistic designs on Ottoman land with an “air of courteous incredulity” (Palestine Explorer, “Belka Arabs,” 180).


Recent popular works include an eponymous Ramadan TV series in 2007 and an illustrated biography, probably aimed at younger readers. See also Ahmad Shuhan, Diwan Nimr bin 'Adwan wa qissat hayatih [The works of Nimr bin ‘Adwan and the story of his life] (Dayr al-Zur: Manshurat maktabat al-turath, 1981).


80 In the 1880s “violent protests” took place in Nablus when the Balqa was subdivided between two Ottoman sub-provinces. The protesters viewed the Balqa as geographically and culturally connected to their own lives, and believed that they should remain administratively united. Jens Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), 60


85 See, for example, Aref el-Aref, *Bedouin Love, Law, and Legend: Dealing Exclusively with the Badu of Beersheba*, trans. Harold Tilley (Jerusalem: Cosmo Publishing, 1944);

96 Sirignano, “A Female Anthropologist in the Arab World.”


99 Haddad, “Political Parties,” 209.

100 Haddad, “Political Parties,” 209.


102 Using translations to discuss normative values was not unusual in the Arabic milieu; Nahda figures such as Jurji Zaydan and the Palestinian writer, journalist, and educator Khalil Baydas (1874?–1949) were major exponents of translation and their influence may be visible in in Haddad’s project.


106 Matthews, *Confronting an Empire*, 64.


111 In addition to the copy in the National Library in Berlin, *Nathan al-Hakim* was lodged in at least one German university library during this period: the University of Leipzig’s copy bears swastika-and-eagle stamps which can be seen through the solid circles printed over them post-1945.

112 Thanks are due to one of the anonymous reviewers of this article for highlighting this link.

113 Tageldin, *Disarming Words*, 7–23.


117 The Palestinian Arabic Book (Jerusalem: Committee for Arabic Culture in Palestine, 1946), 25.
The Other Wells
Family History and the Self-Creation of Jabra Ibrahim Jabra
William Tamplin

Abstract
The Palestinian writer Jabra Ibrahim Jabra (né Chelico) was born in Adana in the French Mandate of Cilicia on 28 August 1919. Jabra’s Syriac Orthodox family survived the Sayfo genocide and probably hailed from the Kurdish-speaking Syriac village of Midên in Tur Abdin, in northern Mesopotamia. In the early 1920s, the Chelico family immigrated to Bethlehem, where Jabra grew up. Jabra was a consummate autobiographer who wrote two autobiographies, six autobiographical novels, and dozens of personal essays. Yet he never revealed his family’s history in Tur Abdin, his birth in Adana, and his immigration to Palestine as a child. In this article, the author exposes and contextualizes biographical facts that Jabra concealed. Tamplin analyzes Jabra’s two autobiographies – The First Well (1987) and Princesses’ Street (1994) – and his novel In Search of Walid Masoud (1978) in light of these revelations to argue that Jabra’s project of “self-creation” (Neuwirth, 1998) extends well beyond his first autobiography. Moreover, Jabra’s lifelong project to propel traditional, collectivist Arab society into modernity by valorizing individual experience precluded other possible sources of identity, such as family history, from compromising Jabra’s sense of modern Palestinian national identity. The author proposes new directions in which to take Jabra criticism, such as trauma studies. Until the full range of concealed facts about Jabra’s life is exposed, literary biographers and critics of Jabra should regard his work with a hermeneutic of suspicion.

Key words
Autobiography; novel; Palestinian; Syriac; Sayfo; genocide; trauma; suspicion; migration; national identity.
How a great writer’s relations treat his personal papers is a matter no one can do anything about. We can only hope that they do not complicate matters more than is necessary, as they are acting within their legal rights in the ownership of those papers, whether to preserve a family secret or out of fear of a particular scandal.

Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, “So That One’s Personal Papers Are Not Scattered by the Winds” in *Mu’ayashat al-nimrah wa-awraaq ukhra* [Living with the tigress and other papers]

Most studies on the life and work of the Palestinian writer Jabra Ibrahim Jabra state that he was born in Bethlehem on 28 August in either 1919 or 1920. The ambiguity surrounding Jabra’s birth year frustrates the literary biographer, and Jabra himself compounds this frustration by never mentioning in his works where or when, exactly, he was born. What literary historians know for certain is that Jabra died a Muslim in Baghdad on 12 December 1994. In 1952 Jabra converted to Islam from Syriac Orthodox Christianity, the religion into which he was born, in order to marry Lami’a Barqi al-‘Askari, the daughter of an elite Iraqi military family. Jabra and Lami’a had two sons, Sadeer and Yasser, and between their births, Jabra obtained Iraqi citizenship. Despite his registered Iraqi citizenship, Jabra considered himself a Palestinian “to the roots of his hair,” like his character Marwan in *In Search of Walid Masoud*. After all, Jabra grew up in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, spoke Arabic natively, and studied at iconic Palestinian educational institutions: the National School in Bethlehem, the Rashidiyya School in Jerusalem, and the Arab College atop Jabal al-Mukabbir. Moreover, Jabra studied under the Palestinian nationalist figures Ishaq Musa al-Husayni, Ibrahim Tuqan, and Ahmad Samih al-Khalidi. Jabra’s nostalgic portrayals of the blue hills, green valleys, and red anemones of springtime Bethlehem give one the impression that Jabra could not have been born far from the “first well” of his Bethlehem childhood.

Jabra was in fact born Jabra Ibrahim Gawriye Mas‘ud Chelico on 28 August 1919 in Adana, which was then part of the French Mandate of Cilicia. Jabra’s parents Ibrahim and Maryam were Syriac Orthodox Christians (Arab. *suryan*; Syr. *suryoye*) belonging to the Chelico family [Shaliko], who probably hailed from the Kurdish-speaking village of Midēn (Arab. Middo/Middu), now Ögündük, in Tur Abdin, the geographic Assyrian heartland in northern Mesopotamia. Jabra’s family most likely fled Adana ahead of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s revanchist army to settle in Bethlehem in 1921 or 1922.

Critics of modern Arabic literature overwhelmingly agree that Jabra’s work treads the line between fiction and autobiography; one cannot understand Jabra’s autobiographies without understanding his fiction, and vice versa. Indeed, Jabra’s autobiographies rely on fictional techniques, and many of his novels’ characters were based on himself and his friends. By his own admission, his novels were autobiographical, and his autobiographies were novelistic:
When I wrote my novels and used an aspect of my life in them, I didn’t imagine that I would write an autobiography, so I gave myself the freedom to weave those autobiographical threads into the rest of the novelistic fabric. When I came to write my autobiography and I finished, I found that some of the events that I could have added to *The First Well*, I had already spoken about elsewhere. In some cases I spoke better about them in my novels than I did in my autobiography. That reason is what actually made me refrain from mentioning certain details; and I won’t hide from you that if I had continued writing the autobiography, I would have restored very many things that I mentioned in my novels and that happened after I passed the stage of childhood. And if I retold those events, it would be as if I had rewritten entire chapters from my novels. I know that this is an extraordinary admission because I usually say that my novels are separate from me. And they really are, but here you’ve cast me into my own “well.”

In other words, Jabra’s novels are “separate from him” in the way that Ibrahim al-Mazini’s *Ibrahim the Writer*, Taha Husayn’s *The Days*, or Muhammad Shukri’s *For Bread Alone* are “separate” from their authors. There has been a great deal of overlap between autobiography and the novel in modern Arabic fiction, and in modern fiction in general. Jabra writes that his biggest influences, when he began writing fiction in the 1940s, were James Joyce, D. H. Lawrence, Aldous Huxley, and Virginia Woolf.

Jabra’s autobiographical writings – his six novels and the two works he marked as autobiographies – were endowed with a strong sense of personal and national purpose. Angelika Neuwirth argues that Jabra’s autobiography *The First Well* formed part of his lifelong project to propel a traditional, collectivist Arab society toward the acceptance of individual autonomy, starting with that society’s acceptance of Jabra’s own individual autonomy. Faysal Darraj has shown that Jabra believed both that the 1948 Nakba was a defeat of Arab tradition by Euro-Israeli modernity and that the Arabs had to modernize through the transformation of their culture. The process of transformation, to Jabra, had to begin with the written word. In other words, the road to Jerusalem lay in linguistic and cultural reform. Tetz Rooke argues that “Jabra’s life-story is naturally also connected to the Palestinian national struggle for liberation; the collective significance of his personal experience is undeniable.” Issa Boullata calls Jabra the last of the Nahda men, capitalizing on the English connotations of “Renaissance man,” and Darraj claims that Jabra viewed himself as a prophet-intellectual (al-muthaqaf al-nabiyy). Critics agree that Jabra’s autobiographical works merge the personal with the political in his and the Palestinian people’s struggle to achieve modernity and progress, a sense of identity, and purpose within the world.

Scholars’ assumptions about Jabra’s unshakeable Palestinian identity may take on a different cast when we learn about Jabra’s concomitant concealment of his family history in Tur Abdin, his family’s survival of the Sayfo genocide, his birth in Adana, and his immigration to Palestine with his family in the early 1920s. These facts trouble
the tidy, uncomplicated image of the exiled Palestinian intellectual that Jabra presented to the world. Why did Jabra deceive his readers about his family history, birth, and early childhood? What new readings of his work can these revelations generate?

In the eastern Mediterranean of the early twentieth century, national borders, nationalist aspirations, and national identities were in extreme flux. It should not be surprising that as dyed-in-the-wool a Palestinian as Jabra was born outside Palestine. While national borders, aspirations and identities were arguably firmer by the time Jabra began writing political poetry in support of the Arab Revolt of 1936–39, they were firmer still by the time Jabra was exiled to Baghdad in 1948. Yet, to my knowledge, in Jabra’s nearly sixty years of artistic output – poems, paintings, short stories, novels, essays, screenplays, criticism, and autobiographies – no overt references to his northern Mesopotamian roots appear. Jabra referred to his Syriac identity in his autobiographies, but he gave no indication of the geographic affiliation which that identity implied. Those indications appear instead on official papers: his Iraqi passport, in which he lists his birthplace as Turkey; and his transfer application to Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, on 8 October 1940, in which he lists his birthplace as Adana, Turkey. Although we do not know for certain, Jabra may have feared the cries of a Zionist “birther,” as it were, who would attempt to discredit Jabra’s experience and identity – and, through him, those of the Palestinian people – by claiming that Jabra could not be a Palestinian because he was not born in Palestine. Jabra may have hidden facts about his family history and early life in order not to damage his personal and political project of Arab national uplift through the modernization of culture, which he sought to achieve through a focus on individual experience in his autobiographical fiction and autobiographies. However, if to conceal his family background was his object, then why did Jabra undermine that object by scattering clues that gestured toward his Mesopotamian background throughout his autobiographical works?

We must consider the possibility that Jabra knew that his family origins would be discovered. This anxiety may account for the large amount of discussion in his novels of hasab wa-nasab (ancestry and pedigree), family history, and certain characters’
investigations into the roots of Jabra-like protagonists. We must also consider the possibility that Jabra may have been unaffected by his family history, birth, and early childhood. He may have considered them irrelevant to his identity, formed through personal experiences during his childhood in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. Yet it is conspicuous that a writer so dedicated to autobiographical writing and self-reflection shunned the sources of identity that other autobiographers have found compelling and meaningful: their ancestors, parents and grandparents, and their homeland; family traditions; religious or ethnic identity; birth; and early childhood experiences. Jabra’s lifelong curation of his autobiography gives credence to Neuwirth’s argument that Jabra’s object in writing *The First Well* was self-creation. To a certain extent, every autobiographer is a self-creator. But few autobiographers fail to mention their family history, birth, and early childhood entirely. My object in this article is fourfold: to reveal biographical facts that Jabra concealed; to examine Jabra’s autobiographies *The First Well* and *Princesses’ Street* and his novel *In Search of Walid Masoud* in light of those facts; to begin to gauge both the nature of Jabra’s relationship with those facts and the extent of what we know and can know before more facts come to light; and to signal new directions for generative readings of Jabra’s works.

“Family history, with all its ramifications”

The term “Assyrian” is often used to refer to ethnic Assyrians who espouse one of the many branches of eastern Christianity traditionally associated with the Assyrians: the Syriac Orthodox ("Jacobites"), the Assyrian Church of the East ("Nestorians"), Syriac Catholics, and Chaldean Catholics. Jabra’s family belonged to the Syriac Orthodox Church. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the vast majority of Syriacs inhabited the regions of Tur Abdin, Diyarbakir, and Mardin in what is now southeastern Turkey. Those mountainous regions lie between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in northern Mesopotamia. The modern Syriac language is descended from Aramaic, and modern Syriacs claim cultural affiliation, if not ethnic descent, from the ancient Assyrians. For the eight hundred years preceding 1932, the Syriac Orthodox Church was based out of Mor Hananyo Monastery outside Mardin.

Beginning in the 1890s, the Ottoman army, Kurdish irregular forces, and Turkish Muslim civilians undertook intermittent but systematic massacres of Syriac Christian communities in their geographic homeland in northern Mesopotamia and southern Anatolia, in and around the borderlands of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. These massacres reached a fever pitch in 1915–16 during the Sayfo genocide, during which around 250,000 Assyrians – half of the world’s total population of Assyrians at the time – perished. In the 1920s, Ataturk expelled most of the rest from their homes in the new state of Turkey to seek refuge in neighboring countries: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine. Today, Assyrian Christians live dispersed all over the world, with large populations in Iraq, Germany, Sweden, and the United States. A few thousand remain in Turkey despite continued persecution.
In the mid- to late-nineteenth century, the fertile land of the Adana vilayet, watered by the Seyhan River, became a cotton-producing hub, attracting immigrants from outlying regions to work the land. By the early twentieth century, Adana was home to some 1,250 ethnic Assyrian Christians. In early 1909, local Ottoman officials in the Adana vilayet – the military governor, judge, mufti, and notables – spread rumors of Armenian insurrection, inciting Muslim mobs to slaughter local Christians. By the end of April 1909, twenty-five thousand Armenian Christians had been systematically slaughtered throughout the Cilicia province with official Ottoman imprimatur. Syriac Christians were also caught up in the massacres, and 418 of them perished.

After World War I, the French established the Mandate of Cilicia to seize the region’s fertile lands and to protect local Christians, four million of whom Ottoman Muslims had slaughtered over the preceding thirty years. In 1922, Ataturk’s administration signaled its intention to cleanse Adana of its remaining Christians, and many local Christians fled the city before the French retreat from Cilicia and the onslaught of the Turkish army.

The Syriac Orthodox Church has a strong and ancient connection to the Holy Land. The majority of the rural inhabitants of Byzantine Palestine before the Arabo-Islamic conquests were Syriac Orthodox Christians. However, in the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottoman censuses recorded no Syriac Orthodox Christians inhabiting Palestine. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, internal migration within the Ottoman Empire brought Syriacs to Palestine in two key waves. The first wave occurred in 1895, when a delegation of approximately twenty families on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land heard of the Hamidian massacres then occurring in their homeland, in which around twenty-five thousand Assyrians were slain. They decided to settle in Palestine. The second major wave of Syriac immigration to Palestine occurred during the first three decades of the twentieth century, peaking in 1917 during the Sayfo genocide. George Kiraz reports that members of the second wave came mostly from Mardin, Diyarbakir, Azakh, Esfes, Kharpurt, Middo, and Ma’sarte, towns and villages depopulated of Christians and Turkified. Most second-wave Syriac immigrants to Palestine settled in Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Jericho, and Haifa. According to Butrus Ni’meh, the head priest at St. Mary’s Syriac Orthodox Church in Bethlehem, established in 1926, the majority of Bethlehem’s Syriacs arrived in 1922.

In 1909, Jabra’s mother Maryam, her twin brother Yusuf, and her first husband Dawud were most likely present in the Adana vilayet, where the latter two were murdered in what Yusuf Ibrahim Jabra called the “massacres of the Armenians.” Four years after Dawud’s murder, in 1913 or 1914, Maryam married again, this time to Ibrahim Chelico (b. 1890/1891), who probably hailed from the Kurdish-speaking Syriac village of Midën in Tur Abdin. Ibrahim may have been in the Adana vilayet as a seasonal worker or as an internal economic migrant, or perhaps Maryam traveled back home – wherever that was – after Dawud was killed and met Ibrahim in Midën or in Tur Abdin. Maryam gave birth to Jabra in Adana in 1919, and it stands to reason that other family members – Ibrahim, Maryam’s sons Murad (b. 1909, by Dawud) and Yusuf (b. 1915, by Ibrahim), and her mother, Basma – were there then too.
do not know exactly when, how, or under what circumstances the Chelicos moved from Adana to Bethlehem. However, because so many Christians fled Adana before Atatürk’s army and because most of Bethlehem’s Syriacs migrated there in 1922, it is likely that the Chelicos moved in 1921 or 1922.

A quarter-century later, in January 1948, a twenty-eight-year-old Jabra Ibrahim Jabra would flee once again, from the newly purchased family home in Jerusalem’s Qatamon neighborhood to his childhood stomping ground of Bethlehem, and then over the next few months to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, and, eventually, Baghdad. Jabra found lodging at the Baghdad Hotel in the fall of 1948 and began teaching English literature at the University of Baghdad. Jabra would go on to marry Lami’a Barqi al-‘Askari, the great-niece of the Iraqi Colonel General Bakr Sidqi al-‘Askari (1899–1937). A former Ottoman military officer of Kurdish origin, Sidqi devised and carried out the Simele Massacre of 1933, in which around three thousand Assyrian Christians were slaughtered in sixty villages throughout northern Iraq.

Why did Jabra conceal his Syriac family’s history of trauma, victimization, and genocide in his autobiographical works, especially when that history came to confront him during his exile in Iraq? An autobiography would have been an appropriate place to discuss the facts of his family history, birth, and early childhood, and Jabra wrote two. Could the cementing of Jabra’s sense of Palestinian national identity during his adolescence and youth, in addition to the growing Zionist threat, have demanded that he conceal his family’s provenance from outside Palestine? One cornerstone of modern Palestinian national identity is family origin in the land of Palestine. One cornerstone of Zionist propaganda is that non-Palestinian Arabs flocked to Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s because of the economic prosperity the Zionists brought. Yet what if one comes from a family that fled to Palestine in the 1920s not because of economic opportunities but because of the imminent threat of genocide? Jabra could have chosen to repress the trauma his Syriac family suffered because more pressing concerns demanded his attention: the Arab Revolt of 1936–39, the 1948 Nakba, and the challenges ahead. In other words, his time, place and allegiance demanded that he be a Palestinian Arab first and a Syriac refugee of genocide in a faraway second.

**“Another Matter Altogether” in *The First Well***

In the preface to his first autobiography, *The First Well* (*Al-bi’r al-ula*, 1987), Jabra states unequivocally that the book is not a family history. *The First Well* deals with the formative experiences that Jabra had in Bethlehem and Jerusalem during “the first twelve years of my life, or rather with seven or eight years of those, ending with my moving from Bethlehem to Jerusalem with my parents in 1932.” In other words, *The First Well* covers Jabra’s life from approximately age four through twelve, starting at least two years after Jabra’s family immigrated to Bethlehem. Jabra justifies his decision not to mention any details of his family’s history, writing: “Nor am I here writing a history of my family, for that is another matter altogether, and I don’t claim
I have the ability to do it.”37 Jabra continues: “And lest I should slide into family history with all its ramifications (tempting as that may be), I have preferred to track the development of one single being who daily grew in consciousness, knowledge, and emotion and who lived in innocence and clung to it even as it gradually abandoned him.”38 Jabra distinguishes himself from those autobiographers who choose to focus on their adolescence or youth, when sexual feelings awaken. Unlike them, Jabra focuses on the “first well,” his childhood, “the source of a magic, constant and beyond explanation, the fountainhead of a radiance which cannot be defined.”39

Jabra’s focus on these particular eight years allows him to evade mentioning his family history in Tur Abdin, his birth in Adana, and his family’s immigration to Bethlehem around 1922. The revelation of these facts would probably call for a few words of explanation, although they would not necessarily cause him to “slide into family history with all its ramifications.” Jabra’s focus on “one single being” in The First Well could be construed as part of his lifelong project to help the Arabs achieve modernity and progress through the validation of individual experience against the tyranny of tradition, as Neuwirth and Darraj write. However, Jabra emphasizes that he is writing about “the development of one single being” to the exclusion of “family history with all its ramifications,” as if the two were mutually exclusive entities or potentially contradictory ones. For Jabra, his Palestinian environment was that element most constitutive of his sense of identity. One wonders whether and to what extent that “developing being” was also a product of the mountains of Tur Abdin, the war-ravaged city of Adana, a traumatized family of genocide survivors, and a childhood flight from Ataturk’s genocidal army.

Along with many Syriacs from Bethlehem, Jabra’s older brother Yusuf Ibrahim Jabra saw no contradiction between his Syriac identity and his modern Palestinian national identity, with roots in Bethlehem, the birthplace of Christ.40 Jabra’s concealment of his family history, birth, and immigration may have served as a kind of insurance against the potential for cynical Zionist propaganda to cast doubt on the authenticity of his Palestininess and that of other Palestinians born outside historic Palestine. Through the purposeful elision of key details of his family provenance and early life in The First Well, Jabra sought to plant his self, and his sense of self, irrevocably in the environment of Palestine by valorizing individual experience at the expense of his non-Palestinian family past. By eliding select autobiographical details from The First Well, Jabra precluded his family history from compromising his deeply rooted sense of modern Palestinian national identity. Jabra ensured that his first well would be remembered as Bethlehem, and not Adana or Midën.

Behind Jabra’s choices about which details of his life to reveal to his reader, he does allude to his family’s traumatic past. Jabra recounts asking his parents Ibrahim and Maryam about their memories of the days before World War I. One day, Maryam makes herself some coffee and, unprompted, says: “The days of yore … your father remembers the days of yore … I swear by your life, we saw nothing but woe in them.”

I asked her, “Do you remember those days well?” She took one more sip.
from her cup and said, “Remember them? Those before the war? Those after the war? I always try to forget them.”

A wave of memories carried her away. My father helped her, and she helped him to recall some of that past, which appeared to me to be very remote and about which my father often said he was happy because his children did not know it.

Murad was a baby seven or eight months old when his father, Dawood, my mother’s first husband, and her twin and only brother, Yusuf, were both killed on the same day in 1909 in tragic circumstances. My mother was then a young woman seventeen years old. She wore black in mourning for her brother and her husband for four years (as did her mother, my grandmother, Basma). Then one day, my father appeared in her life, and “he captivated her,” as she said, with his height, his handsome looks, and his dashing character. He was only one year older than she was, and he said to her, “Take off your black clothes, lady, and you shall never again wear them after today. . . .”

On the day he married her, he promised her and said, contrary to custom, “If our firstborn is a boy, I’ll name him Yusuf after your brother. As for the second, I’ll name him after my father. Are you satisfied?”

My mother said, “I took off the black clothes, thank God. But the war soon came, and they took away your father as a soldier . . . oh! The days of yore . . . we saw nothing but woe in them.”

That woe-filled family past, which appeared to the young Jabra to be “very remote,” had in fact occurred about fifteen years before that conversation. While Ibrahim stated that he was happy that his children “did not know” that past – in other words, had not experienced it firsthand – his stepson Murad and his son Yusuf had indeed experienced it firsthand. Yusuf provides a more detailed version of the same facts, in an interview that Samir Fawzi Hajj conducted in 1998, when Yusuf was 82 or 83:

I was born in 1915. My mother, when she married my father, was a widow, and she had a son, my brother Murad. Her husband had been killed, along with her brother, in the massacres of the Armenians [madhabih al-arman]. When my father married my mother, they agreed to name their firstborn son Yusuf after my maternal uncle who’d been killed, and thus was I named. As for my brother Jabra, he was named after our [paternal] grandfather. The original name for “Jabra” is “Jabriyya.” Our grandfather’s name was Jabriyya and not Jabra – that is, Jibra’il – and in colloquial Syriac, Gawriye. In colloquial Syriac the “b” becomes a “w” so Jabriyyah becomes Gawriye. When Jabra enrolled at the Rashidiyya School, he registered his [family] name as Jabra, even though my grandfather had never heard the name “Jabra” in his life.
Yusuf reveals that Jabra’s politic phrase – the “tragic circumstances” that had led to the deaths of their uncle Yusuf and Maryam’s first husband Dawud in 1909 – were in fact the “massacres of the Armenians.” It was the Armenians of the Adana vilayet who were massacred in 1909, and we can therefore place Maryam in the Adana vilayet, if not the city of Adana, in 1909. We can also confidently place Ibrahim in Adana in 1913 or 1914, when he married Maryam. Jabra Ibrahim Jabra’s use of the evasive euphemism “tragic circumstances” to describe the “massacres of the Armenians” may indicate his desire not to “slide into family history, with all its ramifications.” For if Jabra, the exiled Palestinian intellectual, had written in 1987 that his family had been in Adana in 1909, his reader may have been distracted from the Palestinian identity Jabra had spent his life constructing. Later in the same interview, Yusuf confirms the Chelico family’s continuing presence in Anatolia: “My cousins are in Turkey.”

How did the Chelicos end up in Bethlehem and not Mosul, Urmia, or Cyprus? To my knowledge, few robust sources exist on the manner in which Syriac refugees traveled to Palestine or the British Mandatory administration’s absorption of them. Within Palestine, Bethlehem was the most popular town for the resettlement of Syriacs. According to the 1922 Palestine census, 406 Syriac Orthodox Christians were then living in Bethlehem, compared to 371 in Jerusalem. Butrus Ni‘meh states unequivocally:

The Syriacs in Palestine are from the southern part of Turkey. Their ancestors came here about one hundred years ago.… In 1922, most of the Syriacs came to the Holy Land and founded a small Syriac Orthodox church, while they still hope to return to their homeland (watan). Cognizant of the difficulty of returning, they began buying land, and they founded upon it the present Syriac Orthodox church in 1926.

According to Ni‘meh, approximately 1,200 Syriacs live in Bethlehem today, while around three hundred others live dispersed between Jericho, Jerusalem, and Nazareth. In his interview with Hajj, Yusuf states that he remembers his family’s arrival to Bethlehem in the 1920s. Yusuf recalls this while discussing the extent of the technological changes that he witnessed during his long life:

I remember in the 1920s when we came to Bethlehem. The roads weren’t paved. The cars went tuk tuk tuk. The situation was totally different. The things I’ve seen in my life in the 1920s and the 1930s, and after that, electricity … and how we used to go to Bab al-Dayr …. Many changes have come.

Yusuf also mentions in the Hajj interview that “Jabra is an acquired name. People don’t know us as the Jabra family.” Indeed, people know Jabra’s family as the Chelico family, a surname shared by other Syriacs from Adana and Bitlis. One wonders whether the young Jabra’s choice to list his family name as “Jabra” instead of “Chelico” was guileless. Finding out the answer may help shed light on the dynamics of Palestinian nationalism in the context of secondary educational institutions.
in the 1930s. Someone – although it is not clear who – was responsible for Jabra’s nuclear family’s becoming Jabra, and not Chelico. Jabra was twelve years old when he registered at the Rashidiyya School in Jerusalem, and the registration form may have required him to list only his given name, his father’s, and his grandfather’s. He may not have known that his grandfather’s given name was Jabriyya [Syr. Gawriye], and not Jabra. Did the school principal ‘Arif al-Budayri elide Jabra’s strange and foreign-sounding Syriac name to close ranks around a nascent Palestinian national identity that demanded a commitment to linguistic Arab nationalism? A comparable dynamic existed elsewhere in Palestine, where Shimshelevich became Ben-Zvi and Grüen became Ben-Gurion, also for nationalist reasons. Behind the new surname “Jabra” and between the lines of *The First Well* lies the fact that the Chelico family survived a genocide in which 250,000 of their fellow Assyrians died.

In his published work, Jabra never claims to have been born in Palestine. He gives no indication where he was born, and Jabra scholars and even close friends of Jabra have therefore concluded that he must have been born in Palestine. Jabra does, however, conjure a smokescreen of hints and winks that allude to a Bethlehem nativity. For example, he reminisces about the use of gasoline cans for water in Bethlehem during the days of World War I, as if his family had been there then. He insists that the “first well” of one’s life is the well of childhood, foreclosing other potential candidates for “first well,” such as family history, birth, or early childhood. Jabra could have corrected the historical record once scholars and friends began writing that he was born in Bethlehem, but he did not. Desmond Stewart’s book *The Palestinians* is one example of Jabra’s purposeful non-correction. Jabra read his English friend’s book, cited it in his second autobiography *Princesses’ Street*, and never mentioned the falsity of Stewart’s claim that Jabra had been born in Bethlehem. Yet because Jabra grew up in Bethlehem, and because his novels’ autobiographical protagonists are born in Bethlehem or a Bethlehem-like town, even the close reader of Jabra’s oeuvre walks away from it believing that Jabra, Darraj’s prophet-intellectual, must also have been born in the birthplace of Christ.

**Ancient Assyria and Modern Assyrians in *Princesses’ Street***

Jabra’s second autobiography, *Princesses’ Street* (*Shari‘ al-amirat*, 1994) was published months before his death. Covering his late teens to his mid-thirties, the book consists of six autobiographical essays on Jabra’s experiences as a college student in England during World War II and his experiences in Baghdad as a young professor of English literature. In *Princesses’ Street*, Jabra maintains the smokescreen that he established in *The First Well*: he never claims outright that he was born in Palestine, but he casts hints and allusions that would lead the reader to believe that he was. For example, Jabra asks rhetorically, “When were we Palestinians, ever since I was born, not passing through difficulties as individuals or as a nation?” It is true that the Palestinians were passing through difficulties as a nation when Jabra was born in 1919 in Adana. The phrase “ever since I was born,” however, invites the reader to believe that Jabra was born a Palestinian. It is very unlikely that Jabra’s
parents, grandparents, or siblings would have considered themselves Palestinians as they welcomed Ibrahim’s and Maryam’s second son into the world in postwar Adana.

One key difference between *The First Well* and *Princesses’ Street* is location. Whereas in *The First Well* Jabra was ensconced in the Palestinian milieu of his childhood, memories of the Mesopotamia that his parents had fled lay in wait for him in Iraq. In Iraq, Jabra could visit the ruins of Nimrud, which his ethnic Assyrian ancestors had built. Syriac, Assyrian, and Chaldean churches dotted the landscape of Baghdad. Moreover, tens of thousands of ethnic Assyrians inhabited the plains of Nineveh in northern Iraq, where they had settled after fleeing the Sayf genocide en masse. In addition to the Assyrian ruins and the Assyrian people that Jabra encountered in Iraq, he fell in love with a woman whose great uncle had engineered the 1933 Simele Massacre of Assyrians in northern Iraq. These facts invite an investigation into Jabra’s relationship with the geographical homeland that his parents had fled from and that he fled to.

As a newly arrived professor in Baghdad, Jabra befriended a group of English archeologists, headed by Max Mallowan, who were excavating the Assyrian city of Nimrud in northern Iraq. The ancient Assyrians spoke a Semitic language and occupied the territory around the Tigris River in northern Mesopotamia. Their civilization, founded around 2500 BCE, reached its height in the tenth to seventh centuries BCE. Jabra reflects that Mallowan

extracted, with the obstinacy of a lover, history’s evidence and hidden mysteries from the depths of the hills in the north, those barren hills that concealed in their interiors obscure relics of man’s achievements, of which most often nothing remained to us, not even the merest suggestion.  

Jabra’s lifelong obsession with “hidden mysteries,” documented by Darraj, is echoed in this memory, evoked in the last months of Jabra’s life, when his Syriac family history had indeed become a “hidden mystery” and an “obscure relic.”

Jabra remembers the exact date of his visit to Nimrud:

On March 22, 1951, to be exact, I finally had the opportunity to visit Nimrud/Calah, the capital of the Assyrians during one of their great periods in the ninth and eighth centuries BC. It had been established four centuries before that, and the Medians were the ones who finally put an end to it by destroying and burning it in 612 BC when Nineveh, the next capital of the Assyrians, fell at the hands of the Babylonian Nabopolassar, father of King Nebuchadnezzar. The Nimrud/Calah civilization lasted for about six hundred years.

As Jabra lists the sterile dates, names, and facts, there resounds a fecund silence that one senses could be filled with Jabra’s own connection of his personal past with that of the Assyrians. However, despite the list of humdrum facts, Jabra remembered the exact date of his visit to Nimrud after more than forty years. Why? Jabra writes:

I still remember the exact date of the visit because it was the second
day after the beginning of spring, and the day became associated in my memory with a deeply felt emotion upon seeing the remains of one of the most wonderful of the ancient Arab civilizations, as far as art and culture were concerned.  

Jabra’s assumption that the Assyrians were an Arab civilization is probably a result of his reading of British historian Arnold Toynbee, whom Jabra met while Toynbee was on a speaking tour in the Arab world. Toynbee considered Assyrian civilization the bedrock upon which Arab civilization was later built. Jabra writes:

The Aramaean or “Syriac” civilization (See Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History) was the ancient civilization from which the later Arab civilization proceeded; it was therefore a continuation, in Palestine, of the Canaanite Arab situation as far as atmosphere and thought.

Moreover, Toynbee’s judgments about the role of the Palestinian people in the Arab world accorded with Jabra’s. According to Jabra, Toynbee likened [the Palestinians’] expulsion from their country to the expulsion by the Turks of the Greek thinkers and artists from Byzantium in 1453; these thinkers then spread throughout Europe and were a major factor in ending the European dark ages and bringing about the Renaissance. The Palestinians, he told me, were having the same seminal influence on the Arab world. It was their fate to be the germinators of a new age, the heralds of a new civilization.

Instead of emphasizing his own unique Syriac heritage, Jabra causes “Syriac civilization” to be the cultural ancestor of Arab civilization, obviating the need to discuss the Syriacs’ geographical homeland in Tur Abdin, where Jabra’s family had come from originally. As long as the Syriac civilizational legacy had been subsumed within the Arab, the entire Arab world could be Jabra’s home. To Jabra, the Canaanites were the Syriacs’ past, the Syriacs were the Arabs’ past, and the Palestinians were the Arabs’ future. Raised in the very town the Canaanites had established to worship their fertility god Lehem, Jabra’s life in 1950s Baghdad lay at the momentous intersection of all such relevant civilizations – Canaanite, Syriac, Arab, and Palestinian. In his mind, the exiled Palestinian prophet-intellectual was ideally placed to wrest the Arabs from their “dark ages” and usher in a new Arab Renaissance, a new Nahda.

Whatever Toynbee’s views on the ancient Assyrians or the modern Arabs, he was extremely sympathetic toward the modern Assyrians. Along with Viscount James Bryce, Toynbee compiled the report entitled The Treatment of the Armenians, the French translation of which was circulated at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919–20. The report was the product of a Blue Book commissioned by the British government and originally titled The Treatment of the Armenians and the Assyrians. The initial report detailed eyewitness accounts of massacres of Assyrians committed by Ottoman
soldiers during World War I. However, Viscount Bryce, an Armenophile, decided to shorten the title of the report and its text, eliding accounts of massacres of Assyrians. Bryce’s editorial decision buried the plight of the Assyrians for decades such that historians came to refer to Sayfo as the “Forgotten Genocide.”

In addition to Jabra’s enchantment with ancient Assyrian architecture, he remarks on the many Assyrian waiters who staffed the hotels and restaurants of Baghdad. While dining with his colleague Mrs. Kazin at Baghdad’s posh Alawiyya Club, Jabra recalls that:

Most of the servants and waiters in it were polite Athourians, modern-day descendants of the ancient Assyrians, known for their perfect service and discretion. They spoke Arabic with some difficulty and with a characteristic heavy accent, and they also spoke a kind of limited English with which they managed their affairs (there would come a time ten years later when the club would be Iraqized, but would still continue to be the distinguished social meeting place in town par excellence).

Jabra writes that the modern Assyrians’ Volkgeist was characterized by their “perfect service and discretion,” evincing a nineteenth-century romantic emphasis on national particularity. Such romantic racist thinking engendered the kind of racial nationalism that led to the massacres of the twentieth century such as Sayfo, the Holocaust, and the Nakba.

Jabra explains that he had come to the Alawiyya Club unknowingly underdressed. Because of his innate discretion and politeness, the Assyrian waiter Sargon mentions Jabra’s sartorial faux pas to Mrs. Kazin. She and Jabra chuckle at his unpreparedness and joke about his love for scandalizing the bourgeoisie. Jabra deftly turns the memory, in which he could have mentioned something – anything! – about the recent traumatic past that he and his family shared with the wait staff, into a blithe occasion to engage in the French national pastime: épater les bourgeois. Did Jabra deliberately fail to mention his own ethnic, religious, and geographical connections to the “Athourians” who worked at the Alawiyya Club, or did he just forget? Jabra’s failure to mention the fact that the Alawiyya Club’s wait staff were his ethno-religious cousins resembles the manner in which he nonchalantly recounts facts about the Nimrud ruins without once hinting that he, as a Syriac, was a direct heir to that civilization and its architectural glories. One generation prior, Jabra’s and Sargon’s parents had fled the same genocide. If Jabra’s parents Ibrahim and Maryam had fled east instead of south, they may have settled in the plains of Nineveh as well. Jabra and Sargon could have grown up together, and Jabra’s “first well” could have been Mosul, Tel Kepe, or Sinjar.

One interesting fact about Jabra’s life that he discusses briefly in Princesses’ Street is his marriage to the great-niece of Bakr Sidqi. After World War I, the British settled the Assyrian refugees from Anatolia in the very plains their ancestors had fled. Over the centuries, Assyrians fled from those plains to the mountainous Hakkari region in southeastern Anatolia, where they could better defend themselves against their Turkish and Kurdish neighbors who harassed them with or without official sanction.
Yet no less than twenty years after the British resettlement of Anatolian Assyrians in northern Iraq, the Iraqi army, led by Bakr Sidqi, a former Ottoman soldier, carried out a massacre of Assyrians so brutal that it inspired the Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin to coin the 1933 neologism “genocide.”

Jabra fails to mention Sidqi’s massacre of the Assyrians in Princesses’ Street. Instead, Jabra praises Sidqi for his loyalty and sense of self-sacrifice:

Lami’a was also the niece of General Bakr Sidqi al-Askari, who was the first person in modern Arab history to stage a military coup d’état: in 1936 he rose in support of the man he loved and revered, King Ghazi, son of Faysal I, giving his life as a price less than a year after the coup, when he was assassinated by the opposing factions.

Why did Jabra not mention the ‘Askari family’s skeletons in the closet? Could the reason have had to do with censorship in Saddam’s Iraq in the early 1990s? Did it have to do with Jabra’s fear of stoking internecine tensions in a country as ethnically and religiously diverse as Iraq? Could such a revelation have hurt Jabra’s standing in Iraqi high society or dredged up too many corpses for Iraqi society to stomach? Could Jabra himself have wanted the secret buried in the hills, like the ruins of Nimrud, to remain a hidden mystery? Despite all these possibilities, the fact is that we do not know why Jabra acted as he did. Discovering his motivations and their sources would shed light on the biography of one of the Arab world’s greatest autobiographers.

Jabra hints at a strained relationship with his in-laws in Princesses’ Street. Lami’a’s mother, Umm ‘Amir, felt consternation that her daughter would marry a Palestinian Christian. What Jabra fails to mention, and what was surely not lost on the ‘Askari family, was that Jabra was not just a Christian but a Syriac Orthodox Christian and a close relative of the fierce, restive, traumatized, and nationalistic refugee population that Umm ‘Amir’s paternal uncle Bakr had pacified through genocide just fifteen years before Jabra’s arrival to Baghdad in 1948. Despite the uncomfortable relations that could have existed between Jabra and the ‘Askaris, Jabra reports that he got along effortlessly with Lami’a’s brother ‘Amir and the rest of her family members. All but a few family members came to bless their marriage, which proceeded after Jabra converted to Islam. In the name of love, Jabra eschewed the religious affiliation with his immediate family in Palestine by converting to Islam. In the name of love, he may also have chosen or been forced to eschew his ethnic affiliation with his literal cousins in Turkey and his fellow Assyrians in Iraq. Jabra may have felt no religious connection to the Syriacs and no ethnic affiliation with the Assyrians as a man in his early seventies sitting down to write his second autobiography. Yet whether he felt a connection or not, he never mentions that connection – or the lack of it, or the possibility of it. How can literary biographers interpret an absence?

Jabra glosses over these uncomfortable facts of modern Middle Eastern history as smoothly as he does his family history, birth, and immigration to Palestine. Yet
on two occasions in *Princesses’ Street,* Jabra uses cryptic language to hint that there is more below the surface of his text. First, he mentions that “in my innermost soul, there were deep-seated sorrows about which I did not talk.” Unfortunately for the reader, Jabra does not elaborate on what those deep-seated sorrows were. This admission may be too vague to connect directly to his provenance from outside Palestine, but it is not too vague to connect directly to his lifelong suppression of what may have been family trauma engendered by genocide. In the final two paragraphs of Jabra’s chapter “Lami’a and the *Annus Mirabilis,*” Jabra reminds the reader that in that chapter he has written about merely two years of his life and that he “spoke sparingly, and because of all sorts of necessities, I neglected and deleted many things.” This vague *apologia* seems conventional. Yet it could allude to the fact that Jabra neglected and deleted facts surrounding his family history, birth, and immigration to Palestine.

In the final paragraph, Jabra mentions that the period of Arab history that he lived through was full of possibility but also characterized by dislocation (*tashrid*), terror, and killing. Is there an end to speaking about all that? I have spoken about some aspects of it in my novels; I have sprinkled other aspects in my studies, essays, and interviews. But most will remain for someone who has the ability, the patience, the love to deduce it from letters, papers, and boundless other sources – if they are not dispersed by storms and drowned by floods, and remain intact for some researcher to refer to them, whether it be in the near or the far future.

What precisely is Jabra talking about, and, again, why does he use such vague language? The antecedent of “all that” which Jabra “sprinkled” throughout his novels, studies, essays and interviews is the “dislocation, terror, and killing” that the Arab world witnessed during Jabra’s lifetime. What exactly about the dislocation, terror, and killing must some researcher “deduce” from Jabra’s letters, papers, and other sources? In other words, what did Jabra not state outright? After all, one deduces that which is not stated explicitly. While writing with the utmost vagueness about what he did not mention, Jabra points to that vagueness as the source of a future scholar’s deductions about his life. One could safely assume that Jabra is referring to the “dislocation, terror, and killing” of the 1948 Nakba. But Jabra’s family’s dislocation from Adana, in addition to the terror that may have beset Maryam ever since her relatives were murdered in 1909, had been with Jabra and his family long before 1948, 1936, or 1929. The word that Jabra uses for dislocation – *tashrid* – is incidentally the same root and the same verbal form that he uses to describe the “vagrants” (*musharradin*) from Tur Abdin who settled in Bethlehem in his novel *In Search of Walid Masoud.* One wonders what “necessities” caused Jabra to neglect and delete “certain things.”

What is devastatingly ironic about this passage in *Princesses’ Street* is that on
Easter Sunday in 2010, the metaphorical “storms and floods” that Jabra writes about manifested themselves in the form of a suicide bomber. The terrorist detonated a truck bomb at the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad, near Jabra’s family home. The explosion killed and wounded dozens of people and destroyed Jabra’s home along with his letters, papers, and boundless other sources that “some researcher” could have pored over with “patience, ability, and love.”

The Vagrants of Tur Abdin

It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the glimpses of an Assyrian substrate peeking through from between the lines of all of Jabra’s autobiographical works. While his novels contain features that may or may not allude to his family history – mob executions (Sayfo), minor Assyrian characters, and lovers’ relationships complicated because of family history (Jabra and Lami‘a) – his novel In Search of Walid Masoud (Al-bahth ‘an Walid Mas‘ud, 1978) makes direct reference to the geographic Assyrian homeland of Tur Abdin, Mardin, and Diyarbakir in the context of some extremely poor immigrants to Bethlehem.

In Search of Walid Masoud tells the story of the sudden disappearance of Walid Masoud Farhan, a Roman Catholic Palestinian-Iraqi banker born and raised in Bethlehem during the British Mandate. The book is told by Walid’s friends – Issa Nasser, Tariq Raouf, Maryam al-Saffar, to name a few – who reflect on their relationships with Walid in twelve sections written in the first person. The sixth section is taken from Walid Masoud’s autobiography, which is entitled The Well. The narrator of the first, second, and final sections of the book, and the principal investigator of Walid’s disappearance, is the Iraqi sociologist Jawad Husni, a close friend of Walid’s. Jawad convenes Walid’s friends at a party to listen to a confession Walid recorded on a cassette tape and left in the tape deck of his abandoned car near the “Rutba” border crossing with Syria, which is officially known as the Walid border crossing. After the explosive nature of Walid’s revelations, his friends and acquaintances begin piecing together the truth of his life. Jawad begins interviewing people about Walid’s family history, birth, and early life in order to speculate informatively about Walid’s current whereabouts.

Jawad learns during his investigations that Walid has concealed key details about his life, purposefully misleading Jawad and his group of his friends. Indeed, Jawad recognizes that Walid has constructed a certain image of himself, writing, “The things I [Jawad] know about his [Walid’s] life are what he’s been prepared to tell me, and that isn’t very much. Besides, they’ve been chosen to accord with the image he wants to have of himself and show to others. I need hardly say that sort of image doesn’t convince me at all.” Jawad adds, “I don’t think we know much about his [Walid’s] life, or at least much that isn’t full of errors and illusions, although we’d be justified in inferring a great deal from his books.” In Jawad Husni, Jabra anticipated the literary biographer who would begin asking about him the same questions that Jawad
asks about Walid. Indeed, as Jabra said, his fiction was autobiographical, and one can infer a great deal about his life from those of his books that are not marked as autobiographies. Jabra was not prepared to tell others very much about himself, and the image he wanted to have of himself and show to others was remarkably similar to Walid Masoud’s. Yet Walid’s Palestiniananness, like Jabra’s, goes unquestioned. Jawad writes that “Walid’s background, from the point of view of both birth and political cause, was an important component of the subject” of Walid’s Palestinian identity.

A passing but striking image from Walid’s confession may have been drawn, like so much else of Walid’s biography, from Jabra’s own life. Because of the spontaneity of Walid’s confession, and because Walid no longer has anything to lose by faithfully representing his life, the facts he relates in the taped confession are more revealing than the facts he saw fit to reveal during his life as a respectable banker. For example, the old rogue reveals that he has slept with many of the women at the tape-listening party. Part of Walid’s stream-of-consciousness confession reads:

My father who before he died was lying on the floor like a huge oak felled by the wind and he knew many stories about acorn bread during the days of the Ottoman War banishment and famine I was born after the famine the road sped away with us we were in a truck and the white road wound through the dust fleeing away from us from me and the hills fleeing away and the stones the stone kilometer landmarks which I learned to read after I grew older ….

Walid’s early childhood memory of escape in a truck down a dusty road as the road speeds away from him does not accord with the image of Walid’s life, rooted in Bethlehem, which Jawad uncovers. That memory does however accord with Jabra’s life. Like Jabra’s father Ibrahim, Walid’s father Masoud was drafted into the Ottoman army during World War I. Like Masoud, Ibrahim spent many of his final days lying on a mat on the floor like a huge oak because of the debilitating sciatica he contracted doing manual labor. Like Walid, Jabra was born “after the famine” of the Seferberlik. Walid’s childhood memory of his family fleeing down a dusty road may have been an early memory of Jabra’s: Ibrahim and Maryam, with their three young children and Maryam’s mother Basma in the bed of a truck, fleeing Adana for points south before the advance of the Turkish army. Then again, Jabra was only two and at most three when his family fled, and he may have had no memory at all of his family’s flight. The haunting image of people fleeing in the bed of a truck recurs in Jabra’s penultimate novel, The Other Rooms.

**Walid Masoud** includes a passage on the Ottoman expulsion of the residents of southeastern Anatolia, where Jabra’s ancestors hailed from. In his autobiography, *The Well*, Walid writes that in the Bethlehem of his youth, poverty reigned. There were the poor, the extreme poor, and

at the bottom of this downward slope of poverty, would be other groups who owned nothing at all. The Ottoman period, with its many injustices
and a chaotic rule that had played fast and loose with the rights of individuals and communities alike, had deprived them of their lands and forced them to move from their own territory, to wander around the various parts of this sick “empire” in search of shelter and a bite to eat. Bethlehem had witnessed the arrival of many such vagrants [musharradin] since the middle of the nineteenth century; they came from the wastes of Mardin, Diyarbakr, and Tur Abdin; from the villages of northern Iraq and northern Syria ….\textsuperscript{86}

It is diplomatic of Jabra to write that the “Ottoman period” had deprived such vagrants of their lands. In fact, actual Ottoman officials, soldiers, and Kurdish irregulars ethnically cleansed the regions of northern Mesopotamia of Christians whose ancestors had lived there for millennia. They ethnically cleansed them by massacring them or expelling them and then expropriating their abandoned property, foreshadowing the second expulsion Jabra would experience in 1948. Jabra’s attribution of blame to the “Ottoman period” and its injustices resembles his euphemistic treatment in \textit{The First Well} of the 1909 Adana massacre, which he evasively dubbed “tragic circumstances.” Jabra’s estimate that those “vagrants” had arrived in the middle of the nineteenth century was a chronological exaggeration. According to Syriac Bethlehemite historian and linguist George Anton Kiraz, the first Syriacs from Mesopotamia arrived in Bethlehem around 1895, just after the Ottoman census of 1893–94. Syriac Christians were first officially recorded in Bethlehem in the Ottoman census of 1911–12.\textsuperscript{87}

Jabra employs the same strategy of self-creation in \textit{Walid Masoud} that he does in his autobiographies and autobiographical novels. While Walid resembles Jabra in terms of childhood, adolescence, and youth, Jabra alters certain details of Walid’s family history and birth in order to establish Jabra’s own Bethlehemite credentials. Nevertheless, Jabra leaves traces for the close reader of \textit{Walid Masoud} to investigate: the nature and history of those vagrants from the wastes of Tur Abdin, and the image of a family fleeing in a truck down a dusty road. Walid’s lifelong concealment of details of his family history causes Jawad Husni to cast doubt on the veracity of the life story that Walid told his friends. That doubt causes Jawad to begin an investigation into Walid’s past, and the past he uncovers turns out to be Palestinian to the core. Jabra knew that his own past was far more complicated than Walid’s.

**The Limits of Biographical Critique**

These new revelations about Jabra’s family history and early life could open up his autobiographical writing to new analyses. Critics have regarded Jabra as a Palestinian’s Palestinian and an Arab nationalist’s Arab nationalist with good reason. In his essays on Arab history, politics, culture, and literature, Jabra speaks of himself as a Palestinian and an Arab, and his commitment to Arab nationalism and Palestinian resistance is unquestionable.\textsuperscript{88} Yet literary critics could begin recontextualizing that uncomplicated picture of the Palestinian-born Arab nationalist artist and writer that
critics, following Jabra’s own example, have produced. When a writer whose work is nothing if not autobiographical is revealed to have concealed – or lied by omission about – facts about his biography, critics can rightly begin to regard his work with what Paul Ricoeur referred to as the hermeneutics of suspicion.

Rita Felski picked up on Ricoeur’s phrase to critique the nature of contemporary literary critique, which approaches texts with a kind of cynicism in order to read between the lines and against the grain, even when no insidious truths lurk beneath the text’s surface. Yet how should literary critics approach the work of an author who deliberately hides facets of his identity between the lines and within the finely grained prose of his autobiographies? Jabra’s concealments practically demand that the critic become an “eagle-eyed detective tracking down” his quarry. While critics may want to approach Jabra’s choices about what aspects of his life to reveal in the spirit of sympathetic inquiry, they now have little choice but to read between the lines. What other truths may Jabra have concealed within his texts?

The major theme in Jabra scholarship has been the impact of Jabra – as a wandering, erudite Palestinian exile in Baghdad equipped with excellent English and an elite education – on the modernization of the Arab world through the rejuvenation of culture. Jabra’s civilizational mission was to guarantee the individual Arab his or her freedom. He sought to accomplish this through the valorization of individual experience, starting with his own. Jabra’s principal tool in this effort was the autobiography. Jabra also encouraged the foundation in the Arab world of rules-based institutions that would guarantee individual liberty. Jabra’s vision did not differ markedly from the stated mission of the British Council, which funded his university studies at Exeter (1939–40) and Cambridge (1940–43). Moreover, Jabra’s valorization of individual experience implied the suppression of the given circumstances over which he had no control: family history, birth, and early childhood. Jabra’s focus on his individual experience accounts for why his First Well begins when he was four years old and not, as in Tristram Shandy, at the moment of his conception.

What better candidate did the Arab literary world have in the mid-twentieth century to spearhead modernization through culture? Educated at the Arab College, Cambridge, and Harvard, Jabra was a literal Renaissance man: a painter, translator, art critic, educator, screenwriter, and editor. He was a prolific poet, short story writer, essayist, and novelist. He was also a genial, outgoing man who threw himself into the salons, cafes, and debates of mid-century Jerusalem and Baghdad. Because of Jabra’s frankness about his civilizational mission, there is little scholarship on Jabra that does not hew close to his role in Arab cultural modernization through the individual’s liberation from the ponderous strictures of Arab tradition. Most Jabra criticism emphasizes the role of Jabra’s own life – and his recounting of it in his autobiographies and autobiographical fiction – in the process of Arab cultural uplift. Despite the efforts of the New Critics to bury biographical criticism, Jabra critics cannot but keep it in their repertoire when dealing with a writer whose work is consummately autobiographical. Yet, when dealing with those autobiographies, how do critics write about an absence?
Given Jabra’s family’s survival of Sayfo and the Nakba, these revelations could help generate readings of Jabra’s work that draw on trauma studies. Comparisons could be made with narratives of second- and third-generation Holocaust survivors, who have been shown to evince both a reticence about their families’ trauma and the actual symptoms of prior generations’ traumas. Moreover, the irony that the Nazi leadership settled on the Final Solution because of the international community’s failure to hold the Turks accountable for the Armenian and Assyrian genocides should not be lost on scholars who work on Jabra; the international community’s sympathy for the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust helped galvanize support for the creation of the state of Israel and the displacement – yet again – of the Chelico/Jabra family.

An insidious thread runs from Anatolia to Germany to Palestine, from Sayfo to the Holocaust to the Nakba, connecting Jabra’s first exile to his second. Sonja Mejcher-Atassi’s use of the term “black hole” to describe the murky disappearance of Walid Masoud at the Walid border crossing in Jabra’s fourth novel is a counterpoint to the black hole from which Walid’s creator emerged in 1922. Jabra’s approbation toward the “great Arab civilizational flow” may reflect the desire for safety, shelter, and continuity from a writer who was perpetually adrift.

The cessation of time in black holes calls to mind Jabra’s penultimate and least studied novel, *The Other Rooms* (1986). Like his first novel *Cry in a Long Night, The Other Rooms* takes place in the course of a single night in an unnamed Arab city in an indeterminate time. *The Other Rooms* is a study in shifting identity whose plot resembles Kafka’s *The Castle*: the protagonist, who has forgotten who he is, is led through different rooms in a government building and interrogated. He does not know where he is being led and why. At one point, he looks in a mirror and does not recognize himself. A book about his life called *The Known and the Unknown* (*Al-ma’lum wa-l-majhul*) has been published and, although everyone believes that he wrote it, he knows that he did not. Moreover, in addition to forgetting his name, he finds six different identity cards in his wallet, each with a different name. The protagonist’s sense of self is “split into many pieces,” like the cadaver of himself that he watches a team of medical students dissect. Issa Boullata reads this novel as a meditation on autocratic Arab regimes’ crushing of their citizens’ identities within bureaucratic structures. He reads it as a Kafkaesque literalization of the metaphor of “unending labyrinths of politics and its [politics’] upheavals.” In the future, literary critics may need to understand the protagonist’s alienation in terms of Jabra’s experience of Saddam’s Iraq, the unending Palestine disaster, and Sayfo. In the context of Jabra’s life of alienation, exile, and name-changing, Jabra’s *Other Rooms*, like his life, may expose and unify the temporal connections between all three.

Jabra did not just write about his identity as an exiled Palestinian intellectual. Much scholarship on Jabra will therefore not necessarily be opened up to new readings in light of these revelations. Studies on the role of musical harmony in Jabra’s novels and poetry will not necessarily be deepened by more autobiographical readings, and neither will Jabra’s architectural criticism, his lifelong interest in painting, his translation of *Twelfth Night*, or his later vindicated suspicion toward the CIA-funded
literary journal Hiwar. Yet a posture of hyper-reading, a hermeneutic of paranoia, toward his markedly autobiographical works is difficult to resist once we learn that Jabra was burdened with a great secret made all the more momentous because of his lifelong concealment of it. Faysal Darraj writes that Jabra had three great secrets that propelled his work: his abiding Christian faith, the image of his father Ibrahim, and the city of Jerusalem. Knowing what we know now about Jabra’s past, what can we make of the passage in Walid Masoud in which an Israeli soldier appears at his family home in Bethlehem to ask him if he has always lived there? What can we make of the passage in Hunters in a Narrow Street in which Shabo the Assyrian tells the ambiguously Christian Jameel Farran, born in Bethlehem in 1920, not to reveal his secrets lest he fall foul of the government and find himself the object of its next wave of repression? What can we make of Amin Samma’s encouraging attitude toward Roxane Yasser’s “destruction of the past” as she burns her family’s papers, diaries, letters, and manuscripts in Cry in a Long Night? Jabra kept more secrets than Darraj’s three.

As Jabra entered the world in Adana in 1919, there was no indication that he would become one of Palestine’s greatest writers and one of its most persistent autobiographers. Jabra was a Palestinian because of his individual experiences in Bethlehem and Jerusalem that no forced displacement could wrest from him. Jabra was a Palestinian in spite of his family history and not because of it. His project of Arab-national uplift through the modernization of culture and the securing of individual liberty was founded on his suppression of his own “family history with all its ramifications” (The First Well) and his characters’ rejection of the “lethal labyrinths of the past” (Cry in a Long Night). Furthermore, Jabra’s choice to valorize individual experience in the here and now could be viewed as a rejection of the religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity of the Middle East, which slouched through an apocalyptic century of genocides, forced displacements, civil wars, military coups, negotiations with competing nationalisms, and continual political repression both local and foreign in origin. Jabra may have sought shelter for himself and his family in the “great Arab civilizational flow” and may have found hope for the region’s future in a less complicated and more culturally homogeneous Arab world characterized by the common denominators of cultural Islam, the Arabic language, and Arab nationalism.

Jabra stated in an interview with Elias Khoury that, “if I were not a Palestinian, I would not be anything.” Jabra’s Palestinian identity lay at the root of his sense of self. Yet Jabra’s statement may have been literally true. Had his family not fled Adana for Palestine, they may all have been killed. Understanding Jabra’s identity as contingent may help Jabra critics add perspective to their studies of him and his work, especially when it comes to the nature of Palestinian identity in his autobiographical works. Sonja Mejcher-Atassi writes that Jabra’s recourse to the novel as a genre of artistic creation was in line with Georg Lukacs’ judgment that the novel emerges from a world that grants no homecoming. To Jabra, the already-exiled exile who was forever out of place, the only kind of homecoming he found was in his self.
Figure 2. Jabra Ibrahim Jabra’s application for admission to Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, UK, 8 October 1940. Image by Dr. John Cleaver; Fitzwilliam College Archives, reproduced with the permission of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge.
Figure 3. Map showing the locations of (counter-clockwise, from upper right): the Chelico family’s likely ancestral hometown of Midën (Turk. Ögündük); Adana, the city where Jabra was born on 28 August 1919; Bethlehem, Jabra’s “first well,” where his family lived until he was 12; Jerusalem, the city where Jabra lived from ages 12 through 19 and 23 through 28; and Baghdad, where Jabra settled in October 1948. Image by Google Maps.

William Tamplin is a visiting fellow in the Department of Comparative Literature at Harvard University, where he earned his PhD in 2020. The author would like to thank Alex Winder, Salim Tamari, and the small army of people who helped him with this article: Roger Allen, Hanna “Jan” Beth-Savoce, Alexander Chelico, Linda Chelico, Nabil Chelico, John Cleaver, David Gaunt, Sadeer Jabra, Abigail Jacobson, Caroline Kahlenberg, George Kiraz, Justin McCarthy, Butrus Ni‘meh, and the three anonymous reviewers.

Endnotes
5 Boullata, “Jabra”; author interview with George Kiraz, 24 April 2020 (by email); author interview with David Gaunt, 17 April 2020 and 20 April 2020 (by email). The spelling Chelico for Shaliko may stem from the transliteration system used by the French mandatory authorities in Cilicia. Many thanks to David Gaunt for pointing this out.
8 Jabra, Mu‘ayashat al-nimra, 289–90.
9 Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, “Jadaliyyat al-naqd wa-l-ibda’: min al-khass ila al-‘amm” [The dialectic of criticism and creativity: from the specific to the general] in Mu‘ayashat al-nimra wa-awraq ukhra (Beirut: al-Mu‘assasa al-‘Arabiyyah li-l-Dirasat wa-l-Nashr, 1992): 21–30. For work on the overlap between autobiography and fiction in modern Arabic literature, see Mejcher-Atassi, “Arabic Novel,” 147, and Guth, “Why Novels?” While other Arabic-language authors of autobiographical novels, such as Taha Husayn, diversified their fictional oeuvre with historical novels and novels not drawn directly from their personal experience, Jabra never wavered from the autobiographical novel.

10 Neuwirth implies that because the Western novel was born out of autobiography, and the autobiography out of the medieval confession, Jabra’s confessional mode in his autobiography The First Well, in addition to his novelistic approach to the narration of events, combines the three stages in one. Neuwirth, “Jabra,” 116.


12 Rooke, In My Childhood, 198.


17 Neuwirth, “Jabra,” 116. To be clear, in this article I do not seek to condemn Jabra for his lifelong suppression of key facts about his family history, birth, and immigration to Palestine as a child. I will not compare Jabra to other Palestinian figures whose autobiographies or family histories have proved controversial because of birth or childhood experience, such as Edward Said or Yasser Arafat. Nowhere do I claim – nor do I believe – that Jabra is any less of a Palestinian for his family history in Anatolia, his birth in Adana, or his immigration to Palestine.

18 David Gaunt, “The Complexity of the Assyrian Genocide,” Genocide Studies International 9, no. 1 (2015): 83–103. Because of the nearly five-thousand-year-old history of the Assyrian people and the many distinctions drawn between them along confessional, liturgical, linguistic, and geographic lines, confusion over proper terminology abounds in the scholarship, and this confusion has led to not a little indignant condemnation. Some
consider the terms Jacobites, Nestorians, and Chaldeans controversial and/or outdated. I use them in this article in order to clarify older sources that speak of these ancient Eastern Christian communities, and I do not intend to disrespect anyone.

19 The Syriac Orthodox Church is known as the Jacobite Church for Jacob Baradaeus (543/4 - 578 CE), who broke with the Council of Chalcedon of 451 and declared his belief in the unified nature of Jesus Christ as both fully human and fully divine.


28 While no Syriacs are reported as living in the Jerusalem sanjak in 1889, 459 are listed by 1913. According to the 1911–12 Ottoman census, 386 Syriacs inhabited the Jerusalem district (kaza) and 41 lived in the Jaffa district; Kiraz, Iqd al-juman, 12–13, 53. Reporting on his travels in the Holy Land in a 1908 lecture, Frederick Bliss wrote that between 150 and 200 households of Syriacs lived in Bethlehem and ten Syriac households lived in Jerusalem; Frederick Jones Bliss, The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine; Lectures Delivered Before Lake Forest College on the Foundation of the Late William Bross (New York: Scribner, 1912), 75. Bliss also mentioned the presence of a Syriac bishop, convent and monks in Jerusalem. The Syriacs inhabiting Bethlehem and Jerusalem were largely stonemasons, and many helped construct the Augusta Victoria hospital; “The Syrian (Jacobite) Patriarch in Jerusalem,” The Living Church 39, no. 22 (26 September 1908): 740.

29 Farhud, “Al-Suryan.”

30 George Kiraz, a relative of Jabra’s and a Syriac Bethlehemite, believes that Jabra’s family was originally from Midên (Arab. Middo), now the village of Öğündük, in Tur Abdin in southern Turkey. Scholars of Assyrian/Syriac studies David Gaunt and Hanna Beth-Sawoce have also both independently speculated to me that the Chelico family was originally from Midên. One of the two dialects of modern Syriac currently spoken in Bethlehem is Azakh, from the Idil region, which comprises the village of Midên, in modern-day Turkey. Two brothers of another family of Chelicos moved to the Adana vilayet for seasonal labor, although they moved from the town of Bitlis. Author interview with George Kiraz,
Jabra, First Well, xv.

Jabra, First Well, xv; Al-bi’t al-ulá, 10.

Jabra, First Well, xv–xvi; Al-bi’t al-ulá, 10.

Jabra, First Well, xviii.


Jabra, First Well, 140; Al-Bi’t al-ulá, 163.


This is correct if Maryam wore black in mourning for her slain husband Dawud for “four years,” as Jabra writes in The First Well (Jabra, First Well, 140).


Syriac Palestinians in Bethlehem and Jerusalem have told me that their ancestors came by foot or riding on the backs of donkeys. Because the transition in Palestine from British military to Mandatory rule occurred in July 1920, and because Jabra’s family likely immigrated in 1921 or 1922, the Mandate authorities most likely absorbed them.

In 1922 the population of Bethlehem was 6,658; 87 percent of the population was Christian, and 6 percent was Syriac Christian. J. B. Barron, Palestine: Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922: Taken on the 23rd of October, 1922 (Jerusalem: Greek Convent Press, 1923), tables III, VII, and XIV.

Farhud, “Al-Suryan.”

Farhud, “Al-Suryan.”


Another family of Chelicos unrelated to Jabra’s family, as far as I can tell, had immigrated in approximately 1878 to Adana from the village of Sughourd near Bitlis These Chelicos established themselves as cotton planters in Adana; Chelico, A Family History, 4, 7. Alexander Chelico writes that “[t]he Chelico home in Adana became the destination for all those members of the Assyrian community arriving from Kurdistan and looking for employment,” Chelico, A Family History, 5. It is unclear if or how Jabra’s Chelicos were related to Alexander Chelico’s ancestors. Jabra’s paternal great-grandfather was named Mas’ud, a name which does not appear in the genealogy that Alexander includes in his book. Dahbur, “Jabra Ibrahim Jabra.”

In Princesses’ Street, Jabra writes that he first alerted Stewart to the plight of the Palestinians. Jabra, Princesses’ Street,

55 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 19 (italics added).
56 Syriac Orthodox Christians, as well as Assyrians (Church of the East), Chaldeans (Syriac Catholics), and ethnic Assyrian members of other Christian denominations, are culturally and ethnically descended from the ancient Assyrians.
57 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 39 (italics added).
59 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 42.
60 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 42 (italics added).
Jabra may have conflated the spring season, ancient pagan civilization, and his thirty-year-old self because when he was around thirty, he translated the “Adonis” portion of James Frazer’s The Golden Bough, which discusses death-and-rebirth cults in the ancient eastern Mediterranean. Jabra began translating in 1946 and in 1957 published his translations as a book entitled Adonis or Tammuz: A Study of Ancient Eastern Myths and Religions (Adonis, aw Tammuz: dirasah fi al-asatir wa-l-adyan al-sharqiyyah al-gadimah). His translations sparked the Tammuzi movement in Arabic poetry. Jabra’s early creative work relies on imagery drawn from ancient Middle Eastern rites of spring (Phoenician, Canaanite, Assyrian) detailed by Frazer. Boullata, “Jabra.”
61 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 213.
63 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 85.
64 James Bryce and Arnold J. Toynbee, The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1916 (London: Causton and Sons, 1916); Hannibal Travis, “‘Native Christians Massacred’: The Ottoman Genocide of the Assyrians during World War I,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 1, no. 3 (2006): 327–72, especially 331. British diplomat Mark Sykes alluded to the Syriacs’ sense of Arab national identity in an account of a journey he took in Turkey: “The Christians of north-eastern Tur Abdin are a fearful ethnological puzzle, as they reckon themselves to be Arabian, and speak a barbarous dialect of Arabic.” About the residents of Midên (Middo), Sykes writes that, “I extorted from the laity that it was their opinion that they were really Kurds of Kurdish race.” Mark Sykes, The Caliphs’ Last Heritage: A Short History of the Turkish Empire (London: Macmillan, 1915), 355–56. According to Hanna Beth-Sawoece, the Syriacs of Midên spoke Kurdish until the mid-1930s. Author interview with Hanna Beth-Sawoece, 26 May 2020 (by email). It is doubtful whether the ancient Assyrians would have considered themselves Arabs. The first Arab mentioned in recorded history, Jundub, allied with Ahab of Israel against the kingdom of Assyria.
65 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 94. Boullata’s English translation gives “Athourian,” which is not an English word, to translate Jabra’s athuriyyin, a word that can refer to both the ancient and the modern Assyrians. “Assyrian” is normally used to translate athuriyyin.
66 Most of the Assyrians who settled in the plains of Nineveh in northern Iraq came originally from the Hakkari region in Anatolia by way of Urmiya. They were mostly Church of the East, not Syriac Orthodox.
68 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 71. According to Sadeer Jabra, Bakr Sidqi was the brother of Lami’a’s maternal grandfather; that would mean that Lami’a was Sidqi’s great-niece. Author interview with Sadeer Jabra, 29 September and 7 October 2018 (by telephone).
69 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 77–78.
70 Two non-fiction references to the opposition of ‘Abd al-Hamid Rif’at, Lami’a’s maternal uncle, to their marriage appear in Princesses’ Street (150, 184). Jabra’s first two autobiographical novels, Cry in a Long Night.
(Surakh fi layl tawil, 1955) and Hunters in a Narrow Street (Sayyadun fi sharī‘ dayyiq, 1960), feature future mothers-in-law opposed to Jabra’s autobiographical protagonists’ marrying their daughters.

71 Jabra did however maintain a correspondence with his brother Yusuf, who translated J. B. Segal’s Edessa: The Blessed City (1970), a book on the Syriac spiritual center of Edessa (Ar. al-Ruha), now Sanliurfa, Turkey. Jabra also hosted his younger brother 'Isa when ‘Isa came to Baghdad to look for work.

72 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 92.

73 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 185.

74 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 185 (my translation, modified from Boullata’s).

75 Jabra, Princesses’ Street, 134.

76 Shadid, “In Baghdad Ruins.”

77 Jabra’s first published novel, Cry in a Long Night (Surakh fi layl tawil, 1955), features a mob execution carried out by burning alive, an echo of the 1909 Adana Massacre and the Sayfo genocide. According to the Syriac Jerusalemite Eli Jurj Kuz, burning alive was one method Turks and Kurds used to murder Syriacs during Sayfo. (mirza hon, “Shahadat min filastin min abna’ najin min majazir al-suryan sayfo 1915” [Testimonies from Palestine from the children of survivors of the Sayfo massacres of Syriacs 1915], YouTube, 14 February 2015, online at www.youtube.com/watch?v=gX2ircVaTS4 (accessed 15 May 2020; no longer accessible). Cry also features a scene in which the protagonist, Amin Samma’, turns a conversation about “ancestry and race” (hasab wa-nasab) into one of class, in an echo of the very same maneuver Jabra employed with Mrs. Kazin at the Alawiyyah Club in Princesses’ Street. Hunters in a Narrow Street (1959) features four Assyrian characters who immigrated to Baghdad during or after the 1933 Simele Massacre and who warn Jabra not to divulge his secrets. The Ship (Al-safinah, 1970) features a backstory of murder and blood feud that threatens the two principal lovers’ relationship.

78 Jabra, Search, 27.

79 Maryam al-Saffar says about Walid’s autobiography: “But I prefer The Well, where he talks about his youth. He does it in such a way that I don’t really know whether it’s autobiographical or an attempt at writing a novel.” “It’s part of his autobiography,” said Jawad. “I urged him to write it for ages, but for him it had become a matter of recording his childhood, something he kept circling around and stopping at, but hardly ever broaching.” (Jabra, Search, 266).

80 Jabra, Search, 49.

81 Jabra, Search, 268.

82 Jabra, Mu’ayashat al-nimra, 289–90.

83 Jabra, Search, 267.

84 Jabra, Search, 13–14; Jabra, Bahth, 27.

85 Jabra, First Well, 115–16.

86 Jabra, Search, 134.


91 Jabra critics may in fact need to caution themselves from reading too suspiciously lest they slip into a hermeneutics of paranoia.

92 For Jabra’s call for the Arab world to embrace individual freedom and found institutions that guarantee it, see Jabra I. Jabra, “Al-tarjamah wa-l-nahdah al-‘Arabiyyah al-hadithah” [Translation and the modern Arab renaissance] 1989, in Jabra, Mu’ayashat. Founded in 1934, the British Council served as the UK Foreign Office’s arm of cultural diplomacy when rising totalitarian regimes in Italy, Germany, and the USSR sought to replace Britain on the world stage. The British Council awarded scholarships to promising


94 The same would go for scholars who work on Philip Roth, Rachel Cusk, and Ibrahim al-Mazini.


100 Boullata, *Nafidha*, 69.

101 Boullata, *Nafidha*, 70.

102 Darraj, “Jabra Ibrahim Jabra rahala.”

103 Jabra, *In Search of Walid Masoud*, 182.

104 Jabra, *Hunters in a Narrow Street*, 56.


Gateway to the World
The Golden Age of Jerusalem Airport, 1948–67
Eldad Brin

Abstract
Jerusalem Airport played a vital role in the economic and social life of Jordanian-controlled Jerusalem (1948–1967), despite its basic infrastructure and its situation of operating under political and technical constraints, and subject to disruptive domestic and regional unrest. The unique draw of Jerusalem for Christian and Muslim pilgrims as well as the city’s ideal geographical location vis-à-vis the region as a whole established the small airport as the prime gateway to the city and to Jordan. It became a vital connection for middle-class and upper middle-class West Bank Palestinian residents to the outside world for the sake of work, study, and leisure. As such, it served as a critical link between Arab Jerusalem and the Arab world.

Key words
Jerusalem; Jordan; commercial aviation; pilgrimage; tourism.

Jerusalem Airport (known also as Qalansiya Airport or Atarot Airport), located between Jerusalem and Ramallah, near the village of Qalansiya and Qalansiya refugee camp, operated for about seventy-five years under three successive political jurisdictions (British, 1925–48; Jordanian, 1948–67; Israeli, 1967–2001). Under Jordanian rule, it was a major port of entry for pilgrims, tourists, and distinguished visitors to Jerusalem and to Jordan itself. It is tempting to draw a parallel between the Jordanian upgrading of what had been, almost exclusively, a British military...
airstrip into a small but busy international airport,¹ and the Ottoman inauguration of the rail link from Jaffa to Jerusalem in late 1892. Both were transportation-related game changers: significant quantitative and qualitative boosts to the city’s economy, international connectedness, and cosmopolitan character.

The operation of Jerusalem Airport under Jordanian rule has been referred to in passing in various sources, but almost no single source, academic or otherwise, has been devoted solely to this chapter in the airport’s history. Indeed, the article by Nahed Awwad,² dedicated to the airport, may be the only one that has described, in rather nostalgia-imbued terms, its contribution to the city and the potent memories it evokes among veteran Palestinian Jerusalemites. This article aims to add to Awwad’s groundbreaking contribution toward our understanding of the importance of Jerusalem Airport to the economy and character of Jordanian Jerusalem, and toward the social life of its small elite.

Historical documentation dealing with the operation of Jerusalem Airport, which could have been a vital means by which to study its impact on the city, is scant. Important primary sources, written and filmed, have been permanently lost for lack of awareness for their importance, negligence, or improper preservation.³ Moreover, secondary mentions of the airport are also rare, and often misleading. In advertising and publications from the late 1940s, for example, several airlines used “Jerusalem” in reference to the airport situated near the town of Lod (Lydda), a short distance southeast of Tel Aviv on the coastal plain.⁴ Known today as the Ben-Gurion International Airport, its affiliation with Tel Aviv (International Air Transport Association code TLV) dates back only as far as the early 1950s.

O’Connor pointed to airports being among the most important elements of the infrastructure of modern cities, and to their seminal role in economic development, especially in regards to tourism, which relies on air traffic for its growth. According to O’Connor, airport traffic reflects the vitality of the tourist industry of a given city or region, therefore its critical contribution to the vitality of metropolitan areas.⁵ At first glance, it is difficult to regard Jerusalem Airport, even at its busiest, as a major economic engine. Indeed, over its eighteen years of operation under Jordanian rule, it was served by a total of fifteen-odd airlines, but these consisted of a handful of modest national flag carriers in constant metamorphosis. Frequent mergers and takeovers kept creating new companies, some of them short-lived. (Jordan alone had no fewer than six flag carriers serving Jerusalem Airport within a period of fifteen years). The airport only operated during daylight, often serving small and medium-sized aircraft. Rough winter conditions in the area could be disruptive to the point of causing the suspension of operations (a problem also encountered by the Jordanian air force, which made use of the airport).⁶ Provincial Jerusalem Airport was, indeed, a far cry from the major aviation hubs which developed around the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s, such as in Beirut or Cairo. Direct flights were offered from it mostly to destinations on short or medium-haul routes. Nevertheless, in the humble context of Jerusalem itself it facilitated the arrival of hundreds of thousands of visitors to the city, making it a critical element
in its tourism and pilgrimage industry and leaving a decisive mark on its cityscape. Moreover, it allowed easy access from the city to important regional centers of employment, culture, and trade, mostly in surrounding Arab countries. Indeed, the upgrading of the airport and the related investments made in the city’s tourism infrastructure are regarded as two major developments initiated by Jordan during its brief control over the city.²

More than five decades after the complete termination of flights between the Arab world and Jerusalem, it is rather difficult to retroactively chart, fully and accurately, the true breadth of activity of Jerusalem Airport. Still, contemporary flight timetables of the various airlines that served it, in addition to a handful of auxiliary sources, allow a better understanding of the scope of its operation. This, in turn, allows an overview of the intricate economic and cultural ties Jordanian Jerusalem maintained with neighboring countries, with respect to tourism, pilgrimage, education, and leisure.

**Historical Background and Geopolitical Context**

The initial construction of an airstrip to the east of Qalandiya village, a few kilometers north of Jerusalem, was carried out by the British army in 1925, roughly seven years after the completion of its occupation of Palestine in World War I. This complies with O’Conner’s observation (originally relating to Southeast Asia, but applicable universally), that airports were naturally placed close to the largest centers of colonial power in a given region.³ The Qalandiya airstrip’s location was chosen for its relative proximity to Jerusalem – Mandate Palestine’s seat of government – as well as for the flat terrain in an otherwise hilly area. It was used by the military and by high-ranking officials. In 1936 it was renovated by the prominent Jewish entrepreneur Pinchas Rutenberg. Soon thereafter it was put to very limited commercial use and was served, rarely and irregularly, by Rutenberg’s airline, Palestine Airways, and by British carrier Imperial Airways.⁴

The Qalandiya airstrip was damaged in the war of 1948, which also left Palestine divided between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The airport, along with the lion’s share of nearby Jerusalem’s key holy and archaeological sites, remained under Jordanian control following the war and its inherent economic potential led to a decision to resume its activity. The upgrading of the airport’s rudimentary infrastructure allowed for a substantial increase in its scope of operation. It was officially renamed “Jerusalem Airport” on 18 May 1950, with new civilian facilities such as customs and immigration desks added to the existing airstrip. On the same day, a group of thirty Palestinian refugees coming from Egypt landed there on their way to resettlement on the East Bank of the River Jordan, to be followed by subsequent groups.⁵

A short tarmacked runway constructed in 1954 was extended in 1955 to 1,850 meters. Having been extended, the runway came precariously close to the Jerusalem-Ramallah road, and vehicular traffic was stopped with every landing and takeoff. At an estimated cost of one million Jordanian dinars (nearly U.S. $3 million at the time),
construction of a new terminal building and parking lot was completed in 1956. A recommendation by a British consultancy firm in 1960 to extend the runway twice more to 2,250 meters and 3,000 meters was adopted but not acted upon right away. In early 1962, the International Civil Aviation Organization conducted a technical feasibility study for construction of Jerusalem International Airport, but the study’s results are unknown. The airport underwent a series of improvements towards its passenger facilities in mid-1966; in 1967 works to lengthen the runway were interrupted by the 1967 war.

Beyond the economic rationale, the move to render Jerusalem Airport suitable for regular, civilian service was subject to political considerations. Despite deep-rooted suspicions harbored by the Jordanian leadership towards the West Bank’s Palestinian populace, and while careful not to cultivate Jerusalem to the point of threatening the premiere status awarded to the capital Amman, hesitant and measured steps were taken to develop the city. The municipal status of Jerusalem was elevated in 1959 from regular mayorship to metropolitan mayorship, and in 1960 the city was declared as Jordan’s “Second Capital.” In 1965, British town planner Henry Kendall formulated a master plan for the city, and recommended an extension of its municipal boundaries to include Jerusalem Airport. This recommendation was adopted by the municipality, but was not implemented before the 1967 war.

Jerusalem had lost its status as capital and administrative center for the whole of Palestine and much of its cosmopolitan air in the 1948 war, as the city was badly
damaged and was left divided. At the same time, its predicament coincided with the rapid post-World War II expansion of commercial aviation worldwide and particularly in the Middle East, the introduction of high-speed jet planes and an ever-growing aircraft passenger capacity. A fierce competition between airlines – sometimes between flag carriers of the same country – increased the frequency of flights and brought airfares down. The introduction of low tourist class fares in 1952, and lower still in 1958, made air travel affordable to millions and greatly expanded the civil aviation market. All this bode well for tourism and pilgrimage to Jordan, and by extension to Jerusalem Airport.

The increase in popularity of commercial flights coincided with the specific geopolitics of the Middle East and the armistice regime between Israel and Jordan. It should be noted that most international visitors coming to Jerusalem from Israel’s only international airport at Lod (Lydda) could not roam freely between the Israeli- and Jordanian-controlled sectors of the divided city. In fact, even if allowed to cross the border, they were barred from reentering the sector they came from, leading many to fly out of Jerusalem Airport once having crossed the border. Jordan’s only other international airport, opened in Amman in 1950, was inconveniently located to the east of the Jordan River, some ninety kilometers away.

The occupation by the State of Israel of most of the territory of British Mandate Palestine aided the consolidation of Jerusalem Airport in another sense. The closed borders between Israel and its neighbors greatly increased surface travel times to the primary tourist and pilgrimage attraction of Jordanian Jerusalem. For example, the post-1948 haul from Beirut to Jerusalem by car, over poor road infrastructure and bypassing Israel via Syria and Jordan’s East Bank, was estimated to take around fourteen hours, while the flight between the cities took about one hour. For the sake of travelling between the Levant and North Africa, flying was almost a default mode, with ideally-situated Jerusalem being a convenient stopover.

During Jordan’s rule over the eastern sector of Jerusalem, there was a gradual rise in the number of Western visitors, tourists and pilgrims alike, to travel to its holy sites and biblically-related environs. The total number of visitors to Jordan stood at less than 9,000 in 1950 but grew steadily afterwards. Of the overall number of visitors coming to Jordan, the number of Christian pilgrims alone stood at 35,000 in 1951, 42,000 in 1952, 60,000 in 1953 and over 74,000 in 1954. Just over a decade later, in 1965, the total number of visitors to the kingdom neared 750,000. In the mid-1960s, around two-thirds of air passengers coming to Jordan landed at Jerusalem Airport, twice as much as in Amman. While around 70 percent of pilgrims arrived as members of large groups on commercial flights, some arrived privately, in small groups, on planes chartered from various airlines.

The surge in the number of Christian pilgrims towards the mid-1960s could be partly attributed to the first-ever papal visit to Jordan in January 1964 by Pope Paul VI. The historic visit was leveraged successfully by tour agencies in Jordan and elsewhere to substantially increase Catholic pilgrimage to the Holy Land in subsequent years. Growing numbers of visitors were clearly reflected in increasing revenues from
tourism. Most of these were generated in the West Bank, which in the years 1963–67 alone registered 60–70 percent of all visits to historical sites in Jordan by tourists. Jerusalem itself accounted for about 85 percent of the revenues generated in the West Bank’s historical sites in the mid-1960s.21

Holy sites in Jerusalem and those in the adjacent areas of the West Bank appealed also to a large share of Muslim pilgrims, whether on a dedicated visit or during a stopover on their way to Mecca on hajj and umra pilgrimages. The number of Muslim visitors to Jordan, some of whom came by air and had connecting flights in Jerusalem, was also steadily on the rise during the period of 1948–67. In 1966, roughly 70 percent of visitors to Jordan came from Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries.22

A rough indication of Jerusalem’s share in the burgeoning tourism industry in Jordan before the 1967 war can be discerned from its wide supply of hotels, hostels, and guesthouses as compared to the rest of the country. Whereas in 1948 there were a handful of small hotels and guesthouses operating in the Jordanian sector of the freshly divided city, in the mid-1960s it boasted dozens of accommodation facilities – more than in any other city in Jordan and more than in all other West Bank towns combined. Some were run by Christian churches and associations.23

Exact data regarding the annual number of visitors to Jerusalem, and their mode of travel to and from the city, is almost nonexistent. But the following figures may be helpful in offering us a glimpse of what was an undisputed trend: in 1957, roughly halfway into the period of Jordanian control over the eastern sector of Jerusalem, nearly 60,000 passengers landed at Jerusalem Airport.24 A remarkably modest number by early twenty-first-century standards, it was enough to rank it among the fourteen major ports of call of commercial aviation in the Middle East for that year. In 1966, the approximate number of passengers served by Jerusalem Airport reached 100,000.25

At least nine Western airlines – BOAC (British Overseas Airways Corporation, the predecessor to British Airways), Sabena, Swissair, KLM, Lufthansa, Air France, Alitalia, Cyprus Air, and SAS – were represented by tourist agencies operating in the central business district of Jordanian Jerusalem. Scandinavian airline SAS also included Jordanian Jerusalem in a series of city guides it published in the mid-1960s, and employed a representative in attendance at Jerusalem Airport, assisting tourists with hotel reservations and related matters.26 Despite this, almost no Western airline has ever actually flown into Jerusalem Airport itself. This was probably due to the inadaptability of the small airport and its modest facilities to the needs of large aircraft, as well as to considerations of economic viability.

Arguably, the decision on behalf of Western airlines not to serve Jerusalem Airport may have been compounded by a political constraint: almost no government had officially and fully recognized Jordan’s unilateral annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and the kingdom’s alleged sovereignty over it.27 Consequently, no Western country would allow its flag carriers to serve any airport located in it, an act that might have been construed as such a recognition, as flag carriers are often seen as representations of the states they operate out of. As noted by Dobson, “Civil aviation has always been as much of a political as a commercial affair.”28
The sensitivity involved in having commercial air ties to the politically-disputed West Bank can be gleaned from a 1959 report of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board. In listing the destinations served by the leading American airliner Trans World Airlines (TWA) along its transcontinental routes – mentioning the name of the city and the country it was in (such as Milan, Italy; Bombay, India) – Jerusalem was the only destination with no country name next to it.

This is not to say that TWA directly served Jerusalem Airport. Rather, alongside Pan American Airways (Pan Am), it had passengers conveyed to the city by cooperating with Jordanian and Egyptian airlines (Air Jordan and Misrair, respectively) while Air France and BOAC did likewise by hiring the services of Lebanese airlines (Air Liban and Middle East Airlines), and a Jordanian airline (Arab Airways (Jerusalem) Ltd).

In 1977, ten years after Israel took hold of Jerusalem Airport and renamed it Atarot Airport, Pan Am sought permission to operate flights to it but was denied by the U.S. Government.

Despite the above, the political explanation for Western airlines’ avoidance of Jerusalem Airport is not unequivocal. In late June 1949, an Israeli newspaper reported that preparations were made to initiate BOAC flights from Jerusalem to London. Western leaders and civil servants, while on official visits to the region, did make use of the airport. U.S. Senator Guy M. Gillette, for example, came through Jerusalem Airport in December 1952, as did U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles in May 1953. Moreover, when it was decided that the plane in which Pope Paul VI came in on his historic visit would land in Amman and not in Jerusalem, as initially planned, it was explained as being merely due to the inadequacy of Jerusalem Airport to handle his large aircraft. A year later, the Belgian royal couple flew out of Jerusalem Airport having concluded a state visit to Jordan.

While Western airlines did not serve Jerusalem Airport directly, passengers coming from Europe and North America could easily find connecting flights to it from other airports in the region. Since the late 1950s, Jordanian airline Air Jordan of the Holy Land most probably operated direct flights from Rome to Jerusalem, a route continued by its successor Jordan Airways – establishing what was most probably the only direct link between Jerusalem and continental Europe. Over the years of its operation under Jordan, one could fly directly from Jerusalem Airport to over fifteen cities in Western Europe, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and central Asia. Some airlines established a flight connection to Jerusalem before establishing a route to Jordan’s capital and largest city of Amman.

According to Sela, Arab countries “could not formally acquiesce in a formal annexation of the West Bank to Jordan” but “offered their temporary approval [to it] by formulating it as a ‘trusteeship’,” which allowed them to maintain regular flights to it by their flag carriers. Beyond the obvious economic considerations, this may also be traced to the Arab countries’ religious attachment to the city and the desire to strengthen their ties to it. Arab states regarded themselves as guardians of the Holy City, and their delegates took part in many political, spiritual and social pan-Arab events in it that were mostly hosted by the Jordanian government. Several of these
catered to attendees from Muslim countries from beyond the Middle East. Some Arab states opened consulates in the city and diplomats constantly shuttled to and fro.\textsuperscript{36} United Nations personnel serving in the region also made constant use of Jerusalem Airport, and a UN plane was parked there permanently.\textsuperscript{37}

Still, it is important to note that while most passengers coming through Jerusalem Airport were foreign nationals, mostly tourists and pilgrims (as well as the occasional diplomat or military attaché), it was also used by Jordanian nationals, mostly Palestinians from the West Bank itself. Awwad, for example, mentions the owner of a bookshop from Ramallah who would travel weekly from Jerusalem to Beirut and Cairo to purchase books for his shop,\textsuperscript{38} and most probably was not the only shopkeeper to do so. Souvenir dealers in Jerusalem and Bethlehem used the airport to deliver local olive wood and mother-of-pearl crafts abroad. The airport supplied direct employment to residents of the adjacent Qalandiya refugee camp, who worked there in shifts for fifteen Jordanian piasters a day.\textsuperscript{39}

West Bank Palestinians who studied in universities around the Middle East also made constant use of the airport when travelling between home and school. Under Jordanian rule, no university operated in the West Bank. In fact, the first university to operate in Jordan was opened in Amman, and even that was established only as late as 1962. Palestinians were forced to pursue higher education in universities in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, and even in Libya.\textsuperscript{40}

For the small Jerusalemite elite, Jerusalem Airport presented a way out of what was essentially a small and provincial city, offering a convenient gateway to the cosmopolitan delights available in the major metropolises of neighboring countries. As Ali Kleibo writes, “ennui plagued us.”

Our only respite, for the very few who could afford the indulgence, was the prospect of breakfast in Damascus followed by dinner that same evening in cosmopolitan Beirut. Qalandiya [sic] Airport provided a few flights a week to Cairo where the great divas of Arabic music gave their monthly recitals. A visit to Cairo was our access to the backdrop of all the films and love stories that we knew through the three cinemas of Jerusalem: Cinema Al-Quds, Al-Hamra, and Al-Nuzha [...] To fly to Cairo was to visit the land of dreams, of romance and of magic [...] We would return from Beirut or Cairo a week later to the loneliness of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{41}

As Jerusalem Airport allowed privileged Jerusalemites to roam freely around the Middle East, on rare occasions it also brought luminaries of Western and Arab entertainment to the city: actors Peter O’Toole, Omar al-Sharif, Faten Hamama, and Katharine Hepburn; singers Farid al-Atrash, Samira Tawfiq, and Nouhad Wadie‘ Haddad (known as “Fairuz”); and belly dancer Nagwa Fouad. In these respects, and harking back to Awwad, Jerusalem Airport was more than just an airport, a transit point allowing people to travel from A to B; it was a place associated with freedom and cosmopolitanism, and as such of great symbolic meaning to Jerusalem and at least some of its inhabitants.\textsuperscript{42}
The fact that Jerusalem Airport was located in a politically unstable country, in the very heart of a politically unstable region, had some impact on the airport and the flights that operated out of it during the years covered in this article. On 24 July 1950, an Israeli fighter plane attacked a Lebanese civilian plane during a flight from Jerusalem to Beirut, killing two of its passengers and wounding several others.\textsuperscript{43} In his memoir, Palestinian-Iraqi intellectual Jabra Ibrahim Jabra recalls the suspicious and stern security personnel at the airport in the wake of the assassination of King Abdullah I in Jerusalem in July 1951, and their meticulous search through his luggage upon arriving from Beirut.\textsuperscript{44}

Civil unrest followed the Jordanian elections in October 1954, while in 1955 clashes in Amman and Jerusalem following government support of the controversial Baghdad Pact resulted in casualties and heightened tensions. In late 1956 Jerusalem Airport shut down temporarily in the light of the Suez crisis (Western nationals stranded in the city were allowed into Israel, to fly out of Tel Aviv instead).\textsuperscript{45} To this, one should add an aborted anti-Hashemite coup in 1957 as well as the civil war in Lebanon in 1958. That same year also saw the creation of the United Arab Republic, comprised of Egypt and Syria, and the closing of Egyptian and Syrian airspace to Jordanian planes. A second attempt at a joint Egyptian-Syrian republic in 1963, this time to be joined also by Iraq, ignited further civil unrest in Jerusalem.

All the above resulted in tangible tensions, which often led to violent clashes and obviously deterred tourists and pilgrims planning to visit Jerusalem, most of whom would have arrived by air. Even if undeterred, the temporary suspension of flights or the closing of air space between states, as described above, physically prevented visitors from landing in Jerusalem. Non-political incidents touched on the airport as well: In June 1949, a small United Nations aircraft crashed when landing at the airport, with no casualties; in January 1959, a Jordanian cargo aircraft crashed after taking off from the airport, with unknown casualties; and in April 1965, a Jordanian airliner en route to Jerusalem Airport crashed in southern Syria, killing all fifty-four people aboard.\textsuperscript{46}

**A Growing Connections Network**

When charting Jerusalem Airports’ overall links to other airports in Jordan, the Middle East, and Europe, it is immediately apparent that its function as a hub or a spoke (in other words, a measure of its centrality) depended on specific airlines and specific points in time. But whether a minor airport facilitating feeder services to bigger regional hubs, a stopover, or a sole destination, all flights to and from Jerusalem augmented the city’s international affiliations. These, in turn, contributed towards somewhat restoring its greatly reduced, post-1948 cosmopolitan character. What follows aims to be an exhaustive review of the airlines that served Jerusalem Airport, and the cities directly reachable from it.\textsuperscript{47}

Naturally, Jordan was the first country to have an airline operate regularly out of Jerusalem Airport, if only on a short domestic route. In late June 1949, Arab Airways...
Association (AAA) was reported to have inaugurated a daily service from Jerusalem to Amman. From the very start service was not as frequent, and was almost immediately suspended before resumed a few months later. As of early June 1950, Jerusalem was a stopover for near-daily AAA flights en route from Amman to Beirut.

In late August 1953, AAA was taken over by BOAC, which converted its name to Arab Airways (Jerusalem) Ltd. (AAJ), and had its operations relocated to Jerusalem from Amman. AAJ was probably the only airline for which Jerusalem Airport was, from the very start, a primary hub. Upon inception it began operating flights to Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jeddah (and onwards to Aden), before expanding to Damascus, Kuwait City, and Abadan. Domestic destinations included Amman, Aqaba, and subsequently Ma’an, from where tourists could proceed to the ancient Nabatean city of Petra. In its first year of operation, AAJ catered to over 20,000 passengers.

Some of the company’s routes (Aden to Baghdad, Aden to Cairo, Baghdad to Beirut, Beirut to Aqaba, Jeddah to Cairo, Jeddah to Baghdad, Baghdad to Cairo, and Cairo to Damascus) potentially benefited hotels in Jerusalem as passengers could spend a night or two in the city at the expense of AAJ. On flights between Beirut and Cairo, a free overnight stay in Jerusalem was also offered. Special excursion rates for flights from Cairo, Amman, and Baghdad to Jerusalem were obtainable. On flights that passed through Jerusalem with no layover, passengers were still encouraged to make an overnight sightseeing stopover at their own expense, with no added cost to the air fare. In October 1958, AAJ ceased to operate as an independent company. This was due mainly to the local and regional political instabilities detailed above, which began a year into its operation and which had a cumulative negative impact on the number of passengers it served.

Yet another Jordanian carrier serving Jerusalem Airport was Air Jordan (AJ), founded in 1950. Its head office was located in Amman, but it seems initially Jerusalem was its hub and starting point for most of its destinations, namely Amman itself, Cairo, Nicosia, Beirut, Damascus, Abadan, Kuwait City, Manama, Kabul, Kandahar, and possibly Baghdad. By late 1956, service extended to Aqaba, Jeddah, and Dhahran. Partnered airlines took Air Jordan passengers onwards to Alexandria, Tripoli, and Benghazi. In an attempt to appeal to pilgrims, AJ harnessed the holiness and historical significance of the Holy Land. Its timetable brochures included brief poetic descriptions in English and Arabic of the landscapes which passengers would fly over, citing their biblical references. Jerusalem was the only city for which a detailed map was included in these brochures.

In 1958, AJ merged with AAJ to create a new airline, Air Jordan of the Holy Land (AJHL). By late 1959, AJHL passengers could take direct flights to Jerusalem from Amman, Aqaba, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Ma’an, Dhahran, Jeddah, Kuwait City, Nicosia, and possibly Rome. AJHL ceased operations in September 1961, a few days after the inauguration of a new, government-owned national airline – Jordan Airways (JA). Its list of destinations was considerably shorter and all Arab, but now connected Jerusalem for the first time to Doha.

In December 1963, Jordan Airways, barely two years into operation, was
superseded by the founding of Alia – Royal Jordanian Airlines (to become Royal Jordanian in 1986), which was based in Jerusalem Airport. Initially, flights reached only Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Kuwait City, and Jeddah, but two years into its operation, Alia established the “Holy Cities” flights from Jerusalem to Rome (and onwards to Paris and London).\textsuperscript{56}

The Syrian flag carrier Syrian Airways started operating flights from Damascus to Jerusalem as early as August 1949,\textsuperscript{57} making it the first foreign airline to have served Jerusalem Airport after its coming under Jordanian control. The frequency of this service is unknown. In 1958, following Syria and Egypt forming the United Arab Republic, both countries’ airlines merged to form United Arab Airlines (UAA), which actually operated as an Egyptian, rather than an Egyptian-Syrian, airline, and will be dealt with below when discussing Egypt’s air links to Jerusalem. Syria, with its leaving of the short-lived political union with Egypt, established Syrian Arab Airlines (SAA) in late 1961, resuming a distinct flag carrier. In the 1960s, Jerusalem was served twice-weekly by SAA on flights from Damascus.\textsuperscript{58}

Figure 2. Air Jordan of the Holy Land, October 1959 timetable, Airline Timetable Images Website, online at www.timetableimages.com/ttimages/aj/aj5910/aj5910i.jpg (accessed 21 October 2020).

Flag carriers of Lebanon and Egypt began serving Jerusalem Airport in mid-1950. From Beirut, Lebanese airline Air Liban (also known as Compagnie Generale des Transport), a subsidiary of Air France, started operating a weekly regular service, with an additional weekly flight added every following year. By late 1955, flights between both cities operated daily. By the summer of 1961, this increased to nine weekly flights, a frequency unparalleled by any other of the airlines serving Jerusalem Airport.\textsuperscript{59}
Jerusalem appears as a destination for another Lebanese airline, Middle Eastern Airlines (MEA), on a map dating back to early 1950, but oddly is not mentioned in the flight schedule for that year. MEA was definitely operating daily flights to Jerusalem from 1951 – even before establishing routes to Damascus or Amman. By late 1953, MEA served the Jerusalem Airport twelve times a week. Some flights carried passengers on behalf of Pan Am.60 By September 1956, MEA flights between Beirut and Jerusalem were reduced to once daily.61

When combining the highest frequencies of flights between Beirut and Jerusalem of both Air Liban and MEA, it is immediately apparent that during most of the 1950s and early 1960s these two companies alone connected both cities no less than sixteen times weekly. This made Beirut the most connected city to Jerusalem by air. In 1963, MEA merged with Air Liban and Lebanon International Airways. The new company did not adopt a new name but rather used all three. It continued operating daily flights to Jerusalem until the 1967 war.62

Egyptian flag carrier Misr Airlines operated regular flights to multiple airports and landing strips in British Mandate Palestine since before the 1948 war. In 1949, it changed its name to Misrair and in June 1950, after a hiatus due to the 1948 war, started flying to Jerusalem at an unknown frequency. By early 1955, two weekly flights connected Cairo and Jerusalem Airport, increasing to thrice-weekly by late 1956.63

As mentioned earlier, Egypt and Syria merged their flag carriers in 1958. The combined company, UAA, actually operated more as an Egyptian, rather than a shared, airline. It was even referred to as “Misrair-United Arab Airlines” in its publications, operating four, then five weekly flights from Cairo to Jerusalem by mid- and late-1959, respectively. When the political union between Egypt and Syria terminated in September 1961, UAA turned into an exclusively Egyptian company but retained its name. Until late 1965, and possibly until the 1967 war a year and a half later, flights between Cairo and Jerusalem operated daily, a frequency equal only to that maintained by UAA in flights to London and Rome, and second only in flights to Beirut.64

In regards to the daily or twice-daily flights between Beirut and Cairo to Jerusalem, the latter was not merely a stopover on the way to other destinations or a terminus at the end of a multiple-destination route, but a sole destination. The high frequency of service was due to the fact that flights served not only Lebanese and Egyptian nationals but also Westerners who connected in the major hubs of Beirut and Cairo, having arrived there with Western airlines that did not serve Jerusalem Airport, as discussed above. Even when taking into account the possibility that not all flights from Beirut and Cairo to Jerusalem operated at full capacity, the aircrafts used by MEA (Vickers Viscount 800) and UAA (DC 6B) alone had the theoretical, combined ability of transporting a weekly volume of over 1,000 passengers to Jerusalem and back in the mid-1960s.

Kuwait National Airways, founded in 1954, started operating a weekly flight from Kuwait City to Jerusalem – one of its first five destinations – that year. Under its new name, Kuwait Airways (KA), flights increased to twice-weekly by late 1956 and four-
weekly by early 1963. A second Kuwaiti airline, Trans Arabia Airways, offered four weekly flights between Kuwait City and Jerusalem (two in each direction) in 1963, before being absorbed by KA in April 1964.

Of all destinations by the Persian Gulf reachable on direct flights out of Jerusalem (Kuwait City, Dhahran, Manama, Doha, and Abadan), flights to Kuwait City were the most frequent. This had to do mainly with the relatively large Palestinian community in Kuwait, employed in the booming oil industry and in various, often high-ranking, positions in its private and public sectors. Several hundred Palestinians, many belonging to the educated and professional strata, moved to Kuwait immediately after the 1948 war and took up positions in the administration and civil service of what was then a British protectorate. Jerusalem Airport offered them a convenient gateway when travelling between Kuwait and Jerusalem for holidays or family visits. The airport was of less relevance to the poor Palestinian peasantry that left Palestine to seek work in Kuwait; these usually made their way there using a torturous overground route through the East Bank of the Jordan River and Iraq.

Jerusalem Airport also served Kuwaiti nationals who had sons and daughters

Figure 3. Trans Arabia Airways Kuwait (TAAK), 17 November 1963 timetable, Airline Timetable Images Website, online at www.timetableimages.com/ttimages/kt3/kt6311/kt6311-1.jpg (accessed 17 October 2020).
attending some of Jerusalem’s renowned schools. A handful of Kuwaiti families added a few homes and a mosque to an unofficial neighborhood known as “Airport Neighborhood” (Harat al-Matar), just outside the airport grounds. There they would stay on regular visits to the city, especially during their children’s summer vacation. Indeed, the “Airport Neighborhood” has its roots in British Mandate times, and even after expansion during Jordanian rule remained small. Nevertheless, it is another expression, albeit small-scale when compared to the hotels and travel agencies built in Jerusalem under Jordanian rule, of the physical footprint that Jerusalem Airport left on the city.

It will be noted that while Iraqi Airways probably never served Jerusalem Airport and did not maintain an office in the city, Jerusalem does appear in one of its timetables in reference to the fares charged on flights between it and various other cities served by the airline. This suggests that Iraqi Airways passengers may have been shuttled to and from Jerusalem via a different airline through special arrangements, such as those employed by Western airlines.

Cyprus was most probably the only non-Arab country to have had a flag carrier, Cyprus Air, serving Jerusalem Airport. Service to Jerusalem was erratic: from mid-1952 to mid-1954, before Cypriot independence, regular weekly flights operated between Jerusalem and Beirut, but Jerusalem is conspicuously absent from the airline’s late 1955 timetable. There followed a few years of political unrest in Cyprus and the handling of Cyprus Air operations by British European Airways, which did not serve Jerusalem. Regular weekly flights to Jerusalem, this time directly from Nicosia, resumed by late 1965, a few years following Cyprus’s gaining of political independence and the renewed operation of its flag carrier under the name Cyprus Airways. Jerusalem was once more absent from a mid-1967 (pre-war) timetable.

Conclusions

In the wake of British Mandate rule over Palestine and the 1948 war, the division of Jerusalem, and Jordan’s unilateral annexation of its historical core and major holy sites, the small Qalandiya airstrip gradually established itself as a small but busy aviation hub. Renamed “Jerusalem Airport,” it became the gateway through which most foreign visitors entered Jordan, and Jordanians nationals – mostly West Bank and Jerusalemite Palestinians – accessed the world for the sake of work, study and leisure.

The rapid development of commercial aviation after World War II and an intense competition among a myriad of airlines in the Middle East facilitated the growth of Jerusalem Airport. It went on to serve multiple airlines that offered direct flights to more than fifteen cities, from Europe to central Asia. Jerusalem’s key position in the geographical heart of the Middle East and the fact that Israel, off limits to citizens of all Arab states at the time, occupied the overland routes between the Levant and North Africa, all worked in its favor. Notwithstanding the kingdom’s dwindled coffers, the constant political tensions between Amman and Jerusalem and periods of domestic
or regional instability, it remained a major gateway to Jordan. Humble infrastructure and political constraints may have limited the number of airlines and size of aircraft serving it. Nevertheless, it was the first time – and so far, the last – that Jerusalem enjoyed a regular, civilian-oriented connection by air to the outside world.

Jerusalem Airport was vital in restoring, at least to a degree, Jerusalem’s cosmopolitan character after the fateful events of 1948. Naturally it did much to bolster the city’s tourism-related economy and had a strong impact on the urban landscape from its resultant wide range of hotels, travel agencies, and related businesses. Regular and frequent flights between Jerusalem and a host of major Arab cultural, economic, and political hubs not only offered the occasional respite and business connections to the city’s dwindled elite, but also served to emphasize the city’s pan-Arab relevance after the trauma of war. This gave Jerusalem Airport a distinct historical and political reputation that will continue to compound its obvious importance as a mere transportation facility in Arab Jerusalem’s collective memory.

Eldad Brin received his MA degree in geography from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and his PhD in geography from the University of Haifa. He is an independent researcher whose published works deal with issues connected to Jerusalem’s historical geography and tourism to the city.

Figure 4. A photo of the terminal building taken a few months after the 1967 war, in November 1967. Courtesy of Micha Sender.
Table 1. Airlines serving Jerusalem Airport (compiled by author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Airlines</th>
<th>Year Began Operations in Jerusalem Airport</th>
<th>Destinations of Direct Flights from Jerusalem (at peak of operation) (domestic; international)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Arab Airways Association</td>
<td>1949 (?)</td>
<td>Amman; Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Jordan</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Amman; Cairo, Nicosia, Beirut, Damascus, Kuwait City, Abadan, Manama, Baghdad (?), Kabul, Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arab Airways (Jerusalem) Ltd.</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Amman, Aqaba, Ma’an; Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jeddah, Damascus, Kuwait City, Abadan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Jordan of the Holy Land</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Amman, Aqaba, Ma’an; Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Dhahran, Jeddah, Kuwait City, Nicosia, Rome (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan Airways</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Amman; Beirut, Cairo, Jeddah, Kuwait City, Doha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alia – Royal Jordanian Airlines</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Amman; Cairo, Beirut, Kuwait City, Jeddah, Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Syrian Airways</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syrian Arab Airlines</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Air Liban</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Eastern Airlines (also serving Pan Am)</td>
<td>1950 or 1951</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Liban – Middle Eastern Airlines – Lebanon International Airways (joint operation)</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Misrair</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misrair-United Arab Airlines (jointly with Syria)</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Kuwait National Airways</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Kuwait City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trans Arabia Airways</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Kuwait City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Cyprus Air</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus Airways</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Nicosia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Endnotes

1 In this article, in referring to flights from Jerusalem Airport to destinations outside British Mandate Palestine or Jordan, the term “international” is applied, although most such flights were contained to the regional, Middle Eastern arena.


3 Awwad, “In Search of Jerusalem Airport,” 53.


7 Shai Har-Zvi, “Meh-Abdallah ve’ad Abdullah: Medinit Yarden Kelapehy Yerushalayim – Heksherim Azoriyim ve Leumiyyim” [From Abdullah to Abdullah: Jordan’s policy on Jerusalem – the regional and national contexts] (PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, 2014), 41. Following the 1967 war, former Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion also had a vision of enlarging the Jerusalem Airport, fully adapting it for large aircrafts and making it into Israel’s second international airport. Such a facility, he reasoned, is “an essential condition for the capital of the country because just as you cannot imagine a tourist being unable to fly to Washington, Paris, or Moscow, there is no capital more precious in the world and more important than Jerusalem.” Quoted in Paula Kabalo, “City with No Walls: David Ben-Gurion’s Jerusalem Vision Post-June 1967,” Modern Judaism – A Journal of Jewish Ideas and Experience 38, no. 2 (2018): 172, online at dot.org/10.1093/mj/kjy003 (accessed 8 February 2021).


10 “Qalandia – nemal avir yerushalayim” [Qalandiya – Jerusalem Airport], Heruth, 19 May 1950, 1.

11 “Ever Hayarden marhiva et nemal aqaba” [Trans-Jordan expands the port of Aqaba], Al-Hamishmar, 4 September 1952, 4; Foreign Commerce Weekly 49, no. 16 (20 April 1953): 14, and 56, no. 5 (30 July 1956), 14; “Harakevet leyerushalayim mehira yoter” [The train to Jerusalem is faster], Davar, 20 August 1967, 4.


2021).
20 “Matos norvegi hegi’a mi-yarden le-lod” [A Norwegian plane came from Jordan to Lod], Davar, 19 March 1953, 3; “Hashana beh beit-lechem” [This year in Bethlehem], Haboker 23 December 1954, 2; Muhtasib, “Economic Development of Jordan,” 61.
22 Benvenisti, The Torn City, 105.
23 The exact number of accommodation facilities in Jordanian Jerusalem in the mid-1960s varies among different sources, and ranges between thirty-two facilities (KIM’s Tourist and Travel Agency, Key to Jordan, 65) and seventy facilities (Benvenisti, The Torn City, 105).
25 Williams, “Commercial Aviation in Arab States,” 127; Benvenisti, The Torn City, 105.
27 Amnon Ramon, “Meh Hashashot Kavedim le-Sipu’ach NilHAV ve-Nir Hav: Mahalachei ha-shilton ha-Yisre’el le-’ihud Yerushalayim(Yooni 1967),” [From great misgivings to Enthusiastic and Extensive Annexation: The Israeli government and ‘united Jerusalem’ (June 1967)], in Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, Aviva Halaman, Ora Limor, Rehav Rubin, and Ronny Reich, eds., Heker Yerushalayim le-Tekufoteha: Homer ve-Da’at [Study of Jerusalem through the ages] (Jerusalem: Yad Iz hak Ben-Zvi, 2015), 384. Only Pakistan offered de jure recognition to Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank. Britain did likewise, but the annexation of East Jerusalem was only recognized de facto. Ramon, “From Great Misgivings.”
30 Williams, “Commercial Aviation in Arab States,” 130–32. In a 1964 ad, a California-based touring agent guaranteed potential participants on a pilgrimage tour of the Middle East, “TWA American Flag Carrier all the way […] with exception of flight between Cairo and Jerusalem,” The King’s Business [monthly publication of the Bible Institute of Los Angeles], 55, no. 11 (November 1964): 55.
31 Federal Register, 49 (159), Pan American World Airways Et al., Order to Show Cause, 41444–46. After the 1967 war, some Western airlines on chartered flights did land at newly-renamed Atarot Airport, as was the case in winter 1967, when an Italian plane brought pilgrims to Israel (‘Tzalyanim italkiyim le-bikur beh-yisrael” [Italian pilgrims to visit Israel], Davar, 9 November 1967, 4). The company performed only one of
several scheduled flights, the pilots having complained about the difficulty of landing a DC-6 plane on what was still too short a runway for large aircraft; “Million leorot yisreeliyot ya’aleh tikun sde ha-teufa Atarot” [The repair of Atarot Airport to cost a million Israeli liras], Ma’ariv, 28 November 1967, 7.
32 “Ketzir yedit” [A collection of news flashes], Al-Hamishmar, 29 June 1949, 2. Those flights most probably never took place.
33 “Hasenator Gillette hegia leyisrael” [Senator Gillette arrives in Israel], Heruth, 17 December 1952, 3; “Kabalat panim ledallas beyerushalyim” [A reception for Dulles in Jerusalem], She’arim, 10 May 1953, 1.
34 “Kahir mesita neged bikur ha’apifior” [Cairo incites against the pope’s visit], Heruth, 9 December 1963, 2; “Hazoog hamalchuti habelgi megia hayom lebikur” [The Belgian royal couple arrives today on a visit], Davar, 16 February 1964, 1.
37 “Metos hageneral bull honne zemanit belod” [General Bull’s airplane parks temporarily at Lod], Al Hamishmar, 16 May 1966, 5.
38 Awaad, “In Search of Jerusalem Airport,” 52.
40 “Qalandia Airport shut,” She’arim, 2 November 1956, 7.
44 Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, Princesses Street: Baghdad Memories (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2005), 112.
45 “Sde hate’ufa Qalandia – sagur” [Qalandia Airport shut], She’arim, 2 November 1956, 7.
46 “Metos oom nitrasek beh-kalandia” [A UN plane crashes at Qalandia], Heruth, 14 June 1949, 1; “Hitrasek metos hovala yardeni” [A Jordanian cargo plane crashes], Lamerhav, 23 January 1959, 1; “54 nehergu behitrasek matos yardeni beh-sooria” [54 dead as a Jordanian plane crashes in Syria], Davar, 12 April 1965, 1.
47 A direct flight being such that might make stopovers but does not require a change of aircraft by passengers and retains its flight number throughout. A simplified table listing the various airlines which served Jerusalem Airport and the destinations made accessible by them through direct flights from Jerusalem appears in the appendix.
48 “Amman-Qalandia Air Service,” Palestine Post, 26 June 1949, 2; Foreign Commerce Weekly 36, no. 9 (8 August 1949): 36.
49 Foreign Commerce Weekly 36, no. 9 (8 August 1949): 36.
53 Air Jordan, 1 August 1952, 1 May 1955 and 1 November 1955 timetables, Airline Timetable Images Website, online at www.timetableimages.com/ttimages/aj.htm (accessed 21 October 2020); Foreign Commerce Weekly, 42, no. 8 (19 February 1951): 31; 48, no. 23 (8 December 1952): 29;


61 Williams, “Commercial Aviation in Arab States,” 135.


63 “Sherut avir Kahir-Qalandia” [Air service from Cairo to Qalandia], Haboker, 25 June 1950, 1; Foreign Commerce Weekly 53, no. 8 (21 February 1955): 18; Misrair and United Arab Airlines, 16 April 1955 timetable, Airline Timetable, online at www.timetableimages.com/ttimages/ms.htm (accessed 27 October 2020); Williams, “Commercial Aviation in Arab States,” 134.

64 Misrair and United Arab Airlines, 1 May 1959, 14 November 1959, 1 July 1962, and 1 November 1965 timetables, Airline Timetable, online at www.timetableimages.com/ttimages/ms.htm (accessed 27 and 28 October 2020).


68 Awaad, “In Search of Jerusalem Airport,” 57.


The Red Priest of Haifa

Rafiq Farah (1921–2020)

Randa Farah

Abstract

Rafiq Farah, archdeacon of the Anglican Church and the author’s father, chaired the Society for the Defense of Arab Minority Rights in Israel from 1951 to 1965. This article draws on oral history recorded by the author, on personal documents, and on archival material to chronicle the events that led to the Society’s formation, and to examine more closely the effects of the 1948 Nakba on the Palestinian Arab community in Haifa. In August 1949, Rafiq Farah wrote a letter published in the Israeli Communist Party newspaper al-Ittihad in which he proposed the formation of a league for the defense of universal human rights. Martin Buber, a Jewish philosopher, wrote a letter to Farah supporting the idea. The al-Ittihad article acted as a catalyst that provoked debate among Arabs and Jews and that in turn led to the Society’s formation. After its establishment and until 1966, during a period of a “reign of terror” imposed on Palestinian Arabs, the Society waged a courageous legal battle against Israel’s Emergency Regulations, which included fighting against Israeli confiscation of Arab lands and properties; it was no small feat, and their struggles were not always in vain.

Key words

Rev. Rafiq Farah; Haifa; Society for the Defense of Arab Minority Rights in Israel; Shafa ‘Amr; British Mandate; Emergency Regulations; Martin Buber; settler-colonialism; oral history.
Ordinary people’s recollections in the form of oral life histories and narratives, autobiographies, and diaries are rich sources that serve diverse academic purposes and community projects. This is especially the case in Palestinian studies, where the Zionist colonial state has been systematically destroying all that attests to the history and culture of Arab Palestine and its indigenous inhabitants. Targets of erasure and destruction include archival materials, artefacts, and sites of Palestinian memory. Thus, oral accounts, diaries, letters, photos, memoirs, artefacts, and all that attest to the reproduction of history/memory by ordinary Palestinians are all the more critical to counter the unrelenting processes of erasure, and to reconstruct the memory of places, times, and events of Arab Palestine.

Some scholars approach oral life-histories, or personal and family diaries of “ordinary people” for empirical data to fill gaps or rectify and revise an error, or adopt a phenomenological approach to examine what the narratives tell us about how and why individuals or societies “remember” and what they forget or silence. Others use life-histories and diaries as maps that help them trace social and cultural transformations over time.¹ The non-elite accounts of the past are often referred to as “popular memory” to distinguish it from hegemonic master narratives that pervade public space. A main contention in this piece is that these different genres or spaces where the past is reproduced are not mutually exclusive, as the interweaving of an individual account may variously converge and diverge from hegemonic narratives or professional written texts.

In this piece, I draw on the oral narratives of my father, Rafiq Farah,² archdeacon of the Anglican Church, who chaired the Society for the Defense of Arab Minority Rights in Israel (henceforth the Society), to trace changes and occurrences in Palestine focusing on the late 1940s and 1950s. In addition to filling a gap in the existing literature on the Society, this article traces larger social and political processes that radically transformed individual and collective Palestinian life.³

I recorded my late father’s oral history intermittently over several years, and inherited historical documents mostly from the 1940s up to the mid-1960s. Focusing on the oral narrative here,⁴ I conclude that the Israeli reign of terror under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations⁵ imposed exclusively on the Palestinian Arabs, rendered the legal struggle waged by the Society a significant attempt to restrain the Israeli state, even if it did not halt the process of repression and colonial expansion. The Society’s activities also helped raise political awareness among the Palestinian Arabs regarding their rights in the law, and buoyed up resilience against the newly formed colonial state. Indeed, the legal struggle was one of the few venues and perhaps the only one left to resist in those early years; hence it formed a focal point for bringing together Palestinians from a broad political and social spectrum.

Although my father was at the advanced age of ninety-eight when he passed away on 11 May 2020, his memory and mental faculty had remained exceptionally sharp. I always smiled when he would call me to remind me of my or his appointment with a doctor or another urgent task that needed attention. Moreover, perhaps due to his life-time interest in “truth” and in “objective” history that he had learned in classes
at the American University of Beirut (AUB) in the 1940s, he avoided exaggeration in almost anything he did in life, and certainly in talking about the past, lending more credibility and validity to his account.

My family was among the 150,000–200,000 Palestinian Arabs “inside” – the term used at the time for the survivors of the Nakba who remained in what became Israel in 1948. We were besieged from within by the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, which tightened the noose around us, and from without, by the closure of borders to the Arab world. I still have crystal clear recollections of the environment of terror that touched us all, even as a child growing up during that period.

Indeed, the Israeli reign of terror under the Emergency Regulations meant that the most elementary human rights were annulled, including property rights, citizenship rights, and free movement. In the meantime, Israel’s clamorous noise about its “democracy” was being amplified in media outlets around the world. Nothing seems to have changed. Although military rule and the Emergency Regulations ended in 1966, Israel continued its colonization of Palestine and its discrimination against the indigenous population. Adalah’s list of over sixty-five laws that discriminate against Palestinian citizens in Israel and/or Palestinian residents in the occupied Palestinian territories today confirm this view.6

In the last few years of his life, my father was very clear in his political views: he was against the Oslo agreements, was dissatisfied with the performance of the Palestinian Authority, supported the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) initiative, and advocated for the rights of the Palestinian refugees to return. He believed in a one-state solution as the only moral and durable solution. When I asked him about his work in the 1950s and the use of Israeli laws and courts, or his close relationship with members of the Israeli Communist Party, he would always answer that in order to judge the period, we need to understand the context under which struggle is waged. I hope the reader will do the same.

**Childhood and Youth: Shafa ‘Amr**

Rafiq Amin Farah was born on 16 June 1921, the second of eight children of Amin Farah and Salma Habibi, in Shafa ‘Amr, Palestine, then under British colonial rule. The population – Palestinian Arab Christian, Muslim, and Druze – did not exceed three thousand residents. When reflecting on years past, he described his childhood as a simple life. He lived in a house consisting of two rooms and a kitchen, with no running water, no electricity, and little in terms of furniture. A lower room was for storage, especially olive oil and kerosene. He spoke fondly of the times when the narrow streets of Shafa ‘Amr and the surrounding fields were his playground. Even in his nineties, he would laugh when he recalled how he returned home with “dirty feet and a mouth tainted in green due to the herbs and plants I used to pick and eat.”

There were also stories about climbing blackberry or fig trees. Figs remained his favorite fruit to the last days of his life. He also recalled long hours of play: marbles, games with sticks and pieces of broken flat stones, and hide-and-seek. Town criers
were also a part of his recollections: these men circulated from one neighborhood to the next to publicize government announcements. The town crier would begin with: “O people of the town, according to such and such order … and ended with “you should take notice of it.” He loved going to his paternal aunt’s house Maddul Hayik, where he would ride on their horse as it turned stone wheels round and round, threshing and winnowing the grains.

His parents and the extended family were devout Christians, the kind of parents who made sure the children said their prayers before bedtime. The Episcopal Church for the Anglican Congregation was the center of their lives and my father explained the reason thus: “There were no cinemas, theaters, football, or any other sports, and no cultural events.” But Christianity with a colonial taste began to seep into his life when a Miss Nora Fisher arrived in town with coloring pencils and paper, and even more seductively, with sweets! It so happened that in later years, my father met her husband, Geoffrey Fisher, who was then the Archbishop of Canterbury. This happened during a visit he made with a delegation from the Arab Evangelical Episcopal Church Council in 1957 who travelled to England to discuss “nationalizing the church” by appointing an Arab bishop. 7

The school in Shafa ‘Amr offered only a few elementary classes: my father was a victim of discipline by the math teacher who would stand behind him and place his large hands on his cheeks ready to slap if the answer was wrong. Panic ensured wrong answers and that was the end of my father’s interest in math! During the break he would run to his maternal grandmother’s house Mariam Abu Hamad, who was married to Yusif Habibi. As soon as he arrived, she would give him “half a loaf of fresh bread (tabun) dipped in olive oil, and a sprinkle of salt.”

My father did not know his paternal grandparents very well: Elias Francis Farah died when my father was three years of age, so Elias must have passed away in 1924. My father’s paternal grandmother was Marta Haddad. The story told in the family is that our last name was originally Nsair, not Farah. My father searched for Elias’s birth certificate at the Catholic church in Shafa ‘Amr, but did not find a document. He explained that perhaps the name Francis was connected to Napoleon Bonaparte’s campaign in Palestine, when a unit stationed itself in Shafa ‘Amr during the siege of Akka (Acre) in 1789. Salah al-Din had also made it a center for his military operations when fighting the Crusaders in 1191. Many of the Palestinian Arab Christians who came to live in Shafa ‘Amr and the Galilee, my father explained, did so during Dhahr al-Omar’s period in the eighteenth century because “he did not discriminate against the Palestinian Arab Christians.” Al-Omar had built a castle in the town known to this day as al-Saraya and made Shafa ‘Amr the capital of his emirate in 1761.

Amin Elias Farah, my paternal grandfather, was a trusted figure in Shafa ‘Amr, so much so that Bedouin chiefs in the area kept their money with him for safekeeping, “as if he was their bank.” Having completed only grade 4, he decided to teach himself and acquired many skills and trades. He studied the Qur’an and the Bible and memorized much of these texts. So well-versed was he in the two holy books that he debated Muslim scholars on religious matters, quoting extensively from both. I remember him
as a gentle stoic with a great deal of charisma, and he certainly was a great storyteller. He married twice, the first time when he was perhaps only sixteen to Nazira Marshi from Nazareth who died after giving birth to her first son. Salma Habibi was his second wife.

Amin Elias Farah was also known as a nationalist, although he was never attached to a political party. During the Great Revolt in the late 1930s, rebels would come to him to repair their guns. Among his documents was a copy of a letter written and signed by a number of leading figures in Shafa ‘Amr on 25 March 1925. The signatures included those of my grandfather, Amin Farah, and his brother Salim Farah in support of the “Executive Committee in Jerusalem.” The letter refers to a protest against the deteriorating situation in Palestine resulting from the Balfour Declaration. It describes how the people in Shafa ‘Amr sang patriotic songs, raised black banners, and expressed their readiness to use all means possible to “fight colonialist plans” and save the homeland from the dangers that loomed on the horizon. The letter concluded with a note: “Telegraphs have been sent to the High Commissioner, to Balfour, and Egyptian newspapers” expressing Shafa ‘Amr’s protests and remonstrations. Interestingly, signatures inform us how Shafa ‘Amr society was classified: signatories were positioned according to socioeconomic status or function: landowners, merchants, craftsmen/artisans, farmers, and students. Amin Farah signed under artisan or “industrialist,” while his brother Salim Farah signed under the category of merchant!

My father recounted an anecdote of his father’s:

**Rafiq Farah:** One time, he [Amin Farah] had a talk with Bishop Graham Brown (1891–1942), the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, and during the conversation, my father told the bishop: “If God is British, I will not obey him,” to which the bishop responded: “I was born in China.”

Like most young men in Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria)

---

Figure 1. Letter to the Executive Committee in Jerusalem from Shafa ‘Amr Community Leaders, March 1925. Farah family archives.
during the Ottoman period, my grandfather was ordered to the Safar Barlik, the term used for Ottoman conscription of young men to fight in the Balkan wars and on various fronts during WWI. He was sent to Suez, but after a few years managed to leave by convincing a German doctor that he could not carry a gun due to a bad infection in his thumb. He then walked back all the way, from Suez to Shafa ‘Amr.

My father had vivid recollections of the Mandate era in Shafa ‘Amr, and described a raid that he personally witnessed as a young boy:

Rafiq Farah: The Mandatory government of Palestine issued [successive] emergency regulations which imposed severe punishment on Palestinian Arabs for any small act such as: possessing a long knife, or a pistol, or cutting telephone lines, or for belonging to a rebel group fighting British centers of government or Jewish settlements. Palestinian collaborators were recruited …. One day when I was 14 years-old, a British army unit came to Shafa ‘Amr and ordered all men 14 years of age and above … to gather in an area outside the town under the olive trees some kilometers to the west of Shafa ‘Amr. While the men gathered, another army unit was dispatched to their houses to search for anything they defined as “weapons” including long knives. In the process, they threw out home belongings and foodstuffs. Moreover, each of the men gathered had to walk in front of a hooded collaborator, whose face was hidden by a sack with two small holes to look through and identify Palestinian rebels. I remember we remained squatting there for more than three hours. This, I witnessed personally, as I was there among the men of the village under the olive trees …. The Emergency Regulations meant that a person can be brought to a military tribunal with no possibility of him appealing to a civil court; the Military Tribunal could order the demolition of a house, detain someone for any length of time and so on; those regulations were adopted by Israel in 1948.

Bishop Gobat School (Madrasat Sayhun)

My father completed elementary school at the age of 13 in the summer of 1934 in Shafa ‘Amr and along with other boys from the town he was encouraged to attend Bishop Gobat School in Jerusalem. The school had been built by Bishop Samuel Gobat, the second Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem (1846–79) on what is called Jabal Sayhun (Mount Zion), hence the reference to it as Madrasat Sayhun, or Zion School. He was admitted to the seventh grade; he remembered the school gave him an identification number – “53” – which his mother sewed on all his clothing. He was told he was in the “Lions Group,” and there was also an “Eagles Group” and so on, for playing games and gym classes. He also recalled: “When I enrolled at Bishop Gobat School, I remember that in 1936 there was a strike and there was a schism between the Husayni and Nashashibi families. The Nashashibis studied at Bishop Gobat School, while the Husaynis attended St George’s.”
My father was “modernized” at school through a discipline that segmented time and place. It was strict: the boys had to get up at 6 a.m. and began classes at 8 a.m. At 3 p.m. they went to the school’s football field, which was then in the Greek Colony area of Jerusalem. Upon their return, they washed, had supper and immediately went to a study period that ended at 8:30 p.m. for younger students, and 9:00 p.m. for boys in higher classes.

The boys were also disciplined “spiritually.” They had to alternate attending the Arabic-speaking Anglican St. Paul Church one Sunday and the English-speaking Anglican Christ Church near Jaffa Gate on the next. My father remembered that he and the students did not understand or enjoy the service. However, they were utterly amused by Scottish soldiers who had colorful skirts, drums, and bagpipes as they lined up to enter the church.

Amin Elias Farah could only afford to give his son one shilling for the whole term, which he had to share with his two younger brothers. He remembered how the three brothers envied other boys who had food sent from home stored in a school cupboard. As for the less fortunate, they enjoyed the piece of bread the school gave them during recess.

About the time closer to his graduation, he recalled:

Rafiq Farah: In the last year, or fourth secondary, Hanna Mudawwar and myself had a room for the two of us … then the American Friends (Quakers) who ran a school in Ramallah started a training course for high school students who in the summer holidays would teach boys and girls in their villages …. I ran such a program in Shafa ‘Amr for about three weeks, and about fifty boys came.

Upon his graduation in the summer of 1939, the principal gave him a letter recommending him as an honors student to attend the Near East School of Theology (NEST) and the American University of Beirut (AUB). In that year, Britain declared war on Nazi Germany, and its colonial forces in Palestine brutally crushed the Great Revolt.

Near East School of Theology (NEST) and the American University of Beirut (AUB)

About his years in Beirut at AUB during the war, my father recounted:

Rafiq Farah: I was born in 1921 and the British Mandate in Palestine officially began in 1922. At the time there was no governmental department to register births. Instead, this was done by each mukhtar or representative of a religious community. Yusif ‘Asfur was the mukhtar of the Protestant Church – as it was called – he gave me a birth certificate ….

I graduated from Bishop Gobat School in 1939 and when I left to Beirut, I took a taxi from Shafa ‘Amr to Haifa, then to ‘Akka, Sur, Sayda, and then
Beirut …. I went to Beirut in 1940 and had to sit for the AUB sophomore class exam. In Lebanon the Vichy government was in control … Once in 1944 I was called by the Vichy security intelligence to explain why my philosophy book had all kinds of drawings …. When Vichy was overthrown by the British, a French government was then established under General de Gaulle whom I used to see from afar on Sundays entering the Roman Catholic cathedral. At the university, I registered for different subjects … philosophy I liked best. Dr. Charles Malik was head of the Philosophy Department and I enrolled in his course on Plato’s Republic. I wrote a small thesis on Plato’s theory of ideas for which he gave me an A …. In my class were the Orthodox Patriarch Hazim, Ghassan Tweini of al-Nahar newspaper, and Majid Fakhry who wrote some books on Aristotle …. World War II ended the summer of 1945 … and I returned home, sad to leave university and quite vague as to the next phase of my life.

Ordination: The Last Empty Train to Haifa

**Rafiq Farah:** Upon graduation I returned home to Shafa ‘Amr and after about two months I was asked to go to Jerusalem to prepare for my ordination … the principal of Bishop Gobat school allowed me to live
in a room occupied by two teachers: Paul Demerjian, a sports teacher, and Kamal Nasser, the Arabic teacher. Paul lives now in Holland. As for Kamal Nasser, he joined the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and lived in Beirut where he was murdered by the Israelis in 1973 ….

After I was ordained, I served in Shafa ‘Amr for a year, then was sent to Nablus … (1946–47). I added two more classes to the elementary school there. … Violent clashes between Jews and Arabs increased in 1946–47 …. There was a call by some of Haifa’s residents to declare Haifa an open city to save it from armed Zionist attacks …. However, Zionist terrorist groups were determined to pursue their plans to seize more land …. Violence escalated following the 1947 Partition Plan. In Haifa, armed Jews pushed barrels of explosives down from Hadar HaCarmel to Wadi al-Nisnas and areas [Arab areas] which were lower than the Hadar quarters. This caused death and destruction for Palestinian Arabs. Jewish gangs also placed a bomb in the vegetable market in the Arab quarter which killed more than one hundred Palestinians, among them Jiryis Farah, my father’s cousin. At the Haifa Refinery, Jewish workers killed Palestinian Arabs who were lining up at the main gate to apply for work. When news spread, the Arab workers retaliated killing Jews there. My brother Sami and the late Sadiq Abbud, who was also a member of St. John’s Church in Haifa, escaped the massacre. The British police came and took workers in buses and sent them home. The British were helping the Zionists …. As Britain was preparing to withdraw, General Stockwell agreed to hand their bases in Haifa over to the Jewish militias.

It so happened that in January or February 1948, Reverend Farid Odeh, the pastor of St. John’s Church … left Haifa. The Standing Committee (Executive) of the Church Council of the Evangelical Episcopal community acted quickly …. All other priests found justifications not to go to Haifa, so I was ordained hurriedly and sent there, because I was
unmarried and young . . . I was ordained on Thursday, 4 March 1948, in Nablus since the situation prevented my ordination in St. George’s Cathedral in Jerusalem. Before I left to Haifa, with only a small bag containing essential clothing, an elderly lady from the Taqtaq family handed me a piece of paper upon which was written Psalm 91, and she said “God will keep you and no danger will harm you.”

I took the last empty train to Haifa on 9 March 1948. I did not see anyone on it … there was no train after that … When the train arrived at the Haifa station, there was fighting in some quarters of the town ….

The next morning, I contacted the secretary of St. John’s Church (Mar Yuhanna), Mr. Dawud Yusif, who … introduced me to some of the families who remained in the city …. I found most of the church members worried and afraid …. I decided to go about wearing my black cassock so as to identify myself as a priest as a form of protection. But it did not work … One day, when I went to visit a Palestinian family in the German colony, I heard someone shouting …. “Jasus! Jasus!” (spy). When I entered the house, two Jewish terrorists, I think from the Irgun, entered the house and one pointed a pistol to my forehead, and the other to the back of my head. I did not know any Hebrew then, but fortunately one person there managed to convince those two Jewish terrorists that I am a priest …. On another occasion while I was walking down Share‘ al-Jabal, or Mountain Road, a bullet from a Jewish sniper whizzed by about two centimeters from my right ear.

The British Prepare to Leave

Rafiq Farah: One morning in early April, I had a telephone call from the British District Commissioner to go see him. When I arrived he said he wanted to give the keys of the Social Welfare food stores belonging to the Mandatory government in Haifa to three persons: Mrs. Clautile Khayyat, the wife of Victor Khayyat, Sami Jaraysi, a social worker in Haifa who became one of our best friends … and I was the third. Mrs. Khayyat drove a van to take Sami and myself to churches, monasteries, and to the Haifa coast to distribute bread and tins of sardines to people who had fled the fighting ….

On the night of 21 April, the Haganah … carried out a major armed attack on the Arab quarters of the city. From about seven o’clock in the morning, I saw a stream of people fleeing, some carrying a suitcase, or a bundle of clothes looking for shelter. Many were coming from Wadi al-Salib …. The Haganah began to occupy Arab quarters, and Palestinians fled as the Haganah shot at them to force them out ….
People were distressed, terrified and at a loss … the Palestinians who lived in the eastern part experienced concentrated bombing and shooting … the Arabs were not shooting. It was the armed Jews who were attacking …. Many Palestinians came to our St. Luke’s Church compound; others went to the Haifa harbor hoping to find a boat to carry them to ‘Akka (Acre) or Lebanon. Others took shelter in the compounds of other churches …. Interestingly, a month or so prior to the occupation of Haifa, the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem had agreed with the Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem to allow the Armenians of Haifa to take refuge in St. Luke’s Church compound. After 1948, two Armenian families became permanent residents there.

Beginning on 22 April 1948, about forty people came to my house, among them Khalil Nasser, my brother-in-law, and Nakhul Nakhul …. After a few days, the British began instigating for Palestinians to leave and prepared an armored vehicle to transport them to Jordan. Among those who left was Khalil Nasser. I was told by several persons employed by the Mandatory government that the British did in fact encourage the Palestinians to leave their homeland. Slowly, people left, some went to Jordan, others took boats towards ‘Akka …. I used to have breakfast at the English High School in Haifa, there was a lady called Mariam Rahhal
Towards the end of April and the beginning of May, Palestinians were ordered to register. Lawyers and other figures such as Ilyas Kusa were contacted to communicate the registration requirements to the Palestinians. We first had to submit the British Mandatory passport for identification. Israeli officials then stamped it with the word “botfel” meaning “annulled” and only then could we get the Israeli passport. In a propaganda campaign … Ben Gurion came to Haifa and personally handed some leading figures in the city their passports …. Palestinians who did not have a British Mandate passport used birth certificates.

The Arab Committee: Nur al-Din al-Abbasi, Father Butrus Fakhuri, Bulus Farah, Rev. Rafiq Farah

**Rafiq Farah:** Before the end of April of 1948, several of us formed a small committee under the name “The Arab Committee.” The purpose was to help Palestinians in Haifa …. The members were: Nur al-Din al-‘Abbasi, who became a good friend of ours; Father Butrus Fakhuri of the Greek Catholic Church, Bulus Farah, a prominent Communist … and myself.

The Committee visited two internment camps for Arab detainees: one in Sarafand … where some members from the Ramla parish were being held, and the other in ‘Atlit …. The detainees included those captured during the war, and some people who managed to return from Lebanon or Jordan … but were captured by the Israeli army. We gave those in the internment camps some food and sweets. In the Sarafand camp, I saw Bayyuk Bayyuk and his brothers, and in ‘Atlit camp I saw my brother Tawfiq who was caught crossing back into Palestine from Lebanon, where he was studying.

In the first week following the occupation of Haifa, the Israeli authorities declared that all the Palestinian Arabs will be placed under military rule, later using the Emergency Regulations (1950). The Arabs in Haifa were ordered to abandon their homes and reside only in Wadi al-Nisnas, an impoverished neighborhood. They were also ordered not to move about the city during the first few weeks except in Wadi al-Nisnas. If we had to move, we were ordered to obtain a military permit from the police station … which at the time was near the Carmelite square …. We were also ordered to register our names with the authorities without delay. Some of the prominent Arabs of Haifa who lived in the ‘Abbas quarter, like a few lawyers who had connections … managed to stay in their homes …. Soon after the occupation, I managed to get a written permit to visit
Wadi al-Nisnas … I went there, I found all the homes deserted, some of the doors were ajar with all the furniture still there, and the only living creatures I saw were some dogs and cats …. Some of the residents had fled to ‘Akka, or Lebanon …. It wasn’t long before the Israeli authorities established an office for what they called Custodian for Absentees’ Property. Jewish settlers began to occupy the houses that belonged to Palestinian Arabs … or, entered these houses to steal the furniture and valuables. Some Palestinians asked if I could help them get a written order issued from the Absentee Property office, which stated that no one was allowed to occupy their property or the property of one of their family members who had left the country. I was able to get a few such notices and stuck them on the house doors …. I used to spend long hours in the police station, or in the office of the Custodian for Absentee Property advocating for Palestinian Arab rights and property …. 

With the beginning of the summer of 1948, I began visiting ‘Akka (Acre) where … all the Palestinian Arabs were ordered by the military governor to relocate to the Old City. But our church was outside the Old City … so for a few months, I held services on Sunday afternoons in the home of Philip Hassun, shared also by the family of Michael (Michel) Kawar within the old city …. 

I remember one day in 1948 or 1949 an English man came and asked
to interview me about the situation in Palestine. He must have been connected to the British government. I asked my friend Bulus Farah to … be the main spokesperson …. The British visitor was not very happy with what we said, and since then both the British government and the Israelis began to brand me as the “Red Priest,” and watched me more closely …. I also found out later that the Greek Catholic Archbishop accused me of being “a communist and a trouble-maker!” …. Bulus Farah was in the Palestine Communist Party but was upset and surprised when the Soviet Union agreed to the Partition Plan, and did not join Rakah [the Israeli Communist Party] but he remained a communist. He was a good friend of ours. After the occupation he owned a bookstore for a while …. The Mapam asked him to join their party but he refused and wanted to stay independent …. Bulus did not join the Society although he supported our work.

Establishing the Society for Arab Minority Rights in Israel

Rafiq Farah: On 21 August 1949, I wrote an article in the Communist Arabic newspaper *al-Ittihad* suggesting the formation of a “League for the Defense of Human Rights” open to all Arabs and Jews …. The article created a lot of interest … in Arab and Jewish circles, mainly from supporters of the Ehud party whose founder was Judah Magnes …. Martin Buber, an Ehud supporter and a Jewish philosopher wrote me a letter dated 8 September 1949, supporting … the idea of forming a League. The Communist Party also started to contact me …. Rakah was known to manipulate opportunities to appear as the initiator of ideas or activities to gain popularity…. But originally, the Society came about because of the article I published in *al-Ittihad* ….

Randa Farah: Do you remember who contacted you?

Rafiq Farah: I think it was Hanna Naqqara …. Hanna was a member of the Israeli Communist Party …. We had a meeting in Haifa … and decided to form the Society for the Defence of Arab Minority Rights …. I was chosen as Chairman of the Society whose membership included Arabs and Jews … representing different areas of the country, labour unions, and professions. After a while, the Israeli government started to pressure the members of this Society to leave. Among those being pressured were members of government parties, and others unable to withstand the pressure. Those who remained with me in the Society included Nur al-Din al-‘Abbasi, Arab members from Rakah, and the leftists …. I continued to serve in the Society as its chairman until we left Haifa in 1965. The Society became less active after 1963.
Figure 6. Rafiq Farah’s article in *al-Ittihad*, “Hawla iqtiarah ta’lif hizb ‘Arabi fi Israyil” [Regarding the proposal to establish an Arab party in Israel], 21 August 1949.
Working against the Israeli Reign of Terror (1948–66)

*Rafiq Farah:* We fought against the Emergency Regulations, land expropriation, deportations, the nationality law, the law of return, and so on … the Emergency Regulations were very restrictive …. We sent many letters of protest, held conferences, developed legal documents, published pamphlets, and articles … we spent many hours in police stations, court hearings, etc. …. We were reacting to the immediate repressive measures.

To give the reader a sense of what some of the Society’s documents portray, one, dated 12 December 1955, from Shafiq Dib, the head of the city council of the town of al-Ramah, to the Israeli army’s chief of staff, protests against declaring large swathes of the town’s land as closed areas, including an area of 6,000 dunums, arguing there were no other agricultural or pasture land areas for the town. Another document details the terrible conditions of many who were ordered into exile within historic Palestine, such as Sulayman Zurayk from ‘Ilabun who was late returning to Jaffa (his place of exile) because he was ill. The Military Government ordered his imprisonment for four months, although two doctors testified to his illness.

This heartless Israeli repression was unleashed at a time when the Palestinian Arabs were still traumatized by the massive 1948 uprooting and expulsion: they were leaderless, and many were still mourning the death or exile of loved ones. Most had abruptly lost their sources of livelihood, and others were internally displaced. The latter were given an Orwellian term – the “Present Absentees” – although physically present, they were “absent” in the Israeli legal edifice and prohibited from returning to their homes.

Although the Palestinian survivors remained on their ancestral homeland, the political nexus around them shifted so radically that they were transformed overnight into the undesirable, inferior, and punishable outsiders. Moreover, there was no mass revolutionary movement they could join, no effective political leaders, or any meaningful support from the Arab world. It was in this suffocating environment that my father suggested creating a “League for the Defense of Human Rights,” emphasizing the “human” as the essential subject of rights. He argued against limiting the league to the defense of Arab human rights, not only because human rights were universal by definition, but to avoid the Israeli state repression should their activities be seen as limited to Arabs.

It is also important to bear in mind that the proposal to establish a league to defend human rights occurred in August 1949, less than a year following the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (10 December 1948). This indicates that the Palestinians were becoming familiar with the new world order that followed WWII, including the Universal Declaration, which was considered a revolution in international law. My father was appealing to this new principle, which was premised on the idea that individuals could henceforth obtain protection from the
state. During our conversations, my father explained that for Palestinians both their human rights and their collective rights to self-determination had been and remain violated.

When I asked my father about Buber, he said that although he was ultimately a liberal Zionist, in the context of the time, a critical Jewish voice such as his added weight in supporting Palestinian demands. Indeed, the judicial arena is sometimes one of the few avenues to resist a settler-colonial state. We see this with indigenous struggles across the world where land claims and other rights are being demanded in courts. This does not preclude other forms of resistance, but during certain historical periods, it looms as more critical than others. The Society, through its lawyers, appealed
to Israel’s own laws and its (false) public declarations and claims to democracy to oppose the Emergency Laws and their ruinous effects on Palestinian society.

My father, however, was also a universalist, which was another reason that he called for “human rights” and did not specify a national or religious group. For him, one needed a moral and ethical code upon which to build a durable political and social order, and that meant universal principles. In this sense, he was a Palestinian renaissance man. Over the years, he became less religious and more spiritual, more of a Sufi and a mystic than a priest. He abhorred fundamentalism or any worldview that closed the path to questioning. He called for breaking down barriers and borders, without compromising on collective struggles for liberation, justice, and freedom. It is thus not surprising that alongside my mother, their lifetime commitment was to work for social justice and from within the churches fought against Christian Zionism, which they viewed as poisonous propaganda to facilitate Zionist colonization in Palestine.

The Society’s Activities and Achievements

The Society was formed in 1951, and in 1953 its members were: Rev. Rafiq Farah, president/chairman; Jamil Khoury, lawyer; Hanna Naqqara, lawyer and secretary of the Society representing Rakah; Nur al-Din al-Abbasi, treasurer; Kurt Gruneman (a dentist); Yanni Yanni, Palestinian Arab mayor of Kufr Yasif; Eliazar Beiri, editor of al-Mirsad newspaper; Rustum Bastoni, Knesset member; Tsella Erem, Haifa Municipality member; Salim Jubran, Israeli Labor Union member; Samuel Cohen, secretary of the Committee for the Defense of the Human Being and the Citizen; Muhammad Abdel Qader Yunes, lawyer; Gabriel Stern, journalist, Al Hamishmar; Salim al-Qassem, secretary for the executive committee, Labor Union in Nazareth; Hanna Moeis, Orthodox Church Council, al-Rameh; Abdel Majid al-Zu’bi, member, executive committee, Israeli Labor Union; ‘Uthman Abu Ras, representative of the workers and farmers in al-Tayba.

**Randa Farah:** How successful was the Society?

**Rafiq Farah:** We did not win most cases, but at least we restrained the state a little.

**Randa Farah:** What about al-‘Ard movement (Land Movement)?

**Rafiq Farah:** It had not yet been established as a movement; it was founded later by Habib Qahwaji. At the time, in that early phase, we were focused on how to deal with military rule … how to protect the land.

One of the letters I include here (fig. 8), signed by my father and the two lawyers Hanna Naqqara and Jamil Khoury, calls for equal rights between Arabs and Jews. But it also specifically speaks against national oppression, and racial discrimination revealing that the Society was uncompromising on the Palestinian national question, even if this was not always declared so clearly and publicly.
Dear Friend,

Our Society was established a year and a half ago for the purpose of defending the rights of the Arab minority in Israel and insuring their equality with their Jewish brethren through lawful activities. Our Society was constituted on a non-party basis by Jews and Arabs who firmly believe in just and understanding and friendship without reservation or condition.

Our Society largely contributed to the defense of Arab minority rights. It strives to amend the racial Israel citizenship law which deprived a considerable number of Arab citizens of their citizenship. It aroused public opinion against the land expropriation law which rob Arab land owners and fellahin of their best holdings reaching into thousands of dunums. Consequently it organised delegations, public meetings and work stoppages in protest against these government arbitrary measures. Moreover it demanded the abrogation of poll tax and agitation for municipal and local council election in town and villages populated by Arab citizens. It was furthermore issued manifestos and convened press conferences. Naturally it hopes to consistently and persistently continue these activities until the national oppression policies and racial discrimination is ended.

Now at a time when the government is accelerating its pressure and adding severity in its dealings with Arab citizens at a time when the wave of national oppression is gaining momentum, expressing itself in banishing tens of Arab villagers to distant places; demolishing their homes; rendering them destitute; aggressively barricading their villages and terrorising searching them, a policy leading to pulling down Arab society.

In view of this danger our Society more than any time in the past, strongly feels responsible to preserve the Arab minority in Israel which forms a bridge head of Arab Jewish friendship in the Middle East.

In order to carry out its task on a wider scale our Society needs your moral and material support. We appeal to you to send your generous financial contributions at your earliest.

Your Society for the Defence of Arab Minority Rights, F.O.B. 1886, Haifa.

---

Treasurer

Society for the Defence of Arab Minority Rights, F.O.B. 1886, Haifa.

Dear Sir,

In response to your appeal for financial aid in support of your Society, I send herewith a sum of and undertake to pay a monthly contribution of...

Address

Yours faithfully.

---

Figure 8. Letter distributed on behalf of the Society signed by Rev. Rafiq Farah, Hanna Naqqara, and Jamil Khoury calling for support.
Cooptation of Palestinians was another Israeli state strategy to quell resistance. My father recounted how a member\textsuperscript{13} in the Anglican Congregation had planned to convince the church council to agree to the idea of “transfer.”\textsuperscript{14} However, the plan was divulged and in a 17 January 1951 meeting at St. John’s Church, my father and those who found out about it exposed the person and the plot to the local church committee. My father remembered how “all of us church members were extremely distressed and angry.” The plan was to transfer the community to Brazil, and the incentive was to financially compensate the church and each individual member. In an angry response, the church members wrote to the executive committee of the church council rejecting the plan and to permanently close this subject. Thus, the transfer plan of the Palestinian Anglican community to Brazil was foiled. My father was also active in advancing education for Palestinian Arabs.

St. John’s School, Haifa

Rafiq Farah: In 1950, I decided to re-open St. John’s school that was closed in 1947 because of the dangerous situation in Palestine. I developed it because the Palestinian Arabs needed a supportive Arab environment. In the Israeli schools, students were discriminated against and taught to be pro-Israeli …. I contacted Mrs. Theodora Zarifa and asked her to act as headmistress. On 20 September 1950, the school was opened with twenty-one children. I formed a school committee and we added more classes. By 1965, the school went up to grade seven and had about 250 boys and girls. We used student fees to help improve the school – the building belonged to the church. Classes began in small rooms, then I built more classrooms above the pharmacy …. Among those I hired was Wajih ‘Awad, ‘Izzat ‘Awayyid from Nazareth, and Edward Khamis for sports. I sent both Wajih and Edward to the UK for a year for more training.

As expected, the Israeli government was not happy with what I did and with the school. I brought schoolbooks from Lebanon …. Ben Orr used to come and examine the school and he did not like the fact that we didn’t teach pro-Israeli curricula. One day he threatened me: “The Israeli Security warns you, because you are against Israel ….” I was the head of the school, until we left Haifa (1965). Sulayman Qatran established the Orthodox school in Haifa. Hanna Abu Hanna, your aunt’s husband, was its principal for a number of years. When students completed St. John’s school which went up to grade seven, we used to send them to the Orthodox school.
Al-Ra’ed Journal

Rafiq Farah: In 1951, we began publishing the church magazine, which we named Akhbar al-Kanasiyya or Church News. However, I wanted to expand its readership and include articles not related to the church. Your mother and I then established a journal called al-Ra’ed, meaning “The Pioneer.” Al-Ra’ed became popular, Bulus Farah wrote a monthly article in it.

Randa Farah: Where did you print it?

Rafiq Farah: We used to print it at the Rakah office. I managed to get paper from Norway. In addition, there was a British academic who helped finance it. If I am not mistaken, her name was Ms. Henry … she was interested in the Sufi movement. Every now and then she would send us money from England.

In 1953, I published an article in al-Ra’ed by Dr. Simon Shereshevsky, in which he criticized a new Israeli law which allowed the state to expropriate Arab-owned land. In his article, he used the story in the Old Testament about King Ahab and his wife Jezebel, who seized a piece of land belonging to a poor farmer called Nabut, and then killed him (Kings, ch. 21). The story, as Shereshevsky wrote, applied to what the Israeli government was doing to its Arab citizens. His article had a huge impact.
Israel’s Murder of Three Palestinian Teenagers, 1961

On 17 September 1961, three youths from Haifa, Raymun Yusif Marun, aged 17, George Salim Shama, aged 17, and Jiryis Badin, aged 16, were killed by Israeli security guards while they were attempting to cross the border into Egypt and their bodies were mutilated.

Bulus Farah and my father wrote a pamphlet protesting the murder which they distributed among the Arab population. Also a petition was circulated and signed by hundreds of people from Haifa. My father noted that, “Rakah, typically, was not very happy that we took the initiative before they did.” A wave of anger and sorrow swept over the Palestinian Arabs and some Jewish supporters, calling for a judicial commission of inquiry into the circumstances and the punishment of those who unjustly murdered youths who had no weapons on them.

My father, who headed the funeral march alongside Nur al-Din al-Abbasi, recalled:

**Rafiq Farah:** I headed the Committee for Haifa’s Victims (*Lajnat dahaya Hayfa*) dealing with this horrible crime. Nur al-Din al-‘Abbasi and myself were called to the police station and warned that no “trouble” is allowed during the funeral …. I was at the head of the funeral procession and with me was Nur al-Din.

Aba Hushi (a Polish Jew whose original name was Abba Schneller) was from Mapai, Ben Gurion’s party …. As Nur al-Din and I led the protest to church, Aba Hushi came and brought an armed unit with him. He sat on a chair to watch us … a line of helmeted police were standing at the side of the road leading to Mar Elias Greek Catholic Church, where the funeral of the three youths took place. One of the mothers of the murdered youth wanted me to see the body …. The situation was very tragic … the three young men were from Haifa, one Muslim and two Christians …. We walked from the house in Wadi al-Nisnas down Share‘ al-Jabal to the Catholic church at the end of the street …. there were many people in the march.

On this occasion, the *Jerusalem Post* (17 September 1961) published an article noting that the Committee of 13 included Antoine Marun, one of the victim’s brothers, Hanna Naqqara, Ilyas Kusa, and my father, the chairman, who, according to the *Jerusalem Post* “occasionally sends appeals to international and foreign bodies on local Arab matters.” The article (see fig. 10) noted that the Arabs are calling for an “Enquiry Commission” and for a “legal way open to them” to ask the coroner to open an investigation. This points out how important legal arguments were to the Palestinian Arabs. Even when they did not bring the results they sought, it became a means to raise political and legal awareness in the Arab community and beyond.
Conclusions

One day, not long before his death, my father said, “I became truly ‘aware’ just in the last few years of my life,” referring to the theological and worldly questions that led him to free himself from old rigid traditions and ideas. Over time, he changed his views about religion, politics, and society. In some way, he did become the “red” priest he was accused of being, by those who sought to silence his political activism in the early years. But this change was largely due to fact that the world around him was changing too, and radically so in Palestine. Poignantly, Zionism used the Bible he was preaching to justify colonial dispossession and displacement. This was sufficient motivation for him to reject its literal interpretation and shun biblical Zionism and fundamentalism; instead, he sought liberation theology focusing on ending human suffering in this world, more so than in an imagined other. This, expectedly, resulted in many “traditionalists” and the Church establishment to view him as a rebel of sorts.

This is but one of the conclusions one may draw from his life history, but the narrative allows for other ideas and for further questioning. The first deals directly with the Society and here one may question to what extent and under what conditions can legal battles lead to justice in settler-colonial states, or do they merely provide false hope? What comparisons may be made between the Palestinian struggles in Israeli courts against land confiscation with indigenous land claims in North America and elsewhere? Are western legal venues useful or do they operate inseparably from the political realm to support state claims against individual and collective indigenous rights, meanwhile offering a false veneer of democracy to these states?

A second area of research deals with Palestinian Arab and Jewish relations from 1948 through the early 1950s. One question that his life history raised was the extent to which Palestinian legal battles and protests rattled the liberal senses of figures like Martin Buber, who could never completely shed his Zionism but wavered between supporting the “Jewish state” or the “Rights of Man,” as he shows in his letter to my father. In this context, my father’s al-Ittihad article and other documents I examined revealed two interesting points: the first shows Palestinian awareness of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and its emphasis on the universal applicability of rights that carried with it significant moral weight against exclusivist ideas. The second is that oral narratives and documents can give us a glimpse about the genesis of Palestinian nationalism, and, uniquely, the fissures and views within as to what kind of “nation-society” is imagined for the future: is it chauvinistic or romantic nationalism based on the idea of purity (jus sanguinis), or a civic society underpinned by principles of cosmopolitanism, universality, and diversity?

A third area gleaned from the oral narrative pertains to rural-urban relations and socioeconomic shifts. My father’s childhood recollections, for example, are filled with images of the land, olive and fruit trees, and the rural hinterland landscapes. However, my father was born only four years after the Ottoman Empire crumbled and its traces had not vanished in Palestine. Shafa ‘Amr by then was more of a town than a typical Palestinian village, and boasted a market and trade, a diverse
population (Muslims, Christians, and Druze), small business ventures, craftsmen, and “industrialists.” The Shafa ‘Amr protest letter signed in 1925 gives us a clue about the town’s social structure: signatories were clustered under categories: landowners, merchants, industrialists, and students, who were already leaving the town to study in larger urban centers. In his oral narrative, my father compared Shafa ‘Amr to the larger cities he lived in, like Haifa and Beirut, and on that scale it appeared in his imagination as a small village.

Finally, his efforts to develop schools were part of the battles waged by Palestinians to obtain education and to learn how to maneuver to function under a state that discriminated against them in all areas of life, and suppressed the history of the land and its people. I can still see my father standing on a flimsy wooden stage built for the end of year celebrations in St. John’s school, proudly speaking about its Palestinian-Arab teachers and students, and the latest improvements made to the school and classrooms.\(^6\) As children and despite the repressive political atmosphere, we relished the occasion to dance and sing on the school stage. I can still hear his calming voice in a turbulent world.

Randa Farah is an anthropologist and associate professor at Western University in Canada. She is also an adjunct faculty member at the Centre for Global Studies, Huron University College.

**Endnotes**


2. In this article, the author draws on interviews she conducted (both audio and video) over more than six years; however, the quotes used here are Rafiq Farah’s recollections in interviews conducted in December 2019, video-recorded and transcribed by the author.

3. In Ilan Pappé’s book titled *The Forgotten Palestinians*, I noted that he mistakenly named Bulus Farah, instead of my father, as the chairman or president of the Society. During an email exchange, Pappé noted that he may have used documents that confused my father with Bulus because, although they are not related, they share the same family name.

4. The author plans a more comprehensive article that will analyze the struggles and transformations in Haifa at the time, based on Rafiq Farah’s documents dating from the early 1940s to the 1960s in Haifa.

5. According to John Reynolds (Adalah’s newsletter, vol.104, May 2013), the 1945 British Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulations granted broad emergency powers to the executive and military authorities. Although opposed by Palestinian Arabs and a few Jewish-Israeli judges, legal experts, and religious figures, the British regulations were incorporated into the Israeli legal system and became the legal basis for control of Palestinian Arab regions within Israel, who lived under military rule until 1966; they were used against the Palestinian population of the occupied territories from 1967 onwards. Reynolds notes that the Mandatory regulations are but one element of Israel’s expansive emergency legal regime and that “Israel stands out as the exemplar of ‘permanent emergency’.”
6 See online: The Discriminatory Laws Database compiled by The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (Adalah), online at www.adalah.org/en/content/view/7771 (accessed 7 March 2021).

7 Although the struggle to appoint an Arab bishop had begun much earlier, it was not until 1958 that an Arab Bishop (Reverend Najib Cubain) was officially appointed as Bishop of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, while Bishop Campbell MaCinnes was appointed as Archbishop of the Jerusalem Diocese.

8 They are also Emile Habibi’s grandparents, Emile was my father’s first cousin.

9 Also written as Nseir, Nsayr, or Nusayr.

10 As Reynolds explains, the British Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 were but the last version of the Mandatory emergency codes deployed to repress Palestinian resistance. Earlier versions included: the Palestine (Defence) Order in Council 1931; the Palestine Martial Law (Defence) Order in Council 1936; the Emergency Regulations 1936; the Palestine (Defence) Order in Council 1937; the Defence (Military Courts) Regulation 1937; the Defence (Military Commanders) Regulations 1938; and the Defence Regulations 1939. The Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945 were a more comprehensive form. John Reynolds, “Repressive Inclusion.” Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 49, no. 3 (2017): 268–93.


12 Buber mistakenly addressed my father by his brother’s first name Tawfiq, instead of Rafiq.

13 The author prefers to keep him unidentified here.


15 Interestingly, Buber wrote about the “Rights of Man” and my father about the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” two different though related historical documents. The former is from the late eighteenth century and the French Revolution, while the latter emerged in the aftermath of World War II, when the principle of universality was more firmly established.

16 The Israeli state provided very limited financial support for Palestinian educational institutions, or for any other institutions, and continues to deny assistance to develop Arab villages or neighborhoods within Israel.
Iron Caging the Palestinian Home
Child Home Arrest in Occupied East Jerusalem as Lawfare
Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Amir Marshi

Abstract
The Israeli legal regime in occupied East Jerusalem has increasingly home-arrested Palestinian children, while invoking legalistic welfare discursively reliant on principles of so-called child-protection. While criminologists, legal scholars, and social workers have defined home arrest as a “rehabilitative” alternative to punishment, children’s voices reveal that home arrest is a mundane penal technology used to penetrate a colonized childhood and home. Contextualizing this penal technology within settler-colonial violence, this article reveals how home arrest became an alternative mode of “lawfare,” a legal means of racialized structural violence targeting children. As the voices of children analyzed in this paper illustrate, home arrest invades, cages, and governs the native home and family to ultimately violate, debilitate, and paralyze the home-arrested child’s childhood and future.

Keywords
Palestinian childhood; criminalization, racialization; settler colonial governance; alternative to punishment; lawfare; searing the consciousness; home arrest; unchilding.

Marwan, a Palestinian boy from Jerusalem, was just over 13 years old when he was first home-imprisoned. By the time he was interviewed for this study, at 15 years old, Marwan had been subjected to three arrests. In his words:
Imprisonment at home changed me totally. It made me realize that what teachers, parents, and leaders tell us about the preciousness of children is a big lie. No one asked me what I want, what I think, or how I feel …. No one asked me whether I did what they accused me of and they had no proof of me throwing stones. All I did was throw the ball high, trying to reach the upper part of the pole, not “throwing a stone,” but no one asked me. My parents apologized to the police, my father promised the judge that I will never do it again, and agreed to help in “educating” me while home-imprisoned. So, I was kept at home for fifty days, and I never went back to being the same Marwan again. If you ask me to explain to you how I see the world now after all those days of home-imprisonment, the world from the Palestinian child’s point of view, in here, in the Old City, I see the world as a police station … a big prison … a punishment center, a center for imprisonment.

Although the interrogators – as Marwan narrated above – could not produce actual evidence proving that he did in fact throw a stone, the judge, after “considering” Marwan’s age, made the decision to “release” him into fifty days of home arrest. As Marwan put it, “my parents obeyed,” transforming his home and world into a “detention center.”

Early criminological writings pointed to the “pains of imprisonment” and discussed the psychologically, socially, and economically damaging effects of incarceration, which prompted proposals for community-based “alternatives,” including home arrest. Home arrest was thus presented by criminology, welfare, and socio-legal scholars as an “age-sensitive” and “child-centered” “alternative to punishment” aimed at deterring alleged offenders while taking into consideration the age, developmental stage, and rights of the child in the modern state. Juxtaposing these socio-legal presentations of home arrest with those of Marwan and the many Palestinian children and families that have experienced home arrest in occupied East Jerusalem invites us to rethink this penological practice, while revealing its role in the overall governance of childhood and silencing children’s dissent. It prompts us to grapple with a set of theoretical, methodological, and ethical questions: what psycho-political implications does home arrest have for the child, the family, and the community at large? What are the ensuing penological dynamics of home arrest within the broader context of racialized criminalization, and settler-colonial expansion?

Historically, home confinement as a method of state punishment was applied in order to silence political dissenters. In Palestine, during four hundred years of Ottoman rule and influence, governing policies evolved from early enlightened approaches in the sixteenth century (Sulayman “the law giver” invested heavily in Jerusalem) to more repressive approaches, especially following the Palestinian Naqib al-Ashraf rebel uprising that took place in Jerusalem in the early eighteenth century. The last four years of Ottoman rule in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, from 1914 to 1918 during the First World War, were the most brutal, when many Palestinians were
detained, tortured, and publicly hanged. However, unlike the Zionists that came after them, the Ottoman (and British) regimes were not interested in expelling the natives of Palestine in order to appropriate their lands; rather they both used penological policies with the aim to patronize and exploit the subject Palestinian population.

Following the Nakba, and the establishment of the state of Israel, from 1948 to 1966, Zionists imposed military rule and most young Palestinian men within Israeli-controlled areas were arrested and held (many for several years) in detention centers (mu’taqal) and many under home arrest. As Sabri Jiryis in his scholarly work and Fouzi El-Asmar in his personal biography explain, house arrest was used to silence political dissenters. Central to the military regime was the prevention of the “return” of internally displaced persons and refugees to their villages and towns and maximal confiscation of land. A key tool was the Defence (Emergency) Regulations adopted from British colonialism and used by the Israeli state almost exclusively against Palestinian citizens of Israel and in areas with a majority Arab population. “In the name of security,” these regulations and the appointed Israeli military governors empowered authorities to: declare an area “closed” (which was applied extensively to depopulated Arab villages and towns); prevent any movement in and out of an area; expropriate land (millions of dunums were confiscated between 1948 and 1966); impose curfews in any village (the massacre of Kafr Qassim in October 1956 took place as part of such a sudden curfew); subject specific individuals to police supervision; expel any person from the country (which was almost exclusively aimed at Arabs and “returning refugees”); and place any person under house arrest. When Zionists imposed home arrest as a punitive measure in 1971, France introduced home confinement as an “alternative” for common offenders and the same was done in Italy in 1975. The U.S. also followed reforms in punitive policy and home arrest was first put in practice in St. Louis in 1971 as an alternative to punishment and as a measure to prevent the stigmatizing effect of incarceration.

This paper highlights the narrations and experiences of Palestinian children while critically engaging with the politico-legal discourse that brands home arrest as a “child-sensitive,” “protective,” “alternative to punishment.” Invoking children’s voices allows us to pay attention to the complex network of legality, surveillance, and penology operating in tandem with the political ideologies and racial discourses embedded in state policies. Children’s narrations, as this paper will show, go beyond exposing the “pains of imprisonment” to understanding the regime of settler-colonial governance entailed in home arrest not only as a penal technology, but also as a mode of lawfare that aims at silencing and controlling colonized native communities. Our paper places what is considered to be a rehabilitative “alternative to punishment” within the larger context of settler colonialism in which practices of “criminal justice” are produced. It concludes by showing how home arrest, while utilizing the liberal legal discourses of “age-sensitive” “alternatives to punishment,” operates a slow and hidden structural violence against the native community that cages and dispossesses the home, penetrates and dismembers intimate familial ties, and ultimately unchilds the Palestinian child.
Childhood, Settler-Colonial Violence, and the Native Home

Criminologists have criticized incarceration practices by exposing the effect that deprivation of liberty, autonomy, and contact with loved ones, and their resulting psychological damage have on the imprisoned, and suggested home arrest as an alternative to punishment. Yet, as an alternative punishment, home arrest also carries both negative and positive consequences: home-arrested detainees report the importance of maintaining family life and preserving a normal lifestyle away from what Sykes defined as the “pains of imprisonment.” Chamiel and Walsh suggested that although home arrest tends to be a more therapeutic and rehabilitative, rather than punishment-oriented, option, it can bring about what they called “developmental arrest.” But how do we understand criminal justice punitive measures, including home arrest, through the perspective of the colonized?

Over the last fifteen years, scholars have exposed the way in which discrimination and systemic racism shape the state criminal justice system. Criminology as a discipline, Geoff Ward argues, works to reproduce state-organized racial violence. This “disciplinary complicity,” he explains, is a product of the limited scope in which criminologists have sought to identify modes of violence and their failure to recognize structural forms of what Rob Nixon called “slow violence.” Slow violence is a reworking of the way in which we generally view structural violence as an unseen, destructive process that “play[s] out across a range of temporal scales.” According to Ward, this form of violence, in which “harms are more attritional, dispersed, and hidden[,] becomes ‘un-seen’ as it targets those communities that are already systematically criminalised.” Most importantly, this violence furthers the “dis-accumulation, collective under-development, and generational disadvantage” of historically oppressed groups. Critical scholars suggest that we must pay attention to the structural political violence that dominates colonized groups, generates their dispossession, and governs their bodies, land, and spaces of mobility and livability. Keeping in mind that colonialism was done legally, we have to locate the criminal justice system within larger racializing practices that are guided by the settler-colonial logic of elimination.

As critical scholars have revealed, the modern state-penal incarceration system reorganizes the space and time of the imprisoned subject so as to thoroughly regulate, govern, and discipline his or her bodily and mental capacities. That is, state punishment works as a “technology of self” that constructs subject preferences in alignment with the objectives of the political authority. This is done through objectifying and subjectifying prisoners into “criminalized” others, marked, surveilled, and completely governed in social life. Through indigenous eyes, however, as Cunneen and others have argued, we need to understand the colonial state criminal justice system as “a set of racialising practices” that maintain othered groups in spaces of difference and disposability. Racialized criminalization contributes to the elimination and dispossession of indigenous lives and spaces.

For Palestinian children living in the occupied Palestinian territories, including East...
Jerusalem, the mundane violence of occupation penetrates body and life and dominates all spaces of living: schools, neighborhoods, and homes. Daily policing, patrolling, strip-searching, and arrests add to omnipresent surveillance through CCTV cameras, military checkpoints, and security personnel, which maintain the reappropriation of native life and land and confine children within a condition of caging, criminalization, and unchilding. We analyze “unchilding” in the settler-colonial context in which “[t]he bodies of children…become contested politicized objects, and children are transformed into ‘legalized’ instruments that can be used to enact state violence against themselves, their families, and their larger indigenous communities.” “Unchilding,” according to Shalhoub-Kevorkian, is “an uncompromising practice and ideology whereby violence against Palestinian childhood becomes part of the war machine” and where the deprivation of childhood “operates profoundly through the disruption of the intimate that is embodied in the biopolitical and visceral as well as through the global and local politics of silence, negligence, intervention, and inaction.” That is, by “unchilding,” we are referring to the process through which the legal, political, and military apparatuses of the settler-colonial state objectify the Palestinian child as a security threat that must be constantly surveilled, managed, and targeted. Home arrest, therefore, should be understood within the same context of this colonial governmentality of childhood. That is, unchilding goes beyond the confinement of children’s bodies and restriction of their mobility within their own neighborhood, city, and homeland, to penetrating and invading and governing the home-space through the multiple surveillance technologies, including “welfare” modes of intrusion.

Home carries a psychosocial meaning as a space where a person’s subjectivity in relation to the world is developed. Critical scholars have sought to unravel the way in which social spaces, such as the home, are substantially formed in response to the structural racism and political oppression outside it, making home a political site of survival. The home, for racialized communities, is a place where relations are defined by mutual affirmation and where one can “heal many of the wounds inflicted by racist domination.” Home, for the colonized, functions as a place of memories, as anthropologist and oral historian Rosemary Sayigh argues, which embraces the role of producing identities, localities, social relations, cultures, and the nation. Black feminist scholar bell hooks argues that for the child in the African-American community, the act of homecoming becomes a soothing experience, a place of nurture, where one feels safe from the oppressive experience of racial violence encountered outside the home. According to hooks, the “home-place” is where the child learns “dignity, integrity of being,” and “faith,” a self-affirming site where Black people “could strive to be subjects, not objects” of racial oppression. The history of colonial governments reveals the political logic entailed in the involvement of the settler state within the home and family, which is apparent in child-removal policies. The colonial state’s “welfare” policy was heavily concerned with the lives of native families and informed by racializing notions that viewed these children as threats to be managed through re-disciplining. Such policies were also avowedly “enlightened” and well-intentioned, promoting the project of dispossession.
This paper critically analyzes the use of “alternative” in referring to home arrest as an “alternative to punishment.” It is based on the voices of children and parents in occupied East Jerusalem who suffered home arrest, juxtaposed with court records, letters, and interviews with social workers, lawyers, and human rights activists, conducted between 2015 and 2020. The study follows a multi-scalar methodology, which enabled us to connect disjointed accounts, reach children in their spaces, times, and contexts, and describe the meaning of home arrest. Relying on multi-scalar fragments, as constellations of data to connect thoughts, records, and memories from various times, brought together different analytical threads, but was risky at times. To maintain the safety of interviewees, we used pseudonyms and removed identifying details. In staging voices of children as our epistemological point of departure, we hope to push analytical boundaries and read and deconstruct colonial modes of punishment through the eyes of the colonized and occupied.

**Punitive Violence at Home: The Legal Aggravation**

Despite international and Israeli regulations regarding protection of children and those in custody, the abuse, arrest, and detention by state security forces are facts of everyday life for Palestinian children. A 2017 report by two Israeli human rights organizations, B’Tselem and HaMoked, pointed out that Palestinian children were unprotected following arrest and their parents did not know their condition during arrest and interrogations – in violation of Israeli law. Arrests of children under the age of twelve and interrogation without the presence or, in many cases, knowledge of their parents are routine procedures that render the Juveniles Act, which prohibits such practices, irrelevant when it comes to Palestinian children. Indeed, over the years, arrests of children have starkly increased and more laws have been passed by the Israeli government that legitimize the harsher targeting and sentencing of Palestinian children in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In this context, home arrest has become increasingly used as a strategy of the criminal justice system.

The Israeli legal administration has constructed two legal systems that separate Jewish Israelis subject to Israeli civil law from Palestinians subjugated to either martial law or racialized modes of invoking the law. These racially defined legal distinctions created unequal governance of childhood and expanded the state’s legal capacity to detain and sentence underage Palestinians without recourse. Palestinian children in occupied East Jerusalem are subject to Israeli domestic law, which incorporates international obligations for the protection of children and the disposition of care, guidance, education, and more. Israel is a signatory to the International Convention on the Rights of Child, according to which child arrest should be the last resort. This is evident in Article 40’s focus on the “promotion of the child’s sense of dignity and worth” and in Article 37(b), which explains:

No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity
with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.\textsuperscript{58}

Invoking the Youth (Trial, Punishment and Modes of Treatment) Law and the Juveniles Act\textsuperscript{59} is supposed to allow minors from occupied East Jerusalem the prospect of rehabilitation instead of punishment. Yet, as the 2017 B’Tselem report explains:

When it comes to Palestinian minors from East Jerusalem, the safeguards set out in the Youth Law are routinely rendered hollow and meaningless by police officers, prison guards and judges who consider their nominal, technical observance of the provisions puts them in the right.\textsuperscript{60}

Over the years, the implementation of laws in occupied East Jerusalem tightened the Israeli authorities’ grip over Palestinian children and intensified the criminalization and political punishment of Palestinian minors, as attorney Nisreen Alyan argues, leading to “the effective abolition of alternatives to detention for minors convicted of such offences.”\textsuperscript{61} The main concern of scholars has been Israel’s lack of adherence to international regulations requiring the application of “child-sensitive” alternatives to accused minors; this disregards the pleas of children, parents, activists, and some lawyers not to order home arrest because it in fact produces irreparable harm to the child’s life and family’s livelihood.

Court decisions to put children under home arrest rhetorically frame their decrees as conforming with international and domestic regulations, supposedly lessening violations of the child’s liberty. But rather than showing the “good will” and “sensitivity” of the punishing state, the parents, human rights activists, and lawyers interviewed stressed the far-reaching harm done to children under home arrest. Their positions were well argued by 15-year-old Salim, who framed home arrest as “\textit{maghmagha qanuniya}” (legal aggravation):

\textit{Maghmagha qanuniya} … they want to step on us and on our future… through “law”… Here I am in home arrest until further notice … and not imprisoned at my home … Rather at a relative’s house … my father is not allowed to visit … and I pity our relatives who have become wardens … controlled like myself by Israel … and the legal manipulation …. I am in isolation far from my world, my school, and my parents and sisters … I went out to take a walk…the judged decided to call it “escape”… \textit{maghmagha} [aggravation] I tell you … slow torture … on weak fire …. Home arrest is…\textit{shalal} [paralysis] … it is to paralyze us …. And here my future is being lost. All this and my eyes are open … and my heart is suffering.\textsuperscript{62}

Home arrest, as Salim shows, grants the state the power to manipulate the law and silence his acts of resistance to military occupation. Interviews also revealed how children were picked up in their neighborhoods, mainly on their way to school, and how their release, without even going to court, was conditioned on home-arresting them for ten days or more. In utilizing this image of “benevolence” towards the child,
parents and children pointed to the psychological harm, disruption of normal familial and school life, and destructive financial burdens (fines, losing work days, legal fees) resulting from home arrest.

Home arrest involves a complex, ambiguous procedure and, as respondents explained, often arbitrary arrangements by the criminal justice system that enhance legal manipulations and expand the state’s arbitrary interventions through sentencing, limiting movement, and affecting the financial state of the family. Detention for interrogation reasons can last ten to twenty days before an indictment and further detention, continuing up to six months until a verdict is reached. Prolonging sentences before the indictment in home-arrest cases is not considered actual detention and hence the actual time of detention can continue for longer than ten days even before indictment. Further, days spent in home arrest while court dates are continuously postponed are not counted as prison time or in the overall sentencing of the child, leaving the court with the frequently used option to impose additional, actual prison time beyond what was officially ordered. The random proscriptions and unpredictable sentencing entailed in the legal procedures also interfere with the “coming of age period” of the child. While the interests of the child embedded in international legal discourse focus on the possibility of rehabilitation and the return of the child to the normal life cycle, these legal procedures function to produce an extreme form of what Chamiel and Walsh call “developmental arrest,” as the criminal justice system arbitrarily hinders educational and psychosocial possibilities. Home arrest also has been found to increase school dropout rates, isolate children, and narrow their social encounters, permitting the state to cause irreversible damage to children’s lives. Parents, children, and lawyers explained that the shock of arrest, the need to protect the child, and the fear of the state’s additional punishments prompted them to accept plea bargains.

The uncertainty and ambiguity that the military-legal occupation inflicts on children and families in East Jerusalem is part of the regime of mundane and structural violence that disrupts familial life; dismantles children’s education, rehabilitation, and development; and unchilds them. The multiple ambiguities and randomness through which the criminal justice system handles the legal procedures of home arrest produce multiple prolongations of sentencing and various uncertainties about the present and future. Children experience these ambiguities and uncertainties as cyclical violence, causing emotional, psychological, and developmental harm. We can see therefore how the legal system allows the state to invade and violate the child’s life. The “maghamagha” is a racialized mode of ruling by law to intimately punish, surveil, intimidate, and fragment the native’s community. It demonstrates a legally sponsored, slow unchilding at work, contributing to the broader military-political context that inhibits child development and cages childhood.

Un-homing the Home: Home Arrest as “House Demolition”

In interviews, home-arrested children discussed home arrest as part of the larger military occupation – a military occupation of the home. Home, as children portrayed
it, was a place where one could escape the outside militarized reality of constant policing, targeting, and fear. Interviews with children revealed how the everyday, moment-by-moment encounter with the familial and intimate space of the home had been transformed. In imprisonment, punishment is carried out through a certain determination about the spatial distribution of bodies over cells; in home arrest, the familial psychosocial space of the home is the cell in which the child is locked down and proscribed from movement outside of it. Home arrest, as will be shown, reproduces for the child the psycho-spatial conditions of military occupation and violent imprisonment within the home.

Children shared their experiences of the invasiveness and arbitrariness of the way in which military inspections were conducted throughout their arrest period. Ahmad told us:

They would only come at 5:00 a.m. They would wake up my parents and siblings, enter my room to wake me up. I began to wish for prison ….
The tears were in my eyes when I saw my grandmother shaking, and she has diabetes. They would terrorize her. I was always worried about her.67

The arbitrariness of military inspections added further layers to state legal punishment through caging the home. Inspections legitimize military presence within the home-space, while, as children respondents shared, staging the officers as mediators and rationalizers of the state’s collective penal practices, which penetrate the safe boundaries of home. Furthermore, simultaneously being imprisoned and physically present in one’s community creates layers of seclusion, as Ahmad, 16, described:

When my father was imprisoned, we all felt so deprived of his presence … my siblings and I used to really miss him … he was our hero. I have been imprisoned at home for the past four months and the occupation managed to isolate me from my friends, from the spaces I used to like, my school, and my mosque, but because I am home, I don’t feel I am missed …. I don’t sense my value …. See … they rule us while at home.68

In home arrest, the presence of family and friends comes to signify the child’s isolated position, depriving the home of its sense of warmth and “self-affirmation.” Amjad, 16, expressed the consequences that this had on his perception of home, extending beyond confinement:

I am under home arrest … which is house demolition …. This is how I become a non-human and not a child … outside the equations of human life … animal life … and not in a cage … worse …. I opened the window.
I reached out with my hand to feel the rain … and it was satisfying for a moment …. I played with the rainwater … and every time it rained, I would stretch my hand outside … for freedom …. And then came the settler … he informed the police …. I am under home arrest where I’m not allowed to reach my hands out … and they bombed us with fines that need years to be paid.69
When expressing his frustration with being arrested at home, Amjad described home arrest as part of the state’s practice of “house demolition,” a method of collective punishment used by the settler state against Palestinians.

Na’il, who is 15, reiterated the pain of being excluded from the world that his siblings participate in daily and how trying to glance at the outside is met with the fear of punishment:

I used to open my eyes, watch my siblings getting ready to go to school, while I am imprisoned at home. My days and nights were mixed. I was confused … can you believe that all I wanted is to watch the sunshine? I left home one early morning to go to the roof, but the neighbor caught me, yelled at me with much anger. She feared the military will invade our homes again, break the furniture, and arrest more people …. She told me, “Go bury yourself in your home.”

To be buried at home signifies how spaces of death maintained by the state are extended into the home. As the home transforms into a punitive institution of suffering, it becomes a space of un-freedom (a cage) and, even worse, a space of dehumanization and death. It is not surprising then that Saed, 14, associated his familiar objects with the military, stating: “I started hating my bed …. The feeling is that the military, down here … controls my bed … my bed cover …. They come to check whether I am home, and remove my bed cover.”

The different perspectives of these children show that the transformation of the home-space, in accordance with the penal technology of home arrest, denotes the occupation of home. Whether it is the home-space’s penetration by state military (the invasion), seclusion (the raising of the walls around the house), destruction (the demolition), or dispossession (dehumanization), Palestinian children shared how home arrest legally reproduced the same regime of spatial entrapment, caging, and criminalization in the occupied spaces of their land. This caging creates a paradox in which home becomes a space of constant intimidation that the child longs to escape, while this fear is exacerbated by constant anxiety of the securitized space outside, which is always penetrating the inside. The effect of this invasion of the inside by the outside through home arrest is that there is no space for the child to be free from the occupation, amounting ultimately to what Amjad experienced as “house demolition.”

Family Arrest: “Are We Parents or Prison Guards?”

The criminal justice system uses home arrest as a new penological mode of governing the family, activating its “members to enforce their own surveillance.” When a child is “released” into home arrest, parents are expected not only to accept the web of surveillance technologies that penetrate the home, but also to be participant-agents of surveillance and punishment themselves, while simultaneously being held accountable by them. Parents and siblings are forced to state the following in court: “I will stay
home and not leave the respondent alone in any way. If he escapes, I will call the police.” This becomes their legally signed acceptance of their roles as wardens and informants of the state. As Abu Aysar, father of two children who were subjected to home arrest, explained in a loud, declarative voice, “I am the jailor of the child. He [my son] is not allowed a doctor … can’t even stand at the door of the house. Everyday it’s: ‘Where’s your son? Photograph him …. Photograph him.’”

Such a punishment places parents between two contradictory positions: struggling to maintain their parental roles of nurturers and guardians, while being “state employees,” “wardens,” and “prison guards.” Furthermore, parents are subjected to multiple, heavily damaging threats, blackmailed into exercising their supervisory role as strictly as possible. Abu Aysar said:

Yesterday, the police came at ten in the morning. The boy was alone. His mother was in the same building, on this floor at his grandmother’s. Then they came back at ten at night, they arrested me and the boy, and kept us [at the station] until 4:00 a.m. …. The next morning [today], they summoned my wife. I went there at 2:00 p.m. …. I had to sign off for ten thousand shekels [bail]. I have to pay them today.

The constant threatening of parents with home arrest and large fines for deviating from their roles as agents surveilling their children intensified their apprehensions and made them stricter with their children. In addition, as their communal and economic participation has become limited, parents expressed the sense of being imprisoned themselves. Abu Aysar said:

I am suffering …. The police come by every day. Four in the morning, six in the morning. It’s random. I am imprisoned with him. I can’t work or attend an occasion with his mother. A year, a whole year.

Parents in occupied East Jerusalem struggled with their capacity as caregivers and protectors, describing losing their authority over their children to the state. “Employing” parents as the state’s punitive agents over those that parents should protect has a transformative effect on the intimate ties and political attitudes of the family, making both parties mutual jailers in accordance with the political dynamics of the punishing state.

As this self-destructive condition reveals, the family itself manages its own punitive control within the home, generating a mode of state violence that is self-inflicted and that slowly dismembers the family.

Fuad was arrested at 15 years old. Reflecting on his time under home arrest, he said:

I began to understand what they did to us …. At home, me and my siblings were very anxious … we were fighting all the time. And my father … I hated him …. Would you believe it … he started working for them [the Israelis] as an informer? …. He was afraid that he might lose his job ….
my mother pitied him and was mad at him …. the house is small …. We were all afraid … it’s my fault …. Today I understand what they did to us. Home arrest was supposedly for my sake and in keeping my rights as a child …. they damned the hell out of my rights … through law … and they created a new family … one that is afraid, terrified, anxious, and sick …. There’s my mother who has diabetes now. My brother was actually imprisoned … not house arrest … It was a different experience. For me, they burned my soul [haraqu anfasi] …. And they made me hate my parents … especially my father.

Targeting intimate ties and the “intimate bonds that tie native children to their communities, cultures, and homelands” in settler-colonial contexts is a weapon of war used by the state against indigenous people to complete the colonization process by dismembering the affective bonds tying indigenous children to their kin, community, culture, and homelands. Transforming the father into a state agent reveals the power of the colonial legal mechanism in penetrating and reengineering the native family, as home arrest generates a slow, long-lasting, and hidden violence not only to invade the family and instill fear within the home, but also to signal the coercive structural violation and dismemberment of familial intimate-ties.

An Iron Wall against Palestinian Childhood

The complex web of surveillance, phone calls, police check-ins, parental supervision, electronic monitoring devices, patrol officers, social workers, and more constitutes an active penological system of governing the home-arrested child. Home-arrested children explained how home arrest was not about “rehabilitation” or a “solution to a bad boy’s behavior,” but rather a mechanism of psychosocially controlling the child and family. Such penological governance intends to produce what children termed paralysis (“shalal”). What condition are children talking about when they invoke “shalal”? As Rois claims, the criminal justice system operates as a “youth control complex,” consisting of “a network of racialized criminalization and punishment deployed from various institutions of control and socialization [that] has formed to manage, control, and incapacitate Black and Latino youth,” targeting them daily in “school, at home, or on the street.”

We go beyond Rois to understand disciplinary incarceration in the settler-colonial context of Jerusalem where home-arrested children talked about the helplessness, incapacitation, and submission that they felt home arrest attempts to instill.

Home arrest not only limited Marwan’s movement and accessibility, but also his sense of agency and empowerment against surrounding political violence:

I used to like to go to the neighborhood … to talk politics … to observe the soldiers and settlers … and yes I used to photograph them when they attack and abuse us … and then they paralyzed me completely …. My
parents wanted me back home and we all decided: enough with politics .... I actually promised the judge I will stay home and behave like a normal child.\textsuperscript{82}

Children also exposed how home arrest targets their convictions, belonging, and political activities. Na’il noted the political underpinnings of home arrest:

I feel occupation’s power between us here, inside the home. As my sister said yesterday, they work based on the divide and rule mode; they did it during the Nakba [1948 expulsion of Palestinians] and they are doing it to us … one by one … as individuals.\textsuperscript{83}

The shalal goes beyond being a technique of control. This is ultimately what the criminalization of childhood entails as psychological, emotional, social, and economic punishment becomes the price for standing up against injustice and suffering: it is a crime to be a child resisting mundane oppression.\textsuperscript{84}

As children’s voices suggested, home arrest is not simply about incapacitation and targeting children: it also impacts children’s hopes for change and influences their self-perception and identity. Durgham al-Araj, an activist and ex-prisoner who supervised Palestinian children in Israel’s Damun prison, points out that the political objective of “alternatives to detainment” in East Jerusalem is to control the child and in particular to “drain from [the consciousness of] children their resilient spirit.”\textsuperscript{85} Al-Araj emphasizes the significance of this mode of control being used in Jerusalem, stating that this “attempt at creating [a] separation wall within the mind is about isolating Jerusalemite people and differentiating them from the rest of Palestine.”\textsuperscript{86}

Such findings prompted us to look at Palestinian political prisoner and author Walid Duqqah’s analysis of Israel’s “regime of incarceration, punishment and discipline, as a mode of ‘searing the Palestinian consciousness.’”\textsuperscript{87} What al-Araj claims is a creation of the “separation wall” within the mind, Duqqah calls a “searing the consciousness”: a settler state penological governmental practice that aims at dismantling the collective space and awareness of Palestinians and replacing them with a sense of fragmentation and hopelessness – “for what Israel established of Palestinian enclaves in the occupied territories amount to large prisons, and what it tries to apply against prisoners in the small occupation prisons is a continuation of the same policy.”\textsuperscript{88} The aim of this policy is to “re-articulate humans through absolute control and surveillance over them and every detail of their lives.”\textsuperscript{89} Duqqah’s analysis resonates with our respondents’ suggestions that Israeli penal power operates to achieve the submission of the imprisoned native’s identity, sense of self, collective unity, and agency.

Through isolation, division, and daily slow structural violence, the state increases its capacity of control over the spatial and psychological potentialities of the steadfastness of Palestinian life and childhood. If state punishment through house demolitions is part of the effort to “sear the consciousness,”\textsuperscript{90} home arrest as “house demolition” can be clearly seen as a continuation of this mode of penological governance. While it unchilds the Palestinian child, it attempts to cage and dispossess the home-space
of the Palestinian family and society that provides the psychological infrastructure for steadfastness, resilience, and continuity, and replace them with notions of defeat, desperation, and hopelessness, as Amjad revealed to us in a letter he wrote about his experience under home arrest, entitled, “I am a child with no childhood, imprisoned in a home that doesn’t exist.”

**Conclusions: Home Arrest Lawfare**

Colonial legalities, apparent in our study of home arrest, demonstrate that punishment is a vital technology through which colonial suppression of resistance operates. Centering children’s own narrations and witnessing against the operationalization of law and legality expose the racialization of lawfare reflected in home arrest. John Comaroff states that lawfare is “the effort to conquer and control indigenous peoples by the coercive use of legal means.”\(^91\) It has “had many theatres, many dramatis personae, many scripts.”\(^92\) We maintain that children’s homes become theaters where modes of lawfare are against the Palestinian child’s future, family, and community. Home-arrest lawfare’s use of socio-legal discourses and practices reveals how the Israeli so-called criminal justice system in occupied East Jerusalem positions Palestinian children not as subjects to be rehabilitated, but as objects obstructing settler-colonial social formations\(^93\) to be punished within a criminal framework, outside the social body, in submission to the political will of the military regime.

Home-arrest lawfare exposes the state’s objectives in the confinement and penetration of the colonized home, and its anxious performance of racialized violence through law. The state’s slow structural violence operates in hidden and visible theaters, wounding children and invading their homes and sense of home-ness. Home-arrest lawfare restructures the meanings and role of home for the child and familial relations that persevere between its walls and the penal power and political objectives of the state. Slow violence apparent in the “rule by law” logic via “maghmagha” as a mode of legal maneuvering proved to be a racialized mode of punishing intimate ties, governing and dismembering the native community, and paralyzing the unchilded. The multiple modes of caging, which force families to submit their children to incarceration, and the limited legal means and resources available to families make lawfare against Palestinian families clearly apparent. As families, lawyers, and child representatives claimed, all means and resources of steadfastness that might provide families with power against the court were targeted and threatened.

Re-scripting children’s homes as prisons and turning their families into prison guards positions colonized children as objects of the settler state’s legal manipulations, legitimizing the occupation of the home, aiming at hindering dissent. The variegated and unpredictable effects of colonial lawfare “legalities” went beyond governing childhood to governing children’s homes, searing their minds, and building iron walls inside the visceral quality of the colonized’s sense of home-ness. The colonizer’s legal taxonomies and its lawfare are racially and spatially inscribed, determining who has legal rights, who can be exploited and penetrated, and who is unchilded.\(^94\) Children
positioned as political capital in the hands of the colonizer remain a persistent site of struggle for the native, as lawfare governance hosts a range of violent penal mechanisms aimed at uprooting native existence and silencing acts of resistance among the native children. Theorizing the colonial legality and settler-state penology experienced by Palestinian children, while guided by their thoughts and insights, means that Palestinian children, in exposing the unending injustice, racism, and cruelty against them, persist in rejecting colonial disciplining and maintaining their hope for a future and desire to break the bars of the iron cage.

Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian is the Lawrence D. Biele Chair in Law at the Faculty of Law, Institute of Criminology and the School of Social Work and Public Welfare at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Global Chair in Law, Queen Mary University of London.

Amir Marshi is a research fellow at Mada al-Carmel Center for Applied Social Studies in Haifa.

Endnotes
1 Author interview with Marwan.
2 The authors are aware that the legal concept is termed “house arrest,” not “home arrest,” but the interview with Marwan and a focus group conducted with children from the Old City of Jerusalem and Silwan made it clear that “home arrest” is the more appropriate term in this context. Children in the focus group discussed the English, Hebrew, and Arabic words. They talked about the punitive gains of the state, its “game” in Marwan’s words, in invading the sense of safety and security associated with the home by using social workers, “parole” officers, technological devices (such as electronic bracelets), and police and military drones and cameras. During the focus group, children also distinguished their experience from that of Palestinian political leaders under house arrest, insisting that home arrest of children is aimed at “crushing the family” and “attacking its intimate spaces and relationships,” and not just denying mobility.


13 Sykes, Society of Captives.


17 Their study examined instances in which detained Israeli children succeeded in adjusting to home imprisonment and were able to better their relationships with parents, experience a positive therapeutic process, develop and learn skills, grow, and internalize external boundaries. Chamiel and Walsh, “‘House Arrest’ or ‘Developmental Arrest’?,” 4439.

18 Chamiel and Walsh, “‘House Arrest’ or ‘Developmental Arrest’?.”


21 Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, 2.


26 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Security Theology.


28 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and
Iron Caging the Palestinian Home

[122] Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian & Amir Marshi


30 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.


39 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, *Incarcerated Childhood*.


42 hooks, “Homeplace,” 42.


44 hooks, “Homeplace.”

45 hooks, “Homeplace.”


49 Those interviewed included forty children and thirty-one parents in occupied East Jerusalem who suffered home arrest; also twenty-two court records and twenty-four letters were consulted, and interviews carried out with five social workers, seven lawyers, and seven human rights activists.

50 Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (London: Pluto, 1952/1967); Gloria Anzaldúa,


54 Viterbo, “The Age of Conflict.”


59 Knesset Protocols of the Committee of Child Rights pointed to tension between legislators and politicians that insisted on maintaining children’s rights, in conformity with UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Israeli Youth (Trial, Punishment and Modes of Treatment) Law, and those that framed violent behaviors of children as requiring harsher legal reactions and insisted that state “law and enforcement forces have the right and responsibility to respond using all necessary measures.” Kovner and Shalhoub-Kevorkian, “Children, Human Rights Organisations, and the Law,” 12. In 2014, the Israeli government voted in Knesset Decisions 1775–1776, enabling increased legal measures against those accused of stone throwing in East Jerusalem. Additional legislation was enacted in 2015, among them the 29 July 2015 Enactment of Penal Code (Amendment No. 119), 5775–2015; the 9 September 2015 (updating law enforcement policy and requesting, on behalf of the state prosecutor, detention of each stone throwing suspect until the end of the proceedings); the 2 November 2015 amendment (combining the Youth Law and the National Insurance Law); and the 22 August 2016 Amendment 22 Youth Law (targeting children). For more details, see Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Odeh, “Arrested Childhood.”

60 B’Tselem and HaMoked, Unprotected.

61 Nisreen Alyn, “Stop the Continuing Deterioration in Dealing with Juvenile Offenses,” in Palestinian and Israeli Detention Policies (Ramallah: Commission for Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs, 2017), 44.

62 Author interview with Salim.

63 Youth (Trial, Punishment and Modes of Treatment) Law, 5731-1971 (1971) (as amended) (Isr.).

64 10 Youth (Adjudication, Punishment, and Means of Treatment) Law, amend. 10.


66 Chamiel and Walsh, “‘House Arrest’ or ‘Developmental Arrest’?”

67 Author interview with Ahmad.

68 Author interview with Ahmad.

69 Author interview with Amjad.

70 Author interview with Na’il.

71 Author interview with Abu Ahmad.

72 Author interview with Abu Ahmad.

73 Author interview with Abu Ahmad.

74 Abeer Otman, “Handcuffed Protectors? Palestinian Fatherhood-Protection Unlocking
75 Garland, “‘Governmentality’ and the Problem of Crime.”
76 Author interview with Fuad.
79 Jacobs, *White Mother*.
81 Rios, “Hyper-Criminalization,” 52.
82 Author interview with Marwan.
83 Author interview with Na’il.
84 Shalhoub-Kevorkian, “Gun to Body.”
87 Duqqah, *Searing the Consciousness*.
89 Duqqah, *Searing the Consciousness*.
92 Comaroff, “Colonialism, Culture, and the Law.”
Abstract
The Israeli municipality in Jerusalem plans to turn the only small industrial zone in East Jerusalem into a “high-tech zone,” causing the removal of dozens of small shops and auto repair garages that were established before the 1967 occupation. The author reports on the impact of the plans on Palestinians in Wadi al-Jawz, who fear imminent eviction from their shops, and loss of the only source of their livelihood. They disclaim the intentions of the Israeli municipality to create a “Wadi Silicon,” modeled on Silicon Valley in the United States, as a pretext. Palestinian officials and experts argue that the project comes in the context of Israeli plans to erase the Palestinian Arab face of Jerusalem.

Keywords
Jerusalem; East Jerusalem; Palestinians; Israeli occupation; Silicon; Wadi al-Jawz.

Jerusalemites became deeply concerned in late 2020 about the Israeli Jerusalem municipality’s approval of a master plan for the occupied neighborhood of Wadi al-Jawz,1 which they warn will have catastrophic consequences for the occupied city.

The Israeli municipality’s announcement of an approved “Silicon Wadi” plan in Wadi al-Jawz, which apparently includes other neighborhoods as well, raises concerns among Palestinians in Jerusalem and elsewhere for several reasons: The project is to be built on Palestinian-owned land, in a sensitive landscape, and in an area...
adjacent to the Old City. The plan allows for the construction of large sixteen-story buildings, which means obliterating the Arab face of the city, and altering its Arab, Islamic, and Christian character. In addition to threatening the city’s deep-rooted architectural heritage, the plan raises alarm among business owners in Wadi al-Jawz. The popular neighborhood is the only industrial area in East Jerusalem, which means that hundreds of families will lose their livelihoods and their private property that has been passed on from one generation to another over hundreds of years.

The master plan designates the area as an “advanced high-tech zone” that extends over 250,000 square meters. The municipality labeled the project “Silicon Wadi” in an attempt to cover up its actual intentions, and instead promote it as a development project similar to Silicon Valley in the United States.

Palestinians in the city, however, agree that the master plan ultimately aligns with the Israeli plan to transform the historical landmarks and Israelize the city’s landscape – beginning with al-Musrara neighborhood, passing through the streets of Sultan Sulayman, Salah al-Din, and al-Zahra neighborhoods, and ending with the industrial area in Wadi al-Jawz. Some even describe it as a settlement project, asking: “If the project is so profitable, why are they not implementing it in West Jerusalem? Did the Israeli municipality suddenly become concerned about the welfare of Palestinians in East Jerusalem?”

What Does the Municipality Say?

On 1 November 2020, the Israeli municipality released a statement titled: “Approval of the Silicon Wadi Masterplan,” that was, contrary to the usual procedure, released solely in Hebrew. According to the statement,

The local planning and construction committee approved last week the masterplan for Wadi al-Jawz, which was developed by the municipality of Jerusalem through the Jerusalem Development Authority and is co-funded by the Ministry of Jerusalem and Heritage …. The plan aims to enable local developers and landowners in the area to develop the area to benefit residents of East Jerusalem …. The project aims to turn Wadi al-Jawz Street itself into an advanced high-employment center, “Silicon Wadi,” a hub for trade and development. Building rights will be given for an area of 200,000 square meters that will be used for trade and employment. The municipality noted that it is seeking to “designate the area as an advanced high-tech center …. For that purpose the car repair shops will be moved to employment areas in al-'Isawiyya and Umm Tuba according to recent approvals …. Given the central accessible location, the plan allows for building 900 hotel rooms …. Jerusalem Development Authority actually started working on a detailed plan along Wadi al-Jawz Street to speed up the process, and facilitate the issuance of permits to complete the construction of high-tech offices and hotels as fast as possible.
The Israeli municipality noted in the same statement that the plan goes beyond Wadi al-Jawz:

The masterplan includes a Kidron park, a huge first-class park east of the city. The actual development of the area will start within three months and is expected to take up to two years . . . ‘Uthman Ibn Affān Street north of the eastern neighborhood connects it to Road No. 1 to the west. The plan suggests that the street will turn into a lively axis, a kind of “Train Track Park” for the eastern part of the city. In order to do this, the program recommends building two areas for urban renewal. The plan suggests building alternative residential buildings that accommodate trade, employment, and touristic purposes, while evacuating part of the area for public use – a pedestrian area along Kidron river, etc. . . . The plan also provides new roads that would relieve traffic congestion and connect to nearby main roads. Furthermore, the master transportation plan explores the possibility of laying out light rail transport in the area . . . most of the plan is located in a sensitive natural landscape adjacent to the Old City, and hence the height of housing units will be limited to four floors, but the employment centers can go higher, and new levels can be added gradually up to sixteen floors.

Private Property, Waqf-administered Lands, and No Expropriation Orders

Khalil al-Tufakji, head of the Maps Department at the Arab Studies Society, interviewed for \textit{al-Ayyam},\textsuperscript{2} cast doubts about the project:

The land on which they announced the masterplan is Palestinian-owned land, but it was not announced that this land will be expropriated . . . We’ve been hearing about this project for years, but the truth is that the municipality has no plans for this project although they are talking about approving the masterplan . . . What the municipality is talking about is a huge project that extends from Musrara through the streets of Sultan Sulayman, Salah al-Din, and al-Zahra to the industrial area in Wadi al-Jawz.

An expert on the area, who prefers to be anonymous, agrees with al-Tufakji and said in an interview with \textit{al-Ayyam}: “Turning the masterplan into an actual project on the ground will take many years. If the project was so profitable, why they are not implementing it in West Jerusalem? Are they really invested in the welfare of East Jerusalem’s Palestinians?”

In his interview with \textit{al-Ayyam}, Kamal Obaydat, head of the Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem, called the plan a “shady project”:
The Chamber of Commerce in East Jerusalem has been closed by orders from the Israeli occupation since 2001, which limits its ability to act. We are trying constantly to follow up with owners of lands, shops and workshops in the area. We fear that the Israeli municipality will evict the owners of the shops and workshops in the area, forcing them to lose their livelihoods, and forcibly remove them from the area where they have worked for decades. This project is part of a bigger plan to change the face of East Jerusalem. The size of the project and the way it is being organized is suspicious.

The Israeli municipality sent eviction notices to forty business owners in June 2020, giving them until the end of the year to evacuate. This number represents an estimated one third of the business owners in the industrial area. The municipality informed business owners and merchants that they will be moved to two areas in Umm Tuba and al-'Isawiyya. But what the Israeli municipality calls “employment centers” in these neighborhoods are nothing but ink on paper, and the residents are not agreeing to the establishment of Israeli projects on their lands. The Wadi al-Jawz land on which the industrial area now stands is owned by Palestinian families, and most of
them are family waqf. Most of the business owners in the area are tenants.

Yunis Dwayk, a business owner in the industrial area, believes that this project involves the Judaization of the area, ongoing for more than forty years, and that the municipality is trying to implement it despite opposition from business owners who have rejected the alternatives offered by the municipality.

Dwayk told al-Ayyam: “Six or seven months ago dozens of business owners received eviction notices from the municipality ordering them to evict by the end of the year. The notices were sent to a third of the business owners in the area. We believe that the municipality wants to evacuate business owners in three phases to avoid provoking the public and international opinion.”

Dwayk, who has a small shop to fix car suspensions, in operation since 1953, recalled: “The idea was proposed years ago, and the municipality offered at first to move the industrial area to [settlements] ‘Atarot’ and then to ‘Mishor Adumim’ and now they are talking about Umm Tuba and al-‘Isawiyya.” He added: “Everyone knows that this is the only industrial area in the city. It has been here since before the Israeli occupation and people are used to coming here to fix their cars. Business owners have gone through very hard times, beginning with the Israeli siege on the city in 1993 and ending with the pandemic-related restrictions this year. Now they fear removal, and they are wondering, what will come next?”

Dwayk notes that most of the tenants have been in the area for decades; they have old rent-controlled leases and they are wondering what their fate will be if they are evicted.

Al-Khatib and many others are wondering if there is any truth to what the Israeli deputy mayor, Fleur Hassan-Nahoum, said about discussing the project with Emirati businessmen during her visit to the United Arab Emirates last month. The Israeli official did not confirm that Emirati businessmen agreed to invest in this project, and the UAE from its side did not comment on her statement.

Mohammad Abu Salb, owner of a metal workshop in the industrial area, believes that with this plan the Israeli municipality will be throwing dozens of business owners, hundreds of workers, and thousands of families to the unknown. Abu Salb said: “The municipality posted advertisements a few months ago about the ‘Silicon Wadi,’ and naturally all merchants and business owners were taken by surprise, as they have been hearing about plans for this area for years. But nobody knows what is the nature of the project. Will it be an industrial area or a trade complex? But to our surprise, what is being planned does not have anything to do with an industrial area and we, as business owners, will be kicked out of here.” He added: “We still do not know what will happen or what our fate will be as business owners. Some of us went to the municipality to inquire, but they refused to give any details, although they confirmed that there is a masterplan for the area. We don’t know what will happen to our workshops and livelihoods, and if we were to be moved elsewhere, then where?”

Abu Salb’s grandfather opened the metal shop almost fifty years ago: “Afterwards my father took over and now I am running the shop. For over fifty years, we have been building relationships with customers and now they want us to leave, although
moving customers to a new area is very difficult. Everyone in the city and surrounding neighborhoods goes to the industrial area to fix their cars, it would be very difficult to direct them elsewhere, especially if the new location is farther away.”

A Theoretical Project and Pressure

Lawyer Muhannad Jabara, an expert in zoning and construction in Jerusalem, said in an interview with *al-Ayyam*, “The plan announced by the Israeli municipality in Jerusalem for the industrial area in Wadi al-Jawz, known as ‘Silicon Wadi,’ is a general plan that reflects the municipality’s vision for the future use of the area, and does not constitute a detailed plan that can be presented to the district committee in the Israeli Ministry of Interior.” He did not dismiss the idea that the municipality will pressure dozens of business owners and merchants at the end of the year and the beginning of next year to evacuate from Wadi al-Jawz.

Jabara continued: “In the middle of 2020 the municipality’s legal advisor issued eviction notices to some merchants and business owners in the industrial area informing them that the municipality is in the process of approving a project in the area, and that their presence is inconsistent with the area’s designation since it is not designated as an area for car repair shops, and hence they have to evacuate by the end of the year.”

Jabara explained that the municipality is seeking to propose a general project along these lines to the district committee in the Ministry of Interior to designate the area for commercial, hospitality, and high-tech use under the name “Silicon Valley.” Jabara said that the district committee considered the project to be a theoretical one, and impractical since the land is privately owned by Palestinians and is heavily populated by car repair shops and workshops, and that the landowners did not apply for any new projects in the area. He said that, in light of that, the district committee gave the municipality a chance to prove that this project is practical and not theoretical. He summed up: “Sending eviction notices to the merchants and business owners in the industrial area under the pretense that their existence is illegal and demanding they evacuate aims to convince the district committee that the project is practical and to encourage land-owners to apply for projects that correspond with the municipality’s plan to turn it into what it calls ‘Silicon Wadi’.”

Ziyad al-Hammuri, Director of the Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights, finds that the project is part of a bigger Israeli plan to change the face of Jerusalem. Hammuri stated that the project does not consider the needs of Palestinians in occupied East Jerusalem and is an attempt to change its Arab Islamic and Christian character.

*Abd al-Raouf al-Arnaout, a Palestinian journalist based in East Jerusalem, has been covering issues related to the city since 1992, and since 1995 for al-Ayyam daily newspaper.*
Endnotes


3 Al-Arnaout, “Al-Quds.”
LETTER FROM JERUSALEM

Farewell to the Habesch–Commercial Printing Press
Samia Nasir Khoury

Abstract
This article was inspired by a video from the Palestinian Museum in Birzeit in which Tewfic Habesch, grandson of the founder of the Commercial Press “Habesch,” spoke about the achievements of the press over the past one hundred years. Near the end of the video, Tewfic announced the difficult decision that the family had taken to close the print shop due to the numerous measures Israel was imposing on East Jerusalem. The closure of the city after the 1993 Oslo agreement exacerbated the situation, by barring residents from the rest of the occupied territories from entering the city that had been the center of life for all Palestinians. Khoury relays her personal experiences of working with the Habesch printing press, a highlight of which was their designing and printing of the first university diploma in Palestine granted by Birzeit University in 1976.

Keywords
Musa Nasir; Birzeit University; YWCA; YMCA; Oslo accords; annexation of Jerusalem; Orient House; Sophie Halaby; Chamber of Commerce; Rawdat al-Zuhur

Yesterday [30 September 2020], I watched a video from the Palestinian Museum in Birzeit in which Tewfic ‘Issa Habesch, the grandson of Tewfick Habesch who founded the Commercial Press in Jerusalem in 1920, explained that even the Commercial Press’s loss of their new building and new machines located in the west side of Jerusalem in the 1948
war had not deterred his grandfather. He had been determined to resume the work of the
Commercial Press at new rented premises in the New Gate of East Jerusalem, until they
were finally able to move to their own building on Isfahani Street in 1965.

As Tewfic was relating the achievements of his family’s printing press, I began
reflecting on my personal connection with it after I returned from university in the
U.S. in 1954 and began working at Birzeit College. My father, Musa Nasir, who was
the president of the college at that time, had introduced me to the Habeschs so that
we would resume our printing at the Commercial Press, whose work he knew to be
very efficient and meticulous. ‘Issa, the son of the founder had also just returned from
abroad after finishing his studies to be qualified to work with his father.

As far as Birzeit is concerned, the most memorable job that the Commercial Printing
Press accomplished was the printing of the first university diploma in Palestine, granted
by Birzeit University in 1976. The logo appeared within the name of the university,
which was designed by the renowned Jerusalemite calligrapher Mohammad Siam. The
ubiquitous olive tree logo of the university was created especially for Birzeit College –
later to become Birzeit University – by George Alif, the Russian art teacher at the
college before 1948. The Commercial Press had also printed a book of my father’s
in 1966, Toward a Solution to the Palestinian Problem: A Selection of Speeches and

Of course, I cannot but give credit to ‘Issa’s sister Beatrice, who was always
there at the Commercial Printing Press following up on details. She was an amazing proofreader who ensured that the printing, at that time dependent on letterpress, had no spelling mistakes. Later, after I married and lived in Jerusalem, I worked closely with Beatrice as the Commercial Printing Press for all of the printed material for the YWCA and the Rawdat al-Zuhur school, where I was volunteering. I remember my uncle Labib Nasir who was the general secretary of the YMCA, telling me that they did all their printing at the Commercial Press, and my husband Yousif Khoury had the stationery for his engineering office printed there, as well as our wedding invitations. I still remember Beatrice joyfully describing to a group of us how color was introduced into the printing process which enabled them to print the cards of wild flowers painted by the renowned Palestinian artist Sophie Halaby. Alas, these precious printed images of our vibrant landscape are out of print.

Tewfic was the third generation involved in running the Commercial Printing Press “Habesch” and had helped launch the modern printing methods with which his father was trying to cope. It is with great sadness that this success story had to end by Tewfic announcing that due to the closure of East Jerusalem and the various restrictions, it was becoming too difficult to maintain the work in the city, eventually leading to the decision to close down completely. I could not but shed a tear.

It has become very clear that the Israeli measures against Jerusalemites is to make their daily lives unbearable. It was shortly after the June 1967 war that Israel illegally annexed East Jerusalem and claimed “united” Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel. Ignoring the fact that according to the United Nations the annexation was illegal, Israel established a new reality by its actions on the ground, imposing very high taxes and confiscating property when people were not able to pay. Of course, the situation worsened for the population of East Jerusalem after the Oslo agreement when Israel closed Jerusalem; Palestinians from outside Jerusalem could no longer enter the city, which had been the center of life, culture, commerce, and medical services for all Palestinians. Checkpoints were established at the entrances

Figure 2. This photo is inside the new gate before 1948. The building was built in 1930 by my grandfather. Courtesy of Habesch family.
to the city and permits were only granted to the very few and for special purposes.

The institutions in East Jerusalem have determined to do everything possible to maintain operations and to help people remain in the city. Cultural events and musical programs have been especially important to keep the Palestinian voice heard in Jerusalem and to help in the *sumud* of the people. However, Israel continues to enforce new and innovative measures against the East Jerusalem institutions. We all remember how the Orient House was the first major institution to be shut down, followed by the Chamber of Commerce. The most recent victims of this selective policy were the Palestinian TV as well as the Palestinian Education Department, and the continuous harassment of the Palestinian governor and the minister of Jerusalem affairs.

Undoubtedly, all these measures and restrictions have posed many difficulties on East Jerusalem institutions and businesses. It is very clear that the decision to close down the Commercial Printing Press “Habesch” was not an easy one to make, and only after all options had been exhausted. It will be remembered as a Palestinian institution that fought valiantly to maintain its professional integrity and presence in Jerusalem over the last one hundred years. No small feat.

Figure 3. The press building in Shama’a, Mamilla, was built before 1948. The upper two floors were rented as offices. Samia Khoury: “I still have the original contracts. Unfortunately the machines were never used by us but were stolen by the occupiers. After 1967 my late father told me that he was thanked by an Israeli official for the brand new printing equipment that they used in their governement print house.” Courtesy of Habesch family.
Epilogue: On 15 February 2021, shortly before this article went to the press, ‘Issa Tewfic Habesch, the only son of the founder of the Commercial Press, and director of operations for much of its post-occupation period, passed away in Jerusalem – sadly, and almost simultaneously, with the end of the one-hundred-year era of the Commercial Press “Habesch.”

Samia Nasir Khoury is a retired community volunteer who served as national president of the YWCA and president of Rawdat al-Zuhur, and a founding member of the Birzeit University Board of Trustees and Sabeel–Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center in Jerusalem. She is the author of Reflections from Palestine: A Journey of Hope (Cyprus: Rimal, 2014), and A Rhyme for Every Time (Ramallah: Turbo, 2009).

Figure 4. Same location with the wall behind. Courtesy of Habesch family.
BOOK REVIEWS

A Question of Responsibility

Review by Rona Sela

Adam Raz, *Looting of Arab Property during the War of Independence* [Bizat Harekhush Ha’ravi Bemilhemet Ha’tsmaut]. 332 pages. (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2020. NIS 78.40

Abstract

In this review of Adam Raz’s *Looting of Arab Property during the War of Independence* (2020, in Hebrew) Rona Sela critiques the book as dealing with the subject from a Zionist perspective and accepting Ben-Gurion’s attitude of reducing official/state responsibility for the massive theft against Palestine and Palestinians, and being unconcerned that looting/seizures violated international law. Sela points out that Raz shows that the government made manipulative political use of the “looting” in its drive to ethnically cleanse what would become the State of Israel while arguing, at the same time, that the responsibility lies with the individual (Jewish) citizens of that state, who became “passive accomplices” of its policies. According to Sela, by Raz not distinguishing between individual looting and organized official seizure, he is led to minimize the direct responsibility of the sovereign and adopt biased conclusions that contradict, conceal, reframe, and whitewash the testimonies and cases described in his own book.

While the pillaging and seizure of Jewish private property during the Holocaust is always on the Israeli public agenda, the looting and pillaging of Palestinian property and culture has been largely silenced. Just as Israel demands and receives compensation for Jewish stolen property and for crimes committed against them, Sela argues that compensation for the crimes perpetrated against Palestinians must be on the agenda – morally, legally, and practically – and that Israel must reveal the Palestinian textual and cultural treasures held and hidden in Israeli archives and return them to their rightful owners.

Keywords

Looting; seizure; cultural looting/seizure in Palestine; Nakba; David Ben-Gurion; Absentee Property Law; sovereign and moral responsibility; Assets and Goods’ Awda – claiming the return of seized/looted property, goods and cultural treasures.

Editor’s Note:

A shorter version of the book review was originally published in Hebrew in Haokets: https://www.haokets.org
This important book by Adam Raz expands the available research on the phenomenon of the large-scale looting and seizure of property (known also as pillaging and “war booty”) in the course of the 1948 war. The book’s name makes it clear from the start that the discussion is from a Zionist perspective. The war is not referred to as the Nakba or the neutral “1948 war” (as Raz himself states, 20), although it is clear that looting by individuals and seizure by organized forces – two different practices discussed in the book using the same term “looting” in an erroneous way – played a significant role in the Nakba, together with ethnic cleansing; the destruction, vandalizing, and burning of agricultural property and produce; murder and rape; the killing of animals; and the appropriation and nationalization of houses and lands. Raz chose to omit any hint to the disaster in his title and instead to adorn it with the glamor of “independence.”

The first part of the book, the “essentially historical” part (28), devotes considerable space to a detailed and systematic description of looting and seizure in major cities such as Jerusalem, Tiberias, and ‘Akka. The book is replete with references, quotes, cases, and names, and therein lies its strength. If we ignore the bias conveyed by its title and the fact that the author relates to seizure as pillage and vice versa, its first part certainly confronts the reader with the monstrous scope of the phenomenon. Every human being should be appalled by these descriptions, particularly given that the pillaging was carried out right after the Holocaust and the massive looting and seizure of Jewish property and cultural treasures from private homes and public institutes across Europe.

In the second part, the author examines the issue from the sociopolitical perspective that shaped Israeli society and dovetailed with David Ben-Gurion’s policy. Tom Segev, who in 1984 was the first to deal with the subject of seizure extensively, is mentioned in a minor footnote. Segev’s work has been followed by a number of other studies (such as Fischbach, Tamari, Pappé, Koren, Morris, and Masalha), although Raz mentions only a few. There are also numerous Palestinian testimonies (available in Israeli archives) excluded from the book, as well as Sherene Seikaly’s study that discusses the pillaging in Haifa from her familial and Palestinian perspective.

Importantly, Raz also ignores the looting and particularly the organized seizure of Palestinian intellectual and cultural treasures, and textual and visual archives that were a central part of the historical and cultural erasure in and of the Nakba. This includes the wholesale organized robbery of Palestinian libraries as shown by Gish Amit whose seminal and oft-quoted work receives only two minor references here; the visual archives and collections looted in 1948 – including the work of photographers such as Chalil Rissas (Khalil Rassas) and Chalil Raad (Khalil Ra’d), and later on archives such as that of Karmieh Abboud; as well as cultural treasures seized officially in an planned manner before, during and after 1948, and subjected to the oppressive control of Israeli archives. Raz presents his work as a pioneering study. It is “pioneering,” perhaps, in having been written from the Zionist perspective, thereby continuing a time-honored tradition of erasure out of political considerations.

International law distinguishes between individual pillage by soldiers or civilians and seizure by organized forces; in both cases, the stolen property can belong to
either individuals or public institutes. Raz, however, does not make the fundamental distinction between seizure by organized forces for collective official or sovereign purposes, by military units, militias and state and pre-state institutional bodies, municipal or commercial that worked for official organizations, and looting out of sheer greed by individuals (whether uniformed or not). Although he refers to “individual” as opposed to “collective” or “public looting” (220, 230), he discusses them uniformly and draws similar conclusions from them, as though they were similar acts with equivalent aspects and implications. Raz does not examine their different purposes and characteristics, nor does he differentiate them terminologically, substantively, legally, or morally. Crucially, since the distinction is far from semantic, this often leads the author to biased conclusions that contradict the testimonies and cases described in his book.

This conceptual confusion leads also to a misguided approach to the question of moral and essential responsibility that is my focus here. According to Raz, both individual and collective looting are “a personal act – a choice of action made by a person” (297–98), whereas the seizure of Palestinian assets was “only” (my quotation marks, RS) of real estate by the state acted by laws and regulations). In other words, for Raz, the sovereign’s responsibility is reduced – as if it can be reduced – to the expropriation of houses and lands, a “one-time act” (298) grounded in a political decision and enforced using military and police power. Having been decided by official institutions based on legal procedures, it was and is not seen as a crime. Conversely, looting – both individual and collective – is seen as an individual violation or crime, and even when organized, represents “countless of uncoordinated actions by unrelated individual looters” (298). Moreover, “the looters were the large Jewish public (as individuals), not the sovereign” (22). I will now reexamine this claim.

First, an organized seizure mechanism was established. Arab Assets Committees were appointed (even before the establishment of the State of Israel), and later the Arab Assets Department in the Ministry of Arab (Minority) Affairs and the Custodian of Absentee Property, was among the many bodies that dealt with the issue. These bodies were supposed to oversee the seizure process, to make decisions and rule on issues related to Palestinian property. The military was the executive body. Thus, these sovereign government bodies were supposed to cooperate in this matter. “Whenever an Arab inhabited territory is occupied, a representative of the Department of Arab Affairs will be attached” [to the armed forces], and “every expropriation [by the armed forces] will be made in the presence of a representative of the Department of Arab Affairs.” Subsequently, Gad Machnes of the department commented that the properties of occupied Arab villages “is subject to the supervision of the State of Israel,” and that, “Permanent arrangements have been made for the appropriation of abandoned Arab property for military needs.”

Raz’s statement also contradicts the book’s own descriptions of massive “looting” by organized military units, but also by state (and pre-state) bodies, parties that worked for the state, as well as entire Jewish settlements. One of the cases described is that of the Solel Boneh construction giant (a pre-statehood corporatist arm of the Jewish
community), which seized equipment at the Haifa port. Ezra Danin, who was in charge of “abandoned property” at the time, observed the events together with Ben-Gurion, who asked Danin, “And should this property fall in private hands, would you be any happier? At least this isn’t private robbery” (46). Raz also shows that many Jewish communities in the Galilee had their hands full of stolen goods, on “a special mission on behalf of the Minister of Defense” (200–201), and that at the opposite end of the country, Niv David, the Intelligence Officer of the Negev Brigade, argued that “public looting… for the purpose of promoting or fulfilling Zionism is allowed” (230). Thus, according to Raz, “the looting was not top-down, empowered by a political order” (21), and all examples of decisions made by military commanders or pre-state/state or municipal officials are nothing more than “personal” or “individual” acts – crimes for which the responsibility lies with the direct offenders.

Thus, in summing up the conclusions, Raz adopts Ben-Gurion’s position, who eschewed sovereign responsibility for these rampant acts and preferred to blame individuals. This attempt to reduce the widespread organized booty in 1948 to crimes committed by “ordinary,” “normative” individuals (312), minimizes the direct political responsibility for the injustices, despite the fact that it is abundantly clear in the book’s pages. The pre-state bodies and the government established various bodies to control the seizure and the seized assets; its representatives in the field, including commanders, pre-state/state and municipal officials, and managers of quasi-state bodies, not “only” seized property in practice but were sometimes also involved in looting for private gain; and in 1950 the Absentee Property Law was enacted, to legalize the wholesale land grab during and after the war retroactively.

Moreover, the state made little effort to prevent individual looting. Ben-Gurion enabled the organized seizure under various guises, undermined the work of the Ministry of Minorities that was supposed to supervise the military’s actions in Palestinian towns and villages (and prevent individual looting), and turned a blind eye to private pillaging. He ignored warnings and criticisms by ministers, public officials, military officers, intellectuals, and Zionist movements, and disregarded the accusations of many who blamed him personally for the pillage (261). Furthermore, the attempt to portray the organized “collective looting” (seizure) as individual crimes, minimizes the direct responsibility of the sovereign. Raz’s conclusions conceal, reframe and whitewash the crimes described in the book. Apparently, Ben-Gurion’s propaganda survived seven decades to land intact, directly into this book, with little critical benefit of hindsight.

Secondly, Raz himself demonstrates how the sovereign used the looting by both individuals and “groups” to prevent the return of Palestinian refugees (249–50). From the looter’s perspective, “the return of the Arab inhabitants to their ransacked city would have required him to give back, hide or destroy the property he has looted”; the sovereign took advantage of this fact and became a silent partner in crime as “the particular personal interest aligned with the political one” (300). On the one hand, Raz shows that the government made manipulative political use of the “looting” in its drive to ethnically cleanse what would become the State of Israel (293), and on the
other, he argues that the responsibility lies with the individual (Jewish) citizens of that state, who became “passive accomplices” (293) of its policies. Quite an impressive ideological juggling act.

Third, I argue that the individual looting followed closely in the footsteps of its institutional doppelgänger, and that the latter paved a way that affected large sections of the Jewish public. Civilians adopted their leaders’ twisted norms. In other words, the sovereign’s responsibility for individual looting extends also in setting the pattern of action (theft). In Jaffa, for instance, the first to steal, as claimed by Ruth Lobitz of the Communist party in 30 May 1948, were not “the ordinary masses from the street. At first it was the Etzel. For days on end, cars loaded with goods flowed out of Jaffa, and sometimes cars delivered goods requisitioned by the Haganah – items essential for our war effort…. Only then came the masses and private enterprise. If this phenomenon is not nipped at the bud, no explanations or exhortation would do any good” (220). The book also ignores the fact that the widespread pre-1948 seizure of documents, photographs, and other items for intelligence purposes also paved the crooked way to subsequent crimes. For example, I have found at least three organizations – two in Haifa and one in Gaza – that were closely monitored by Jewish intelligence sources in the mid-1940s. During the war, surprisingly enough, Jewish forces “visited” those organizations in their specific addresses, seized them, and today their documents are held in Israeli archives. Raz conveniently disregards such evidence.

Finally, Ben-Gurion clearly considered private looted property as state property. Although officially he condemned it, he was more preoccupied by the identity of the new owners of the seized property. In addition, Ben-Gurion was hardly concerned by the fact that looting violated international law. In a letter written 15 June 1948, he stated in no uncertain terms: “The Harel unit [Brigade] that drove down from Jerusalem yesterday carried in their vehicles property seized in Jerusalem: refrigerators, carpets, furniture, etc. You must beseech them on behalf of the high command to immediately submit a list of the items they have seized and transported and their whereabouts – because the booty belongs to the military (to the state) rather than to the individual soldiers or brigades. Quick and vigorous action is required.” Furthermore, to ensure that the seized items would end up in state rather than private hands, a system of monetary compensation for the looters was put in place. Israel’s first prime minister himself makes it perfectly clear here that the military acts of robbery are state acts (as if anyone had doubts), and that his government closely monitors such acts – as in other dark regimes, it kept meticulous records of what was taken from where (both looting and seizure), and each item’s price tag – a sovereign bureaucracy of crime documentation.

While the pillaging and seizure of Jewish private property and cultural treasures during the Holocaust is always on the Israeli public agenda, the looting and taking of booty of the Palestinian property and culture has been largely silenced until four decades ago. Just as Israel demands and receives compensation for Jewish stolen property and for crimes committed against them, Palestinian stolen property and
compensation for crimes perpetrated against Palestinians must be on the agenda – morally, legally, and practically. It is also high time that Israel opens the Palestinian textual, cultural, and visual treasures hidden in Israeli archives and returns them to their rightful owners, as was also written to me by the previous state archivist in our lengthy correspondence a decade ago.  

The critical questions Raz fails to address are, why did the state take such an important role in robbery, why did it establish a mechanism to supervise it instead of preventing it, what were the moral and practical consequences of this move, and how did the state benefit, not only economically, from the seized goods? Furthermore, Raz explains to his readers that when confronted by contradictory evidence, the historian may prefer one narrative over the other, “But he must explain to us why” (278). Moreover, he comments in a footnote: “I also dispute with [Gish] Amit’s general tone in discussing the fate of the Arab books” (71). I dare say that he takes issue with Amit’s critical tone, while he remains safe in the bosom of Zionism. Raz does not see the contradictions and biased conclusions in his own book, let alone explain them. Like David Ben-Gurion, he minimizes or evades the responsibility of the sovereign for the 1948 looting/seizure spree so amply described in his own words.

Rona Sala, a curator and visual history researcher, focuses on colonial Zionist/Israeli photography and archives, seizure and looting of Palestinian archives and their subjugation to repressive mechanisms, and constructing alternative postcolonial visual practices and archives. Sela is the director of a film-essay: Looted and Hidden: Palestinian Archives in Israel (2017), online at vimeo.com/213851191 (accessed 25 March 2021).

Endnotes

1 The use of the term “Arab” rather than “Palestinian” or “Palestinian-Arab” further attests to the author’s Zionist perspective. Dan Rabinowitz showed long ago that the widespread use of “Arab” as the almost exclusive adjective for the local Palestinian population reflects power relations and the official, hegemonic agenda; see Dan Rabinowitz, “Eastern Nostalgia: How the Palestinians came to be Israeli-Arabs,” [Hebrew] Theory and Criticism 4 (1993): 141–51. It is part of an oppressive strategy of erasure employed by the dominant group against the minority group that seeks, among other things, to deny the attachment of the indigenous population to its land and country.


3 For example, after the Dayr Yasin massacre of 9 April 1948, a young Palestinian woman was forced to stand under the blazing sun
next to other women – their clothes were torn off them, their ear and finger rings were stolen and they were even photographed nude (translated to Hebrew by The Arabic Department of the Jewish Information Service from al-Yaqza, dated 6 May 1948, Haganah Historical Archive, 105/71, 710). It might be that these are the photographs that the Supreme Court was afraid would have a “visual effect” that might “affect the State’s international relations (Supreme Court file 07/10343, 3 May 2010). Accordingly, they are the subject of ongoing classification, such as by a special committee headed by (former) Minister of Justice Ayelet Shaked on 11 September 2016 (Sela 2017 [2018], 209).


See Oxford Public International Law, paragraphs A1, 3-4. While pillage is prohibited due to 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations (B (1) (10) and became a war crime in 1954 (D [23]), the rules regarding seizure are more complicated. See also, Jose Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser, and M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court, International Humanitarian Law Series 10 (Brill, 2009), 521–29.

According to Rabinowitz, Eastern Nostaligia, 141: “The labelling issue is irreducible to the grammatical or syntactical meanings of this or that term. The question that shines out of the semantic mist that characterizes the writing about the Palestinian citizens of Israel is substantive, touching a live and exposed nerve. The poetics of representation is related to the politics of representation […] both deriving from and reproductive of power relations in real life.”

The legal aspect of these claims should be discussed separately.


In practice, their activities were undermined from an early stage, as is documented in the archives. For example, David Horowitz of the Jewish Agency, who was appointed to one of the committees, resigned and wrote to Ben-Gurion in his resignation letter: “We have no influence on events and under such
circumstances I find myself unable to fulfill my duties effectively” (IDFA and Ministry of Defence Archive, 236; 2 May 1948).
15 A deliberately misleading Zionist terminology designed to conceal the true fate of the property and more importantly, its owners.
16 Sela, “Genealogy.”
17 The Etzel (Hebrew acronym of National Military Organization, also known as the Irgun) was a rightwing militia that occupied the northern part of Jaffa in April–May 1948.
18 The largest Jewish militia, which would form the foundation for the Israeli military, received Jaffa’s official surrender on 13 May 1948.
19 Sela, Made Public, Palestinians in Military Archives in Israel; Sela. “Genealogy of Colonial Plunder and Erasure.”
20 Sela forthcoming.
25 Amit, in Ex-Libris, mentions that the Palestinian assets have been estimated between 743 million pounds to one billion dollars, 85; see also Benziman and Atallah, Subsidiaries, 165.
Footballmania
Review by Roberto Mazza


What can one learn from a football game? Football is certainly bigger than the game itself and is often a metaphor projecting reality on a pitch. Nicholas Blincoe, playwright and screenwriter, had been living in Palestine, mainly in Bethlehem, for a number of years and by 2004 had become a football fan. Blincoe not only developed a love for the game but, more importantly, an interest in the history of football in Palestine. While the work of Issam Khalidi on the history of sport and football in Palestine remains unparalleled, the recent work of Blincoe is an interesting and entertaining narrative that discusses both the history and the contemporary question of football in Palestine and Israel.

The first part of his More Noble than War is an historical account of the development of football in Palestine from the late Ottoman period through the Mandate and the creation of the State of Israel. The second part of the book is a contemporary journey through Israeli-Palestinian football (Palestinian football in the West Bank and Gaza is only briefly mentioned) that illuminates the complexities beyond the game. The second section is also more engaging as Blincoe recounts his trips observing various teams over recent years. He reflects on the question of Palestinian players playing for Israeli teams and Palestinian teams playing in Israeli competitions – and the matter of racism, especially as exhibited by the supporters of the Beitar Jerusalem team, also known as “La Familia.”
Football arrived in Palestine with British missionaries in the early nineteenth century, but the game did not develop until the beginning of the twentieth century when the first team was created at St. George’s Anglican School in Jerusalem in 1908. The outbreak of the First World War halted football games, and then, following Britain’s conquest of Palestine and the establishment of the Mandate in 1920, football became an arena for the emerging division between Palestinians and Zionists. The story told by Blincoe reveals that there were two football scenes in Palestine, one played by Palestinians and one by Zionist settlers, with little if any interaction between them. The British attempts to administer a multiethnic and multireligious country while at the same time favoring the Zionists, indeed also impacted this area.

The example of Alfred Mond, a football enthusiast and retired parliamentary member, demonstrates the extent of British commitment towards the Zionist cause even in the sports arena. Mond sponsored the application to the world football governing body FIFA of the Maccabi organization, which would have represented football in Palestine. While the application was rejected, this anecdotal story shows that Palestinians would have had an even more difficult time with admittance to FIFA.

The detailed story of football in Palestine, presented by Blincoe in nineteen chapters in the first part of his work, contextualizes the emergence and competition between two organizations, Zionist and Palestinian. While the British certainly played a major role fostering the former, this story also marked the relationship between football teams and fans post-1948. Two of the most fascinating stories to follow are those of Yosef Yekutieli, the founder of Zionist-Israeli football, and Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, the ideologue who led Zionist football to adopt, to some extent, a fascist ideology, such as that represented by the Beitar organization and today by Beitar Jerusalem, the team that does not allow Arabs.

Blincoe’s account of his personal journey through Israeli-Palestinian football focuses on the issues facing Palestinians living in Israel and the ways in which they negotiated their identity and presence on the pitch and in the organization of Israeli football. The author notes that the language of football is Hebrew, even for Palestinian teams, an important consideration in light of the fact that out of 221 teams in the Israeli leagues, ninety are Palestinian, or a full 40 percent of the leagues. Israeli media and politicians often point this out to show what Israel should become. This was noted during discussions of Sakhnin’s win in the Israel Cup in 2004, when many, despite the historical context, believed that the future was promising and Israel could become “a happy place.” Sakhnin fans, however, were determinedly waiving the Palestinian flag, reminding Israelis that coexistence is not based on the success of a football team.

Reality, however, is very different and the investigation of Beitar Jerusalem and its hardcore “La Familia” section of fans, shows that while Palestinian teams may be increasing their presence and chance for success, the football world is still rife with racism. Beitar Jerusalem, linked to the Likud and other right-wing parties, has essentially marketed racism and become the symbol for anti-Arab attitudes in Jerusalem and Israel. It will be interesting to see what transpires if the sale goes through of 50 percent of the club to an Emirati group.
Football mirrors society, as some like to say, and Blincoe’s narrative shows just how the situation of Palestinians in Israel has been one of subjugation and limited opportunity in Israeli society. The book concludes by pointing out that although Palestinian teams make up 40 percent of Israeli football, they are still considered second class: many Israeli teams prefer to hire Jewish players from abroad rather than from Palestinian grassroots. Football, then, is just one aspect of the Palestinian history of exclusion.

Unfortunately, Blincoe does not address the way football also serves as a forum for solidarity, diplomacy, or international politics of Palestine-Israel, as suggested by the visit of Barca in their 2013 “Peace Tour,” or Maradona in commenting, “In my heart, I am Palestinian,” or how Palestinian flags feature in Irish football. With football as an international sport, viewing Israel-Palestine through its lens opens up many interesting questions and perspectives.

More Noble Than War is a poignant and well-written narrative – one that shows the importance of looking beyond politics and diplomacy, to focus on the daily and the routine. Yet inevitably, the narrative once again emerges, that even football – despite dreams of it being a great equalizer – is not an equal field and Palestinians, even when they win, continue to be “second class.”

Roberto Mazza is lecturer in the history of the modern Middle East at the University of Limerick, executive editor of the Jerusalem Quarterly and host of the podcast Jerusalem Unplugged.

Endnotes
EXHIBITION REVIEW

Printed in Jerusalem
Meaning, Form, and Vision
Review by Tarteel Muammar and Hasan Safadi

Abstract
In July 2020, while Palestinians were enduring lockdown and isolation to counter the COVID-19 pandemic, and health protocols hampered cultural institutions, the Palestinian Museum launched an online version of the exhibition “Printed in Jerusalem: Mustamloun,” (Tubi‘a fi al-Quds: mustamlun judud), originally scheduled to open in spring 2020. Reviewers Tarteel Muammar and Hasan Safadi take the readers on a tour of the exhibition, which was curated by Baha Jubeh and Abdel-Rahman Shabane, and share their observations within their critical and analytical framework, on the relationship of “printing” to the social, political, and economic conditions in Jerusalem, linking it to censorship, and the status of the city of Jerusalem. They attempt to raise questions about the vast trove of materials, which include historical prints and two hundred printing clichés, and knowledge presented, to stimulate debate and to invite further research into this subject from various perspectives.

Keywords
Printing; New Mustamloun; Jerusalem; Palestinian Museum; al-Karmil newspaper; Yusuf Nasr; Sixth Communiqué; censorship; political and cultural publications; Haifa.

On 27 July 2021, as Palestinians were suffering from long months of lockdown and isolation, and as cultural institutions were hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic health protocols,
the Palestinian Museum launched an online version of the exhibition Printed in Jerusalem: Mustamloun (*Tubi‘a fi al-Quds: mustamlun judud*), which had originally been scheduled to open to the public in spring 2020. It took considerable determination on the part of the Palestinian Museum to inaugurate this exhibition during an extended period of restricted gatherings. The exhibition, which encompasses a vast trove of materials and rich history, was organized by two new curators, Baha Jubeh, and second-time guest curator Abdel-Rahman Shabane. From the museum’s online description, the exhibition:

explores the relation between Jerusalemites and publications printed in their city – be their content political, educational, commercial, cultural or touristic – by probing the profession of the mustamly.

The creators of the Printed in Jerusalem (Second Iteration) exhibition have tackled the concept of the “new mustamloun.” This was the basis for the exhibit’s exploration of new ways to conceptualize archival materials, as well as to produce artworks that simulate the original materials. The materials were donated by Jerusalem’s Lawrence Press to Dar Al-Tifel, and the exhibition was initially launched at Jerusalem’s Palestinian Heritage Museum at Dar Al-Tifl in 2018.

The concept and properties of mustamloun have changed over the different historical periods. It took us some time to research the meaning of mustamloun. The curators define the word as follows:
A mustamly (plural: mustamloun) was tasked with dictating manuscripts to copyists and acted as an intermediary between author and the reading public. Historically, the transmission of content was merely one aspect of the role of the mustamly, the other being that of censorship. They were able to ban and omit, and to promote that which fell in line with their beliefs and intellectual inclinations. The profession of the mustamly is an ancient one that disappeared like others before it as modernisation replaced human voices with machinery’s hum and grind.\textsuperscript{2}

Shaykh Ahmad Shakir defines the term mustamly as “a person who asks for dictation from the shaykh” (taken from the Arabic verb yumly; “to dictate”), hence the mustamly receives the narration of the shaykh and transmits/dictates the content to the students. When it was challenging for them to be heard by all attendees, the shaykh would have one or more persons assigned with the task of transmitting their talk to the rest of the audience. As such, the mustamly would reach a high status through reporting and informing the public about the contents of the shaykh’s speech.\textsuperscript{3}

As noted throughout the museum’s publications and interviews, the exhibition seemingly brings into being and explores “the new mustamly,” particularly in the recent history of Jerusalem. However, the question that arises is: what does that concept really mean, and how does it relate to modern printing? What is the relation of modern printing with the acts of dictation (“Istimla’’’)? Also, who is a mustamly today? What are his roles, and what tools does he use? And why does the exhibit restrict the role of the new mustamly to the act of censorship within the context of a complete monitoring and behavior control system?

Entering the Exhibition

The exhibition presents rich and diverse archived works without confining itself to a single narrative or chronological order. That can be noticed when one sees the great array of newspapers, such as al-Fajr, and Filastin, as well as various magazines and printing clichés (whether letters, logos, stamps, and the like) in addition to a collection of educational books by Khalil al-Sakakini and others. The works are divided into groups, and the groups into sections that are not visibly marked for the visitors. This style of presentation generally attracts the visitor’s attention but makes it difficult to coherently grasp how the knowledge products are interlinked, until one watches the interviews related to these sections within the Palestinian Museum’s electronic platforms.

The transitions between sections and materials revealed some time gaps in the research process, which may have been due to deficiencies in the archives, artworks, and exhibition publications. This made it challenging to interact with the exhibition’s objective of understanding Jerusalem life in all of its aspects through the lens of printing presses, since it did not transmit a sense of the historical and social context of the city. One may call into question the purpose of this exhibition and its preoccupations, as
seen in how it deals with the archive’s available materials, and its primary focus on printing and printed materials. In this way, we find ourselves moving from the “Sixth communiqué” to al-Fajr newspaper’s archives, the impact of Jordanian censorship, and on to the clichéd advertisements of famous industries (as well as touristic clichés, schoolbooks, and so on) in Jerusalem. This happens without establishing an inductive historical analysis in conjunction with the intellectual, cultural, economic, social, and political transformations in the region.

Importantly, there is no mention or reference to the ownership of printing presses or who has the right to own them. For example, Ottoman sultan Bayezid II prohibited all forms of printing by his Muslim subjects in order to enhance his monopoly over Arab-Islamic production in the region, while he gave other religious groups the right to establish their own printing presses within the empire, on the condition that they not use the Arabic letters. This freed Jews and Christians to establish their own printing presses and delayed the printing process for Muslims.

There is also no reference to the craft of printing and to those who mastered it nor to the related crafts of carpentry, blacksmithing, painting, and Arabic calligraphy. This leads us to wonder whether the exhibited printing clichés (metal/wooden plates that bear ink) were locally produced or were imported from abroad. It also makes us reflect on the production or import of pigments and colors (which can impart

Figure 2. A sample of the collection of educational books by Khalil al-Sakakini. Courtesy of The Palestinian Museum, 2020.
information on the relationship of Jerusalem and its cultural and social history with the rest of the world). Although the exhibition specified that it examined the formation of social, economic and political relations in the city, the presentation raised a number of significant questions that went unanswered.4

Jerusalem in the Exhibition

The city of Jerusalem played a prominent role in the printing sector, not only in historic Palestine but also in the whole of the Levant. The first printing press in Palestine was established in Jerusalem in 1830 by Jewish resident Nesim Beyk.5 With Jerusalem a global religious center, printing in the city was concentrated on Christian and Jewish religious books. Printing activities eventually extended from religious to commercial, cultural, and political publications, all of which had a great impact on public life. The exhibition did zoom in on the period of Jordanian rule in Jerusalem – with materials depicting Jordanian censorship of local newspapers – as well as Israeli military rule over Jerusalem – highlighting the restrictions and prohibitions pertaining to printing and publishing.

Jerusalem’s actual role in the field of printing was only partially presented in “Printed in Jerusalem: Mustamloun.” The exhibition displayed a certain historical phase of printing but did not delve into how the profession was developed. It also did not explore the broader historical and geographic contexts, which could have tied Jerusalem (as a central city and religious pilgrimage site) to other Arab and Palestinian cities, as well as shown the relation between these cities and their inhabitants in terms of culture and the social, political, and economic life at the time. Adding those layers could have helped us understand the great role that publications, such as Najib Nassar’s al-Karmil newspaper in Haifa, had in shaping the political and cultural awareness of Palestinians in the north, not to mention the many achievements in Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo that were made in partnership with and inspiration from Jerusalem.

This second iteration of the “mustamloun” exhibition generally lacked specification of the political and social life of the mustamly in Jerusalem, and did not examine sensitive political dimensions of this profession. For example, what was the selection criteria of the mustamloun, and who was the party who hired them? By whom were they apprenticed to become the “eyes and tongues” of the regime that gave them a political and social status, such as during the sensitive political period of the city’s Ottoman era. Were they not appointed by the ruling authorities at the time?

The Political Dimension and the Sixth Communiqué

The exhibition did not present a full picture of the reciprocal relationship between printing and the political situation in Jerusalem. The city, after all, had undergone successive oppressive regimes that prohibited all liberationist and nationalist printing activities. Although the exhibition did include the Jerusalemite al-Fajr newspaper in
several of its sections, it made no mention of what happened to its founder Yusuf Nasr, who was assassinated in 1974 in mysterious circumstances because of his political views and his role in political life. His body has never been found.

On the other hand, an art installation work titled *The Sixth Communiqué* was prominent in the exhibition, and pointed to the status of Jerusalem and its printing presses during the first intifada. This installation demonstrated the printed materials at the time, as well as reflected on the hunt and searches, arrests, and assassinations of those who printed revolutionary materials. The premise was that the “Sixth Communiqué was printed in Jerusalem,” but the information provided was not sufficient to ascertain whether the first intifada communiqués were, in fact, printed there. The linkage between this installation work and the exhibition was a distraction for visitors that reinforced the act of merely (and perhaps passively) “watching.”

With all of this in mind, we must not neglect to note the tremendous efforts made to develop this exhibition, including the transfer of all these works from Jerusalem to Ramallah and the related risks – especially in light of the harsh political and security situation – for the purpose of presenting them to the largest possible number of people, in hope that this knowledge may contribute to further advancement.

**Conclusion**

This exhibition enables us to view printing as a transition point in modern history that constitutes an important change in societal culture and the formation of modern identity. Printing has contributed to the acceleration and spread of knowledge on the global level, as demonstrated by various historical stages of printing in Jerusalem in the exhibit. The exhibition also contributes to our understanding of the role of printing in the previous eras in relation to the news, when an entire day was needed to update events through daily newspapers, and its opportunity as a space for discussions, debates, and deliberations.

The most important epistemological contribution of the “New Mustamloun”...
exhibition, in the case of links to censorship, is that the “algorithms” of today’s modern technology and its accompanying tools for monitoring and targeting knowledge distribution can be seen as a form of mustamloun. We can see how these new mustamloun (algorithms) direct us on what to watch, hear, and read. The technological revolution transformed printing and printing presses to a digital world where a tremendous amount of (diverse and sometimes contradictory) data can be produced. Through speedy updates, overwhelming amounts of information shapes the greater part of our consciousness and awareness of current issues. Hence, the visible act of censorship is unnecessary; it has expanded its reaches to that of epistemological authority.

It would be fascinating to take this contemporary conceptualization into a third iteration of the exhibition, based on today’s reality through the mirror of the past. This could allow a broad and critical eye to give the exhibition a new, vibrant, and dynamic dimension.

Tarteel Muammar, from Bethlehem, has a BA in journalism and political science from Birzeit University. She is currently assistant coordinator of the “Visual Arts: A Flourishing Field” project at A.M. Qattan Foundation.

Jerusalemite Hasan Safadi holds a BA in journalism and political science from Birzeit University, and was previously with al-Safir newspaper and the Institute for Palestine Studies. He is currently a media officer at A.M. Qattan Foundation.

Endnotes
1 The Arabic title differs slightly from the English, see online at www.palmuseum.org/printed-in-jerusalem (accessed 1 March 2021).
4 Written in Jerusalem – The New Mustamloun – Exhibition catalogue, 27.
6 Interview with Baha Jubeh (1:45): online at youtu.be/-EFXMuCSsZo (accessed 1 March 2021).
Introduction
As part of the institutionalized spatial planning designed to cement Jerusalem, in both its eastern and western areas, as the “undivided and united” capital of the State of Israel, Jerusalem District Planning Committee recently proposed a new structural plan for the so-called “city centre” of East Jerusalem – spanning the areas of Bab Al Amoud (Damascus Gate), Salah El Deen, Nablus Road, Zahra Road, up to borders with the Shaik Jarrah and Wadi Al Joz neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. This plan builds on a legacy of Israel’s history of colonial planning policy that aims to divide and control Palestinian communities through implanting Israeli settlements in occupied areas of the City, while also limiting their potential for economic development and social cohesion.

The planning process, like all other Israeli municipal and state measures in East Jerusalem, are unilateral measures which exclude the (approximately 320,000) Palestinian citizens of the city from strategic decisions affecting their daily lives and livelihoods. Needless to say, with 70 years of such planning experience, Israel cloaks its colonial proposals in a “legal”, “professional”, “modernizing” and “culturally sensitive” narrative. Exclusion of Palestinians in this regard takes two forms:

• planning objectives which by definition and design neglect their legitimate social, economic and cultural aspirations and favors those of the Israeli population;
• political, civil and planning processes which treat Palestinian
Jerusalemites as individual “residents” rather than a population with collective, national interests.

This overview of the implications of the “city center” plan focuses on four main channels of impacts on economic and social development: infrastructure and movement, building policy, the cultural heritage and history of the area and the East Jerusalem social fabric, and the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. The attached socio-economic profile of the concerned areas of the city (prepared by MAS in 2016) provides some additional background information on their particular population and local economic features.

1- Infrastructure: divide and rule

The proposed plan creates a new flow for traffic in the area by establishing a “ring road” that circumvents the Salah El-Deen neighborhood while simultaneously changing some of the main roads in the area to one-way streets and pedestrian zones. While the justification for these changes may be argued for easing traffic flow, it will entail transforming the area so as to no longer serve as the pivotal transport hub for Jerusalemites. The implications for the local community and small commerce can be far-reaching. Historically, Salah El-Deen street has been the main access point to Damascus Gate and the Old City for Palestinians coming from the north and the east. This allowed Salah El-Deen to become a busy hub for business, tourism, professional services and public transport making it one the most important economic center in East Jerusalem.

However, the new infrastructure plans artificially disconnect the area from Bab Al Amoud: by rechanneling and choking the flow of nearby vehicular traffic, and monitoring the flow of people through this main entry from the north-east into the Old City. Furthermore, this would increase the position of Bab Al Khalil (Jaffa Gate) as the main entrance to the Old City by redirecting the flow of tourists through the adjacent Israeli Mamilla shopping area.

2- Building and housing: ethnic cleansing

The plan also sets out new building policies that limit the construction of new buildings and additional floors to very few plots of land, including both residential housing and other tourist and commercial constructions, and at most an additional 20-25% of current space. As East Jerusalem faces a major housing crisis, this would not only increase the stress on the housing market and the possibility for developing mixed commercial/residential space (as this area has always been), but it would also severely limit the potential for economic development and limit the function of this area which has a residential, commercial, and touristic nature.

For an area that heavily depends on tourism for income, the lack of potential for growing existing hotels, building new ones, or creating new centers that would attract more tourists is a formula to abort local economic development. It is also important to note that such a planning strategy and the ensuing restrictions are not consistent in authorities’ treatment of east and west Jerusalem, adding a new
layer to the discriminatory policies against the growth and prosperity of Palestinian quarters of Jerusalem, pushing the population to exit the city center and the old city, by making these areas uninhabitable.

3- Erasing culture, society and history

It appears that the Israeli planners did not care to learn more about the historical origins of these Palestinian quarters, which were actually among the areas surrounding the Old City to the north and west that became the natural extensions of the old city population as the Palestinian middle class began to emerge in the early 1900s. However, “Zionist zoning” in Jerusalem has rarely exhibited sensitivity to the significance of Arab or Islamic cultural heritage, as witnessed by:

- the destruction of the ancient Mamilla Islamic cemetery, which was a natural contiguity of the Old City and its walls, and the building on a so-called “Museum of Tolerance” in its place; or,
- the bulldozing in 1967 of the Mughrabi quarter of the Old City and the enforcement of extremely strict and discriminatory zoning pushing the Palestinian residents, especially their offspring, to move outside the city in areas that are now inside the wall.
- Separating the areas of Suwwaneh, Wadi Joz, Al-Tur, and the holy basin are east of the old city and transforming it into a “Biblical Park”.

In addition to the new building policies that are to be implemented, the plan also categorizes any building constructed prior to 1967 as a cultural heritage site thus banning any construction other than conservation. While this will likely protect many of the actual cultural and historical sites in the area, it also bans the development of many buildings built prior to 1967 especially during the Jordanian administration, that do not necessarily have any historical, architectural or cultural significance. On the other hand, the (continuing) Jordanian role since 1948 as custodian of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem, is an important factor shaping the social, political and even architectural fabric of the city today. Hence, there is a need for a planning policy that is more sensitive to, and better preserves the legacy of the era of Jordanian rule, and safeguards the role and interests of Jordanian institutions today in the affairs of the holy city.

It must be emphasized that Israel has generally restricted new construction or by Palestinians in this or other sensitive areas of East Jerusalem, rendering it architecturally reminiscent of the early and mid-20th century (with little renewal since). Overall, the new building policies and the categorization of cultural heritage sites makes the development of the neighborhood virtually impossible. In essence, it is a set of laws and policies that are aimed at maintaining the somewhat dilapidated status quo of the Salah El-Deen area with no room for natural urban growth and development and increasingly less a magnet for people and commerce.

The plan is also lacking an essential aspect of any structural master plan which would take into consideration the natural growth of the area and the needs and economic practices of the population that lives in it. As it currently stands, the
designs show no plan for what to do with the growing population, where to create new housing centers, how to ensure public transport and what to do with displaced persons and businesses (especially in Wadi Al Joz area). This risks inflicting permanent damage to the socio-cultural status and role of this area. Palestinian collective aspirations and the relation of Jerusalemites to the increasingly constrained space left to them by colonial processes, have always been and will continue to be disregarded systematically by Israel.

4- Preventing East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine and detaching it from the Palestinian national economy

Lastly, it is important to consider how the spatial implications of the plan impact political and legal status of East Jerusalem as the capital of the future State of Palestine. In particular, the plan reconfigures and cuts the Bab al Amoud/Sultan Suleiman area with a ring road (or public transport network) connecting to west Jerusalem and eventually to Israeli colonized areas to the north-east of Silwan and the Holy Basin). In doing so the plan will entail further isolation of the “Old City and its Walls” (a World Heritage site) from its natural adjacent quarters such as this (and similarly, the areas to the east of the Old City currently experiencing intensive Israelization). Alarmingly, it risks a move towards “Disneyfication” of the Old City, turning it to another commercialized site on the Israeli tourism circuit, and intensification of the ongoing erasure of its rich Islamic and Christian Arab/Palestinian cultural heritage.

On the other hand, the increasing isolation and “enclavisation” of the once wholly Arab populated, owned and administered East Jerusalem has grave consequences for its pivotal role in the Palestinian national economy, contributing 12% of its GDP thirty years ago, dropping lately to 7%. The arteries of Palestinian trade and movement of people that once passed north and south, east and west through Jerusalem are today cut. Long-entrenched geo-economic dynamics have been distorted to the detriment of the Palestinian population struggling to exist and maintain a distinct identity “within the Wall”, while maintaining historic economic relations with the rest of the West Bank in particular.

Notwithstanding recent US recognition of Israel’s illegal sovereignty over both East and West Jerusalem further complicating the issue, this need not preclude (and for Palestinians of course in no way precludes) planning for East Jerusalem as the capital city of Palestine. Such a plan that has not included any of the local Palestinian communities and/or authorities in its purpose or design is a continuation of Israel’s policies in East Jerusalem that aim to not only divide and control the Palestinian communities but to also undermine East Jerusalem as the future capital of Palestine.

5- Policy Messages

- For the socio-economic, cultural and political reasons outlined above, this plan should be vigorously challenged as an unacceptable game-changer as regards the still unresolved status of Jerusalem, by international par-
ties and in international forums concerned with the situation and human rights of the Palestinian people living there under prolonged Israeli occupation, to safeguard the unity of the occupied Palestinian territory.

- This could take the form both of individual representations and expressions of concern about the Plan by individual countries to the Israeli authorities, as well as pursuing the issue in the concerned United Nations Humans Rights Council (including Special Rapporteurs) and General Assembly levels, on the basis of it constituting a violation of international laws that jeopardizes the possibility to reach to internationally legitimate political solution.

- Furthermore, Palestinian stakeholders on the ground, both those challenging the plan and those impacted by it, should be supported through donor programs for East Jerusalem, and refer to the “Jerusalem Development Cluster Plan” adopted by the Palestinian government as the guiding framework for the programs supporting the Jerusalem economy and community.

- Indeed, the separate and special status of the “City of Jerusalem” as envisaged in international legitimacy since the 1947 Partition Resolution designated Jerusalem as “Corpus Separatum”, should serve as a beacon for future planning for the city and for international support for its besieged Palestinian population.

- Additionally, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is distinctly responsible and related given its role not only in protecting the holy city’s sites and public endowments (Awqaf properties), but also because of its historical economic and social relationship with East Jerusalem.
editor’s note:
jq thanks the palestinian central bureau of statistics (pcbs) for providing this key document to jq readers. the full report can be found online at www.pcbs.gov.ps/downloads/book2557.pdf
### Selected Indicators by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza Strip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Population, End Year 2020</td>
<td>5,164,173</td>
<td>3,086,816</td>
<td>2,077,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>2,625,355</td>
<td>1,572,632</td>
<td>1,052,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>2,538,818</td>
<td>1,514,184</td>
<td>1,024,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Area (km²)</td>
<td>6,024.82</td>
<td>5,659.91</td>
<td>364.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Capita/km²), End Year 2020</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>5,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Population Below 15 Years, End Year 2020</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Household Size, 2020</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate for Population Participated in the labour force Aged 15 Years and Over, 2020</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students per Class at Basic Stage, 2019/2020</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students per Class at Secondary Stage, 2019/2020</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Households Who have Computer Desktop, 2020</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Beds per 1000 of Population, 2019</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product (Million USD), 2019 (Constant Prices)</td>
<td>15,829</td>
<td>12,998.8</td>
<td>2,830.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (USD), 2019 (Constant Prices)</td>
<td>3,378.3</td>
<td>4,822.5</td>
<td>1,422.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Value of Exports (Million USD), 2019</td>
<td>1,103.8</td>
<td>1,092.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Registered Value of Imports (Million USD), 2019</td>
<td>6,613.5</td>
<td>5,878.8</td>
<td>734.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Fixed Telephone Lines, 2019*</td>
<td>467,189</td>
<td>341,089</td>
<td>126,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Housing Density (Person per Room), 2018</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data excluded those parts of Jerusalem which were annexed by Israeli Occupation in 1967. ©PCBS
Call for Submissions to the Jerusalem Quarterly

The Jerusalem Quarterly accepts author submissions of original contributions about Jerusalem, its social and political history, and its current realities. Occasionally personal memoirs or works of fiction are accepted. Submissions may be made throughout the year; specific deadlines for special thematic issues may also be announced.

JQ sends all manuscripts to designated readers for evaluation. Authors should allow four to eight weeks from the date of submission for a final evaluation and publication decision.

Please direct submissions or queries to the JQ team: jq@palestine-studies.org

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Articles submitted to JQ for consideration should adhere to the following:

• Size: 3,500 to 12,000 words, and including an abstract (maximum 200 words), a list of keywords (maximum 10), and a brief author’s biography (maximum 25 words).
• Spelling: American English according to Merriam-Webster.
• Text style: Refer to Chicago Manual of Style (CMOS) for all questions regarding punctuation, capitalization, and font style.
• Transliteration of Arabic, Hebrew, and Turkish names and words should follow the style recommended by the International Journal for Middle East Studies, but modified for Arabic transliteration, by omitting all diacritical marks except for the ‘ayn and hamza.
• Citations should be in the form of endnotes and written in full (CMOS) as in the original source, with transliteration if needed.
• Any photos (minimum 600 dpi), charts, graphs, and other artwork should be camera-ready format. The author should provide captions and credits, and indicate the preferred placement in the manuscript. The author is responsible for securing permission to reproduce copyrighted materials.
The Ibrahim Dakkak Award for Outstanding Essay on Jerusalem

The Ibrahim Dakkak Award for Outstanding Essay on Jerusalem is an annual award launched by the Jerusalem Quarterly in 2017 to commemorate the memory and work of Ibrahim Dakkak (1929–2016), Jerusalem architect, activist, political leader, and former chairman of the Advisory Board.

It is awarded for an outstanding submission that addresses either contemporary or historical issues relating to Jerusalem. A committee selected by the Jerusalem Quarterly determines the winning essay. The author will be awarded a prize of U.S. $1,000 and the essay will be published in the Jerusalem Quarterly.

Essays submitted for consideration should be based on original research and must not have been previously published elsewhere. They should be 4,000 to 5,000 words in length (including endnotes), preceded by an abstract of no more than 200 words, and up to 10 keywords.

If the submitted article is in Arabic, the abstract and keywords should be in English.

Any images should be submitted as separate files with a resolution of 600 dpi minimum, if possible. Submitted images must have copyright clearance from owners, and have captions that are clear and accurate.

Please submit essays and a short bio (including current or previous affiliation with a recognized university, research institution, or non-governmental organization that conducts research) via email to jq@palestine-studies.org, mentioning the Award.

The deadline for submissions is 15 January of each year.
تصفح مجلة الدراسات الفلسطينية بنصوصها الكاملة منذ الإصدار الأول عام 1990 على موقعنا الإلكتروني الجديد:
www.palestine-studies.org/ar/journals/mdf/issues
ALL ISSUES OF THE JERUSALEM QUARTERLY SINCE 1998 ARE AVAILABLE ON OUR NEW WEBSITE
www.palestine-studies.org/en/journals/jq/issues
Connecting

Middle East To Europe

Through Our State-of-the-Art Network and Data Centers Spread From Europe and all the way to the Middle East

int.w.s@paltel.ps
Editors: Beshara Doumani and Salim Tamari
Executive Editor: Roberto Mazza
Managing Editor: Carol Khoury
Consulting Editor: Issam Nassar
Editorial Committee: Rana Barakat, Rema Hammami, Penny Johnson, Nazmi Jubeh, Alex Winder

Advisory Board
Rochelle Davis, Georgetown University, U.S.
Michael Dumper, University of Exeter, U.K.
Rania Elias, Yabous Cultural Centre, Jerusalem
George Hintljan, Christian Heritage Institute, Jerusalem
Huda al-Imam, Imam Consulting, Jerusalem
Hassan Khader, al-Karmel Magazine, Ramallah
Rashid Khalidi, Columbia University, U.S.
Yusuf Natsheh, Al-Quds University, Jerusalem
Khader Salameh, al-Khalidi Library, Jerusalem
Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Queen Mary University of London, U.K.
Tina Sherwell, Birzeit University, Birzeit

Contributing Editors
Yazid Anani, A. M. Qattan Foundation, Ramallah
Khaldun Bshara, RIWAQ Centre, Ramallah
Sreemati Mitter, Brown University, U.S.
Palestine Naili, Institut français du Proche-Orient (Ifpo), Jordan
Jacob Norris, University of Sussex, U.K.
Mezna Qato, University of Cambridge, U.K.
Omar Imseeh Tesdell, Birzeit University, Birzeit
Hanan Toukan, Bard College Berlin, Germany

The Jerusalem Quarterly (JQ) is the leading journal on the past, present, and future of Jerusalem. It documents the current status of the city and its predicaments. It is also dedicated to new and rigorous lines of inquiry by emerging scholars on Palestinian society and culture. Published since 1998 by the Institute for Palestine Studies through its affiliate, the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, the Jerusalem Quarterly is available online in its entirety at www.palestine-studies.org/en/journals/jq/about.

The Jerusalem Quarterly follows a double-blind peer review process for select contributions. Peer reviewed articles are indicated as such in the table of contents.

This journal is produced with the financial assistance of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Palestine/Jordan. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, nor those of the editors or the Institute of Jerusalem Studies.

Email: jq@palestine-studies.org
www.palestine-studies.org

ISSN 2521-9731 (print version)
ISSN 2521-974X (online version)

Cover photo: Rachel’s Tomb, Bethlehem (between 1934 and 1939), Library of Congress, online at www.loc.gov/item/2019707357/
