No Bridge Will Take You Home: The Jordan Valley Exodus Remembered through the UNRWA Archives
Atwa Jaber

Abstract
In the summer of 1967, Israel occupied the Jordan Valley and transferred most of its Palestinian population eastward toward the opposite bank of the Jordan River, including thousands of Nakba refugees who had resided in camps run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). At the time, Israel aspired to as much land and as few Palestinians as possible in the Jordan Valley, and so deployed vicious strategies to forcibly displace and deny the return of many Palestinians. In the post-1967 years, Israel demolished tens of Palestinian communities it had depopulated in the Jordan Valley, preparing the ground for its expansionist settlement enterprise in the area. This recent period of the Jordan Valley’s past remains overlooked. In the absence of a comprehensive historiography, the oral history of Palestinians and UNRWA’s archives are key sources for the study of the social history of the displaced population. This article draws from these two sources to examine the circumstances of the Jordan Valley’s occupation and to document, analyze, and preserve fading narratives of the Palestinians.

Keywords
Palestine; Israel; Jordan Valley; UNRWA archives; oral history; images and displacement; 1967 war; Palestine refugees.

On 5 June 1967, the Israeli military forces occupied the Jordan Valley (Ghawr al-Urdun), the area which
extends from ‘Ayn Jidi on the Dead Sea to the northernmost borders of the West Bank near Bisan. At the time, the Jordan Valley had been home to around three hundred thousand Palestinians who lived in prosperous communities throughout this vast geography. A large part of this population were Nakba refugees, who had settled in refugee camps in the aftermath of their displacement from historic Palestine in 1948. Following the occupation of the Jordan Valley, this article argues, Israel envisaged the area as an empty frontier – a depopulated space to be designated for permanent Israeli settlement. This expansionist, settler-colonial vision of the occupied Jordan Valley materialized at the expense of Palestinian land and lives. In the Jordan Valley – more than elsewhere in the occupied West Bank – Israel displaced the vast majority of Palestinians, residents and 1948 refugees, and systematically prevented their return to their lands and homes, marking a rupture in their longstanding communities and the beginning of a prolonged displacement. In the Jordan Valley, an abrupt exodus occurred from which Palestinians are yet to return.

This article explores this period of the Jordan Valley’s past which, in the literature addressing the history of Palestine and the Palestinians, remains a narrowly charted territory. To do this, the article draws from two sources that offer substantial knowledge about the Jordan Valley’s Palestinian societies: oral histories and materials from the UNRWA archives. The testimonies of Palestinians that appear in this article were gathered as part of my research in the Jordan Valley and in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, where I am conducting in-depth interviews with Palestinians whom Israel expelled in 1967 across the Jordan River. The UNRWA archives hold digitized written and audio-visual materials about the Jordan Valley’s population, especially refugees, from the early 1950s.

The critical and decisive role of oral history for the study of Palestine’s past and present is well established, particularly its role in documenting Palestinians’ experiences of displacement and exile. In the problematic absence of primary written Palestinian sources, as historian Saleh Abdul Jawad suggests, oral testimonies become a principal source to retrieve, preserve, and write Palestine’s recent history. In the Jordan Valley, where written sources on the Palestinian exodus are almost nonexistent, there is particular necessity to gather and document the oral history of the displaced Palestinian population. In this context, oral testimonies become the foundation to reconstruct fading narratives of Palestinians about key moments of survival, struggle, and displacement, which they have lived since Israel occupied the Jordan Valley.

The archives of UNRWA have also gained increasing scholarly attention that addresses the histories behind the archives’ establishment, the politics of their curation, and their advantages for historical research. As an institutional archive that reflects the policies and politics of a foreign humanitarian aid agency, it is imperative to critically approach the UNRWA archives and the materials that they offer. Nevertheless, as Anne Irfan and Jo Kelcey rightly emphasize in part one of this Jerusalem Quarterly special issue, the fragmented Palestinian archival landscape – due to Israel’s continuing attempts to loot and destroy Palestinian archives – make the archives of UNRWA “a de facto Palestinian national archive,” one that holds great potential for research on
Atwa Jaber

The Jordan Valley Exodus Remembered

The Palestinians since the Nakba. In the Jordan Valley, where tens of thousands of refugees settled in 1948 and were displaced again in 1967, materials from the UNRWA archives offer a deeper understanding of their social history, both at home and in exile.

Drawing from both of these sources, this article provides key insights about the history of the Jordan Valley and its Palestinian communities. First, by discussing the reality of life in the Jordan Valley before Israeli occupation in 1967, the article argues that the Nakba refugees formed an integral part of the social and economic fabric of the area, despite their catastrophic uprooting that led them to resettle in the Jordan Valley in 1948. In this vein, whereas the Jordan Valley was largely portrayed as a grim, arid space in which Palestinian refugees struggled to find shelter, the article highlights that the refugees found the determination and the resources to gradually transform their initial living conditions and to establish thriving communities. Secondly, by exploring the circumstances and consequences of the Israeli occupation in 1967, the article argues that the Jordan Valley had been central to Israeli plans for permanent settlement in the occupied lands, which entailed the forcible transfer of most of the Jordan Valley’s Palestinian population – particularly the Nakba refugees – toward the east bank of the Jordan River. Guided by these plans, Israel devised and implemented three strategies that transformed the demographic reality of the Jordan Valley and planted the seeds for Israel’s ongoing settler colonialism in the area: the mass displacement of Palestinians, the systematic denial of their return, and the demolition of their communities.

The Israeli occupation of the Jordan Valley not only led to the dispossession of Palestinians and the perpetual control of their land, but also forced many Nakba refugees into another cycle of displacement without return. The article therefore perceives the Jordan Valley exodus from two entwined perspectives: as a space, the Jordan Valley is an area which the refugees had passed into, settled, flourished, and were displaced again, and which Israel had long envisaged as an inseparable part of its expansionist settler-colonial project; and as a point in time, the exodus of the Palestinians from the Jordan Valley in 1967 constituted a continuity of a prolonged displacement, one that began during the 1948 Nakba and is still ongoing today. Finally, the article ends with a glimpse of the current reality of life in the Jordan Valley, where the past and present collide, and the exodus of Palestinians continues by other means.

The Way to the Bridge: Settling the Nakba Refugees

During the Nakba in 1948, which marked the forced displacement of more than half of Palestine’s native population at the hands of Zionist militias, many of the displaced Palestinians took refuge to the north, in Lebanon and Syria, while others were forced eastward toward the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. At the time, not all refugees who headed eastward crossed the Jordan River, and tens of thousands settled in the Jordan Valley. They mainly gathered near bridges that functioned across the Jordan River, where four refugee camps soon emerged. Close to King Husayn Bridge (referred to as Allenby Bridge by Israelis, and Karama Bridge by Palestinians), in the surroundings of Jericho, the refugees settled
in three camps: ‘Aqbat Jabr camp to the southwest of Jericho, ‘Ayn al-Sultan to the northeast of the town, and al-Nuway’ima camp to the north. While the exact number of refugees who settled in each of these camps at the time of their establishment is unclear, their population on 4 June 1967 is estimated at around ninety-three thousand refugees. Close to Damya Bridge (called Adam Bridge by Israelis), near the village of al-Jiftlik, al-‘Ajajra camp (also known as Abu al-‘Ajaj) emerged, with an estimated population of thirty thousand refugees.

After the establishment of UNRWA in December 1949 and the beginning of its operations in May 1950, the agency started providing relief services to the refugees in the Jordan Valley. UNRWA archival records on the Jordan Valley’s refugee camps and their populations also date back to this period, including demographic data on the refugees, reports of UNRWA operations, and photographs and films that document the agency’s services in these camps. Through UNRWA archival records, especially photographs and films, distinct stages of the refugees’ lives in the Jordan Valley emerge.

In ‘Aqbat Jabr, as the photographs in figures 1 and 2 illustrate, the refugees initially settled in a desert-like area where the lack of infrastructure or adequate shelter made their living conditions dire. As in most other refugee camps, classes for refugee children were held in the open air, and the refugees were sheltered in basic tents. Here, as historian Issam Nassar suggests, photos of the earliest days in the refugee camps allow us to clearly see the historical conditions of the refugees at the time, uncovering visual evidence that delineates “the violence of their uprooting, and the misery of their daily life at the time when the lens shutter closed.” But it is by combining these images with the testimonies of the refugees themselves that refugees’ experiences can be fully grasped.
During an interview with Abu Sa‘id, a Palestinian refugee from ‘Aqbat Jabr, he recounted how the refugees who first settled in the camp were intending to cross the bridges toward the east bank of the Jordan River:

After leaving their towns and villages in Palestine, refugees crossed a long distance, and when they arrived at the borders [with Jordan], they heard that people were already gathering here. The area of ‘Aqbat Jabr was the largest gathering of refugees at the time because of its proximity to the borders. This area was a vast empty piece of land with many wild plants; even apes would not have lived here! But there was water, which was the most necessary thing for our life. There was a wide waterway that surrounded the camp … and this made ‘Aqbat Jabr a green area for many years. There were agricultural farms all around us.\textsuperscript{14}

Such testimonies reveal aspects of refugees’ lives that are missing from UNRWA’s photographs. Uprooted from their homes and dispossessed from their lands, on their way to the bridge, the refugees found a source of life, a stream, in the middle of an area where life was barely possible. The refugees found in the Jordan Valley a resourceful environment which allowed them to transform their initial living conditions in the arid spaces of shelter and gradually establish thriving communities in the refugee camps. Indeed, throughout the 1950s, the Jordan Valley camps grew in size and population, and the refugees found the potential to create small but growing economies. This transformation is also documented in UNRWA’s records.
In 1967, UNRWA reported that reliance on the agency’s services had gradually decreased and “some of the refugee camps had developed into thriving communities, even though they were still at a fairly low social and economic level and still contained many families living on the edge of subsistence.”15 Palestinian testimonies further demonstrate how refugee camps in the Jordan Valley became vibrant communities that stood out as key population centers in the area.

Abu Salim, a refugee from ‘Aqbat Jabr, discussed how the lives of refugees in the Jordan Valley changed during the 1950s and the early 1960s, shaped by transformations in housing conditions, UNRWA services, and the social and economic status of many refugees:

Most of the refugees who settled in ‘Aqbat Jabr were originally farmers from Jaffa and its surrounding villages, who had worked in the orange orchards before the Nakba. When they came to ‘Aqbat Jabr, after they had lost everything, they found new ways to live. For example, people from [the depopulated village of] al-‘Abbasiyya started producing straw mats. The raw materials were plentiful, and the products had a big market … as an alternative for carpets. There was even an association for the women who worked and produced the mats.16

Having lost everything during the Nakba, many refugees found in the Jordan Valley alternative livelihoods, despite the stark difference between the environments of the Jordan Valley and the areas from which the refugees were displaced in 1948. With the support
of UNRWA, particularly the agency’s vocational training programs, refugees utilized the potentially fertile lands that surrounded the camps, established small but growing businesses, and marketed their products in the camps’ markets (figures 4 and 5).17

Eventually, ‘Aqbat Jabr camp became a prominent commercial center in the Jordan Valley. Abu Sa‘id clearly remembered:

In ‘Aqbat Jabr, there were shops for textiles, vegetables, and fruits. There were coffee shops, and even watch repair shops. Some of the prominent Palestinian merchants also had stores in the camp, and people from other areas used to come and buy goods here [in ‘Aqbat Jabr]. At the time, the town of Jericho did not have the significance it has today, and ‘Aqbat Jabr was the commercial center of the Jordan Valley, even for the people of Jericho.18
Within two decades of the refugees’ settlement in the Jordan Valley, the initial grim conditions of life in the refugee camps had eased, and the camps gradually became flourishing communities.

In other parts of the Jordan Valley, refugees and non-refugees worked hand-in-hand in agriculture, cultivating large plots of the Jordan Valley’s lands and benefiting from the area’s generous water resources. Historian Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh states that “after the Nakba in 1948, Palestinian refugees settled in the Jordan Valley and transformed its arid and salty lands to flourishing paradises, growing various fruits, diverse vegetables, dates, grain crops, flowers, and many trees.” Such was the story of al-‘Ajajra refugee camp near al-Jiftlik, where most of the refugees who settled in the camp were peasants from the depopulated village of ‘Ajjur, northwest of Hebron. They were experienced farmers and skillfully contributed to working al-Jiftlik’s fertile lands.
Abu Ibrahim, an elderly Palestinian from al-Jiftlik, remembered how agriculture in the village flourished after the refugees arrived:

After the Nakba in 1948, refugees started coming [to al-Jiftlik] and renting plots of land to cultivate. They took half of the crops, and we [the landowners] took the other half. Many refugees from ‘Ajjur came here because the lands were fertile, and water was abundant. Of course, there were refugees from other areas of Palestine who also lived in the camp, but the majority came from ‘Ajjur, which gave the camp its name, al-‘Ajajra or Abu al-‘Ajaj. There was no difference between Bedouins, peasants, or refugees. We [the locals of al-Jiftlik] and the refugees lived as one, we also used to marry each other … We supported our brothers who were displaced after the Nakba, we split our bread with them.20

Like the camps around Jericho, al-‘Ajajra gradually grew to become an integral part of al-Jiftlik. By the mid-1960s, the camp became a commercial center for the village, where many Palestinians from the surrounding areas marketed their agricultural produce.21

There is not much data in the UNRWA archives about al-‘Ajajra refugee camp, which is striking, especially when oral and written sources indicate that UNRWA built schools, a clinic, and a cafeteria for the refugees in the camp.22 Yet the agency never recognized al-‘Ajajra as one of the official camps in the Jordan Valley, unlike ‘Aqbat Jabr or ‘Ayn al-Sultan. Here, as Irfan and Kelcey argue, UNRWA’s decision-making power plays a role in reproducing silence in its archives – a source of epistemic injustice toward the thousands of refugees who lived in al-‘Ajajra.23 In this case, oral testimonies can tell us a lot about refugees’ life in the camp, their displacement after Israel’s 1967 occupation, and eventually the camp’s demolition.

**Bridges in Ruins: The Jordan Valley Exodus**

“There is no such thing as wilderness, only depopulation.”

– Patrick Wolfe24

Under the swift blows of the 1967 war, Israeli military forces occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan (al-Jawlan) heights. Shortly after the occupation, a plan devised by Yigal Allon – then member of the Israeli cabinet and former commander of the Zionist Palmach militia – called for permanent Jewish settlement in most of the occupied territories, and intensely so in the Jordan Valley.

In its broadest terms, Allon’s plan proposed the replacement of Israel’s 1949 armistice line borders with enlarged “defensible borders” that followed the region’s topography, to protect Israel from Arab attacks coming from the east. To achieve this, Allon proposed the fortification of a frontier area extending from the Israeli-
occupied part of the Golan heights in the north to the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula, which entailed the annexation of a twenty-kilometer-wide strip of the Jordan Valley. In the annexed Jordan Valley, Allon further proposed a series of agricultural settlements and paramilitary outposts spread along the Jordan River. Beneath Allon’s security narrative lay a Zionist ideological motive, by which he perceived the establishment of agricultural settlements in the Jordan Valley as the “regeneration” of Labor Zionism and the “revival” of its agricultural pioneering spirit, aiming “to make the desert bloom.” Allon assumed that eventually Israel would formally annex the Jordan Valley, keeping this occupied border area under full Israeli control.

According to the blueprints set forth in Allon’s plan, Israel perceived the Jordan Valley as a frontier geography, an area that would bring about “maximum security and maximum territory for Israel with a minimum number of Arabs.” This settler-colonial logic of acquiring as much land and as few Palestinians as possible, unfolded in the Jordan Valley through the strategies of violence that Israel implemented during and after the occupation: the mass displacement of Palestinians, the systematic prevention of their return, and the demolition of their communities.

Figure 6. “Palestinians cross the demolished King Husayn (Allenby) Bridge toward the east bank of the Jordan River during their exodus in 1967. Many had been displaced from towns, villages, and refugee camps in the Jordan Valley.” Photographer unknown. © UNRWA Film and Photo Archive.
Mass Displacement

Across the ruins of King Husayn Bridge, destroyed by Israel during the war, the vast majority of the Jordan Valley’s Palestinian population – now displaced from Jericho and its surrounding refugee camps, from al-Jiftlik and al-‘Ajajra refugee camp, and from numerous other Palestinian communities – moved to the east bank of the Jordan River. The scale of the mass displacement of Palestinians from the Jordan Valley is conspicuous in the statistics available through UNRWA’s records. According to the agency’s reports from September 1967, within three months of the Israeli occupation, around two hundred thousand Palestinians had already crossed from the West Bank toward Jordan, including sixty-five thousand registered refugees from the area of Jericho and its surrounding refugee camps. In al-Jiftlik, where UNRWA’s statistics are lacking, Palestinians testify that Israel displaced two-thirds of the village’s population, including refugees who had lived in al-‘Ajajra refugee camp.

The abrupt displacement of Palestinians is also documented in materials from the UNRWA Film and Photo Archive. Figures 6 and 7 show Palestinians crossing the demolished bridges toward the east bank of the Jordan River, carrying on their backs their children and whatever belongings they could take with them. Israeli soldiers, standing atop the bridge, watch them as they scramble to cross. In these photographs, the struggles of the displaced and the intimidation of the occupier are both portrayed within the frame of the image, one below the other, signifying the stark cruelty of the exodus.

Figure 7. “Palestinians crossing the demolished King Husayn (Allenby) Bridge in the summer of 1967. In this photo, Israeli soldiers appear atop the bridge, watching Palestinians as they struggle to cross. Photographer unknown.” © UNRWA Film and Photo Archive.
While UNRWA’s statistics reveal the magnitude of the Jordan Valley exodus and the agency’s photographs capture the suffering of the displaced population, the oral testimonies of Palestinians recount many untold episodes in the story of their displacement from the Jordan Valley. Many of the displaced Palestinians were refugees who had witnessed the atrocities of the Nakba. They crossed the river toward Jordan fearing similar Israeli massacres would take place in the Jordan Valley. Abu ‘Ali, an elderly Palestinian from al-Jiftlik, recounted:

When Israel occupied the Jordan Valley, thousands of Palestinians from al-Jiftlik were forced to leave the village and cross the [Jordan] river, including refugees from al-‘Ajajra refugee camp. Among many others, I and my three brothers took refuge in the Jordanian village of Ma‘addi on the opposite bank of the river, waiting for the situation to calm down …. We were fearful of bloodshed similar to what the Zionists committed during the Nakba in 1948.31

Indeed, Israel actively facilitated the exodus through terrorizing and coercion, which generated a strong fear of bloodshed among Palestinians. In a report to the UN General Assembly on the conditions affecting civilian populations in the aftermath of the occupation in 1967, Nils-Göran Gussing, the special representative of the UN secretary general, mentioned “persistent reports of acts of intimidation by the Israeli armed forces and of Israeli attempts to suggest to the population, by loudspeakers mounted on cars, that they might be better off on the East Bank.” Gussing stated further that “there have also been reports that in several localities buses and trucks were put at the disposal of the population for [their transfer] to the East Bank,” and that in some situations Israel dynamited Palestinian homes as a form of intimidation to expel Palestinians from their communities.32 Other accounts describe Israel killing and torturing hundreds of displaced Palestinians who attempted to return.33

Such accounts are consistent with Palestinians’ own testimonies about Israel’s policies which facilitated the Jordan Valley exodus, as Abu Sa’id from ‘Aqbat Jabr recalled:

During the occupation, the Israeli army entered the camp [of ‘Aqbat Jabr] and arrested many people. For many days, the Israeli warplanes were flying over the camp to intimidate the refugees, many of whom fled out of fear. I remember one time when the Israelis hung the dead body of a fedayee [a Palestinian freedom fighter] from a helicopter and flew over the camp. They also used to throw pamphlets from planes that threatened Palestinians with war and asked them to surrender. This is how they made many Palestinians leave.

Israel’s policies continued until around 88 percent of the Jordan Valley’s population ended up on the east bank of the Jordan River.34 Neither UNRWA nor the Jordanian government was ready to accommodate the sudden influx of displaced Palestinians.

According to the UNRWA commissioner general, in September 1967, half of the Palestinians whom Israel displaced from the West Bank took refuge with relatives
or friends, often in the UNRWA-run refugee camps that the agency established in Jordan after the Nakba. The rest of the refugees remained in the open air, under trees, in Jordanian government buildings, in UNRWA schools, or in mosques. To respond to the severe shortage of infrastructure and facilities, the Jordanian government established nine temporary tented camps near the borders, commissioning UNRWA to run six of them. Together, the new camps provided shelter for most of the Palestinians displaced from the Jordan Valley.

Figure 8. “Wadi al-Dulayl camp, one of the first emergency tented camps that UNRWA set up on the east bank of the Jordan River to accommodate the refugees displaced from the West Bank, 1967. UNRWA’s original caption states: this camp “was closed at the start of winter and the refugees moved to new camps in the east Jordan Valley where the winter climate is milder.” Photographer unknown. © UNRWA Film and Photo Archive.

As figures 8 and 11 illustrate, the new camps sheltered the refugees in conditions that resembled the earliest years of their settlement in the Jordan Valley. Two decades after their exodus from historic Palestine, many of the refugees who had settled in the Jordan Valley after the Nakba found themselves, yet again, back in tents. Both UNRWA and the Jordanian government treated the incoming refugees as a temporarily displaced population that could soon return to the West Bank. Meanwhile, camps throughout Jordan became even more overcrowded with refugee families whom Israel continued to displace.
Displacement without Return

It was not long before the Jordanian government, UNRWA, and the international community realized the great scale of the displacement from the areas that Israel occupied in 1967, especially the Jordan Valley. In Jordan, where the largest numbers of the displaced Palestinians had settled, diplomatic pressure increased on Israel to facilitate the return of the displaced Palestinians, including persistent calls by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that Israel as an occupying power should abide by its obligations stipulated under the Fourth Geneva Convention. 36

Israel accordingly announced on 2 July 1967 that it was willing to authorize the conditional return to the West Bank of the displaced Palestinians, with the ICRC acting as an intermediary between the Jordanian and the Israeli governments. With hopes that the crisis was going to end, UNRWA immediately appealed to all those who might still be contemplating leaving their homes to stay where they were, and urged all concerned, on grounds of common humanity, to encourage those persons who had already left to return to their former place of residence, and to do everything to allay the fears which deterred them from going back. 37

On 10 July 1967, Israel laid out the process for the repatriation of the displaced Palestinians who were willing to return: the head of each of the displaced families must fill and submit a form for himself and his family members, accompanied by everyone’s identity documents, by 10 August 1967. 38 After the Israeli and the Jordanian governments agreed on the text of the application forms, Israel was to print and deliver the forms to the ICRC, which would then forward them to the Jordanians for distribution. The agreement also specified that the approved returnees were to be repatriated through temporary bridges, which Israel erected across the Jordan River, with a capacity to receive returning Palestinians at a rate of five thousand per day. 39 In reality, however, Israel created numerous obstacles to hinder this process.

On 17 July, the Jordanian government received the first batch of application forms, on Israeli Ministry of Interior letterhead. As this was not part of the initial agreement, the Jordanians refused the printed forms and returned them to the Israelis. The ICRC steered lengthy negotiations between the two governments, culminating in a meeting at Allenby Bridge between representatives of the Jordanian Red Crescent and the Israeli government. In that meeting, according to UNRWA, Israel agreed on a new heading that included the names of both states with the ICRC emblem in the middle, and the ICRC pressured Israel to extend the deadline for submitting the application to 31 August 1967. 40 All of this created a substantial delay in the delivery of the revised return applications, which reached the Jordanian government on 12 August. This meant that the Jordanians had less than three weeks to ensure that displaced Palestinians completed the application process, let alone arrange for the logistics of the actual return. 41
Despite these practical obstacles that Israel had erected, the Jordanian government, UNRWA, and the ICRC spared no effort to ensure the distribution, completion, and return of the application forms before the 31 August deadline. In fact, as UNRWA reported at the time, the Jordanian government managed to forward to the Israeli Ministry of Interior the completed repatriation applications of 32,000 displaced families, involving some 160,000 Palestinians – around 75 percent of the displaced population.42 Israel, however, accepted only a fraction of the submitted return requests.

Indeed, Israel only approved applications related to persons who had permanently resided in the West Bank until 5 June 1967 and crossed to the east bank between 5 June and 4 July. This automatically excluded tens of thousands of Palestinians who were displaced after that period. Also, the Israeli guidelines for the approved returnees required that adult sons and daughters were obliged to apply separately from their families, and that all application forms must be accompanied by passports, identity cards, and UNRWA registration cards. Furthermore, Israel stipulated that it would not approve the request of any applicant whose return it considered to involve a risk to Israel’s security or its legal order.43

In many cases, the Jordanian government received the lists of approved applicants from the Israelis with less than twelve-hours notice for them to cross the bridges back to the West Bank. A single list sometimes included Palestinians in different camps, leaving only a few hours to locate, contact, and transport them to the crossing points set up for repatriation.44 Israel often included some members of a single family while excluding others, and thus “families were faced with the choice of either leaving a son or daughter behind or of losing their opportunity of return.”45 Consequently, Israel discouraged many Palestinians from returning even when their applications were approved.
Between 18 and 31 August 1967, Israel allowed only 14,051 of some 200,000 displaced Palestinians to return to the West Bank.\(^4\) Despite all of the efforts led by the ICRC, UNRWA, and the Jordanian government, Israel refused to relax its restrictive criteria for repatriation or to extend the deadline for return any further, even for Palestinians whose applications were duly submitted and approved but could not return in time. As UN special representative Nils Gussing concluded at the time, Israel’s strategy to prevent the return of the displaced Palestinians was clear:

> even without the many initial difficulties which were bound to arise during such an extensive and delicate operation, the deadline set by the Israel Government could not have allowed the return of all those who wished to do so. Even if the potential daily rate of 5,000 returnees mentioned by Israel had been reached every day during the period of 18 through 31 August, only some 55,000 displaced persons could have returned.\(^4\)

Most of the Palestinians whom Israel displaced from the Jordan Valley never returned. Even when approvals were issued, Israel explicitly excluded Palestinians displaced from the area of Jericho, including UNRWA-registered refugees from the camps of ‘Aqbat Jabr, ‘Ayn al-Sultan, or al-Nuway‘ima. Following the exodus of the Palestinians, Israel consolidated the new demographic reality of the Jordan Valley through mass demolitions, especially in the refugee camps.
Mass Demolitions

Among the small minority of the displaced Palestinians who returned to the Jordan Valley was Abu Rizq Masa‘id, a peasant from al-Jiftlik. In his testimony about the return journey, he recounted:

We left al-Jiftlik in July [1967] and stayed in the [temporary] camp of Ma‘addi on the east bank for three months. When the Red Cross called for the displaced Palestinians to register for returning to the West Bank, we registered and eventually returned to our home … Most of the displaced people did not return, because Israel stopped the registration process when they saw that many people were willing and registering to return. My father was approached at night and told that our family’s request was approved. They put us in Red Cross trucks and took us to Ghor Nimrin camp [the largest of the temporary camps on the east bank of the Jordan River]. We stayed there for one night, and in the morning we crossed the [temporary] bridge near al-‘Awja. There were nine of us. Each one was given five Jordanian dinars, blankets, and canned food, and we returned home.48

Upon returning to the Jordan Valley, Abu Rizq remembered, he found that the
Palestinians who had remained were scattered and most of the villages were depopulated. In al-Jiftlik, most houses were empty, and their inhabitants had not returned:

After those who returned settled, [the Israelis] went to all of the areas of the Jordan Valley. They demolished every village where no Palestinians remained, and this happened throughout the entire Jordan Valley. In al-‘Ajajra, the remaining handful of families were moved to empty houses in al-Jiftlik, and they wiped the camp out. The thousands who had lived there were all displaced to Jordan. They then combed the entire village [of al-Jiftlik], neighborhood by neighborhood. They destroyed any empty structure. They confined us in the remaining areas, and from that day onward, if we build, they demolish. There were many other areas in the Jordan Valley that Israel wiped off the face of earth.49

Indeed, al-Jiftlik was one of approximately thirty Palestinian communities – villages, khirab (hamlets), herding communities, and refugee camps – that Israel demolished, in whole or in part, after the exodus of the Palestinians in 1967.50 In addition to al-‘Ajajra camp, Israel completely demolished al-Nuway‘ima camp and transferred the remaining refugee families to ‘Aqbat Jabr or ‘Ayn al-Sultan.51

Figure 12. Interview with Sa‘id Dajani, ‘Aqbat Jabr Camp Service Officer, UNRWA video clip F-069 (1987), online at (unrwa.photoshelter.com) bit.ly/43k8llD (accessed 8 June 2023).

In ‘Aqbat Jabr, Israel also carried out demolitions in the areas where the displaced
refugees never returned. As the demolitions continued, they were disguised by a security narrative similar to that which Allon used to justify his plan to depopulate, annex, and permanently settle in the Jordan Valley. Abu Salim recounted:

After the Israeli occupation, there were many empty houses in the camp. They were all demolished in 1984. When the Israelis took the decision to destroy these houses, they said the reason was that Palestinian fedayeen [freedom fighters] who infiltrated from Jordan were coming to these houses and hiding there. They informed UNRWA and carried out the demolition as planned. This drastically changed the camp.52

In the autumn of 1968, the weather got colder, and the temporary camps that the Jordanian government and UNRWA erected for the displaced Palestinians became uninhabitable. Schools in UNRWA refugee camps throughout Jordan were still overcrowded with new refugees, and thousands of Palestinian families who could not return to the West Bank needed more permanent accommodation. The refugees were thus relocated toward the highlands of Amman, where the temporary camps became more condensed, and gradually transformed into spaces of prolonged shelter. Once again, the refugees were forced to move farther away from their homeland, across the river from the West Bank, still hoping that some bridge will take them home.

Conclusion

Today, fifty-six years after Israel’s military occupation and the ensuing exodus, the Jordan Valley is home to sixty thousand Palestinians whose present is as ominous as their past.53 Through the intertwined strategies discussed above, Israel laid the ground for its expansionist settler-colonial project, gradually transforming the Jordan Valley into the space that Allon envisaged in his plan. In place of many of the depopulated and demolished Palestinian communities, Israel has thus far established thirty settlements, inhabited by thirteen thousand settlers who control 95 percent of the Jordan Valley’s lands.54 Meanwhile, Palestinians in the Jordan Valley continue to face systematic policies of oppression and erasure, which Israel began during the occupation in 1967: daily evictions, home demolitions, movement restrictions, and denial of access to land and resources. More recently, Israel has been calling for the formal annexation of the Jordan Valley, marking another step toward permanent settlement in the area. Between the past and the present of the Jordan Valley, there are many unexamined stories of survival and displacement which Palestinians lived before and after the exodus. Some were explored in this article, while many other stories are yet to be told.
Revisiting this history offers new insights as to what the Jordan Valley can tell us about the logic and manifestation of Israel’s settler colonialism. On the one hand, as the memories of Palestinians and the UNRWA archives both reveal, the Jordan Valley was a harbor for thousands of Palestinian refugees in the aftermath of the Nakba. Despite their catastrophic displacement from their homes, refugees found in the Jordan Valley the will and resources to survive, and settled in camps near the bridges of the Jordan River. The transformation in the living conditions in the camps led the refugees to become an integral part of the Jordan Valley’s communities, where they lived and even prospered until Israel occupied the Jordan Valley in 1967. At that time, as the stories of the refugee camps indicate, Israel spared no effort to continue what it had started during the Nakba – to forcibly transfer the Jordan Valley’s refugees across the Jordan River to the east bank. Even when Israel allowed the repatriation of some of the displaced Palestinians, only a small minority of the Jordan Valley’s displaced population ever returned. With that in mind, it is important to approach the Israeli occupation and the consequent exodus of the Palestinians in 1967 not as an isolated event, but rather as part of the ongoing Nakba that began in 1948.

On the other hand, the examined materials highlight the particularity of the Jordan Valley among the areas occupied by Israel in 1967. In the Jordan Valley, Israel had aspired for as much land and as few Palestinians as possible, following the longstanding Zionist logic of settler-colonial expansion. This led Israel to perceive the Jordan Valley as an empty frontier, but nothing could have been farther from the truth. To achieve this vision, Israel’s military strategies were most aggressive in the occupied Jordan Valley; in this particular space, the real and direct complement to the formation of a settler society was the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. This is manifest not only in the plan which Allon devised for the area, but also in the scale of the displacement, dispossession, and denial of return which Israel organized against the Jordan Valley’s Palestinians, especially the Nakba refugees. This analytical path allows us to understand the history that this article narrates from broader perspectives across time and space, offering new insights into Israel’s ongoing settler colonialism in the Jordan Valley and in larger Palestine, a settler colonialism that is being further entrenched every day.

Atwa Jaber is a doctoral researcher in international history and politics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. His work focuses on the relationship between forced displacement, collective memories, and oral histories, particularly concerning the Jordan Valley. He would like to thank the JQ guest editors Francesca Biancani and Maria Chiara Rioli and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and feedback, and Nicole Bourbonnais for her valuable thoughts on an earlier version of this article. The research for this article received funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation [grant number 203937].
Endnotes

1 Estimates of the Jordan Valley’s population on the eve of the occupation in 1967, ranging between 200,000 and 320,000, are inconclusive. This is due in part to inconsistent data from the Ottoman and British periods, as well as the major demographic shift that occurred after the settlement of the Nakba refugees in the Jordan Valley in 1948. See: Ahmad Heneiti, al-Siyasa al-Isra’iliyya tijah al-aghwar wa afaquha [Israeli policy toward the Jordan Valley and its prospects] (Beirut and Ramallah: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2016), 26; Ghazi Falah, Salwa Massad, Lina Adwan, Rawan Kafri, Hadil Dalloul, and Alyssa Rhodes, “Israel’s Spatial and A-Spatial Strategy of Dispossessing the Jordan Valley’s Palestinian Inhabitants,” GeoJournal (2023): 8, online at doi.org/10.1007/s10708-023-10876-9 (accessed 8 June 2023); and PLO Negotiations Affairs Department–Negotiations Support Unit, “Israeli Annexation of the Jordan Valley” (map), online at www.passia.org/maps/view/74 (accessed 18 May 2023).

2 Some of the interviews that appear in this article are drawn from my previous research on the history of the village of al-Jiftlik, conducted between October 2018 and June 2019 for my master’s thesis at the Geneva Graduate Institute. See Atwa Jaber, “Disrupted Past, Suspended Present: Colonialism, Displacement, and Resilience in the Jordan Valley: The Case of Al Jiftlik.” unpublished master’s thesis, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2019. The more recent interviews are from my doctoral research on the oral histories of Palestinians from the Jordan Valley, which has been ongoing since September 2021.

3 I submitted an official request to UNRWA in February 2023 to access their central registry in Amman. As I write these words, this request is still being processed.


8 Until the end of the British Mandate, according to historian Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, there were six functional bridges between the two banks of the Jordan River: Banat Ya’qub, al-Majami’, Shaykh Husayn, Damya, King Husayn, and a railway bridge on the Haifa–Dar’a line; Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, Biladuna Filastin [Our Country, Palestine] (Kafr Qari’: Dar al-Huda, 1991), vol. 1, 76. As I discuss in this article, Israel
demolished the bridges in the Jordan Valley during the 1967 war to sever the West Bank from Jordan.

9 The camps of ‘Aqbat Jabr and ‘Ayn al-Sultan were established in 1948 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As Jalal Al Husseini indicates, before the establishment of UNRWA, the ICRC was “tasked in December 1948 with registering and providing for refugees’ basic needs under the guidance of the UN Relief for the Palestine Refugees (UNRPR).” See Jalal Al Husseini, “The Dilemmas of Local Development and Palestine Refugee Integration in Jordan: UNRWA and the Arab Development Society in Jericho (1950–80),” Jerusalem Quarterly 93 (Spring 2023): 63.

10 I say “estimated” because, while statistics for the ‘Aqbat Jabr and ‘Ayn al-Sultan populations are relatively clear, statistics for the al-Nuway’ima population are still lacking, especially in official UNRWA records. For UNRWA’s official statistics, see UNRWA, “Profile: Ein el-Sultan Camp” (factsheet), May 2015, online at (unrwa.org) bit.ly/46ABs7i (accessed 23 May 2023); UNRWA, “Profile: Aqbat Jabr Camp” (factsheet), March 2015, online at (unrwa.org) bit.ly/3D2MYe8 (accessed 23 May 2023). The overall estimate used here is based on the statistics compiled in Heneiti, al-Siyasa al-Isra’iliyya, 26.

11 Like al-Nuway’ima camp, the exact population of al-‘Ajajra is unknown. The available estimates come from Palestinian testimonies. Author interviews with: Abu ‘Ali Masa’id, al-Jiftlik, 11 October 2018; Abu Sharif Masa’id, al-Jiftlik, 20 March 2019; Abu Rizq Masa’id, al-Jiftlik, 26 May 2022; Abu Ibrahim Srour, Furush Bayt Dajan, 13 June 2022; Umm Amjad Masa’id, al-Baq’a camp, 13 February 2023; and Umm ‘Atiya Masa’id, al-Baq’a camp, 21 February 2023. Some names have been changed to protect the privacy of individuals.

12 UNRWA was created on 8 December 1949 by the United Nations General Assembly (GA Resolution 302 [IV]) “to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees.” See UNRWA, “Who We Are,” online www.unrwa.org/who-we-are (accessed 8 June 2023).

13 Nassar, “Photography and the Oppressed,” 53.

14 Author interview with Abu Sa’id, ‘Aqbat Jabr Refugee Camp, 6 July 2022.


17 Since the beginning of UNRWA’s operations, vocational training constituted one of its main assistance programs to the refugees, aiming to integrate them in the job markets of the host countries. For more on the history of UNRWA’s mandate, including vocational training, see Riccardo Bocco, “UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees: A History within History,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 28, no. 2–3 (2000): 229–52.


19 Dabbagh, Biladuna Filastin, vol. 1, 97.

20 Author interview with Abu Ibrahim Srour, Furush Bayt Dajan, 13 June 2022


22 Dabbagh, Biladuna Filastin, vol. 2, 571.

23 Irfan and Kelcey, “Historical Silencing.”


27 In a forthcoming book chapter, I explore in detail Allon’s plan and its links to former and later stages of Zionist settler colonialism in the Jordan Valley. I argue that the blueprints that Allon put forward, although never officially endorsed by any Israeli government, have constituted the foundation for Israel’s ongoing policies against Palestinians and their lands in the Jordan Valley. See Atwa Jaber, “The Israeli Annexation of the Jordan Valley: Exploring a History of Settler-Colonial Expansion,” in Contemporary Debates on the Question of Palestine, ed. Riccardo Bocco and Ibrahim Saïd (Geneva: Graduate Institute Publications, forthcoming).

28 Yigal Allon as quoted in Weizman, Hollow Land, 58.


35 “Report by the Secretary-General” (S/8158), 2 October 1967, annex 2, para. 2.


38 “Report by the Secretary-General” (S/8158), 2 October 1967, para. 185.

39 “Report by the Secretary-General” (S/8158), 2 October 1967, para. 191.

40 “Report by the Secretary-General” (S/8158), 2 October 1967, paras. 185–88.


42 “Report by the Secretary-General” (S/8124), 18 August 1967, para. 8.


44 “Report by the Secretary-General” (S/8158), 2 October 1967, para. 192.


46 “Middle East Activities of the ICRC,” 448.

47 “Report by the Secretary-General” (S/8158), 2 October 1967, para. 196.

48 Author interview with Abu Rizq Masa‘id, al-Jiftlik, 26 May 2022.

49 Author interview with Abu Rizq Masa‘id, al-Jiftlik, 26 May 2022.


52 Author interview with Abu Salim, ‘Aqbat Jabr Refugee Camp, 6 July 2022.
