Abstract
This paper discusses the establishment of the first Protestant church in mid-nineteenth-century Jerusalem, under Ottoman rule, relying mainly on British Foreign Office archives. It begins with an introduction to the geopolitical context for the spread of Protestantism in Greater Syria, with particular focus on Palestine, including Britain’s initial diplomatic efforts to achieve this goal and the challenges it faced on different fronts. The discussion situates these challenges and the ways Britain overcame them within the context of Ottoman imperial regulations, which recurringly stalled or halted construction efforts. As a result, Britain’s hopes of establishing a Protestant church in Jerusalem, and the Ottoman sultan’s frequent obstruction of these efforts, reflect the layered British-Ottoman relations in the nineteenth century. The paper ends with an examination of the ways the British government managed to secure an Ottoman permit (firman) issued by the sultan, that allowed the completion of the church’s construction in 1849.

Keywords
Britain; Protestant Church; Ottoman Empire; Jerusalem; Palestine.

In 1819, Britain began to spread Protestantism in Greater Syria through the missionary activity of the Church Mission Society (CMS). The Church Mission Society believed that Jerusalem would be the site of the Second Coming of Christ and that the primary condition
for this to happen was the conversion of the Jews to Protestantism. Because Protestantism was still new in the region, Britain sought international protection for its missionaries – not only from Ottoman authorities, but from rival churches, especially the Catholic and Orthodox churches, which had well-established relationships with the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, Britain’s interest in Palestine cannot be separated from its relationship with other European powers, namely France and Prussia.

France’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 threatened the communication routes between Britain and its colonies in India. This was directly related to Britain’s decision to side with the Ottomans against the French in 1799, resulting in the defeat of the French forces at Acre (‘Akka). In 1840, European powers again intervened to protect the Ottoman government from the advancing forces of Muhammad ‘Ali, the rebel governor of Egypt. In exchange for its support at ‘Akka, Britain made demands on the Ottomans, which included opening European consulates in Jerusalem: Britain established a consulate in 1838 in Jerusalem and appointed William Tanner Young its first vice-consul in Jerusalem, while the British consul general was located in Alexandria.

In general, British-Ottoman relations at the time were cordial, and Britain sought to preserve the sovereignty and integrity of the Ottoman Empire in order to maintain the transportation route to India and quell Russian (or other European) ambitions in the Ottoman Empire. The British foreign secretary Henry John Temple (18 April 1835–2 September 1841) and the British government used soft power to secure their interests. This is evident in the way British politicians and colonialists began to talk extensively about Palestine in relation to its importance to India and for the protection of transportation routes to it.

But Britain’s interests in the region went beyond Protestant missions. Over the course of the nineteenth century, Britain – among other European forces – sought to expand its influence in the region militarily, politically, and economically. One way to achieve this was through offering protections to religious minorities who paid homage to European ecclesiastical bodies. This reflected internal developments within the Ottoman Empire, where the centuries-old millet system was being superseded by the capitulation system, which saw European powers offering economic, religious, and commercial freedoms and other privileges to their citizens, and including the Christian minorities in Ottoman domains. The conditions of Christian subjects were not bad in the Ottoman Empire, and at the time were not ready or qualified for capitulation. Perhaps they did not benefit from it on the ground, but European countries took advantage of the capitulations to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. In turn, this led to a collision between the Ottoman Empire and European forces with interests in the region. France and Russia had already established such protections over Catholics and Maronites, and Orthodox Christians, respectively. However, Protestant communities did not yet exist in the region, so Britain could not claim protection over any religious minority. Thus, the British consulate in Jerusalem expressed concern for British political and commercial interests, and for the protection of British travelers and tourists, which extended to Jews – including
the Jews who were already there and the new ones arriving with the Protestants – and Protestant missionaries who had begun to settle in Jerusalem since the beginning of the nineteenth century. As a result, Protestant missionaries in Palestine sought British government protection through the consulate, which coordinated its efforts with the Protestant ecclesiastical leadership in Britain.

Britain’s interest in establishing the first Protestant church in Jerusalem was therefore political, above all, as it secured Britain a foothold in Palestine. To do so, Britain needed to manage the conversion of Jews to Protestantism, and tasked Reverend John Nicolayson, a Danish missionary active with the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews (later the Church’s Ministry among Jewish People), with this responsibility. Arriving in Jerusalem in 1826, Nicolayson established the first Protestant community in Jerusalem composed of converted Jews, and spent the next three decades in the city, until his death in 1856. Converting Jews to Protestantism was therefore a strategic move to ensure British influence in the city, an initiative welcomed by the Church of England.

In a letter to foreign secretary Temple, vice-consul Young identified “two Parties to be noticed who will doubtless consider themselves entitled to some voice in the future disposition of affairs here [Palestine]. The one is the Jew – to whom God originally gave this land … and the other, the Protestant Christians, his legitimate offspring.” The British government’s interests in protecting the Jews in Palestine went hand in hand with its support for the establishment of the first Protestant Church in Jerusalem, although the Church of England is not clearly defined as Protestant.

Indeed, building the church was a matter of “practical interest,” and Britain expected to be able to buy land designated for the construction of the church on Mount Zion (Jabal Sahyun) in Jerusalem. Therefore, Nicolayson asked the Church of England to establish a Protestant church in Jerusalem, approved by the British government and official Christian institutions. The London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews also petitioned the British government to obtain official assistance for constructing the church during the period of Egyptian rule in Greater Syria (1831–40). Thomas Baring, president of the London Society and a member of the British parliament, wrote to Palmerston in 1837 asking him to instruct the British consul general in Alexandria, Patrick Campbell, to obtain permission from Muhammad ‘Ali to build a small church and buildings suitable for missionaries in Jerusalem. Nicolayson also asked the British ambassador in Istanbul, John Ponsonby, for his support in order to build the church and help in case of any trouble with the Ottoman Empire.

Muhammad ‘Ali had previously authorized the purchase of land to be dedicated to a church registered in Nicolayson’s name and expressed his personal desire to grant permission to establish a Protestant church in Jerusalem to win Britain’s favor in his war with the Ottoman Empire. Still, in the end, he advised the British government to submit its request to the Sublime Porte in Istanbul since the matter was related to the basic laws and the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, despite the state of war between the Ottoman sultan and Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha. In late January 1841, the Sublime Porte refused to grant a permit (firman) to build the church, citing Ottoman
law, the ongoing war with Muhammad ‘Ali, and its lack of control over Jerusalem at the time. However, with Palmerston’s encouragement, the London Society’s directors did not give up; they went ahead with their project and pressed the Ottoman Empire as far as Ottoman law would allow.22

After the Ottomans, aided by an alliance led by Britain, expelled Muhammad ‘Ali from Greater Syria in 1940 and reestablished the authority of Sultan Abdulmejid I (1839–61),23 Palmerston forwarded Baring’s 1837 letter to Ponsonby in Istanbul, reminding him that the London Society had been aware of the failure to obtain official permission to construct the church. Palmerston confirmed that the London Society wanted to take advantage of the new situation in Syria after Muhammad ‘Ali’s expulsion by urging the Sublime Porte to approve the establishment of a small Protestant church in Jerusalem and registering this church in Nicolayson’s name on behalf of the society. Palmerston emphasized that such approval would be well-received by the British public, who increasingly felt that the Sublime Porte should respect its obligations vis-à-vis the Church of England, and should allow Protestant Christian worship to take place in Jerusalem.24 Accordingly, the British ambassador submitted another request to the Sublime Porte in order to approve the construction of the church, but this order was rejected again on the basis that shari’a (Islamic law) and the “Pact of ‘Umar”25 prohibited the establishment of “new” Christian churches.26

Britain did not take kindly to the Ottomans’ rejection after having helped the Sublime Porte regain control of Greater Syria. There was no doubt in the British government that Catholic and Orthodox states such as France and Russia had played a role in obstructing the establishment of a Protestant church in Jerusalem, thereby impeding the expansion of British power into the region. These unfavorable circumstances brought work on the project to a halt.27 In fact, the Protestant mission in Jerusalem stopped all work and efforts to build a Protestant church in Jerusalem in 1840, and Nicolayson was left waiting “with faith” for the situation on the ground to change.28

New Diplomatic Movement with Rifat Pasha

In July 1841, the Ottoman foreign minister, Sadik Rifat Pasha, affirmed his government’s general willingness to work with the British government but ruled out permission to build a Protestant church.29 According to Rifat Pasha, if churches had been built in the Ottoman Empire previously, this was to fulfill the wishes of its Christian subjects. Those who were not Ottoman subjects or residents remained forbidden to establish churches. Therefore, permission to build a church for a new (Protestant) denomination in Jerusalem was out of the question. Ponsonby informed Palmerston of the sultan’s position. However, the sultan had suggested to Ponsonby that he would not object to the use of former church buildings for Protestant churches. Ponsonby’s mission was thus to convince the Sublime Porte to see that strengthening the Protestant faith in the Ottoman Empire would be a “great good,” and so suggested that a small church could be restored in a short time for this purpose.30 Nicolayson could thus avoid violating the Ottoman laws prohibiting the construction of new churches.
Meanwhile, Prussia, Britain’s Protestant counterpart in continental Europe, sought to cooperate with Britain to obtain Ottoman recognition for the Protestant church.\textsuperscript{31} In fact, Prussia played a great role in establishing the first Protestant church in Jerusalem. Prussian-British coordination was uninterrupted and voluminous diplomatic communication was exchanged between the two on this issue. The king of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm IV (1840–61), himself hoped to unite Protestant European powers. Because Prussia was politically weak at the time and unable to pressure the Ottoman Empire alone, it sought to coordinate its positions with Britain, for its political and military weight and important influence in the world.\textsuperscript{32}

Friedrich Wilhelm IV appointed Chevalier (Christian Karl Josias) Bunsen on a special mission to London to explain the regent’s views regarding improving the conditions of the Christian population in the Ottoman Empire. The Prussian government also intended to encourage European Protestants to settle and buy lands in the Ottoman Empire, the idea being that securing Protestant residence, whether they were original subjects of the empire or foreigners who settled in it, would allow them to obtain guarantees and protections like those enjoyed by Christians of other denominations. Palmerston instructed Ponsonby to coordinate steps to achieve these goals with the Prussian ambassador to Istanbul, Karl Hans Königsmark. Evidently, Britain and Prussia’s growing colonial interests had brought them into competition with other Christian European powers that wielded influence inside and outside the Ottoman Empire.

When Ponsonby met the Ottoman foreign minister Rifat Pasha in August 1841, the latter promised to support the building of a Protestant church in accordance with the wishes of the British government in an unauthorized manner.\textsuperscript{33} He would order the local Ottoman authorities, including the qadi of Jerusalem, not to oppose it on condition that the building’s appearance and dimensions were modest and not ostentatious. Ponsonby hoped to obtain this promise in writing, but the Sublime Porte would not, according to Rifat Pasha, grant written permission.

**British Governmental Change and Its Repercussions**

In August 1841, after a vote of no confidence in the British Parliament, Sir Robert Peel succeeded William Lamb as prime minister, with George Hamilton-Gordon replacing Palmerston as foreign minister. The new British government inherited the project of building a Protestant church in Jerusalem, but Peel and Hamilton-Gordon were less enthusiastic than were their predecessors.\textsuperscript{34} Peel was afraid of provoking France and feared that his government might be seen as antagonistic to Catholics.\textsuperscript{35} The Peel government soon decided to distance itself from the political dimensions of the project, informing leaders of the London Society that its efforts to build a Protestant church in Jerusalem would be “as a purely religious enterprise.”\textsuperscript{36} This means that the British government would continue to support the project of establishing the Protestant church as a religious project only, so as not to conflict with European powers who had interests in the region.
Meanwhile, Rifat Pasha affirmed that the Ottoman government would respect the empire’s Christians and their religious institutions. However, given the small number of Ottoman Protestants at the time, and especially since there was no established Protestant community or leader in the Ottoman Empire, small churches would be sufficient as a start. If Prussian or other Protestants wanted to immigrate to the Ottoman Empire and become subjects of the sultan – as the Jews of Spain had done previously – Rifat Pasha suggested that the Sublime Porte would receive them with pleasure. They would be guaranteed the right to worship freely and enjoy the privileges provided by the Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber (Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane) of 1839, including the right to buy land and build new churches. This solution would grant the kings of Britain and Prussia only informal protection over Protestant churches formed by Ottoman subjects. It was clear that Nicolayson and the Protestants were not in the process of seeking Ottoman protection or being Ottoman subjects at that time, as Rifat Pasha had wanted, because the Ottomans, and not the British, as minorities, would officially protect them.

In October 1841, Ponsonby met Rifat Pasha again and renewed his demands for permission to build a Protestant church in Jerusalem somewhere other than the old one. Though Rifat Pasha announced his intention to reject the request officially, Ponsonby emphasized that the Ottoman ministers did not personally oppose such a request; rather, they were concerned with some of the scholars in the Supreme Council of Justice led by Shaykh al-Islam, the highest religious authority in the Ottoman Empire. In light of this rejection, Ponsonby went on the offensive, seeking to put Rifat Pasha and the Sublime Porte on the defensive. Ponsonby referred to Article 18 of the agreement between Britain and the Ottomans signed in September 1675, during the reign of Sultan Mehmed IV, which read:

That all capitulations, privileges, and articles granted to the French, Venetian, and other princes, who are in amity with the Sublime Porte, having been in like manner, through favor, granted to the English, by virtue of our special command, the same shall be always observed according to the form and tenor thereof, so that no one in the future do presume to violate the same or act in contravention thereof.

Arguing that Britain should enjoy every privilege granted to France and Russia, Ponsonby claimed that denying the right of Protestants to build a church in Jerusalem would be an “insult,” and suggested that Rifat Pasha consider the consequences of the Sublime Porte’s violation of its treaties with Britain. Ponsonby pressured Rifat Pasha, reminding him not only of previous treaties, but noting that Britain had stood by the empire during its struggle with Muhammad ‘Ali. Despite this, Ponsonby described his conversations with Rifat Pasha as “perfectly cool” and “amicable in tone,” believing that Rifat Pasha would eventually agree to the request to establish the church.

The British government believed that permission to build a church in Jerusalem was not out of reach, but some delay would be required before the issue could be
successfully raised again. The king of Prussia expressed hope for Britain’s success in this matter and directed Prussian officials in Istanbul to assist. As the two most powerful Protestant empires, Prussia and Britain were determined to exert constant pressure on the Sublime Porte to build a Protestant church in Jerusalem – for them, a relatively simple but historic achievement in the wider context of their relations with the Ottoman Empire that would serve as the basis for any future concessions.44

Construction Begins and Stops

As diplomatic negotiations took place, the stream of visitors to Palestine grew and Jerusalem’s small Protestant community increased in number.45 On 28 February 1842, Anglican Bishop Michael Solomon Alexander, a Jewish convert to Christianity who played a major role in consolidating the Protestant presence in Jerusalem, laid the first row of stones upon the concrete foundations where the Protestant church would be built, and on 1 November of the same year the ceremonial cornerstone was laid.46 Although the Sublime Porte appeared to have never approved the construction, it did not prevent the ongoing construction of the church beyond attempts to intervene to halt it – at least according to the official information received by the British government.47 Indeed, a November 1842 report that reached the British government indicated that the Sublime Porte looked with great displeasure at its progress, though it could not resist British pressure.48

The Ottomans drew a clear distinction between carrying out construction work on the church – which was already in progress – officially granting permission to build the church, and legitimizing British protection over the church and its members. In fact, the construction of a Protestant church in Jerusalem was to be the start of the realization of many privileges for Protestants – whose numbers were still relatively low at the time – and not only in Jerusalem, but throughout the Ottoman Empire.49

Yet, shortly after construction began, local Ottoman authorities issued orders that brought it to a halt in March 1843. This was a result of the “strongly worded” petition submitted to the Sublime Porte by Jerusalemites, who were described in British documents as “anti-social” (that is, anti-Protestant) in Jerusalem. The petitioners made two main allegations: (a) they questioned the legality of buying land to build a church; and (b) they claimed that there was no precedent for issuing a permit allowing the building of a church in a place where there had never been a church.50 At that time, it seemed that Britain was violating Ottoman laws and pursuing a fait accompli policy in building this church.

On 20 March 1843, Hamilton-Gordon sent the new British ambassador Stratford Canning to express the British government’s dismay as a result of the letters recently received from the British consul general’s office in Syria. Evidently, the British government had been led to believe that if the Protestant church was unobtrusive, the Ottoman authorities would not object to its construction.51 Meanwhile, British Foreign Secretary Hamilton-Gordon asked Canning to raise the issue with Rifat Pasha, expressing the British government’s disappointment and asking Rifat Pasha to
order ‘Ali Effendi, the governor of Jerusalem, to allow construction to resume without hindrance. The British were reluctant to request a formal firman from the sultan on this matter, which would risk an official refusal. Therefore, Hamilton-Gordon left the matter entirely to Canning, being a seasoned British ambassador, to act at his own discretion as he saw fit. Canning was to determine the best course of action according to his personal knowledge of the sultan and his principal ministers, and to coordinate with Königsmark, the Prussian ambassador, to increase their chances of success.\footnote{52}

To strengthen British-Prussian cooperation, the new Prussian foreign minister Heinrich von Bülow emphasized the need to coordinate with Canning regarding the Protestant church in Jerusalem.\footnote{53} Meanwhile, the ambassador engaged in “secret” negotiations with the Sublime Porte to allow construction on the church to resume. Canning obtained confirmation that neither Sultan Abdulmejid I nor Shaykh al-Islam would object to the church building. However, Canning found it impossible to make progress on the issue of the church since the Sublime Porte objected to Britain’s support of the rebellious Serbs against the Ottomans earlier in the century. Although the Sublime Porte did not issue any new refusal, Canning’s attempts were met with silence and evasion by the Ottomans; he could only cling to a “weak” hope of communicating Hamilton-Gordon’s instructions to the new Ottoman foreign minister, Ibrahim Sarim Pasha, when the opportunity arose.\footnote{54} Canning met with Sarim Pasha on the morning of 1 May 1843 for a “secret” conversation and conveyed his hope that he could report that the meeting was “satisfactory,” or that permission according to the prevailing conditions would be “ready.”\footnote{55}

By August 1843, the special Prussian envoy to London Chevalier Bunsen sent to Hamilton-Gordon two copies of plans for the church prepared by an architect and approved by the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews. The plans were drawn up in strict adherence to the principles laid down from the start, including that the church should be part of the dwellings erected in the Prussian consulate and a similar height as the neighboring houses so as not to be obvious. The planned church’s external structure was to be discretely simple, without towers or domes. Further, since the British consular residence was adjacent to the building on one side, the church would therefore look like a consular church. Bunsen emphasized that it would accommodate no more than three hundred people, as the number of worshipers in normal circumstances did not exceed fifty.

The most urgent matter, Bunsen stated, was for the Sublime Porte to reverse the “unwarrantable” decision of six months earlier to halt construction work, a decision apparently issued by officials in Beirut and Jerusalem, not Istanbul, due to local protests. Despite local objections to the construction plan, Bunsen was certain the Sublime Porte would not issue further decisions halting it and he pleaded with Hamilton-Gordon to send a copy of the plans for the church to Canning. He requested Hamilton-Gordon’s assistance in the efforts to remove obstacles to its construction.\footnote{56}

However, a stumbling block emerged between the British government and the London Society. Hamilton-Gordon explained that the British government could not accept a private association, no matter how respectable (referring here to the London

\textit{Jerusalem Quarterly} 94 [ 77 ]
Society), providing official housing for the British government representative in Jerusalem. Thus, the British government was not prepared to rent part of the complex owned by the London Society as a consular residence, nor make any public statement in support of the society’s actions. Yet, the property’s status as a consular residence was understood as a necessary precondition for Ottoman permission to establish a church there, and Hamilton-Gordon emphasized that this was the only way to build the church without further hindering the process.⁵⁷

In October 1843, Hamilton-Gordon wrote to Canning saying that he had received information of a very positive nature from Bunsen regarding the claim made by the Ottoman authorities. The letter stated that the new information made the Ottoman objections to the church’s construction no longer valid. According to the new information, during the Egyptian control of Jerusalem (1831–40), an Armenian bought the plot of land on which Britain planned to build the church from the Jacobite Church, considering it an inalienable Christian endowment (waqf) that can be sold for religious purposes only.⁵⁸ In turn, the Armenian sold the land to Nicolayson as permitted by law. That is, Ottoman law allowed Christian churches to be rebuilt for the sake of worship. The Protestant church, on which construction had stopped, would thus be in the same place as a former Jacobite church. Hamilton-Gordon emphasized that the ancient church was still partly present in the form of an abandoned mosque.

Nicolayson insisted on traveling to Istanbul with all the necessary documents to prove to the Sublime Porte the permissibility of building the Protestant church. Bishop Alexander and Nicolayson went to Istanbul to make their case, stopping in Beirut to consult with the British consul, Hugh Henry Rose. Rose dissuaded the bishop from appearing suddenly in Istanbul because traveling there and discussing the issue of building a church in Jerusalem may stir competition among the representatives of the European powers in Istanbul and embarrass the British ambassador, who was making strenuous efforts in this regard with the Sublime Porte. Nicolayson continued alone to Istanbul, although he found Rose’s position (and that of the Ottoman government and its local authorities in Jerusalem and Sidon) frustrating.⁵⁹

Nicolayson arrived in Istanbul and was preparing a “strenuous endeavor” to overcome the Sublime Porte’s objections to completing the church. The British foreign secretary instructed Canning to coordinate with Nicolayson to convince the Sublime Porte to grant permission to resume work on the church and to send instructions in this regard to the local Ottoman authorities in Jerusalem.⁶⁰ Canning emphasized the need to link the church to housing for the British and Prussian consuls, and wondered whether it would be safe to propose the site of the Jacobite church to build the Protestant church. Noting that his earlier conversation with Rifat Pasha had not been encouraging, Canning planned a joint meeting with the new Prussian ambassador in Istanbul Karl Emil Gustav von M. Le Coq (1842–47) and Rifat Pasha, hoping that Le Coq might help in his efforts. Still, Canning was firmly convinced that the Sublime Porte would not accede to the joint British-Prussian appeal.⁶¹
Ongoing Negotiations

Negotiations between the British government and the Sublime Porte entered a new stage in January 1844. The Protestant church in Jerusalem appeared once more on the diplomatic agenda and Bunsen and Nicolayson added their efforts to the “struggle” to change the Ottoman position. Meanwhile, the Prussian foreign minister Bülow assured his British counterpart of Frederick Wilhelm IV’s interest in the matter and his efforts to obtain permission. When Canning met with Rifat Pasha and other ministers, he believed that the Sublime Porte was less strenuous in its objections to the Protestant church in Jerusalem; still, Rifat Pasha considered that it would be quite difficult to grant permission, and recommended postponing the matter further. Canning sent Rifat Pasha a new request, upon instruction from his government, to remove any Ottoman barrier to the church’s establishment. Canning stressed that he would continue to exert pressure until Rifat Pasha came back with a positive decision regarding the church.

Compared to its previous positions, the Ottoman Empire now faced a new issue on which it had no precedent to base its decision. The Sublime Porte’s refusal to allow the completion of the first Protestant church in its realm could be read as closing the door to others as well, intended to prevent other religious minority denominations from making similar claims.

Apparently, the Sublime Porte had not made any new or explicit objection to the completion of the church. However, by adopting the usual delaying tactics, it referred the whole matter to the governor of Sidon, Asad Pasha, who in turn postponed his response for nearly a year, perhaps with some degree of prior coordination between Asad Pasha and Rifat Pasha. Canning expressed hope that Asad Pasha would approve the church’s completion according to the “wise influence” of Rose, the British consul in Beirut, who was working for a positive report from Asad Pasha to the Sublime Porte until all “basic” difficulties encountered were removed.

In March 1844, the conversion of 150 Orthodox Christians to Protestantism in the Hasbaya region in Lebanon gave rise to new problems with the Ottoman Empire, diverting attention from the issue of completing the Protestant church after all attempts had been made to solve it. Thus, in light of Ottoman rejectionism, there was no British diplomatic correspondence on the matter of the Protestant church in Jerusalem for about a year, until the British politician Anthony Ashley-Cooper lobbied the Foreign Office to return attention to the church. In March 1845, a petition signed by some fourteen hundred clergy and fifteen thousand laity in support of the project was presented to Hamilton-Gordon, who subsequently asked Canning to resume his lobbying in Istanbul and continued to express his belief that the Sublime Porte could be swayed to accept the church.

Canning met with the new Ottoman foreign minister Mehmed Shekib Effendi in late May 1845 and conveyed to him the essence of British demands. Shekib Effendi asked Canning to present his claims in a note to be studied by the Sublime Porte. Canning met Shekib Effendi again in early July and requested a definite and satisfactory answer.
from the Sublime Porte. He was concerned that Ottoman ministers would continue to postpone the matter “indefinitely,” and emphasized that other obstacles were likely to arise; still, he was convinced that the “present” intention of the Sublime Porte was to grant the required permission. He also noted that the British government would continue its efforts until it received a decisive response.\textsuperscript{71}

**Issuing the Firman and Completing Construction**

British Ambassador Canning met Ottoman Sultan Abdulmejid I on 25 August 1845. The sultan confirmed that he had agreed to issue a royal firman that included permission to complete the construction of the Protestant church in Jerusalem. Canning considered this a goodwill gesture, enhancing Britain’s confidence in its policy toward the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{72}  

A week later, the Sublime Porte sent a memorandum to Canning stating that the British had permission to establish a place of Protestant worship inside the residence of the British consulate in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{73} The Sublime Porte also sent this decree to Asad Pasha, noting that British Protestant subjects who visited Jerusalem faced difficulties due to the lack of a place of Protestant worship, and that friendly relations between the British government and the Sublime Porte led the latter to grant permission to allocate a Protestant place of worship inside the residence of the British consulate in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{74} Perhaps the issuance of the firman was a result of the historical and generally positive relations between the two empires, or a natural result of the pressure of powerful Britain on the weakening Ottoman Empire.

On 16 October 1845, the consuls of Britain and Prussia informed Jerusalem governor ‘Ali Effendi that, based on the sultan’s decree, construction on the Protestant church in Jerusalem would proceed. Two days later, ‘Ali Effendi visited the site of the proposed building at the head of a large delegation and announced that the construction was contrary to what was stated in the firman. He claimed that the decree did not mention the location of the church and that he did not understand from the document that the intended building would be a real church. Rather, he understood that it would be a place designated for prayers inside the headquarters of the British consulate for British and Prussian Protestants.\textsuperscript{75}

The new British consul in Jerusalem, H. H. Newbolt, informed ‘Ali Effendi that the church building on which work had already begun was the same place mentioned in the firman and that the British consulate had moved to a place adjacent to the proposed church. Newbolt acknowledged that the decree did not specifically refer to a church, and argued that the building need not be called a church; it could instead be called a Protestant place of worship. Nor did the firman specify the place in which it should be established, except by indicating that this building was inside the headquarters of the British consulate. ‘Ali Effendi asked the British to halt construction on the church until he received further orders from the Sublime Porte. Newbolt countered by suggesting that construction continue until they were each able to speak to their superiors; when ‘Ali Effendi refused, Newbolt asked him to put his decision in writing, which ‘Ali Effendi also refused.\textsuperscript{76}
After nearly a month, Canning suggested that time not be wasted waiting for approval from the governor of Jerusalem; rather, the British should express their shock and disappointment to the new Ottoman foreign minister, ‘Ali Pasha, who had replaced Shekib Effendi. Canning insisted that ‘Ali Effendi’s behavior in Jerusalem went against the Sublime Porte’s firman and thus merited the sultan’s discontent. The British embassy in Istanbul thus lodged a protest with ‘Ali Pasha regarding the new obstacles that ‘Ali Effendi had put in the way of completing the Protestant church in Jerusalem. The British embassy indicated “with good intentions” that although the church building was not actually inside the consulate, it was planned to be part of the consular establishment in the future. The embassy asked ‘Ali Pasha to give clear and definitive orders that no further delay would occur, which should be addressed to ‘Ali Effendi and phrased in a way that left no room for doubt. ‘Ali Pasha announced that he would send the necessary messages to ‘Ali Efendi and Asad Pasha.

A new, more explicit, firman was issued on 9 December 1845, stipulating the resumption of construction work on the church in its current location. Ultimately, the first Protestant church in Jerusalem was completed and consecrated as Christ Church on 21 January 1849. Reverend John Nicolayson served as its rector until his death in 1856. This was a key step toward Britain’s subsequent pressure on the Ottoman Empire to officially recognize the Protestant community. In October 1850, Sultan Abdulmejid I issued a firman formally recognizing the Protestant community as an official religious denomination, alongside Catholics and Orthodox Christians. This was considered a great achievement and welcomed in Britain.

**Conclusion**

Britain was serious about strengthening its influence in the Middle East, especially in Palestine, after the French invasion of Egypt and Muhammad ‘Ali’s rebellion in Greater Syria. To do so, Britain sought the establishment of a Protestant community in the region that it would directly protect – much like France and Russia did with Catholic and Orthodox Christians in the region, respectively – and pushed to build the first Protestant church in Jerusalem. Missionary organizations, chief among them the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews, also had vested interest in the formation of a Protestant community in Palestine.

The common interests of missionary organizations and the British government, along with devoted Protestants such as Nicolayson, brought them to work in concert for the establishment of the church in Jerusalem. This, combined with the persistent diplomatic pressure that Canning and other British diplomats placed on the weakening Ottoman Empire, ultimately led to the construction of the first Protestant church in Jerusalem and the entire Middle East.

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Britain’s Position on Establishing the Protestant Church

Mustafa Kaan Sağ, “Edirne’de Bir İngiliz Endnotes

1 Hanna Kildani, Modern Christianity in the Holy Land (Bloomington, IN: Author House, 2010), 454; Hoffmann, Anglo-Prussian Bishopric, 310.

2 James Finn, Stirring Times, or Records from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles of 1853–1856, vol. 1 (London: C. Kegan Paul, 1878), 134; Hoffmann, Anglo-Prussian Bishopric, 10. In 1673, King France Louis XIII sent a fleet to the Dardanelles and obtained a new capitulary treaty recognizing him as the sole protector of the eastern Catholics. Catherine II obtained the same right to protect the Orthodox Church and its followers in the Ottoman Empire after defeating the Ottomans and forcing them to sign the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarcaji in 1774. The two churches maintained their position as institutions officially recognized by the Ottoman Empire.

3 Spencer Smith to Granville, 3 September 1798, and Foreign Office to M. Smith, Downing Street, 10 October 1798, in the National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), Foreign Office (FO) 78–20.


6 Millet was an independent court of law pertaining to “personal law” under which a confessional community (a group abiding by the laws of Muslim shari’a, Christian canon law, or Jewish halakha) was allowed to rule itself under its own laws. Despite frequently being referred to as a “system,” before the nineteenth century, the organization of what are now retrospectively called millets in the Ottoman Empire was not at all systematic. Rather, non-Muslims were simply given a significant degree of autonomy within their own community, without an overarching structure for the millet as a whole. The notion of distinct millets corresponding to different religious communities within the empire would not emerge until the eighteenth century. See Fatih Öztürk, Ottoman and Turkish Law (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2014), 1–69.

8 The Ottoman Empire generally refrained from interfering with the rights of its Christian subjects or their churches; and although some argue that the Ottomans allowed Christians under their rule to have absolute religious freedom, this was not the case, even after the Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth century. See: Hoffmann, Anglo-Prussian, 9–10; William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801–1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923), 3; Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1998), 51–52; “Protestantism in Turkey” (from the Morning Chronicle), Littell’s Living Age 31, no. 387 (18 October 1851): 101–2; and Abul-Fazi Ezzati, The Spread of Islam: The Contributing Factors (London: Islamic College for Advanced Studies Press, 2002), 12–13.


11 Kildani, Modern Christianity, 453–54.

12 Kildani, Modern Christianity, 453–54.

13 The London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews is an Anglican missionary society founded in 1809. The main goal of the society was to promote Christianity among the Jews. The society’s work began among poor Jewish immigrants in the East End of London and soon spread to Europe, South America, Africa, and Palestine. The London Society was the first such society to work on a global basis. In 1914, the society was described as the oldest, largest, richest, most enterprising, and best organized of its type, and had auxiliary societies throughout the British Isles and Canada. A mere five thousand Jews were baptized by the society since its foundation. This number showed a major failure of the society’s efforts toward the conversion of Jews to Christianity. The society often adopted a Zionist position, and expressed the view that
the Jewish people deserved a state in the Holy Land, in accordance with the Restoration beliefs of its founders, decades before Zionism began as a movement. It supported the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and continues to engage in pro-Israel advocacy. In response to changing attitudes toward outreach and the Jewish people, the society has changed its name several times over the years, first to Church Missions to Jews, then the Church’s Mission to the Jews, followed by the Church’s Ministry among the Jews, and finally to the current name of the Church’s Ministry among Jewish People (CMJ), which was adopted in 1995.


15 Sir T. Baring to Viscount Palmerston, Jaffa, 14 March 1839, TNA FO 78/368.


19 McCaul, “Retrospective View,” 40; Finn, *Stirring Times*, vol. 1, 134.

20 Sir T. Baring to Viscount Palmerston, Winchester, 1 February 1841, in TNA FO 881-207; Joseph Moseley, *Russia in the Right: Or, the Other Side of the Turkish Question* (London: Clarke, Beeton, and Company, 1854), 14.

21 Finn, *Stirring Times*, vol. 1, 134.

22 Sir T. Baring to Viscount Palmerston; Moseley, *Russia in the Right*, 14.

23 Sir T. Baring to Viscount Palmerston.

24 Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby, Foreign Office, 8 February 1841, no. 21, in TNA FO 881-207; Moseley, *Russia in the Right*, 14.


27 Finn, *Stirring Times*, vol. 1, 135.


29 M. Pisani to Viscount Ponsonby, Pera, 23 July 1841, and Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston, Therapia, 27 July 1841, no. 246, in TNA FO 881-207.

30 Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston, Therapia, 11 July 1841, no. 229, in TNA FO 881-207. Ponsonby also ruled out using violence against the sultan or his government to achieve this goal.


36 Greaves, “Jerusalem Bishopric,” 349.

37 Viscount Ponsonby to Earl Aberdeen, Therapia, 7 October 1841, extract no. 11, in TNA FO 881-207; and Moseley, *Russia in the Right*, 16–17.

38 Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane was a proclamation by Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid I in 1839 that launched the Tanzimât period of reforms and reorganization in the Ottoman Empire. The proclamation was issued at the behest of reformist Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha. It promised reforms such as the abolition of tax farming, reform of conscription, and guarantee of rights to all Ottoman citizens regardless of religion or ethnic group. The goal of the decree was to help modernize the empire militarily and socially so that it could compete with the Great Powers of Europe. It also was hoped the reforms would win over the disaffected parts of the empire, especially in the Ottoman controlled parts of Europe, which were largely Christian. It was published in the Tekvim-i Vekayi journal in Ottoman Turkish. In addition, it was published in Greek and French. The Edict of Gülhane did not enact any official legal changes but merely made royal promises to the empire’s subjects, and they were never fully implemented due to Christian nationalism and resentment among Muslim populations in these areas. Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Alan Masters. *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Facts on File, 2009).

39 Count Kanigsmark to Viscount Ponsonby, 12 September 1841, F.O. 881-207; and “Protestantism in Turkey” 101.


41 Viscount Ponsonby to Earl Aberdeen, Therapia, 7 October 1841, Extract no. 11, in TNA FO 881-207. Rifat Pasha denied that the matter was an insult, but Ponsonby retorted that it was unfortunately not dependent on the opinion of “His Excellency” (Rifat Pasha).


43 Viscount Ponsonby to Earl Aberdeen, Therapia, 7 October 1841, extract no. 11, in TNA FO 881-207; and Moseley, *Russia in the Right*, 16–17.

44 Mr. Bankhead to the Earl of Aberdeen, Pera, 17 November 1841, extract no. 48, in TNA FO 881-207.

45 Perry, *British Mission*, 70.

46 Perry, *British Mission*, 70–71. When the ceremonies were over and routine construction work commenced, disputes broke out with the architect, James Johns. In January 1843, the London Society replaced Johns with Matthew Habershon and appointed R. Bates Critchlow as construction supervisor.

47 Asked by parliament in February 1843 whether the Ottoman authorities had permitted building a Protestant church in Jerusalem, Peel responded that they had not, as it would be contrary to shari‘a. *Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 67 (London: Thomas Curson Hansard, 1843), 18–22.


53 Bülow sent orders for this to Karl Emil Gustav von M. Le Coq, who was to become the new Prussian ambassador to Istanbul. This was confirmed by Hamilton-Gordon in his letter to Canning on 5 April 1843. Earl of Westmorland to Earl of Aberdeen, Berlin, 29 March 1843, no. 41, and Earl of Aberdeen to Sir Stratford Canning, Foreign Office, 5 April 1843, no. 49, in TNA FO 881-207.

54 Sir Stratford Canning to the Earl of Aberdeen, Constantinople, 18 April 1843, no. 82, in TNA FO 881-207.

55 Sir Stratford Canning to the Earl of Aberdeen, Constantinople, 1 May 1843, no. 93, in TNA FO 881-207.


57 Earl of Aberdeen to the Chevalier Bunsen,
Waqf, also known as *hubus* or mortmain property, is an inalienable charitable endowment under Islamic law. It typically involves donating a building, plot of land, or other assets for Muslim religious or charitable purposes with no intention of reclaiming the assets. A charitable trust may hold the donated assets. The donor is known as a *waqif*.

Earl of Aberdeen to Sir Stratford Canning, Foreign Office, 4 October 1843, no. 125, in TNA FO 881-207.