

The Zionist Commission and the Jewish Communities of Greater Syria in 1919

Andrew J. Patrick



At the end of the Ottoman Empire, many community leaders and individuals within those communities were faced with “critical choices” that often determined the fate of the particular group to which they belonged.¹ Having witnessed what had transpired in the chaos of World War I, people realized that making the wrong choices could harm their standing at best, or destroy their communities at worst. The deportation and subsequent elimination of vast numbers of Armenians and members of other communities during the war served as distressing evidence of this. In making these choices, people had to weigh past loyalties against new realities, and the apparent situation at present against what might come to pass in the future.

The summer of 1919 and the events surrounding the fact-finding journey of the King-Crane Commission through Greater Syria represented a particularly significant moment in this era of flux. The commission was the product of political wrangling at the

Chaim Weizmann and the Zionist Commission, 1918. Also pictured: Edwin Samuel, W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore, Israel Sieff, Leon Simon, James de Rothschild and Joseph Sprinzak. *Source*: Wikipedia.

Paris Peace Conference and represented American President Woodrow Wilson's attempt to interject his ideals into the post-war settlement of Ottoman lands. Originally planned as a grander "Inter-Allied" fact-finding mission, the King-Crane Commission was made up solely of Americans after the French, British, and Italians declined to send delegates. Their mission was to gauge the political aspirations of former Ottoman subjects in order to inform the Paris Peace Conference's final decisions about the region. The division of Greater Syria, representing perhaps the most sensitive topic among the Allies, wound up being their main focus. With the arrival of the King-Crane Commission in Greater Syria (June 1919), individuals and groups in the region had to decide which political stance they would take before the Americans. The issues on which they were forced to form opinions included whether the Arabic-speaking Ottoman lands should form one new country or several, whether or not they would ask for independence or help from a mandatory power, and whether or not Zionism should move forward in any form. In sum, the commission made Greater Syria, with its already charged atmosphere, a political minefield for its inhabitants at this moment.

One particularly pertinent example of this came in the testimony of the region's Jewish communal leaders in front of the King-Crane Commission. In 1919, many of Greater Syria's Jews were ambivalent about Zionism and feared the backlash that might come if they voiced support for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. With this being the case, many Jewish leaders were poised to tell the King-Crane Commission that they were indifferent to Zionism. Ultimately, however, the region's urban Jewish elite professed support for Zionism to the Americans and these decisions were made partly as a result of the Zionist Commission's labored but successful campaign to obtain such testimony. The Zionist Commission, having been established in March 1918 in order to advise the British government on the implementation of the Balfour Declaration,² also waged a small and mostly fruitless campaign to obtain pro-Zionist testimony from non-Jewish groups. Their minimal success in this endeavor, when compared with their success in obtaining pro-Zionist testimony from Jews, illustrates the rift that the issue of Zionism was causing in the region. Generally speaking, the leaders of Greater Syria's communities were forced to make measured and fateful political choices in front of the King-Crane Commission which altered the social fabric of the region. The new, post-Ottoman division of the region's communities had begun, and this article provides a window into this process by examining the Zionist Commission's role in the creation of the new communal landscape during the summer of 1919.³

The Political Setting in the Region

In 1919, many inhabitants of Greater Syria were optimistic about their political situation but they also realized that there were powers larger than themselves hoping to gain from the post-war division of Ottoman lands. The British occupied much of the region and the French had a divisive presence on the Lebanese coast. Amir Faysal, a leader of the Arab Revolt, may have been accepted by most people at the Paris Peace Conference

as the *de facto* spokesman for Greater Syria, but he was viewed with skepticism by many of the region's elites for a number of understandable reasons: he was not from Greater Syria, had been installed as leader by force of British arms, was largely funded by the British government, and had an inner circle of advisers whose members were composed mainly of "young, transnational elites," many of whom had little connection to Syria.⁴ The notables of the region were somewhat annoyed by this and remained cool to Faysal. In addition, Faysal was far more amenable to having a mandatory power with substantial control over Syria than were the majority of politically active people in the region. He even had difficulty achieving any sort of consensus among the members of "al-Fatat" (the "secret society" of nationalists Faysal had joined during the war), who remained deeply divided between asking for independence, a British mandate, or an American mandate.⁵

The Zionists were also in a difficult situation partly because numerous local groups had already been formed with the intent of stopping Jewish immigration to Palestine. One set of these groups were the Muslim-Christian Associations. Formed in late 1918 in the major cities of Palestine, these associations were generally comprised of wealthy and established notables who presented a united front in opposition to Zionism, though internally they often did not agree on other aspects of the region's political future. Other regional groups, such as al-Nadi al-'Arabi (the Arab Club) and al-Muntada al-Adabi (the Literary Club), were generally composed of "the young Arab intelligentsia" and were similarly anti-Zionist, though they too were often not in total agreement about what to request beyond the cessation of Zionism.⁶ Despite their internal differences, opposition to Zionism provided these groups with a central organizing principle and this opposition was voiced emphatically to the King-Crane Commission.

Despite being taken aback when it was announced that the King-Crane Commission was actually going to happen, the Zionists were well-prepared for its visit. As the commission arrived in the region, the local Zionists received instructions from their European and American leaders. American Zionist and future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, for example, cabled from Paris on 13 June that the Zionists should "make [a] full presentation of [the] achievements [of the Zionist] colonist[s] despite Turkish rule and almost insurmountable difficulties". Furthermore, he stated that their claim should not be judged "merely by numbers in Palestine" but was instead a "historical claim" which "rested on [the] ardent desires [of] millions [of] Jews" who were "ready to return from dispersion at the first opportunity."⁷ Chaim Weizmann repeated these arguments in a (rather belated) 21 June cable and added that the local Zionist Commission should "Inform them [the King-Crane Commission] [of] our cooperation with Feysal and our desire to work harmoniously with [the] Arab population for [the] good of Palestine."⁸ The Zionists in Palestine, however, required few instructions along these lines. They knew that their job was to get the commission to endorse Zionism and also knew that they had to accomplish two things in order for this to be a possibility: get all of the local Jews to back Zionism in front of the commission and try to minimize or undermine the expected anti-Zionist testimony (a challenging task by the summer of 1919).

By the summer of 1919, the Zionist Commission seemed to have accepted that they would likely have difficulty convincing any groups other than Jews to support their cause mainly because of growing anti-Zionism among Muslims and Christians. Because of this, they mainly focused on convincing the Jewish communities of Palestine to express support for Zionism. They also realized that they needed to pay close attention to the political space of Greater Syria, thus the Zionists decided that they would send their agents to the towns on the itinerary of the King-Crane Commission a few days before they arrived in hopes of convincing the Jews throughout Greater Syria to support Zionism. The divisions within the Jewish population of Greater Syria set the Zionists the complicated task of trying to convince all of these communities to support their cause, with many different communities and leaders having different agendas. It was the “Arabized Jews” both in and beyond Palestine, having (in the words of scholar Moshe Behar) “practically a zero role in the formation of Zionism” and being “profoundly non-separatist, non-irredentist, non-political, non-national and certainly non-Zionist,” who worried the Zionist Commission most.⁹ This push by the Zionist Commission was also an early stage of their generally successful attempt to conflate Judaism with Zionism in front of the King-Crane Commission.¹⁰ The Zionists, then, were attempting to make support for Zionism part of the regional (and global) Jewish identity. Yet the further they got from Jerusalem, the more difficult it was to get Jewish leaders to support Zionism.

The Jewish Communities of Palestine

The King-Crane Commission landed in Jaffa in June of 1919 and the tension in Palestine was immediately manifest. This was illustrated by an incident within the Jaffa Municipal Council. The council had been invited to speak before the commission, but its president neglected to notify its Jewish members that this was to occur. The Jewish council members, who had only heard about the council’s testimony after it was given, protested to the council president and received the following explanation (according to a report by the Zionist Commission): “the President [of the municipal council] explained that he did not notify the Jewish members for the reason that he knew that the Moslems wanted to protest against Zionism, and he felt it might be uncomfortable for the Jewish members to be present.” Despite this rather partisan incident, the Jewish community in Jaffa did have the chance to air their pro-Zionist views to the King-Crane Commission and was reportedly “quite satisfied with the hearing which they obtained.”¹¹ In Jerusalem, the Zionists faced more pronounced opposition. According to a Zionist agent, there was a string of meetings on 13 and 14 June at the homes of prominent Jerusalem Muslims (like Kamil al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem). In these meetings, there were contentious discussions among the region’s Muslim elite about which “demands” they should “hand over to the commission.” Although there was significant disagreement over these “demands,” the Zionist agent (who claimed to have knowledge of the meeting’s proceedings) noted that the only non-controversial matter discussed was the “request against Jewish immigration”.¹²

While it appeared there was little the Zionist Commission could do to convince Jerusalem's non-Jewish populations to support Zionism, their lobbying efforts among the local Jewish groups appear to have been more effective. Every Jewish leader interviewed by the King-Crane Commission supported Zionism. This surprised commission member William Yale, who claimed to have witnessed anti-Zionist sentiment among Jewish groups in his time living in Jerusalem before and during World War I. Yale, who was organizing the delegations the American commission would hear in Jerusalem, even sought the testimony of Jews whom he believed to be anti-Zionist. One particular choice Yale made that angered the Zionist Commission was to have Haham Bashi (Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem) Nissim Danon speak before the Americans, apparently because they thought he would give anti-Zionist testimony. In protest, the Zionists claimed that Danon had been a Turkish appointment and represented no one.¹³ Despite these protests, Danon spoke to the King-Crane Commission and seemed to surprise both Yale and the Zionists by endorsing the Zionist project.¹⁴ Annoyed by Yale's behaviour, Zionist leader Harry Friedenwald protested to his superiors in Paris, claiming that Yale (who was actually a supporter of Zionism at this point) had "acted with definite plans to injure us before the Commission." Despite this, Friedenwald proudly reported that among the "Jewish depositions heard," there was "practical unanimity in their demands, and not a single discordant note from any of the parties." Friedenwald further stated that this was the result of the "excellent labors" of certain members of the Zionist Commission.¹⁵ Another member of the King-Crane Commission, Albert Lybyer, asked the Spaffords of the American Colony in Jerusalem about the disappearance of anti-Zionism among the Jews. The Spaffords replied to him that the "Jerusalem Jews [were] now all for Zionism – much money spent."¹⁶

Later in their time in Palestine, the King-Crane Commission faced large crowds in Nazareth and the tension was high. The following is a description of Nazareth during the commission's visit, as reported by a Zionist delegate, and it illustrates the major political moment spawned by the commission:

We went to Nazareth at night. The road was full of riders for the American commission; some faces looked friendly when we met, most of them showed open hatred or at least some embarrassment in our presence. We found Nazareth full of delegates. [...] The Nazareth Christian population, or at least the poor, greeted us Jews very heartily in the streets and shops; reproaches were addressed us for not settling there: the city is in despair, "Should the Jews not come to revive its business, they [the Christians] will have to emigrate to Jerusalem, where a living can be made."¹⁷

Despite moments like this, calls for "No Jewish Homeland and no Jewish immigration" remained the norm among Nazareth's population.¹⁸ In Tiberias, Zionist operatives ran into dissent among the Jewish population, having found a "French Jewish subject" who "claimed to be representative of some hundred French subjects" and was "considering" asking the King-Crane Commission for a French mandate. They were able to change his

mind “after an explanation of the situation” and, on 23 June, this group gave the standard testimony suggested by the Zionist Commission.¹⁹ As the King-Crane Commission left Palestine, they were under the impression that the Jewish communities were uniformly for Zionism. The Zionist Commission had successfully advocated for their cause among the Jewish communities of Palestine, but they had more difficulty with the Jewish groups to the north.

Zionist Commission Agitation among the Non-Jewish Groups of Palestine

The Zionist Commission also attempted to influence several groups of Arabs in order to bolster their case in front of the King-Crane Commission. One Zionist agent (likely agronomist Chaim Kalvarisky who had lived in Palestine since 1895) personally tried “to make [a] real split and create a separation between the town people and the peasants (Fellahins)” around Jerusalem by showing the fellahin that “their interests were opposed to those of the town people.” He succeeded, through “arguments and persuasion with a little material means,” in getting several groups to either not mention Zionism in their testimony to the commission or at least state that the chosen mandatory power could make the final decision about Jewish immigration. This agent also was able to cause confusion at Jaffa and Jerusalem because he convinced various fellahin to protest to the commission that notables claiming to speak for their village actually did not.²⁰ Another agent, who signed his documents “Reliable Informant,” reported in an undated dispatch from Ramallah that an ally of Faysal’s had arrived in the city in order to spread his recommended demands, organize elections for the Syrian Congress, and “obtain volunteers for the Sherifian army.” The agent suggested that “an agitation” against these projects “can be carried on by my friends among the villagers,” though no report of any actual agitation followed.²¹

The Zionists did have some success in obtaining pro-Zionist petitions from several non-Jewish leaders. One such petition, from the mukhtar (leader) of a small village near Haifa (though possibly written by a Zionist agent), stated that “we declare that there is no reason to forbid to the Jews the immigration into Palestine, especially if we take into consideration the benefits the art of agriculture and our estates will draw from their presence.”²² Another “Sheikh” from the village of Qatra (“Katrah”) wrote to the Commission that they had “learned from the colonists of the Jewish Katrah many things which improved our life, economically, personally and socially,” though the petition did not specifically mention support for Jewish immigration.²³ Although no evidence exists about the decision-making processes of these men, it is likely that they chose to dissent from the prevailing political project of their neighbors in Palestine (independence/unity/anti-Zionism) because local conditions, in these two cases, appear to have trumped all other considerations. More specifically, the Zionist colonies aided the economies of their respective communities and they were likely afraid of losing these benefits. It is also possible that the Zionist agent was able to obtain this testimony with the use

of “material means,” which likely meant bribery of some kind. The critical nature of the choices made by these two community leaders was emphasized by articles in the Damascus press which chastised Arabs who had supported Zionism by claiming “The curse of God and the Arab people fell upon the heads of these men, – betrayers of their people and their birthplace.”²⁴

The Jewish Communities of Greater Syria

Beyond Palestine, the Zionist Commission’s attempt to obtain pro-Zionist testimony from the region’s Jews was difficult and the agent sent ahead of the King-Crane Commission (Abraham Elmaleh, a Sephardi journalist and educator from Jerusalem) ran into trouble in numerous other parts of Greater Syria. In Damascus, the Zionists again tried to ensure that the testimony of the local Jews was in line with their goals. The Damascene Jews were nervous about their testimony before the commission, stating that they “fear the Arabs in whose midst they dwell” but also that “their love for Palestine and their brethren obviously will not allow them to oppose the aspirations of Zionists.” Elmaleh, despite having little respect for this group of Jews (remarking that they “by nature are not great men”) understood that they were “between a hammer and an anvil” in their situation. He noted that one of the leaders of the Jewish community suggested that they needed to keep their safety in mind and tell the commission that “the question of Palestine does not affect them.” This alarmed Elmaleh and he engaged in an ultimately successful struggle to convince them that giving pro-Zionist responses was the only way to “answer the Commission as true Jews,” though he gave no details of this discussion. His job was made easier when a member of the King-Crane Commission (likely William Yale) arrived and guaranteed the Damascus Jews that their answers to the commission would be “held in complete secrecy.” The Damascus Jewish delegation endorsed Zionism, and the triumphant Elmaleh continued to Beirut in order to galvanize Jewish opinion before the commission arrived there.²⁵

Beirut presented another challenging task to Elmaleh. He arrived in the city a few days before the commission and first went to see Zionist sympathizer Joseph Farhi, the influential businessman who was vice-president of the Jewish “communal council” (“Vaad Ha’ir”). Elmaleh then went with Farhi to see Selim Dana, “Chief Director of the French Bank of Syria,” whom he believed to be the most influential member of the Jewish community, stating “his words receive attention everywhere and his opinion is accepted on every question.” Much to Elmaleh’s dismay, Dana demurred on Zionism. “His views on the National Movement,” noted Elmaleh, “are those of an assimilationist,” with Dana further stating that he believed there to be “nothing between the Jews of Palestine and Syria.” A “long discussion of 2 hours in duration” ensued (again Elmaleh did not detail the issues discussed) and Dana was eventually convinced to “sign any memorandum that we [the Zionists] desire on the question of Palestine and to present it to the American Commission on the condition that the question of choice of the Protecting Power be left open.” After this, Elmaleh met Beirut’s Vaad

Ha'ir and was able to convince them to allow him and Joseph Farhi to craft the Zionist "memorandum" that they would present to the King-Crane Commission, though the Council insisted on asking for France as the mandatory power for Lebanon.²⁶

In Aleppo, Elmaleh observed that the Jews in the city were more "keenly watched" by the "Moslem Arabs" than their more anonymous counterparts in the other cities. Indeed, local policemen had "visited the houses of the Jews forcing them to sign their consent to all decisions of the Syrian Congress," by which he meant the Damascus Program.²⁷ Despite their apprehensions, Elmaleh was able to organize a gathering of Aleppo's Jewish "notables" to whom he "fully related all the happenings" in Greater Syria thus far and "requested them to unite with their brethren so that the American Commission should gain the impression that on the question of Palestine there was no division of opinion among scattered Jewry." Elmaleh was pleased when "his words were favourably received," stating that "assimilation had not entered the Aleppo Community as for instance at Beirut." Aleppo's Jewish leaders decided to support Zionism and leave the question of the mandatory power for Syria "to the League of Nations." Elmaleh's apparent victory took a dramatic turn when the forces in the city agitating for the Damascus Program somehow learned of the testimony that was to be given by the Jews and "warned" the leaders of the Jewish community "that as a result of such a statement to the Commission they would be in danger." This "made the Jews afraid," according to Elmaleh, and a second meeting was held in which they decided to adhere more closely to the Damascus Program on the question of mandates but still to "utterly oppose" the Damascus Program "in relation to Palestine." Elmaleh and two others were appointed to write the official memorandum to the commission.²⁸

Abraham Elmaleh almost singlehandedly carried the Zionist cause to the often skeptical Jews in the larger cities of Greater Syria and proved adept at this job. In his words, "all the Jews without any distinction, even those who appear to be assimilationists, are united with us in our demands, and are ready at all times to declare this." Though this may have been an overstatement, his accomplishment was impressive. His assessment of the state of opinion among the non-Jews, however, would not have been encouraging to the Zionists: "All the Arabs in Syria under the government of the Sheriff [sic] are opposed to the Zionists, to Jewish immigration and to a National Home for the people of Israel in the land of Israel."²⁹ The re-organization of allegiances (Muslim/Christian versus Jew/Zionist) based mainly on this one politically charged issue appeared to be fairly far along at this point.

Conclusion

As is often correctly asserted, the Middle East was reborn in the wake of World War I. Although the geopolitical aspect of this contention is fairly well studied, it is necessary to further investigate the local and communal processes by which people ethnically "unmixed" and repositioned themselves in the post-war Ottoman lands in order to truly understand the ways in which this rebirth impacted the lives of the region's people.³⁰ It

is clear that longstanding communal identities were being rapidly transformed in post-Ottoman Greater Syria. The coming of the King-Crane Commission created a major political moment in Greater Syria and the consequences of this moment were different for the different communal groups involved. Broadly speaking, the arrival of the King-Crane Commission pushed the Muslims and Christians closer together and helped to make them “Arabs.”

The Zionists immediately recognized that both the King-Crane Commission and the opening of Greater Syria as a political space threatened their project. Because of this, they worked assiduously to help ensure the creation of a British-controlled Palestine under which Zionism could flourish. Many of Greater Syria’s Jews (especially the Arabized Jews who had lived in the region for a long while) were making a “critical” choice in deciding to support Zionism. Having been essentially asked to choose between their neighbors and their co-religionists, they largely chose the latter. Even though their testimony was usually kept secret (though versions of it were somehow leaked to the press in certain instances), the Jews of the region risked shattering longstanding communal relationships by siding with Zionism. It is clear that things could have been different for the Jewish communities of Greater Syria. If the Zionist Commission had not chosen to engage the region’s Jewish communities, it appears that at least some leaders from these communities would have given more ambivalent testimony about Zionism before the King-Crane Commission. The fact that some of these leaders were willing to give qualified endorsements of Zionism only in secret before the King-Crane Commission indicates that although they may have sympathized with Zionism, they did not want the controversy associated with Zionism to harm their local Jewish community. Zionism, in some of their minds, appeared to be a movement outside of, and indeed represented something of a threat to, their communal existence. Giving pro-Zionist testimony had less to do with being a “true Jew” in their minds (to use Elmaleh’s term), and more to do with not wanting to “oppose the aspirations” of their Zionist “brethren” (to borrow the words of the Damascene Jews). It seems that in giving pro-Zionist testimony, they did not see themselves as Zionists at this point. It is also important to note that Elmaleh did not mention having to confront any Jews who were ideologically opposed to Zionism during his journey, which is something he likely would have mentioned in his rather frank report about his time in Greater Syria to the Zionist leaders in Jerusalem. Ultimately, the Zionist Commission’s successful intervention did seem to move the Jewish communities with which it negotiated towards a more pro-Zionist stance than they would otherwise have taken and they convinced the King-Crane Commission that the Jews of Greater Syria were “unanimously in favor of the Zionistic scheme.”³¹ Without this intervention, the dynamics within Greater Syria’s Jewish communities may well have developed differently.

The summer of 1919 was a fateful moment in the history of Greater Syria. With new political realities coming into being, the population of the region was forced to make choices of individual and collective communal identity. In general, the visit of the King-Crane Commission was a political moment that hastened a broad communal realignment in Greater Syria and significantly decreased the likelihood of peaceful co-existence between the Jews and the other populations of the region.

Andrew J. Patrick is an Assistant Professor of History at Tennessee State University. He has also taught at Zayed University and New York University Abu Dhabi. His research focuses on the relationship between the United States and the Middle East.

Endnotes

- 1 The term “critical choices” is borrowed from Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 108.
- 2 Neil Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy: Vol. 1, Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts 1913-1931* (London: Frank Cass, 1983), 32.
- 3 This article is an elaboration on my quick study titled “Critical Communal Choices at the End of the Ottoman Empire” in *World War I in the Middle East*, ed. by Mustafa Aksakal and Elizabeth Thompson (a National Endowment for the Humanities project), <https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/world-war-i-in-the-middle-east/>. It contains ideas that will be further expanded in my forthcoming book *America’s Forgotten Middle East Initiative: The King-Crane Commission of 1919* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014).
- 4 Mohammad Muslih, “Arab Politics and the Rise of Palestinian Nationalism,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 16, no. 4 (Summer, 1987), 82. See also James Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 27, and Philip Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 78-82.
- 5 Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, 61-63, and Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 78-86.
- 6 Abigail Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem between Ottoman and British Rule* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 152-59; Ann Moseley Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939: The Frustration of a National Movement* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 83-84; Muhammad Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 158-74; and Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 89-92. Quote in Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, 154.
- 7 Washington, D.C., Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Felix Frankfurter Papers, Reel 15, Frankfurter to Brandeis, 25 May 1919; and Jerusalem, Israel, Central Zionist Archives, L3/472, cable from Frankfurter to Harry Friedenwald (acting head of the Zionist commission in Jerusalem), 13 June 1919. Hereafter referred to as CZA.
- 8 CZA, L3/472, cable from Weizmann to Friedenwald, 21 June 1919.
- 9 Moshe Behar, “What’s in a name? Socio-terminological formations and the case for ‘Arabized Jews,’” *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture* 15:6 (December 2009): 747-771 (765-6).
- 10 See Moshe Behar, “Palestine, Arabized Jews and the Elusive Consequences of Jewish and Arab National Formations,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 13:4 (November 2007): 581-611 (589-92).
- 11 CZA, L3/340, Harry Friedenwald to the “Inneractions Committee” of the Zionist commission in Paris, 20 June 1919.
- 12 CZA, L4/794, undated document titled “Last informations [sic] concerning the arabic [sic] demands from the peace conference delegation.” The agent did not mention how he obtained this information.
- 13 CZA, L3/340, Harry Friedenwald to the “Inneractions Committee” of the Zionist commission in Paris, 20 June 1919.
- 14 CZA, L4/794, “A report by Rabbi Danon about his interview with the American commission,” undated, likely 20 June 1919.
- 15 CZA, L3/340, Harry Friedenwald to the “Inneractions Committee” of the Zionist Commission in Paris, 24 June 1919.
- 16 Champaign, Illinois, University of Illinois Archives, MS Albert Lybyer Papers, Box 16, fol. “Diary,” 15 June 1919.
- 17 CZA, L4/794, S. Nibashan to Zionist Commission, Jerusalem, 23 June 1919.
- 18 CZA, L4/794, S. Nibashan to Zionist Commission, Jerusalem, 23 June 1919.
- 19 CZA, L4/794, Mr. Montagu D. Eder to Friedenwald, 27 June 1919.
- 20 CZA, L4/794, document titled “Report on the Fellahin question and the American Section of the International commission on Mandates in Turkey.”
- 21 CZA, L3/426, undated document titled “Report” and signed by “a Reliable Informant.”

- 22 CZA, L3/340, "Petition of the Moukhtar of Makd Mina," 29 June 1919.
- 23 CZA, L3/340, Petition from the Sheik of Katrah, "June 1919."
- 24 CZA, L4/794, document titled "I. Report on Journey through Syria," 1-10.
- 25 CZA, L4/794, document titled "I. Report on Journey through Syria," 6-14.
- 26 CZA, L4/794, document titled "I. Report on Journey through Syria," 16-17.
- 27 In this document (approved in early July), the Syrian Congress protested Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant and called for "complete political independence" of a unified Greater Syria. If the powers insisted, the new state would accept "technical and economic assistance" (not a mandate) from the United States as long as it did not impinge on this independence. Britain was named the second choice to give such assistance if the US would not, and both French and Zionist claims to the land were repudiated entirely.
- 28 CZA, L4/794, document titled "I. Report on Journey through Syria," 25-26.
- 29 CZA, L4/794, document titled "I. Report on Journey through Syria," 30-31.
- 30 "Unmixed" is borrowed from Rogers Brubaker, "Aftermaths of Empire and Ethnic Unmixing," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18:2 (April 1995): 189-218.
- 31 'Report of the American Section of the International Commission on Mandates', *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, 13 vols (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1942), XII, pp. 773, 779.