

Jerusalem's Villages Grey Development and Annexation Plans

Ahmad Heneiti

The future of Jerusalem villages seems inescapably clear if Israel decides to extend its sovereignty over additional areas of the West Bank and annex them to Jerusalem, “the capital of Israel,” according to the “The Deal of the Century,” and consistent with “Greater Jerusalem 2020” and “Jerusalem 5800,” Jerusalem’s plan for 2050.¹ Two main factors lead to this clarity: the lack of an imminent solution to the Palestinian issue, which allows Israel to prolong its policies and weaken the Palestinian Authority’s control over these areas, coupled with Israel’s concrete plans for the area, that is, to sustain the de facto situation while fostering a “grey” distorted reality in all social, economic, and planning dimensions, crucial to Israel’s plans for a metropolitan Jerusalem.

Most of Israel’s planned actions have already been completed, especially in north and northwest Jerusalem, while plans are still pending for the eastern part of the city. The Israeli vision for Jerusalem 2020–2050 represents an important entry point to understanding the transformations that await villages in the Jerusalem district, and the social impact this will engender, if the Israeli annexation plan is implemented.

The Israeli Vision for the City of Jerusalem

“Greater Jerusalem 2020” is one of the most comprehensive plans ever devised for the city of Jerusalem covering urban planning, tourism, economy, archeology, education, environment, transportation, culture, and art. This Israeli master

plan is considered a planning determinant for Jerusalem within a number of Zionist organizations, particularly for the Israeli municipality in Jerusalem. The central issue for this plan is to approach Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the Jewish people and an international Jewish city. This vision, of course, is highly linked to the city's demographics, and the Palestinian presence in it. Relevant literature suggests that the demographic balance Israel foresees for Jerusalem is 30 percent Palestinians and 70 percent Jews,² and is reflected in the many racist and exclusionary Israeli practices and measures that aim to reinforce this equation on the ground. These measures have already had a negative impact on Jerusalem's villages, as will be detailed later, by restricting Palestinian economic activity and the space available for them in the city, leading to residents' deteriorating economic situation in East Jerusalem. In 2017, unemployment among Jerusalem's Palestinians reached 25 percent, especially affecting new graduates and holders of higher academic degrees, and 75 percent of Palestinians in Jerusalem were categorized as poor.³

Israel limited the spatial development of Palestinian villages in Jerusalem, allocating only 14 percent of the land for building housing units for Palestinians, and less than 10 percent of the municipal budget for East Jerusalem's neighborhoods.⁴ Consequently, the real estate market (the cost of buying and renting houses) skyrocketed. Given the challenging economic situation, many Jerusalem residents could no longer afford to live in the city due to the high cost of housing, whether buying or renting, and the limited supply of housing units for Palestinians. Thus, the restricted economy and lack of space led many Jerusalemites to relocate outside the segregation wall to decrease their living expenses⁵ – to the villages of Jerusalem as viable destinations, in turn negatively affecting the infrastructure and spatial planning of these villages.

Spatial Planning for Jerusalem's Villages

The negative consequences of the Israeli vision of Greater Jerusalem 2020 has not been limited to within the current borders of the Jerusalem municipality, but has extended beyond it to affect all Palestinian villages and towns in the vicinity. Usually, cities expand toward the surrounding villages and towns, extending the urban environment as they overlap. So, too, Jerusalem's towns and villages, based on their distance from Jerusalem, became part of the municipality's plans, and were transformed from independent units to neighborhoods subject to central city planning. The expansion of Jerusalem's borders did not happen as a result of normal developmental planning, however, but due to racist planning based on exclusion and annexation. The continuous expansion of the borders of Jerusalem's municipality led to the annexation of large Israeli settlements and lands not populated by Palestinians, and the isolation of Palestinian villages and towns surrounding Jerusalem, thus marginalizing the centers of several Palestinian villages and reinforcing the desired demographic balance.

The Israeli spatial planning policy became “a tool to establish, institutionalize and normalize ethnic and colonial minorities' stereotypes, especially about elites,

settlers and growing groups on the one hand, and weak groups such as minorities and indigenous people on the other.”⁶ In addition to the planning authorities, military officers participate in the planning process; Yiftachel labeled this combination of forces as the “militarization of planning,”⁷ and called the Israeli expansion, which serves the strong dominating ethnic group, “creeping Apartheid.”⁸ Razi Nabulsi, on the other hand, calls it “functional Apartheid,”⁹ since it reflects a set of unlegislated and unpublished policies that are practiced on the ground.

The Israeli planning for Jerusalem is almost complete in the north and northwest parts of the city. West of Jerusalem, there are fourteen villages outside the Wall that are under the jurisdiction of the Jerusalem District, two other villages inside it (Bayt Iksa and Nabi Samwil), and some small neighborhoods such as Haret al-Khalayla and Haret Tal Adaseh. An envelope of Zionist settlements supported by the Wall has been established around Jerusalem. According to Ben Gurion, the first Israeli prime minister, “Settlements are determinants of the state’s security that are not any less important than establishing an army.”¹⁰

The establishment of settlements and roads that bypass Palestinian villages from all directions turned these villages into small, isolated cantons. For example, the villages of Bayt Iksa and Nabi Samwil were separated from the other villages by the segregation Wall and a military checkpoint at the entrance to Bayt Iksa, while access to Nabi Samwil is limited to only its residents – and requires tedious bureaucratic measures in order to pass through the military checkpoint next to al-Jib village. “Jib Biddu,” which consists of eight villages (Biddu, Bayt Surik, Qatanna, Bayt ‘Anan, Bayt Ijza, and Bayt Daqqu, al-Qubayba, Khirbet Um al-Lahm), was separated from other villages in the area and from the city of Ramallah; entry/exit to it has become possible only through a narrow 1,120 meter-long tunnel that lacks basic infrastructure, and that may collapse in winter when it floods and sometimes is impossible to drive through. The villages of al-Jib, Bir Nabala, al-Judayra, and Bayt Hanina form another pocket in the area. This pocket is connected with the governorate of Ramallah through a tunnel that passes under road 45. Consequently, these villages were turned into open isolated cantons visible to the Israeli occupation, which makes them easy to control. The same applies to the villages located in north Jerusalem such as al-Ram, Jaba‘ and Mikhmas; the first has been “stifled” by the segregation Wall, while the second and third have been surrounded with settlements and bypass roads, turning each village into a small canton.

The Israeli exclusionary planning policy was developed to ensure control over the largest possible area of Palestinian land without its residents. Hence, vast areas of these villages were annexed by the segregation Wall, while the permits policy controlled owners’ access to their lands inside the Wall in a manner that guarantees their confiscation in the future under the pretext of being “abandoned lands.”¹¹ This policy will limit the viable social, economic, and spatial areas available in these villages. The 133 kilometers of the Wall that surround the city of Jerusalem facilitate the confiscation of 15,974 dunums, equal to 43 percent of the area of the District of Jerusalem.¹²

The situation in northwest Jerusalem is very similar to that in the eastern villages of Jerusalem such as al-Sawahra, Abu Dis, al-‘Ayzariya, and al-Za‘ayim, except that the Israeli planning for these areas has not been completed yet. The planning process is being prolonged given the extreme international opposition to it. Nevertheless, the Israeli measures on the ground are ongoing. These villages have been surrounded by the segregation Wall from Jerusalem’s side, although there was urban overlap with the city before the construction of the Wall. From the east, the villages have been further blocked by settlements and advanced infrastructure, mainly bypass roads. The confiscation of vast areas of lands in these villages for settlement expansion limits future infrastructure development and horizontal urban expansion. It is expected that the isolation of the eastern villages of Jerusalem will be reinforced by the completion of the E1 settlement plan.

The settlement plan for East Jerusalem (E1)¹³ attempts to connect Ma’ale Adumim and adjoining facility installations with the urban environment of the city of Jerusalem. The plan extends over 12,000 dunums in addition to the original Ma’ale Adumim settlement located over 48,000 dunums. It includes 4,000 housing units in addition to ten hotels, a commercial area that extends over 1,354 dunums, and 180 dunums designated for a police station. The plan realizes part of Israel’s vision for Jerusalem 2020. Despite uprooting some Bedouin communities, confiscating several dunums, and building the police station, the plan is uncompleted in the wake of vicious international opposition, given the sensitivity of the area that links the south of the West Bank with its center and north.

The full implementation of this plan will require the confiscation of vast areas of land from Abu Dis, al-Sawahra al-Sharqiyya, al-‘Ayzariya, and ‘Anata, in addition to some plots from the villages located within the borders of Jerusalem’s municipality, such as al-‘Isawiyya and al-Sawahra al-Gharbiyya. In order to evacuate the intended area from its Palestinian residents, Israel started harassing the Bedouin communities living within the E1 plan area, dismantling their homes and economic establishments. In the late 1990s, some Bedouin communities were forced out of their homes to expand Ma’ale Adumim. A scheme was drawn to enlarge the “mountain plan” and force the Bedouin communities to resettle there after the completion of the E1 plan. This plan would only add to the social and economic hardship of Bedouin communities since it would strip them of their main economic resource: livestock.¹⁴

Social Reality in Jerusalem’s Villages

The demographic structure in Jerusalem’s villages differs according to the geographical location of each village. Some of these villages sustained the original family-based structure, while in others original families merged with immigrants and refugees. To elaborate, villages to the northwest of Jerusalem maintained to a great extent the original family structure, except for a temporary period in Bir Nabala. The geographical location of these villages made that possible, as they are relatively far from the main transportation network, and the segregation Wall later stifled these

villages and severed their historical relationship with the city of Jerusalem. Villages to the north of Jerusalem, on the other hand, are advantaged with their proximity to the main transportation network, which made them viable places for job seekers from various parts of the West Bank to seek employment in the main work hubs in Jerusalem and Ramallah. The same applies to villages east of Jerusalem given their central location near the road that links the north, center and south of the West Bank, especially after the Palestinians were banned from using the historical road that passes through the heart of Jerusalem, and after the segregation Wall was erected. Also, the Bedouin population became integrated into these villages, either by moving into them or as a result of horizontal expansion that ultimately came to include Bedouin communities in the outskirts. The positive immigration to these villages created a heterogeneous society.

Demographics played a role in the level of community harmony in the villages northwest of Jerusalem, as social disintegration was characteristic of diverse villages. At the same time, Israel planned the present and future of all villages in a manner that would keep them weak and disintegrated, especially that they are the first defense frontline to Jerusalem, and would create a weakened and fragile Jerusalemite Palestinian strip that would inevitably reflect on the Palestinian society in the heart of the Holy City.

Ambiguous Demographics

Population growth rates, as explained in the table below, were quite unexpected and suspicious. The table shows that population growth rates in villages immediately outside the Israeli municipal border from 1997 to 2007 were 18 percent, while they were only 7 percent from 2007 to 2017. Population growth rates in the West Bank, on the other hand were 28 percent and 22.6 percent during those periods, respectively,¹⁵ indicating a significant discrepancy in the rate of population increase between the villages of Jerusalem and the villages of the rest of the West Bank. The question is how to explain this difference?

There are general reasons for this that apply to all villages, and specific reasons for each stand-alone village. Many of the families that live in these villages hold Jerusalem IDs, whether they live legally within the municipality's borders, or illegally outside it. They are afraid they may lose their Jerusalem ID if they are counted as residents of other villages and, therefore, do not cooperate with the census.¹⁶ The villages of al-Ram and Dahiyat al-Barid are good examples: the population in al-Ram and Dahiyat al-Barid dropped between 1997–2007 by 3 percent, and the decrease accelerated to 33 percent in the next decade. Yet the actual situation in the village of al-Ram would indicate otherwise, where urban density and population movement clearly increased. According to estimates of the electricity and water meters and waste volume, the town's population totals 54,000 persons.¹⁷ The same also applies to Bir Nabala before the Wall was erected and the village became completely separated from Jerusalem.

Population in Jerusalem Governorate Outside Municipality Border by Locality and Sex, 2017

Locality	Total of Population			Population Increase %	
	2017	2007	1997	2017–2007	2007–1997
Jerusalem (J2)	133,877	124,635	105,857	7%	18%
Rafat	2,779	2,141	1,573	30%	36%
Mikhmas	1,288	1,305	1,391	-1%	-6%
Qalandiya Camp	7,876	7,962	6,712	-1%	19%
Qalandiya	540	1,063	855	-49%	24%
Bayt Duqqu	1,657	1,461	1,177	13%	24%
Jaba'	3,705	2,870	2,398	29%	20%
Al-Judayra	2,489	2,052	1,570	21%	31%
Al-Ram and Dahiyat al-Barid	12,264	18,356	18,899	-33%	-3%
Bayt A'nan	3,978	3,589	3,154	11%	14%
Al-Jib	3,903	3,805	3,436	3%	11%
Bir Nabala	4,647	4,343	4,499	7%	-3%
Bayt Ijza	807	629	497	28%	27%
Al-Qubayba	3,662	2,860	1,516	28%	89%
Kharayib Umm al-Lahim	379	328	276	16%	19%
Biddu	7,777	6,129	4,704	27%	30%
Nabi Samwil	221	233	161	-5%	45%
Hizma	6,726	5,654	4,517	19%	25%
Bayt Hanina al-Balad	1,046	966	1,025	8%	-6%
Qatanna	6,596	5,823	5,555	13%	5%
Bayt Surik	3,803	3,505	2,827	9%	24%
Bayt Ikasa	1,675	1,708	1,162	-2%	47%
'Anata	13,109	10,864	7,112	21%	53%
Al-Ka'abina (Tajammu' Badawi)	811	626	713	30%	-12%
Al-Za'ayyem	5,924	3,068	1,801	93%	70%
Al-'Ayzariya	16,425	15,874	12,807	3%	24%
Abu Dis	9,551	9,721	8,937	-2%	9%
A'rab al-Jahalin (Salamat)	1,754	650	893	170%	-27%
Al-Sawahira al-Sharqiyya	5,862	5,229	3,861	12%	35%
Al-Shaykh Sa'd	2,623	1,757	1,783	49%	-1%

Source: PCBS.

Bayt Ikxa is a special case: the village population increased by 47 percent between 1997 and 2007 and dropped by 2 percent during the next twenty years. This is attributed to the Wall being built in 2002 besieging the city, and the military checkpoint stationed at the entrance to the village preventing non-residents from going into the village unless they underwent complicated measures. The checkpoint even hampers the movement of residents themselves and forced many to relocate.¹⁸ Perhaps the location of al-Za‘ayim near the military checkpoint that connects the settlements of Ma‘ale Adumim, Kedar, and several others along the eastern side of the West Bank and North Palestine to Jerusalem encouraged people to move to the town, especially after the building of the Wall. The population growth rates between 1997–2007 and 2007–2017 were 70 percent and 93 percent respectively. According to an employee in al-Za‘ayim municipality, 95 percent of the residents hold Jerusalem IDs. During the census, the census employees were accompanied by municipality employees to add credibility and encourage cooperation with the census. Seventy percent of the population cooperated with the census, leading employees to estimate the population at 10,000 people, that is, an increase of 226 percent, which means that the actual number of residents in most of the villages in the District of Jerusalem is uncertain.

Grey Area

Sound urban and spatial planning is usually based on population growth predictions. Planning is connected to infrastructure and services, and the lack of accurate demographic data negatively impacts the planning process and creates discrepancies between the municipality’s resources and expenditures. Demographics are related to the volume of available services, which in turn are usually determined by the municipality’s revenue and governmental allocations. Otherwise, the municipality’s deficit would increase and it would become incapable of delivering the expected level of services, which would lead to the spread of “social diseases,” such as crime, drugs, public property vandalism, consumption of public space, etc. The visual landscape of the urban space in most of Jerusalem’s villages reflects the chaos of life and neglect of public spaces.

Field observation shows that villages of the north and east of Jerusalem are witnessing vertical urban expansion. The nature of construction there (crowdedness and lack of services) shows that most are built illegally and often without permits. Streets are narrow, making it sometimes difficult for two small cars to pass in opposite directions, drug trafficking and abuse thrive,¹⁹ the use of illegal “discarded” cars,²⁰ and litter inside villages, in valleys, and in open spaces proliferates. This is generated by what Yiftachel calls a “grey area” – located between the whiteness of secure/consensual legitimacy and the blackness of destruction and death. Grey spaces are spaces that have neither been integrated nor eliminated; they represent semi-permanent margins of the present urban areas.²¹

More than two thirds of the area of Jerusalem’s villages is categorized as area “C.”

In some villages, 96 percent of the area is categorized as area “C,” such as ‘Anata, while the remaining area is area “B.”²² There are also areas that are under the Israeli municipality’s jurisdiction, but located outside the segregation Wall, and have become adjacent to these villages, such as ‘Anata, al-Ram, al-Za‘ayim, and several others. Hence, Israel has considerable control over life, planning, and security affairs in these villages and is more capable of intervening. This limits the ability of the Palestinian Authority to exercise its sovereignty and authority over the people and makes Israeli approval conditional to its involvement. These areas are also highly neglected in the Palestinian Authority's budget, as most of the budget is allocated to areas of Jerusalem located inside the Wall.

The geopolitical reality of these villages generated a distorted form of urbanization,²³ as the planning process was assigned to local authorities, where every municipality or village council plans for itself regardless of the neighboring villages. Many of the villages were not able to implement their plans due to lack of sufficient funds or lack of cooperation from residents and their refusal to abide by the laws. This led to the disintegration and fragmentation of development in the area and limited efficiency and functionality caused by the lack of integrated plans. This is exactly what the Ministry of Local Governance is encouraging by adopting individual spatial plans for each village, and the manner in which it monitors implementation and fund allocation, while spatial strategic plans remain plans on paper that are never implemented.

Spatial Planning that Destroys the Future of Jerusalem

An additional cause for alarm is the focus on village planning apart from its connection to Jerusalem, the capital of Palestinians. Ignoring this aspect in the spatial planning for these villages will be a distortion in the future vision for Jerusalem. About this, Nazmi Jubeh, history professor at Birzeit University, says:

Work cannot continue in areas under the jurisdiction of the PA, and/or de facto treated as such, without a structural plan that guarantees a metropolitan future for Jerusalem. This is needed to guarantee natural growth and development in the geographical space. Al-‘Ayzariya, Abu Dis, Ram, Bir Nabala, Kufr ‘Aqab, ‘Anata, and Hizma cannot be left at the mercy of the village councils and municipalities, as they have already turned into what resembles slums, lacking the requirements for growth and development. Hence, [rather than] losing day-by-day, the valuable factors that Palestine will need in the future . . . planning should be approached through an integrated project with a vision and philosophy to establish the future capital of the Palestinian State. Adopting the above-mentioned planning standards in these areas, and perhaps also Bayt Lahm and Ramallah, will not only guarantee the future of the capital, but also improve performance within this challenging area.²⁴

The challenges that face spatial and urban planning in Jerusalem are significant. The Israeli occupation's grip over the city, and surrounding villages as well as the empty areas between them, in addition to the fragmentation of these areas by settlements and bypass roads, weakened the ability of the Palestinian institutions to implement many structural area plans that had been developed on paper, like the plan for northwest Jerusalem. By distorting local development in this area, Israel aims to prevent the creation of a stretch of connected Palestinian communities, which means that these areas will remain weak and marginalized, and will continue to lack the minimum level of strength, which will in turn reflect on the center of Jerusalem. According to Khamaysi:

Urban studies indicate that there is a direct controversial relationship between the economic status of the metropolitan urban center, the periphery, and parts of it. The stronger the economy of the periphery, the stronger the economy of the metropolitan center would become. This relationship, however, is deformed in Jerusalem as the periphery is weak and so is the center. It is true that some individuals and locations are thriving economically, but this only confirms that Jerusalem's economy is weak, making it incapable of participating in the international economy and delayed developmentally.²⁵

Therefore, these areas are considered "grey" areas according to Yiftachel. Grey areas are usually "areas where development works and residents are torn between legal and security aspects, and between complete annexation on one side and expulsion, destruction and death on the other."²⁶

The obvious developmental deformation of Jerusalem adds to the negative stereotypical image about life there. Random construction is usually undertaken without permits for two reasons: Building is located on the outskirts of villages, and while usually easy to plan for, construction in area "C" requires permits from the Israeli occupation authorities, which are usually rejected. Also construction depends on family initiative, without involvement of institutions or organizations, according to available plots of land, resulting in a chaotic character to the urban landscape in these villages. Given the limited number of open private areas and the rising cost of land,²⁷ residents cope by trespassing on areas allocated for local public development. Random construction also negatively affects village infrastructure such as roads, sanitation, and the like, and will be an increasing problem in the next few years.

Villages of Jerusalem and the Annexation Plan

The cornerstone of the "Peace for Prosperity Plan," announced by the Trump administration as the "Deal of the Century," is consistent with the Israeli vision of Jerusalem. The plan states:

Jerusalem will remain the sovereign capital of the State of Israel, and it

should remain an undivided city. The sovereign capital of the State of Palestine should be in the section of East Jerusalem located in all areas east and north of the existing security barrier, including Kufr ‘Aqab, the eastern part of Shu‘fat and Abu Dis, and could be named al-Quds or another name as determined by the State of Palestine.²⁸

The plan adds that Palestinians living in the capital of Israel and areas beyond the 1949 armistice line will have three options:²⁹

1. Become citizens of the State of Israel
2. Become citizens of the State of Palestine
3. Retain their status as permanent residents in Israel

The so-called Prosperity Plan is based on two principles, to reinforce the Israeli vision for Jerusalem – expressed by insistence on the Jewishness of Jerusalem as a unified indivisible capital of the Jewish people, and to foster de facto policies, expressed over and over again, especially that “throughout decades several suggestions and ideas were proposed, but elements of these plans were unimplementable given the facts on the ground in Jerusalem and in the greater Middle East.”³⁰ These two principles explain the fate of the Jerusalemite Palestinians.

Israeli statistics in 2018 indicated that Jerusalem had the highest population density compared to other cities in Israel. The population of Jerusalem totals 919,400; 569,900 Jews and 349,500 Palestinian. 61 percent of the city’s population live in the eastern part of the city; 39 percent of them are Jewish and 61 percent are Palestinian; while Jews make 99 percent of the population in West Jerusalem.³¹ These numbers show that the desired demographic equation in Jerusalem according to the Israeli vision has not yet been achieved, as Palestinians make up 38 percent of the city’s population. This drives Israel to seek to limit the number of Palestinians living in “Jerusalem, the capital of Israel.” Complicated bureaucratic measures block the option of becoming a “citizen of the State of Israel,” and jeopardize the option of “retaining their status as permanent residents of the State of Israel,” since a significant percentage of them cannot find affordable housing in Jerusalem as a result of Israeli economic policies and the deterioration of the economic situation. Consequently, Kufr ‘Aqab and other areas that are considered inside the borders of Jerusalem’s municipality but outside the Wall are destined to become Palestinian areas. The final maps have not been finalized, nor at the very least have they been announced so far, which creates ambiguity regarding the fate of some areas. This is manifested in the non-demarcation of the borders of “Jerusalem, the capital of Israel,” and in the interim map that shows that villages of West Jerusalem will be within the borders of the Israeli capital, which is contradictory to the plan’s vision. Therefore, the plan will reinforce the production of Palestinian cantons within the borders of “Jerusalem, the capital of Israel.” The implementation of the plan would lead to:

1. Implementation of the E1 plan, reinforcing the transformation of some Palestinian villages east of Jerusalem (‘Anata, Hizma, and al-Za‘ayim) to cantons and secluded areas, while others (al-‘Ayzariya, Abu Dis, Sawahra and Shaykh Sa‘ad) will be

allowed to expand to the south, so they will become connected with the villages north of Bethlehem, although within very narrow areas, and will be besieged from the west and east.

2. Reinforcement of the situation of the villages northwest of Jerusalem as it has been previously diagnosed.
3. Uprooting of several Bedouin communities currently living within what will be considered “Jerusalem, the capital of Israel.” The population of these communities add up to 3000 people.
4. Building more tunnels and bridges to connect the residents of these villages and towns with the “State of Palestine,” and between the north and south.

Conclusion

The colonial Israeli conflict manifests itself openly in Jerusalem. Prospective studies on Jerusalem indicate that both Palestinians and Israelis will continue to immigrate to Jerusalem, given its functional and affective importance,³² in addition to the natural population growth, as the average age in 2018 among Jews is 25.2 years, and 21.6 among Palestinians.³³ The Israeli exclusionary policy will drive Palestinians to the rural periphery, that is, areas outside the borders of “Jerusalem, the capital of Israel”. These inputs will result in the continuation of deformed urbanization in the villages located outside the borders of the Israeli municipality. This deformed urbanization is an objective of the Zionist plans for Jerusalem that aim to weaken the Arab heart of the city by weakening the periphery. The exacerbation of the current reality will reinforce the “grey areas” and will allow the rise of crime, lawlessness, and drug abuse, making these areas a living example of negative citizenship.

This paper does not address the potential stripping of the legal status of Kufr ‘Aqab, Dahiyat al-Barid, and other Palestinian communities located under the jurisdiction of the Israeli municipality, and changing the status of its people to non-residents of Jerusalem as one of the results of annexation, if implemented by Israel. If this does occur, it will create significant social chaos, since more than 100,000 residents who hold Jerusalem IDs are unable to move within the segregation Wall because the areas allocated to the Palestinians there cannot accommodate reversed immigration nor can Palestinians afford the high living costs. This will generate yet another crisis for Palestinians living in Jerusalem.

Ahmad Heneiti is a researcher focusing on al-Aghwar, Bedouins, and marginalized sectors.

Endnotes

- 1 For the Jerusalem 2020 and the Jerusalem 2050 plans, see Nur Arafah, with comments from Maha Saman and Raja Khalidi, “Roundtable: Israel’s Colonialist Projection and Future Plans in Occupied East Jerusalem,” *Jerusalem Quarterly* 68 (Winter 2016): 76–89, online at www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/211012 (accessed 1 June 2021). See also Haleema Abu Haniya, “al-Mukhattat al-Isra’ili li barjazet al-quds fi dou’ “khuttet al-quds 5500”: Ru’yet al-Quds 2010–2050” [The Israeli plan to gentrify Jerusalem in light of the Jerusalem 5500 Plan: Vision of Jerusalem 2010–2050] *Istishraf* (April 2019).
- 2 Some literature mentioned 28 percent Palestinians and 72 percent Jews. See, for example, Sari Maqdisi, “Mashru‘ ‘unsuri: i‘adit takwin mujtama‘ al-Quds” [Racist project: restructuring the society of Jerusalem] in *al-Dawla al-wahidah lissira‘ al-‘arabi al-isra’ili: baladun wahidun li kaffet muwatini* [The One State Solution for Arab-Israeli Conflict: One Country for all Citizens], ed. Hani Fares (Beirut: Markaz Disrasat al-Wihdah al-‘Arabiyya, 2012), 79.
- 3 “Iqtis‘ad al-Quds tahta ban‘adiq al-ihtilal” [The Economy of Jerusalem under the Rifles of the Occupation] al-Jazeera, 9 December 2017, online at cutt.us/QorBc (accessed 18 September 2021).
- 4 Arafah, “Roundtable: Israel’s Colonialist Projection,” 182.
- 5 Abu Haniya, “al-Mukhattat.”
- 6 Oren Yiftah‘el, “al-Ithnograatiyya siyasat al-‘ard wal hawiyya fi Isra’il/Filastin [Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), trans. Sulafa Hijjawi (Ramallah: Madar, 2012), 525.
- 7 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 269.
- 8 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 274.
- 9 Razi Nabulsi, *Zionism and Settlement: Strategies to Control Land and Produce Ghettos* (al-Bireh: Palestinian Center for Policies and Strategic Studies Research – Masarat, 2017).
- 10 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 261.
- 11 Residents said that the civil administration issues permits to older residents and denies them to younger ones under security pretexts. The civil administration often delays the issuance of permits, which affects agricultural workers dependent on seasonal work. (Team research conducted by the Institute of Community and Public Health in Birzeit University in 2019 about Biddu’s pocket.)
- 12 Nazmi Jubeh, *al-Iskan fi al-Quds: bayna mitraqat al-istitan wa al-imkanat al-mutaha* [Housing in Jerusalem: Between the Hammer of Settlement and Available Capacities], (Ramallah: Institute of Public Policies, 2009), 29.
- 13 For more about E1 Plan, see “The E1 Plan and Its Implications for Human Rights in the West Bank,” December 2012, online at www.btselem.org/settlements/20121202_e1_human_rights_ramifications (accessed 1 June 2021).
- 14 For more on this topic see Ahmad Heneiti, *al-Tajammu‘aat al-Badawiyya fi wasat al-diffah al-gharbiyyah ka haala diraassiyya* [Bedouin communities in the middle of the West Bank as a case study], (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2018).
- 15 Population and percentages are taken from the Palestinian census for the years: 1997, 2007, and 2017.
- 16 For more on this see Ashraf Bader, “al-Ti‘dad al-sukkani fi al-Quds biwasfihi adaat lissaytara wa al-tashthiyya al-isti‘mariyya” [Census in Jerusalem as a Tool for Control and Colonial Fragmentation], *Istishraf* (February 2019).
- 17 The village council in 2010 estimated the actual population of al-Ram and Dahiyat al-Barid to be between 50,000 and 60,000 people. Special Report of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the occupied Palestinian Territories, *East Jerusalem, Key Humanitarian Concerns* (March 2011), 76, online at unispal.un.org/pdfs/OCHA_SpFocus-EJer.pdf (accessed 1 June 2021).
- 18 Ahmad Heneiti, Shir‘az Nasr, and Wi‘am Hammoudeh, “al-Quds wa reefuha: Qura shamal garb al-quds namouthajan” [Jerusalem and Its Countryside: Villages of Northwest Jerusalem as a Case Study], Institute for Palestine Studies, forthcoming.
- 19 Heneiti, “Jerusalem and Its Countryside.”
- 20 According to the statistics from Biddu’s mayors, the number of “discarded” vehicles in the villages in northwest Jerusalem is approximately 3,500 cars. The estimate of the Abu Dis municipality is from 2,000 to 2,500 discarded cars.
- 21 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 293.
- 22 See ARIJ, “Dalil al-Tajammu‘at al-Filastiniyya” [Directory of Palestinian Communities], online at vprofile.arij.org.

- org/jerusalem/ar/vdata.php (accessed 18 September 2021).
- 23 See Rasem Khamayseh, “I‘adet tashkil al-muhit al-maqdisi, qalb al-dawla al-Filastiniyya” [Restructuring Jerusalem’s Periphery, the Heart of the Palestinian State] *Hawliyat al-Quds* 16 (Fall/Winter 2013), in Arabic, online at www.palestine-studies.org/ar/node/144746 (accessed 1 June 2021)
- 24 Jubeh, “Housing in Jerusalem,” 10.
- 25 Khamayseh, “Restructuring Jerusalem,” 45.
- 26 Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, 277
- 27 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns*, 77.
- 28 “Safqet al-Qarn: al-salaam min Ajl al-Izdihaar – al-shaqq al-siyassi” [The Deal of the Century: Peace for Prosperity – Political Part] (Developmental and Political Studies Center, 2020), 20.
- 29 “Deal of the Century.”
- 30 “Deal of the Century,” 6.
- 31 Michal Korach and Maya Choshen, *Jerusalem: Facts and Trends* (Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, 2020), online at jerusalemstitute.org.il/en/publications/jerusalem-facts-and-trends-2020/ (accessed 1 June 2021).
- 32 Rasem Khamayseh, “al-Dimographia fi al-Quds: al-waaqe‘ wa al-tahawullat wa al-istishraf” [Demography in Jerusalem: Reality, Transformations and Prospects] *Siyasat Arabiyya* (July 2019): 24.
- 33 Korach and Choshen, *Jerusalem Figures and Trends, 2020*, online at jerusalemstitute.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/shnaton_C1420.pdf (accessed 1 June 2021).