

The Jerusalem Light Rail in Historical Perspective

Urban Transportation and Urban Citizenship between Ottomanism and Apartheid

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Abstract

In the summer of 2014 during riots that broke out in Jerusalem after the kidnapping and murder of a Palestinian boy, Muhammad Abu Khdeir, by Jewish settlers, three stations of the Jerusalem Light Rail were vandalized and set on fire; their destruction targeted the fantasy of a united, modern, and conflict-free Jerusalem that the light rail sought to embody. Since its opening in 2011, proponents of the light rail have held it up as an example of Jewish-Arab coexistence in the city; after all, according to company reports, almost a quarter of the rail's daily passengers are Palestinian. Despite this statistic, however, the light rail is instead an embodiment of the long-term failure of urban citizenship in Jerusalem. Examining the light rail in historical perspective against the plans for a tramway in late Ottoman Jerusalem sheds light on a very different moment in which the tramway represented aspirations for and interest in a shared Jerusalemite urban identity. Over time, however, urban segregation, political sectarianism, and colonialism transformed the possibilities for urban citizenship in Jerusalem.

Keywords

Jerusalem; urban transportation; urban citizenship; intercommunal relations; urban segregation.

In the summer of 2014, during riots that broke out in Jerusalem after the kidnapping and murder of a Palestinian boy, Muhammad Abu Khdeir, by Israeli

Jewish settlers, three stations of the Jerusalem Light Rail were vandalized and set on fire.¹ The stations were all located in northeast Jerusalem across the Green Line in the Palestinian neighborhood of Shu‘fat up to its border with Bayt Hanina, and their destruction targeted the fantasy of a united, modern, and conflict-free Jerusalem that the light rail sought to embody.

Since its opening in 2011, proponents of the light rail and urban boosters alike have held it up as an example of Jewish-Arab coexistence in the city; after all, according to company reports, almost a quarter of the rail’s daily passengers are Palestinian. However, as the events of 2014 showed, this is a superficial and decontextualized vision of the light rail in a more complex urban landscape. Instead, the nascent scholarship has examined the light rail as a tool and symbol of urban colonial rule over Jerusalem, an example of infrastructure violence, a performance space selling the “modernization” of Jerusalem, and a smokescreen promoting and concealing normalization of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem.²

The light rail is also an embodiment of the long-term failure of urban citizenship in Jerusalem. Other than historians in the field, few people know that the Jerusalem light rail is a twenty-first-century realization of a twentieth-century modernist plan that emerged in the last decade of Ottoman rule. Elsewhere I have written about some of the local urban actors and institutions behind the tramway proposal and related concessions, and two recent articles on the rise and fall of the tramway concession based on Ottoman archival documents have added a great deal to our understanding of this important effort in the context of Ottoman urban development.³ In this article, I expand on the local conditions that precipitated and shaped the tramway proposal and discuss more broadly what it would have meant for the city and its residents and visitors at the time, an effort which I see as an expression of Ottoman urban citizenship. This urban citizenship was facilitated by a tradition of municipal governance, common residential and commercial life, and a modernist discourse that underscored Jerusalem as a city of all its residents.

Even so, urban citizenship in Ottoman Jerusalem was challenged by the growing development of segregated *extramuros* settlements and the growing impact of the Zionist movement on urban politics and governance. Although the tramway’s failed implementation was most directly due to problems with capital, elite rivalries, the outbreak of World War I, and the dismantling of the empire, the aborted Ottoman tramway as seen in the reflection of the extant Jerusalem light rail also signals the limits of Jerusalem as a shared city in both practice and imagination.

The Ottoman City

It is a cliché among popular authors and journalists to refer to Jerusalem’s Ottoman era (1516–1917) as one of decay and stagnation, but in fact throughout its rule the Ottoman state invested significant attention and resources in the city and province.⁴ Moreover, a tremendous amount of original research in recent decades shows that nineteenth-

century Jerusalem was a dynamic, modernizing city firmly rooted in a forward-looking and globally-oriented Ottoman Empire.⁵ Jerusalem's incorporation into the global economy, facilitated first by steamship travel and then by the construction of the Jaffa–Jerusalem railroad in 1892, further accelerated urban development, demographic growth, and geopolitical investment in the city.

For the Ottoman state, transportation projects linked remote parts of the empire together, provided the state with additional tools for population surveillance and control, and presented evidence of imperial progress to its population and to the world.⁶ By the turn of the twentieth century, there were urban tramways, first horse-powered then electric, in the capital Istanbul as well as in the large cities of Damascus, Salonica, Beirut, and Izmir. For the Ottoman urban elites and aspiring middle classes, these tramways represented urban modernization and development, and they contributed to complex and wide-ranging physical and social urban transformations at the dawn of the twentieth century.⁷

In addition, by the second half of the nineteenth century, new state institutions such as the municipality (*baladiyya*) and local and provincial councils (*majlis 'umumi* and *majlis idari*) were created as part of the Tanzimat imperial reform project, giving local elites an active and institutionalized role in local governance.⁸ Although this role was undoubtedly circumscribed by the political authoritarianism of the Hamidian era, these reforms regularized Muslim, Christian, and Jewish urban residents serving together in the municipal and provincial councils throughout the empire. Furthermore, top-down and bottom-up ideas and practices about vertical and horizontal imperial belonging [Ottomanism/*Osmanlılık*] emerged, albeit unevenly. New public spaces of leisure and civic celebration also took root in the city.⁹

Put together, these institutions, practices, ideas, and – invariably – struggles characterized urban citizenship.¹⁰ While the historian Nora Lafi correctly cautions us against nostalgia, Ottoman urban governance undeniably was a “negotiated urban balance based on the coexistence of communities,” what she calls an “Ottoman *pax urbana*.”¹¹ As is clear from the Jerusalem municipal council minutes recently digitized and translated by an international team of scholars, from the 1890s to the 1910s the municipality saw its task as serving residents of the city irrespective of religion or ethnicity.¹² Municipal tenders and leases were issued regularly to tax-farmers and tenants from different religious groups, street cleaning services were contracted for the various quarters of the city regardless of the composition of its residents, and policies relating to urban services were applied to the city as a whole – and with Jerusalemites as a unit – in mind. For their part, Jerusalem residents made their own demands of the municipality, shared ideas about city life, and competed with each other over urban rights and responsibilities.¹³

It is unclear when the idea of a public tramway system for Jerusalem first emerged, or who initiated it.¹⁴ Jerusalem notables who traveled to the imperial capital as well as migrants to the city would have had first-hand experience with urban tramways, and it is clear that they often drew on regional and global precedents for their ideas about modern urban life. The first mention of a tramway for Jerusalem that I have found

was in a letter exchanged in 1905 between Zionist officials discussing an anticipated increase in land prices outside the city walls, the apparent cause being rumors of a new tramway that would service the area. However, no other sources from around that time have been found yet indicating the origin of those rumors.¹⁵ Two years later in 1907, a French company proposed establishing electric transportation between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, to no end.¹⁶ In the aftermath of the 1908 Ottoman revolution, however, a messianic new era of progress and development captured the imagination of the empire's elites and masses and ideas of a broad public works overhaul in Jerusalem emerged.

The first documented discussion of plans for an electric tramway in the city appeared in early October in the newspaper *al-Quds*, when the paper reported that a group of notable merchants had gathered to discuss the establishment of a commercial company and a "patriotic Ottoman Palestinian bank" that would seek concessions for a tramway and running water and "anything that is of national, commercial, and public good."¹⁷ Another notice on the same page mentioned that the new governor, Subhi Bek, had called on commercial notables to establish a commercial chamber in the city; while the Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture did not receive its official license until January 1909, it worked behind the scenes throughout the fall.¹⁸

The chamber saw its goal as broadly serving as an intermediary between the government and the city's merchant, industrial, and financial classes to work for the "economic development of the country." It attracted fifty-seven registered members in the city, primarily Ottomans but also a few foreign citizens belonging to the various resident religious groups.¹⁹ Its members included merchants of various kinds, industrialists, landowners, bankers, but also a tailor, goldsmith, and supplier to the Ottoman military.²⁰ Among its numerous interests, the chamber listed projects relating to public works.

Between fall 1908 and 1910, the tramway and related urban development projects primarily swirled around the municipality, the Chamber of Commerce, the bank established by the chamber members as shareholders, and the city's multireligious urban elite involved in these organizations. Although the municipality did not have the legal authority to sign concessions and large public works projects without the permission and approval of the other imperial bodies, this was a period of far more active involvement on the local level. In an issue of *al-Quds* that appeared early in Governor Subhi Bek's tenure, the Jewish bank clerk and former government agricultural inspector Dr. Yitzhak Levi penned an extraordinary open letter, challenging Subhi Bek as the city's first "constitutional pasha" to work as a faithful public servant in true partnership with the city's elites to reform and develop the city.²¹ One week later, Subhi Bek published his response that outlined his vision for the city's development, reminding Levi and other readers that in his first week on the job he had already ordered a study on bringing running water to the city, among other initiatives.²²

Around the same time, the Jewish vocational school director and public figure Albert Antébi mentioned in a letter to a colleague that Subhi Bek had tasked him

with researching a number of topics dealing with Jerusalem's development, including the potential tramway.²³ No doubt Antébi was asked to contribute due to his active role in the nascent Chamber of Commerce; he was officially elected secretary in December, and later the Chamber claimed authorship of this study and others.²⁴ By early December 1908 one of the Hebrew newspapers publishing in the city, *Ha-Zvi*, finally reported on the establishment of a "shares company" led by Jewish, Muslim, and Christian elites with the aim of building a "municipal electric train."²⁵ What *ha-Zvi* and (two months prior) *al-Quds* were referring to was the newly established Société Commercial Palestine (SCP), an arm of the new Chamber of Commerce.

On 1 January 1909, *al-Quds* reported that two prominent Jerusalemites, the Hijaz railway engineer Muhammad Nazif Bek al-Khalidi and the doctor Niqula Effendi Esperidun, had petitioned the Ministry of Commerce and Public Works to construct an electric tramway between Jaffa and Jerusalem and to provide both cities with electricity.²⁶ In response, the government had requested a study of the viability and necessity of such a concession, involving both the local governor and the municipality. Jurji Habib Hanania, the editor of *al-Quds*, praised al-Khalidi and Esperidun's initiative aimed at "broadening civilization" in the province and bringing Jerusalem to the level of other "advanced and progressive cities." Later that same month the SCP submitted a formal bid to secure a concession for developing running water, electricity, and a tramway in Jerusalem.²⁷

The Tramway as a Site of Urban Citizenship

The proposed tramway was intended both to modernize the city and to address the transportation needs of its residents and visitors. Beginning in the 1860s, construction in Jerusalem had expanded the city's size dramatically. In seven decades, the city grew almost six-fold from approximately seven hundred dunams of built-up land in 1838 to 4,130 dunams on the eve of World War I.²⁸ The great majority of this expansion took place outside the city walls. As a result, while in the 1860s the earliest *extramuros* buildings were constructed within one kilometer of Jaffa Gate (Bab al-Khalil) (including the Russian Compound, the Jewish philanthropical Montefiore/Mishkenot Sha'ananim houses, and the German Templar Colony), over the subsequent decades construction went out farther and farther. By the early 1910s, the farthest buildings and neighborhoods were almost two and a half kilometers from Jaffa Gate, twice as far as before.

Foreign, Jewish, and Zionist institutions are often credited with this *extramuros* expansion, but in fact the Jerusalem municipality itself played a key role in institutionalizing core civic spaces and municipal institutions outside the city walls.²⁹ In addition to new municipal offices, the municipal garden, hospital, and pharmacy were also constructed on Jaffa Road. The municipal building and municipal garden were built just outside the city walls, but the hospital and pharmacy were located on the western edge of the built city at the time, 1.7 kilometers from Jaffa Gate. In the early 1890s, a municipal council meeting labeled this an "inconvenient" and

“distant place” that serviced mostly villagers in the adjacent lands rather than people from the city, and a satellite pharmacy was opened within the city walls.³⁰ Despite this description, however, the 1894 Conrad Schick map makes clear that the hospital was far from isolated, as it was flanked by several schools and other buildings in addition to new neighborhoods on both sides of Jaffa Road. However, at a time when all commercial, religious, and public works needs could be met within the one square kilometer area of the walled city, the fact that it was *perceived* to be so distant tells us a great deal about daily circulation in Jerusalem.

This area west of the *intramuros* city expanded steadily in the subsequent years. In fact, according to the Ottoman census returns from 1905, the Ottoman population living outside the walls had almost reached parity with the *intramuros* population, with approximately fourteen thousand residents living in twenty-three neighborhoods outside the city walls.³¹ Since the vast majority of non-Ottoman foreign citizens were reported to be living in the *extramuros* city, it seems clear that the demographic weight of the city overall had shifted outside the walls. Residential sorting patterns throughout Ottoman Jerusalem were varied, but about two-thirds of the city’s population lived in mixed neighborhoods with populations of different religions, denominations, ethnicities, and classes living closely together.³² Most of the *extramuros* compounds, however, were more ethnically and religiously homogeneous, particularly those that were constructed by philanthropic associations, Jewish religious denominations (*kollels*), and Zionist building associations.

While these homogeneous compounds were neither autonomous nor isolated in the city’s landscape, many of them were constructed with bakeries, ritual baths, and synagogues, services that would give residents fewer reasons to circulate in the city. Many of them also were constructed with walls around the neighborhood, a practical defense in a time when jackals and robbers could be found, but one that also visually blocked it off from the city. If the *intramuros* city was characterized by regular encounter and shared spaces in close proximity, important elements of urban citizenship, then the growth of these segregated compounds challenged this.³³ The one-third of Jerusalem’s population that lived in homogeneous neighborhoods at the turn of the twentieth century would continue to grow in subsequent years.

Furthermore, because Jerusalem is a hilly terrain without asphalt-paved streets at that time, relatively short distances were considered more remote and with rough terrain at the turn of the century. Some people used donkeys and other beasts of burden for travel outside the city walls.³⁴ The municipality even set aside funding to pay the traveling inspector his transportation costs associated with renting a “beast” “because of the long distance between places” outside the Old City, whose perimeter spanned 2.5 kilometers.³⁵ More commonly, wagons and carriages for hire were stationed at Jaffa Gate and regularly carried passengers along Jaffa Road to the westernmost neighborhoods, but the poor road conditions meant that their wheels would get stuck in the dirt road and passengers would be choked by dust clouds on the journey.³⁶ In addition, intra-city wagon or carriage travel was an added expense for individuals that restricted their mobility throughout the city and limited the connectedness of the more

distant *extramuros* quarters.³⁷ The municipal council more than once intervened to regulate the fares being charged by intracity wagons and carriages.³⁸

It was the city's size as well as the relative inconvenience in reaching all parts of it that led the municipal council to support the tramway proposal. In mid-January 1909, the Jerusalem Municipal Council minutes recorded:

The number of buildings and constructions increases day by day all across outside the city; these are expanding at the moment, with completed houses at an approximate one hour distance from the town wall; hence, transportation must be facilitated to the houses outside the wall, which are located in a space transformed into a fully-fledged town, and comfort must be provided for the people. It is thus obvious that it is necessary to expand a tramline outside the town and that this would bring benefits.³⁹

The SCP's tramway proposal in 1909 included three lines that would originate at Jaffa Gate, the commercial and transportation hub of the city. The longest line of over two kilometers would follow Jaffa Road to the west, passing the municipal public garden, the Russian colony (including hospices for pilgrims and a church), various schools (the Sisters of Saint Charles, the Alliance Israélite Universelle), hospitals (the municipal hospital, the German and Jewish hospitals), and numerous stores, markets, and businesses. In addition, nine new neighborhoods straddled both sides of Jaffa Road, together housing over five thousand residents.⁴⁰ Many of these residents were Jewish, although there were also large numbers of Christians and smaller numbers of Muslims residing along this stretch of the city.

The second planned line ran south almost a kilometer and a half to the Jaffa–Jerusalem railroad station, which would have been its primary purpose. As it was, travelers arriving from Jaffa to the train station had to secure wagons, donkeys, or porters to help them uphill to the city with their luggage; a tram stop there taking them directly to Jaffa Gate would greatly facilitate their arrival in the city. In addition, the line would pass by Montefiore neighborhood with over fifteen hundred Jewish residents, and the stop at the train station would have shortened the distance to the city for Baq'a neighborhood further south, already home to over six hundred Muslims and Christians. Future expansion of this line all the way to Bethlehem would have served both foreign pilgrims and tourists as well as commercial relations between that town and the city.

The third proposed line is somewhat puzzling, as the map shows that after initially passing through some Christian churches and religious institutions just south of the Mamilla cemetery, it would wind through orchards before ending up at the train station, just north of the German colony. The Mamilla and Talbiyya neighborhoods it would pass were small, with only about seven hundred largely Christian residents between the two of them. Perhaps the vision was that this area too would be built up in the future (and indeed it was, only a few decades later).

The SCP's proposal was ambitious: in addition to the future expansion of the second line to Bethlehem, the proposal also outlined plans to build a new tram line to the Mount of Olives, another key pilgrimage and tourist destination and thus important

to the Jerusalem economy.⁴¹ The tramway would have had both passenger and cargo cars, further underscoring the economic incentive of transporting goods arriving at the train station from the Jaffa port as a key concern for the Chamber of Commerce and its constituent members.

Ultimately, the SCP's bid fell through due to insufficient funding, rivalries between the chamber and the municipal council, and imperial administrative hoops, but the tramway concession idea did live on for another four years and through several additional iterations. In the summer of 1910, the Jerusalem municipality announced a call for applications for four public works concessions, including the tramway.⁴² A few months later close to the deadline in October, a tramway concession proposal template was circulated that almost tripled the SCP's 1909 proposed track length to over 15.5 kilometers.⁴³ Some of the important changes included a rail line in the northeast of the city, an area that was previously neglected in the SCP plan, a second line in the northwest, and a tramway all the way to Bethlehem, nine kilometers to the south. The northeast line would go to the Shaykh Jarrah mosque and would service an area of the city with more than fifteen hundred primarily Muslim residents, connecting to the main Nablus–Damascus road; another line would go to the Schneller orphanage, the farthest building in the northwest of the city while passing through several new neighborhoods with over twenty-five hundred Jewish residents.

Importantly, this proposal template also included a future tramline from Jaffa Gate to the Mosque of Omar (referring to the Haram al-Sharif), pending the municipality's successful application of eminent domain to secure the land needed for the track. In addition to underscoring the importance of the third holiest site in Islam (and the holiest Muslim site in Palestine), this tramline would have aided Muslim pilgrimage and reasserted Ottoman imperial patronage over the city; this line also would have passed by the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, of course one of the most important destinations of thousands of Christian and European tourists and pilgrims visiting annually. Measuring only 650 meters long, this proposed line was a challenging addition, however, since the line would go through the heavily built-up *intramuros* city.⁴⁴ It also would allow passengers to bypass important markets that they otherwise would have passed through, with a certainly negative impact on those vendors.

It is not clear what happened in this round of proposals, or whether the municipality even received any applications. The next archival documentation comes only four years later, in January 1914, when a concession was signed with the Greek Istanbulite Evripides Mavrommatis. At that time the American consul in the city observed, "From a municipal point of view, there is no doubt that these concessions will be of great benefit to the city. . . . The tramways will no doubt open up the suburban sections and relieve the overcrowding and unsanitary conditions prevailing in within the walled part of the city."⁴⁵

This final round resulted in the most ambitious tramway proposal yet: six lines that would link the city to neighboring towns (Bethlehem) and villages (Shaykh Badr and the Mount of Olives), go deeper into the *intramuros* city than previously planned, and more fully connect sacred and secular, local and foreign interests.⁴⁶ Moreover,

the proposed lines would have serviced Muslim, Christian, and Jewish sites and heterogeneous as well as homogeneous neighborhoods. However, World War I broke out only months after Mavrommatis signed the concession, and within a few years the arriving British were adamantly opposed to such an image of visual modernity that would mar the Jerusalem landscape. Mandate-era British electricity concessions to the Zionist industrialist Pinchas Rutenberg in the 1920s did not result in tramways being constructed in either Jerusalem or Jaffa/Tel-Aviv.⁴⁷

It is telling that the main agents in the tramway concession hunt had shifted sharply from local Jerusalemite business and civic leaders in 1909, to imperial citizens and international bankers by 1914. At the same time, the tramway concession that Mavrommatis ultimately received was far more responsive to the city's geography and transportation needs than the first one proposed in 1909. Unfortunately, surviving primary sources do not allow us enough insight into the negotiations that took place behind the scenes in the tramway proposals, so we cannot know the role of Jerusalemites in pushing for or against the specifics of the proposed lines. Other aspects of Jerusalem life in these years, however, reveal some of the ways that its residents struggled over competing visions of and claims to the city. For example, bourgeois urbanites sought to clamp down on peasants selling their goods on the streets; foreign residents refused to pay street cleaning fees; urban crime led to increased fears and tensions in various parts of the city.⁴⁸ Given this, it is reasonable to assume that residents would have had competing interests and aims with the tramway proposals.

More pointedly, urban administration became more politicized with the question of Zionist influence in the city. The municipal elections of 1910 that resulted in the election of two Jewish council members – at least one of whom, David Yellin, was affiliated with Zionist institutions – were critiqued by the local newspaper *al-Munadi* as corrupt. The questions of Zionism and European colonialism increasingly impacted civic life in a variety of ways, among them contributing directly to the splintering of the local Masonic lodge, an important site of Ottoman intercommunal sociability, in 1913.⁴⁹ These struggles over urban citizenship nevertheless remained structured around a shared, if negotiated, city in which daily encounters across religious groups continued.

During World War I, civic leaders in the city cooperated to distribute grain and humanitarian relief and to combat the locust plague, but they also clashed over the relative contributions of each to these efforts as well as to the broader wartime context.⁵⁰ Within a few years, though, the conditions of the Balfour Declaration and British marginalization of the Jerusalem municipality, which did not hold elections until 1927 (a full decade after the city's occupation by British troops and officials), coupled with the sharp increase in Jewish immigration to Jerusalem and the increasing urban segregation and urban violence that developed meant that the preconditions for the Ottoman *pax urbana* had already been destroyed. By the mid-1920s, a Jewish group called “ha-Toshav” (the Resident) emerged to propose separating Jerusalem into Arab and “Hebrew” municipalities; among its supporters was the former Ottoman municipal council member, David Yellin.⁵¹

The Apartheid City

If “a picture is worth a thousand words,” then the twenty-first century equivalent would be the social media feed; the Hebrew and Arabic language Facebook pages of the Jerusalem light rail operator are reflections of the divided city and the hierarchical publics that the train purports to serve. On the Hebrew page run by the current operator of the light rail, the Cfir company, in between operational announcements and job advertisements they publish regular Shabbat and Jewish holiday greetings, one of the most recent of which, Purim, included instructions for crafting a face mask with the logo of the light rail. On International Women’s Day, company employees distributed flowers to female passengers and featured a video celebrating the work of female employees. On Valentine’s Day, the page featured the heartwarming story of a young Jewish couple’s engagement on the train where they had met four years prior. These posts regularly receive dozens of likes, hearts, and other emoji reactions in addition to comments from the Hebrew-speaking public.⁵²

In contrast, the light rail’s Arabic language Facebook page has not been updated in over a year, since 14 April 2021, when the former operator of the light rail, CityPass, posted its last announcement; the new operator Cfir has not bothered to open an Arabic-language Facebook page at all. Even when the CityPass Arabic page was active, it contained none of the human-interest stories or community and culturally embedded posts that are common on the Hebrew page. Instead, its posts consisted entirely of operational announcements, with little to no attempt to tailor them for the Palestinian audience. One post, from 12 April 2021, announcing the train schedule changes for Israeli Memorial Day (Yom ha-Zikaron) illustrates the shocking dissonance that the light rail was asking its Palestinian passengers to ignore: the post casually referred to the holiday as the “Day of Remembrance for the [Jewish] Martyrs of Israel’s Conflicts [with Arabs] (*yawm dhikra shuhada’ ma’arak Isra’il*).”

Whether no one challenged this terminology at all or whether any criticism was scrubbed from the page is unknown, but it would not be surprising if no one even noticed, since in general there was very little public engagement with the Arabic Facebook page aside from the occasional request for employment or questions about the schedule. One uniquely substantive and critical comment was written by Umm Karim Sanduqa who complained about light rail inspectors regularly targeting Arab passengers, just one sign of the structural racism that the company – like the city which issued its tender – practiced.⁵³ In other words, the fact that Palestinian passengers like Umm Karim utilize the light rail on a daily basis occurs in spite of their surveillance and discrimination in its train cars and stations, reflects rather their limited access to convenient public transportation that links their residential areas with other parts of the city where they need to travel to work, study, shop, or take care of bureaucratic matters.

Indeed, one cannot understand the Jerusalem light rail without recognizing the deeply segregated urban landscape in which it functions and which it serves – and which it seeks to obscure all the while reinforcing it. This segregation is measured

not only in terms of the almost total residential segregation of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem, but also in terms of the division of public spaces in the city as well as the role of the transportation infrastructure in maintaining this segregation.⁵⁴ Prior to the construction of the light rail, intra- and inter-city bus transportation in Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem was largely provided by Palestinian buses and informal shared van lines, a legacy of the pre-1967 infrastructure. The Israeli bus company, Egged, had few stops in Palestinian neighborhoods even while Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem expanded and was fully integrated into the city's bus lines.⁵⁵

The light rail's construction slightly changed this policy, as the original red line has three stops in Palestinian neighborhoods and one stop adjacent to the Old City walls and downtown East Jerusalem, out of twenty-three stops; however, the three stops in Palestinian neighborhoods (al-Sahil, Shu'fat, and Bayt Hanina) are the only stops which do not connect to any city bus lines, underscoring the limited and isolated nature of the light rail's integration of Palestinian neighborhoods into Jerusalem's transportation infrastructure.⁵⁶ The second planned (green) rail line includes one stop serving the Palestinian neighborhood of Bayt Safafa in southern Jerusalem out of the planned forty one stops. Further, according to the transportation master plan, of the ten total lines planned for the light rail, only one, the brown line, would primarily serve Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, despite the fact that they comprise more than one-third of the city's residents.⁵⁷

This transportation situation reflects the broader structural discrimination embedded into urban governance, urban planning, and the urban experience of Palestinian Jerusalemites. Although they comprise more than 37 percent of the population of the city, Palestinian Jerusalemites are woefully underserved by the municipal government, receiving only about 10 percent of its allocations on an annual basis.⁵⁸ Since Palestinians do not recognize Israeli sovereignty, East Jerusalemites boycott participation in the municipal elections and have no role in the municipal government.⁵⁹ In any event, the majority of policies impacting East Jerusalemites are made at the national, not municipal, level, including Israeli national policies targeting Palestinian Jerusalemites' residency rights, their access to building permits, policing, and mobility.⁶⁰ Furthermore, ministry-level, legislative, and judicial collaboration with the Jewish settler movement has resulted in widescale and ongoing land expropriation and expulsions of Palestinian Jerusalemites from their homes, and only a miniscule percentage of land use permitted to them in the city.⁶¹ Most prominently, the 202 kilometers of the Israeli "Separation Wall" built around Jerusalem beginning in 2002 transects a number of East Jerusalem neighborhoods and separates them and their Palestinian residents from the rest of the city.⁶²

Due to all of these metrics, scholars have labeled contemporary Jerusalem variously a "colonial city," an "urban ethnocracy," or a case of "urban apartheid."⁶³ What each of these terms captures is the structural role of Israeli institutions working in concert to implement the "Judaization" of the city and to consolidate Jewish political, territorial, demographic and economic control at the intentional expense

of Jerusalem's Palestinian residents. In this context we can also view the recently approved plans to construct a cable car connecting the New and Old City (from the Ottoman railway station to the Dung Gate) that would cater to the desires of Jewish Jerusalemites and foreign tourists as well as serve local and state officials with a vested interest in shaping a particular vision of a "modern" Jewish Jerusalem. The cable car would whisk visitors from the commercialized and sanitized "First Station"⁶⁴ over the Hinnom Valley to the City of David archeological site in Silwan, leading to the further expropriation of Palestinian lands and marginalization of Palestinian presence.

The fact that over one third of the residents in contemporary Jerusalem have no say in what happens in their city is reflective of the city as a "gray space" of contested, informal, and inferior urban citizenship.⁶⁵ Not only do residents not have a role in the formal institution of governance, but they also have a precarious participation in informal institutions affiliated with the municipality.⁶⁶ Palestinian freedom of cultural expression, historic preservation, and even everyday use of the city is all contingent on Israeli decisions, subject to Israeli restrictions, and subservient to Israeli narrations. Nevertheless, East Jerusalemites actively struggle to reclaim their rights as urban citizens not just as occupied residents. Independent NGOs and VGOs (voluntary grassroots organizations) based in East Jerusalem also struggle to shape the city, and a few joint civil society organizations give voice to Palestinian claims.⁶⁷

Concluding Thoughts

On 3 April 2022, the light rail operator Cfir published a post on its (Hebrew) Facebook page addressed to "the Muslim residents of Jerusalem" with "Ramadan Karim" greetings in both Arabic and Hebrew.⁶⁸ Within several weeks, 445 people "liked" the original post, but several public comments posted in response undercut the holiday greetings aimed at reflecting a united Jerusalem. The first comment by a Jewish passenger sarcastically prayed, "May the Creator of the Universe protect your [Cfir's] windows on this holiday," a reference to the attacks on the train infrastructure that broke out in 2014 and periodically since then in times of tension. Fifteen people liked or laughed at this comment, while another Jewish passenger added, "I'm dying [of laughter]." A comment by a different Jewish passenger retorted, "To the PA is the place for them," but a typo in the original post [*le-reschutz* instead of *le-reshut*, for the Authority] made his meaning opaque; two Palestinians "loved" or laughed at his comment.

Cfir's public relations holiday greeting and the public comments posted in response unintentionally allows us to shine light on the deep racism, suspicion, and separation in contemporary Jerusalem, one that of course predates and goes far beyond the light rail. And yet it also highlights the large gap between the Jerusalem society of the late Ottoman period and today's Jerusalem. Then, the city was one unified political and geographic entity, despite the religious, class, and nationality differences of residents and visitors alike, and despite the urban struggles and tensions that emerged. It was commonplace to read holiday greetings to the various religious groups in the city in

both the Arabic and Hebrew language press, often prefaced with thoughtful reference – and deference – to “our brothers” of the different faith. The municipal government, despite being the object of at times sharp criticism in the pages of the Jerusalem press, also worked to represent and develop the city as a whole, with no permitted divisions based on religion or ethnicity. Ottoman urban citizenship was at times unifying and at other times fragmenting – but it was always active and negotiated.

Today, there is no pretension that Jerusalem’s Jewish and Arab residents share the same political, social, or spatial frame. The light rail’s Palestinian riders might very well be paying *passengers*, but as they travel through the tramway’s various stops, surrounded by evidence of their residential and commercial segregation as well as their political disenfranchisement and erasure, they surely know that they are far from being urban *citizens*. Scholarly debates about whether or not urban tramways can provide positive means for connecting cities and their residents continue, but the reality in Jerusalem is on a completely different track.⁶⁹

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Endnotes

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- 2 Amina Nolte and Haim Yacobi, “Politics, Infrastructure and Representation: The Case of Jerusalem’s Light Rail,” *Cities* 43 (2015): 28–36; Hanna Baumann, “Infrastructural Violence in Jerusalem,” in *Reverberations: Violence Across Time and Space*, ed. Yael Navaro, Zerrin Özlem Biner, Alice von Bieberstein, and Seda Altuğ (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021); Omar Barghouti, “Derailing Injustice: Palestinian Civil Resistance to the ‘Jerusalem Light Rail,’” *Jerusalem Quarterly* 38 (Summer 2009); Jake Silver, “Cruising the Jerusalem Light Rail,” *differences* 31, no. 2 (2020); Olga Levitan, “The New Jerusalem Light Rail Train as a Performance Space,” in *Borderlines: Essays on Mapping and The Logic of Place*, ed. Ruthie Abeliovich and Edwin Seroussi (Jerusalem: Da’at ha-Makom, 2019); Raffael Beier and Amina Nolte, “Global Aspirations and Local (Dis-)Connections: A Critical Comparative Perspective on Tramway Projects in Casablanca and Jerusalem,” *Political Geography* 78 (2020).
- 3 Michelle U. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); Sotirios Dimitriadis, “The Tramway Concession of Jerusalem, 1908–1914: Elite Citizenship, Urban Infrastructure, and the Abortive Modernization of a Late Ottoman City,” in *Ordinary Jerusalem, 1840–1940: Opening New Archives, Revisiting a Global City*, ed.

- Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire (Leiden: Brill, 2018); Yasemin Avcı, “Jerusalem and Jaffa in the Late Ottoman Period: The Concession-Hunting Struggle for Public Works Projects,” in *Late Ottoman Palestine: The Period of Young Turk Rule*, ed. Yuval Ben-Bassat and Eyal Ginio (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011).
- 4 See, for example, the documents in Ömer Faruk Yılmaz, ed., *Vesika ve fotoğraflarla Osmanlı devrinde Kudüs* (Istanbul: Çamlica, 2009) and Şerife Eroğlu Memiş, *Hurûfât defterlerinde Kudüs-i Serif kazası: vakıflar, görevler ve görevliler* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2017).
- 5 Among other works, see Yasemin Avcı, *Değişim sürecinde bir Osmanlı Kenti: Kudüs (1890–1914)* (Ankara: Phoenix, 2004); Johann Büssow, *Hamidian Palestine: Politics and Society in the District of Jerusalem, 1872–1908* (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*; Abigail Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem between Ottoman and British Rule* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011); Vincent Lemire, *Jerusalem 1900: The Holy City in the Age of Possibilities* (University of Chicago Press, 2017); Roberto Mazza, *Jerusalem from the Ottomans to the British* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009); Musa Sroor, *Fondations pieuses en Mouvement de la transformation du statut de propriété des biens waqfs à Jérusalem (1858–1917)* (Beirut: Institut français du proche-orient, 2010); Yair Wallach, *A City in Fragments: Urban Text in Modern Jerusalem* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020); Salim Tamari, “Confessionalism and Public Space in Ottoman and Colonial Jerusalem,” in *Cities and Sovereignty: Identity Politics in Urban Spaces*, ed. Diane E. Davis and Nora Libertun de Duren (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); Dalachanis and Lemire, eds., *Ordinary Jerusalem*.
- 6 Avcı, “Jerusalem and Jaffa in the Late Ottoman Period.”
- 7 Dimitriadis, “The Tramway Concession of Jerusalem”; James Ryan, “‘Unveiling’ the Tramway: The Intimate Public Sphere in Late Ottoman and Republican Istanbul,” *Journal of Urban History* 44, no. 5 (2018).
- 8 Yasemin Avcı, Vincent Lemire, and Falestin Naili, “Publishing Jerusalem’s Ottoman Municipal Archives (1892–1917): A Turning Point for the City’s Historiography,” *Jerusalem Quarterly* 60 (Autumn 2014); Haim Gerber, *Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 1890–1914* (Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1995); Avcı, *Değişim sürecinde bir Osmanlı Kenti*.
- 9 See the discussion in Salim Tamari, *The Great War and the Remaking of Palestine* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2017), ch. 3.
- 10 See Malek Sharif, *Imperial Norms and Local Realities: The Ottoman Municipal Laws and the Municipality of Beirut (1860–1908)* (Beirut: Ergon Verlag, 2020); Sibel Zandi-Sayek, *Ottoman Izmir: The Rise of a Cosmopolitan Port, 1840–1880* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philipp, and Stefan Weber, eds., *Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Beirut: Orient Institut der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, 2002); Ulrike Freitag and Nora Lafi, eds., *Urban Governance under the Ottomans: Between Cosmopolitanism and Conflict* (London: Routledge, 2014).
- 11 Nora Lafi, “Mediterranean Cosmopolitanisms and Its Contemporary Revivals: A Critical Approach,” *New Geographies: Journal of the Harvard University Graduate School of Design* 5 (2013); Freitag and Lafi, eds., *Urban Governance under the Ottomans*.
- 12 Avcı, Lemire, and Naili, “Publishing Jerusalem’s Ottoman Municipal Archives.” Because the municipality was the lowest level of imperial government, it often deferred questions, problems, and budget shortfalls to the higher-ranking administrative council.
- 13 Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*.
- 14 The current Jerusalem master plan for transportation credits Theodor Herzl with this vision, as his utopian novel *Altneuland* referenced a tramway. “History,” online at jet.gov.il/light-rail/ (accessed 26 October 2022). This, of course, denies all Ottoman and Palestinian initiative and agency in urban development and modernization.
- 15 26 March 1905. Palaestina Immobilien Gesellschaft, Central Zionist Archives L18/5457. That summer, the Seventh Zionist Congress declared acquiring concessions in Palestine as one of their four goals, alongside industrial and commercial development and “exploration.” Fredrik Meiton, *Electrical Palestine: Capital and Technology from Empire to Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019), 45.

- 16 Avcı, “Jerusalem and Jaffa in the Late Ottoman Period.”
- 17 *Al-Quds*, 3 October 1908.
- 18 The official name was the *Kudüs-ü Şerif tijaret sanaet ve-ziraat odası* (Jerusalem commercial, craft, and agricultural chamber). For more on the chamber, see Joseph B. Glass and Ruth Kark, “The Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture, 1909–1910: An Early Attempt at Inter-Communal Cooperation,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no. 2 (2018).
- 19 *Al-Quds*, 11 January 1909. Meiton notes that the Zionist movement sought to place members on the chambers of commerce in the country. Meiton, *Electrical Palestine*, 239–40n128.
- 20 *Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce, d’Industrie et d’Agriculture de Palestine*, 1, no.1 (July 1909).
- 21 *Al-Quds*, 7 October 1908. The open letter was translated and republished in the Hebrew-language *Ha-Zvi*, 9 October 1908. For more on this exchange, see Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*, 166–67. (At the time, I was only aware of the Hebrew and French language versions of the letter.)
- 22 *Al-Quds*, 14 October 1908.
- 23 Glass and Kark, “The Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce.”
- 24 *Al-Quds*, 11 January 1909. See also *Bulletin*, July 1909.
- 25 *Ha-Zvi*, 7 December 1908.
- 26 *Al-Quds*, 1 January 1909.
- 27 Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*, 173–82; Dimitriadis, “The Tramway Concession of Jerusalem.”
- 28 Ruth Kark, *Jerusalem Neighborhoods: Planning and By-Laws, 1855–1930* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1991), 11.
- 29 Falestin Naïli, “The De-Municipalization of Urban Governance: Post-Ottoman Political Space in Jerusalem,” *Jerusalem Quarterly* 76 (Winter 2018); and Yair Wallach, “Jerusalem’s Lost Heart: The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman City Centre,” in *Urban Neighborhood Formations*, ed. Nazan Maksudyen and Hilal Alkan (London: Routledge, 2020).
- 30 “Request to warn the hospital officials about their duties, 11 April 1892 (Gregorian calendar) – 30 Mârt 1308 (Ottoman fiscal calendar (Rumi),” Open Jerusalem archives, JM-AIY/OttomanRegisters/Vol1/p4a/item24, online at (openjerusalem.org) bit.ly/3E5TfH2 (accessed 4 November 2022). In particular, it was noted that women and the poor were not able to access the distant city hospital.
- 31 According to Schmelz, 44 percent of the city’s population lived in the *extramuros* neighborhoods. Uziel O. Schmelz, “The Population of Jerusalem’s Urban Neighborhoods according to the Ottoman Census of 1905,” in *Aspects of Ottoman History: Papers from CIEPO IX, Jerusalem*, ed. Amy Singer and Amnon Cohen (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1994). Figures for non-Ottoman foreign residents are sketchy, but a conservative estimate would place them at around 10,000.
- 32 Michelle U. Campos, “Mapping Urban ‘Mixing’ and Intercommunal Relations in Late Ottoman Jerusalem: A Neighborhood Study,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 63, no. 1 (2021): 133–69.
- 33 Campos, “Mapping Urban ‘Mixing.’”
- 34 See, for example, Gad Frumkin, *Derekh shofet bi-Yerushalayim* [The Path of a judge in Jerusalem] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1954).
- 35 “More supervision needed outside of city walls, 4 June 1910 (Gregorian calendar) – 22 Mayıs 1326 (Ottoman fiscal calendar (Rumi),” Open Jerusalem archives, JM-AIY/OttomanRegisters/Vol16/p18b/item139, online at (openjerusalem.org) bit.ly/3DFxPzd (accessed 4 November 2022).
- 36 Roads were wet down by municipal crews to tame the dust at regular intervals.
- 37 Intracity wagon travel was taxed, adding to the cost for drivers and their passengers. For discussion of wagon travel, see Yehoshu’a bar David Yellin, *Zichronot le-ben Yerushalayim* [Memories of a son of Jerusalem] (Jerusalem: Zion Press-Ruhold Brothers, 1923); and David Yellin, *Kitvei David Yellin* [The writings of David Yellin], vol. 1–2 (Jerusalem: Reuven Mass, 1972).
- 38 “Decision to Fix Carriage Fares,” 26 May 1892, Open Jerusalem archives, online at (openjerusalem.org) bit.ly/3WAlifV (accessed 26 October 2022). “Upon a Ministry of Commerce and Public Works’ letter regarding electricity in the cities of Jaffa and Jerusalem, 11 January 1909,” Open Jerusalem archives, online at (openjerusalem.org) bit.ly/3WMxHqD (accessed 26 October 2022).
- 39 “Minutes from the Municipal Council of Jerusalem,” Open Jerusalem archives, online at (openjerusalem.org) bit.ly/3t1XfSJ (accessed 26 October 2022).

- 40 Schmelz, "The Population of Jerusalem's Urban Neighborhoods," 112.
- 41 Dimitriadis, "The Tramway Concession of Jerusalem."
- 42 "Announcement of four major municipal projects: water supply, tramway, sewage system, telephone lines," 21 July 1910," online at www.openjerusalem.org/ark:/58142/3P9d0 (accessed 26 October 2022).
- 43 "Acting Consul Morgan to Ambassador Lowther," 5 November 1910, the National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), Foreign Office (FO) 195/2351/312-91.
- 44 Earlier communication between the British acting consul and the ambassador indicated that the *intramuros* line would terminate near the Jewish quarter, possibly at Bab al-Silsila. "Acting Consul Morgan to Ambassador Lowther," 12 August 1910, TNA FO 195/2351/167-73.
- 45 24 January 1914, quoted in Mazza, *Jerusalem from the Ottomans to the British*, 187 n75.
- 46 Line 1: through Jaffa Gate to Souk et Allor, the bazaar of the Jewish quarter. Line 2: Jaffa Gate, Me'ah She'arim, Ecole Schneller, Shaykh Badr, Municipal Hospital, Jaffa Gate. Line 3: Jaffa Gate east to Nikoforiya, New Palace. Line 4: Jaffa Gate to Bethlehem. Line 5: Jaffa Gate to the Mount of Olives. Line 6: Jaffa Gate to Saint Croix and Shaykh Badr. President of the city council, Central Zionist Archives (CZA), A153/143. See Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*, 181-82.
- 47 After the war, the Greek government sued the British on behalf of their new citizen, Mavrommatis, for his rights to the concessions in Jerusalem. Meiton writes that the British received a request in 1920 from a Mr. Dabdub and a Mr. Handal to be considered for future concessions on, among other things, tramways, but this appears not to have been followed up. Meiton, *Electrical Palestine*, 239-40 n135. For more on the British partnership with the Zionist movement on the economic development of Palestine, see Lilach Barak, "The Anglo-Jewish Economic Board for Palestine – The First Decade," *Israel Studies* 26, no. 3 (2021).
- 48 Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*.
- 49 Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*.
- 50 Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*.
- 51 Yehoshua Ben Arie, *Yerushalayim ha-Yehudit ha-hadasha be-tkufat ha-Mandat* [New Jewish Jerusalem in the Mandate Period], vol. 3 (Jerusalem: Ben Zvi).
- 52 Cfir, online at www.facebook.com/cfirjer/ (accessed 23 March 2022).
- 53 14 April 2021, online at www.facebook.com/citypass.jerusalem (accessed 23 March 2022). It is surprising that her comment was left on the page, but perhaps Citypass employees let it slide since their tender was set to expire.
- 54 Ghazi Falah, "Living Together Apart: Residential Segregation in Mixed Arab-Jewish Cities in Israel," *Urban Studies* 33, no. 6 (1996); Oren Shlomo, "Sub-formality in the Formalization of Public Transport in East Jerusalem," *Current Sociology* 65, no. 2 (2017).
- 55 I have not been able to locate historical route maps, but during the 1990s, the two buses that went through East Jerusalem stopped their East Jerusalem detours due to political unrest and violence in the city. The district court office on Salah al-Din Street retained its bus stop but added metal grating to the windshield to protect it from stones (author's recollections.) See also Michael Romann and Alex Weingrod, *Living Together Separately: Arabs and Jews in Contemporary Jerusalem* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 45-46; and Sophie Rose Schor, "Public Transportation in Jerusalem: Locus of Separation or of Integration?" 7 September 2015, online at (sophieschor.com) bit.ly/3UwoZuG.
- 56 See online at jet.gov.il/light-rail/, red line map accessed 24 April 2022.
- 57 See online at (jet.gov.il) bit.ly/3T7u3Va (accessed 24 April 2022).
- 58 Meir Margalit, *Discrimination in the Heart of the Holy City* (Jerusalem: International Peace and Cooperation Center Jerusalem, 2006); Amir Cheshin, Bill Hutman, and Avi Melamed, *Separate and Unequal: The Inside Story of Israeli Rule in East Jerusalem* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
- 59 Munir Nueseibah, "Municipal Elections in Occupied Jerusalem: Why Do Palestinians Boycott?" in *The Condition of Democracy*, vol. 3, *Postcolonial and Settler Colonial Contexts*, ed. Jürgen Mackert, Hannah Wolf, and Bryan S. Turner (London: Routledge, 2021).
- 60 Aviv Tatarsky and Efrat Cohen-Bar, "Deliberately Planned: A Policy to Thwart Planning in the Palestinian Neighborhoods of Jerusalem," Ir Amim and Bimkom,

- January 2017, online at (ir-amim.org.il) bit.ly/3FOGUIL (accessed 26 October 2022).
- 61 Wendy Pullan, "Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities," *Journal of Architecture* 16, no. 1 (2011); Michael Dumper, "Israeli Settlement in the Old City of Jerusalem," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 21, no. 4 (1992); Sarah Kaminker, "For Arabs Only: Building Restrictions in East Jerusalem," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 4 (1997).
- 62 Ir Amim, "The Separation Barrier," online at www.ir-amim.org.il/en/issue/separation-barrier (accessed 26 October 2022).
- 63 Haim Yacobi, "Jerusalem: From a 'Divided' to a 'Contested' City – and Next to a Neo-Apartheid City?" *City* 19, no. 4 (2015); Haim Yacobi, "From 'Ethnocracy' to Urban Apartheid: The Changing Urban Geopolitics of Jerusalem/al-Quds," *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 8, no. 3 (2016); Scott A. Bollens, *On Narrow Ground: Urban Policy and Ethnic Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000); Philipp Misselwitz and Tim Rieniets, eds., *City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism* (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2006).
- 64 This is the original Ottoman train station that was transformed into an outdoor shopping mall and destination space. See Yair Wallach, "Nostalgia and Promise in Jerusalem's Derelict Ottoman Railway Station," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 38 (Summer 2009).
- 65 Oren Yiftachel, "Epilogue – from 'Gray Space' to Equal 'Metrozanship'? Reflections on Urban Citizenship," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 39, no. 4 (2015).
- 66 Nufar Avni, Noam Brenner, Dan Miodownik, and Gillad Rosen, "Limited Urban Citizenship: The Case of Community Councils in East Jerusalem," *Urban Geography* 43, no. 4 (2021).
- 67 See, for example, the work of the Ta'awun organization in the Old City, online at ocjrp.welfare-association.org/content/about-us (accessed 4 November 2022); and various projects spearheaded by PASSIA, especially their 2016 publication *Mustaqbalna – Our Future!* online at passia.org/page/1 (accessed 4 November 2022). On the challenges facing civil society organizations in East Jerusalem, see Gianfrancesco Costantini, Estephan Salameh, Maher Issa, "Mapping Study of Civil Society Organisations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," European Union Representative Office the West Bank and Gaza (2011), 31–33, updated 2015, online at www.eeas.europa.eu/node/15100_en (accessed 26 October 2022). The most prominent Israeli organization working with East Jerusalemites is 'Ir 'Amim, but 'Emek Shaveh has also played an important role, see online at www.ir-amim.org.il/en (accessed 4 November 2022); and online at emekshaveh.org/en/ (accessed 4 November 2022). Oren Yiftachel proposes the concept of "metro-zenship" that might help moderate these issues and carve out a space for urban belonging. Yiftachel, "Epilogue – from 'Gray Space' to Equal 'Metrozanship'?"
- 68 Cfr, online at www.facebook.com/cfrjr.
- 69 For an assessment of the future of Jerusalem's Palestinians as envisioned by the city's master plans, see Nur Arafah, *Which Jerusalem? Israel's Little-Known Master Plans*, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network (Jerusalem, May 2016). On tramways as tools of marginalization, see Raffael Beier, "The World-Class City Comes by Tramway: Reframing Casablanca's Urban Peripheries through Public Transport," *Urban Studies* 57, no. 9 (2020). On tramways as potential tools of urban connectivity, see Ronen Shamir, *Current Flow: The Electrification of Palestine* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), and Laura Kemmer, "Bonding: Infrastructure, Affect, and the Emergence of Urban Collectivity" (PhD diss., HafenCity Universität Hamburg, 2020).