

# Orthodox Communal Politics in Palestine after the Young Turk Revolution (1908-1910)<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction

The controversy between the Greek religious bureaucracy and the Arab congregation in Ottoman Palestine over the financial management and general administration of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem is well known. Its causes were deeply rooted, reflecting ideological and social tendencies that expressed nationalistic aspirations, as well as a reaction against orientalist stereotypes. This paper examines the evolution of the controversy in the period after the Young Turk Revolution (1908). The new regime, pressed to intervene in order to preserve public order and social stability in a period of fluidity in local and international politics, played a significant role in the power struggle between the two adversaries. The patriarchal crisis of 1908-1910 also had an intra-ecclesiastic dimension, being linked with the *coup d'état* against Patriarch Damianos by a powerful opposition which viewed the Arab Orthodox cause as an opportunity to acquire religious authority. While the laity to some degree determined the reinstatement of Damianos to his see, it was unable to change the balance of power in its favor.

The patriarchal crisis of 1908-1910 has been examined by various authors within the wider context of the social developments in Palestine in the late Ottoman period, as well as the reformulation of the religious landscape and inter-communal politics. Elie Kedourie viewed the crisis as an initial step in the introduction and development of a national idea,<sup>2</sup> while Derek Hopwood interpreted it mainly as a consequence of the Russian penetration into the local Christian populations.<sup>3</sup> Researchers Daphne Tsimhoni and Sotirios Roussos

considered it to be an important incident that prepared the ground for the long-term collision between the Greek ethnocentric clergy and the Palestinian Arab laity under the British Mandate.<sup>4</sup> Recently, Bedross der Matossian, who compared the influence of the Young Turk Revolution on three major religious organizations in Jerusalem (the Armenian, Orthodox, and Jewish communities), concluded that the outcome of the patriarchal crisis was determined by the Ottoman regime's concerns about the development of Arab nationalism.<sup>5</sup> In our view, Matossian's secessionist thesis can be disputed at least insofar as the events before 1911 were concerned. This is because the Arab national movement was at that time (1908-1910) in the first stages of its development, not yet presenting an actual threat to the central authorities. Instead, we hold that the Ottoman stance was determined by the contemporary political agenda as well as the diplomatic engagements of the regime.

The above-mentioned studies were mainly based on two reports by the British Mandatory Authorities on the affairs of the Patriarchate.<sup>6</sup> These reports are of great importance for the study of the modern history of this religious institution, since they reflect the perception of all sides involved in the controversy and contain key historical documents that are otherwise extremely difficult to access. This paper provides new historical material about the crisis by examining certain documents published in Greek which were not taken into account by previous researchers. Our perspective is that the pro-Greek stance of the Ottoman Sublime Porte was not grounded on the perceived threat of Arab nationalism, but on legal, political, and diplomatic considerations. The paper is divided in two parts. First, we provide a contextual historical account of the events that led to the patriarchal controversy, placing emphasis on social developments and ideological innovations within the Empire after the *Tanzimat* reforms and how these influenced the Orthodox community in Palestine. The second part deals with the strategy and actions of the actors involved in this quest for religious power, paying particular attention to the broader political and inter-communal stakes as well as the role of diplomacy. In conclusion, the paper reveals that in the case of the Jerusalem Orthodox community, the Ottoman regime change did not signify the application of modernist policies, as expected, but further fortified the existing traditionalist state of affairs. Hence, by not responding adequately to public sentiment and the call for change of communal structures, the Young Turks failed to face the challenges of their period at the micro-level of the Palestinian Christian Orthodox population.

## **The Politicization of Religion**

The patriarchal crisis was essentially an outcome of the transition to modernity of Palestine's traditional social and political setting. On the one hand, the *Tanzimat* reforms opened the way to the partial secularization of the multi-ethnic Orthodox community by allowing the lay element to take a more active role in the decision-making process of the community via the establishment of the so-called Mixed Council. The establishment of the *National or Communal Regulations* of the "Rum-Millet"<sup>7</sup> in Constantinople (1862)

confirmed the transition of power from the religious bureaucracies to the urban elites (Phanariots) and the developing bourgeoisie.<sup>8</sup> While these regulations were applied in the Patriarchates of Constantinople and (somewhat later) Antioch as well, they were not accepted by the Orthodox bureaucracy of Jerusalem, for they were perceived as a threat to its rule. On the other hand, the Arab national idea dominated the social space, weakening loyalties to the previous hegemonic element of communal cohesion that was based on religious affiliation. At the same time, religion was “politicized” as an instrument of social penetration for the attainment of national objectives. Consequently, while until the eve of modernity the Ottoman Empire’s socio-political structure was grounded on sectarianism, from then on what had previously been a solid and coherent whole (e.g., the Orthodox community-*millet*) was divided into different political and cultural entities: the Greek, the Bulgarian, the Arab, and others.<sup>9</sup>

The “nationalization” or “politicization” process of the religious sphere entailed a gradual transformation of the Orthodox Church’s organizational structures from a non-ethnic sectarian representation to a national-based religious affiliation. This process, which took place in almost all the Orthodox patriarchates, was a consequence of the transition from the empire-state to the nation-state. It resulted in the fragmentation of the previously “ecumenical” and united Orthodox world, which was organized in large ecclesiastical entities in a centralized administrative system into ethnic-based religious bureaucracies ruling defined ecclesiastical territories. The role of Russian diplomacy in this process has been widely appreciated in this respect, since control of the Orthodox institutions, either through the capitulations regime or funding and various donations, was an important condition for applying Russia’s “Third Rome”<sup>10</sup> foreign policy.<sup>11</sup> The lay Orthodox struggle in Palestine was not unique or separate from the wider Ottoman society or the broad diplomatic landscape; it was actually one of a series of similar developments that had taken place in other ecclesiastical provinces, such as the Bulgarian Exarchate within the Patriarchate of Constantinople, or the Arab Orthodox uprising against the Greek hierarchy in Antioch at the end of the nineteenth century.

The Palestinian Arab laity, in the first stages of self-determination and following the administrative paradigm of the other collective Orthodox bodies of the Empire, perceived Greek rule as a form of religious imperialism. For the local Arab Orthodox elite, which had acquired a special economic and social status in Palestine, this state of affairs was deemed unacceptable. Palestinian Arabs, therefore, sought to gain control of the Patriarchate. The role of the press in this struggle was of the utmost importance, forming and at the same time reflecting the communal perspective, as well as expressing the collective hopes of the growing national group.<sup>12</sup> The newspapers *Alquds*, *Al-Karmil* and *Falastin* became the agents for defining the ecclesiastical establishment as the religious “enemy” in contrast to the victimized Palestinian self, putting the question of Greek dominance at the center of their critique. The Palestinian press perceived the Greek clergy as oppressors, who had usurped the Arab cultural patrimony from its rightful owners and exploited for their own interests the religious real estate as well as other income and pilgrim donations without taking into account the needs of the congregation that should be in principle their recipient. It is interesting to note that the Arab Orthodox editor of *Falastin*, ‘Isa al-‘Isa founded his newspaper in order to contribute to the Palestinian Arab Orthodox cause.<sup>13</sup> To these voices we should add that of Khalil Sakakini, who was probably the

most prominent intellectual figure of his time in Palestine. Sakakini participated actively in the patriarchal dispute of 1908-1910. In 1913 he wrote a pamphlet titled *al-nahda al-orthodoksiyya fi Filastin (The Orthodox Renaissance in Palestine)* that led to his excommunication.<sup>14</sup> In this study as well as in his diaries the Greek clergy is constantly portrayed as tyrannical, corrupt and degenerate.<sup>15</sup>

In the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century the Palestinian Arab laity sought the establishment of a Local Council in each ecclesiastical province and a Mixed Council for the administration of communal affairs. Furthermore, they demanded active participation of the secular element in financial management, as well as in procedures for electing the patriarch and bishops. Last but not least, the free entrance of the local Arab Orthodox to the monastic Brotherhood was regarded as *sine qua non* for reconciliation between the two poles within the community. Ultimately, the aims were “democratization” and the removal of the “foreign” Greek hierarchy from the Church of Jerusalem. The fact that both processes were contested by the same opponent resulted from their identification with the local populations. The “Arabization” of the Patriarchate was perceived as a basic element in “secularizing” the ecclesiastical administration, while simultaneously the “reformation” of the power structure within the religious organization was presented as an important step towards the fulfilment of the Arab Orthodox national programme.

The ideological background of the Greek dominance was the messianic fallacy of “Helleno-orthodoxia.” This is a theoretical formulation of Greek irredentism of the *Megali Idea*, according to which Greek national identity is intimately tied to the Orthodox religion. This socially dominant ethno-phyletist narrative advocates the primordial, and thus essentialist, equation of Orthodoxy with the Greek nation. In short, an individual can be regarded as a member of the Greek “imagined community” only if he/she is a Christian Orthodox and *vice versa*.<sup>16</sup> The Orthodox lay populations in Syria and Palestine, therefore, were not regarded as Arab, but rather as Greek “arabophones” (αραβόφωνοι).<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the various shrines in the Holy Land under the custodianship of the Patriarchate were perceived as the tangible continuity of the Greek presence in the historical cradle of Christianity. According to this “invented tradition” of the Greek imagined proprietorship of Palestine’s Christian sanctuaries, these did not belong to the Orthodox commonwealth at large. Rather, the Greek nation was their sole owner. The Holy Places were perceived as national treasures, and as such the non-Greek Orthodox populations could not have a say in the administration of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, which was the competent authority for their guardianship. Since Orthodoxy is held to be the true faith expressing God’s word and the Greek nation is represented as being by definition the “rightful” owner of His Holy Places, the Greek people are defined as the “chosen” people, under whose guidance all the ecclesiastical centers should continue to operate, as they had since their establishment. For the advocates of Helleno-orthodoxia, thus, the Patriarchate should be exclusive, and entrance to it should be confined only to Greek nationals or subjects. Consequently, Athens, as the nation-state’s capital, should be the political center par excellence not only of all Orthodox institutions, but also of the Orthodox populations at large, regardless of any other criteria defining their collective identity.<sup>18</sup>

Two strategies were formulated within the Greek ecclesiastical apparatus for confronting the developing local Orthodox movement: a) absolute rejection of lay

demands, which were viewed as subverting the Greek character of the Patriarchate and its religious “purity”; and b) the adoption of a controlled concession to the community of some secondary rights without putting at risk the institution’s Greek character and centralized governing structure. The long-standing conflict between these two distinct schools of thought led to a series of crises within the Patriarchate from the end of the nineteenth century onwards.<sup>19</sup> The one under discussion caused a split within the Greek senior clergy with major repercussions for the future of the Jerusalem Patriarchate.

## **Historical Background: The Beginning of Communal Division**

The deposing of Patriarch Cyril II (1872) by the ethnocentric synod may be regarded as the “official” opening of the dispute, after which the Palestinian Arab Orthodox communities of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Lydda, Haifa, Nazareth and other cities made plain their dissatisfaction with their religious and political representatives. Furthermore, Russian diplomacy was gaining in influence, favoring Cyril and threatening Greek predominance within the community.<sup>20</sup> Although in this dispute the lay movement failed in its efforts, it was the first widespread manifestation of insistence on participating in patriarchal affairs. A protean political movement was formed that over time played a constructive role in the development and crystallization of the Arab-Palestinian national idea.<sup>21</sup> The Greek hierarchy from then on faced open opposition by the local Orthodox, who demanded the establishment of a Mixed Council as well as their free enrolment in patriarchal circles.<sup>22</sup> The clerical establishment perceived these demands as the “Trojan horse” that would ultimately lead to its expulsion from Jerusalem.<sup>23</sup> The burning issue was therefore the establishment of patriarchal Regulations, which would legally protect the Greek administrative dominance over the laity.<sup>24</sup>

The patriarchal Regulations, the so-called Fundamental Law, were compiled in 1875, and with the support of Kiamil (Kâmil) Pasha, Mutasarrif (District Governor) of Jerusalem, were ratified by the Sublime Porte. The Fundamental Law consisted of seventeen articles whose provisions set out the organizational structure of the institution and the method of electing the patriarch and the hierarchy.<sup>25</sup> However, it neither satisfied the local Orthodox demands, nor promoted the synodal principle at the expense of patriarchal centralization. The patriarch exercised absolute control over all religious and administrative affairs, as well as patriarchal finances and the management of the Patriarchate’s vast movable and immovable property. Having the power to change the composition of the Synod at any time, the patriarch could obtrude his view on any question, rendering the Synod a secondary organ that would simply ratify the decisions already taken by him with no practical means to react. Even in the extreme case of the patriarch finding no clergy to support his views on a matter, he had been bestowed the power not to call for a synodal assembly, nor to execute synodal decisions which were against his will. Taking into account that there was no condition on which a patriarch could be dethroned or suspended from office, the members of the monastic Brotherhood were dependent either as a group or as individuals on the patriarch’s disposition. As far as the lay cause was concerned, the

Fundamental Law was quite frustrating, as it brought no improvement in the relations between the dominant Greeks in religious matters and the desire of the Palestinian Arab laity for a greater say in communal affairs. The participation of some lay representatives in the patriarchal elections was not a significant concession at all, since it did not allow any change in the balance of power within the institution. In addition, there was no clear reference about the amount of financial help to be given to the congregation from the revenues of patriarchal real estate, pilgrim offerings, or other donations. Consequently, the laity was in fact compelled to obey the Patriarchate's orders, receiving only minor gains for itself. Before the Palestinian Arab protest, Patriarch Hierotheos (1875-1882) circulated his famous encyclical. This document had a special symbolic value, since it was the first official statement by the Greek establishment declaring the monastic Brotherhood to be open to the admission of the local laity. Furthermore, it was supposed to promote more active participation of the laity in the decision-making process.<sup>26</sup> It is characteristic that the local orthodox community invoked the encyclical's content in the succeeding patriarchal crises of 1908-1910 and 1923 as means to constitutionally fortify their goals.<sup>27</sup> However, the same document was intended, in fact, to subvert Palestinian Arab demands, and in any case was never applied.

The end of the nineteenth century found the Greek religious establishment facing an economic depression, Russian penetration into its territory, and an increasingly activist local Orthodox. On top of that, the death of Patriarch Gerasimos (1891-1896) opened the way to internal division: one camp supported the election of Photios (later Patriarch of Alexandria), who had played an active role in religious politics in the past decade; while the other camp favored Eythimios, who was the sacristan of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and one of the wealthiest monks of the Brotherhood. Because the Russians opposed his candidacy, Photios proposed the nomination of the *Locum Tenens*, Damianos, who had previously and secretly agreed to resign after a while; that is, after preparing the ground for Photios' final dominance. The election resulted in a tie between Damianos and Eythimios. Consequently, under the Fundamental Law, Damianos was nominated as patriarch, since his vote as *Locum Tenens* was counted twice. Damianos, however, instead of keeping his word, reconciled with Eythimios and compelled Photios, his previous protector and ally, to retreat to Antioch. From then on, the only tactic Photios could follow was to bide his time and exploit any mistake by Damianos in the intra-ecclesial or political arenas. The reformulation of communal politics after the Young Turk Revolution provided such an opportunity.

## **The Patriarchal Crisis 1908-1910**

The Second Constitutional period gave a new impetus to the modernization process in the Empire, creating new political structures and rearticulating the public agenda and discourse. The establishment of the Young Turk regime opened the way to free elections and democratic representation for the various ethnic and religious groups at the center of politics. The legal system was reformed, freedom of the press instituted, and secularization

was promoted.<sup>28</sup> Palestinian society welcomed the revolution with great enthusiasm, especially given the importance of the area for the three monotheistic religions. Various religious organizations, as well as the diplomatic corps of the western powers, became more active.<sup>29</sup> Within this context, the Young Turks' promise to grant equal rights to all citizens was seen by the local Orthodox communities not only as the signal for a fresh start in their relations with their Muslim compatriots, but also as the opportunity to put an end to Greek ethnic dominance over "their" Church. In fact, the restored Constitution (1908) seemed to offer the laity a greater opportunity to participate in the religious administration. The Constitution (Article 111) provided that:

In each *Qaza* [sub-district] there should be a council of each community. To this council is assigned the supervision —

A. of the administration of the revenues of immovables and capital sums subject to *waqfs* [religious endowments] according to the directions of the founders and agreeably to the customs observed from of old;

B. the use of properties appointed for philanthropic objects agreeably to the conditions prescribed in the testaments relating thereto. ...

Each of these councils is composed of members elected by its own community, in accordance with special regulations which will be drawn up. These councils will be subject to the local authorities and the general councils of the *vilayets* [provinces].<sup>30</sup>

The local Orthodox community, with Russian support, interpreted the article as legitimizing its participation in managing patriarchal finances, and demanded its immediate application. The dispute in June 1907 about its rights over the cemetery on Mount Zion had prepared the ground for the laity's new demands.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, the "Arabization" of the Church of Antioch (1899) was tangible proof that its struggle could bear fruit. Its first move was the formation of a forty-member Council, asking for its official recognition by the religious authorities.

Damianos sought to delay the decision about the Council, since regulations for its operation had not yet been drawn up. Two initial meetings of a joint committee were held in September 1908. In the Greek view, Article 111 did not stipulate lay participation in the administration, but merely created a supervisory organ with no real power. This interpretation was based on articles 11 and 118 of the Constitution, which determined a) that the State protected within the Empire the free exercise of all the recognized cults and the maintenance of the privileges conferred on each community up to that time (Art. 11); and b) that the existing laws, regulations, and customs should be preserved as long as they were not modified or annulled by a later law or order (Art. 118). For the Greek apparatus, the relevant State legislation, namely the Fundamental Law (1895) and the *Berat* recognizing the validity of Damianos' election to the patriarchal throne (1897), stipulated clearly that "the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre under the patriarch had a special monastic status,"<sup>32</sup> according to which the officials of the institution were monks (*kalogiroi*), who were required to govern the "churches and the monasteries" according to

the orders of their head.”<sup>33</sup> As such, the application of Art. 111 to the Church of Jerusalem via the imposition by the laity of a council for ruling patriarchal affairs could not be accepted. Consequently, any unilateral decision on the Palestinian Arab part, directly or indirectly modifying this special status of the institution that differentiated it from the other religious organizations, or any change of communal operation without a previous legal order, which had to be confirmed by the Patriarchate (as the legitimate political authority of the Orthodox population within its territory of responsibility [*millet* system]), would violate articles 11 and 118, respectively.

The other important stake in the dispute had to do with patriarchal finances and the management of *waqf* property, which had significantly increased, especially after the enactment of the 1858 Ottoman Land Code, an important step towards the deregulation of the real estate market.<sup>34</sup> There is strong evidence that from the mid-nineteenth century, Orthodox monks had purchased agricultural and urban land and constructed large building blocks and markets in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine.<sup>35</sup> In short, the institution’s real estate assets were estimated at 631 properties in the early 1920s in Palestine alone.<sup>36</sup> However, statistical data about the exact number and the coverage of these estates have never been published by patriarchal officials, the lay community or political authorities. Katz and Kark, having identified 355 of these *waqfs*, noted that their assets covered substantial tracts of land. Indeed the area of only 176 of these properties for which data were available amounted to approximately 37,000 *dunams* (one dunam is equivalent to 1,000 sq. meters).<sup>37</sup> To these assets in Palestine, we should add the large tracts of land and other properties in Bessarabia, Greece, Constantinople, Izmir and other places,<sup>38</sup> which rendered the Patriarchate of Jerusalem one of the wealthiest religious institutions in the Orthodox commonwealth.<sup>39</sup>

It made perfect sense that the laity aimed to co-administer and share in the profits of such a portfolio, over which patriarchal officials had absolute control. In addition, the Fundamental Law did not stipulate an obligation for the senior clergy to provide any specific sum to cover educational or other social needs of the laity. On the other hand, the Greek hierarchy strongly opposed such a development. Their argumentation was based on the literal interpretation of certain legal as well as diplomatic documents, without taking into account other aspects of the question. Particularly, the patriarchal establishment asserted that the only income to which the proposed Council might arguably have a claim to manage was that derived from those *waqfs* and wills which provided some money for charitable purposes. For the Greek ecclesiastics any further discussion about lay interference over the management of holdings endowed to the Holy Places or for the use of the various patriarchal dependencies was out of the question.<sup>40</sup> According to their view, this latter type of monastic property was governed in accordance to a “special legislative framework,” as determined by the so-called *Status Quo* principle, protected by the Ottoman State through the enactment of special edicts (1852-1853), as well as by the international community (Art. 62, Treaty of Berlin, 1878). Although it might be argued that the *Status Quo* was not a concrete code that stipulated the parameters of religious operation, but an abstract legal concept regulating “on the ground” guardianship of the Christian sanctuaries by the various denominations, the *Firman* (imperial edict) of 25



May 1853 was considered by the Greek clergy to be quite clear about *waqf* management. For the patriarchal side, it prohibited any change or appropriation of the ownership or administrative status of the real estate holdings or of any other property belonging to the Orthodox institutions and monasteries within the Empire.<sup>41</sup> Consequently, taking into account that the greater part, if not almost all, of the *waqf* properties were endowed for the sake of the Brotherhood's guardianship of the sanctuaries, the laity could actually participate only in a very small part of the property and revenue management. Additionally, the Greek side invoked the same Article 111 of the Constitution, which stipulated that *waqf* administration had to be in accordance with "the directions of the founders." On what grounds, therefore, could the laity claim the supervision of a *waqf* estate endowed for the preservation of a monastery or a sanctuary? In contrast, such a case was perceived by the religious bureaucracy as signifying a violation not only of the *Status Quo* or Canon Law, but also of the same Constitution on which the laity was founding its claims.

In opposition to the legal formalism of the Greek hierarchy who presented the law as both fair and historical, the laity invoked Christian ecclesiology and theological teaching. In particular, the local Orthodox considered religious property to be "the endowments of the Church considered as a whole."<sup>42</sup> In other words, the signifier "church" was not identified with religious bureaucracy, but the Orthodox community *per se* without distinguishing between the congregation and the clergy. Within this ideological formula, it demanded the yearly allocation of 60,000 Napoleons in order to cover its various social and educational needs. Before the deadlock in negotiations, Damianos had proposed the establishment of a Commission made up of Jerusalem notables to make suggestions with respect to rents, taxation, and other financial issues. The laity, on the other hand, proposed in October 1908 a Mixed Council to control and manage the finances and properties of the Patriarchate, modelled on that of the church in Constantinople. The Mixed Council would be composed of six lay and six clerical members.<sup>43</sup> This was refused by the Jerusalem Patriarchate hierarchy, which provoked violent demonstrations. The church of St. James was closed and protests soon spread to Bethlehem and Jaffa, leading to intervention by the Porte. The Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha ordered a local investigation in November 1908 and pressed the patriarch to be more conciliatory.<sup>44</sup> Damianos agreed to meet again with lay representatives, albeit without accepting their claims. However, this meeting was perceived by the Greek religious apparatus as an act of retreat which endangered the national character of the Patriarchate. On 13 December 1908 the Synod assembled without the presence or authorization of the patriarch (thus violating Fundamental Law), and decided to suspend Damianos. It should be made clear that the Synod's resolution was illegal. The next day, the Synod elected the elderly Archbishop of Tiberias as *Locum Tenens* of the Convent.

This synodal decision was not so much in objection to Damianos' handling of the council issue, but on the intra-ecclesial balance of power. It was actually a well-organized political move dependent on right timing. The leading actor behind the scenes in this hierarchical crisis was not the *Locum Tenens*, but Archimandrite Meletios (Metaxakis), the future patriarch of Constantinople and Alexandria and probably the most important Orthodox figure in the twentieth century. Meletios as chief secretary was the official

who handled almost all the affairs of the Patriarchate and who had enjoyed the absolute confidence of Damianos. In 1907, however, Meletios met Photios, the Patriarch of Alexandria – the old rival of Damianos – while in Cyprus. This placed Damianos in disfavour, and Meletios was thereafter excluded from promotion to the higher ranks of the Brotherhood. Thus, the only option he had for maintaining his power was the deposing of Damianos, whose handling of the local Orthodox uprising gave him the pretext he sought. Meletios went secretly to Alexandria in November, where he gained the confidence of Photios, who still had influence with the Brotherhood. The Photios group united with the clerical circles under Meletios to effect the ecclesiastical *coup d'état*.<sup>45</sup> The opposition was also supported by the other Greek-dominated Orthodox institutions that removed Damianos' name from the *sacred diptychs* (the symbolic recognition of ecclesiastical authority via certain commemorative prayers). Support from the Patriarchate of Constantinople was of major importance for the success of the endeavor, since, as the primary religious representative of the *millet* to the Sublime Porte, its mediation was crucial for obtaining the necessary political approval. The Patriarch of Constantinople Joachim III even threatened Damianos with the most drastic penalty for an Orthodox official, *kathairesis* – expulsion from clerical rank.<sup>46</sup>

The stance of the Greek government was controversial. It is beyond doubt that it controlled the Church of Greece and exerted influence on the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and was well aware of the support of the other Orthodox institutions for Meletios. Athens did not side openly with either of the rivals in Jerusalem but when things got out of hand it intervened in favor of Damianos. It appears that Athens backed Meletios at first, but retreated after the Russians and the Western powers intervened. In conclusion, it may be said that Greece did not map out a concrete and well-organized policy as far as the Jerusalem Patriarchate was concerned, but preferred to take a secondary role.

At the central political level, the alliance between Damianos and the local population created certain problems. Kiamil Pasha, who was opposed by the Young Turks, needed the votes of confidence for his government from both the Greeks and the Palestinian Arab deputies. Although the latter were all Muslims, except for one Maronite, the vizier could not afford the risk of losing them.<sup>47</sup> At the same time, Greek interests were represented by a uniform and cohesive group headed by the deputy of Smyrna (Izmir), Panagiotis Karolidis, one of the most influential figures of the Greek hegemonic national(ist) narrative of that time. In addition, the Exarch of the Brotherhood in Constantinople, Glykerios, worked to gain the support of other parliamentary deputies. In a 12 October letter to Glykerios there is a reference to certain assurances given by the Jaffa deputy Hafiz Bey al-Said to the hierarchy in support of the Greek patriarchal cause. To this point, it might be indicative that Hafiz Bey was even hosted as a guest at the patriarchal dependency, the so-called *Metochion*,<sup>48</sup> in Phener during his stay in the capital. As far as the two deputies from Jerusalem, Ruhi al-Khalidi and Said al-Husayni, were concerned, the letter suggested that Glykerios should simply transmit to them patriarchal greetings with no further comment or recommendation.<sup>49</sup> Although this archival testimony cannot lead us to concrete historical conclusions, it is quite evident that the patriarchal side had actively lobbied to safeguard its dominance. Kiamil Pasha recognized the nomination of

the new *Locum Tenens*, following his parliamentary win in January 1909.<sup>50</sup>

The deposing of Damianos caused a new communal uprising that led to the assassination of six individuals, while several churches and monasteries throughout Palestine were occupied by the local Orthodox. Although they were quite indifferent to Damianos *per se*, because of his earlier behaviour, the local Orthodox considered him to be the lesser of two evils in comparison to Meletios Metaxakis' group. Taking into account that both Canon Law and the patriarchal Regulations dictate that the patriarch will, in principle, hold his office for life, the synodal intervention presented them as the guarantors of legitimacy. Furthermore, the Muslim community actively supported their cause, which made it even more difficult for the Ottomans to ignore or suppress them, since Ottoman soldiers were unwilling to intervene against their co-religionists.<sup>51</sup>

In addition to the laity's support, Damianos was patronized by Russian diplomats. Consul A. T. Kruglov never recognized his dethronement, shielded him from insult, and boycotted by all possible means the new ecclesiastical leadership.<sup>52</sup> The Russian stance led to German and British intervention in Damianos' favor as well, since their consuls in Jerusalem could hardly allow Moscow to be seen as the only great power to rally round the local population. The special political interests of their countries in Palestine involved the creation of close bonds with local Christians,<sup>53</sup> and thus they felt they had to protect Damianos. It should be noted that under Damianos' tenure, an unofficial coalition between the Orthodox and Protestant churches in Palestine had developed, grounded in their mutual aversion towards the Roman Catholic Church<sup>54</sup> and their insistence on the maintenance of the *Status Quo*.<sup>55</sup> Although Damianos had not recognized the Anglican orders in 1907,<sup>56</sup> he allowed the Anglicans (who owned no part of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher) to use the Orthodox Chapel of Abraham there. He also cultivated friendly relations with the consuls of the Protestant powers. It is characteristic that he sent a valuable volume of the New Testament to King George V as a gift for his coronation, and he was awarded a medal of honor by the Palace for his activity in the Holy Land. As for the German authorities, it suffices to say that Kaiser Wilhelm II was greatly honoured by Damianos during his 1898 visit to Jerusalem. The Kaiser, very well-disposed towards the patriarch, asked the sultan in 1903 as a personal favor to release from prison certain Orthodox monks who had been convicted for quarrelling in the Holy Places.<sup>57</sup>

Meletios Metaxakis' opposition had acquired from the Porte affirmation of the legitimacy of Damianos' deposition, and this was backed up by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, as well as the other Greek ecclesiastical institutions. Damianos, on the other hand, had reached an understanding with the Orthodox laity with broad social support at the local level, and enjoyed Russian patronage, namely the official protection of the Orthodox *millet* within the Empire. British and German support made this alliance even stronger. Before this complicated state of affairs had coalesced, the Ottomans set up a commission of inquiry headed by the governor of Damascus, Nazim Pasha, to reach a compromise between the opposing sides. The major obstacle, however, was that a probable withdrawal of recognition for the *Locum Tenens* would jeopardize the authority of Ottoman rule. Then the death of the *Locum Tenens* opened the way for Damianos' reinstatement. As the Palestinian Arab reaction escalated, Nazim pressed the Brotherhood

to recognize him as its legitimate head, saying he could take no responsibility for the future safety of the monks.<sup>58</sup>

The opposition had no choice but to submit. Fearing that the laity might exploit this fluid situation and drive forward with the support of Russia as well as the local Muslim population, fear of the election of an Arab patriarch was probably the primary motive for its retreat. The earlier expulsion of the Greek clergy from Antioch had made the Greek hierarchy extremely cautious. What the “Arabization” of the Syrian Church had manifested was that such a structural break in religious power politics depended on three main prerequisites: a) internal division within the dominant hierarchy, leading to paralysis of the apparatus and a power vacuum; b) dynamic mobilization of the dominated lay and/or national group in order to exploit the momentum, with a clear agenda; and c) the interventionist policy of an influential political protector, i.e. Russian, which could pressure the central Ottoman authorities to accept a likely subversion of the established religious power system at the expense of Greek interests.

The question that arises, then, is whether these three conditions were fulfilled as far as the Church of Jerusalem was concerned during the period under discussion. In general, the two ecclesiastical crises had important similarities. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that the Antiochian crisis and the expulsion of the Greek clergy had taken place in 1899. That is to say, the historical context was totally different in terms of domestic politics, ideology and diplomacy from that created after the Young Turk Revolution. Furthermore, there were two main differences between the two cases, which in our view determined the final outcome. The first was that the Antiochian upper clergy was not comprised solely of ethnic Greeks as in Jerusalem, but also included Arabs who held important offices within the church bureaucracy. Particularly, Syrians faced no impediments in becoming bishops, formed the majority group within the Synod, and had a say in the administration.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, when the Greek Patriarch Spyridon was forced to resign in 1899, it was not difficult for them to organize a separate electoral council that nominated Meletios Dumani as its new religious head.

A second possible difference was that the status of Palestine was in political terms more important than that of Syria. This was because Jerusalem, due to its symbolic value, had been a central concern of the western powers, which intervened in order to protect the rights and privileges of their affiliated churches over the Holy Places. A potential “Arabization” of the Orthodox institution might have threatened the *Status Quo* agreement. Raising this question at a time when political stability was of primary importance would not be an acceptable development for the new regime. Furthermore, the international community wished to avoid a possible reopening of the *Status Quo* issue, which might have triggered a new dispute between the protecting powers at a critical geopolitical period and affected the international economic balance of power. In contrast, the Antiochian crisis of 1899 was probably viewed by the central authorities and European diplomacy as internal rivalry within a religious institution at the periphery of the Empire, and as such of secondary importance. Thus a comparison between the two crises indicates that the maintenance of the religious *modus operandi* in Jerusalem a few years before the Great War was by far more vital from the viewpoint of domestic

and international politics than the power struggle between opposing clerical and ethnic factions over the Syrian Church. The different stance of the Russians in relation to the two crises might be indicative of this point. In short, while they had supported the Arab Syrian struggle all the way until the accession of Meletios Dumani to the throne, it seems that the major Russian objective in Jerusalem was not its immediate “Arabization,” but actually the reinstatement of Damianos.

In any case, neither the internal opposition to Damianos’ rule nor any other Greek religious or political center, such as the Constantinople Patriarchate or the government in Athens, could afford risking the national character of the Brotherhood. Since these power centers did not immediately succeed in nominating a new Jerusalem Patriarch who was fully recognized by all the interested parties, it became clear that Damianos’ position *vis-à-vis* their allegations was strengthened with the passage of time. Consequently, accepting defeat was the only means to ensure that an ethnic Greek would stay in the patriarchal office. As mentioned above, the spectre of Antioch haunted the Greek clergy of Jerusalem, and the only thing they could do to serve their Helleno-orthodox ends, in the name of which they had initiated their struggle against Damianos, was to withdraw until a new opportunity arose to dispute his authority. Damianos took back his See in late February 1909. One of his first decisions was to make Consul Kruglov an honorary member of the Brotherhood.<sup>60</sup> The Greek government successfully pressed the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Church of Greece to consent. At the same time, the main figures of the opposition, Meletios Metaxakis and Chrisostomos Papadopoulos, were exiled, their sole remaining ally being the Patriarchate of Alexandria.

## The Turkish Order

The outcome of the intra-ecclesial power struggle, however, did not calm the Palestinian Arab Orthodox, but rather increased their desire to attain their goals. Direct negotiations between the two sides took place throughout 1909, but the central power in Constantinople had the final word. The Porte established a five-member committee to inquire into the affair and draw up proposals for a solution to the crisis. Both the Patriarchate and the laity sent delegations to the capital. The local Orthodox community, with increased self-confidence, had a range of demands. These were:<sup>61</sup> 1) the creation of communal councils; 2) the establishment of a Mixed Council with a lay majority (one-third clergy to two-thirds laymen) to control all patriarchal affairs, including educational activities and *waqfs*; 3) the approval of the Mixed Council as a condition for any admission to the Brotherhood Mixed Council; 4) unrestricted admission of native Orthodox to the Brotherhood; 5) active participation of the laity in electing the patriarch; 6) the restriction of synodal competencies to spiritual matters; 7) representation of the parish clergy in the Synod; 8) the election of clerical officials (i.e., bishops) by the local community and their permanent residency in their dioceses; 9) the prohibition against engaging in secular occupations for all members of the Brotherhood; 10) the guarantee for equal opportunities within the Brotherhood regardless of ethnic criteria; 11) the unification of patriarchal revenues

and the publication of a yearly balance sheet; 12) the approval of the lay representatives and the parish clergy as a condition for deposing a patriarch; and 13) the registration of *waqf* properties in the name of the community.

Meeting these demands would inevitably lead to the “Arabization” of the Patriarchate, rendering it a domestic religious institution. Its operation would have followed a clearly secularized pattern of administration, a possibility unacceptable to the predominant guardian of the Christian Holy Places. Last but not least, there was no *waqf* founded in the name of the community, and its interference in the administration of properties not endowed directly for its use was legally prohibited.

For the Greek side, the Palestinian Arab claims were seen as divided into two main categories: a) those having a social character, such as education, health services, charity, and such; and b) those affecting the *Status Quo*, and thus the administration of the Holy Places, management of religious property, and their respective revenues.<sup>62</sup> According to the patriarchal memorandum to the Porte, the religious establishment would not accept the establishment of a Mixed Council nor lay participation in electing the patriarch. It was proposed instead to create a joint committee, composed of Orthodox notables and patriarchal representatives, to supervise judicial affairs, charity distribution, and educational activities.<sup>63</sup> These proposals fell short of satisfying the lay demands. The Greek religious establishment made no tangible concessions, clinging to the same nationalistic and orientalist views that inevitably led to a deadlock.

On May 30, 1910 the Government finally published the so-called “Turkish Order”<sup>64</sup> that determined generally the following:

1. The establishment of a Local Council in each diocese.
2. The creation of a Mixed Council composed of six lay members and six patriarchal representatives. The competencies of the Mixed Council were to be the following: a) family law questions (divorce, alimony); b) supervision of the management of real and movable property donated to the parish churches and the charitable institutions of the community; c) supervision over educational activities; and d) supervision over the distribution of charity. The Patriarchate, for its part, was ordered to allot to the Mixed Council one third of its revenues, namely an amount no less than 30,000 Turkish pounds, “as long as the revenue flow is unhampered.” A representative elected by the community of each town was to participate in the administration of the local parish church, school, and the other community institutions.
3. Arab Christians in Ottoman Palestine were free to enter the Brotherhood, in accordance with the regulations of the Patriarchate.
4. The non-titular bishops should spend a significant amount of their time in their dioceses in order to meet the pastoral needs of the community.

The “Turkish Order” was essentially a Pyrrhic victory for the Palestinian Arab Orthodox, since the institutional privileges of the hierarchy, which secured the Greek character of the Patriarchate, remained almost untouched. First of all, the various Local Councils as well as the Mixed Council were to begin operating only after the enactment of

their regulations. The responsibility for drawing up these regulations was given to the patriarchal authorities;<sup>65</sup> hence, any thought of actually accepting a lay majority was wishful thinking. As far as patriarchal finances were concerned, the Mixed Council could have no say in the administration of the Holy Places, nor the revenues derived from them that were to be managed solely by the patriarchal bureaucracy. Furthermore, the Greek hierarchy still made any decisions as to whether Palestinian Arab Orthodox could enter the Brotherhood. Last but not least, there was no change in the patriarchal electoral procedure, which remained an exclusively Greek matter.

Another governmental edict was enacted two years later on 7 February 1912 clarifying certain questions about the competencies and operation of the Mixed Council. These included such matters as the election of the lay representatives, the timing of elections, the venue of the meetings of the body, the decision-making process within it, the allocation of funding for it by the Patriarchate, as well as its exact responsibilities over education. This edict did not invalidate, but only modified the Order of 1910. Instead of adopting the Palestinian Arab Orthodox view, however, the central authorities strengthened Greek control, as Peri and Zisk rightly comment.<sup>66</sup> In particular it was ordered that in case of a tie within the Mixed Council between the clergy and the laity, the chairman's vote, namely that of the patriarchal representative, would be decisive. Thus, the amendment rendered the body ineffective, since the laity could not actually influence its decisions. Furthermore, the amendment gave the Synod the opportunity to review the patriarchal budget (which determined the revenues to be allocated to the Mixed Council) before submitting it to that body. This meant that the accounts could be "fixed" in order to minimize the amount to be provided.<sup>67</sup>

Still, the political gains for the Palestinian Arabs from the establishment of the Local as well as the Mixed Council, albeit limited, might be viewed as advances towards their emancipation. For, taking into account their previous status, the right to participate even partially in the administration of some communal activities, as well as to supervise to some degree the acts of the Patriarchate, were steps in the right direction. The Mixed Council, however, never really functioned. There were a few meetings between the two sides, without any practical result. The First World War and the financial embarrassment of the Patriarchate rendered its operation void.

## **Concluding Remarks**

As we can see from the relevant documents and historical events, the effects of the Young Turk Revolution on the religious power politics of the Orthodox Church of Jerusalem were important, but not substantial. The necessary legal changes were never truly applied, even though they had been implemented in other ecclesiastical territories, such as the Churches of Constantinople and Antioch. Why, then, did the new regime, instead of promoting secularity and the ethnic rights of the laity (which were more or less "institutional" principles of the Young Turk movement) reaffirm the power of the Greek religious apparatus over the Palestinian Arab Orthodox? According to Mattosian, the

“explanation to this behaviour is that the central government did not want to encourage the Arab-Orthodox community ... because of their complicity with the Arab National movement ... considered by the Young Turks as a threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire that they envisioned.”<sup>68</sup>

In our view, however, this thesis can be disputed at least for the period of 1908-1910. At that time, a crystallized and homogenous Arab national group did not exist which could assert its political autonomy and right to self-determination. The Arab national idea in Palestine was in the first stages of its formulation and was confined to a small elite group, while the political loyalty of the population to the *Ottomanist* ideology and the central political authorities was still very powerful.<sup>69</sup> Thus, the Palestinian Arab Orthodox cause did not comprise an actual threat to the state’s integrity. In fact, the powerful and effective national ideology that threatened Ottoman rule at that time was Greek, and a large segment of the Christian populations in Asia Minor and the Balkans identified with it.<sup>70</sup> Consequently, if we accept Mattosian’s rationale that the reason behind the stance was to undermine the developing separatist movements, their main target should have been the Greek community, as the most influential and active within the Ottoman territories. As such, the political authorities would surely have favoured the Palestinian Arab laity, not the Greek religious establishment, as they did. In this respect, it is interesting to note the thesis that the Young Turks did not follow a concrete nationalistic agenda or adopt forceful Turkification policies immediately after gaining power.<sup>71</sup>

Our view is that the Ottoman handling of the affair was probably based on domestic politics, as well as diplomatic considerations. First of all, the legal ground for altering the existing state of affairs was tenuous. As mentioned before, the application of Article 111 for establishing a Mixed Council for the supervision of patriarchal administration was nullified by other clauses of the same Constitution (Articles 11 and 118), which rendered the consent of the Greek Brotherhood a precondition for any change to the institutional framework of patriarchal operations, as defined by its Fundamental Law and the *Berat* of Damianos. It is also interesting to note that there was no relevant activism among the laity when the Constitution was enacted in 1876 until its suspension in 1878. In fact, there is no relevant reference to the Constitution in the emblematic “forbidden” book of the local Orthodox cause, *A Historical Glance at the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulcher*, first published in 1893 in Beirut.<sup>72</sup> The reason for this remains an open historical question, but it may be indicative of the vulnerability of the Palestinian Arab legal reasoning.

In addition, any likely change in the financial administration of patriarchal assets and revenues which would entail active lay participation would violate the existing legal and religious norms. The Patriarchate was structured as a monastic organization, governed by the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulcher, whose primary responsibility was the protection of Orthodox rights and privileges over Christian sanctuaries. The various endowments to the Holy Places were not, therefore, perceived as *waqf* properties of the community at large, but of the monastery. An Ottoman acceptance of the Palestinian Arab claim would probably put at stake the whole perception of monastic property and the legal paradigm of its management within the Empire at large. A possible total reversal of its legal status would have not only caused a plethora of administrative problems within the various



church organizations, but primarily it would have signified a rupture between the new regime with the important monastic centers of the Empire, such as Sinai or Mount Athos, whose *waqf* properties were enormous. From a political perspective, it was by all means more productive for the Young Turks to retain good relations with these institutions, which had a special symbolic value for the collective consciousness of the Orthodox populations at a time of fervent Greek nationalism. In other words, maintaining the loyalties of the economically dominant and politically powerful Greek community to the regime, within the context of the *Ottomanist* ideological paradigm, was more important than satisfying some intra-communal demands of a minor Arab ethnic Christian group at the periphery with no actual representation in the upper echelons of the central bureaucracy.

On the other hand, the Palestinian Arab Orthodox and the Greek national movements might not be seen as exclusive categories. In that case, the political behaviour of the Sublime Porte after 1911 might be explained in terms of its reaction against the decentralization tendencies of the Arab elites. Taking into account that the relationship with the Greek community was relatively stable and had little effect on the tension with Athens on the eve of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), it is possible that the Ottomans might have been wary of the effect of Arab nationalist agitation within the Orthodox community independently of the Greek factor. If we accept this hypothesis, support of the Greek stance *vis-à-vis* the laity through the edict of 1912 makes sense. As mentioned above, however, this scheme cannot adequately explain either the enactment of the “Turkish Order” in 1910 or the reinstatement of patriarch Damianos at about the same time.

The pro-Greek stance of the Ottomans might have been based on international politics as well. Any possible change in the administration of monastic property would have given the various Great Powers, such as France, a reason to intervene. The property of the various western-based religious organizations might have been in danger if the Latin or the Anglican lay communities in Jerusalem had demanded participation in the management of the finances and properties of their respective churches. The Ottoman government feared the likely intervention of Western powers if it failed to protect the ecclesiastical elites under their patronage. At the same time, satisfying the local Orthodox demands might be viewed as a violation of the *Status Quo* that defined the rights of each denomination over the Holy Places. Re-opening questions that had caused so many problems in the past (even having been the pretext for the Crimean War) was hardly a welcome diplomatic prospect for the Ottomans at this fluid period of political life. In addition, it would provide an additional argument for the imperialist Western powers in favor of maintaining the capitulations system, which involved their protectorates over certain Christian communities, at the time when that system’s abolition, or at least weakening, had become a strategic aim of Ottoman foreign policy. Last but not least, we may assume that British and German diplomacy played a role in the outcome of the affair in favor of the Greek objectives.<sup>73</sup> These governments had established good contacts with the senior clergy, whereas the promotion of the laity was perceived as a further penetration and gradual control of the Russians over the Patriarchate – a damaging prospect for their broader interests in the region.

We may conclude that the patriarchal crisis of 1908-1910 signified the loss of a great

opportunity for the “democratization” of religious administration. The high expectations for change and progress generated by the Young Turk Revolution were not confirmed in the case of the Orthodox community of Palestine, which even into the present faces the same problems.

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#### Endnotes

- 1 We are grateful to Salim Tamari and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions. The comments of the participants at the 20<sup>th</sup> International Congress of Comité International des Études Pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes (CIEPO) (Crete, 2012) have been helpful in articulating our arguments. We thank Alifa Saadia for editing our paper as well as Nadav Solomonovich for his help.
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- 3 Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914: Church and Politics in the Near East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).
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- 8 For the text: Charalampos Papastathis, *Oi*

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- 9 Demetrios Stamatopoulos, *Metarrithmysi kai ekkosmikeusi: pros mia anasynthesi tis istorias tou Oikoumenikou Patriarxeiou ton 19o aiona* [Reformation and Secularization: towards a Reformulation of the History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century] (Athens: Alexandria, 2003), 20-21.
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  - 12 Laura Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 16-43, 75-100.
  - 13 Noha Tadros Khalaf, *Les Memoires de ‘Issa al ‘Issa: Journaliste et Intellectuel Palestinien 1878-1950* (Paris: Editions Karthala, 2009), 61-64; R. Michael Bracy, *Printing Class: ‘Isa Al-‘Isa, Filastin, and the Textual Construction of National Identity, 1911-1931* (Lanham: University Press of America, 2011), 19-40.
  - 14 Laura Robson, “Communalism and Nationalism in the Mandate: The Greek Orthodox Controversy and the National Movement,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41 (2011): 15.
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  - 17 Pavlos Karolidis, *Peri tis ethnikis katagogis ton Orthodoxon Christianon Syrias kai Palaistinis* [Regarding the national origin of the Orthodox Christians of Syria and Palestine] (Athens: P.D. Sakellariou Press, 1909); Eleni Stoikou, “Ellinikes apopseis gia tin ekklesiastiki cheiraphetisi ton Orthodoxon Aravon sta patriarcheia Antiocheias kai Ierosolymon apo ta mesa tou 19ou os tis arches toy 20ou aiona,” [“Greek views about the ecclesiastical emancipation of the Orthodox Arabs in the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century”] *Kleio* 5 (2009): 155-196.
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- 21 Hopwood, *The Russian Presence*, 180-185.
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- 23 Miliaras, “Ta epi patriarchou Prokopiou,” 311-312.
- 24 Bertram and Young, *The Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem*, 27.
- 25 For an English translation of the text, see Bertram and Luke, *Report of the Commission*, 243-249.
- 26 Timotheos Themelis, *Episima eggrafa peri ton dikaion tou Patriarcheiou Ierosolymon (1908-1913)* [*Official Documents concerning the Rights of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem (1908-1913)*] (Jerusalem: Press of the Convent of the Holy Sepulchre, 1914), 50-53; Kallistos Miliaras, “O Aytokratorikos Kanonismos tou Patriarcheiou Ierosolymon kai i efarmogi aytoy” [“The Imperial Law of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and its Application”] *Nea Sion* 27 (1932): 369-383; Bertram and Young, *The Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem*, 27-30.
- 27 For the 1908-1910 crisis, see Timotheos Themelis, *Episima eggrafa*, 50. Explicit reference to Hierotheos’ encyclical was also made in the declaration of the First Arabic Orthodox Congress (Haifa, July 20, 1923). Bertram and Young, *The Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem*, 273-278.
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- 29 Yuval Ben-Bassat and Eyal Ginio, “Introduction: the Case Study of Palestine during the Young Turk Era,” in *Late Ottoman Palestine: The Period of Young Turk Rule*, ed. Yuval Ben-Bassat and Eyal Ginio (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 5; Gudrun Kraemer, *A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of Israel* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), 121-127.
- 30 Bertram and Luke, *Report of the Commission*, 250-251.
- 31 The disturbance began when part of the cemetery wall collapsed because of the construction of a new patriarchal dependence. When the Brotherhood started the renovations, the Arabs protested and blocked off access to the workers, afraid of a possible appropriation of the cemetery land by the Greek clergy, even though the latter was the owner. Moreover, they erased the sign of the Brotherhood from the door and replaced it with “Cemetery of the Indigenous Orthodox.” After negotiations and the mediation of the powerful urban notables, the laity agreed to withdraw with guarantees that the cemetery land would stay at its usufructuary. Anonymous Author, “Ekklisia Ierosolymon,” [“Church of Jerusalem”] *Ekklisiastikos Pharos* 1 (1908): 297-306; Archim. Meliton (Agiotafitis), *Skieraselis tis istorias tis Ekklisias Ierosolymon. Tis o enochos? [A Shady Page of the History of the Church of Jerusalem. Who is Guilty?]* (Athens: 1920).
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- 37 Katz and Kark, “The Church and Landed Property,” 385.
- 38 Demetrios Stamatopoulos, *To Agiotafiko Metochi Konstantinoupoleos, archeiakes piges (18os-*

- 200s ai.) [*The Metochion of the Holy Sepulcher in Constantinople, archival sources (18<sup>th</sup>- 20<sup>th</sup> cent.)*] (Athens: INE/EIE, 2010); Athanasios G. Helias, *Ta Metochia tou Panagiou Tafou kai tis Monis Sina stin Ellada (1830-1888)* [*The Metochia of the Holy Sepulcher and Sina Monastery in Greece (1830-1888)*] (Athens: Akritas, 2003).
- 39 Konstantinos Papastathis, "Church Finances in the Colonial Age: the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem under British Control, 1921-1925," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 49 (2013): 712-731; Konstantinos Papastathis and Ruth Kark, "Secularization and the Politics of Land Administration: the Case of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, from the Ottoman Times to the British Mandate," (under preparation).
- 40 Themelis, *Episima eggrafa* [*Official Documents*], 12-13.
- 41 For the Firman's text (in Greek) see, Kallistos Miliaras, *Oi Agioi Topoi en Palaistini kai ta ep' auton dikaia tou ellinikou ethnous* [*The Holy Places in Palestine and the Rights of the Greek Nation over them*] (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2002, reprint), II, 629-630.
- 42 Bertram and Young, *The Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem*, 138.
- 43 Themelis, *Episima eggrafa* [*Official Documents*], 14-15.
- 44 Hopwood, *The Russian Presence*, 197.
- 45 Meliton (Agiotafitis), *Skiera selis* [*A Shady Page*].
- 46 Bertram and Luke, *Report of the Commission*, 256-257.
- 47 Hopwood, *The Russian Presence*, 198.
- 48 *Metochion* is the immovable property of a church organization, such as a patriarchate or a monastery, far from its headquarters and usually in big cities, where its monks and representatives reside in order to carry out the various functions of their institution. *Metochion* could also be any kind of dependency, such as another monastery, as well as any other establishment or institution functioning under the supervision or responsibility of the sovereign monastery. The Jerusalem Patriarchate had such properties in Istanbul, Izmir, Athens, Moscow, Rumania, etc.
- 49 Themelis, *Episima eggrafa* [*Official Documents*], 40-41.
- 50 Meliton (Agiotafitis), *Skiera selis* [*A Shady Page*].
- 51 Bertram and Luke, *Report of the Commission*, 260.
- 52 Hopwood, *The Russian Presence*, 198.
- 53 Kenneth Cragg, "The Anglican Church," in *Religion in the Middle East: Three Religions in Concord and Conflict*, ed. Arthur J. Arberry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 570-595; Meir Verete, "Why Was a British Consulate Established in Jerusalem?" *English Historical Review*, 85 (1970), 316-345.
- 54 Thomas Hummel, "Between Eastern and Western Christendom: The Anglican Presence in Jerusalem," in *The Christian Communities in Jerusalem and the Holy Land: Studies on History, Religion and Politics*, ed. Antony O'Mahony (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003), 157.
- 55 The Protestants actually had no claim over the Holy Places and were focusing on missionary work. Hummel, "Between Eastern and Western Christendom," 151; Theodore E. Dowling, *The Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem* (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1913), 64-68.
- 56 Bryn Geffert, "Anglican Orders and Orthodox Politics," *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 52 (2006): 296-298.
- 57 Meliton (Agiotafitis), *Skiera selis* [*A Shady Page*].
- 58 Bertram and Luke, *Report of the Commission*, 260-264.
- 59 For details about the Antiochian crisis, see Hopwood, *The Russian Presence*, 159-179.
- 60 Hopwood, *The Russian Presence*, 199.
- 61 Bertram and Luke, *Report of the Commission*, 265-269.
- 62 Themelis, *Episima eggrafa* [*Official Documents*], 42.
- 63 Themelis, *Episima eggrafa* [*Official Documents*], 43-50.
- 64 Patriarchate of Jerusalem, *Episima eggrafa peri tou proskynimatikou kai dioikitikou kathestotis Ekklisias Ierosolymon* [*Official Documents concerning the Status Quo in the Holy Places and the Administration of the Church of Jerusalem*] (Jerusalem: Press of the Convent of the Holy Sepulchre, 1944), 30-40.
- 65 Themelis, *Episima eggrafa* [*Official Documents*], 68-72.
- 66 Oded Peri and Izhak Zisk, "The Ottoman Government's Resolution (1912) on the Internal Organization of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem," *Cathedra* 52 (1989), 131-148.
- 67 Peri and Zisk, "The Ottoman Government's Resolution (1912)."
- 68 Matossian, "The Young Turks Revolution," 529; Matossian, "Adminstrating the non-Muslims," 632.

- 69 Muhammad Muslih, "Arab Politics and the Rise of Palestinian Nationalism," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16 (1987): 77-94; Ernest Dawn, "The Origins of Arab Nationalism," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi et. al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 3-30.
- 70 Elli Skopetea, "Oi ellines kai oi exthroi tous: I katastasi tou ethnous stis arches tou 20ou aiona," ["Greeks and their enemies: the condition of the nation in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century"], in *I istoria tis Ellados tou 20ou aiona: oi aparches 1900-1922* [*History of Greece in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century: The Beginnings 1900-1922*], ed. Christos Chatziosif (Athens: Vivliorama, 1999), Vol. I, 9-35; Vangelis Kechriotis, "Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman Greeks or just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution," *Études Balkaniques* 41 (2005): 51-71.
- 71 Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
- 72 This book was written by archimandrite Raphael Hawaweeny (later bishop of Brooklyn) under the pseudonym 'Abd al-Ahad- Eshshafi against the Greek dominance in Antioch and Jerusalem as well as the corrupted methods employed for reproducing their religious authority. Hawaweeny's polemical study was one of the first to articulate a clear discourse from within in favor of the institutionally marginalized Arab congregation. The book was condemned by the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and its circulation was forbidden. 'Abd al-Ahad- Eshshafi, *Lamḥa ta'riḫiyya fī akhawīyat al-qabr al-muqaddas al-yūnāniya* (Beirut: 1893). [Translated by Michel Najim, *An Historical Glance at the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulcher* (California: Oakwood Publications, 1996)]. The text is open access: <http://www.najim.net/brotherenglish.pdf>. Accessed 17 June 2013.
- 73 Meliton (Agiotafitis), *Skiera selis* [*A Shady Page*].