Settlement Monitor

Edited by Geoffrey Aronson

This section covers items—reprinted articles, statistics, and maps—pertaining to Israeli settlement activities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Unless otherwise stated, the items have been written by Geoffrey Aronson for this section or drawn from material written by him for Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories (hereinafter Settlement Report), a Washington-based bimonthly newsletter published by the Foundation for Middle East Peace. JPS is grateful to the foundation for permission to draw on its material.

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Can Bush’s Diplomacy End Occupation?


There is little reason to believe that diplomats will bridge the chasm between expectations accompanying the Annapolis conference and the relentless dynamic of continuing lawless occupation and settlement. In such an environment, the facts of everyday life under occupation count for far more than diplomatic abstractions.

On 8 August, the Ma’an Press Agency reported charges by Salah al-Ta’mari, the governor of Bethlehem, that Israel has increased the number of military checkpoints in the Bethlehem area. “Ta’mari said that the Israeli military procedures are destroying the daily lives of residents of the governorate. Soldiers humiliate Palestinians forced to cross the checkpoints and detain them for hours without justification. Reports in the press about a reduction in the number of West Bank checkpoints are false, he noted, complaining that ‘temporary’ checkpoints in the governorate have separated Bethlehem from the surrounding villages and the southern West Bank city of Hebron.”

Later in August, Ma’an reported a demonstration by Palestinians “to protest the extension of Israeli settlements and to try to prevent the confiscation of 500 dunams” on lands belonging to the village of Mazra’a al-Qibliyya, where settlers are said to have already begun planting crops. “The governor of Ramallah told demonstrators that [Palestinian Authority] President Mahmud Abbas was very angry about the land confiscation and declared that it was Israel’s aim to transform Palestine into a purely Jewish state at a time when everybody is talking about reviving the peace process.”

According to a recent report by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), West Bank settlers vandalized 643 olive trees belonging to Palestinians in the first half of 2007. An additional 1,100 trees were destroyed by fire of undetermined origin. Most of the incidents took place in the Ramallah and Nablus

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regions, according to a Ha’Aretz report on the study, “in particular in the areas around illegal outposts that control land adjacent to Palestinian orchards.”

Israel’s state prosecutor has informed the High Court that documents presented by Hebron settlers as proof of their ownership of a building that they occupied in March 2007 are “forgeries, or there is grave doubt about their authenticity.” Nevertheless, the government of Ehud Olmert has not prevented what are now 25 families from squatting in the building, where religious instruction is also being held. The defense ministry, which issued an eviction order months ago, is prohibiting building improvements, explaining that any change in the status quo would be a violation of a court order. As reported by Ha’Aretz, “Orin Struk, a senior member of the committee of Hebron Jews, said that the requests to install windows, insulate the roof and hook the building up to electricity are not intended to influence the question of ownership on the building but are rather for humanitarian reasons only. According to Struk, the building is inhabited by several children whose health must be looked after, and it must be fixed in order to avoid floods and disease.” If past is prologue, the squatters will remain.

During the last year, ultra-Orthodox settlers comprised 40 percent of the increase in the West Bank settler population. In the coming year, their percentage is set to increase even more. High housing prices in Israel have in recent years led tens of thousands of these religious and relatively poor Israelis to cross the Green Line, where, as a result of settlement policies promoted by the Olmert government, there is plenty of available, inexpensive housing. Mod’in Ilit is one of their principal settlements, along with Beitar Ilit, whose municipal jurisdiction was recently linked by military order with that of nearby Jerusalem. Matityahu East is a new neighborhood in Mod’in Ilit. Although construction of the neighborhood on private land belonging to Palestinian residents of Bil’in contravenes even Israel’s legal code, the High Court, while acknowledging this, has nonetheless permitted the squatters to remain. As reported in Ha’Aretz on 6 September, “although the neighborhood was established in an illegal manner and without proper permits on land that belongs to the Palestinian village of Bil’in, the already-constructed part of the neighborhood will not be dismantled or destroyed. The meaning of the ruling is that the [putative Israeli] owners of the dwellings are able to remain in their apartments.”

One day before this ruling, the same court, in response to a petition from Bil’in landowners, ordered the IDF to reroute 1.7 kilometers of the separation barrier near Bil’in in order to reduce the village’s 1,600 dunams now west of the existing barrier. If the IDF reroutes the barrier, it is likely that villagers’ agricultural land—the prospective site of an expansion of Matityahu East—will ultimately be east of the barrier. Losing only some of their land to the barrier is counted by beleaguered Bil’in residents as a great, if bittersweet, victory.

Ha’Aretz reported a claim by the Arab Hotels Company that in Jerusalem, “the Israel Land Authority is working hand in glove with the Ateret Cohanim settler organization in order to dispossess Palestinian landowners of 30 dunams [4 dunams = 1 acre] in East Jerusalem and transfer the parcel to Ateret Cohanim without a tender.” A government official is reported to have explained that the contract with the association was signed in order “to keep the territory in Jewish hands.” These are the everyday realities at the heart of Israel’s settlement enterprise. Not only do they pose a formidable, growing obstacle to an independent and sovereign Palestinian state, they also are a far more relevant indicator of the future than any diplomatic framework that the Bush administration, or any of its predecessors, has promoted.

In recent months, against a background defined by such daily realities as those noted above, and spurred on by Washington, Israeli and Palestinian officials have for the first time since January 2001 been addressing core issues—Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, and borders. Despite much speculation, nothing definitive has emerged about the content of their discussions, or the form of whatever understandings they might produce—for instance, a new declaration of principles, a framework agreement on final status that Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas demands, or a broad statement of goals that the U.S. and Israel prefer.

The only new and dramatic idea this process is known to have produced is a controversial Israeli suggestion to include the “Little Triangle,” a largely Arab Israeli region, in areas to be “swapped” for Israeli settlements west of the separation barrier. When Yisrael Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman first mooted this idea, it was widely derided as illegal and racist. MK Otniel
Schneller, Olmert’s key adviser on settlement issues, voiced his support for the idea, stating, “[The Arabs of the Triangle] are angry that they do not live in a state of all its citizens. So we will live in a Jewish state and they will live in a state of all its citizens. There will not be a withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. There will be a redeployment whose signature is not bulldozers [as in Gaza] but concrete mixers [for barriers and roads].”

Schneller noted that “there is no possibility of reaching any agreement without leaving 13 percent of the area of the West Bank in our hands in settlement blocs. Such an agreement must proceed slowly, step by step.” In the territorial domain, Palestinians are said to be demanding “Taba minus”—that is, 97 percent of the territory east of the Green Line and swaps compensating for 3 percent of West Bank territory ceded to Israel.

Even as Israel and the United States attempt to dampen expectations of a diplomatic advance, Abbas and his supporters view the process that Washington has jump-started as their best and perhaps last opportunity to win the battle for Palestinian public opinion and to enable Fatah’s return to uncontested rule. The Palestinian leader has been weakened by the Hamas victory in Gaza and Israel’s new policy designating Gaza a hostile territory. He sees the diplomatic process now under way as a vehicle for producing “a final formula, an end game, and after that to think about implementation and a timetable for implementation on the ground.” Adviser Yasir ‘Abid Rabbuh, a supporter of the president’s hard line against Hamas and an initiator of the Geneva dialogue (see the Special Document section in JPS 130), explained that “all the international resolutions stipulate that a settlement should be based on the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, a fair and agreed solution to the refugee issue in accordance with Resolution 194, and security for all parties.”

Washington’s management of this process—a hands-off observation of Israeli-Palestinian efforts to reach an understanding, driven in large part by the U.S. president’s commitment to a “meeting” with goals at least one step removed from substantive agreement on issues related to final status—is far different from the activism and the agenda that shaped the Madrid process shepherded by President George H. W. Bush and his peripatetic secretary of state, James Baker, 16 years ago.

The participation of Saudi Arabia is a key goal of the United States and Israel, but the Saudis hesitate to be part of a process that is so ill-defined. “We will see . . . whether for the intent of the conference [the Israelis] will take the measures of confidence-building . . . such as the freeze of settlements and stopping the building of the wall,” Saudi FM Prince Saud al-Faisal explained: “Because it will be curious for Abbas and the prime minister of Israel to be talking about peace and the return of Palestinian land while Israel is continuing to build more settlements. So at least a moratorium on the building of settlements will be a good signal to show a serious intent . . . It is not too much to ask,” he said, adding that this was a common Arab, not just a Saudi, position.

The diplomatic process is exciting little interest among Palestinians and Israelis, who share skepticism about the kind of initiative now at diplomatic center stage. “The Palestinian citizen,” explained al-Quds, “senses a broad gap and a contradiction between the Israeli diplomatic discourse and the field reality.” Israelis are not much bothered by the occupation. Nor do they see Olmert as they had come to see Sharon, as the kind of figure with the political gravitas to challenge the policy of creating facts.

ACTIVITY IN HEBRON

HEBRON: THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN THE AL-RAS NEIGHBORHOOD (EXCERPTS)

This joint report by B’Tselem and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) was released on 19 October 2007. The full text of the report is available at www.btselem.org.

On 19 March 2007, a new settlement was established in the heart of the al-Ras Palestinian neighborhood [in Hebron]. In the months that have passed since then, despite the decision of the defense minister at the time to evacuate the settlement, the settlement has grown. Recently, the settlement was connected to the electricity grid, and construction and renovation work is taking place at the site.

Since the settlement has been established, the harm to the Palestinian residents has increased, and they have suffered further infringement of their human rights. Palestinians suffer both from the settlers and from Israeli security forces who have been assigned to protect the settlement.
Researchers from B’Tselem and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) found that establishment of the settlement and the failure to evacuate it have led, for example, to the following:

- Extensive abuse and violence by settlers in the new settlement, carried out in front of the eyes of members of the security forces;
- Abuse and violence by security forces posted on or near the new settlement;
- Increased prohibitions on movement enforced by Israeli security forces.

**Failure to Enforce the Law on Violent Settlers**

During the course of the first six months of the new settlement, B’Tselem and ACRI documented scores of cases in which settlers attacked Palestinians in the area. The attacks include beatings, blocking of passage, destruction of property, throwing of stones and eggs, hurling of refuse, glass bottles, and bottles full of urine, urinating from the settlement structure onto the street, spitting, threats, and curses.

Settlers attack residents of the Palestinian neighborhood daily, in the light of day and in front of large numbers of soldiers and police who protect the settlement. The army set up a position on the roof of the settlement building and a checkpoint on the road nearby, so it is impossible for an attack to occur in this area that is not within the eyesight of security forces. But, as is the case in the neighborhoods in Hebron’s city center where Israeli settlements have been established, the soldiers and police who witness attacks fail to take sufficient action to stop the attacks and enforce the law. At times, they do nothing. In many instances, Palestinians who sought the aid of security forces standing at the site of the attack were told that their only duty was to protect the settlers.

**Harm by Israeli Security Forces**

Violence against Palestinians by soldiers and police is nothing unusual in the city center. With the establishment of the new settlement, more security forces were assigned to the area, and with it came an increase in harassment, degrading treatment, and violence by security forces against Palestinians living in the al-Ras neighborhood. B’Tselem and ACRI documented many such incidents in the past six months. The violence has included beatings with rifles or hands, frightening Palestinians by firing blanks or by threatening live gunfire, destruction and theft of property, blocking of passage, and swearing and making racist comments.

**Restrictions on Movement**

The army contends that following the establishment of the new settlement, the original prohibitions in the area remained intact, and that it did not impose additional restrictions on Palestinian movement. The reality is different: The army established a new checkpoint in the al-Ras neighborhood, near the new settlement. The checkpoint is staffed around the clock, and many of the Palestinians wanting to cross are checked. Some of them, primarily young men, are delayed time and again. Also, the army has prohibited Palestinians from passing along the road by the mosque near the new settlement. It has installed a permanent gate and an observation tower alongside the gate.

The new restrictions on Palestinians in al-Ras are in addition to the prohibition on Palestinian vehicles using the Kiryat Arba road, a north–south artery that passes through the neighborhood. This prohibition has been in place since the beginning of the second intifada, in September 2000.

**Conclusion**

The settlement that was recently established in the al-Ras neighborhood has made the lives of its Palestinian residents, who lived under harsh conditions previously, intolerable. In recent months, Palestinians living in houses near the new settlement have built wire fences and walls to prevent settlers from invading their homes and to protect their families from stone- and bottle-throwing. Also, many residents have stopped parking their cars near the settlement, fearing the cars will be damaged by settlers or security forces.

In other neighborhoods in the city center in which settlements have been built, the infringement on their human rights forced many Palestinian residents and merchants to move out of the area. There is concern that if the attacks and harm continues in the al-Ras neighborhood, residents will be left with no option but to abandon the neighborhood. As the restrictions on movement in the area increase, the greater the harm to the entire city, given that the new settlement in the al-Ras neighborhood completes territorial contiguity of settlement points from Kiryat Arba in the east to the Tel Rumeida settlement in the west.

Israel must immediately remove the settlers from the building, regardless of the
issue of whether they purchased it or not.

**Jewish Hebron Market Heir Opposes Settlers**

In August 2007, Israel Defense Forces removed several hundred Jewish settlers illegally occupying a two-story building in Hebron city center's marketplace following an Israeli court's refusal to recognize settler claims to the building. Settlers have alternately occupied and evacuated the building since 2001. This article by Tovah Lazaroff originally appeared in *The Jerusalem Post* on 26 August 2007.

The descendent of the Jewish owner of Hebron's disputed marketplace is left-wing, secular, and lives in Tel Aviv. Unlike the Hebron Jews who were forcibly evicted from the marketplace on 7 August, retired journalist Haim Hanegbi, 72, does not dream of returning to the city where his family lived for more than two hundred years.

There, settlers have placed a large white banner over the empty shops in which they demand: “Return the stolen property.” They believe that because this marketplace was once owned by Hanegbi's grandfather, Haim Bejayo, and used by the city's Jewish community, they have a right to settle the area situated at the entryway to their Avraham Avino neighborhood. It’s a claim Hanegbi rejects.

“I have more rights than the settlers and the army,” he told *The Jerusalem Post* last week. He wants the marketplace to revert to the Palestinians who made use of it from the 1930s to 1994, when Israel forced them to shut down the shops after Baruch Goldstein, from nearby Kiryat Arba, killed 29 Palestinians as they prayed in a mosque attached to Hebron’s Cave of the Patriarchs.

For Hanegbi, the issue is greater than the scrapping settler claims to the marketplace. It is a declaration of justice, not nationalism. “Write
that I am an anti-Zionist," said Hanegbi, who believes in a "state of all its citizens."

His grandfather, he said, wanted to return to Hebron, "just as every refugee dreams of it. The whole land is filled with people dreaming of returning, that is the nature of the person who wants to return to his roots." But Hanegbi said he was of the belief that Jews could only come back to Hebron in a situation of justice, in which both Palestinians and Jews had equal rights in the city under the law.

"Justice can't be one-sided," he said. "So I can return only when everyone can return."

SETTLEMENT GROWTH AND CONSTRUCTION

MOST SETTLEMENTS LIE EAST OF FENCE, MOST SETTLERS WEST

This Ha'aretz article by Nadav Shragai was published 16 August 2007 and reprinted in the September-October Settlement Report.

While only 48 of the 122 settlements in the West Bank are situated to the west of the separation fence route, these settlements house the vast majority of settlers, according to an analysis conducted by Ha'aretz. The analysis, which is based on Interior Ministry data, shows that 76.2 percent of all settlers—209,716 in number [excluding East Jerusalem's settler population]—reside in the 48 settlements that will be to the west of the [separation wall], once it is completed. Only 65,440 settlers currently reside in the 74 settlements that lie to the east of the fence route, comprising 23.8 percent of the overall settler population in the West Bank.

However, some of those settlements [east of the separation wall] have experienced an above average growth rate in 2006. Har Bracha, near Nablus, has expanded by 9.2 percent; Beit Hagai, in the southern Hebron hills, by 9.5 percent; Talmon, in the northern Binyamin region, by 8.1 percent; and Yitzhar by 12 percent. Negohot, the only West Bank settlement that is accessible exclusively through area A, has expanded by 20.6 percent.

The settlement population west of the [wall] has increased by 11,338 between June 2006 and July 2007. The total population of the settlements east of the fence grew by 2,886 during the same period. . . .

Whereas the large ultra-Orthodox religious settlements of Mod'in Ilit and Betar Ilit expanded by 10 percent, the larger secular settlements expanded less dramatically: Ariel by 0.7 percent, Givat Ze’ev by 1.1 percent, and Ma’ale Adumin, Efrat, Alfe Menashe, and Karnei Shomron each grew by 4.5 percent.

The population decreased in 19 settlements and increased in 103 during the past year. In 44, natural growth was below the settlement average, which stands at 3.5 percent. According to Interior Ministry figures, the region that has seen the sharpest population decline is the Jordan Valley, which includes the settlements of Giti, Hamra, Mehola, Na’amah, Niran, Netiv Hagdud, and Pazel. Overall, the number of settlers this year has grown from 260,645 to 275,156, which is a 5.45 percent increase, more than twice the growth rate of the Jewish population of Israel.

CONSTRUCTION IN THE SETTLEMENTS CONTINUES, MAY–OCTOBER 2007 (EXCERPTS)

The following was taken from Peace Now’s periodic report on settlements, which can be found at www.peacenow.org.il. Footnotes have been omitted for space considerations.

The Number of Settlers

The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) has published the number of settlers in the West Bank [excluding East Jerusalem] updated to 30 June 2007. According to the CBS, the number of settlers is 267,500, which is an annual growth of 5.8 percent. The growth in the settlements is much larger than the annual growth in all of Israel, which is only 1.8 percent. This means that the growth in the settlements is much more than the "natural growth" and includes massive migration of settlers to the West Bank.

Construction in Settlements

In 88 settlements, construction is underway, ranging from a single house to large projects of tens and hundreds of housing units. Most of the large projects are being built in settlements on the “Israeli” [western] side of the fence, in the settlement blocs, and especially in the settlements in the Jerusalem area, in the Ma’ale Adumin bloc, Gush Etzion, and the Givat Ze’ev bloc. Construction on different scales is also under way in 43 settlements east of the fence. . . . According to a report published by the Israel Land Administration (ILA), in 2006, 27 percent of the housing units built on land that was sold by the ILA was in the West Bank (6,118 of 22,718 housing units).
The New Trick

...In the last few months, hundreds of new caravans appeared in many settlements and outposts. Because of the prohibition of transporting caravans without a permit from the Civil Administration, the settlers had decided to “bypass” the ban and to construct the caravans in the settlements.

The settlers transport the materials (walls, windows, etc.) and put them together inside the area of the settlement. In many settlements, special workshops for the construction of caravans were set up. In many settlements, especially in the area of the Mate Binyamin Municipal Council, dozens of new trailers appeared in the last few months, as detailed below. Almost all of those settlements are on the eastern side of the separation barrier.

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<th>Settlement</th>
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<td>Ofra</td>
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<td>Ateret</td>
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<td>Kochav Hashachar</td>
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<td>Shilo</td>
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<td>Pu’el</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kedumim</td>
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<td>Mitzpe Jericho</td>
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<td>Eli</td>
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“Pninat Ha’ayalot”—Giant Project for Haredi Community in Givat Ze’ev

Givat Ze’ev, a local council northwest of Jerusalem with 11,800 residents, has a diverse population: religious, secular, and Haredi Jews. Most of the residents are former residents of Jerusalem who sought housing at cheaper prices than in Jerusalem, a ten-minute drive from the city.

A few years ago a new construction project began in Givat Ze’ev, “Agan Ha’ayalot,” and an attempt was made to sell the apartments to mixed population, secular and religious. Sales were sluggish, and the project did not get off the ground. Recently, the Nofei Yisrael Company had started to market [approximately] 600 housing units to ultra-Orthodox Haredi population. A publication by the marketing company said: “The project is in a closed compound […] to protect the interests of the Torah-observant population” and includes “synagogues, ultra-Orthodox elementary schools, ritual baths, and schools for advanced Torah learning” (see www.nofi-israel.co.il).

The neighborhood is being built at a great distance from Givat Ze’ev, on a 3.5 km winding road from the end of the settlement (the distance as the crow flies is 600 meters). Construction of the neighborhood will enlarge Givat Ze’ev’s area by hundreds of dunams and complete the takeover of the western lands almost as far as the Beit Horon settlement and the separation fence.

Construction of E1

The construction of the SJ (Shomron and Judea) district police headquarters is currently being completed as part of the E1 construction plan for thousands of housing units, industrial and tourism areas between Ma’ale Adumim and Jerusalem. If the plan serializes, it could close the door on chances to reach a permanent agreement with the Palestinians. The plan will complete the isolation and disconnection of East Jerusalem from the West Bank and cut the Palestinian space in two: a southern area and a northern area, movement between which would be long and winding. Without reasonable territorial contiguity and without access and connection to East Jerusalem, there can be no viable Palestinian state, and we will not be able to reach an agreement to end the conflict.

On 24 September 2007, the OC Central Command issued seizure orders for 1,128 dunams to pave a road for Palestinian traffic between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank, consisting of a huge bypass by tens of kilometers east of Ma’ale Adumim and E1. Peace Now believes that the road was meant to allow Israel to feel it was “taking care of the Palestinians’ welfare.”...
all. Even though all of the legal procedures to evacuate the outposts were completed, nothing has been done to this day to evacuate them and they continue growing and thriving. Expansion was noticed in four of those outposts: Givat Assaf (a new trailer and two new rooms for existing trailers), Mitzpe Lachish (ground works for construction or erection of a mobile home), Mitzpe Yitzhar (a new trailer), Ramat Gilad (two new trailers). Peace Now has petitioned the [High Court] on this matter, demanding the demarcation orders be enforced.

Evacuation of Trailers and Other Incursions

Along with the continued development and construction in the outposts and settlements, the government tries to maintain an appearance of law enforcement, which is negligible considering the extent of construction.

Two new incursions detected by Peace Now and reported to the Civil Administration were evacuated by the IDF: the Ma’on East outpost near the settlement of Ma’on, populated by young people from the settlement, and the Mitzpe Yossef outpost near Mt. Grizim near Nablus, where a religious seminary of Braslav Hassidim operates in the daytime hours.

On 25 September 2007, a new trailer brought to the outpost of Nofei Nehemia a week earlier was evacuated. In the month of August, three new trailers were evacuated from the outpost of Avigail, after it was reported by Peace Now. Likewise, on 6 September 2007, the security forces demolished an illegal structure in Kfar Eldad (near Nokdim), which turned out to be a dove cote.

[There has also been a] war of attrition by the settlers against the IDF: During summer vacation, as well as the holiday of Sukkot, the settlers organized demonstrations in which they “erected” new outposts on lands the demonstrators invaded. In some places, the IDF had to pursue the large groups of youths who were evicted from the site and came back again repeatedly. [Repeated invasions have been made] into the settlement of Homesh, which was evacuated as part of the disengagement. There have been dozens of settlers there since July. The security forces occasionally evacuate the invaders but they return to Homesh within hours. A similar phenomenon is taking place presently . . . but to a smaller extent, near the settlement of Kedumim, at a site the settlers call Shvut Ami.

Roads

. . . An examination by Peace Now showed that presently 33 km of roads are being built to serve a small number of settlers, at an investment of at least NIS 315 million [about $86.5 million]. The upgrading of a small segment of Highway 90 in the northern Jordan Valley can be added to this. According to Ma’ariv newspaper, the investment for upgrading the road is of NIS 34 million [about $9.3 million], invested by the Ministry of Transportation.

Summary and Conclusions

Declarations of “freezing the settlements”: In recent months, the government of Israel has declared in different contexts its intention to freeze construction in settlements. It was recently published that the defense minister froze approval of construction plans as part of “applying pressure” on the settlers in the negotiations over evacuating the outposts. However, the defense minister’s office did not confirm there really was such an order. It appears to be an attempt by the settlers to “raise the price” in negotiations with them and create the impression they are being restricted, especially because of the work of the ministerial committee on outposts (see below).

. . . As part of the hearing of the petition by Peace Now and the Palestinian landowners against the outpost of Migron, the state announced that the defense minister is in negotiations with the settlers to evacuate the outposts. According to reports, the emerging “compromise” as part of the negotiations with the settlers includes the retroactive approval of some of the outposts and the relocation of others to “legal” locations that can be approved. Past experience shows that the only ones to gain from such negotiations are the settlers themselves, who knowingly broke the law but retroactively received government approval and recognition of the facts they put on the ground themselves.

Since the phenomenon of the illegal “outposts” began in the 1990s, there have been a number of evacuations of outposts as part of that sort of agreement. In almost all cases, the outposts that were evacuated were unpopulated, or incursions that were evacuated during the first days before the settlers actually settle down in them. In almost all the populated locations the settlers returned to the outpost (Mitzpe Yitzhar, Hazon David, Ma’on Farm, and others).

Peace Now has counted 30 “evacuations” of outposts over the years.
Eighteen [outposts] were never populated; of the 12 that were populated, 4 returned after the evacuation; 3 moved to a nearby location; one is maintained by the army; and only 4 were completely evacuated [see www.peacenow.org.il for a complete table of evacuations].

Another worrisome trend is the discussions of the ministerial committee on the implementation of the Sasson Report [see Doc. C2 in JPS 135], which are focusing on a draft prepared by the Justice Ministry, whose purpose is reportedly to retroactively legalize most of the outposts. Moreover, the draft says the defense minister’s permission will not be needed to expand the settlements (in total conflict with the Sasson Report recommendations). Considering the use made in the past by the government of Israel of the term “expansion” of the settlements, there is concern that this is a de facto green light for building new settlements and outposts under the guise of “expansion” of existing settlements, without need for government permission. These worrisome trends, along with the report figures that show construction and investment in the settlements are continuing apace, are a badge of shame.

**PALESTINIAN ROAD PASSAGES AROUND JERUSALEM**

*From Settlement Report, November–December 2007.*

Israel’s denial to Palestinians of free, fast, and convenient access to East Jerusalem’s urban core began in the 1990s, when Route 60—the historical north–south road linking major West Bank cities with Jerusalem—was declared off-limits to all Palestinians except residents of annexed East Jerusalem. Three Israeli plans have been formulated to establish “transportation contiguity” between the northern and southern sectors of the West Bank while continuing to ban Palestinian passage through Jerusalem. Each has been carried out or is currently under construction.

**Option B1**

In the past few months, Israel has been building a concrete wall in the middle of a new stretch of highway east of Jerusalem. The wall is not meant to divide settlements from the rest of the territory, but to separate Palestinian vehicles from Israeli motorists, confining the former to a narrow corridor. Instead of the relatively fast and smooth drive alongside Ma’ale Adumim and the hairpin turn back in the direction of Ramallah (Option B2), Option B1 features a lengthy crawl through the densely populated Palestinian towns of Abu Dis and Azariya, passing under the Israeli road to Ma’ale Adumim, before joining the highway now being walled south of Anata. This route, like the others devised for Palestinian traffic, including the narrow and hazardous Wadi Nar road, imposes high transportation costs on the Palestinian economy. It also starkly illustrates the dichotomy between Israeli and Palestinian transportation options as constructed by Israel, graphically symbolized by the wall that divides the highway. The route used by Israeli drivers offers fast and convenient access to the central business districts of Jerusalem, while Palestinian drivers are excluded from the city and the high potential area of E-1 adjacent to it where large settlement development is planned.

**Option B2**

Option B1 will serve as an alternative to Option B2, part of which is shared by Palestinians and Israelis along the stretch of road bordering Ma’ale Adumim and the E-1 area.

**Option C**

Unlike Options B1 and B2, Option C moves Palestinian traffic around Jerusalem farther eastward, eliminating it altogether from Palestinian areas between Ma’ale Adumim and Jerusalem. The projected route continues east from the Wadi Nar road, making numerous descents and ascents before intersecting Highway 1 along the barren stretch between Jerusalem and Jericho. From here, the most probable option onward to Ramallah is the traditional road (Route 440) to and from Jericho to Ramallah. Compared to the traditional direct link (Highway 60) through Jerusalem, Option C increases the driving distance between Bethlehem and Ramallah threefold and the cumulative elevation to be covered about fifteen-fold, because Jericho lies far below sea level, while Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Ramallah are at altitudes of about 700 to 800 meters.

**WHO FUNDS THE PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES IN EAST JERUSALEM?**

*From Settlement Report, September–October 2007.*

Today, approximately 2,000 of East Jerusalem’s settlers residing in small outposts in Silwan, the Old City, and Shaykh Jarrah are being guarded by an “army” of 350 highly trained and armed private security guards. This service costs the state $3,800 per settler annually.