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SETTLEMENT MONITOR

EDITED BY GEOFFREY ARONSON

This section covers items—reprinted articles, statistics, and maps—pertaining to Israeli settlement activities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Unless otherwise stated, the items in this section have been written by Geoffrey Aronson directly for this section or drawn from material written by him for Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories (hereinafter Settlement Report), a Washington-based bimonthly newsletter published by the Foundation for Middle East Peace. JPS is grateful to the Foundation for permission to draw on its material. Major documents relating to settlements appear in the Documents and Source Material section.

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SHARON'S NEW MAP

From Settlement Report, May–June 2002.

A new, post-Oslo era has begun in the occupied territories. The understandings between Israel and the Palestinians that made possible the establishment of a Palestinian Authority (PA) led by Yasir Arafat and the creation of Palestinian security services with a mandate in Palestinian populated areas (areas A) of the West Bank have been irrevocably undermined. Likewise, the territorial division of the West Bank that resulted from the Oslo process—the creation of areas A, B, and C—is no longer relevant to the reality in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. As one U.S. official who recently returned from the region remarked, “the Oslo map today is meaningless.”

The government of Ariel Sharon has effectively destroyed the principle feature of the Oslo era by ending Israel's consent to recognize the security responsibilities of the PA in area A—covering the principal Palestinian towns in the West Bank. As Amir Oren of *Ha'Aretz* wrote on 5 April 2002, in the occupied territories “the IDF has been ‘color blind’ for some months: There is no differ-

ence, as far as the army is concerned, between brown (the color on the map of the areas in the territories under full Palestinian civilian and security control [area A]), white (areas of full Israeli control [area C]), or yellow (Israeli security and Palestinian civilian control [area B]). The IDF is doing as it pleases in all of them.”

Just as he is determined to reinvent a less powerful Palestinian Authority more suited to his preferences, Sharon, more than anyone else on the international diplomatic stage, and to his great advantage, is proceeding from an assumption that the Oslo map is an artifact of history, as relevant to the future as was the 1947 Partition Plan map after the first Israel-Arab war in 1948.

Sharon is determined to construct a new map for the occupied territories—one that reflects his understanding of how best to protect Israel's security interests, both domestically and regionally, and to safeguard and expand Israel's settlement enterprise. An Israeli deployment based upon these views is now being devised and implemented.

When Sharon met U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in mid-April, he answered Pow-

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ell's request to withdraw Israeli forces from Palestinian towns in the West Bank by explaining that the objective of Israel's unprecedented military operation was to deploy the IDF in security zones in the Jordan Valley and in the region east of the Green Line separating Israel from the West Bank. As *Ha'aretz* reported on 14 April 2002, the logic of his plan was this: a military defeat would convince the Palestinians and the international community to leave these security zones, including major Palestinian population centers, under effective Israeli control for many years.

To leave no doubt of his intentions, Sharon showed Powell a map of the West Bank outlining the two security zones.

Sharon's territorial preferences were formed decades ago, and they have not changed significantly over time. The settlement plan he unveiled as minister of agriculture in 1977 focused on the area of the West Bank east of the Green Line. Sharon planned settlements in this region as a way of preventing the creation of "a solid Arab block" straddling Palestinian towns on both sides of the Green Line and reaching eastward to the populated region joining Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, and Jerusalem. In this latter area, Sharon spearheaded the establishment of numerous small settlements along the mountain ridge.

The Sharon map of 1997 proposed the annexation to Israel of 64–70 percent of the West Bank and 31 percent of its Palestinian population (see *Settlement Monitor* in *JPS* 107, p. 138). It acknowledged the need to accommodate the reality of Palestinian sovereignty in a portion of the West Bank within a strategic environment dominated militarily by Israel and without obstructing the expansion of Israeli settlements.

The following areas of Israeli sovereignty were proposed by Sharon in 1997:

- A 20 km wide strip along the Jordan Valley border with Jordan
- A 7–10 km wide strip along the Green Line border
- Three roadways running in an east-west direction across the West Bank
- Control over "metropolitan Jerusalem," including Bethlehem
- Every settlement to be included in a security zone and will not be isolated

This outline was put forward in the context of a final status agreement as outlined in


the Oslo accords. In today's environment, Sharon prefers to think in terms of long-term interim measures, which necessarily excludes Israel's de jure annexation of territory. Instead of annexation as part of a final status agreement, Israeli policy is now defined as one of unilaterally defining and constructing security zones as part of a long-term interim arrangement.

On 4 March 2002 Sharon defined these areas as including a 5 km strip east of the Green Line, except for the Ariel region, where it increases to 20 km; and a 15–20 km strip west of the Jordan River—from the Gilboa range south to the shelf above the Alon Road, including the area close to Ma'ale Adumim. From Ma'ale Adumim south, the zone would be 10 km wide. He later explained that in the context of Operation Defensive Shield that commenced in late March, "the mountain plateau and water sources will remain in Israeli hands" and added that "in the region of the mountain plateau along its length [new] settlements to assure Israeli security rule like Keddumim and Elkana will be established in coming years."

The reference to the need to protect existing settlements and to plan new ones is a key element in current Israeli policy. For those settlements outside the two large security zones and the Jerusalem region, security will be enhanced by fashioning eight isolated Palestinian enclaves monitored by Israeli security forces, thus enabling settlers to pursue a "normal life." Settlements, not Palestinian towns, will enjoy uninterrupted continuity. Palestinians, not settlers, will bear the primary burden created by security arrangements for the latter. MK Yosef Lapid, after a tour of these areas, noted that 400,000 Palestinians in 108 villages live in Sharon's western security zone now being demarcated along the Green Line.

On 30 January 2002 the Sharon cabinet approved the "Wrapping Greater Jerusalem" scheme, a political-security concept for assuring Israeli and settlement security in the metropolitan Jerusalem region. Significant parts of the West Bank—including Givat Ze'ev in the north, Ma'ale Adumim to the outskirts of Jericho in the east, and the Etzion bloc to the south—define its territorial perimeter, which is to be guarded by soldiers from the border police. Barriers will be constructed along only 11 km. The area east of Givat Ze'ev to Adam has already

The West Bank After Oslo: Control and Separation—June 2002



been fenced, according to Khalil Tufakji, head of the Orient House’s Mapping and GIS Department. Most of the West Bank roads into this region have already been barricaded, forcing traffic into discreet and tightly controlled access points.

These zones, long part of Sharon’s vision of Israeli control over the destiny of the West Bank, have now been married to an increasingly vocal popular Israeli demand for “separation” from Palestinians. The idea animating this demand is that no Palestinian, except for humanitarian cases, will be permitted to

cross into Israel. Most of the plans for separation or unilateral withdrawal now under discussion, including the one supported by the Sharon government, are first and foremost the product of an Israeli desire *not* to separate from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but to remain in the territories in both the security and settlement dimensions.

The plan approved by the Sharon cabinet calls for the creation of a security buffer zone with two fortified lines—a western “seam line” running approximately parallel to the Green Line, and another on the zone’s

eastern perimeter. The former line is 286 km, of which 68 km (11 km of which are to be built around Jerusalem) will feature barricades such as a wall or electronic fence that will indicate not only when someone breaches it, but also when someone approaches it. Small sections of the wall/fence have been constructed at local initiative over the years; parts of it date to 1994. Thirty checkpoints will be established for vehicular passage along this line. Four crossing points will be established for commerce, featuring the cargo transfer system in place between the Gaza Strip and Israel that prohibits the entry of Palestinian trucks into Israel. The four points are to be located at Salim near Jenin, Qalqilya, Tarqumiyya, and Jerusalem.

The eastern perimeter will not be marked with a fence but will have various passive and active security and monitoring measures. An idea to mine the area east of the eastern perimeter was rejected because the IDF feared that Palestinians would steal the mines for use elsewhere.

Within the West Bank, and in the absence of any agreed upon Palestinian security capability, the IDF will maintain the existing network of scores of checkpoints controlling Palestinian movement into and out of cities and villages. The checkpoints encircling Palestinian areas are meant to enhance the security of Israeli settlements.

Results of the government's allocation of a multimillion dollar budget for the scheme are to be expected within the year. Yet previous plans inspired by a similar aspiration to prohibit Palestinian entry into Israel have not materialized. A cooling of public passions and the recognized inability of such measures to assure an increase in the security of the Israeli public had, until 2002, produced many plans but no integrated physical barriers.

Under Sharon's leadership, however, some sort of barrier will be erected, notwithstanding its dubious security value, but more significantly because it fulfills a strategic plan for settlement expansion long pursued by the prime minister. As Internal Security Minister Uzi Landau explained the plan for Israel's separation from Palestinians, "They are there, but we are here and there as well."

SETTLEMENTS AND ECONOMICS

ISRAELI BUDGET ENCOURAGES SETTLEMENTS

From Settlement Report, March–April 2002.

The recently passed Israeli national budget for 2002 confirms once again the privileged position of settlers and settlements in the occupied territories. Investment grants to industries located in the settlements increased by 12 percent to \$4.6 million. Incentives to encourage home purchases—including grants up to \$20,000 and soft loans of \$8,000 to home buyers—now stand at \$64 million annually. Personal income tax breaks will cost the government \$106 million according to MK Mossi Raz of the opposition Meretz Party. The budget for the Agriculture Ministry's Settlement Division is almost \$19 million. The Religious Affairs Ministry won \$11 million for construction of synagogues in settlements. Allocations for free preschool education for settlers amount to \$5.3 million. The cost of guarding small settlement areas in East Jerusalem's Silwan, Ras al-Amud, and Old City Muslim Quarter is \$5 million. Overall, reported *Ha'Aretz* on 27 December 2001, "the average investment per capita in regional [government] authorities in the territories is NIS 8,146 [\$1,732] annually, nearly three times the sum spent per capita inside the Green Line."

Israeli local authorities in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights were the recipients of \$500 million in government funds from 1990 through 1999 to enable them to balance their local budgets. This amount was four times greater than the funds allocated to poor Jewish towns within Israel. Israeli Arab local authorities, in contrast, had deficit financing of \$2 billion over ten years, according to the Adava Center, which analyzes information concerning equality and social justice in Israel.

A report by the Interior Ministry further highlights the settlements' favored position. The report—which analyzed government financing of settlements in the areas of municipal budgets, residential housing construction, and highway construction—noted that the ministry's grants to local government councils representing the settlements in 2000 were up to eight times the amount allocated to poorer Jewish communities in Israel. Expenditures by the Defense Ministry were excluded.

Adava reported 32,560 housing starts in the West Bank and Gaza Strip settlements in the 1990–99 period, costing \$2.5 billion, 65 percent of which was financed by public funds, almost twice the national rate of 38 percent. More than one-quarter [152] of all

residential housing starts in November 2001 were in the settlements.

Construction of the network of bypass roads in the West Bank and Gaza during 1990–99 averaged more than three times the national per capita average. In the 2002 budget, \$32 million has been allocated toward the construction of bypass roads, “but in practice,” explains a 15 February 2002 article in *Ha’Aretz*, “bypass roads amounting to NIS 228 million [\$50 million] are now currently under construction. Last year, partly under Barak and partly under Sharon, no less than NIS 200 million [\$44 million] were allocated to bypass roads in the West Bank. According to one estimate, since Oslo, Israel has spent more than NIS 1.25 billion [\$300 million] on bypass roads in the territories.” Additional road construction—centered in Greater Jerusalem—amounts to more than \$67 million.

Israel, reversing a policy in effect for decades, has decided to establish a separate electricity network in the occupied territories exclusively for settlements. The new network serving settlements will cost \$155.5 million.

MK Avshalom Vilan of Meretz estimates that since 1967 Israel has spent \$11 billion to create the settlement infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. “Had we invested this money within the state of Israel, it would be a different country today,” he observed.

SPENDING ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP, AND GOLAN HEIGHTS (EXCLUDING EAST JERUSALEM) IN NIS 2000 PRICES, 1990–99

Findings of the Adava Center for Information on Equality and Social Justice in Israel, Yedi’ot Aharonot, 29 January 2002, and Ha’Aretz, 28 January 2002, reproduced in Settlement Report March–April 2002.

Per Capita Annual Capital Transfers from the Central Government to Local Councils

Settlements	3,679
Development towns	2,308
Arab communities	1,720
National average	1,458

Per Capita Expenditures by Local Councils

Settlements	5,428
Development towns	4,176
Arab communities	2,402
National average	3,807

Per Capita Contributions by Residents to Local Councils

Settlements	1,732
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Development towns	1,925
Arab communities	681
National average	2,348

SETTLEMENT-BASED INDUSTRIES SUFFER EFFECTS OF INTIFADA

From Settlement Report, March–April 2002.

Israeli settlement policies have long focused on the transfer of Israeli civilians to new or expanding settlement communities throughout the occupied territories. There is, however, a less heralded, and by most accounts, far less successful element of Israel’s settlement equation—the creation of a viable economic infrastructure in the occupied territories to support this growing population.

For most of the last three decades, the aim of settlement groups and governments alike has been to relocate as many Israelis as possible to the areas captured in June 1967. The economic viability of these new colonies has always been less important. This bias is as much a product of geographic realities as the priorities of settlers and government officials, who have always viewed their main task as winning the contest with Palestinians for control of as much of this contested patrimony as possible. Except possibly among settlers in the agriculturally rich Golan Heights and Jordan Valley, and the Gaza Strip, with its easy access to cheap agricultural labor, the prospect of job opportunities has never registered as a leading cause for relocating to these outposts. Most settlers moved for ideological reasons and quality of life, not to find a job.

The geographic placement of settlements seriously challenges planners concerned with establishing a local sustainable economic base independent of government sponsorship. This predicament is particularly true for the scores of smaller outposts scattered throughout the West Bank. Massive investments in roads, communications, water, and electricity have not compensated for the fact that these outposts are capable only of supporting the most rudimentary sort of independent, entrepreneurial economic activities. The state not only builds and protects settlements, it continues to supply the financial wherewithal that enables many of the 40,000 families in the West Bank to live their lives in economic security.

Rather than establishing employment sources in each settlement, successive Israeli governments have allocated tens of millions of dollars to the creation of industrial parks.

Of the twenty-six such developments Israel has built, ten are in the West Bank. During the last three years, factories established in settlements have received \$46 million in grants from the Investment Center for the Encouragement of New Enterprises and the Expansion of Existing Enterprises. Many other government subsidies act similarly to harness economic development to the overriding objective of settling the occupied territories.

A 30 November 2001 article in *Ma'ariv* notes that during the Oslo period, "the Yesha Council understood that the establishment of industrial parks was the simplest, most legal and effective means for extending control over the lands of Judea and Samaria." In an era in which settlement expansion was constrained by a commitment not to establish new outposts, settlement leaders concluded that industrial areas offered "a means to create facts on the ground and to rule over as much empty land as possible." While Israel indeed established new settlement outposts, new industrial parks claimed far more territory and with far less controversy.

According to *Ma'ariv*, despite the millions of dollars lavished upon these enterprises, "most of the parks are failing and abandoned. The economic and security situation has chased away potential investors and delivered them a grievous blow."

The Bron industrial park, for example, was established during the last two years on 1,500 dunams (4 dunams = 1 acre) of land next to the settlement of Keddumim. Only one-third of the site is open, and only two small concerns—one manufacturing cleaning products and the other producing soap—currently operate, employing thirty people.

The only growth industry at the Bron site is security. The monthly bill for such services has risen to \$25,000 since the eruption of violence between Israelis and Palestinians in September 2000.

Two industrial sites have established a record of achievement and economic success that distinguishes them from their hapless peers. The site at Mishor Adumim is almost thirty years old and enjoys quick access to Jerusalem, only a few miles away. Unlike the industrial zone at Atarot, in East Jerusalem, that has been all but abandoned because of security concerns, Mishor Adumim, located next to the large settlement of Ma'ale Adumim (pop. 25,000) along the road to Jericho, has not suffered from the al-Aqsa intifada. Sited on 3,000 dunams, its 115 enter-

prises employ 2,000 people, half of them Palestinians. Barkan, near Ariel, with its population of more than 15,000, is also close to Israel proper and thus enjoys the dual advantages of proximity and the highest level of government subsidy. Barkan's 5,000 employees, half of them Palestinian, work in 100 enterprises with earnings in the millions of dollars.

Israel exports products from the industrial zones in the occupied territories to the European Union (EU) and the United States under preferential trade agreements. The EU has begun to take initial, halting steps toward imposing sanctions on Israel for exporting these products as if they were made in Israel. In late November 2001 it notified importers that Israeli exports from the occupied territories are not included in the Israeli-EU trade agreement and are, therefore, subject to import duties. Israel's reoccupation of areas A in March and April 2002 increased these concerns.

Israeli industrialists are already demanding that the government compensate them for any losses resulting from the EU decision. Israelis are also concerned about the domino effect of the EU action, particularly in the United States, whose trade agreement with Israel resembles the one between the EU and Israel. One Israeli company has already moved its operations out of the West Bank and into Israel.

Avigdore Yitzhaki, Sharon's chief of staff, suggests, however, that the imposition of sanctions by the EU will result in the expansion of industrial parks in the occupied territories.

LAND GRAB: ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENT POLICY IN THE WEST BANK

This 105-page report by B'Tselem, released in May 2002, examines the evolution and implementation of Israeli policy toward settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the results of this policy in terms of human rights and international law. The excerpts below are taken from the conclusion to chapter 7, "An Analysis of the Map of the West Bank." The full text of the report and accompanying map are available on line at www.btselem.org.

During the discussions on the final-status agreement, a discourse developed among the Israeli public surrounding the question of "percentages of land"—percentages handed over, or due to be handed over, to the Palestinians and percentages remaining, or that

will remain, in Israeli hands. The debate focused on the question of what percentage of the whole would be handed over to the Palestinians and how much would remain in Israeli hands.

As we have attempted to show. . . , the location of each area controlled by the settlements—and not merely its size (i.e., the percentage)—is a crucial variable in terms of the infringement of human rights in general and the chances for realizing the right to self-determination in particular. . . .

[The table below] summarizes the data . . . regarding the scope of areas under the control of the settlements. One of the main findings apparent in the table is the tremendous scope of land—almost two million dunams—included in the areas of jurisdiction of the six [Jewish] regional councils, and which is not included in the municipal boundaries of the settlements that compose the regional councils. Certain parts of these areas are defined as “firing zones” and are used for exercises by the IDF. The other areas are currently defined as “nature reserves,” with the result that no development is permitted.

In general terms, the extent to which the settlers and the Civil Administration exercise

control over these areas is not uniform and varies from one council to another. Arvot Hayarden Regional Council (almost 900,000 dunams) constitutes an example of a council that exercises maximum control of these areas, a result of the combined effect of the sparse Palestinian population in the area, on the one hand, and the farming of some of this area by settlers, on the other hand.

Mount Hermon Regional Council would seem to be an example of the opposite approach. Thus during attempts by settlers in recent years to expand the settlements in this regional council, it emerged that areas defined as part of the area of jurisdiction of the council were actually held by Palestinians, who used them for residence, agriculture, and/or grazing.

B’Tselem is not aware of any plan that relates to these areas. . . . Their future will effectively be defined by possible developments in the political arena. If the pace of construction and expansion of the settlements typical of the 1990s continues in years to come, these areas may be used as reserves of land for the establishment of new settlements and industrial zones and/or for the expansion of existing settlements beyond their existing municipal boundaries.

AREA OF THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS BY REGION
(in thousands of dunams)

Region	Built-Up Area	Municipal Boundaries (including built-up areas)	Land Reserves	Total Area under Control of the Settlements*
Eastern Strip	14.8	75.9	1,203.0	1,278.9
Mountain Strip	16.9	62.6	409.4	472.0
Western Hills Strip	30.9	109.8	265.2	375.0
Jerusalem Metropolis [†]	34.3	129.4	90.6	220.0
Total	96.9	377.7	1,968.2	2,345.9
Total in percentage of the area of the West Bank[‡]	1.7%	6.8%	35.1%	41.9%

* Relates to the areas within the area of jurisdiction of all the settlements (including built-up areas) and unallocated land reserves within the jurisdiction of the regional council.

† Including both metropolitan Jerusalem and municipal Jerusalem. The “area of jurisdiction” of the settlements in municipal Jerusalem is calculated according to the area attributed by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics for each “neighborhood” as a statistical locale (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook*, Table 4/A).

‡ A total of some 5,608,000 dunams, which includes the areas annexed to Jerusalem. The calculation does not include no-man’s-lands and the proportionate area of the Dead Sea.