“Deserving of the Closest Attention”: Ronald Storrs and the Communities of Jerusalem in the First Two Years of British Military Rule

Christopher Burnham

Abstract

This article explores the formative stages of Ronald Storrs’s governorship of Jerusalem by focusing on the nascent years of British control in Palestine from 1917 to 1919. While much scholarship has concentrated on Storrs’s patronage of the Pro-Jerusalem Society, his response to the Nabi Musa riots of April 1920, and his early relationship with the Zionist Commission, less consideration has been given to the establishment of his authority in Jerusalem during his first two years in the city. Drawing upon Storrs’s personal papers and archival research, it traces the roots of his style of governing back to his childhood experiences and education, together with his early years as a colonial administrator in Egypt. In doing so, greater context is given to Storrs’s initial perceptions of the city after his arrival in December 1917, and his subsequent relations with the communities of Jerusalem during the first two years of British rule.

Keywords:

Ronald Storrs; governor; personality; Jerusalem; military rule; OETA; education.

Few figures during Britain’s ill-fated involvement in Palestine elicited as much fury and vituperation as the British administrator Ronald Storrs. As the first military governor of Jerusalem under British rule from 1917 to 1920, and the first civilian governor from 1920 to 1926, he succeeded in angering and alienating Palestinians and Zionists alike, while being lionized by

T. E. Lawrence as “the most brilliant Englishman in the Near East.”[1] Discussion of Storrs’s tenure in Jerusalem has often been reduced to the impact of Orientalism on his worldview or, more simplistically, that he was pro-Zionist and anti-Arab (or vice-versa).[2] Such approaches suggest he was a governor with little agency, his decisions dictated by dogma alone.

Unsurprisingly, Storrs saw things differently. In his memoirs, *Orientations*, Storrs famously asserted: “I am not wholly for either, but for both. Two hours of Arab grievances drive me into the Synagogue, while after an intensive course of Zionist propaganda I am prepared to embrace Islam.”[3] Storrs clearly felt himself a neutral authority when governing Jerusalem. In doing so, he neatly exemplifies Rashid Khalidi’s argument that the British in Palestine viewed themselves as “arbiter … above or outside a ‘local’ conflict, rather than as part of it, or even the creator of it, as they were in many cases.”[4] Storrs’s beliefs and their impact on the city and its inhabitants should not be underestimated, particularly given the “consistently personal approach” that has been identified as a hallmark of his time in Palestine.[5]

This article discusses the roots and impact of Storrs’s personal approach during the nascent years of British control in Palestine from 1917 to 1919. While much has been written about Storrs’s patronage of the Pro-Jerusalem Society, his response to the Nabi Musa riots of April 1920, and his relationship with the Zionist Commission, less attention has been given to the establishment of his authority with key communities in Jerusalem during his first two years in the city.[6] This article thus considers how Storrs wove the personal with the political in his dealings with the Muslim and Christian populations of Jerusalem at this time. First, however, it explores Storrs’s formative years at school and university and his early career serving the British occupation in Egypt, identifying how these experiences influenced his initial perceptions of Jerusalem.

Civic Duty with an Imperial Predisposition: 1881–1917

Born on 19 November 1881 in Bury St. Edmunds, Ronald Henry Amherst Storrs was the eldest son of Anglican priest John Storrs and Lucy Anna Maria Cockayne-Cust (daughter of Henry Francis Cockayne-Cust MP). Both were to exert their influence on the young Storrs; his “Dearest Mother” was the main recipient of his correspondence while at Temple Grove and Charterhouse, while his father taught him to “cherish the Church of England [and] to work for it when in authority.”[7] Indeed, as a student at Charterhouse he seriously considered following in his father’s footsteps and becoming a vicar.[8]

Storrs’s time at Temple Grove Preparatory School (1892–95) and, more significantly, Charterhouse (1895–1900) helped steer him away from this religious calling. The former sought to provide students with “training for … the acceptance of responsibilities all over the world,” placing great emphasis on “patriotism and individual leadership,”[9] while at the latter Storrs fell under the influence of the Sixth

Form Master, Thomas Ethelbert Page, "one of the few," according to Storrs, "who could inspire as well as teach."[10] Page strove to understand the mentality and mindset of his students, just as Storrs would later attempt with Palestinian Arabs and Zionists in Palestine.[11] Most notably, Page believed in constant efforts to enable the oppressed and marginalized to fulfill their full potential.[12] Page's impact on Storrs's trajectory is clear. As he neared the end of his time at Charterhouse, Storrs encouraged his mother to look for jobs for him in the imperial or domestic service.[13] Temple Grove's emphasis on individual leadership across the empire met within Storrs a sense of civic duty provided by T. E. Page. Both would help formulate Storrs's outlook in Jerusalem.

In many ways, Charterhouse in the late nineteenth century provided the perfect breeding ground for a future colonial administrator like Storrs. The school maintained strong links with alumni serving in various roles across the globe, actively celebrating their achievements in the *Carthusian*, the school magazine for which every student paid sixpence a month as part of their school fees.[14] These salutations reached fever pitch during the Second Boer War, where the Old Carthusian Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Baden Powel was glorified in prose and verse for his actions.[15] The bond between alma mater and alumni transcended continents and oceans, creating a community where imperial duty and sacrifice was admired and aspired to.

This is not to suggest that Storrs always felt at ease at Charterhouse. Letters to his mother show that he often suffered from homesickness.[16] He experienced similar emotions early in his time in Egypt, expressing his loneliness in his new role at the Ministry of Finance in Cairo.[17] Such isolation was a far cry from his experiences studying Classical Tripos at the University of Cambridge from 1900 to 1904. While he found his college, Pembroke, lacked "*chaleur communicative*," Storrs's membership in the Decemviri, an elite ten-man debating society whose members at the time included John Maynard Keynes and Charles Tennyson, helped make amends.[18] Tennyson encapsulated much of the strength and vibrancy of Storrs's personality at Cambridge, describing the future governor of Jerusalem as "a strange figure of so vehement a personality that you cannot understand how even the dead weight of propriety amidst which he lives can have so long concealed him from you."[19] The absence of social stimulation, so keenly felt early in his time in Egypt after the opportunities provided at Cambridge, was not to be repeated when he arrived in Palestine. Soon after his arrival in Jerusalem, Storrs set about creating the networks and relationships that his new professional responsibilities required and his personality desired.

"Two and Seventy Jarring Sects": Storrs Arrives in Jerusalem

Storrs was in Cairo when he heard news of Jerusalem's surrender to British forces and General Edmund Allenby's subsequent entry to the city on foot on 9 December 1917. The city, and later Palestine as a whole, had entered a period of what Salim Tamari has described as "cultural liminality" between the Ottomans and the British.[20] With typical flourish, Storrs declared he would have given his soul to have been there. However, he did not have to wait long for this opportunity. On 15 December, Brigadier-General Sir

Gilbert Clayton, whom Storrs had worked with in the Arab Bureau in Egypt, requested his assistance in his new role of Chief Political Officer for Palestine. On 20 December, Storrs arrived in the city that had captured his imagination: Jerusalem.[21]

Yet Storrs did not come without preconceived political and personal ideas about Jerusalem. Issam Nassar argues that "a place … has more than one identity, each designating a particular experience in time."[22] Storrs's experiences in December 1917 were framed through prior visits to the city and his own personal faith. He had visited Jerusalem seven years before with his beloved uncle Harry Cust and Cust's wife, Nina. Viewing his trip in 1910 as a "pilgrimage," Storrs recalled "the brooding poignancy of the atmosphere," which, coupled with Cust's recitation of Tennyson's *In Memoriam* on the Mount of Olives, left a powerful impression.[23] This trip, together with Cust's sudden death in March 1917, undoubtedly impacted Storrs's early perception of the city. Indeed, Storrs's first diary entry after his arrival in December 1917 recalled his uncle's attempt to buy a Bible printed in Jerusalem.[24]

Storrs viewed the city as a location with deeply personal memories writ large through recent bereavement, and as a site of Christian veneration. British officials in Palestine and London were acutely aware of the religious implications of a Christian power taking control of the Holy City; at the same time they also expressed concerns about alienating Muslims around the world due to the occupation of Jerusalem and the Balfour Declaration. As such, they attempted to downplay the occupation of Jerusalem as a political, religious, or colonial maneuver, and instead emphasized its military nature. They did this not only to protect religious sensitivities and avoid local resentment, but also to avoid antagonizing European allies, in particular France and Italy.[25] But official policy is one thing, deeply held personal beliefs quite another. Biblical Orientalism, which used, and continues to use, carefully selected elements of religion to describe and control the "Holy Land," provided the cultural background to Storrs's own views of the city (he was, after all, the son of a clergyman). By defining the local residents of Palestine, whatever their religion, through the prism of the Bible, Palestine became suspended in biblical time, allowing tourists and imperialists to make direct links between ancient religious tales and twentieth-century Palestine.[26]

Storrs opens one of his chapters on the city in his autobiography, *Orientations*, with the first line of Psalm 122, "I was glad when they said unto me…," assuming that readers would recognize the biblical reference to the Holy City, and would also be aware of the psalm's call to "pray for the peace of Jerusalem."[27] Here religious and civic duty converges: the peace and prosperity of Jerusalem depends upon the prayers of the faithful. As governor – and as one of the faithful – Storrs believed he could deliver these aims.

Such lofty responsibilities seemed highly unlikely in December 1917. The incumbent governor, General William Borton, had not settled in the city, suffering from what Storrs described as "melancholia." Shortly after Christmas, Storrs was offered his post.[28] He was now a contracted employee of the newly formed Occupied Enemy Territory Administration South (OETA South). Possessing no military background, Storrs would instead rely on his knowledge of Arabic and administrative experience

in Egypt to establish himself in his new role, facets that made him somewhat of an exception in the nascent military government of Palestine.[29]

Storrs was quick to identify "the broad problems that faced the city" and to proffer blame for the situation. He had earlier suggested that his temporary role was to "help in restraining the two and seventy jarring sects" in the city.[30] Now, with a position of power and relative permanence, he appealed to general headquarters, claiming that:

> Jerusalem is as perfect a specimen of organized pauperism as you would wish to find … divided up into numerous and mutually hostile communities and subjected to centuries of organized pauperization … the Turks have not the reputation … of leaving much that is eatable or moveable.[31]

In letters home, Storrs blamed the "Turks" for the pitiable state of the city.[32] While conditions were undoubtedly poor in the city as a result of wartime pressures, such a narrow focus served a narrative of backward-looking, inept, and cruel Ottoman rule and competent, modernizing British rule. Jerusalem's modernization was thus viewed as a result of British benevolence, Zionist immigration, and European influence: a "limited perspective" that did not "take into account the internal dynamics within the city."[33] As a recent appointee of a newly occupying power, Storrs was unlikely to truly understand such dynamics.

Far from being a city of "organized pauperism" as described by Storrs, Jerusalem had been modernizing under Ottoman rule from the 1880s onward: from improved sanitation as a result of paving main roads to the establishment of a municipal hospital that could be accessed by all inhabitants regardless of their nationality or religion.[34] A deal for a new tramway, street lighting, and a modernized water system, which the Ottoman municipality had in 1914 with Evripidis Mavrommatis, a Greek Ottoman from Istanbul, had been placed on hold with the outbreak of World War I.[35] The geographic footprint of the city also increased under late Ottoman rule. Population increases, Jewish immigration, and sanitary conditions within the Old City led to new developments beyond the city walls.[36] Jews established new planned neighborhoods, and missionary projects such as the Russian Compound on Jaffa Road were erected, while Christians and Muslims also built private residences outside of the city walls.[37]

Estimating the population of post-war Jerusalem is difficult, but Roberto Mazza's careful corroboration of various extant sources, combining scholarly research and estimates by contemporary Western visitors to the city, suggests that the population of Jerusalem in 1914 was approximately eighty thousand, of which about fifty thousand were Jewish, fifteen thousand Christian, and fifteen thousand Muslim. By the end of World War I, the population of the city had dropped to between fifty-five thousand and sixty thousand, though Jews remained the largest community.[38]

Dividing Jerusalem's population into Muslims, Jews, and Christians, however, does a disservice to the sheer multiplicity of different faiths, rites, and rituals present. It also obscures differences in class, ethnicity, language and area of residence.[39] Within and between each community there existed divisions, and while relations could

become strained, they were far from the "mutually hostile" state of affairs presented by Storrs. Muslims were the largest community in Palestine but formed a minority in Jerusalem. According to Storrs, this community differed from the Christian and Jewish population as it was not "divided into rites, degrees, or denominations but into two great partisanships, the Husaynis and the Nashashibis."[40] The Jewish community was split primarily between Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews. The former, who spoke Yiddish, emigrated mainly from Germany and Eastern Europe in two aliyahs from 1882 onward and between 1904–10, while the latter were subdivided into Yemeni, Bukharan, Kurdish, Damascene, Georgian, Persian, and Moroccan communities. The general identity of the Sephardim overrode these divisions and united them when necessary, whereas the Ashkenazim were further divided along religious lines between Orthodox, Ultra-Orthodox, Hasidic, and Agudist sects. Some secular Jews also formed part of this community.[41] Storrs was himself cognizant of this fragmentation, noting in *Orientations* that certain strands of Orthodox Jewry in the city were "not only not pro- but violently anti-Zionist," desiring only "to be left in peace and … practice … their religion." The governor would go on to forge a good relationship with the Orthodox Jews of Jerusalem, suggesting that their sympathies may have been stoked by Zionist attacks against him.[42]

Intercommunal relations prior to British control were fluid as opposed to binary in nature, shaped both by World War I and by the transition from Ottoman to British rule. Early attempts to provide aid for the local population in 1914 were led by the military governor of Jerusalem, Zaki Bey, culminating in a one-off meeting of Jews and Muslims in November 1914. This was important for two reasons: firstly, it represented Ottoman attempts to secure loyalty to their empire, and secondly, it demonstrated efforts by Jews and Muslims to create a united front against the Christians in the city, with the Sephardi community in particular concerned by Christian attempts to incite Muslims against the Jews.[43] Tensions also existed between the New Yishuv (Jewish immigrants to Palestine after 1882) and the Old Yishuv (those Jews who lived in Palestine prior to this date), and between Armenians who had lived for generations in Jerusalem and those refugees who arrived after the Armenian Genocide.[44] Meanwhile, intercommunal relief work was made possible through the auspices of the Red Crescent Society, when the locust plague of 1915 saw all residents of Jerusalem aged between nineteen and sixty commandeered by the municipality to collect locust eggs so that they could be burned.[45]

While confessional affiliation was undoubtedly important in late Ottoman Jerusalem, it was not the only form of self-identification. The diaries of Wasif Jawhariyyeh, a well-connected Jerusalemite musician, suggest that the *mahallat* or neighborhood unit, with substantial intercommunal cooperation within different *mahallat*s, primarily determined identity. This was especially the case during the city's numerous festivals, including Ramadan, Nabi Musa, Purim, and Easter.[46] The diaries of Conde de Ballobar, the Spanish consul in Jerusalem during World War I, also offer a revealing glimpse of community interactions. On Christmas Eve 1915, the Muslim Zaki Bey attended the service at the Church of the Nativity – a "thing

that they would surely not imagine in Europe."[47] The following November during the observance of a Day of Remembrance, Ballobar observed: "In the minaret of the mosque which is across from the Holy Sepulchre there were two Franciscans, various Armenians and two Jews. One does not see this anywhere but Jerusalem."[48] Thus, Storrs's assertion of centuries of organized pauperism and mutual hostility are tempered. While there was undoubtedly food shortages and great hardship in Jerusalem, they were the result of short-term decisions made by the Ottomans during the war, not the result of hundreds of years of mismanagement.[49] In making these judgments, the new governor was reflecting the dominant narrative that Britain had removed the Ottomans' "barbarous yoke" from Jerusalem. The reality of life in the city (and in Palestine more widely) prior to British rule was somewhat different to these initial impressions.[50]

Storrs and the Communities of Jerusalem: Where the Personal and the Political Entwined

As governor of a diverse city, Storrs came into contact with a variety of different groups and interests throughout the course of a working day. In a telling example, between 10:00 AM and noon on Monday, 3 June 1918, Storrs met with: police and gendarmerie officers; the grand mufti and qadi of Jerusalem, officials of the shari'a court, and ulema; the grand rabbi and other rabbis of the Jewish community; ecclesiastical heads of the different Christian communities; the mayor, along with members and officials of the municipality; officials from the law courts; the director-general and other officials of the waqf administration; the director of public education and other education officials; notables of Jerusalem; notables of villages around Jerusalem; and officials from the finance and public debt department of the administrative office.[51] This schedule highlights the multitude of interests Storrs had to consider when governing Jerusalem, although the tight timescale (each meeting was allotted approximately ten minutes) would suggest an approach to consulting the communities that was more performative than practical. The Zionist Commission is notably absent from the agenda on this day, but had a key influence on affairs in the city throughout the military administration.

Writing in early 1918, a somewhat surprised Storrs asserted that "all these sects, creeds, nations and communities, though mutually hating and hated, are in the ordinary relations of life so far as we are concerned, friendly, agreeable, and not unentertaining persons, deserving of the closest attention."[52] This was civic duty through an imperialist lens: the commendable attitude of the city's inhabitants toward the British made them worthy of assistance. In providing them with his attention, Storrs was to raise and dash the hopes of various communities throughout his time as governor, starting in the formative years of British military occupation.

Within days of his arrival in the city – and prior to his appointment as governor – Storrs had sought out two of the key notables of the Husayni family: Mayor Husayn al-Husayni who was president of the municipality and his cousin, Kamil al-Husayni

– mufti of Jerusalem.[53] His initial impressions of the mayor were that he possessed "honest and obliging weakness," while Storrs bonded with the mufti because of his knowledge of Egypt. Such visits were not mere pleasantries: Storrs's diaries note that throughout the course of his conversation with Kamil he was able to gather some "*faits divers*" regarding the waqf and Orphanage Treasury.[54] The necessity of knowledge and the pleasures of socializing were already coalescing in his approach to key Jerusalemites, but nonetheless it marked the start of what was for Storrs a period of "close and friendly contact" with the mufti.[55]

The occupation of Palestine by the British saw the imposition of martial law, halting reforms for mayoral elections that had been proposed by the Ottomans. When in early 1918 Mayor Husayn al-Husayni died, the role of appointing a new mayor therefore fell to the governor. Tradition dictated the appointment of a relative of the deceased and Husayn's older brother, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, was selected as the new mayor of Jerusalem.[56] With a background in provincial administration, Musa Kazim was one of the first urban notables to be integrated into the Ottoman administration.[57] This clearly impacted his approach to the mayoralty, with Storrs recalling that he had "all the dignity and some of the good qualities of the traditional Ottoman Governor."[58] However, the relations that Storrs cultivated with the Husayni family were not without their detractors. Palestinian intellectual and educationalist Khalil al-Sakakini tersely noted that Palestinian Arabs disliked Storrs because "the Husayni family are the only people he knows. He listens only to their opinion."[59] Indeed, British commitments to establishing a Jewish National Home as stipulated by the Balfour Declaration, and later adapted as part of the terms of Britain's Mandate in Palestine, saw their relationship deteriorate throughout the period of military rule, culminating in Storrs's removal of Musa Kazim as mayor following the Nabi Musa riots of April 1920 and the appointment of Raghib Bey Nashashibi as his successor. In doing so, Storrs would sow further discord among the notables of the city.

The aforementioned "cultural liminality" between the Ottomans and the British that Palestine had entered in 1917 would be played out in Storrs's approach to the celebration of Muslim ceremonies. The military governor placed great importance on this, viewing it as a "testing ground for the paradigm of British rule in Palestine." In particular, he viewed the Nabi Musa festival, held every April in Jerusalem, as "an opportunity to establish a patronage relationship with the Muslim elite and to demonstrate his respect for Islam, thus rendering the transition from Ottoman to European rule more palatable."[60] This promotion of "historical continuity with the Ottomans" was exhibited by various British officials during the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) years in the hope that such stability would help reconcile Palestinian Arabs to British rule and their sponsorship of Zionism, while also demonstrating British accommodation of Muslim traditions within this new reality.[61]

The 1918 festival was the first to be held under British rule and Storrs took on a key role on the first day of festivities: the Friday of the Banners (*jum'at al-a'lam*). Greeting local notables and shaykhs at Government House, Storrs received the banners of the

Prophet, two banners of Nabi Da'ud (the prophet David), and two of the Haram al-Sharif, saluting the banners after prayers. In doing so, the new governor took on the mantle of his Ottoman successor.[62] Such an appearance was not merely an attempt at maintaining the much vaunted (but often vanquished) status quo. It represented an effort by Storrs to establish himself as an expert of Muslim and Arab tradition with the residents of the city, while also helping to establish relationships with key figures within the municipal and religious communities.[63]

These relationships were further cemented by the hosting of parties, an understandable pursuit given Storrs's initial isolation in Egypt, with many functions taking place at both the governorate and Storrs's private residence. As a noted poet and oud player, Jawhariyyeh played at several such events and would later aid the governor in the purchase of Eastern antiquities, as well as briefly working alongside Charles Ashbee, the secretary of the Pro-Jerusalem Society and civic advisor to Storrs.[64] He recollects in his memoirs how the registry room at Governorate House was often "turned into a celebration hall where singing, dancing, and acting went on during business hours in the presence of various local guests" who attended on Storrs's invitation.[65] He further recalls a gathering at Storrs's residence that was attended by Muslim notables and civil servants from the Jerusalem district, where the military governor impressed his captive audience with a political speech in classical Arabic. Jawhariyyeh himself was requested by Storrs to dress in traditional Arabic attire while playing the oud.[66] As Yair Wallach notes, it is as if Storrs himself believed that he understood "the Middle East better than its local inhabitants, so much so that he could dictate their suitable attire."[67] Likewise, Abdul Latif Tibawi questions Storrs's claims to linguistic expertise, arguing that the Arabic contained in *Orientations* belie a "pretentious amateur" in the subject.[68] In any event, the efforts Storrs took to demonstrate an appreciation of Arabic and Islamic culture – no matter how inaccurate this understanding was – placed him in a small minority of British officials, who, like his more illustrious friend T. E. Lawrence, used this knowledge to inform their attitudes and approaches to the region.

The strengths and limitations of this approach are exhibited in a further anecdote from Jawhariyyeh's diaries. Reflecting on a demonstration against the Balfour Declaration and the separation of Palestine from Greater Syria, the oud player described how the procession stopped outside of the governorate, demanding to hear what Storrs had to say:

> When the crowds saw the governor, they fell silent. Storrs then spoke in his rotund voice and said, "And make them ready for whatever you can of force," and went back in immediately. It was an extremely funny act but these comedies did not fool the patriotic Arabs that knew Storrs well.[69]

The military governor quoted to the assembled crowd verse 60 of the eighth chapter of the Qur'an, Surat al-Anfal (the spoils). Verses 60 to 66 instruct Muslims to be ready for war to defend Islam, but also to make peace if the other side wishes to.[70] In quoting

this verse, Storrs utilized his knowledge of both Arabic and Islam – together with his quick wit – to establish his position as a reasonable intermediary and defuse the concerns of the demonstrators. However, as Jawhariyyeh notes, such an act did little to dampen growing discontent at British rule, and Storrs's role within it.

Shortly after the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, Britain and France published the Anglo-French Declaration. It took the form of an official communique from the British and French governments, with copies given to the press and posted on public noticeboards in towns and villages across Palestine, Syria and Iraq. In a bid to allay Arab suspicions of imperialist intentions by the British and the French, the document declared that any new governments should be determined by the local populations themselves.[71]

The day after the declaration was publicized, Storrs arrived at his office to be greeted by Muslim and Christians looking for further clarification. In particular, they wanted to know whether Palestine was included as part of Syria in plans to establish "indigenous" government. In an example of the limited authority he had as governor of a city, as opposed to being part of the national administration, he "replied to them in general terms, and they left apparently satisfied." Expressing his concern at the timing and content of the declaration, Storrs declared he would "do his best to stifle the manifestation" but this would be a hard job as "they now consider themselves to have received a definitive mandate from the British and French Governments."[72]

With regard to shutting down any petitions to the French, Storrs sent for the mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Kazim al-Husayni. He informed the mayor that, "while everyone was free to hold what political opinions they desired, they could not, so to speak, take their stand upon a political platform and continue to remain in the service of a non-political Military Administration." Next Storrs turned his attention to the Latin Catholic members of the committee, having eliminated in his mind the "two chief members." He gave the Latin patriarch the names of his members who were on the committee, and warned those who continued to pursue the petition that "the British Government and the Allies were not in the mood for receiving sectional petitions on political matters at a time such as this."[73] In this way, Storrs was able to pick-off any potential troublemakers to the detriment of the Palestinians, Muslim and Christian alike, over whom he ruled.

In a similar vein to his approach to Muslim festivities, Storrs placed great symbolism upon the celebration of Christian ceremonies, with the various strands of Storrs's *Weltanschauung* demonstrated in his approach to maintaining order during the Greek Orthodox Festival of Sabt al-Nur (Holy Fire or, literally, Saturday of Light) before Easter. British antipathy toward the event long predated Storrs's arrival in Jerusalem, with Victorian Evangelicals viewing the ceremony as representative of the chaos and disorder endemic in non-Western Christian practice, not least after a tragic crush in 1834 led to the deaths of four hundred believers.[74] For Storrs, the son of an Anglican priest, Christian traditions and festivals as practiced by the Church of England were familiar territory. Celebrations in Jerusalem, although broadly following the same liturgical calendar, were a different matter altogether. While Eastertide "almost

throughout the world" was the "season when, if only for three days, the death of strife becomes the victory of peace," in the Holy Land and "most of all in the Holy City," Easter meant "for generations the sharpening of daggers and the trebling of garrisons."[75] With his awareness for trouble heightened following skirmishes between the Greek Orthodox and Armenian churches in the Grotto of the Nativity in Bethlehem during their respective celebrations of Epiphany and Christmas (which happened to fall on the same day), Storrs prepared with great trepidation for the 1918 Festival of the Holy Fire.[76]

The potential for trouble was further compounded by internal disputes within the Greek Orthodox Church. World War I had placed the patriarchate in severe financial difficulties, with Patriarch Damianos secretly permitting the sale of land to Zionists to help balance the books. Moreover, tensions existed between the Arab laity and the Greek hierarchy, with the former trying to wrest control of the patriarchate from the latter.[77] Finally, and of most immediate concern to Storrs in his preparations, the Orthodox Church possessed no priest in Jerusalem higher than an archimandrite, whose low status would preclude the ceremonies from taking place at all.

Ever aware of the politics of perception and sensitive to the fact that celebrations should take place with a "maximum of decorum," Storrs wrote to OETA headquarters expressing the negative impact of any cancellation on the Christian community. He also viewed the ceremony as an opportunity to show "fitting proof of the spirit of the new, as well as a contrast to that of the old administration" if the festivities could go ahead with "a minimum parade of armed force."[78] Keen to avoid following the Ottoman approach of deploying six hundred troops to maintain order, the military governor, on the advice of petitions from both the executive committee of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and the lay community, recommended the appointment of a high-ranking prelate to oversee formalities.

Unsurprisingly, the two proposed different candidates: the patriarchate advocated requesting a metropolitan from the patriarchate of Alexandria, while the lay community recommended Porphyrios II, archbishop of Mount Sinai. Storrs himself felt that Monseigneur Photios, patriarch of Alexandria, would be best placed to take on such a task, were it not for his dislike of Damianos, the exiled patriarch of Jerusalem and subsequent concerns that he would omit Damianos's name from the prayers. He also rejected asking Photios for a metropolitan from Alexandria on the grounds that permitting entry "to a high ecclesiastical dignitary of one denomination might involve similar concessions to other churches, which it is for the present undesirable to grant."[79]

Recognizing the impracticalities of involving the patriarch of Alexandria either directly or indirectly, Storrs requested that Porphyrios II be placed in charge of the ceremony. However, he was not simply following the advice of the lay community alone. The military governor knew the archbishop of Mount Sinai personally and professed to having "official and social relations" with him for the last ten years. Moreover, he was "equally well known to General Clayton, and has, I believe, had more than one conversation with the Commander-in-Chief."[80] Storrs also acknowledged

that Porphyrios "would be the first to see the advantage to his own prestige if these difficult weeks could pass off under his presidency without disturbances."[81] OETA accepted this proposal, with Porphyrios II being appointed locum tenens of the patriarch for the duration of the ceremony.[82]

The military governor's preparations for the Holy Fire in 1918 are illuminating. As the first observance of the festival under Christian authority for several centuries, Storrs was eager for celebrations to mark a departure from what he identified as an inelegant Ottoman approach. His disapproval of their methods, together with his perception of the city as a hotbed of sectarian violence and his strong beliefs in the sanctity and decorum of Christian festivities, led him to take an active role in preparations. Concerns surrounding the management of "two and seventy jarring sects" saw him utilize his knowledge of the internal affairs of the Greek Orthodox Church alongside his own existing social network, so important to Storrs after his lonely first years in Egypt. His appointment of Porphyrios II as locum tenens was a bid to ensure that the festival passed in a peaceable manner. Once more Storrs's approach entwined the personal and the political.

"Terms of Friendship and Confidence": Storrs's Personal Approach under Scrutiny

Storrs's handling of the first ceremony of the Holy Fire in 1918 was a success acknowledged at the highest levels of the administration. Writing to the chief administrator of Palestine, General Arthur Money, Allenby recognized that the military governor's "tact and skillful handling of a difficult and delicate situation could not have been surpassed. He has shewn [*sic*] himself to be an Administrator of a very high order."[83] With recognition came new responsibilities: following the advance of British troops into Syria in September 1918, Storrs was sent to establish a new northern branch of OETA in Haifa. In December, he was elevated to the rank of brigadier-general when he was appointed acting chief administrator during Money's annual leave.[84] His stock was so high that Money recommended Storrs for a Commander of the British Empire medal (which he subsequently received in January 1919) and confided that he wanted the military governor to be his successor as chief administrator.[85]

Storrs assumed these duties as some members of OETA were growing concerned with London's policy in Palestine. General Money was acutely aware of the problematic nature of Britain's commitment to the Balfour Declaration, arguing that both Muslims and Christians were apprehensive that Palestine was "going to be handed over to the Jews."[86] He strongly felt that the British government should clarify its position: that the declaration supported a Jewish homeland in Palestine, not a state or sovereign government. If Britain were to support a Jewish government "in any form," an Arab rising was guaranteed.[87] In response, Zionists lobbied Whitehall to pay no heed to arguments that aimed to soften Jewish expectations in Palestine. London subsequently pressured Money and Chief Political Officer Gilbert Clayton to amend their views.

Both refused and resigned their positions in 1919. Storrs, expecting to succeed Money as chief administrator, was passed over in favor of Major-General C. F. Watson on the suspicion that Storrs was not sufficiently pro-Zionist.[88] The relations Storrs had fomented with the communities of Jerusalem were now being used against him by the Zionist movement.

Watson's return to Jerusalem in August 1919 saw the military governor receive the strongest criticism yet of his administration of the city. On leave until early October, Storrs returned to find that the new chief administrator had on 24 September asked London to dismiss Storrs from his post. Accused of being too preoccupied with religious politics, and with allegations that Jerusalem was calmer in his absence, the governor "begged and was justly afforded, the opportunity of confronting the Chief Administrator."[89]

Successfully upholding his position and avoiding dismissal, Storrs noted that it was not stated in which direction he was influenced by religious politics. Disputing the charge that he had a tendency for "internal politics, whatever they may mean," he asserted pithily that:

> Jerusalem has seldom been in the past, and is unlikely to be in the future, and most certainly is not now, untinged by a certain interest in religion … And if by "internal" is meant an undue interference in the interior economy of religious establishments, I maintain, and can prove that this was never done in Jerusalem until my departure on leave.[90]

Defending his administration, Storrs maintained that his custody of Jerusalem had seen "constructive innovations, over and above the normal machinery of government, owing to my personal initiative," citing reforms to the Jerusalem prison, the regulation of food supplies, the establishment of a municipal library reading room, the founding of a chamber of commerce and a school of music, the refurbishment of the Ophthalmic Hospital, and the creation of the Pro-Jerusalem Society as proof of his interventions.[91]

On the second charge, Storrs reiterated his belief that Jerusalem in the spring was a tinderbox due to the confluence of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian festivals, making the city the "political and religious storm centre of Palestine."[92] Concluding his defense with what could be viewed as a subtle attack on the new chief administrator, Storrs accepted that:

> Unpopularity for a time in certain political circumstances and with certain political sections, would even if true, not necessarily be discreditable. But the terms of friendship and confidence on which I have lived with the various Communities of Jerusalem for the last two years have been attested by many public expressions of good will, these sufficiently known to any adequately informed person, able and willing to keep himself in direct contact with the public.[93]

In a position such as Storrs's, strong friendships with the various groupings of Jerusalem could easily be alleged as showing an undue interest in internal politics. The military governor's deep personal need for a wide social and cultural network borne of the intense loneliness and homesickness he experienced early in his administrative career meant that the lines between the personal and the professional could easily become blurred.

This commitment to fomenting a wide social and cultural network, coupled with the freedom to pursue his own initiatives and a strong belief in intercommunal cooperation, saw Storrs turn to his great loves forged during his time at Charterhouse and Cambridge: chess and music. He founded a Chess Club with a Jewish treasurer, a Latin Catholic secretary, and several Muslim members. As club president, he organized a tournament that saw the first four prizes go to Jews, with the fifth prize being taken by the military governor himself.[94]

Similarly, he established the Jerusalem School of Music, but his visions of music uniting Christian, Muslim, and Jew alike were soon halted. Becoming increasingly irate with the lack of engagement from all sectors of society, Storrs haughtily wrote in the *Palestine Weekly*, the English-language supplement to the right-leaning Hebrew newspaper *Do'ar Ha-yom*, that "it is for Palestinian audiences to show themselves worthy of the opportunity they have been given."[95] Despite his best efforts, 90 percent of the school's membership remained Jewish. With regret, he handed over the school to the Jewish community on the condition that it continued to be called the Jerusalem School of Music and that it should remain open "to all seeking instruction without distinction of race or creed."[96]

For Storrs, these enterprises were intended to be "international and non-political." He believed that:

> Music is purer than visual art, and offers less opportunity for the cruder and more obvious forms of nationalistic propaganda … It is my firm belief … that even a mixed Palestine audience could hardly extract political significance from a sonata, a quintet, or a symphony.[97]

Storrs's position as governor of an occupying force facilitating the Balfour Declaration meant that establishing a Western music school in the city was never going to be a "non-political" act. Moreover, his accounts of the music school and chess club in *Orientations* imply that Palestinian Arabs were not interested or capable of participating in cultural activities. As Ilia Xypolia argues, the "peer 'civilization' that could cooperate with the superior culture of the West [as Storrs perceived it] was only the Jewish one."[98] By pursuing his own personal interests, he implanted a Western musical culture in Jerusalem that would more likely chime with the Zionists given their European origins. These actions, together with his protection of the British position in Palestine, would lead to Storrs appearing to be increasingly disingenuous in his claims to be "not wholly for either, but for both" as his time in Jerusalem progressed.

Conclusion

Reflecting on his first years in Jerusalem, Storrs would describe his period as military governor as granting him "the bliss of arbitrary rule."[99] The freedoms he received as governor allowed him to involve himself in local politics and intrigue in a greater way than would later be possible following the establishment of a civilian administration in Palestine in July 1920. At this point Storrs had established the key hallmarks of his time governing Jerusalem: a deeply personal approach that melded the professional requirements of his job with a desire to create social and cultural opportunities for all the communities of the city *on his terms*, in order to fulfil his need for society and allay potential feelings of loneliness and homesickness. This style of rule was borne of his experiences as a student at Temple Grove, Charterhouse, and Cambridge, and his initial struggles in Egypt. When Storrs utilized a similar approach with the Zionist Commission during and after their inaugural visit to Palestine in April 1918, he succeeded only in placing himself in an even more difficult position. As a result of his desire to ingratiate himself with all parties, their hopes and expectations were raised in such a way that, throughout his time in Jerusalem, Storrs could never truly satisfy them.

Christopher Burnham received his PhD from the European Centre for Palestine Studies at the University of Exeter in 2022. His first book on Ronald Storrs's time as Governor of Jerusalem (from which this article draws its argument) is scheduled for publication by Routledge in September 2024.

Endnotes

1 T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (London: Wordsworth, 1997 [1926]), 40.

2 See Ilia Xypolia, "Orientations and Orientalism: The Governor Sir Ronald Storrs," *Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies* 11 (Summer 2011): 25–43; Noah Hysler Rubin, "An Orientalist in Jerusalem: Ronald Storrs and Planning of the City," in *The First Governor: Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Jerusalem, 1918–1926*, ed. Nirit Shalev-Khalifa (Tel Aviv: Eretz Israel Museum, 2010), 89–107. A. L. Tibawi contends that in Jerusalem "everything Storrs forbade the Arabs was allowed at least to the Zionist Jews." See: A. L. Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914–1921* (London: Luzac, 1978), 319. For accusations of anti-Zionism, see: Motti Golani, "An Engima – Sir Ronald Storrs and Zionism," in *First Governor*, ed. Shalev-Khalifa, 51–75; and Rory Miller, "Sir Ronald Storrs and Zion: The Dream That Turned into a Nightmare," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 3 (July 2000): 114–44. For accusations of anti-Semitism, see William B. Ziff, *The Rape of Palestine* (London: Longmans Green, 1938), 253.

3 Storrs, *Orientations*, 339–40.

4 Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Struggle for Palestinian Statehood* (London: Oneworld, 2007), 51.

5 Roberto Mazza, *Jerusalem: From the Ottomans to the British* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009), 180.

6 For more on the Pro-Jerusalem Society, see Rana Barakat, "Urban Planning, Colonialism, and the Pro-Jerusalem Society," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 65 (Spring 2016): 22–34; Nirit Shalev-Khalifa, "Sir Ronald and the Knights of the Stone Order – Ronald Storrs, Architect of Jerusalem's Visual and Cultural Perceptions and the Pro-Jerusalem Society," in *First Governor*, ed. Shalev-Khalifa, 15–50; and Roberto Mazza, "'The Preservation and Safeguarding of the Amenities of the Holy City without Prejudice to Race or Creed':

The Pro-Jerusalem Society and Ronald Storrs, 1917–1926," in *Ordinary Jerusalem*, ed. Angelos Dalachanis and Vincent Lemire (Leiden: Brill, 2018), vol. 1, 403–22. For more on the Nabi Musa riots, see Roberto Mazza, "Transforming the Holy City: From Communal Clashes to Urban Violence, the Nebi Musa Riots in 1920," in *Urban Violence in the Middle East: Changing Cityscapes in the Transition from Empire to Nation State*, ed. Ulrike Freitag, Nelida Fuccaro, Claudia Ghrawi, and Nora Lafi (New York: Berghahn, 2015), 179-94. For exploration of Storrs's relationship with the Zionist Commission, see Golani, "An Enigma," 51–76.

7 Storrs, *Orientations*, 4. For examples of Storrs's correspondence with his mother, see Storrs Papers, reel 1, box 1, folder 1. Storrs rarely wrote dates on his letters from school, much to his mother's chagrin (see Storrs, *Orientations*, 6). Dates of letters will be cited where included, otherwise the reel, box and folder of the Storrs Papers must suffice.

8 Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, reel 1, box 1, folder 1.

9 Meston Batchelor, *Cradle of Empire: A Preparatory School through Nine Reigns* (London: Phillimore, 1981), xiv.

10 Storrs, *Orientations*, 10.

11 Storrs, *Orientations*, 10.

12 Niall Rudd, *T. E. Page: Schoolmaster Extraordinary* (Bristol, UK: Bristol Classical Press, 1981), 45.

13 Storrs to his mother, no date, Storrs Papers, reel 1, box 1, folder 1.

14 *Carthusian* 7, no. 231 (April 1898); *Carthusian* 7, no. 245 (November 1899).

15 *Carthusian* 7, no. 247 (February 1900); *Carthusian* 7, no. 248 (March 1900); *Carthusian* 7, no. 250 (June 1900); and *Carthusian* 7, no. 252 (August 1900).

16 Several undated letters from Storrs to his mother highlight this homesickness. See Storrs Papers, reel 1, box 1, folder 1.

17 Storrs to his mother, 29 October 1904, Storrs Papers, reel 2, box 2, folder 1 – Egypt 1904–1909.

18 Storrs, *Orientations*, 14. See various undated Decemviri invitations in Storrs Papers, reel 1, box 1, folder 1.

19 He goes on to comment upon Storrs's sense of humor and musical ability. See Charles Tennyson, *Cambridge from Within* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1913), 185, 191–94. Despite the anonymity of this extract, Storrs confirms in a letter to his mother that a full pen-portrait of himself can be found in the chapter on the Long Vacation. See Storrs to his mother, 13 April 1913, Storrs Papers, reel 3, box 2, folder 2 – Egypt 1904–13).

20 Salim Tamari, "City of Riffraff: Crowds, Public Space, and New Urban Sensibilities in War-Time Jerusalem, 1917–1921," in *Comparing Cities: The Middle East and South Asia*, ed. Kamran Asdar Ali and Martina Rieker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 302–11. See also Awad Halabi, "Liminal Loyalties: Ottomanism and Palestinian Responses to the Turkish War of Independence, 1919–22," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41, no. 3 (Spring 2012): 19–37.

21 Storrs, *Orientations*, 272–76.

22 Issam Nassar, *European Portrayals of Jerusalem: Religious Fascinations and Colonist Imaginations* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006), 2.

23 Storrs, *Orientations*, 32.

24 Storrs, *Orientations*, 276.

25 Abigail Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem between Ottoman and British Rule*, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 118–30.

26 Lorenzo Kamel, "The Impact of Biblical Orientalism in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Palestine," *New Middle Eastern Studies* 4 (2014): 14–15.

27 Storrs, *Orientations*, 286. Psalm 122: 1–9, King James Version.

28 Storrs, *Orientations*, 285.

29 Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, 137.

30 Storrs, *Orientations*, 273.

31 Storrs, *Orientations*, 287.

32 Storrs to Nina Cust, 9 January 1918, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1 – Jerusalem 1918–19.

33 Conde de Ballobar, *Jerusalem in World War I: The Palestine Diary of a European Diplomat*, ed., Eduardo Manzano Moreno and Roberto Mazza (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 5.

34 Mazza, *Jerusalem*, 22–23.

35 Sotirios Dimitriadis, "The Tramway Concession of Jerusalem, 1908–1914: Elite Citizenship, Urban Infrastructure, and the Abortive Modernization of a Late Ottoman City," in Dalachanis and Lemire, eds., *Ordinary Jerusalem*, 475–89.

36 Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Jerusalem consisted of the walled city. Within these walls, the city was divided

into neighborhoods based not solely on confessional affiliation but on the common shared features of its residents; be it religion, tribe, place of origin, ethnicity or group. Adar Arnon, "The Quarters of Jerusalem in the Ottoman Period," *Middle East Studies* 28, no. 1 (January 1992): 7–12.

37 Rochelle Davis, "Ottoman Jerusalem: The Growth of the City Outside the Walls," in *Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighborhoods and Their Fate in the War*, ed. Salim Tamari (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2002), 10–29.

38 Mazza, *Jerusalem*, 36–40.

39 Yair Wallach, *A City in Fragments: Urban Texts in Modern Jerusalem* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2020), 15.

40 Storrs, *Orientations*, 401.

41 Mazza, *Jerusalem*, 41–42. Louis Fishman suggests that disparate strands of Palestinian Jewry at this time – Ashkenazi and Sephardi, Zionist and non-Zionist, secular and religious – united in the aftermath of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution under a banner of pan-Hebrew identity as part of the Ottoman Empire. Still, many members of the diverse pre-Mandate Jewish communities of Palestine remained largely ambivalent toward Zionism and its aims throughout the period of British rule. Yair Wallach posits that only by the 1930s did the Yishuv succeed in becoming a separate Hebrew-speaking Jewish society as per Zionist designs. See: Louis A. Fishman, *Jews and Palestinians in the Late Ottoman Era, 1908–1914: Claiming the Homeland* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020), 134–71; Yair Wallach, "Rethinking the Yishuv: Late Ottoman Palestine's Jewish Communities Revisited," *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies* 16, no. 2 (2017): 275–94; and Thomas Philip Abowd, *Colonial Jerusalem: The Spatial Construction of Identity and Difference in a City of Myth, 1948–2012* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2014), 16*n*21.

42 Storrs, *Orientations*, 415.

43 Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, 32–34.

44 Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, 40–47.

45 Jacobson, *From Empire to Empire*, 35–37.

46 Salim Tamari, *Mountain Against the Sea: Essays on Palestinian Society and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 71–92.

47 Ballobar, *Jerusalem in World War I*, 84.

48 Ballobar, *Jerusalem in World War I*, 114.

49 Mazza, *Jerusalem*, 117–18.

50 For a scholarly refutation of Ottoman-era Palestine as an oppressed backwater, see Michelle U. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).

51 Hours of reception at the Military Governor's Office 3 June 1918, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

52 Storrs, *Orientations*, 401.

53 Ilan Pappe, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis, 1700–1948*, (London: Saqi, 2010), 41.

54 Storrs, *Orientations*, 278–280.

55 Storrs, *Orientations*, 401.

56 Pappe, *Rise and Fall*, 167.

57 Pappe, *Rise and Fall*, 111–12.

58 Storrs, *Orientations*, 401.

59 Quote from Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate* (London: Abacus, 2001), 107.

60 Yair Wallach, "The Oud Player and the Governor: Jerusalem Arabs' Relations with Ronald Storrs and the British Administration," in *First Governor*, ed. Shalev-Khalifa, 79.

61 Awad Halabi, *Palestinian Rituals of Identity: The Prophet Moses Festival in Jerusalem, 1850–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2022), 42.

62 Awad Halabi, "The Nabi Musa Festival under British-Ruled Palestine," *ISIM Newsletter* 10 (2002), 27. Footage exists of this rather stilted and awkward ceremony: see Imperial War Museum (IWM) Film Collection 45, *The NEBI-NUSA [sic] FESTIVALS: scenes and incidents en route,* Jury's Imperial Pictures, 1919, online at www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/1060022598 (accessed 2 November 2023).

63 Wallach, "Oud Player," 78–79.

64 Wallach, "Oud Player," 84.

65 Salim Tamari and Issam Nassar, eds., *The Storyteller of Jerusalem: The Life and Times of Wasif Jawhariyyeh* (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2014), 122.

66 Tamari and Nassar, eds., *Storyteller of Jerusalem*, 126.

67 Wallach, "Oud Player," 78.

68 Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, 69.

69 This quote is from the Qur'an verse 8:61. Tamari and Nassar, eds., *Storyteller of Jerusalem*, 126.

70 Qur'an 8:60–66.

71 Anglo-French Declaration, 7 November

1918, in George Antonius, *Arab Awakening*, (Safety Harbour: Simon Publishing, 2001), 435.

72 Confidential Report to HQ on the impact of the Anglo-French Agreement, 19 November 1918, the National Archives (UK) (hereafter TNA), FO 371/3386.

73 Continuation of Confidential Report to HQ on the Anglo-French Agreement, 24 November 1918, TNA FO 371/3386.

74 Gabriel Polley, *Palestine in the Victorian Age: Colonial Encounters in the Holy Land* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2022), 56–58.

75 Storrs, *Orientations*, 304. Interreligious violence was rare in late Ottoman Jerusalem and tended to be intrareligious. See Mazza, "Transforming the Holy City," 180–81.

76 Storrs, *Orientations*, 304.

77 Mazza, *Jerusalem*, 60-61.

78 Storrs to OETA HQ, 17 March 1918, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

79 Storrs to OETA HQ, 17 March 1918, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

80 Storrs to OETA HQ, 17 March 1918, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

81 Storrs to OETA HQ, 17 March 1918, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

82 Storrs, *Orientations*, 306.

83 Allenby to Money, 5 May 1918, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

84 Storrs, *Orientations*, 306, 323.

85 Storrs to unidentified recipient, 1 December 1919, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

86 Report from Major-General A. W. Money, Chief Administrator, OETA, Jerusalem, 20/11/1918 in Doreen Ingrams, *Palestine Papers, 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict* (London: John Murray, 1972), 44–45.

87 Curzon to Balfour, January 1919, in Ingrams, *Palestine Papers*, 44–45.

88 D. K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 198.

89 Storrs to unidentified recipient, 1 December 1919, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

90 Storrs to unidentified recipient, 1 December 1919, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

91 Storrs to unidentified recipient, 1 December 1919, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

92 Storrs to unidentified recipient, 1 December 1919, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

93 Storrs to unidentified recipient, 1 December 1919, Storrs Papers, reel 6, box 3, folder 1.

94 Storrs, *Orientations*, 316.

95 "Music – Arieh Avilea," *Palestine Weekly* (undated), Storrs Papers, reel 10, box 3, folder 5.

96 Storrs, *Orientations*, 316.

97 Storrs, *Orientations*, 423.

98 Xypolia, "Orientations and Orientalism," 35.

99 Storrs, *Orientations*, 317.