Proximity Talks, the Settlement Freeze, and Direct Negotiations: Reexamining U.S. Policy

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PROXIMITY TALKS, THE SETTLEMENT FREEZE, AND DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS: REEXAMINING U.S. POLICY

WILL PROXIMITY TALKS END THE OCCUPATION?


The formal inauguration of proximity talks between Israel and the PLO signifies the high-water mark of seventeen months of diplomacy conducted by the Obama administration. After a rancorous false start in March precipitated by an ill-timed announcement of settlement plans in East Jerusalem on the eve of a visit by Vice President Joe Biden, formal proximity talks finally commenced on 8 May.

Hanan Ashrawi, the veteran Palestinian negotiator, on 3 May said of the limited process sponsored by the Obama administration, “I would not call them negotiations but rather diplomatic shuttle tours undertaken by the American envoy.”

Some terms governing the talks were modified in the wake of the March debacle. The United States appears to have reached agreement on two issues with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Although the immediate aim of diplomacy is to move to a direct Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, the proximity talks would indeed offer a forum to discuss, if not negotiate, “core issues”—settlements, borders, refugees, security, Jerusalem, and water; and notwithstanding insistent Israeli declarations about a continuing commitment to settlement expansion in East Jerusalem, Israel would refrain from unspecified “provocative” settlement activities.

A Policy Rethink

The most important result of the recent dispute between Jerusalem and Washington over East Jerusalem settlement expansion may be a broad reexamination of U.S.
policy. Two important principles guiding U.S. policy toward the Israel-Palestine conflict can be discerned from these recent statements by President Obama and two senior aides:

- The definition of the resolution of the conflict as "a vital national security interest of the United States"
- The framing of the challenge facing U.S. policymakers as one requiring reconciling Israel's legitimate security requirements with the demands of Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary, the consistent and impassioned articulation by top U.S. officials, including the president, of a "vital U.S. national interest" in ending Israel's occupation and creating a Palestinian state at peace with Israel is unprecedented. It also suggests a new determination to solve rather than manage the problem, not as a favor to the parties but first and foremost as a consequence of a hard-headed determination to safeguard U.S. interests.

This central strategic conclusion is, however, at odds with the oft-stated reflexive insistence that Washington "cannot want an end to the conflict more than the parties themselves." Past administrations often relied on such rhetoric to avoid tougher U.S. policies. Both Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, among others, have invoked this phrase as if the concept is self-evident. But if an American commitment to achieve an outcome that by definition meets U.S. national security requirements is to be left hostage to the warring interests of Israelis and Palestinians, then Washington has ceded the strategic initiative to them. This strategy promises not merely continuing instability but the festering of a conflict that costs the United States in both blood and treasure, and which by Obama's own estimation, threatens vital American national security interests. Simply stated, defining the resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict as a vital national interest requires Washington to want to achieve its objective more than the other parties to the conflict want to achieve theirs. If the Obama administration believes in its own assessment of the stakes involved, Washington must be prepared to want peace more than Israelis and Palestinians do, not primarily for their sake but for our own.

There are, therefore, policy consequences to the administration’s decision to describe the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a vital interest. U.S. officials have correctly distilled the basic challenge facing policymakers. Reconciling legitimate Israeli security requirements with the demands posed by the exercise of Palestinian sovereignty is achievable, but until now it is not clear that Washington has internalized the costs involved in realizing this objective or shaped U.S. policy to meet it. Doing so requires Washington to establish a menu of legitimate Israeli security requirements and legitimate attributes of Palestinian sovereignty that can be married to a policy framework that enhances the U.S. interest in stability and regional security. This was in fact the task begun by National Security Advisor Gen. James Jones for the George W. Bush administration in the wake of the Annapolis conference in November 2007. A White House policy review will no doubt make use of Jones's earlier effort.

A Rump Palestinian State

The road from today’s proximity talks to the execution of a new U.S. policy is a long one, however. Continuing stalemate and an abiding Israeli desire to maintain control of the policy agenda are far more likely to increase the prospects that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will promote the creation of “a state with provisional borders” on those areas of the West Bank where Israel has diminished settlement or security interests. Netanyahu may pull a page out of former prime minister Ariel Sharon’s playbook with a West Bank variation of the 2005 Israeli “disengagement” from the Gaza Strip. The territorial dimensions of the rump Palestinian state envisaged by Israel were first established in 1995 with the creation of a Palestinian Authority governing areas A and B comprising 41 percent of the West Bank. But the origins of this concept can be traced to ideas presented by Ariel Sharon as early as 1977 and foreshadowed in Netanyahu’s own Alon plus map thirteen years ago. These are populated Palestinian areas that even the most ardent supporters of “Greater Israel” are prepared to cede for demographic reasons. Although he has yet to adopt it as policy, this plan reflects Netanyahu’s minimalist concept of a Palestinian state, preserving expansive settlement and territorial gains from Israel’s 1967 conquest.
The amount of territory awarded to such a rump entity would initially approach 60 percent of the West Bank and notably appears to include the evacuation of more than a score of settlements in the Jordan Valley-Allon Road region that would nonetheless remain under Israeli control. As in Gaza in 2005, an Israeli redeployment would be viewed by many as transforming the connection between Israel and the West Bank from occupation to a relationship of reduced Israeli responsibilities. Unlike in Gaza, however, Israel has in place in the West Bank the infrastructure—settlements and the vital road network of roads built during the Oslo era—to enable the annexation of land and settlements where the vast majority of settlers live. That is, Israel may undertake a partial evacuation, as part of an interim agreement or unilaterally as in Gaza, without a withdrawal of the scale required to enable the exercise of Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank.

A Palestinian state established under these circumstances contradicts the vital interests of the United States as expressed by the Obama administration itself. A state with provisional borders would likely prolong the conflict, since it would not create a foundation for a comprehensive final status peace agreement rooted in the exercise of genuine Palestinian independence and the preservation of legitimate Israeli security interests—the two elements at the heart of American policy.

MOVING BEYOND A SETTLEMENT FREEZE—THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION LOOKS FOR A NEW COURSE

From Settlement Report, July–August 2010

In their meeting on 6 July, President Barack Obama and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented a well-choreographed bit of political theatre aimed at highlighting the “excellent” personal and political relations between the two leaders and the countries they represent. Obama explained after their meeting that, “As Prime Minister Netanyahu indicated in his speech, the bond between the United States and Israel is unbreakable. It encompasses our national security interests, our strategic interests, but most importantly, the bond of two democracies who share a common set of values and whose people have grown closer and closer as time goes on.”

Both leaders were intent upon resetting a rocky relationship, characterized by their ongoing public disputes about settlement expansion. Instead they stressed close bilateral military, intelligence, and security cooperation.

In his June meeting with PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, Obama also reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to “a two-state solution in the Middle East in which we have an Israel that is secure and fully accepted by its neighbors, and a Palestinian people that have their own state, self-determination, and the ability to chart their own destiny.” Yet the president, in contrast to the optimism he exuded at the recent meeting with Netanyahu, did not conceal his continuing frustration with the pace of diplomacy, describing the state of affairs as a “dead end.”

The call for an end to settlement expansion has been at the heart of this policy. But the qualified ten-month settlement moratorium, declared in late November 2009 after months of U.S. effort, has had no effect on the ground or in convincing Palestinians and the rest of the international community of Netanyahu’s good intentions. Indeed Israel’s government has invoked the moratorium as a reason not to comply with both domestic legal and international obligations in the road map to dismantle unauthorized settlements. In a recent reply to petitioners demanding enforcement of prior court decisions calling for the dismantling of the settlement of Amona, for example, the state prosecutor’s office offered an explanation for its inaction that was described by Ha’Aretz correspondent Akiva Eldar as “the line that will go down in the ‘chutzpah’ record books: The prosecution asks to reject the demand to evacuate the illegal settlement since diverting the limited means of enforcement to old illegal construction ‘is not high on the respondents’ agenda.’ And why not? ‘Means of enforcement’ are needed to implement the temporary building freeze in the settlements. In other words, the government’s decision in the matter of the temporary moratorium on construction in the settlements has become the illegal settlements’ insurance policy.”

Administration officials, notwithstanding Obama’s own public dissatisfaction, have adopted a more optimistic view. In briefings before the Netanyahu visit, they
explained that the moratorium has accomplished its objective—now defined as readying the parties for direct talks that Israel has long demanded.

“The settlement freeze or moratorium that the prime minister announced last fall was really quite significant and we think has contributed to the progress we have made so far,” explained National Security Council official Dan Shapiro, senior director for the Middle East and North Africa.

The moratorium has “facilitate[d] productive proximity talks to lead into those direct talks and to help facilitate an atmosphere of confidence and trust to address what are, of course, some very complicated issues” added Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor for strategic communications. “Capitalizing on the momentum that’s been built through the proximity talks [it is time] to move—to continue to move forward and to reach direct negotiations in pursuit of a comprehensive peace.” Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erakat took public issue with this upbeat characterization and asked Washington for “clarifications.”

The settlement moratorium is set to expire on 27 September 2010. While existing restrictions on settlement construction have had no lasting impact, their extension beyond 2010 would affect the pace of expansion as building now underway is completed without being replenished by new construction starts. The wheels of the government and settlement bureaucracy have continued to turn during the moratorium and are ready to issue tenders and begin new construction on hundreds of units immediately after the moratorium expires.

Netanyahu once described the moratorium “as a one time measure for a limited time to protect the larger interests of the State of Israel”—that is, a policy aimed first and foremost at preserving relations with Washington rather than as an olive branch to Palestinians. In keeping with the effort to create more amicable U.S.-Israel relations, the leaders chose not to mention the settlement moratorium until asked by a reporter. In the president’s response there was no evidence of the former insistence on the need for a complete freeze. Instead, Obama remarked that Israeli “restraint” on settlement expansion “has been conducive to the prospects of us getting into direct talks before moving on to the new policy. And my hope is that once direct talks have begun, well before the moratorium has expired, that will create a climate in which everybody feels a greater investment in success. Not every action by one party or the other is taken as a reason for not engaging in talks. So there ends up being more room created by more trust. And so I want to just make sure that we sustain that over the next—over the next several weeks.” Netanyahu struck a discordant note in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on 8 July, hinting at his intention not to renew the moratorium after it expires at the end of September.

After a year-long effort to persuade Israel to freeze settlements, Washington has muted its concerns about settlements and expects that the Palestinians will do the same. Washington appears to be returning to the days of urging Israel to merely “curb” settlements—as the president indeed did after his meeting with Abbas in early June, while searching for a new diplomatic approach. Netanyahu too has an interest in coming to an understanding with Washington on this issue that will allow him to continue settling. U.S. officials pointedly declined, however, to comment on a question about Obama’s support for the letter George W. Bush sent to Ariel Sharon in April 2004, in contrast to their previous refusal to endorse the letter, which noted:

In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.

“In Netanyahu’s circles,” wrote Yossi Verter in Ha’aretz, “they are discussing two options for the period after the moratorium expires in September: the first is the ‘differential arrangement’ according to which Netanyahu will announce that Israel will build only in those areas that are certain to be under Israeli sovereignty in any future agreement; that is, in settlement blocs and not in isolated settlements. The second option is more complicated and dangerous: to announce officially that construction will resume but to indicate to the Americans that this is a bluff, that on
the ground the freeze will continue. There will be tractors working here and there but nothing more.”

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence and Atomic Energy Dan Meridor, one of Netanyahu’s ministers most sensitive to the need for coordination with Washington, has offered public support of the “differential arrangement,” suggesting that Israel continue construction after the end of the moratorium only in those areas it intends to remain permanently. Adoption of such a policy would signal Netanyahu’s effort to restore the old “rules of the game” that permitted the West Bank settler population to triple since 1992, and finesse U.S. opposition to settlement expansion.

Whatever the choice Israel makes in September, Washington’s laborious effort to achieve an effective end to settlement expansion appears to have run out of steam, even if, as Israel Harel, a prominent settler, explained, “there has been no strategic change in Obama’s policy of two states for two peoples, and Israel must still make most of the concessions.”

The armistice on display during the U.S.-Israel summit resolved none of the issues at the heart of the continuing stalemate. Now, Palestinians who bet upon U.S. success in stopping the settlement machine will have to recalculate.

On 8 July, the Palestinian-owned al-Quds al-Arabi daily carried the following report by Ashraf al-Hawr: “A prominent Palestinian source told al-Quds al-Arabi yesterday that all the signs pointed to the fact that the American administration will start exerting pressures on the Palestinian Authority during the next few days to get it to accept direct negotiations with Israel.” This view was seconded by someone familiar with the Obama administration’s deliberations. “I expect a full court press on Abu Mazin to go to direct talks.”

**EIGHT MONTHS INTO THE SETTLEMENT FREEZE (EXCERPTS)**

*This report by Peace Now was published on 2 August 2010. The full report is available at www.peacenow.org.il.*

The findings [of Peace Now’s eight-month assessment of the implementation of the freeze] underscore the notion that unless the settlement moratorium is extended—with no new “exceptions” or loopholes—and unless it is enforced, this ten-month moratorium will have been meaningless.

**The Main Findings:**
- At least 600 housing units have started to be built during the freeze, in over 60 different settlements.
- At least 492 of those housing units are in direct violation of the law of the freeze.
- During an average year (when there is no freeze) approximately 1,130 housing units start to be built in eight months in the settlements. The new construction starts during the moratorium constitute approximately half of the normal construction pace in the settlements.
- Some 2,000 housing units are currently under construction in the settlements, most of them started before the freeze was announced in November 2009.

This means that on the ground, there is almost no freeze or even a visible slowdown, despite the fact that legal construction starts have been frozen for eight months. It also means that the government of Israel is not enforcing the moratorium.

**A. New Construction**

At least 600 new housing units have started to be built during the moratorium, in at least 390 new structures—223 permanent structures and 167 caravans or semi-permanent structures.

The approved exceptions: On the eve of the freeze, the Israeli government approved some 492 housing units to be started during the freeze (and an additional 112 units that were granted during the freeze in Beitar Illit). Only 141 of those exceptions have begun to be built, and therefore according to Peace Now’s count, at least 462 new housing units have been built illegally in violation of the freeze. Within these 462 units, 31 caravans and 7 permanent structures have been built in outposts, and not only do they violate the settlement freeze but they violate the Laws of Planning and Construction.

It should be noted that for the most part the violations of the settlement freeze have been fairly small scale, with buildings being built here and there in various
There are several construction projects that had begun to prepare their infrastructure but were stopped because of the settlement freeze. These include a project for 62 new housing units in the settlement of Barqan, [approximately] 100 new units in Neriya, and 60 units in Sha’are Tikva.

B. How Significant Is the Freeze? What Would It Look Like Without the Freeze?

Over the course of the last decade, on average 1,700 new housing units were built each year in the settlements (according to the data from the Central Bureau of Statistics that does not include illegal construction). In eight months, this would mean that an average of 1,133 new housing units would have been built. Peace Now estimations that only 603 new units have been built shows a significant decrease in the number of units being built; almost half of the annual total. However, according to the declared freeze, there should have been no new construction starts whatsoever.

C. Ongoing Construction

The settlement freeze did not include construction that began before the freeze took effect. At least 693 structures continued to be built during the freeze (in addition to the 390 that were started during the freeze), within them some 2,000 housing units. Only if the freeze continues will it have a meaningful effect on the ground. Restarting construction will render the ten-month freeze insignificant. It will become a meaningless, several month delay on some construction projects.

Analysis

The fact that Israel implemented the moratorium as military law—which is the law of the land in the West Bank—demonstrates that if the government of Israel wants to freeze construction, it can. The fact that the government of Israel [GOI] approved an unusually large amount of settlement construction just before the moratorium was implemented, and then insisted that this construction be exempted from the moratorium, cast doubt from the start on the seriousness of the GOI’s intentions regarding the moratorium from the start.

The fact that in addition to this exemption, the GOI insisted on additional “exceptions” to the freeze, permitting new starts to continue, cast further doubt on the GOI’s good-faith commitment to the moratorium.

The fact that since the moratorium was imposed the GOI has turned a blind eye to large-scale construction in settlements that violates the moratorium—construction on a scale that far surpasses our own worst-case estimates—casts further doubt on the seriousness of the GOI’s intentions.

BOYCOTTING SETTLEMENTS

Palestinian Settlement Boycott Highlights

From Settlement Report, July–August 2010.

2009

8 December: The Palestinian Authority (PA) announces a boycott of Israeli goods produced in West Bank settlements. National Economy Minister Hassan Abu-Lhudeh says the government has already confiscated $1 million worth of products, including foods, cosmetics, and hardware. The objective is to eliminate all settlement-made goods from Palestinian stores in 2010. The settlements sell $200 million worth of products yearly in the West Bank and Gaza, according to the Palestinian Government Media Center.

Reacting to the announcement, Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesperson Yigal Palmor says, “I don’t think by concentrating their efforts on boycotts they will achieve any of the political goals, if these still include reaching a peace agreement with Israel.”

2010

5 January: Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad affirms the PA’s dedication to removing Israeli settlement-produced goods from Palestinian markets in the West Bank. He urges the international community to intervene in order to “force Israel to stop ignoring international law and the Palestinians’ rights.”
12 January: Prime Minister Fayyad launches the National Honor Fund, which will promote the availability of Palestinian produce in local markets as well as strengthen the position of Palestinian goods in global markets as an alternative to products manufactured in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The PA National Economy Ministry says it will deposit $150,000 in the fund each month in an effort to remove settlement-produced goods from the Palestinian market and encourage the sale of local Palestinian products.

7 March: The PA moves to prevent Palestinian workers from taking jobs in settlements. National Economy Minister Abu-Libdeh says he is drafting a law that will ban Palestinians from taking such jobs.

22 April: Labor Minister Ahmad Majdalani says that by the end of the calendar year there will be no Palestinians working in Israeli settlements. He notes that there are 7,000 fewer Palestinians working in the settlements because of a decline in the production of settlement goods. Majdalani says that Palestinian products are quickly replacing the settlement goods in shops and that the former settlement laborers are being absorbed into the Palestinian workforce as demand for local products increases.

27 April: Silvan Shalom, the Israeli minister for regional development and development of the Negev and the Galilee, condemns the Palestinian boycott: “Those who take this step are not interested in peace but rather in continuing the conflict. This order harms not only the chances for dialogue—it also hurts the 25,000 Palestinians who work in the factories that Abu Mazin [President Mahmoud Abbas] is calling to boycott. While Israel is making great efforts to advance and improve the Palestinian economy, this order hurts the chances for both economic and political peace.”

2 May: Israeli deputy foreign minister Danny Ayalon says the Palestinian boycott is “part of a continuous planned and budgeted campaign of incitement.” The YESHA Council, an organization representing Israeli West Bank settlers, calls it “economic terrorism.”

16 May: As Prime Minister Fayyad attends a bonfire of Israeli products, he declares that Palestinians are “committed to a path of nonviolent resistance and defiance in the face of the settlement enterprise, and we are defiantly expressing our right to boycott those products and I believe it is working.”

18 May: The PA launches the House to House campaign. In the first phase, Palestinians are advised against buying settlement goods, and house inspections begin across the West Bank. A guide used by inspectors lists fifty settlement companies whose products are forbidden and includes some producing construction material, baked goods, and wine.

19 May: University student councils at Palestinian universities offer their full support for the PA boycott of settlement goods, vowing to ensure that students adhere to the embargo.

21 May: Israeli officials hold talks with their Palestinian counterparts, asking them to halt the boycott. Industry, Trade and Labor Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer says that “the boycott must be lifted immediately because of the fact that many [settlement] businesses in Judea and Samaria employ a large number of Palestinians. [. . .] An economic boycott is a base political tool that does not contribute at all to the atmosphere we are trying to create in our region.” The Israeli government characterizes the boycott as a violation of the Paris Protocol, the economic agreement that accompanied the Oslo accords and was agreed to in 1994.

22 May: Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas endorses the boycott publicly for the first time. “We are very happy that our young people. . . went voluntarily to empty Palestinian homes of products from the settlements,” he says. “We are not inciting against Israel. We do not want to boycott goods coming from Israel.”

24 May: Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu calls on the PA to stop opposing economic peace with Israel. He describes the Palestinian boycott as “a measure that will only hurt the Palestinians in the end and is another example of counter-productive Palestinian action.”

27 May: Prime Minister Fayyad tells reporters “the boycott. . . shall continue. . . until our homes are empty of settlement goods.” The Palestinian list of settlement products contains 500 items. The campaign involves volunteers visiting more than 255,000 Palestinian homes on the West Bank to help families differentiate between settlement products and goods made in Israel that the campaign does not target.
The PA announces that it is planning a $50 million fund to help workers quit jobs in Israeli settlements by the end of the year.

8 June: Finance Minister Abu-Libdeh stresses that the boycott only affects settlement products, not goods produced in Israel, and affirms the PA’s desire to maintain ties with the Israeli market. He declares that the PA is “interested in peace and cooperation with [Israel], therefore we will not participate in any boycott against the Israeli economy as a whole.”

11 June: The Land of Israel right-wing parliamentary bloc submits a bill to outlaw homegrown and international boycotts against Israel. The bill has the support of 25 politicians from the right wing and centrist parties. It could theoretically force the PA to pay thousands of dollars in compensation to businesses affected by the boycott.

28 June: Prime Minister Fayyad launches the Shop to Shop campaign aimed at removing all settlement products from Palestinian market shelves by the end of the year. 650 volunteers will participate in the campaign under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy’s district offices. Over 66,000 shops across the West Bank will be inspected for compliance with the blacklist of settlement-produced goods.

Who Succeeded in Frightening the Israeli Settlers?

This article by Roi Katz originally appeared in Hebrew in Walla News on 5 May 2010. It was translated into English by the Alternative Information Center on 20 May 2010. The article is available at www.alternativenews.org.

The response of the settler community to Palestinian threats to boycott goods of the territories highlights the panic the former are experiencing. “Enemy action” is how Chairperson of the Judea and Samaria Council Dani Dayan labeled threats of the (Palestinian) Authority to impose prison sentences on Palestinians who work within settlements, and unintentionally exposed the cracked backbone of Jewish colonialism in the territories of Judea and Samaria.

250,000 settlers beyond the Green Line live a quality of life about which other residents of Israel can only dream. Almost 0% unemployment, a well-funded education system, functioning local council, and outstanding transportation infrastructures that were purchased with our tax money, but all of this suddenly dissipates before the Palestinian threat to halt the celebration and cease providing cheap labor and purchasing goods labeled with the Israeli occupation. An entire economic system is exposed as a house of cards. What began perhaps as a Palestinian spin has suddenly become a real threat.

So Who Will Mix the Plaster?

The classic model of settlers was “live in a settlement and work in Petah Tikva” [AIC—near Tel Aviv], and although some of them are attempting to shake off this image, the majority still get up in the morning to the views of Judea and Samaria but make a living in Gush Dan and Jerusalem. Only a tiny minority work the land and rely on “Hebrew labor,” with no foreign or Palestinian workers. If the Palestinians cease to build the red-roofed settler homes and boycott the assembly line in the Barqan Industrial Area, they will expose the big bluff of industry in the territories. Even the captains of the settlers in Judea and Samaria admit that one of the primary reasons Israeli factories chose to work in the territories’ industrial zones is the proximity to the Palestinian human resource. In less laundered words, if the Arabs find it difficult to reach the factory in Netanya [AIC—city in Israel] because of security problems, let’s move the factory near the Palestinian village and continue to cheaply produce without the closure on the territories shutting down our conveyor belt. Economically, all sides benefit. The Palestinians make a living, the factory produces, the Jews are happy, and the bottom line is impressive. Politically, it is an entirely different story.

The fear that gripped the settlers is reminiscent of the hardships of the farmers from Gush Katif following the withdrawal. Suddenly they discovered that within the Green Line there exist strict limits on migrant workers, water quotas are stingy, and other stumbling blocks and laws that no one knew existed outside of the Kissufim crossing. Come and see how many of the farmers from Gaza returned to work in farming and understand how profitable it was near Gaza and how problematic by Ashqelon. The margins of Israel are admittedly extremely narrow but that does not
hamper two economic systems, at least, to act one alongside the other.

**Paliestinians Change Direction**

However, a hole in the pocket does not alone explain the panic. It apparently derives from the fact that settler leaders understand that this is a hole in the dam and if they do not stop it in time, a flood will result. This tactic of the Palestinian struggle focuses on the soft belly of Israel, in its weak points of the occupation system and its security propaganda. The popular struggle in Bi'lin through the economic boycott, these are moves that garner international sympathy, do not cost human lives, and leave Israel with no response. Rubber-coated bullets, tear gas, and tanks don’t help here, neither [does a settler public relations campaign within Israel].

**BY HOOK AND BY CROOK: ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY IN THE WEST BANK (EXCERPTS)**

This report by B'Tselem was published on 6 July 2010. Footnotes have been omitted for space considerations. See Doc. C4 for further excerpts from this report. The full report is available online at www.btselem.org.

**Data on the Settlements**

Between 1967 and May 2010, 121 official Israeli settlements were built in the West Bank. Another approximately 100 outposts were built—settlements established without official authorization, but with the support and assistance of government ministries. These figures do not include four settlements in the northern West Bank that Israel evacuated as part of the “Disengagement Plan” in 2005.

In addition, Israel established 12 neighborhoods on land annexed to the Jerusalem municipality after 1967; under international law, these are considered settlements. The government also supported and assisted the establishment of several enclaves of settlers in the heart of Palestinian neighborhoods in the eastern part of Jerusalem—among them the Muslim Quarter of the Old City, Silwan, Shaykh Jarrah, Mount of Olives, Ras al-Amud, Abu Dis, and Jabal Mukabir.

According to the latest figures, half a million persons live in the West Bank settlements and in the Israeli neighborhoods established in East Jerusalem.

... 

**B. Land Area of the Settlements**

In this report, the calculation of the total land area of the settlements is based on official state maps prepared by the Civil Administration, dating December 2006. According to these maps, the total area of the West Bank, including the areas annexed to the jurisdictional area of the Jerusalem municipality, is 5,602,951 dunam (one dunam is equivalent to 1,000 square meters, 0.1 hectares, or 0.247 acres). The total built-up area of settlements was calculated using one of two measurements: the boundaries of the built-up areas in each settlement, including parts within these areas that have not been built up, or a sum total of the built-up areas in settlements where these areas are separate from each other. The boundaries of the built-up areas were calculated by superimposing aerial photos of settlements and outposts, taken in 2009, on the Civil Administration maps.

**Table 3: Area of the Settlements as a Proportion of the Area of the West Bank**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of West Bank area (2009)</th>
<th>Total built-up areas in settlements</th>
<th>Total municipal jurisdictional areas in settlements</th>
<th>Total areas of regional councils</th>
<th>Total area controlled by the settlements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area in dunams (2009)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>9.28</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55,479</td>
<td>520,050</td>
<td>1,879,774</td>
<td>2,399,824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mechanisms for Taking Control of West Bank Land and Illegal Construction in Settlements

[The settlement enterprise has been characterized, since its inception, by an instrumental, cynical, and even criminal approach to international law, local legislation, Israeli military orders, and Israeli law, which has enabled the continuous pilfering of land from Palestinians in the West Bank. The principal means Israel used for this purpose was declaration of "state land," a mechanism that resulted in the seizure of more than 900,000 dunams of land (16 percent of the West Bank), with most of the declarations being made in 1979–1992. The interpretation that the State Attorney’s Office gave to the concept “state land” in the Ottoman Land Law contradicted explicit statutory provisions and judgments of the Mandatory Supreme Court. Without this distorted interpretation, Israel would not have been able to allocate such extensive areas of land for the settlements. In addition, the settlements seized control of private Palestinian land. By cross-checking data of the Civil Administration, the settlements’ jurisdictional area, and aerial photos of the settlements taken in 2009, B’Tselem found that 21 percent of the built-up area of the settlements is land that Israel recognizes as private property, owned by Palestinians.]

Table 4: Area of the Settlements by Ownership (in dunams, with the percentage in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>&quot;State land&quot; within the municipal area (not including regional council areas)</th>
<th>Survey land within the municipal area (not including regional council areas)</th>
<th>Private Palestinian land within the municipal area (not including regional council areas)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;State land&quot; within the built-up area</td>
<td>36,717 (66)</td>
<td>391,173 (75.2)</td>
<td>1,682 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey land within the built-up area</td>
<td>1,682 (3)</td>
<td>31,047 (5.9)</td>
<td>11,388 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Palestinian land within the built-up area</td>
<td>11,388 (21)</td>
<td>53,484 (10.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1^Ed. Note—These paragraphs were excerpted from the report’s summary.