“UNESCO betray their mission and give a bad name to diplomacy and the international institutions. . . . I urge UNESCO to withdraw this bizarre resolution and to engage in protecting, not distorting, human history.”1 With this statement on 13 October 2016, Isaac Herzog, chairman of the Israeli Labor party, commented on the umpteenth resolution passed at the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) regarding Israel’s policies in Jerusalem. On that same day, fifty-eight members of UNESCO Executive Board had casted their vote on resolution 200 EX/25, titled “Occupied Palestine,” submitted by Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Sudan.2 Part one of the resolution regarded specifically Jerusalem: it deplored “Israel’s persistent excavations and works in East Jerusalem particularly in and around the Old City,” and condemned “the escalating Israeli aggressions” toward Jerusalem’s holy sites and their worshippers.3

Though similar resolutions had been passed at UNESCO since Israel’s occupation of Jerusalem in 1967, resolution 200 EX/25 received particular worldwide media attention and the immediate outcry of Israel’s government. At the center of the controversy was the uncompromising language employed in the resolution, accused of expressly failing to link Jerusalem’s holy sites to Judaism. Specifically, the text refers to the Haram al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) as a Muslim holy site only, with no mention of its Hebrew name, Har HaBayit, or its English equivalent, Temple Mount; similarly, the Western Wall or Wailing Wall is mentioned only as al-Buraq Plaza, followed by “Western Wall Plaza” in quotes. On the day after the vote, UNESCO’s director general
Irina Bokova released a statement in which, without mentioning the resolution explicitly, she highlighted that Jerusalem’s importance for the three main monotheistic religions was the reason for its inscription on the World Heritage List and warned that any attempt to “deny, conceal or erase any of the Jewish, Christian, or Muslim traditions undermined the integrity of the site.”

The director general’s reconciling statement aimed at deflecting accusations that UNESCO was betraying the purposes of the organization and failing its function. As a matter of fact, nothing unusual characterized this vote. The resolution was submitted, discussed, and voted on by the member states following the defined procedures. Further, it is worth mentioning that UNESCO’s resolutions are not legally binding, which means that UNESCO does not technically have the power to compel member states’ compliance with its resolutions. Nevertheless, what UNESCO does provide, in Michael Dumper’s words, is an “international platform for ‘naming and shaming’ states who fail to fulfill their responsibilities.” The definition of what UNESCO is and can do is clearly a central and difficult one. However, as Bokova’s intervention might suggest, UNESCO is not to be understood merely as a space where international actors fight multilateral “diplomatic wars,” but also as an actor with its own agenda and policy, existing beyond its member states’ mandate.

Much academic attention has been given to the study of international organizations and especially international intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as “independent actors engaging in diplomatic activities.” Such scholarship moved away from the realist view of IGOs as mere tools of their member states or stages to showcase soft power and negotiate on cultural matters to pursue national interests, and instead examined IGOs as purposive actors whose authority “lies in their ability to present themselves as impersonal and neutral – as not exercising power but instead serving others.” UNESCO was established in 1945 as one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations in the belief that peace cannot be established only through political and economic agreements, but also “on the basis of humanity’s moral and intellectual solidarity.” In the case of UNESCO, the involvement of experts in outlining the organization’s agenda was crucial for generating the international legitimacy needed to establish UNESCO’s role worldwide. From the outset, the organization employed scientific experts and external advisory bodies in order to define the paradigms of cultural heritage and to reinforce its position as a neutral, “non-political” cultural arbitrator. Within this frame, this paper focuses on the early involvement of UNESCO in Jerusalem in the late 1950s. Through the analysis of one of the first experts’ missions sent by UNESCO to Jordan, it will highlight the role of the organization as an independent actor: a stakeholder in international matters related to culture, engaging in diplomatic activities to carry out its mandate.

In her study on the role of UNESCO in sustaining cultural diversity, Irena Kozymka drew an important distinction between the classical notion of cultural diplomacy that has been mostly confined “to the promotion of one nation’s culture abroad to strengthen relations with other nations . . . or to promote national interest,” and the diplomacy of culture, an activity in which “culture is a field of international relations in its own right as much as a tool of foreign policy.” By applying the concept of diplomacy of culture
to non-state actors, UNESCO can convincingly be analyzed as an actor engaging in diplomatic activities for the purpose of culture. Employing the notion of diplomacy as “the established method of influencing the decision and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence,”¹¹ this paper will shed light on the practices of UNESCO’s experts and bureaucrats involved in this early mission, and thus show their role in conforming Jordan to UNESCO’s Western academic practices and values in the field of cultural heritage.¹²

“A Mission to Study These Holy Places”

In 1957, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was in the process of undertaking planning works at the country’s historical sites, with the purpose of promoting tourism. In this context, the Jordanian government asked UNESCO for the support of specialized experts in the field of restoration and conservation of historical sites. The request aimed to gather together a mission of highly qualified experts who would advise the Jordanian government on the best measures to restore and preserve the numerous archaeological and historic sites situated in Jordanian territory, including Bethlehem and Jerusalem’s Old City in the Jordanian-occupied West Bank. Previously, in December 1954, Gerald Lankester Harding, a British archaeologist and previous director of the Jordanian department of antiquities, raised the possibility of UNESCO sending an architect to Jordan to assist in the reconstruction work at Jarash, and to inspect other ancient monuments. In his reply to Harding’s request, archaeologist and conservationist Jan Karel Van der Haagen, the head of the UNESCO Museums and Monuments division, informed Harding that UNESCO had, at its general conference in Montevideo, adopted an item stating that missions can be sent to member states, upon request, to advise them on the conservation and restoration of their monuments, archaeological sites, or the organization of their museums. Although similar missions of purely advisory nature had been sent to Lebanon and Syria in 1952, the general conference had formalized member states’ ability to demand supporting missions in all fields treated by UNESCO, and had doubled the budget intended for this purpose.

Aware of the UNESCO mission sent to Tripoli, Lebanon, in the early 1950s, Ali Adibi, the Jordanian acting resident representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board (UNTAB),¹³ wrote in October 1957 to the chief of the UNESCO bureau of relations with member states, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, to request UNESCO’s contribution to “a very important and pressing matter”:

As you know Jordan is the home of many holy and historical places of universal significance. In the course of improvement of some of these places to attract more tourists, the Government inevitably has come across some problems, which affect such features as, for example, the old wall and the gates of the old city of Jerusalem. . . . Upon the request of the government, I am writing to find out whether UNESCO can send to Jordan Government a Mission to study these holy places and give the Government their
recommendations for their preservation. I know of one UNESCO Mission which, some years ago, rendered similar services in connection with the city of Tripoli in Lebanon.14

Adibi required the expertise of archaeologists and historians, reporting that UNTAB’s local experts in town planning admitted that the problem of preservation of the holy sites needed investigations and specific expertise beyond their competence.15 The Jordanian request was warmly welcomed within UNESCO, despite some reservations. On the one hand, Jordan’s demand was taken as nothing less than the opportunity for UNESCO to save the historic remains of the Holy Land.16 On the other hand, Malcolm Adiseshiah, UNESCO’s assistant director general, warned colleagues not to rush into action in light of the “sad and unlovely” outcomes of another mission that had not ended with the desired results. Adiseshiah referred to Cesare Brandi’s 1956 mission to investigate the Dome of the Rock’s mosaics. The mission had been requested in early 1956 by Gerald Harding, at the time director of the department of antiquities in Amman. However, the tensions that preceded the Suez Crisis and that eventually produced the pro-Egyptian and anti-British government of Sulayman al-Nabulsi and the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, also led to the abrupt end of Gerald Harding’s mandate.17 Therefore, by the time Cesare Brandi arrived in Jerusalem in summer 1956, the political situation had completely changed. Brandi wrote in his notes that he had to face “a systematic obstructionism by the so-called Egyptian restorers,” and in September 1956 he was asked to leave the country by the consul general and the minister.18

Despite Adiseshiah’s concerns, UNESCO – knowing the Jordanian government’s intention to carry on restoration works in order to encourage tourism – saw a chance not to be missed to direct Jordan’s conservation practices technically and aesthetically. Adibi’s letter was quickly brought to the attention of the interested departments. In less than fifteen days, Van der Haagen had submitted the Jordanian request to Rudolf Salat, director of the department of Cultural Activities, suggesting that UNESCO accept involvement in Jordan. Van der Haagen highlighted the serious risks posed by Jordan’s desire to encourage tourism, if measures were not “undertaken with a deep respect, a great knowledge, and sensible taste.”19 He insisted that only great experts in the fields of archaeology, history, architecture, and landscape preservation, with their knowledge and taste, could ensure that such precious sites would be respected, preserved, and promoted.20

The wheels were set in motion. In November 1957, Salat wrote to UNESCO’s interim director general Jean Thomas to inform him of “the grave problem of preservation of holy sites in Jordan.”21 Before discussing the importance of UNESCO’s potential intervention in Jordan, Salat reassured the interim director general on the nature of the Jordanian request. He stressed that the problem of preservation was purely technical and absolutely not related to political issues arising at the time of the creation of the state of Israel, including proposals for the internationalization of Jerusalem and its surroundings.22 Further, to emphasize UNESCO’s neutral role when it came to political matters, he added that “this extremely delicate issue [the status of Jerusalem] was still the order of the day of the United Nations, and therefore it did not concern UNESCO.”23
At this time, UNESCO was still constructing its international authority as the leading organization for the protection and conservation of cultural heritage. (The World Heritage Convention would only be drafted in 1971.) Therefore, active involvement in Jordan, and especially at holy sites such as Jerusalem and Bethlehem, meant not only the expansion of UNESCO’s influence, but also considerable publicity for the organization. In fact, despite not having a financial budget planned for such intervention, Salat highlighted that:

These holy monuments being of exceptional value for three great religious families of the world, I am certain that any help that UNESCO is able to bring to preserve and valorize these monuments, will be highly appreciated by the public opinion of the entire world.

Despite UNESCO eagerness to send a mission of three experts to Jordan as quickly as possible, the mission started only in autumn 1959, two years after the first official Jordanian request, and was composed of only two experts: Hans H. Steckeweh, an architect from Hannover and a former official involved in the preservation of monuments in Germany; and architect Mohammed Abbas Badr, head of the Antiquities Service in Cairo. Steckeweh’s mission lasted four month, while Abbas Badr assisted only for five weeks, and covered several sites spread throughout Jordanian-held territory, including Bethlehem and Jerusalem.

“Everything Should Be Done to Preserve the Original Character of These Monuments of Outstanding Value”

UNESCO’s expert mission to Jordan produced one preliminary and one final report, as well as voluminous correspondence between Steckeweh and Van der Haagen. These sources reveal the importance that UNESCO placed on its independent role and interests in matters of cultural heritage conservation. The universal religious importance ascribed to Jerusalem and Bethlehem by Christians, Muslims, and Jews, and the consequent interest of pilgrims and tourists in visiting the sites was the main concern of the organization, manifesting in two ways: first, undertaking conservation according to what UNESCO believed to be tourists’ expectations; and second, protecting sites from the reckless development that tourism could eventually bring about. Both, Steckeweh and Van der Haagen agreed that preserving Bethlehem and Jerusalem meant stopping development and modernization in favor of maintaining the “picturesque narrow and winding streets of former days, used only for foot traffic.” Development was perceived as a threat to these medieval cities not only for the structural damage it could cause to significant monuments and buildings, but especially for the transformation of the atmosphere of the cities:

The expectations of a visitor with religious interests on visiting Bethlehem are considerable, for this “small town” has a place in the Christian regard, perhaps equal to that of Jerusalem. Certainly he will not expect to be confronted with a modern town. Until quite recent times these expectations
would have been gratified, but unfortunately this is now no longer the case. As with so many other towns in Jordan, the aspect of the city is rapidly changing the old to the new.29

Steckeweh was particularly shaken by the demolition carried out in proximity to the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem in order to clear space for visitor parking lots. He found that such works had seriously affected “the dignity of the site,” and that “in the absence of experienced architects, a simple remedial measure would be the planting of trees to screen the newly erected buildings and the adjacent demolitions.”30 In addition to a general feeling of mistrust for local practitioners and authorities, what emerges vividly from the UNESCO expert report and correspondence is the perception of local inhabitants being a threat to the medieval cities’ heritage.

In correspondence with Van der Haagen, Steckeweh expressed his frustration with public opinion’s general disinterest in issues of conservation. Even though Steckeweh viewed Jerusalem and Bethlehem as “the last remaining mediaeval town in the Near East that had resisted modernization,” he ascribed such resistance to the inevitable poverty and disinterest of its inhabitants rather than their conscious desire to preserve the ancient cities. Moreover, he feared that the inhabitants’ lack of awareness of the value of the cities’ medieval layout could easily allow dramatic transformations of Jerusalem, if these changes were presented as offering the chance for better living conditions.

In comparing Jerusalem’s public opinion with the educated one found in “any European countries,” the German architect claimed that anywhere else there would have been “strong public criticism about the aluminium imitation gold covering of the Dome of the Rock – while here [in Jerusalem] nobody cares.”31 The comparison between local and European/Western public opinions, as well as the comparison between these public opinions’ sensitivity to beauty, stands out in the notes of the UNESCO expert. In his letters, Steckeweh often highlights that the only people caring genuinely about the conservation of Jerusalem’s Old City are foreigners living in loco, who had no impact since they did not dare publicly criticize conservation policy.32 The concept of “good taste” used as evidence of a cultural lack of awareness of heritage value is present in the expert’s report and letters:

The poverty of the town makes advice on preservation illusory at present. There is hardly anybody amongst the people concerned who really understands what such advice is aiming at. Even simple matters of mere good taste, they simply don’t understand what I mean or why I worry. If you see their homes from inside, you will find some explanation: you see the most tasteless things mixed with others – you very seldom meet a man with good taste. Amongst the intelligentia of the country nobody really cares for antiquities, old cities and churches and similar things. To them “old” means “poor.” The only argument that counts is the tourist and his money. . . . So there is no public opinion to back an effort in favor of the preservation of the old town nor of the Mount of Olives.33
Steckeweh’s essentialist understanding of “good taste” suggests the existence of innate, universal parameters of taste, related to cultural and educational settings, which are indeed rooted in UNESCO’s vision of its own mission. In fact, questions regarding the existence of universally shared aesthetic parameters would become especially urgent with the development of the World Heritage Program, whose convention was adopted in 1972. For instance, the first page of the convention reads: “it is essential to adopt a convention establishing an effective system of collective protection of the cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value, organized on a permanent basis and in accordance with modern scientific methods.” This key concept of “outstanding universal value” implies that value is an attribute intrinsic to a property. Such value must also warrant the employment of experts for its definition and conservation. In other words, if heritage at this early stage of UNESCO was understood as an object or a place whose value is intrinsic in its own “historical fabric,” the role of the expert, who possesses the scientific knowledge that enables him to identify properties’ value, assumes inevitable relevance.

In December 1959, during his mission in Jerusalem, Steckeweh contacted Van der Haagen searching for some guidance to deal with a Jordanian government plan to build a Hilton Hotel on the Mount of Olives. The Hilton was to be built south of the Carmelite convent, on terrain belonging to the Jerusalem waqf. Hans Steckeweh’s opposition to the construction of such a hotel confirmed his open mistrust of local cultural heritage policies.

As an architect, I feel that the project could be done according to the aesthetic requirements of the site; on the other hand it could be harmful. As a preserver of historical sites, I feel like Lord Allenby and his successors, who made the Mount of Olives a nature reserve. But they were backed by power, money, and public opinion, all of which is now on the opposite site. What I am really afraid of is the development, which under present conditions of control will follow the construction of a big and most fashionable hotel. The whole site, now a pretty poor village site, will become fashionable, prices of ground will rise, speculation set in, and building of all kinds will bring up beyond control and spoil the site beyond repair.

Van der Haagen was aware that UNESCO’s policy forbade the organization from giving instructions to their experts about specific technical problems, and therefore wondered to what extent and in what form he could offer his guidance. However, he shared Steckeweh’s concerns. In his reply, he agreed that if the plan for a hotel on the Mount of Olives were to go through, the entire character of the site would be dramatically changed. After expressing his concern about such a possibility, Van der Haagen wondered whether the Jordanian plan should note have been released to newspapers, predicting this would cause worldwide protests, particularly in the United States. The strategy of turning to international public opinion was not limited to putting external pressure on the Jordanian government; it also had an “educational” aim. UNESCO’s practitioners often released interviews and wrote newspaper articles to raise awareness and “educate” public opinion about the organization. Thus, Van der Haagen suggested a “popular educational article on
Old Jerusalem and its problems to be published in the Courier, a magazine circulated by UNESCO since 1948 that by 1960 reached, according to Van der Haagen, more than one million readers throughout the world. He also advised that editorials be published in local Jordanian papers to sensitize public opinion to the fact that modernization would destroy the unique features of Old Jerusalem, and that tourists would not visit Jordan to see a city that resembled many other modern cities in the Middle East.

On the local level, Steckeweh tried to talk with local political and religious authorities in an attempt to find a common base of opposition to this plan. The expert found the mayor of Jerusalem, Ruhi al-Khatib, in agreement with his concerns, but afraid of being powerless to influence wider tourism plans outlined in Amman. Steckeweh found the religious authorities, on the contrary, not especially shocked by the plan. By the time Steckeweh wrote his final report, distributed in 1960, the plan to build the hotel had been put on hold, in part because of pressure from the municipality.

The practices of the UNESCO experts involved in the first official mission to Jordan and the Holy Land in 1959 show the approach of an organization willing to influence and educate countries according to Western academic standards of cultural (and natural, if we consider the Mount of Olives) heritage conservation. Indeed, a European interest in gaining the stewardship of the Holy Land’s biblical heritage was already evident in the early twentieth century, when European imperial powers competed among each other to gain the role of protectors of Jerusalem. During the British Mandate, authorities reinforced the imperial narrative of the city entering a redeeming era after having been neglected by its Ottoman rulers. Similarly, UNESCO’s agenda included the conformity of countries to an internationally defined set of values through its experts’ diplomatic practices.

**Conclusion**

The late 1950s and 1960s represented a transitional phase for UNESCO. In these same years, UNESCO launched the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia. The Nubia campaign aimed to save ancient monuments in the Upper Nile Valley from being flooded by Nasser’s construction of the Aswan High Dam, and was the first collaborative international heritage rescue effort involving UNESCO. Even if in 1959 UNESCO’s World Heritage Program was not yet defined in the terms that are now associated with it, the Nubia campaign set the concrete ground for the idea that the international community shared the duty to safeguard the cultural historical heritage that testifies to the history of mankind, and helped define UNESCO’s public image of international authority in this field.

This paper focused on the first consultative expert mission sent by UNESCO to Jordan to advise the Jordanian government on preservation of its cultural heritage, especially of the holy sites that had fallen under its control since 1949, to explore UNESCO’s diplomatic activity in the Holy Land. As seen in Hans Steckeweh’s mission and reports, the practices of UNESCO’s experts “in mission” and “in office” can be analyzed as instances of UNESCO’s diplomatic activity in the Holy Land. UNESCO employed this
diplomatic activity to get the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to conform to UNESCO’s practices of conservation rooted in a Western academic set of aesthetic values. Experts promoted the organization’s idea of what heritage is, and how it should be preserved, by meeting with local experts and the local political establishment, by searching for the support of influential groups, and by releasing information to the international press to wind up public opinion.

The holy sites in general, and Jerusalem in particular, have become central to the Palestine-Israel conflict over the decades, and the Old City of Jerusalem especially has transformed into a symbol of legitimacy for the different interest groups involved. To justify historical narratives, Jerusalem’s Old City has been repeatedly demolished, excavated, rebuilt, and renamed, and as much academic literature has highlighted, archaeology and heritage practices have been increasingly exploited to serve political agendas and reinforce nationalist discourses. Within this frame, the question of UNESCO’s diplomatic role in Palestine in general and in Jerusalem in particular is of major importance. Especially in a case such as Jerusalem, where heritage – and its definition – has been used for decades to claim belonging by competing national groups, the role of UNESCO has increased in importance over time. Here, conflicting actors have benefitted from the involvement of an alleged super partes arbitrator, and UNESCO through its experts has increasingly shaped the knowledge framework within which the conflict has taken place to this day.

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Endnotes
1 Isaac Herzog’s Facebook page, 13 October 2016 (3:47 pm), online at m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1220814351294860& id=161648040544835 (accessed 29 June 2017).
2 Among the twenty-four countries that voted in favor, China and Russia stand out. On the other side, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Estonia, and Lithuania were the only six countries opposing the resolution. Twenty-six countries abstained from the vote.
The United Nations Technical Assistance Board

In-depth discussion of the notion of expertise


UNESCO’s advisory bodies include the International Center of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and International Center for the Study of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM).


In-depth discussion of the notion of expertise is beyond the scope of this article; however, throughout the paper the term will be understood according to UNESCO’s own definition, namely as “a recognized specialist with particular skills, expertise or knowledge,” contracted by the organization in advisory or consultative capacity. UNESCO, “Consultants and Experts,” online at en.unesco.org/careers/consultant%20and%20experts (accessed 5 January 2017).

The United Nations Technical Assistance Board (UNTAB) was created in 1949, when after the creation of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA), the United Nations General Assembly also created a mechanism for the participation of specialized agencies – the Technical Assistance Board (TAB). The board was comprised of the executive heads (or their representatives) of the UN and its specialized agencies and was the forum where technical assistance requests were discussed, progress reports given, and agency programs presented.


Adibi to Galindo Pohl.


Rashid Khalidi, “Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World,” in *The Modern Middle East*, ed. Albert Hourani, Philip Shukry Khoury, Mary Christina Wilson, 541.


Van der Haagen to Salat.

Van der Haagen to Salat.


“Il ne s’agit pas du problème politique qui s’est posé au moment de la création de l’État d’Israël quand on a envisagé l’internationalisation de Jerusalem et de ses environs ou du moins de certains monuments considérés comme lieux saints par les Chrétiens, les Juifs et les Musulmans.” Salat to Thomas.

Salat to Thomas.

The correspondence between Van der Haagen and Salat (30 October 1957), as well as between Salat and Jean Thomas (5 November 1957), expresses concern for the lack of funding in the case of accepting Jordan’s request. Van der Haagen wrote: “Je sais aussi qu’actuellement le budget pour le programme de participation dans le domaine de la préservation du patrimoine culturel de l’humanité est épuisé” (Van der Haagen to Salat); Salat wrote: “En réservant les détails qui doivent être étudiés très soigneusement soit du point de vue financier (car en effet aucun crédit n’est prévu dans le budget actuel), soit du point de vue technique (choix des experts)” (Salat to Thomas).

Salat to Thomas.


Steckeweh, Final Report, 15.

Steckeweh, Final Report, 15.

Steckeweh, Final Report, 15.


Steckeweh to Van der Haagen, 3.

Steckeweh to Van der Haagen, 2–3. Emphasis added.

Steckeweh to Van der Haagen, 2. Emphasis in the original letter.
36 Van der Haagen to Steckeweh.
37 “The various local authorities also should become convinced that it is the towns interest to maintain the old and to restrict modern construction. I think you are now trying to establish good relations with some of the influential people in the country to ‘educate’ them to this point of view.” Van der Haagen to Steckeweh.
38 Van der Haagen to Steckeweh. Van der Haagen wrote: “In 1960 it may be possible for the UNESCO Courier, read by more than one million people throughout the world, to publish a popular educational article on Old Jerusalem and its problems. … The Government should be aware of the fact that the main reason for which tourists will be more and more attracted to Jordan is to see that which is old and unique. They should understand that any radical modernization would destroy the unique features and would make them resemble many other modern cities in the Near East. Perhaps it will be possible that two or three editorials be published in local papers on this subject.”
39 Van der Haagen to Steckeweh. Van der Haagen wrote: “In 1960 it may be possible for the UNESCO Courier, read by more than one million people throughout the world, to publish a popular educational article on Old Jerusalem and its problems. … The Government should be aware of the fact that the main reason for which tourists will be more and more attracted to Jordan is to see that which is old and unique. They should understand that any radical modernization would destroy the unique features and would make them resemble many other modern cities in the Near East. Perhaps it will be possible that two or three editorials be published in local papers on this subject.”
42 As Laurajane Smith points out in her book Uses of Heritage, UNESCO was over the years able to construct what she defined as an “Authorized Heritage Discourse,” based on “narratives of Western national and elite class experiences, which reinforces ideas of innate cultural value tied to time depth, monumentality, expert knowledge and aesthetics.” Laurajane Smith, Uses of Heritage (London: Routledge, 2006), 299.