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# SETTLEMENT MONITOR

EDITED BY GEOFFREY ARONSON

*This section covers items—reprinted articles, statistics, and maps—pertaining to Israeli settlement activities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Unless otherwise stated, the items in this section have been written by Geoffrey Aronson directly for this section or drawn from material written by him for Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories (hereinafter Settlement Report), a Washington-based bimonthly newsletter published by the Foundation for Middle East Peace. JPS is grateful to the Foundation for permission to draw on its material. Major documents relating to settlements appear in the Documents and Source Material section.*

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## QUARTET'S ROAD MAP IRRELEVANT TO DRAMATIC CHANGES ON THE GROUND

*From Settlement Report, November–December 2002.*

Diplomatic paralysis and dynamic, dramatic changes favoring settlers in the division of land in the occupied territories dominate the Israel/Palestine landscape today. The Quartet's road map (see Doc. D3), which aims at filling the diplomatic vacuum created by the failure of the Oslo process and the Sharon government's rejection of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as "an entity that supports terror" has only confirmed the assessment of diplomatic paralysis.

The road map is based upon assumptions rejected by Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon and offers phased "performance-based" promises unlikely to be considered sufficient by Palestinians. An Israeli government led by Sharon is not interested in a diplomatic solution. One led by Amram Mitzna, Sharon's challenger in upcoming elections, is championing ideas and a vision

of Palestinian statehood far bolder than contemplated by the road map's architects.

The ideas outlined in the road map document draw inspiration from the Madrid conference and the stillborn Mitchell and Tenet programs spawned in the wake of the al-Aqsa intifada. Significantly, the Oslo accords are conspicuous by their absence in the diplomatic antecedents cited by the Quartet.

Nevertheless, the road map's intent is to renew the security bargain made between Israel and the PLO in September 1993, offering Israel once again the promise of a Palestinian commitment to defeat the militant Palestinian opponents of the status quo while holding out the attainment of a sovereignty over perhaps half of the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and all of Gaza as an interim measure.

The Quartet misses an opportunity to address the territorial contest at the core of the dispute. The scores of new "outpost" settlements established before Sharon's tenure, not to mention the almost 200 settlements where 400,000 Israelis reside, are implicitly blessed by the road map even as the Quartet

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reiterates the necessity to completely freeze settlement expansion at some point in the process. A freeze is a poor and unworkable substitute for settlement evacuation, which is the key requirement of any workable solution.

These ideas would have had far more relevance in the months before the 2000 Camp David and 2001 Taba talks failed to reach an agreement that would "end the conflict," an aspiration absent from the Quartet's agenda. The timetable outlined in the road map has already fallen victim to Israel's upcoming election. More significantly, there is no doubt about the refusal of the Sharon government and, just as important, Israel's security establishment, to embrace the security equation at the heart of the Quartet's ideas. Israel under Sharon is settling in for an extended period of direct exercise of security responsibilities everywhere in the occupied territories, a dramatic transformation from the last decade, and one that the Bush administration, the road map notwithstanding, hesitates to confront.

The explosion of new settlements, despite their innocuous description as "outposts," attests to a program of claiming ever more occupied space along the West Bank's central north-south axis vital for the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. The cascading effect of this policy is seen most vividly in the hamlet of Yanun (see below), where Palestinian life has been made all but untenable by the combination of expanding settlements and settler harassment under the complicit gaze of the IDF. The abandonment of Yanun by its residents may well prove temporary, but, as with the seemingly permanent restrictions imposed on the tens of thousands of residents from Hebron to Nablus, and the equally dramatic if less reported changes in Gaza's topography, it serves as an unmistakable wake-up call to those complacent about the impact of settlement expansion on the destiny of the two peoples.

## SETTLEMENT FACTS

*From Settlement Report, November-December 2002.*

### NEW SETTLEMENT OUTPOSTS ESTABLISHED (AS OF NOVEMBER 2002)

<i>Year</i>	<i># of New Outposts</i>
1996	6
1997	2
1998	12
1999	15
2000	2
2001	21
2002	42
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

*Note:* Year of establishment was not available for 8 outposts.

Number of outposts located inside existing settlement planning boundary: 37

Number of outposts located outside existing settlement planning boundary: 53

*(Note:* Information on the location of 17 outposts is not available. The location of one outpost is unclear.)

Peace Now reports that only eight outposts established since 1996 have been completely dismantled. Former DM Benjamin Ben-Eliezer claimed that during February 2001-November 2002, 56 outposts were dismantled.

Number of uninhabited outposts: 24

Number of outposts housing a handful of unmarried individuals: 4

Number of outposts housing 1-5 families: 28

Number of outposts housing 6-10 families: 6

Number of outposts housing 11-15 families: 6

*(Note:* One outpost houses 19 families. Information on the population of 39 outposts is not available.)

### GOVERNMENT TENDERS ISSUED FOR SETTLEMENT CONSTRUCTION, 1998-JUNE 2002

<i>Settlement Location</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>East Jerusalem</b>						
Har Homa	—	1,498	1,214	—	—	2,712
Pisgat Ze'ev	—	—	415	131	48	594
<b>Gaza Strip</b>						
Nisanit	4	—	—	—	—	4
Rafiah Yam	—	10	—	—	—	10
<b>Golan Heights</b>						
Ein Zivan	—	—	18	—	—	18
Qatzrin	—	—	86	—	—	86

<i>Settlement Location</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>West Bank</b>						
Alfe Menashe	136	—	—	212	—	348
Ariel	320	—	—	—	—	320
Beitar Ilit	—	1,089	—	—	244	1,333
Efrat	—	20	17	—	359	396
Elkana	—	—	76	39	—	115
Giva Benjamin	—	—	—	—	76	76
Givat Ze'ev	—	594	—	—	—	594
Har Adar	—	—	80	—	74	154
Karnei Shomron	—	57	—	—	—	57
Kiryat Arba	—	12	—	—	—	12
Kochav Ya'acov	—	—	—	696	—	696
Ma'ale Adumim	—	461	174	734	286	1,655
Ofarim	400	—	—	—	—	400
Rachelim	—	—	14	—	—	14
Talmon A	—	—	29	—	—	29
<b>Annual Total</b>	<b>860</b>	<b>3,741</b>	<b>2,123</b>	<b>1,812</b>	<b>1,087</b>	<b>9,623</b>

### SETTLEMENT TIGHTENS THE NOOSE ON JERUSALEM

*The following article by Amira Hass was published in Ha'Aretz on 9 October 2002.*

As opposed to the conventional wisdom in Israel, namely that the leaderships of the PLO, Fatah, and the Palestinian Authority (PA) are exclusively engaged in internal squabbling, in recent days they have in fact been considering the issue of whether the two-state solution—the establishment of an independent and viable Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel—could even be implemented at this time.

The PLO's Negotiations Affairs Department, which is headed by Abu Mazin (Mahmud Abbas), has raised the question of whether Israel's construction policies in the settlements in general and in Jerusalem in particular have not in effect shattered the previous framework for peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, obliging the sides to replace it with a more suitable framework.

Abu Mazin's department is now putting the finishing touches on a document that summarizes Israel's construction activities, especially in the West Bank territories around Jerusalem, and in the eastern part of the city. The document also considers the implications of the new separation fence that is now going up. For its data, the framers of the document relied on readily available information that has appeared in the Israel press, or has been supplied by the Peace Now movement and the B'Tselem organization. The document is entitled "Israel's Pre-emption of a Viable Two-State Solution." Appended to it is a separate chapter that considers the economic, social, and political

implications of Israeli construction policies in East Jerusalem.

In this spirit, Palestinian finance minister Salam Fayyad, who is currently in Washington, cautioned his American counterparts that Israeli settlement policies are liable to frustrate the implementation of a solution based on establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. This was reported yesterday by sources in the PLO negotiations department. Fayyad left Sunday for conversations with senior U.S. figures on diplomatic and financial matters. He took with him a series of maps, as well as the document whose main points are described below.

Fayyad is considered an "American appointment" to the new Palestinian cabinet that was named in early June under international pressure to carry out reforms in the Palestinian government. Fayyad, a Tulkarm-born economist, served for years as a senior International Monetary Fund (IMF) official. He has been the IMF's representative in the PA ever since the PA's establishment. In the few months since his appointment to the cabinet, Authority sources say that the Fayyad has succeeded in making sure that the PA's scant revenues are deposited in a single bank account (instead of several different accounts); has put an end to the never-ending deviations from the budget that were the result of the checks that Yasir Arafat would hand out to anyone who asked; has initiated the process of breaking up the PA's commercial monopolies; has established standards for transparency in the budget and in the ministries of the Authority; and has caused Israeli finance minister Silvan Shalom to transfer some of the tax revenues that Israel has owed the PA for two years.

Even when the Palestinian Council caused the new cabinet to resign, saying the cabinet had not complied with the requirements of the reform, its members underscored their great appreciation for Fayyad's professionalism. Three weeks ago, he also had an opportunity to show his patriotic backbone. Fayyad was attending a routine meeting with Yasir Arafat when IDF tanks laid siege to the Muqata' and began destroying the compound. He could have left, in coordination with the Israeli authorities, but opted to remain with Arafat and the others, and from the besieged office continued to conduct conference calls on financial matters with representatives of the contributor countries that are partners in the reform program.

The document that Abu Mazin's department has been drafting for the past month calls the settlements "colonies" and warns, "If the international community continues to remain unwilling to reign in Israeli colony construction and expansion, irreversible 'facts on the ground' and the de facto apartheid system, such facts will force Palestinian policymakers to reevaluate the plausibility of a two-state solution."

According to the document, Israeli construction in the West Bank in general and in the area of Jerusalem in particular would leave the Palestinians with chances for a "state" in name only, that would more closely resemble an Indian reservation in the United States, with limited access to water and land. This is the opinion of the document's authors—a team of legal scholars, academics, and geographers who have been working in the framework of what is called the "Jerusalem Task Force" for the past two years.

Israel has exploited the opportunity afforded by the conflict to expand in three directions through its construction and settlement policies in Jerusalem. These trends originated long before the outbreak of the intifada: closing off East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank; for all intents and purposes cutting off the northern West Bank from the southern West Bank; and the prevention of any opportunity for Palestinian urban development, partly by means of expanding construction in the settlements of the West Bank in general and in Jerusalem in particular.

According to the document, the Jerusalem metropolitan area that is now coming into being—through a network of outer and inner

roads, outer and inner separation fences, the route of the light railway system and an accelerated wave of construction that is linking together Israeli settlements—will extend over an area of 440 square kilometers, of which only 25 percent lies in West Jerusalem, with the remainder in territory occupied in 1967.

This construction, which links Israeli settlements to Jerusalem, blocks the development options of the future capital of the promised Palestinian state, cuts off Palestinian villages from one another and from East Jerusalem, and ensures continued Israeli control in widespread areas of the West Bank, through Israel's control of the roads.


Construction in southwest Jerusalem, which is closing in on Bethlehem and its sister cities of Bayt Sahur and Bayt Jala and the villages in the area, will deny them the opportunity of natural growth, and cut them off from both Jerusalem and the southern West Bank.

The document states that this is being perpetrated by means of the expansion of Gush Etzion (including the ultra-Orthodox settlement of Beitar Illit), which can expand up to two-and-a-half times its current size, through construction at Har Homa and the settlements along its flanks—Givat Hamatos and Givat Ha'arbaa, which is planned for the area south of Har Homa, and by means of paving the Za'atra-Bayt Sahur road that would directly link eastern Gush Etzion (the settlement of Tekoa) with Har Homa.

In East Jerusalem, the document's authors cite the E-1 plan that would expand the Adumim settlement bloc, creating a contiguous territorial belt of settlement between Ma'ale Adumim, Pisgat Ze'ev, and French Hill. This would "consolidate Israeli control over key transportation junctions for all the roads connecting the northern West Bank to the south including the vital eastern ring road." The same would happen with the east-west roads that link the Jordan rift in the east to western Israel. This E-1 expansion plan, which has already led to some expropriation of lands of surrounding Palestinian villages, "will also foreclose any possibility of Palestinian economic and urban development in the largest area of nondeveloped land near occupied East Jerusalem, effectively destroying any prospects of meaningful Palestinian presence in Greater Jerusalem."

As opposed to the southern and eastern gates of the capital, in which—according to

*“Capturing the Hilltops” Israeli Settlement Outposts 1996-2002*



the document—all it will take is a single bloc of settlements to functionally partition the eastern part of the city from its surroundings, the continuum of Palestinian construction, albeit thin, between Shu'fat and Ramallah compelled Israel to build two settlement blocs along the outer rim of the city's northern gate. They are the Givon bloc that lies northwest of Givat Ze'ev, and includes Givon, Givon Hahadasha, Givat Shmuel, and Har Adar; and the Binyamin bloc, which comprises Adam, the Sha'ar Binyamin industrial

zone, Psagot, Tal Zion, and Kochav Ya'acov in the northeast.

There are three highways running east-west and north-south that are now being completed and expanded, which link these two Israeli settlement blocs to one another, to other settlement blocs in the West Bank, to western Jerusalem, and to Tel Aviv. These roads also happen to break up the continuum of Palestinian communities in the region, separating them from one another, disconnecting them from Ramallah and Jeru-

salem, and preventing their development. Examples include Jaba and Hizma in the east, and Shaykh Jarrah, Bayt Hanina, Shu'fat, al-Ram, and Bir Nabalab in the west, as well as the western villages of Bidu, Katana, and Bayt Iqsa.

The document states that as opposed to ring roads in other cities of the world, which are intended to ease traffic around densely populated areas, the ring road in Jerusalem is "intended to tighten Israeli control over Jerusalem." The ring road is designed to link "the southern colonies"—Tekoa and Har Homa—with "the northern colonies" and simultaneously divert Palestinian traffic far from the city center.

"The 'security' wall," reports the document, "will be three times as long as the Berlin Wall and, at points, twice as high," and will in its initial stage lead to the de facto annexation of 3–5 percent of West Bank territory to Israel. With its erection in East Jerusalem, an additional 3 percent of West Bank territory will be annexed to Israel, with a total of 90,000 Palestinians who are not residents of Israel finding themselves living between the fence and the Green Line.

The long-standing Israeli policy of discrimination on the allocation of budgets and land reserves is turning the Palestinian territory in Jerusalem proper into slums that are isolated from one another, states the chapter about the implications of Israeli construction in East Jerusalem for the Palestinian population. These slums are denied open land tracts for future population growth and economic and commercial growth.

The document predicts an exacerbation of population density in these slums, which will be fertile ground for poverty and disease. The Israeli construction policies in Jerusalem and in the northern and southern West Bank spoil any possibility of leaving Jerusalem as an open city shared by two peoples and two states. The document concludes by cautioning that unless Israel leaves territorial continuity in the Palestinians' hands, "the only remaining option is for the Palestinians to accept a one-state, two-nations solution." However, this will not be accepted by Israel because of Palestinian demographic superiority that threatens the Jewish state, say the authors of the document.

They conclude with the hope that Israeli fears about Palestinian demographic growth "might 'push' the Israelis to reconsider their settlement policies and perhaps accept divi-

sion of the city," and at the last moment come to their senses and accept the two-state solution.

### SETTLERS FORCE DESERTION OF YANUN VILLAGE

*On 18 October 2002, the last of twenty-five families left the West Bank village of Yanun after four years of worsening attacks by settlers, who in recent years have established sites on nearby hilltops. The exodus from Yanun is the first time in recent memory that Palestinians abandoned an entire village because of settler harassment. After the IDF guaranteed the villagers' protection, a few families returned to Yanun on 23 October (many had established temporary residence in the nearby village of Aqraba). Settlers resumed attacks on 25 October. Although the IDF did not intervene, the families did not leave.*

*The following statement was issued by Yanun councilor 'Abd al-Latif Sobib and reproduced in Settlement Report, November–December 2002.*

Yanun is located three kilometers to the north of Aqraba. It is as ancient as the olive trees that cover the surrounding hills as well as meadows. The village is divided into two parts, upper and lower Yanun. During the Ottoman period, the village was inhabited by aristocratic, well-known families that originally came from Bosnia. There is a holy shrine believed to be the prophet Nun in the eastern part of the village. A visitor to the village can also see the ruins of an old Ottoman mosque. There is a natural spring upon which the farmers and the shepherds who live there depend.

The northern part of the village (upper Yanun) is considered illegal by the Israeli authorities, and people are not allowed to build new houses there or have proper facilities. Yanun is a typical example of how Palestinian villages have been wiped out as a result of successive Israeli government expansionist policies and as a result of the aggressive acts of the settlers. The settlers of nearby Itamar who are legally covered, protected, and fully armed have been carrying out planned aggressive and terrorist activities intended to kick the people of Yanun out of their homes and impose their control, not only over the lands of Yanun, but over the nearby farms of Aqraba.

These activities include:

1. Repeatedly attacking people in their homes, throwing stones, shooting at win-

dows and closed doors, terrifying young children and women.

2. Attacking families on their farms. Here are a few examples of these brutal acts:

a. In one of these attacks Ghalib Adel, 40, was beaten brutally. He lost one of his eyes and had his leg broken, in addition to suffering several bruises. Atif Tawfiq, Rashad Salim, and Inbisat Ahmad were also beaten in the attack.

b. Muflih Adel was beaten severely and taken to the hospital unconscious.

c. Ghassan Abu Kaf, 38, escaped murder and was shot in the leg.

d. Ahmad Mahmoud, 80, lost one of his eyes in a settler attack.

e. 'Abd al-Latif Yusif, the mayor of the Yanun Council, was beaten severely in an attack.

f. Hani Hamdallah, 24, was shot dead, while Fadi Fadil was injured in another attack by settlers.

3. Killing hundreds of sheep using poisonous injections and live bullets.

4. Blocking the main road to the village of Yanun.

5. Spoiling the only natural source of water in the village.

6. Burning down and destroying the only source of electricity, the electric generator that was donated by the Economic Development Group.

7. Preventing farmers from getting to their farms and attacking them using fierce dogs and live bullets.

8. Destroying the crops by ploughing the farmed land and burning crops that were harvested and ready to transport, as evidence of possession and control. At least three cases of burning have been recorded.

9. In broad daylight, stealing olive trees that belong to local farmers.

10. Imposing a siege around the natural pastures and preventing shepherds from getting to them.

11. Preventing the relatives of the people of Yanun from visiting Yanun and shooting at the cars that go there, including the car of the mayor of Aqraba.

12. Cutting off the main road from Aqraba to Nablus. This road, which was finished in 1935, is no longer safe to travel.

13. Even teachers at Yanun elementary school were subjected to questioning and provocations by settlers.