During the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936–39), the British government sent Sir Charles Tegart to Palestine to assess the security situation, make recommendations for reforming the Palestine Police, and restore “law and order.” Tegart, an Irishman, served in the British colonial police force in Calcutta, India, from 1901 to 1931. During these years, he rose in the ranks, becoming commissioner of police in 1923 and commanding over 5,000 men.1 In British colonial eyes, he was highly “successful” in crushing “unrest” and “terrorism.” One reason for his “success” was his reorganization of the Calcutta police force, creating a flexible structure that allowed portions of the force to act as offensive mobile units during times of “unrest.” Another reason was his ambitious plan to move police stations from inferior rented buildings into permanent, purpose-built police stations. He successfully carried out this building project from 1925 to 1930.2 Although he avoided the press and publicity, several attempts on his life, as well as rumors of him going out in disguise, gave him a certain amount of notoriety. When he retired from the colonial police, he was invited to join the Council of India in London, which advised the British government on Indian affairs, where he served until 1937.

During two extended visits to Palestine during the revolt, Tegart made a series of recommendations for reforming the police, many of which were put into place. Among these, he proposed building seventy-seven fortified police stations or fortresses throughout the country and energetically pushed for their construction even after he returned to England. In the early 1940s, after the revolt was put down and when Britain desperately required all its financial resources to fight the Germans in World War II, over two million pounds were expended to construct
fifty-five of Tegart’s police fortresses. Why did the British approve of and pay for fifty-five new police fortresses in Palestine in the early 1940s, given that they had already brutally suppressed the Arab Revolt and killed, exiled, caused to flee, or imprisoned virtually all Palestinian Arab leaders? And why did Tegart continue to advocate for this massive building project, well beyond his contracted period of service in Palestine?

Tegart Comes to Palestine

After the first phase of the Arab Revolt (April–November 1936), when some twenty thousand British troops were sent in to crush the uprising, the Colonial Office sent a commission to investigate its causes. The Peel Commission arrived in Palestine in November 1936 and interviewed various leaders. The commission’s report, published in July 1937, suggested that Palestine be partitioned into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and a remnant British Mandate. The Palestinian Arabs rejected this proposal. On 26 September 1937, the British district commissioner for the Galilee, Lewis Andrews, and a British constable were killed in Nazareth. Andrews was the highest-ranking British official to be killed in the revolt up to that point and it rocked the British leadership in Palestine and London. British troops increased their brutal “searches” of Palestinian Arab villages. On 8 October, the Colonial Office – exploring all means to quell Arab resistance in Palestine – asked Tegart to consider taking over the position of inspector-general of police in Palestine. However, Tegart declined the invitation and instead insisted that he go to Palestine as an advisor and that the matter remain private. The Colonial Office agreed and he was soon meeting with Mandate officials, including in London. By the time Tegart arrived in Palestine in December 1937, he entered upon a rapidly changing administrative scene: Archibald Wavell had replaced John Dill as general officer commanding (GOC), and by April 1938 Wavell himself would be replaced by Robert Haining; Alan Saunders had replaced Roy Spicer as inspector-general of police; and the plan was set to replace High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope with Harold MacMichael in the near future. Haining, MacMichael, Saunders, and Tegart, arguably the four most powerful Britons in Palestine in the spring of 1938, were all viewed by the Zionist leadership as friends and allies, and eager to suppress Arab resistance. In April 1938, a commission led by Sir John Woodhead, whom Tegart knew from India when Woodhead had been acting governor of Bengal, arrived in Palestine to consider options for partition.

Figure 1. Inspector-General Alan Saunders with Sir Charles Tegart (right) upon his arrival in Palestine, December 1937
Tegart worked quickly, visiting various police outposts throughout the country and meeting with British members of the Palestine Police and other officials. In late January 1938, he submitted his formal report, consisting of twenty-eight recommendations. These included: overhauling the Criminal Investigation Department (CID); establishing a rural mounted police force with a “tough type of man, not necessarily literate”\(^\text{11}\) and putting in place frontier protection – police posts, roads, and a fence on the northern border.\(^\text{12}\) Several recommendations focused on the cohesion and *esprit de corps* of the police, calling for better “compensation for the families of police officers killed in the execution of their duty”; better housing for police; and “the abolition of small police posts,” which Tegart viewed as vulnerable to attacks.\(^\text{13}\) As Gad Kroizer has observed, Tegart’s strategic vision for the Palestine Police was a militarized but flexible force in which men could shift quickly from conventional police work to counter-insurgency as the situation demanded.\(^\text{14}\)

Many of Tegart’s recommendations were implemented, some immediately, though the substantial capital investment of the two recommended construction projects, the northern border barrier and police housing, required approval of the Foreign Office. Tegart pushed for the rapid construction of the border barrier, later known as Tegart’s Wall, and it was approved and completed by August 1938. Though several British officials pointed out that the barrier, made largely of wire, was easily cut, the British establishment, in typical colonial delusion, celebrated it as a success.\(^\text{15}\) The construction of a “wall” as well as many of Tegart’s other recommendations were echoes of tactics that Tegart had used or shown to be useful during his many years leading the colonial police in Calcutta, and Laleh Khalili correctly points out how imperial counterinsurgency “best practices” moved in “horizontal currents” between colonies and beyond.\(^\text{16}\)

After submitting his report, Tegart continued to advise the Mandate government, in particular the police and the military. Tegart met almost daily in a “security” meeting with the GOC, the inspector-general of police, and chief secretary to discuss the ongoing, and still widespread, Arab Revolt. In April 1938, Tegart laid out plans for punishing villages suspected of cooperating with the rebels in any way.\(^\text{17}\) By early May he and his “security” meeting colleagues received a detailed intelligence report (including hand-drawn area maps) identifying the names of villages and names of “gangsters” in each village, and the names of villagers known to be supportive of the revolt.\(^\text{18}\) In late May, the British military, police, and civil administration began a large-scale occupation of these villages in the Galilee, Haifa, and Samaria districts.\(^\text{19}\) Tegart and the high commissioner’s chief secretary, William Denis Battershill, toured the Galilee during the last three days of the operation, narrowly escaping a rebel attack in Tiberias.\(^\text{20}\)

**Tegart’s Return**

Tegart’s contracted tour of service in Palestine came to an end in June 1938. His recommendation for “police housing” had yet to be acted upon. Despite the British decimation of the Palestinian Arab leadership through arrests, exile, and imprisonment, the
Arab Revolt was still widespread. In August 1938, rebel forces killed the British assistant district commissioner in Jenin, W. S. S. Moffat.21 “Tegart’s Wall” had been completed by this point, but obviously was not having the effect that the British had hoped. The British press carried news of rebel actions, embarrassing officials for their inability to control the situation. That same August, the Colonial Office called upon Tegart to return to Palestine. The situation was deemed so urgent that Tegart was flown to Palestine, rather than traveling by boat, as he had on his first tour.

Tegart arrived back in Palestine mid-September 1938 and met with GOC Haining to assess the situation.22 The British had lost control of most of Palestine, except for a few cities, to the Palestinian Arab rebels. By early October, the rebels had even taken control of the Old City of Jerusalem. After four days, however, the British stormed the Old City and slowly regained control. Meanwhile, the British prime minister signed the Munich Agreement recognizing Nazi Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland in western Czechoslovakia, hoping to appease the Germans. With the imminent threat of war with Germany gone, the British felt they could send more troops to Palestine. The British opted at this point for a two-pronged approach to quell the Arab Revolt: more troops and increased military suppression of the revolt; and an international conference in London (the St. James Conference), to which Palestinian Arabs and Jews would be invited to try to reach a mutually acceptable compromise – a highly improbable outcome, as the British privately recognized.23

As the British continued their brutal suppression of the revolt in November 1938, Tegart turned his attention back to the subject of police housing and police stations. The rebels had successfully attacked several police stations during the preceding months: In August, they had captured the police station in Hebron. In September, the British shut down several police stations and posts due to continued rebel attacks.24 In October, after taking over the Old City of Jerusalem, the rebels burned down the police station.25 In November, the high commissioner appointed a committee, chaired by Tegart, to study the question of future police infrastructure in Palestine.

In the previous spring, eager to get his proposed border barrier built as soon as possible, Tegart had managed to bypass the normal process of working through the Mandate’s Public Works Department (PWD). Instead, he employed the contracting company of the Federation of Jewish Labor, Solel Boneh. Now, Tegart again called on its chairman, David HaCohen, to inquire as to the possibility of Solel Boneh lending one million pounds for the massive construction project of new police stations.26 HaCohen offered a forty-year loan at 4 percent interest; alternatively, HaCohen proposed a rent-to-buy scenario whereby Solel Boneh would build the stations at their own expense if Britain agreed to rent the buildings for twenty years, after which they would be signed over to Britain.27 Tegart’s attempt to bypass the PWD and contract with Solel Boneh ultimately failed, as the government insisted on using its own people. Tegart pressed the PWD for a cost estimate, but the PWD needed more specific details and site locations. Tegart was becoming impatient.28

From the winter of 1938 into the spring of 1939, Tegart sought examples of police
structures capable of withstanding formidable attack and met with his “housing committee” almost weekly. 29 He requested aerial photos of the police outpost in Wadi Rum, Transjordan, 30 and received recommendations for Haifa and Kiryat Haim. 31 The district commissioner of Galilee and Acre reported on the price of land and provided his view on each station’s housing requirements. 32 Tegart and his committee collected a loan offer from Barclays bank, a description of a building block north of Tel Aviv, and materials lists. 33 Tegart himself worked on proposals for the police headquarters in Jerusalem. Between housing committee meetings, Tegart continued to visit police stations around the country. In late December 1938, he toured the north and, as his convoy returned to Jerusalem, survived an ambush that took the life of a colleague. In late January 1939, the chief secretary and Tegart visited the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea area: Masada, Kalya, the potash works at Jabal al-Sudum, Jericho, and Allenby Bridge. 34

By late March 1939, Tegart and his police housing committee finished their report. It called for seventy-seven new purpose-built fortress-like police buildings, with garages, stables, and food and water storage vaults. 36 The basic idea was that the buildings could house both the offices and the residence of the police and be strong enough to withstand a prolonged siege. Some buildings would also be able to house additional government offices, so that in the event of “unrest” the British administration could continue its work. Tegart provided a cost analysis for renting the buildings and claimed that a capital investment upfront would pay for itself within five to ten years (depending on the final
In a lengthy cover letter, Tegart emphasized the need to act quickly, citing a plan to build a relatively small new police station in Palestine’s north that took five years to move through the approval process. By the time it was approved, the land for the proposed station had been sold to another buyer.

If we now pause and zoom out to survey the larger context, two questions arise. One has to do with the locations of the seventy-seven proposed police fortress and the other has to do with the cost and timing of the entire project.

**Location**

Given the context of the Arab Revolt, during which Tegart made his recommendation to secure and improve police stations and police housing, one might think that the majority of suggested locations would be in or near where the revolt against the British raged most intensely, in predominantly Arab cities, towns, or villages. The British officials in London were led to believe this to be the case. At the Colonial Office in London, an official wrote:

> I do feel that it is most important that the work on the Tegart police building scheme should be equitably distributed between the two communities, if this can be achieved. The Arabs are hardly likely to be enthusiastic about the scheme, which is primarily directed against them, and it will create the worst possible feeling if these stations, which are mostly in Arab rural areas, are constructed not only by Jewish contractors but by Jewish labour.

But these stations were not “mostly in Arab rural areas.” In fact, the opposite was true. Most of the police fortresses were to be in or near Jewish populations. Of the seventy-seven proposed sites, thirty-one were in Jewish colonies or areas immediately adjacent to Jewish settlements. The report called for fortresses in Rishon le-Zion (south of Jaffa), Ramat Gan (east of Tel Aviv), Hatikva (east of Jaffa), Hadera (on the Mediterranean coast midway between Tel Aviv and Haifa), Rehovot (southwest of Ramla), and other Zionist settlements. They form almost a ring around Jaffa. “Mixed towns” such as Haifa and Tiberias were also slated to receive a Tegart fort. Arab towns, such as Nablus or Shifa’Amr were also on the list, but in oddly low proportion. The places where the Arab Revolt had seen some of the heaviest fighting, such as within the triangle between Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarm, were not to receive a police fortress.

Taking into the consideration the context of 1938, when the Woodhead Commission had been drawing up partition maps, and the fact that the Jewish Agency Executive had produced its own partition proposal (with the intent to influence the Woodhead Commission), the suggested locations for the Tegart forts become more interesting. The Woodhead Commission, though it concluded that the partition of Palestine was impracticable, devised three partition plans (A, B, and C). The majority of the commission...
favored plan C, which called for a very small Jewish state in the coastal strip from Tel Aviv north to Tantura (about twenty kilometers south of Haifa); an Arab (Palestinian) state consisting of the coast around Gaza plus the hill country and part of the Jordan Valley (Hebron, Jericho, Nablus, and Jenin); and a continued British Mandate over the Galilee and the northern frontier, a “Jerusalem enclave” (including Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Lydda), and the Negev (including Beersheba and Rafah on the Egyptian border). Plotting the seventy-seven proposed Tegart forts onto the plan C map allocates forty forts to the territory retained by the British Mandate, twenty-one to the proposed Jewish state, and fifteen to the proposed Arab state (figure 3).

The Jewish Agency Executive’s partition plan of 1938, meanwhile, envisioned a Jewish state in all of the north and the Galilee, contiguous with the coastal plain down to Tel Aviv, plus the area on the coast south of Jaffa to just north of al-Majdal, with a finger including the western part of Jerusalem. The British would continue their mandate over East Jerusalem (the Old City and some surrounding Arab neighborhoods), Bethlehem, Hebron, and Ramallah, with a finger extending to Lydda, plus Jericho, the Dead Sea area, and the Negev, including the entire length of the border with Egypt. The proposed Arab state would consist of three separate enclaves, one in the south (comprising Gaza, Beersheba, and Bayt Jibrin), one in the northern highlands (from Jenin to Bir Zeit, including Tulkarm), and the port city of Jaffa. Plotting the suggested locations for the Tegart Forts onto this map, the British would retain control over only nine forts, twelve would fall within the proposed Arab state, and an overwhelming fifty-six would be in the proposed Jewish state (figure 4).

The location of the proposed police fortresses clearly favored Jewish population centers and historical Zionist settlements in Palestine. Their placement does not seem at all related to preparing for another Arab Revolt. Further, the construction of the initial
fifty-five fortresses took place during dire times for the British in World War II.

**Timing and Cost**

During the months that Tegart was energetically working on the police housing proposal (January through April 1939), the British were putting down the last remnants of the Arab Revolt. In late March 1939, the British killed one of the few remaining rebel leaders, ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Hajj Muhammad. (Tegart put a photo of the dead man in his photo album.) In mid-April, Tegart believed that the British had almost completely put down the Arab Revolt, not through politics but through force, and that the remaining rebels were ready to lay down their arms if offered amnesty.

Tegart was also well aware of the St. James Conference taking place in London during these same months, and he followed news and rumors about it. He understood the parameters: that if the Zionists and the Arabs could not reach a workable compromise, the British would be at liberty to do as they saw fit in Palestine. Perhaps the continuation of such a building project at this time is evidence that the British used the St. James Conference as a ploy to help deflate the Palestinian Arabs’ rebellion against British rule. Perhaps it shows that the British had every intent to continue to rule Palestine.

Tegart returned to England in May 1939, just as the British government announced its new policy on Palestine: limiting Jewish immigration and projecting an independent Palestine within ten years, to be arranged in coordination with both Arabs and Jews. If, after ten years, British efforts were unsuccessful, they announced that they would commit the matter to the League of Nations. Zionists saw this as a betrayal. Palestinian Arabs demanded an independent state immediately. But Britain had clearly indicated that it was on the road to giving up Palestine. Internationally, the British prime minister and others in the government had believed that they had averted a war with Germany with...
the Munich Agreement, but when on 7 May 1939 Hitler entered into a military alliance with Mussolini, war again seemed likely. On 3 September 1939, Britain declared war on Germany. The exhaustion of the revolt, Britain’s waning interest in remaining in Palestine, and the amplification of tensions and eventual outbreak of war in Europe would all seem logically to undermine any significant expenditure of money and resources on police buildings in Palestine.

Yet, upon returning to England, with his second contracted period of service completed, Tegart continued to advocate for funding and construction of the police fortress. He visited contacts in the Colonial Office, the War Office, and the Foreign Office. He wrote the inspector-general of police and the chief secretary back in Palestine to keep them informed of his progress. In March 1940, Tegart’s building plan was approved by the British government. In October 1941, the high commissioner for Palestine wrote to the secretary of state for the colonies:

It will be recalled that report of the Tegart Committee dealt with accommodation in both rural and urban areas and envisaged the construction of 79 [sic] buildings, of which the approved rural scheme provided for 54 new buildings and included accommodation for departments other than Police in 13 of these buildings. The 54 buildings have now been completed and are in use. The approved estimated cost of the rural scheme was £P2,200,000; the actual cost cannot yet be stated . . . however, the Director [of Public Works] does not expect that the approved provision of £P2,200,000 will be materially exceeded.

A copy of the dispatch was sent to Tegart four months later, with a note that read, in part: “The completion of the work in the face of many difficulties of supply created by the war was a notable achievement.” During the nearly year-and-a-half that it took to build fifty-four police fortresses in Palestine (March 1940–October 1941), Nazi Germany had attacked England in the Battle of Britain, making the outlay of £2.2 million on concrete police buildings in Palestine even more remarkable. Though Palestine became a significant base for the British military during World War II, at the time of Tegart’s proposal and energetic follow-up efforts and the government’s final approval (January 1938 through 9 September 1939), the war was a European war. It would be another year before Italy and Japan joined Germany, turning it into a “world war.” Other factors, including Tegart’s personal support for the Zionist movement, are thus worthy of consideration.

**Tegart, the Zionist Leadership, and a “Good Stick”**

Tegart had a particularly noteworthy relationship with Chaim Weizmann, president of the Zionist Organization. It is clear that Tegart respected Weizmann and grew quite close to him. Tegart described Weizmann to an official in the War Office as someone who
“tempers his particular brand of Zionism with realism and an innate feeling of loyalty toward H[is] M[ajesty’s] G[overnment] and particularly, as I know, towards the P[rime] M[inister].”

In May 1938, when Tegart returned from Palestine to London, he met with Weizmann even before meeting with the Colonial Office. Tegart was concerned by Weizmann’s gloomy mood about the future, given the emerging British policy. While attending parliamentary debates on Palestine, Tegart sat next to Weizmann. Tegart wrote to Weizmann in August 1938, expressing his concern that the British would put down the “outrages” and gain the upper hand before the Woodhead Commission published its report.

Tegart and his wife also had a warm personal friendship with Chaim Weizmann and his wife. Tegart enjoyed visiting Weizmann’s palatial home in Rehovot and swimming in Weizmann’s pool, stocked with goldfish. On one visit, Tegart had too much to drink and ended up spending the night rather than driving back to Jerusalem. After Tegart survived the December 1938 ambush on his motorcade in Palestine, Weizmann congratulated him by telegram, to which Tegart responded with a handwritten thank-you note. After Tegart’s second and final term of service in Palestine, he continued his friendship with the Weizmanns, occasionally joining them for dinner in London, where they discussed the political situation in Palestine. Tegart updated Weizmann on his home improvement projects, which he claimed to be inspired by Weizmann’s house in Rehovot.

During Tegart’s time in Jerusalem, the Jewish Agency also sent the deputy director of its political department and legal advisor Bernard Joseph to visit him on several occasions.
occasions. While there is no evidence of these meetings in Tegart’s papers, Joseph’s detailed reports to the executive committee of the Jewish Agency provide a glimpse into the relationship and the dynamic. On 18 March 1939, Joseph had a lengthy meeting with Tegart. Tegart began the meeting with a discussion of the current political situation, “as is his wont.” Tegart stated his confidence that the Arab Revolt was thoroughly put down, telling Joseph, “the situation would never get out of hand again, and if such a band [of Arab rebels] came in [to Palestine] they would just be mowed down as they were the other day in Transjordan. They would not have a chance.” Tegart brought up the St. James Conference, taking place at that time, and wanted to know if Joseph thought that Secretary of State for the Colonies Malcolm MacDonald’s approach (namely, “a scheme whereby the Jews would be dependent on the Arabs to get the immigration they wanted whilst the Arabs would be dependent on the Jews to get the Independent State that they wanted”) was a clever one. Joseph explained why he thought it was an unfair approach and suggested that the British would have had greater success if it used partition as a threat. Tegart “appeared to be rather taken by the suggestion and said, ‘You mean partition would be a good stick with which to beat both parties into agreeing?’” Joseph noted that Tegart “evidently felt that the idea was a good one.” Tegart was unaware that Joseph chaired the Jewish Agency Executive’s “Boundaries Committee,” which had mapped out the agency’s partition plan.

Was Tegart influenced by Zionist leaders concerning the locations for the police fortresses? If so, this would follow a pattern that Gideon Biger has pointed out from the early years of the Mandate: “British and Jewish development of Palestine amounted to a ‘joint structure,’ whereby the British would ‘lay the infrastructure’ and the Jews ‘depend on it for the success of their settlement endeavours.’”

**Concluding Thoughts**

The sole in-depth study of Tegart’s work in Palestine, and the fortresses that became his legacy, was written by Gad Kroizer as a PhD dissertation for the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. It is based on archival sources, mainly in Britain, but also in Israel. Faithfully if perhaps uncritically following the British archival testimony, Kroizer found that “Tegart positioned fortresses in strategic locations: along major longitudinal and latitudinal transportation arteries and railways; at central junctions; in cities and villages that had been problematic during the revolt, primarily in Arab areas.” One could argue about the strategic importance of the sites, but, as I have shown above, the majority of proposed fortresses were not in areas that had been problematic during the Arab Revolt, and they were not “primarily in Arab areas.” In fact, the proposed fortresses were mostly in or near Jewish areas and mix Jewish-Arab towns. Moreover, if either the British or the Zionist partition plan had become a political reality by the time the first fifty-five fortresses were completed in October 1941, less than 20 percent of the fortresses would have been in the proposed Arab state.
My research so far has found no explicit evidence that the Zionist leadership influenced Tegart’s decision about the location of the proposed fortresses. However, Tegart’s close relationship with Chaim Weizmann, the central advocate for partition among the Zionist leaders of that time, is notable. Among the locations proposed for a fortress was Rehovot, the small Zionist settlement south of Tel Aviv where Weizmann owned a beautiful home and Tegart liked to visit. Rehovot had remained mostly quiet during the Arab Revolt.

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Endnotes
3 The killing of Andrews is widely held as the beginning of the second, more violent stage of the Arab Revolt. However, Kelly points out that the uptick in Arab violence toward the British started after two weeks of increased brutal British collective punishments, euphemistically called “village searches.” Matthew K. Kelly, *The Crime of Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017), 109.
4 University of Oxford, St. Anthony’s College, Middle East Center Archive (hereafter MECA), Tegart Papers, box 4, file 2a, folio 2.
5 Little time was wasted. In London on 26 October 1937, Tegart met over lunch with the high commissioner of Palestine, Arthur Wauchope, and the newly appointed inspector-general of the Palestine Police, Alan Saunders, together with Cosmo Parkinson, the permanent under-secretary of the Colonial Office. MECA, Tegart Papers, box 4, file 2a, folio 3–4.
6 University of Oxford, Rhodes House, Bodleian Archive, Brit. Emp. s. 467, Correspondence and Papers of Sir William Denis Battershill (hereafter Battershill), box 10, file 4, folio 32b.
8 MECA, MacGillivray Papers, GB165-0193.
9 MECA, Saunders-Alb11-016 (3767-3769).
10 The National Archive (UK) (hereafter TNA), Colonial Office (hereafter CO), 733/383/1, folia 66ff.
11 TNA CO 733/383/1, folio 66.
13 Gad Kroizer, “From Dowbiggin to Tegart: Revolutionary Change in the Colonial Police in Palestine during the 1930s,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 32, no. 2 (May 2004): 115–33.
14 See Cahill, “Sir Charles Tegart,” which includes a photo of a farewell dinner for Tegart held at the King David Hotel. Testifying to this British view of the world, the centerpiece of the long dining table was a small barbed wire “Tegart’s wall” complete with a miniature “pillboxes.”
16 See Tegart’s memo “Collective Responsibility of Villages,” dated 4 April 1938, in MECA, Tegart Papers, box 2, file 3, folia 82–83. Here Tegart notes that villages in the vicinity of a “railroad, road, telephone and telegraph lines and also pipelines and also Rutenberg’s [electrical] grid” will be collectively held responsible for the protection of these items and punitive measures taken against those that did not do so. On 3 May 1938, Tegart recommended that the British
occupy “bad” villages, and on 10 May he met with the GOC, the inspector general of police, the chief secretary, and other military officials to plan the occupation of “enemy villages.” On British brutality against Palestinian Arab civilians, see Matthew Hughes, “From Law and Order to Pacification: Britain’s Suppression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39,” Journal of Palestine Studies 39, no. 2 (Winter 2010): 6–22.

18 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 2, file 3, folia 104–13. The vast majority of these villages were in areas east of Tulkarm and around Jenin and Nablus – areas that were later slated to have few police fortresses.

19 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 2, file 3, folia 114–50.

20 The last night of their short tour of the “defenses,” Tegart and Battershill dined at a seafront restaurant in Tiberias, lingering over drinks before retiring for the night. Only the next morning did they learn that rebels had entered Tiberias during the night and shot up the place. Battershill, box 4, folio 31b.

21 Kelly, Crime of Nationalism, 126.

22 MECA, MacGillivray’s Diary, GB165-0193

23 Kelly, Crime of Nationalism, 142.

24 Kelly, Crime of Nationalism, 133n62.

25 Kelly, Crime of Nationalism, 144.

26 David HaCohen was also deeply involved in intelligence gathering for the Haganah; it is unclear if Tegart was aware of this at the time. See Cohen, Army of Shadows, 83–84, 114, 124–26, 183, 213–14.

27 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 1–2.

28 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 90–96.

29 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 4–6.

30 On 29 November, the pilot sent him a photo of the square, high-walled fortress with a note that he thought it could accommodate twenty men and would cost about £P1,500 to build. In his reply, Tegart mentions to the pilot that he is now getting detailed information from Amman. MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 3, 7.


32 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 82–85. On 24 February 1939, the chief secretary sent letters for all district and division commissioners, with more specific instructions for what they were to provide to Tegart and housing committee. MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folio 86–89.

33 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 74, 49–51, 48.

34 Battershill, box 12, folio 51b.

35 Battershill, Brit. Emp. t. 8 (4/5/3). The date written on the back of the photo reads “1938,” but Battershill’s diary clearly places the visit in January 1939.

36 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 101–9, 123–140, 141–46.

37 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folia 141–46.

38 S. E. V. Luke, 19 April 1940, in TNA CO 733/416/14, folia 23 (emphasis added).

39 It should be noted that Zionist leadership was divided over whether they should even entertain the idea of partition. Chaim Weizmann, the president of the Zionist Organization, was a strong supporter. David Ben Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency in Palestine somewhat reluctantly did as well. However, both Weizmann and Ben Gurion viewed it as merely a jumping off place, from which they would eventually obtain more territory.


41 CASA, K1C, folio 289.

42 Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter CZA), Z4/32152.


44 MECA, Tegart Papers, Box 4, file 4, folia 34–39.

45 High Commissioner of Palestine to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 October 1941, in MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folio 121. On 9 September 1939 the Colonial Office received approval from the Treasury to spend up to £P2,500,000. TNA CO 733/389/17, folia 21. Interestingly, the Survey of Palestine puts the actual expenditure at £P1,441,000 between 1940 and 1944. See A Survey of Palestine Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991), vol. 2, 538.

46 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 3, file 3, folio 120.

47 MECA, Saunders-Alb12-058. Several forts were built along the northern frontier and completed prior to the 55 “rural” forts mentioned above.

48 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 4, file 4, folio 62.

49 MECA, Tegart Papers, box 4, file 4, folio 35

50 CZA Z4/32153.

51 Tegart and his wife were hosted by the Weizman’s for dinner in mid-July 1938, for example. CZA Z4/32153. Battershill
describes the house as palatial and mentions the goldfish in the pool. Battershill, box 12 and box 15, file 5.

52 See Weizmann’s telegram, MECA, Tegart Papers, box 4, file 2b, folio 30; and Tegart’s reply, CZA Z4/32153.

53 Tegart to Weizmann, 22 August 1938, CZA Z4/32153.

54 This phrase indicates that Joseph must have met with Tegart at least several and perhaps many times before, since he describes a pattern that he had observed in Tegart. CZA Z4/32152.

55 CZA Z4/32152.

56 CZA Z4/32152.

