The Quarterly Update is a summary of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting the Palestinians and the future of the peace process.

BILATERALS

Palestine-Israel

Despite a proposal by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah for reviving the peace process, Israeli PM Ariel Sharon continued to escalate his campaign to reassert control over all of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem by launching two intensive military operations, Colorful Journey and Defensive Shield, targeting the Palestinian Authority (PA), weakening the Palestinian infrastructure and economy, and marginalizing PA head Yasser Arafat. At the same time, Sharon began implementing a buffer zone plan to tighten control along the Green Line and over Palestinian movement between West Bank population centers.

As the quarter opened, Israeli-Palestinian violence was at a high level and increasing (see Chronology for details). Sharon had just returned (2/10) from a high-profile meeting in Washington, which had been important symbolically but offered no practical steps toward a cease-fire (see Quarterly Update in JPS 123). With Palestinian rocket attacks and shootings continuing, Sharon's approval rating for his handling of the intifada was at a low of 38% (compared to overall approval ratings of 70% in 12/01). Sharon had secured (2/10) Israeli cabinet approval to step up attacks and carry out a "rolling response" to the "new level of threat" posed by Hamas's use of Qassam-2 rockets. Meanwhile, Arafat was still restricted to his Ramallah compound, where he had been confined by Israel since 12/5/01 and where his ability to affect the course of the intifada was doubtful: 70% of PA Preventive Security Force (PSF) offices and 90% of PSF barracks had been destroyed, and there was deep popular resentment over his near total acquiescence to U.S. and Israeli demands to punish Palestinian opposition groups. As of 2/15, approximately 1,033 Palestinians (including 21 Israeli Arabs), 262 Israelis (including 69 Israel Defense Forces [IDF] soldiers and security personnel, 77 settlers, 116 civilians), and 7 foreign nationals had been killed.

The Saudi Initiative

On 2/17, as violence steadily increased, an initiative by Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah to be presented at the Arab summit at the end of 3/02 and calling for full Arab normalization with Israel in exchange for full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders was revealed by New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman and confirmed by the Saudi embassy in Washington on 2/18. Though the idea that a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace would involve full normalization had been the unwritten understanding of the parties since the 1991 Madrid Conference, the timing of the initiative elicited considerable interest in Europe and the Arab world. The PA immediately called it (2/17) a "huge step forward," but Israel pronounced it too vague and noted that it "could justify the right of return." As the U.S. initially (2/22) pronounced it of "little relevance . . . to the immediate challenge of trying to reverse the mounting violence," the initiative was temporarily set aside.

Meanwhile between 2/16 and 2/21, violence had been escalating dramatically, leaving 52 Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead: the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AMB) and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) carried out three suicide bombings (2/16, 2/17, 2/18). Unidentified Palestinians staged suicide attacks on settler (2/17, 2/18) and IDF (2/18, 2/21) targets. An AMB gunman attacked (2/19) an IDF post in the West Bank. Palestinians fired (2/16) two Qassam-2 rockets and two mortars at targets in Gaza and across the Gaza border into Israel, causing no damage. The Israelis assassinated three senior Hamas members (2/16, 2/19); staged massive incursions into Nablus (2/20) and
Gaza City (2/21); conducted massive aerial and naval assaults on the West Bank and Gaza, including F-16s strikes on Khan Yunis (2/21), Nablus (2/17), Rafah (2/18, 2/19), and Ramallah (2/17, 2/19); reinforced troops and tightened closures across the West Bank and Gaza; and for the first time since 9/00 set up (2/17) portable housing for IDF troops in the West Bank, suggesting plans to prolong its military offensive.

With violence threatening to spin out of control and with U.S. VP Dick Cheney planning to tour the Middle East in 3/02 to build support for a U.S. strike on Iraq (widely rumored to be planned for 5/02 or fall 2002), the U.S. intervened in late 2/02 to press Israel and the PA to resume trilateral security talks with the CIA aimed at achieving a cease-fire. Israeli DM Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, PSF Gaza head Muhammad Dahlan, and Arafat adviser Muhammad Rashid met secretly on 2/20 and agreed to resume security talks. At the first session, on 2/21, the CIA secured Israel’s pledge not to initiate military operations for one week except to prevent imminent terrorist attacks. Also on 2/21, the PSF arrested three senior PFLP members wanted by Israel in connection with the 10/01 assassination of Israeli Tourism M Rehavam Ze’evi. In response, the Israeli cabinet agreed (2/24) to ease the tank cordon around the Ramallah compound to allow Arafat freedom of movement within Ramallah, though leaving the city would require permission of a special Israeli government forum led by Sharon and Ben-Eliezer. To further ease restrictions, Arafat must also arrest anyone behind the Karine A arms shipment (see Quarterly Update in JPS 123) and bring a complete halt to Palestinian violence.

Meanwhile, Sharon declared (2/21) in a TV address that Israel would not negotiate under violence and demanded the “complete demilitarization” of the PA areas as a “prelude” to a final settlement. The PA canceled a round of trilateral talks to protest Sharon’s remarks and the “insulting” requirement that Arafat ask permission to travel but resumed the meetings on 2/26.

With the situation deteriorating, the U.S. took a second look at the Saudi initiative. After quiet consultations (2/22–25) between the State Dept. and Egypt, the European Union (EU), Israel, the PA, and Saudi Arabia (including direct consultations with Arafat and Sharon) and securing Sharon’s willingness (2/24) “to allow Saudi officials to present the plan to him” if they were serious, U.S. Pres. George W. Bush phoned Crown Prince Abdallah (2/26) to praise the initiative as an “important step” in need of elaboration. On 2/27, U.S. Secy. of State Colin Powell announced that he was dispatching Asst. Secy. of State William Burns and CIA Dir. George Tenet to Saudi Arabia to pursue new openings for peace but insisted that the onus was on Arafat to halt violence. Arafat applauded the decision to send Burns and Tenet and repeated (2/27) that the Saudi plan was a “very strong platform” requiring U.S. backing.

During the week (2/22–27) that Israel agreed not to initiate attacks, violence diminished significantly but continued at a moderate level, leaving eight Palestinians, three Arabs who attempted to infiltrate Gaza from Egypt (2/27), and four Jewish settlers dead. Israel maintained tight curfews on Palestinian towns and strictly limited movement through IDF checkpoints, including barring or firing upon (2/24, 2/25, 2/26) vehicles transporting Palestinians to hospitals; directed shells and machine gun fire at Palestinian residential areas (2/22, 2/24, 2/25); and bulldozed and occupied several Palestinian homes (2/25). Most Palestinian incidents involved gunman sniping at Jewish settlers on bypass roads, but on 2/27 a female AMB suicide bomber detonated a device at an IDF roadblock in the West Bank, injuring three IDF soldiers.

**Operation Colorful Journey**

Although the 2/27 AMB bombing was minor and resulted in only three injuries, the IDF used it to end the one-week suspension on initiated attacks. On 2/28, the IDF launched Operation Colorful Journey, targeting Palestinian refugee camps, ostensibly to capture Palestinians involved in “terrorist attacks.” (IDF Col. Avi Cochavi admitted [2/28] that the operation had been planned days in advance.)

The operation began on 2/28–29 with full-scale incursions into the West Bank’s Balata and Jenin camps (both AMB strongholds), which remained the focus of the operation for the first week. When Palestinian violence increased rather than subsided, and Bush announced plans (3/7) to send U.S. special envoy Anthony Zinni back to the region to secure a cease-fire, the IDF expanded the campaign (beginning 3/7) to other camps and Palestinian towns, including sending 20,000 troops into Ramallah on 3/12. After Zinni arrived in Israel on 3/14, the IDF withdrew (3/15) to the outskirts of most re-occupied areas. Operation Colorful Journey ended by the morning of 3/19, hours after...
Cheney's arrival (3/18) in Israel. During the operation, at least 237 Palestinians were killed, 100s injured, more than 2,500 detained, and some 1,800 Palestinian homes severely damaged or demolished.

The main targets were in the West Bank: Aida (3/7–15), Amari (3/11–15), Balata (2/28–3/18), Dahaysha (3/7–15), Jenin (3/1–4, 3/7–18), and Tulkarm (3/7–15) camps and the towns of Bayt Jala (ca. 3/14–18), Bethlehem (3/7–18), Qalqilya (3/10–15), and Ramallah (3/12–14). The IDF also made large-scale incursions into Beitunia (ca. 3/11), Khuza (ca. 3/8), and Nur al-Shams (ca. 3/7) in the West Bank and Bureij (ca. 3/11), Jabaliya (ca. 3/11), and Rafah (ca. 3/4) in Gaza, though reports are unclear as to the exact dates of the IDF's entry and withdrawal. Closures on all other major Palestinian population centers were tightened, and land, sea, and air strikes were carried out in numerous villages across the West Bank and Gaza (see Chronology), as well as in Gaza City, where shelling on 3/7 and 3/10 destroyed the entire 25-building PA compound, including Arafat's personal residence, and Ramallah, where the IDF shelled the PA compound on 3/6 while Arafat was meeting with EU special envoy Miguel Moratinos. The IDF met fierce Palestinian resistance in many areas (especially Balata, Jenin, Nur al-Shams, and Tulkarm camps and Ramallah) but virtually no resistance in others (e.g., Dahaysha camp).

The reoccupation of Balata typified the IDF's method of operation in the other refugee camps: it immediately sealed off the camp, barring even ambulances; cut water and electricity (including to hospitals); imposed a 24-hour curfew, lifting it briefly on the first day to allow "noncombatants" to leave the camp (few left, fearing permanent expulsion); occupied strategically located houses and UNRWA schools as IDF command posts; and conducted house-to-house searches, breaking through walls to move from building to building. After the intensification on 3/7, the IDF ordered all Palestinian males aged 15–45 to surrender for questioning (e.g., in Tulkarm 2/8, villages near Rafah 3/9, Ramallah 3/12). The men were typically held at UNRWA schools and had numbers written on their arms to facilitate processing. While most were released after an identity check, more than 2,500 were detained for brief periods and dozens were arrested. The IDF also stepped up assassinations, killing two senior AMB members, Muhammad Abu Halawa and Fawzi Murrar, on 3/5 and making failed attempts on members of the AMB (3/9), Fatah (3/10), Hamas (3/4), and the PSF (3/5); six other incidents (3/1, 3/6, two on 3/8, 3/10, 3/14) may have been assassinations.

Instead of curbing Palestinian violence, Operation Colorful Journey sparked an unprecedented string of Palestinian suicide attacks that killed 41 Israelis and injured nearly 200: AMB bombings and shootings on 3/2, 3/4, 3/9, and 3/17; a Hamas bombing and shooting on 3/7, 3/9; an Islamic Jihad bombing on 3/17; a PFLP bombing on 3/7; and unattributed bombings and shootings on 3/5, 3/10, 3/12, and 3/18 (see Chronology for details). In the 3/2 and 3/9 bombings, the AMB and Hamas specifically picked bombers who lived in refugee camps to retaliate for Colorful Journey.

Although the official line was that the operation was designed to arrest Palestinians wanted for "terrorist attacks," IDF West Bank cmdr. Brig. Gen. Yitzhak Gerson said (3/1) that the underlying message was that "there is no target that is off limits"; IDF Central Command head Maj. Gen. Yitzhak Eytan said (2/28) that the operation aimed at "breaking the taboo of [entering] the refugee camps." On 3/15, Ben-Elizer stated that Operation Colorful Journey was essentially "for show"; an anonymous senior security official stated (3/15), "Nobody in the Shin Bet thinks these operations will stop terrorism." Indeed, during the operation, the IDF confiscated only 10s of light weapons, a handful of rockets and mortars, and destroyed 12 factories and workshops that could have been used for making bombs or rockets. IDF Col. Yair Golan acknowledged (3/15) that the IDF was unable to capture most-wanted Palestinians during the operation (IDF reports on 3/11 said only six on the most-wanted list had been captured); those arrested were only mid-level militants. Nonetheless, IDF Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz claimed (3/15) the operation was a success, noting that the aim was to demoralize the Palestinians and citing the high number of Palestinian casualties.

As the operation progressed, Sharon twice called cabinet members to escalate the assault: on 3/3, following an AMB sniper attack that day (seven soldiers and three settlers killed), and on 3/5, following an AMB shooting in Tel Aviv on 3/4 (three Israelis killed, 31 wounded). At the 3/3 inner cabinet meeting, Sharon discussed charting an intensified policy of "sustained military pressure"
against the PA and Palestinian militant groups. At inner cabinet and full cabinet meetings on 3/5, Sharon proposed a 17-point operational plan reportedly including massive “mopping-up” operations in refugee camps, incursions into selected areas A and B, and to halt all contacts (formal and informal) with the PA. Though details of the meetings were not released, cabinet members reportedly debated “removing” Arafat, with DM Ben-Eliezer and FM Shimon Peres urging against. Publicly, Sharon argued (3/4, repeated 3/6), “The aim [of Colorful Journey] is to increase the number of losses on the other side. Only after they have been battered will we be able to conduct talks,” adding in a separate statement (3/4), “We must hit them, and hit them again and again, until they understand.” In the end, the full cabinet gave (3/5) the IDF “free rein to further intensify military pressure on the PA, especially in Ramallah” and barred all Palestinian vehicular traffic in the West Bank. At an inner cabinet meeting on 3/13, Sharon and Ben-Eliezer reportedly argued heatedly over the escalation, with Ben-Eliezer threatening to leave the government and Sharon accusing him of countermanding his orders on 3/12 to launch F-16 strikes on Ramallah and seize the PA compound.

Meanwhile, the U.S. urged both sides to exercise “restraint” (2/28, 3/2, 3/4, 3/5), reportedly making stronger private calls for Israel to deescalate. With Israel’s decision (3/5) to escalate, Powell issued (3/6) the U.S.’s strongest public criticism during the operation, warning that “Sharon has to take a hard look at his policies to see whether they will work. If you declare war against the Palestinians thinking that you can solve the problem by seeing how many Palestinians can be killed, I don’t think that leads us anywhere.” Sharon’s office replied (3/6) that “Israel is responding with a war against the terror organizations within the framework of its right to self-defense.” Bush, at the urging (3/6) of Egyptian pres. Husni Mubarak and given Cheney’s international tour (3/11–20) to rally support for a strike on Iraq, announced (3/7) he would send Zinni back to the region but did not do so for nearly a week, giving Israel time to wrap up its operation. In advance of Zinni and Cheney’s visits, the U.S. tempered expressions of concern over Israel actions (e.g., 3/10) and demands (e.g., 3/12, 3/13, 3/14, 3/16) that Israel withdraw from areas A with statements (e.g., 3/10, 3/12, 3/13) that the U.S. “understands” that Israelis are “under attack” and are acting “to defend themselves and to fight terror.”

Though the IDF was out of the towns and camps by 3/19, it still encircled them and remained in control of wide swaths of PA areas, including an additional 20% of Gaza (bringing the total amount of the Strip under Israeli control to approximately 50%). By the end of the operation on 3/18, the death toll of the intifada had reached 1,332 Palestinians and 310 Israelis.

The Zinni Mission and Arab Summit

From 3/19 to 3/26, international efforts focused on the 3/27–28 Arab League summit in Beirut, where Saudi Arabia was to present Crown Prince Abdullah’s initiative. Hopes were that if violence could be kept down, Israel might allow Arafat to leave the territories to address the summit in person and that with the anticipated adoption of the Saudi initiative the two sides might have enough confidence to resume security and political talks along the lines of the Tenet cease-fire plan (see Doc. D2 in JPS 121) and the Mitchell Committee recommendations (see Doc. A2 in JPS 120).

Zinni’s mission, which began on 3/14, was to revive PA-Israeli security talks and move the sides toward implementation of the Tenet plan. After numerous meetings with Israeli, PA, EU, Russian, UN, and other U.S. officials in the region (including several meetings with Sharon and Arafat), Zinni convened a low-level PA-Israeli security meeting on 3/17 and convinced the sides to resume trilateral security meetings with the CIA beginning on 3/18. The PA team soon complained (3/19), however, that Zinni was limiting talks to steps, required of the PA (e.g., arresting militants, seizing illegal weapons) without discussing Israeli steps, such as a withdrawal to 9/28/00 positions, lifting closures, or easing economic restrictions. The PA also wanted to link security and political talks by including a definite timetable for implementation of a cease-fire and by linking specific PA security measures to Israeli pullbacks. Israel insisted, however, that the PA implement a full cease-fire before any IDF withdrawal. Trilateral meetings continued without progress until 3/24 (with a one-day suspension by Israel on 3/21 to protest an AMB suicide bombing that killed three Israelis and injured 40), when Zinni presented “bridging proposals” for a three-phase cease-fire plan virtually identical to but less detailed than the Tenet plan (the only noticea-
ble difference being a six-week target for completing IDF redeployment to 9/00 positions instead of leaving the schedule up to Israel and the PA). Zinni gave the two sides until 3/26 to respond but on 3/26 canceled the follow-up talks, saying the sides were obviously too far apart to bother meeting.

Meanwhile, Cheney stopped (3/18–19) in Israel for three rounds of talks with Sharon before heading to Turkey to continue his international tour. Cheney said he would not meet with Arafat or any PA officials unless Arafat implemented a cease-fire, but that he would be willing to return to the region to meet him if he took clear steps to implement the Tenet plan.

As a reward for the PSF’s arrest (3/8) of the fourth and last Palestinian wanted by Israel in connection with the Ze’evi assassination, Sharon gave (3/11) Arafat permission to travel outside Ramallah but not abroad. (In protest, two cabinet members from the right-wing Yisrael Beitunia party, Tourism M Benjamin Elon and Infrastructure M Avigdor Lieberman, quit the ruling coalition.) After his third meeting with Cheney, Sharon declared (3/19) that the cabinet would allow Arafat to attend the Arab summit if he first implemented the Tenet plan, but would not allow him to return if serious attacks occurred in his absence or if his address contained “incitement.” Under strong U.S. pressure, Sharon said (3/26) Arafat could go to the summit but asked the U.S. to allow Israel to bar him from returning if violence continued while he was in Beirut. The U.S. refused, and Arafat declined to leave, fearing exile.

Meanwhile, as the U.S. and Arab states continued to pursue the Saudi initiative behind the scenes (though Bush emphasized on 3/7 that it would not be a focus of Zinni’s talks), Israeli-Palestinian violence continued at a high level, including Israeli raids into PA areas (especially Rafah on 3/23 and 3/25) and Palestinian suicide bombings by Islamic Jihad (3/20) and the AMB (3/21, 3/22); from 3/20 to 3/26, 26 Arabs and 12 Israelis were killed. Sharon declared (3/20, 3/21) that Arafat was “solely responsible” for the attacks. After the 3/21 bombing, Sharon convened (3/21) his cabinet to discuss massive military action. Although the cabinet ultimately decided to “postpone retaliation” so as not to scuttle Zinni’s mission, Israeli officials speaking on condition of anonymity stated (3/24) that Israel was preparing for a major assault on Palestinian territories that would be broader and deeper than Operation Colorful Journey. Some Israeli reports (see Mideast Mirror and Washington Post 3/25) claimed that Cheney had “reached an agreement” with Sharon that if Zinni’s mission failed, the U.S. would support an Israeli assault on the Palestinians. In interviews with the Israeli dailies Ma’ariv and Yedi’ot Aharanot on 3/26, Sharon declared that he never should have promised the U.S. that he would not physically harm Arafat but that he “should have gone to the Americans and demanded that [Arafat] be expelled from the region.”

On 3/27, as the Arab summit opened in Beirut, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated a device in a Netanya restaurant, killing 29 Israelis and wounding 100 at a Passover dinner. On 3/28, as the Arab states unanimously adopted the Saudi initiative, a Hamas gunman infiltrated Elon Moreh settlement, fatally shooting four settlers. The two attacks completely overshadowed the Arab summit, which Israel moreover declared (3/28) was a “nonstarter.” Sharon convended (3/28) a cabinet meeting where he, Ben-Eliezer, and Mofaz rallied support for expelling Arafat. When word reached Washington, Powell immediately phoned (3/28) Sharon to say that exiling Arafat would be unacceptable to the international community. With IDF intelligence, Mossad, and Shin Bet heads also warning the cabinet that Arafat might prove more harmful in exile, Mofaz reportedly (Washington Post 5/6) proposed launching a “punishing assault” on the Palestinians to “clear the way for political negotiations” to which Sharon had replied, “There aren’t going to be any political negotiations.” On 3/29, the cabinet announced (3/28) its decision to “totally isolate” Arafat and called up 20,000 IDF reservists.

**Operation Defensive Shield**

The morning of 3/29, the IDF launched Operation Defensive Shield, sending scores of tanks into Ramallah before dawn to encircle Arafat’s compound, reoccupy tall buildings as sniper and observation posts, dig up roads, create roadblocks, demolish water mains, and declare a 24-hour curfew. Anticipating a major attack, 1,000s of Palestinians fled Ramallah, international organizations evacuated expatriate workers, and city residents hoarded provisions. The first day, the IDF bulldozed the PA compound walls, moved through the complex collecting documents, demolished nine of its ten buildings, and trapped Arafat and his aides in two win-
dowless offices of the remaining building. Five Palestinians and two IDF soldiers were killed in the fighting, around 50 Palestinians were injured, and another 70 Palestinians (mostly Force 17 members and some medical workers) were detained. Israel vowed (3/29) that Arafat would not be physically harmed.

The Arab states, EU, Russia, and the UN condemned (3/29) Israel's actions and demanded its immediate withdrawal, while Bush ordered his aides to say as little as possible. Following morning meetings with Bush and his national security advisers, Powell stated (3/29) that the U.S. “understands the Israeli government’s need to respond to these acts of terror,” that it was “terrorism in its rawest form” that precipitated Israel’s operation, and that Zinni would remain in the region (see Doc. C2).

Overview of the Military Operation

The stated purpose of Defensive Shield was to isolate Arafat, to demoralize and intimidate the Palestinians so they would be willing to accept Israel's demands in peace negotiations, and to detain “terrorists” and dismantle the “terrorist infrastructure.” The unstated goals—the dismantling of the PA and the destruction of Palestinian infrastructure (social, economic, and political)—were portrayed as unfortunate byproducts of the campaign forced upon Israel by circumstances generated by Arafat.

Operation Defensive Shield lasted six weeks and focused on Palestinian population centers in the West Bank. Primary targets were Ramallah (3/29–5/1), Bethlehem (4/1–5/10), Jenin camp (4/3–19), and Nablus (4/3–21), with Qalqilya (3/31–4/9) and Tulkarm (4/1–4/9) as secondary targets. The IDF also made major incursions into numerous villages and refugee camps. Operations were so widespread that exact dates of the IDF's entry and exit from areas frequently could not be confirmed. The most significant of these tertiary operations appear to have been the following (listed in chronological order; b. denotes “began,” or the first confirmed report of operations): Aida (b. 4/1), Dahaysha (ca. 4/1–16), Bayt Jala (b. 4/2), Tamun (b. 4/3), Taytsir (b. 4/3), Tubas (b. 4/3), Askar (b. 4/5), Yatta (ca. 4/5–10), Qabatiyya (ca. 4/6–10), al-Til (b. 4/6), Dura (ca. 4/9–25), al-'Ayn (b. 4/10), Samu (b. 4/10), 'Ayn Bayt Himla (b. 4/11), Birzeit (b. 4/11), Dahariyya (b. 4/11), Bayt Sahur (b. 4/12), Qura (b. 4/15), Sawahra al-Sharqiyya (b. 4/16), Abu Dis (b. 4/17), Azariyya (b. 4/17), and Bayt Umar (b. 4/17). Throughout the operation, closures were imposed on all West Bank Palestinian population centers and Palestinian vehicular movement (prohibited on 3/5) remained banned. Gaza and Jericho were spared, raising speculation that Sharon was reviving ideas of a Palestinian statelet in Gaza only or some revision of the 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement as final status. The Palestinian enclave in Hebron was also virtually untouched, reportedly (4/23) because the IDF could not guarantee the safety of the 450 settlers there during a comprehensive offensive.

Defensive Shield began full force on 3/29, with what at first appeared to be an operation to capture and expel Arafat. The operation expanded and intensified on 4/1, once the 20,000 IDF reserves called on 3/28 were fully mobilized, and again on 4/6, after Bush announced (4/4) plans to send Powell to the region later the following week. The IDF began to wind down operations on 4/9, just before Powell arrived on 4/11. By 4/21, the IDF had withdrawn to the outskirts of most population centers, except Bethlehem and Ramallah, where sieges on the Church of the Nativity and Arafat's compound continued. Sharon officially declared the end to the “first stage” of Operation Defensive Shield on 4/21, vowing to make incursions into areas as needed thereafter to prevent “terrorist attacks.” The IDF withdrew from Ramallah on 5/1 and from Bethlehem on 5/10, marking the true close of Operation Defensive Shield.

Each incursion followed the same general pattern: Troops, tanks, and armored personnel carriers (APCs) would enter the locale from three directions; declare the area a closed military zone; impose a 24-hour curfew; cut electricity, water, and phone lines; and occupy tall and strategically located buildings as sniper/observation points and schools and municipal buildings as command centers. To prevent Palestinian movement, tanks would crush cars (and occasionally ambulances) parked on the streets, shoot out windshields of cars, and tear up roads. Troops would shoot at any Palestinians within view, including at windows inside their homes. The IDF barred or severely hampered the entry and movement of the press and medical and humanitarian workers, routinely denied care to the sick and injured. Curfews would be lifted for two to four hours every four days to allow Palestinians to restock food and seek medical care.
With curfews and troops in place, the IDF would conduct vigorous house-to-house and other destructive searches, sometimes moving between houses by breaking through walls. Theft and gratuitous destruction were reported. Though the IDF officially denied it, some soldiers openly admitted (e.g., 4/14, 4/25) using Palestinians as human shields while conducting house-to-house searches. In Jenin and Nablus in particular, the IDF bulldozed homes and shops along narrow streets to give tanks and APCs greater access.

In each location, men (and occasionally women; e.g., Aida and Dahaysha on 4/2) aged 15–45 were called upon to surrender for questioning and for identity checks against lists of wanted men. Many were ordered to strip to their underwear. IDs were confiscated against receipts bearing the ID number. Schools, municipal buildings, IDF bases, and occasionally Jewish settlements were used as detention and processing points. On 4/7, the IDF reopened the Ansar 3 prison in the Negev, which was used during the first intifada and can hold up to 6,000 prisoners. As during Colorful Journey, many were released after a quick identity check, but 1,000s of others were detained, often hand-cuffed and blindfolded, for 24 hours or longer. They were often released from IDF bases far from their homes, sometimes only in their underwear and with blankets. Closures often made it impossible to reach home. Without their official IDs, they could be arrested at any IDF checkpoint. The search for wanted men extended to hospital wards and operating rooms (e.g., 3/30, 3/31) and included halting ambulances and strip searching paramedics and the injured (reported by the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees [UPMRC] on 4/16).

Among the institutions ransacked and severely damaging by the IDF during Operation Defensive Shield were the Palestinian Council offices; PA Ministries of Agriculture, Civil Affairs, Culture, Economy and Trade, Education, Finance, Higher Education, Industry, Interior, Local Government, Public Works, Social Affairs, and Supplies; the PA Health Secretariat in Ramallah (main ministry offices are in Gaza); the PA Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS); the PA General Office of Personnel; the PSF headquarters in Beitunia; the Ramallah city hall; the human rights groups Addameer, al-Haq, and LAW and the UN Human Rights Commission offices in Ramallah; the medical organizations Health Development Information Project and UPMRC; and the Khalil Sakakini Cultural Center. The IDF raided and confiscated files—including landownership records from the Ramallah city hall, voting and polling records from the PCBS, PA personnel records from the General Office of Personnel, and the entire video archive of all Palestinian Council (PC) sessions—stole hard drives and destroyed computers, blew open safes and stole money, and vandalized offices. Banks also reported attempts to blow open safes and ATMs. All major Palestinian radio and TV stations were raided and vandalized and their archives confiscated. In addition, a number of churches were damaged and mosques and libraries raided; doctors offices, medical clinics, private offices, and schools also seemed to be particular targets for vandalism. Numerous historic sites in Bethlehem and Nablus were damaged or destroyed, raising charges that Israel was targeting Palestinian cultural heritage. A number of Palestinian officials (including PA Information M Yasir ‘Abd Rab- buh, PSF West Bank head Jibril Rajab, and Nablus mayor Ghassan Shaka) had their homes searched and temporarily occupied. (For a preliminary report on destruction of Palestinian institutions, see www.shaml.org.)

Given the severity of the closures and the level of destruction, casualty figures for Operation Defensive Shield varied wildly by source and ultimately may never be known. Conservative estimates suggest that from 3/29 to 4/21, 250–320 Palestinians and 32 IDF soldiers were killed. According to the IDF (4/15, 4/21, 4/25), more than 5,000 Palestinians were detained, including 150 of the 230–250 Palestinians on Israel’s wanted list; of the 35 “most wanted,” all but eight were captured or killed. As of 4/21, at least 1,500 were still in detention, of whom 800 had been arrested for participating in attacks on Israelis, including 60–70 “heavy terrorists.” The 1,500 apparently included 1,400 “leading activists” (349 Hamas, 344 Fatah, 82 Islamic Jihad, 356 PSF). The most prominent among those arrested was Fatah West Bank head and tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti, captured by IDF commandos on 4/15. According to various IDF reports (4/1, 4/5, 4/10, 4/25), during the entire operation, soldiers confiscated 1,300 rifles, 670 pistols, 430 homemade bombs, 90 machine guns, 50 grenades, 2 grenade launchers, 20 Qassam rocket motors, and 4 explosive belts and destroyed 23 workshops that may have been used for making bombs or rockets.
Most attention focused on IDF operations in Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin, and Nablus.

**Ramallah**

Operations in Ramallah centered on the PA headquarters, de facto seat of the Palestinian government, where Arafat, some 100 aides and guards, and a number of Palestinian prisoners jailed in the complex were placed under siege on 3/29. Israel also sought custody of wanted Palestinians held in the complex, including Arafat aide Fuad Shubaki, wanted in connection with the *Karine A* arms shipment (see Quarterly Update in *JPS* 123), and the four PFLP members wanted for involvement in the Ze’evi assassination. To pressure Arafat, the IDF cut electricity and water to the two rooms where the Palestinians were holed up, strictly limited the delivery of food and medicine, occasionally jammed cell phones, and strictly controlled visitors to the compound; Zinni on 4/5, the Egyptian FM on 4/13, Powell on 4/14, the Jordanian FM on 4/19, Burns on 4/22, and, after weeks of demands, two EU reps. on 4/24. During the siege, more than 40 foreign and Israeli peace activists crossed (e.g., 3/31, 4/6) to join the Palestinians in a show of solidarity.

In response to repeated EU demands to meet with Arafat, Sharon proposed (4/2) allowing EU officials into the compound if they would agree to escort Arafat into exile. Alternatives were FM Shimon Peres’s offer (4/2) for Arafat to “voluntarily” leave the territories if a third country would offer him asylum and Sharon’s offer (4/24, 4/25) to allow Arafat to leave the compound for Gaza. Arafat refused all these deals, as well as Israel’s demands to take custody of the four PFLP detainees, arguing that Oslo gave the PA jurisdictional rights to try the men and noting that they had been transported to the compound’s PSF jail in a U.S. embassy vehicle with an IDF escort under a deal brokered by the U.S. (The four men were found guilty in a summary trial at the compound on 4/22-25.)

On 4/28, the Israeli cabinet and Arafat agreed to a deal proposed by Bush under which Israel would allow Arafat to travel freely in exchange for Arafat turning over the four PFLP members, Shubaki, and PFLP secy. gen. Ahmad Saadat to British and U.S. (non-military) security personnel who would oversee their detention in a Jericho jail. On 5/1, the six were transferred, and Israel lifted the siege and withdrew to the outskirts of Ramallah.

** Bethlehem**

In the fighting that followed the IDF’s initial incursion into Bethlehem (4/1-3), a number of Palestinian fighters (some seriously or mortally wounded) along with some civilians sought refuge in the Church of the Nativity, assuming the inviolability of a religious sanctuary; along with clergy, around 200 people holed up inside. The IDF laid siege to the complex, demanding the fighters surrender and release their “hostages” (the civilians and clergy, who repeatedly denied being held against their will). The IDF cut water and electricity to the buildings, restricted the delivery of food and medical aid, and barred the evacuation of the wounded and dead, while IDF snipers fired upon anyone who ventured outside without phoning to coordinate a surrender or who came into view inside the complex. During the six-week standoff, 10 Palestinians were shot dead and 11 wounded (including one monk), and a few dozen clergy and civilians chose to leave the church. Beginning 4/16, the IDF permitted the removal of the wounded and dead. The IDF also attacked the complex three times (4/8, 4/16, 5/1) with percussion and smoke grenades in what may have been preliminary moves to storm the church. The assaults sparked fires that seriously damaged a conference room in St. Catherine’s convent and lightly damaged the Franciscan and Greek Orthodox monasteries.

Israeli officials repeatedly said (e.g., 4/12, 4/14) that the Palestinians could end the siege by turning themselves in to face trial before an IDF military court or by going into “permanent exile” abroad, but the Palestinians did not respond. On 4/23, Palestinians inside and outside the church, with Arafat’s approval, opened negotiations with Israel on ending the siege. For the next ten days, talks centered on whether the Palestinians would comply with Israeli demands for a list of names of everyone in the church. On 5/4, Arafat, under pressure from the EU, U.S., and Vatican, authorized negotiators to provide the list, from which Israel identified 39 wanted men. Under U.S. pressure, Arafat agreed (5/6) to a deal under which 13 of the 39 (9 AMB members, 3 Hamas members, and Arafat’s Bethlehem intelligence chief, Abdallah Da’ud) would be exiled to Italy and 26 would be “exiled” to Gaza. The remaining 84 in the church would be freed after a brief identity check. Italy announced (5/7), however, that it had not been consulted, and after several days of dickering, Cyprus agreed
to take the 13 until their final destinations could be arranged. On 5/10, the 39 Palestinians were transported to Cyprus and Gaza, and Israel withdrew to the outskirts of Bethlehem. The Palestinians sent to Gaza arrived to a hero’s welcome and were freed. Of the 13 sent to Cyprus, one was hospitalized and 12 were sent to host countries on 5/22 (three each to Italy and Spain, two each to Greece and Ireland, and one each to Belgium and Portugal). The 12 were given refugee status and one-year residency permits; if they leave their host country, they will not be allowed to return.

The clergy allowed the IDF and the public to inspect the Church of the Nativity immediately after it was evacuated on 5/10. The nave was filthy and lightly pockmarked by gunfire but was in generally good shape and quickly cleaned for ecumenical services several days later. The grotto, where Jesus is said to have been born, was in “pristine” condition. Some who toured the complex reported seeing healthy stores of food, raising doubts about claims from those inside during the siege that they were desperately low on food. One suggested explanation was that the food stores were in the Armenian monastery, where the monks had barricaded themselves early on, openly stating that they had ample food but did not want to share it with the Palestinian fighters.

The Old City of Bethlehem was heavily damaged during the IDF reoccupation. The historic Madbassah Square, the 300-year-old pilgrims’ quarters, and numerous centuries-old facades were destroyed or heavily damaged, along with several Bethlehem University buildings (including the library) and many new projects financed with donor aid for the 2000 millennium celebrations.

**Jenin**

The IDF went into Jenin camp (pop. 13,600) in a predawn push on 4/3, reportedly believing that the initial massive show of force and obvious firepower on the surrounding hills would discourage resistance. (Most of the troops deployed in Jenin were taken from the 20,000 reservists called up on 3/28—i.e., soldiers who were well trained but had not drilled on the mission.) Palestinian fighters immediately engaged the IDF, reportedly sniping at troops and setting booby traps along streets and in empty buildings, killing as many as 11 soldiers by 4/8. Palestinian casualties appeared to be high from the outset.

The incursion followed the standard pattern of entry from three directions, closure, shut down of electricity and water, searches and detentions, etc., but the IDF maintained an especially tight closure. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported (4/8) that after hours of negotiation with the IDF that day, it allowed only three ambulances into the camp to take out one injured Palestinian each; procedure took six hours because troops searched each ambulance entering and leaving; two of the injured were immediately arrested. The same day, aid workers reported that 200 women and children had walked out of the camp, showing signs of severe dehydration after five days without water. Villages around Jenin reported taking in 1,000s of Palestinians who had either fled the camp or who were unable to return after being released from IDF questioning. On 4/13, the Palestinian human rights group LAW reported that it believed all “surviving men” had left Jenin and only 3,000 women and children remained; UNRWA corroborated the 3,000 figure when it entered the camp on 4/16.

The situation had escalated on 4/9, when 13 IDF soldiers conducting house-to-house searches were killed when a Palestinian suicide bomber in a building rigged with explosives reportedly detonated a series of devices, collapsing the building atop the soldiers, and Palestinian snipers fired on other units arriving on the scene. On 4/10, the IDF reportedly began bulldozing “whole stretches” of homes where the soldiers had been killed. Eyewitness reports (e.g., 4/10, 4/12) accused the IDF of collapsing occupied homes and of burying bodies during the demolitions to hide evidence of a massacre.

On 4/11, the IDF lifted the curfew for several hours for the first time since 4/3, claiming to have quelled the resistance. Reports immediately emerged citing the bulldozing of corpses. The IDF admitted (4/12) to burying bodies, allegedly to prevent a health crisis, and announced plans to truck corpses from Jenin to a remote “enemy’s cemetery” in the Jordan Valley. (The Israeli High Court ruled on 4/14 that the army could remove bodies from the camp under ICRC supervision but must turn them over to the Palestinians.)

Aid workers were permitted 100 yards into the camp for the first time on 4/15. They reported that the main residential area had been “obliterated,” creating a “vast crater of broken concrete” the size of two city blocks, and that the “smell of decomposing bodies hung over at least six heaps of rubble” bull-
dozed by the IDF. An Amnesty International forensic expert stated (4/18) that there were “nagging anomalies” in the camp, such as the absence of severely injured Palestinians and the fact that only 21 bodies had been brought to the Jenin hospital during 13 days of heavy fighting. The IDF completely pulled out of Jenin overnight on 4/18–19. By the end of the quarter, 53 bodies had been recovered, at least 21 of them civilians, and 22 Palestinians were reported missing. More than 20 IDF soldiers were killed. Preliminary surveys suggested that around 10% of the camp had been flattened and some 1,000 homes destroyed or severely damaged, leaving over 4,000 Palestinians homeless. UNRWA cautioned (4/15), however, that solid figures would not be known until there was a census of the camp and heavy equipment brought in to evacuate bulldozed areas.

Almost from the beginning of the operation, there had been insistent reports of high losses on the Palestinian side. Ha’Aretz on 4/9 reported that Peres was referring in private to a “massacre” in Jenin and was worried about international reactions, while reports from the camp (e.g., 4/9, 4/10) spoke of Palestinian bodies “littering the streets,” Israeli executions, and hundreds of bodies under the rubble. On 4/12, IDF chief spokesman Brig. Gen. Ron Kitri told the press that “there were apparently hundreds of people killed in the Jenin camp.” The IDF quickly issued (4/12) a clarification saying Kitri was referring to casualties, not deaths, and later (4/14) specified that 45 were killed and 277 injured. IDF sources raised and lowered the estimated death toll numerous times thereafter, finally claiming (4/26) that only 26 Palestinians, all militants, had been killed and that the Palestinians were moving bodies from a nearby cemetery into the camp to boost the body count.

Given the insistent accusations of a cover-up, on 4/19 the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved U.S.-drafted Res. 1405, calling for an investigation of the Jenin incursion. Israel initially agreed to cooperate, saying (4/19) it had “nothing to hide.” UN Secy.-Gen. Kofi Annan appointed the team on 4/22. Israeli government lawyers, however, soon cautioned (4/23) that an investigation could open Israel to war crimes charges for using Palestinians as human shields, denying medical assistance, and using disproportionate force. Israel began (4/23) to protest the team’s composition and mandate, declaring (4/28) it would not cooperate with the investigation without assurances. After numerous compromises and delays, Annan disbanded the team (5/1), citing irreconcilable differences with Israel. Annan’s announcement was timed with Israel’s acceptance of the compromise deal ending the Ramallah standoff, raising speculation that the U.S. had arranged a quid pro quo. Indeed, Sharon referred to the Jenin inquiry in an address to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) on 5/7, saying, “I would like to thank the American administration and its leadership that helped us, understood us, and supported us to get out of this trap.”

**Nablus**

The drama surrounding Jenin overshadowed events in Nablus, which seems to have suffered the greatest number of casualties and the highest level of damages of any locality during Defensive Shield. Resistance to the IDF incursion (4/3–21) was strong and focused on the narrow warrens of the Old City, particularly the historic covered market, where Palestinian fighters reportedly rigged scores of booby traps. To get at the fighters, the IDF shelled and destroyed (4/5) the eastern market area and bulldozed buildings to widen streets for tank access, as it did in Jenin. When reporters and aid workers were allowed into the city for the first time on 4/13, rescuers pulled an elderly Palestinian couple from the rubble of their home, which had been bulldozed on top of them on 4/5, killing eight family members including three children. Journalists noted major damage to numerous historic buildings in the Old City, including the St. Demetrius Greek Orthodox monastery, the Great Mosque, the 19th-century Kanaan Olive Soap factory, and an Ottoman-era bathhouse. The World Bank (4/23) and Washington Post (5/21) estimated that some 260 homes had been destroyed, another 1,000 seriously damaged but repairable, and 1,500 “less heavily damaged.” Donors assessed (5/15) the damage in Nablus at $114 m., compared to $83 m. in Jenin and $51 m. in Ramallah. The cost to reconstruct the Old City was put at $42.5 m. At the time troops withdrew on 4/21, hospitals reported at least 75 Palestinians killed (including 50 civilians and 13 who reportedly died of medical complications when they could not reach hospitals) and 160 seriously injured.

**The Powell Mission**

As Israel pressed its military offensive, international calls for the U.S. to intervene to curb Sharon or risk a wider, full-scale war...
met with little response. In his first statement on the operation, Bush said (3/30) that Arafat “can do a lot more” to prevent attacks on Israel and that the U.S. supported Israel’s right to “defend itself.” To remain “engaged,” Bush made (3/30) brief phone calls to Crown Prince Abdullah, Jordan’s King Abdullah, UN Secy.-Gen. Annan, EU rotating head Jose María Aznar (Spain), and Mubarak.

Meanwhile, Zinni met (4/1) with EU, Russian, and UN reps., who warned that Israel’s operation to “uproot terror” would cause a serious humanitarian crisis and would neither halt violence nor lead to peace. Zinni reportedly disagreed, arguing that destruction of the military and physical “terrorist infrastructure” would halt Palestinian attacks, after which the sides could move ahead with the Tenet and Mitchell plans. The Zinni analysis was undermined by five suicide bombings, one attempted suicide bombing, and another suicide attack that killed 18 Israelis between 3/30 and 4/2. Meanwhile, with Hizballah stepping up crossborder attacks (see below), Egypt suspending (4/3) diplomatic dealings with Israel except those that “serve the Palestinian cause,” the Arab League declaring (4/3) the Saudi initiative at least temporarily dead, and oil prices creeping upward, the U.S. finally said (4/3) that it would be willing to discuss Palestinian political demands before violence was brought under control, dropping its insistence that diplomatic efforts focus on achieving a cease-fire, as Israel demanded.

On 4/4, a week after Operation Defensive Shield began, Bush for the first time called on Israel to halt the incursions and withdraw and announced he would send Powell to the region late the following week (see Doc. C3). But he also stated that Arafat was in a situation “largely of his own making” and called on “responsible Palestinian leaders” to step forward. Other U.S. officials added (4/4) that they did not expect Israel to be able to stop its assault “on a dime.” As a result, according to an Israeli cabinet minister speaking (4/4) anonymously, Sharon did not take Bush’s statement seriously and saw it as something “negotiable.” Asked to clarify Bush’s position, Powell said (4/5) that the U.S. expected Israel to halt incursions “as soon as possible or without delay, whichever formula you choose.” When criticism of the U.S.’s passivity continued, and Israel did not react, Bush phoned Sharon on 4/6 to say that Israel must begin its withdrawal from PA areas “without delay.” Sharon said he would “expedite” operations but would not promise to wrap them up before Powell’s arrival.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration began signaling interest in an alternative Palestinian leadership. Bush declared in an interview (4/5) that Arafat “certainly hasn’t earned” his trust and that “there are other leaders in the region who can lead.” The White House announced (4/5) that Powell had no plans to meet with Arafat the following week but that he was “looking forward . . . to meeting with the leaders in the region who have worked for peace.”

As Operation Defensive Shield did not diminish but expanded, and as the Arab League called (4/6) for sanctions against Israel, Powell stated (4/7) that Bush’s 4/4 demand for an immediate Israeli withdrawal was only a “request.” On Sunday morning talk shows, he stated that “Prime Minister Sharon is the elected leader of a democratic sovereign nation, and his very best friend in the world is the United States of America, led by President George W. Bush.” Powell also began to downplay his trip to the region, saying he did not expect he would secure a cease-fire. In Israel, Sharon’s cabinet “overwhelmingly” approved (4/7) continuing military operations even if it meant defying the U.S. Sharon declared (4/8) that once the military offensive was complete, he would be willing to hold Madrid-style talks with “moderate and responsible Middle Eastern leaders”; if a “responsible Palestinian leadership” could be found, Israel would be willing to help the Palestinians “rebuild their destroyed economy” and “prepare their people for peace and good neighborliness.”

On 4/8, a “plainly irritated” Bush publicly reiterated his call for Sharon to pull back immediately, telling him, “I meant what I said.” Zinni pressed (4/8) the issue privately with Sharon, who announced (4/8) that the IDF would begin to pull out of Qalqilya and Tulkarm within hours but that operations in other areas would continue. Meanwhile, Powell arrived in Morocco (4/8) on the first leg of his tour. He was met on the tarmac by King Muhammad VI, who was wearing a sticker proclaiming “We Are All Palestinians” and asked Powell whether it was not “more important to go to Jerusalem first”—a sentiment conveyed throughout his tour. While in Morocco, Powell also met Crow Prince Abdullah, who reportedly told him Saudi Arabia would not support new Israeli-Palestinian negotiations unless Israel withdrew from PA areas and the U.S. deployed Ameri-
can monitors in the territories and helped re-build Palestinian institutions. Before arriving in Israel on 4/12, Powell met Mubarak in Cairo (4/9); Annan, Russian FM Igor Ivanov, and EU foreign policy adviser Javier Solana in Madrid (4/10); and King Abdullah in Amman (4/11), who urged him to secure a specific timetable and plan of action from the two sides. The EU, Russia, and UN issued (4/10) a statement (see Doc. A4) declaring support for Powell's mission and calling on Israel and the PA to "move toward a political resolution," essentially ceding the diplomatic lead to the U.S.

On the eve of Powell's arrival, Sharon warned (4/10) that it would be a "tragic mistake" for him to meet with Arafat and stressed, "It is our right to defend our citizens, and there should be no pressure put on us not to do that." In their first brief meeting (4/11), Sharon stated that the IDF was "not about to leave" Bethlehem, Jerin, Nablus, or Ramallah. Back in Washington, the White House stated (4/11) that Bush never expected Israel to "salute and say yes" to his demands to halt incursions and withdraw and that Bush still considered Sharon a "man of peace." Arafat, however, was declared (4/11) a "homicide bomber," the White House adopting Israel's terminology in reference to a 4/10 Hamas suicide bombing in Haifa (staged by a Jenin resident to protest IDF actions there).

In four hours of "difficult" talks (4/12), Sharon refused Powell's request for a withdrawal timetable from PA areas and reiterated his proposal for a Madrid-style peace conference once a cease-fire is achieved. Powell went to the PA's Ramallah compound on 4/14 to discuss the conference idea with Arafat, who endorsed it in principle but said he would not take steps to implement a cease-fire until Israel halted Operation Defensive Shield, withdrew from PA areas, and restored his freedom of movement. Sharon stressed (4/14) that Israel would not participate in a conference if Arafat attended. Powell suggested (4/15) that the meeting could be held at the FM level so Sharon and Arafat would not have to meet.

Powell made a quick trip (4/15) to Lebanon and Syria to urge them to rein in Hizbollah and held brief follow-up meetings with Sharon (4/16) and Arafat (4/17). On departing with Zinni for Washington on 4/17, Powell said his trip had successfully laid the foundations for gains in weeks to come and suggested an international conference might be held as early as 6/02, but he criticized Arafat, stating, "We believed all along that he could have done more, and I have made it as clear as I can to him that we are, and have been, disappointed with his performance and it is time for him to make a strategic choice." He said he expected Israel to withdraw from Palestinian cities soon but did not give a deadline. Powell stopped in Cairo on the way home for a planned meeting with Mubarak, but Mubarak suddenly became "unavailable," and Powell conferred with the Egyptian and Jordanian FMs instead.

In Cairo, Powell announced tentative plans to send CIA Dir. Tenet to the region to assess the status of the PSF and discuss ways of reconstituting the Palestinian security forces. A senior State Dept. official said (4/17), however, that "Tenet can't go in to assess their capacity until the Israelis have finished destroying it." As Operation Defensive Shield finally began to wind down at Sharon's pace, Bush again praised (4/18) him as a "man of peace" and applauded Israel for beginning to withdraw, claiming Sharon "gave me a timetable and he's met the timetable."

By 4/21, the official close of the first stage of Defensive Shield, Israel arguably had achieved many of its goals. Arafat was politically and physically isolated, with Israel openly discussing his expulsion and the U.S. hinting that an alternative Palestinian leadership would be desirable. The PA was almost completely destroyed, existing more in theory than in fact. Palestinian material losses were staggering. The West Bank was divided and sealed, its infrastructure severely damaged, and its economy destroyed. With stiff closures in place, Palestinian violence (apart from resisting IDF incursions) was down, though there had been two significant Hamas suicide bombings in Haifa (4/10) and Jerusalem (4/12) that had killed 14 Israelis and wounded 64. Sharon's approval rating had climbed back up 17 points to 62% by 4/5 and was still rising. (It would reach 70% by 5/15.) Moreover, Sharon had proved that the U.S. would not or could not restrain him. But in terms of dismantling the "terrorist infrastructure," success was questionable: given the scope of the incursions, detentions, and searches, the amount of weapons seized and the number of wanted men captured (see above) was paltry.

Israeli Tourism M Ephraim Sneh and FM Peres reported (4/21) that Sharon and his close advisers were secretly drafting a plan...
to annex 50% of the West Bank. Sharon’s office said (4/21) only that the government would make its plans known when an international peace conference is held. The Israeli human rights group B’Tselem issued (5/13) a report showing that Jewish settlers control 41.5% of the West Bank.

**The Push for PA “Reform”**

Toward the end of the quarter, the focus of peace efforts increasingly shifted from holding an international conference to “reforming” and restructuring the PA. Specifically, the debate shifted to who would head the PA, how much power would the PA have, and what kind of authority Arafat would retain.

In Texas, Bush received (4/25) Crown Prince Abdullah, who laid out an eight-point plan (approved by Arafat and Arab states) for simultaneous cease-fire and confidence-building measures that would lead to implementation of UN Res. 242 and the Saudi initiative. The U.S. ignored the ideas, not even mentioning Abdallah had brought a plan (the Saudis leaked the details to the press on 4/27), and instead pursued Sharon’s idea for Madrid-style talks. Powell, Annan, Ivanov, FM Josep Pique of Spain (EU rotating head), and Solana (the Quartet) met in Washington and formally announced (5/2) plans to hold a “regional peace conference” at the FM level in summer 2002 to secure a cease-fire, revive peace talks, rebuild the PA security apparatus, and boost humanitarian aid to the Palestinians. The U.S. immediately began downplaying the event on 5/3, suggesting that the planned gathering be referred to as a “ministerial meeting” or a “series of ongoing discussions to help solidify the visions that have been expressed.” “With respect to Arafat,” Powell said (5/2), “it’s not a question of rehabilitating him. He knows what is expected of him.” National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was more explicit, stating (5/5), “The Palestinian leadership that is there now, the Authority, is not the kind of leadership that can lead to the kind of Palestinian state that we need. It has got to reform.”

Meanwhile, Sharon stepped up efforts (see Quarterly Update in JPS 123) to cultivate alternatives to Arafat, sending his son Omri to meet secretly with Arafat adviser Muhammad Rashid, reportedly seeking and receiving assurances that the PSF would crack down on violence in Gaza. Israeli DM Ben-Eliyzer then revealed (4/29) he had offered PSF Gaza head Muhammad Dahlan “control over the Strip, including an IDF withdrawal” and that Dahlan had said the offer was interesting but was noncommittal.

On 5/2, Dahlan said he was confident that one of Arafat’s first priorities after being freed (5/1) from his confinement would be to “make fundamental changes in the Palestinian security structure” and “reexamine the PA’s basic structure,” adding that he was not actively pursuing the position of overall coordinator of the PA security services but would not turn down the job if it were offered.

On 5/5, Sharon arrived in Washington for consultations. In a speech (5/6) to the ADL before meeting with Bush, he said that Arafat should be expelled from the territories, ruled out negotiations over a final status agreement, and suggested that Israel would be unwilling to open negotiations at all unless there was a new Palestinian leadership, a reformed PA, and a “complete cessation of violence, terrorism, and incitement.”

When Bush and Sharon met on 5/7, their talks focused on plans to reform the PA and only briefly touched on convening a conference. Sharon reiterated his three-point plan calling for “an end to terror and a cease-fire,” followed by an “interim period” of unspecified duration, and finally final status negotiations. He said that it was “premature” to discuss a Palestinian state or the fate of Jewish settlements, that Israel would never agree to withdraw to 1967 lines, and that a “pre-condition” to any political settlement would be restructuring the PA to create “a unified internal Palestinian security force under a suitable figure [see above] and a prime minister, ostensibly subordinate to Arafat” but who holds real power. Bush, when asked if he would press Sharon to negotiate with Arafat, said, “I’m never going to tell my friend the prime minister what to do or how to handle his business. That’s his choice to make.” Bush added that a Palestinian state was still his goal but that the priority should be halting Palestinian violence and restructuring the PA. He reaffirmed plans to send CIA dir. Tenet to the region to help the PA rebuild a security force to fight “terrorism,” saying the force should be “unified” under the command of one person. An official in Sharon’s entourage acknowledged (5/7) that “reform is a gentle way of pushing Arafat aside.” At the Labor Central Committee (5/15), party leader Ben-Eliyzer and his main party rival, MK Haim Ramon, agreed that, in Ramon’s words, “There is no partner [for
peace] now and apparently, neither will there be one in the foreseeable future.” Sharon reiterated (5/14) demands that the PA “undergo basic structural reforms in all areas—security, economic, legal, and social.”

Meanwhile, Arafat himself called for broad reforms, new elections, and national unity in a Nakba Day address (5/15) in which he also accepted responsibility for mistakes made by the PA and denounced suicide bombings (see Doc. B2). His adviser Rashid met with Peres (5/12) and U.S. officials (ca. 5/15) to discuss resuming security talks and reorganizing the PA security forces. Quartet reps. met (5/14) in Jerusalem to work on a “menu” of reforms to propose to Arafat.

Israel Eyes Gaza

Meanwhile, Palestinian violence had declined significantly, with the IDF out of most population centers and severe closures keeping Israelis and Palestinians segregated. From 4/22 to the end of the quarter, the semi-official second stage of Operation Defensive Shield, the IDF relied on large one-day or overnight incursions into West Bank villages and towns to conduct arrest raids and house-to-house searches for “terrorists,” arresting as many as 150 Palestinians at a time. The incursions targeted Bayt Umar (5/13–14), Hallul (5/13–14), Hebron (4/29–30, 5/9), Jenin (4/26), Nablus (4/26, 5/3), Qalqilya (4/26), and Tulkarm (5/2, 5/5, 5/7). Many raids resulted in the deaths of prominent “wanted” men: overt assassinations were staged on 4/22, 4/24, 4/29, and two 5/14; probable assassinations took place on 4/26 and 5/3. The punishing IDF attacks and loose open-fire regulations took a harsh toll, leaving 70 Palestinians dead between 4/22 and 5/15.

As Bush and Sharon left their 5/7 meeting, they were informed that a suicide bombing in the Tel Aviv suburb of Rishon Letzion had killed 15 Israelis and injured 57; a caller to the media claimed responsibility on behalf of Hamas’s military wing. Sharon immediately cut short his visit and returned to Israel, where he convened (5/8) the inner cabinet, which empowered Sharon and Ben-Eliyzer to take any action they deemed necessary. In Washington, Bush called (5/8) on Sharon to keep “his vision of peace in mind” but did not urge restraint. Israel announced the bomber had come from Gaza.

On 5/9, the IDF began massing troops on the Gaza border and called up reserves (fewer than 20,000) in preparation for a major attack. By 5/10, however, senior Israeli officials and generals were questioning the wisdom of attacking Gaza: Aside from the high population density, Gazans had carefully watched Israeli operations in the West Bank (particularly Jenin and Nablus) with an eye to similar incursions in Gaza and since 5/7 had been actively preparing counteroffensives; many “wanted” Palestinians had already gone underground. Moreover, Hamas’s political wing could not confirm that the military wing was responsible, and on 5/10 Palestinian sources identified the bomber as Zidan Vazani, a 19-year-old from Jenin, raising questions among the Israeli public as to why the IDF should strike Gaza. Ben-Eliyzer was also reportedly angry over leaks about IDF operational plans. (Some reports suggested that Mubarak had threatened to deploy Egyptian forces to the Sinai if Sharon moved on Gaza. Mubarak stated on 6/4 that on 5/9 he had warned Sharon directly against an incursion, saying, “I think he understood the situation.”) On 5/11, the IDF postponed the Gaza operation and sent some reserves home, but most troops remained on the border.

The U.S. postponed (5/13) Tenet’s trip until it could be confident that violence was on the wane, concerned that a strike on Gaza could change everything. Incoming IDF chief of staff Maj. Gen. Moshe Ya’alon, in Washington on 5/15 for consultations with U.S. officials, vowed that the attack “will happen. It’s only a question of time.”

Overview of the Clashes

At the close of the quarter, at least 1,669 Palestinians (including 23 Israeli Arabs and 11 unidentified Arab crossborder infiltrators), 466 Israelis (including 143 IDF soldiers and security personnel, 108 settlers, 215 civilians), and 10 foreign nationals had been killed. Miftah estimated that 43,000 Palestinians had been injured up to 3/26. The IDF placed the number of Israelis injured at 3,690 (2,618 civilians, 1,072 security) up to 4/7; the IDF typically counts individuals suffering from “shock” after bombings as injured, which elevates the figures. Some 1,500–2,000 Palestinians remained in detention, around 1,200 of them in Ofer camp, near Ramallah, and 500 in Ansar 3.

The World Bank estimated (3/18) that between 9/28/00 and 12/31/01, the Israelis did $305 m. damage to infrastructure, agriculture, and public and private buildings ($193 m. in Gaza, $112 in the West Bank), including uprooting nearly 500,000 trees, demolishing
nearly 88,000 structures (e.g., homes, storage buildings, walls, wells, fences), and bulldozing 32,500 dunams of topsoil (4 dunams = 1 acre). The PA Agriculture Min. reported (3/2) that 20,000 dunams of that amount were in Gaza, representing 12% of Gaza’s agricultural land. The World Bank estimated (3/18) overall economic losses to the PA at $7.5 b. through 12/01.

The Israeli cabinet reported (3/25) that between 9/00 and 12/01, Israel had spent $1.1 b. to cover direct government expenditures related to the intifada and had incurred $1 b. in lost state revenues. (On 3/21, the Bank of Israel put the figure for lost revenue for the same period at $2.4 b.) Most direct expenditures were made by the DMin., including $290 m. for new munitions and defense measures, $54 m. for construction, and $34 m. for “the Home Front” (including measures to protect settlements and settler vehicles). Some members argued that Israel could take tax money collected on the PA’s behalf (estimated at $1.6 b. as of 3/12) to pay for these expenses. Some also called for new laws that would allow Israeli civilians to sue the PA for damages resulting from the intifada.

This quarter, Israel carried out 11 killings (down from 12 last quarter) that were certainly or almost definitely assassinations: AMB’s Muhammad Abu Halawa (3/5), Fawzi Murra (3/5), Marwan Zallum (4/22), and Yaqub Saraya (4/24); Hamas’s Nazih al-Siba’i (2/16), Tarik al-Dufashi (4/29), and two senior Hamas members (2/19); Islamic Jihad’s Ahad Ajaj (3/30); and two PA intelligence officers (5/14). At least another 9 deaths (up from 8 last quarter) had the markings of assassinations but could not be confirmed as such because they took place during the heavy operations (3/1, 3/6, two on 3/8, 3/10, 3/14, 4/5, 4/26, 5/3; see Chronology for details). Attacks targeting AMB’s Samir Awais (3/9), an unidentified Fatah member (3/10), Hamas’s Hussein Abu Kuwayk (3/4), and Islamic Jihad’s Ziyad Shuwayki (4/5) were clearly assassination attempts that failed. An incident on 3/5 may have been a failed attempt on PSF Brig. Gen. Abd al-Raziz Majayda.

There were 38 Palestinian suicide attacks this quarter (up from 20 last quarter), which killed 127 Israelis and injured more than 500. There were 26 bombings (2/16, 2/17, 2/18, 2/19, 2/27, 3/2, 3/5, 3/7, 3/9, 3/17, 3/20, 3/21, 3/22, 3/26, 3/27, 3/29, 3/30, two on 3/31; 4/1, 4/2, 4/10, 4/11, 4/12, 4/19, 5/7). Another 12 attacks (2/18, 2/21, 2/25, 3/4, 3/7, 3/9, 3/10, 3/12, 3/17, 3/18, 3/29, 4/24) could be called “suicide” insofar as they were certain to result in the death of those who staged them. Four of the attacks (bombings on 2/27, 3/29, 4/12; a knife attack on 2/25) were carried out by women, and 14 (mostly on IDF checkpoints or settlements) were staged by persons with no reported affiliation. AMB staged 12 attacks, Hamas 7, Islamic Jihad 3, and the PFLP 2. Also of note, senior Hamas political leader Isma’il Abu Shanab reported (ca. 4/4) that the 3/27 Netanya bombing (29 killed) and the 3/31 Haifa bombing (15 killed) resulted in so many casualties because Hamas was now using weapons-grade explosives rather than sugar and fertilizer. This was also probably the case for the Rishon Letzion bombing on 5/7 (15 killed). On 3/14, Palestinian assailants for the second time staged a roadside bombing that disabled a Merkava tank; the first instance occurred on 2/14. In general, use of roadside bombs, grenades, and mortars remained low this quarter. A total of six Qassam-2 rockets were fired (two each on 2/16, 3/5, and 3/18), resulting in two injuries.

Israel’s military operations sparked a surge of collaborator killings. Six collaborators were killed during Colorful Journey, and 23 during Defensive Shield. A PA security court sentenced (4/7) another five to death and a sixth to life in prison, but no executions were carried out.

As reported above, the IDF routinely barred medical workers access to the wounded during Operations Colorful Journey and Defensive Shield and fired on them to the point that the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) was sometimes (e.g., Ramallah 3/12–13, 4/1–2) forced to suspend operations entirely. The ICRC, PRCS’s parent body, reported (3/8) that about 70% of PRCS ambulances had been damaged by Israeli gunfire and that more than 130 PRCS employees had been wounded since the intifada began. The UPMRC reported (3/4) that 11 doctors, nurses, and ambulance workers had been killed and 170 attacked since the start of the intifada. On 3/13, the IDF declared that ambulances must coordinate with the IDF and submit to IDF inspections of up to 10 minutes to ensure that they are not transporting gunmen. No estimates have been made of how many Palestinians died as a result of these policies.

In addition to raiding and ransacking Palestinian TV and radio stations during Opera-
tion Defensive Shield, the IDF also routinely harassed journalists to deter them from covering military advances. During the quarter, one journalist was killed (3/13), at least six were wounded (two on 3/13, 3/29, 4/1, 4/2, 4/9), at least five were detained without charge or access to lawyers for as long as a month (e.g., 4/26, 4/30), and some 20 had their press credentials revoked for entering closed military zones (e.g., 4/5, 4/22) or airing “crude anti-Israeli propaganda” (e.g., 4/2). Journalists were shot at with live ammunition, rubber bullets, and stun grenades, even when they camped in hotels in large groups (e.g., 3/12, 4/2) or drove in clearly marked media vehicles (e.g., 3/29, 4/2). Their bureaus were threatened with $15,000 fines, legal actions, and closure for airing anti-Israeli material or “harboring” Palestinians in their offices (e.g., 3/31, 4/2); the IDF raided and ransacked (4/8) two Arab TV bureaus, allegedly searching for armed Palestinians. On 5/3, the Committee to Protect Journalists named the West Bank as the worst place to be a journalist based on dangers created and restrictions imposed by Israel.

Jewish vigilante groups placed (3/5) a bomb on the playground of a Palestinian school in East Jerusalem that exploded, injuring two teachers and 24 children, and ambushed (4/2) and killed two Palestinians driving near Tulkarm. On 4/28, Israeli police arrested two Jewish settlers, who may have been behind the 3/5 attack, for planting a timer-controlled bomb in an East Jerusalem hospital; the bomb was defused. Four other Jewish settlers, including former head of the outlawed Kach movement, were arrested on 5/10 and 5/14 for participating in the plot. Five other Kach members threatened and chased (5/9) Israeli Arab MK Talib al-Sana from a Jerusalem restaurant, vowing to continue “haunting” Arab MKs wherever they are. In early 5/02, leaflets signed by the Jewish Underground circulated in settlements, claiming responsibility for killing eight Palestinians and enjoining Jews to attack Palestinians and Israeli Arabs.

Peace Now reported (3/18) that 34 new Jewish settlements had been built since Sharon took office in 2/01, most officially described as “extensions” of existing settlements. The new sites have 1 to 22 housing units, mostly mobile homes. The Knesset Finance Committee approved (5/7) more than $6 m. to fund agricultural projects in Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley, grants for “young settlers” to move to the Jordan Valley and Golan Heights, and “security infrastructure” for settlements. Israel issued (4/23) tenders for construction of 47 new settlement units and began constructing 480 new units in Efrat. The IDF began (5/7) work on settler-only bypass roads near Khan Yunis and near Nablus that will use more than 1,000 dunams of Palestinian land.

**Buffer Zones** As Israeli-Palestinian violence deteriorated at the start of the quarter, Sharon reiterated plans (2/21, 3/4) to create buffer zones to form “security separation” between Israeli and Palestinian territory. The plan was secretly approved by the cabinet in 6/01, and work along an 18-mile stretch of the Green Line between Tulkarm and Jenin began in late 9/01 (see Peace Monitor in JPS 122). On 4/8, Sharon announced that when Operation Defensive Shield was complete, the IDF would withdraw to “defined security areas” that would act as “a buffer between the Palestinian territories and our territories, to prevent infiltrations into Israeli settlements and attacks on Israeli civilians.”

On 4/14, the Israeli cabinet approved construction of a series of fences, sensors, ditches, and barriers that would roughly follow 50 miles of the 1967 border at an estimated cost of $125 m. Sharon said the IDF would be positioned on either side of the barriers, creating a security zone of up to 3 miles wide inside the West Bank. No Jewish settlements or military bases would be removed, and Israel would continue to control aquifers, major roads, and all terrain over 1,200 feet above sea level. On 4/25, the IDF began building a 4.6-mile stretch of security fence for a buffer near Tulkarm on 8,000 dunams of confiscated Palestinian land. By 4/25, the Civil Administration had also reportedly issued orders declaring another 69,000 dunams along the Green Line west of Jenin, including 11 Palestinian villages, “buffer zones,” “security zones,” or “anti-infiltration zones.”

On 5/7, the IDF informed foreign missions and consulates in Jerusalem and Ramallah that it was dividing the West Bank into eight zones (Bethlehem, Hebron, Jericho, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Tulkarm). Palestinians wanting to move between zones would have to secure one-month travel permits from the Civil Administration; Palestinians holding Jerusalem ID cards would be barred from entering the West Bank; goods moving between zones would have to change haulers at IDF check-
points, similar to the back-to-back hauling system between Jordan and the West Bank. Donors and UNRWA warned that such a system would harm the economic and humanitarian situation in the West Bank. At the close of the quarter, the plan had not been put into effect in a comprehensive manner. New travel permits had not been instituted, but the IDF was stringing barbed wire around Ramallah and Bethlehem to restrict access to Jerusalem and had converted (ca. 5/9) an IDF checkpoint outside Beitaunia into a commercial crossing for goods entering Ramallah. The new crossing is five miles east of the existing Qalandia commercial crossing, which sits on the Green Line.

**Independent Peace Initiatives and International Demonstrations**

On 2/18, a group of 1,000 senior IDF, Shin Bet, and Mossad reserve officers, led by former Israeli PM Ehud Barak, launched a campaign calling for a unilateral withdrawal from most of the West Bank and Gaza, except for a buffer zone along the border with Egypt; demarcating a border that would bar Palestinians from entering Israel; and evacuating about 20,000 Jewish settlers from 40 settlements. Israel would withdraw before reaching a peace treaty or cease-fire, recognize a Palestinian state in areas under PA control, and hold peace talks with the government of that state.

A number of large peace rallies were held in Israel this quarter. As many as 20,000 individuals attended a “Get Out of the Territories” rally in Tel Aviv organized by MK Yossi Sarid and PLO Jerusalem affairs rep. Sari Nusseibeh. (However, 50,000 right-wing Israelis held an opposing “Get the Enemies Out of the Country” rally on 3/11 in Jerusalem, urging Sharon to topple the PA.) Peace Now rallies were attended by 3,000 Israelis in Jerusalem on 3/2 and 15,000 in Haifa on 4/21. A small Israeli-Palestinian peace rally (4/3) at Jerusalem’s al-Ram checkpoint was violently dispersed by Israeli security personnel, injuring 20. A convoy of 100s of Israeli Arabs attempted to deliver food to Jenin on 4/9 but was halted by the Israeli border police in East Jerusalem, attacked by Jewish settlers, and shot at apparently by an IDF soldier, wounding two.

With the 3/27 Netanyahu bombing and the start of Operation Defensive Shield, 100s of foreign peace activists (called “international-als”) headed to the territories, and Ramallah in particular, on solidarity visits and to act as human shields or checkpoint observers to protect Palestinians. On 3/28, Israeli authorities at Ben-Gurion airport began detaining incoming foreign nationals suspected of making solidarity rather than tourist visits, deporting many of them immediately. On 3/31, the Israeli Interior Min. officially barred entry to Israel to all foreign nationals affiliated with Palestinian NGOs or solidarity groups. By 4/18, more than 150 foreign nationals reportedly had been barred entry to Israel and deported.

International rallies in support of the Palestinians had largely tapered off by late 2/02, but with the start of Operation Colorful Journey on 2/28, rallies resumed in the Arab states, occurring daily in Egypt and Jordan and frequently in Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen (including a rally of 100,000 in Sana’ on 3/26), as well as in Turkey. After the start of Operation Defensive Shield, rallies grew more frequent, becoming daily events in most Arab states, and spreading worldwide. Rallies and marches of significant size were held in Australia, Bahrain (where demonstrators threw Molotov cocktails at the U.S. embassy on 4/5), Bangladesh, Belgium (including 10,000 on 4/7, 15,000 on 4/8), Brazil, Britain (including 15,000 in London on 4/13), Canada (including 10,000 in Ottawa on 4/21), China, Colombia, Corsica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt (including violent clashes on 4/1, 4/5), France (including 10,000s in Paris on 4/6), Germany (including 10,000 on 4/1 and 11,000 in Berlin on 4/13), Greece (where a bank was also bombed on 4/5 as an “act of support for the Palestinians,” causing no injuries), Holland (including 10,000 in Amsterdam on 4/13), India, Indonesia (including rallies of 10,000s on 4/2–5), Iran (including 10,000s in Tehran on 4/6), Iraq, Italy (including 100,000 in Perugia Assisi on 5/12, 10,000 in Rome on 4/6), Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait (including more than 10,000 on 4/18 and a demonstration ca. 3/30, denouncing U.S. complicity in Israeli aggressions and burning American flags), Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco (including 800,000 in Rabat on 4/7), New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Saudi Arabia (including 5,000 outside the U.S. consulate in Dahran on 4/5, a violent rally in western Saudi Arabia on 5/7), South Africa, Spain, Sudan (including 10,000 in Khartoum on 4/1), Syria, Tunisia (where the historic Ghriba synagogue was truck bombed on 4/11, killing 16, possibly in protest of Israeli actions), Turkey, Uganda, the U.S. (including up to 100,000 in Washington on 4/20),
Yemen (including 300,000 in Sana‘) on 4/9 and a march that brought a petition to the U.S. embassy on 4/3, denouncing the U.S. as a “sponsor of terrorism”), and Yugoslavia.

Saudi Arabia held a three-day telethon (4/11–13) that raised $109 m. in cash and $54 m. of in-kind donations to assist the Palestinians. The al-Saud family inaugurated the drive, with Prince al-Walid Bin Talal giving $27 m., King Fahd giving $27 m., Crown Prince Abdullah giving $1.35 m., and Prince Sultan giving $800,000. The UAE held two telethons in 4/02 that brought in $85 m.

Egypt held (5/1) a telethon raising $1.26 m. Kuwait held a charity drive (beginning 4/17) to fund sending 30,000 emergency food rations and medicine to the West Bank. All donations were to be distributed by the ICRC.

Egyptian first lady Suzanne Mubarak also led (4/29) a high-profile solidarity march from al-Arish to the Rafah crossing.

### Domestic Israeli Moves

The Knesset passed (3/4) the Imprisonment of Illegal Combatants Law, which allows the IDF chief of staff to detain anyone who can be reasonably assumed to take part in “hostile activity against Israel, directly or indirectly.” Such detainees may be held without charge or trial as long as “hostilities against Israel” continue. An “illegal combatant” law was first proposed in 6/00 but withdrawn under local and international criticism. The draft was revived in 2/02, shortly after U.S. attempts to deny prisoner of war status to Taliban and al-Qa‘ida detainees at Guantanamo. The Israeli government also issued (2/17) an emergency regulation empowering the Interior Min. to ban citizens from leaving the country for a six-month period and immediately used it to prevent Islamic Movement head Shaykh Raad Salah from leaving the country. On 4/8, the Israeli High Court refused to overturn an order issued (4/5) by the IDF early on during Operation Defensive Shield that allows troops to detain Palestinians for 18 days without access to a lawyer.

Israel’s trial against Israeli MK Azmi Bishara for publicly praising Hizballah opened (2/27) in Nazareth. Bishara argued that the case was a politically motivated attempt to delegitimize his views and that his statements, made in two speeches, fall within the limits of free speech. In a similar case, the Israeli state prosecutor in Beersheba arrested and charged (4/12) five Israeli Arab community leaders with “supporting a terrorist organization” for making statements in support of Hizballah and Palestinian resistance groups during a Land Day demonstration on 3/30. The Knesset passed (5/15) an anti-incitement bill allowing someone who publicly incites to violence or praises, supports, or encourages “terrorist actions” to be jailed for up to five years. The Knesset also passed (5/15) a bill empowering the Central Election Committee to disqualify individuals and parties from running for the Knesset if they explicitly or implicitly deny the existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, engage in racist incitement, or support the armed struggle of an “enemy country or terrorist organization against Israel.”

The Israeli cabinet froze (5/12) all requests for family reunification and added more stringent clauses to the policy whereby Palestinians who gained legal status in Israel under family reunification (1) can have that status revoked if they engage in criminal or “anti-state activity” and (2) “will not have the right to request family unification for any other relative.”

Haifa University opened proceedings (5/12) to revoke the tenure of Prof. Ilan Pappe ostensibly for unauthorized trips abroad but widely believed to be in connection with his defense of an M.A. thesis concerning a 1948 massacre in Tantura. Israel’s National Union of Students ordered (4/10) student unions around the country to bar Arab students from undertaking any political activity on campuses, arguing they would inevitably organize “activities which support terrorism.”

In order to “help fight a growing wave of terrorism,” Israel loosened (3/6) gun licensing restrictions and issued an additional 60,000 gun permits to civilians and guns to on-duty firemen and municipal inspectors. Nearly two-thirds of Israel’s 6,000 bus drivers already carry arms on the job.

A poll of Israelis taken by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University in 2/00 and released on 3/12 showed that 46% of Jews polled favored transferring Palestinians out of the West Bank and Gaza; 31% favored transferring Israeli Arabs out of Israel; 61% felt Israeli Arabs pose a threat to Israeli security; 72% opposed Arab parties being part of the coalition government; and 80% believed Israeli Arabs should not participate in important decisions, such as delineating Israel’s permanent borders.

Israel’s right-wing Moledet party began (3/26) advertising in Arabic newspapers in Israel a new service to locate “overseas places of work, study, and residences for in-
Intra-Palestinian Relations

At the opening of the quarter, intra-Palestinian tensions were particularly high as a result of Arafat's decision last quarter, under extreme international pressure, to undertake preventive arrests of Palestinians likely to stage attacks on Israeli targets and to declare the armed wings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad illegal (see Quarterly Update in JPS 123). Already sensing last quarter that Sharon was opening channels with senior Palestinians who might serve as an alternative leadership, Arafat in 2/02 reportedly designated his successors in case of emergency, reaffirming chief negotiator and PLO Exec. Comm. secy. Mahmud Abbas to head the PLO and picking Palestinian Council speaker Ahmad Qurai' to head the PA. From the time Israel moved on the Ramallah compound on 3/29, Abbas and Qurai' lowered their profiles and stopped addressing the press, leaving the public comments to Local Government M Saeb Erakat and Information M 'Abid Rabbuh, reportedly seen as too weak to be considered leadership options by Israel and the U.S. Arafat also rejected (2/24) Sharon's request for a second meeting with Abbas, Qurai', and Arafat's powerful adviser Rashid; the first had been held on 1/30, and no details were released (see Quarterly Update in JPS 123).

Arafat allowed Rashid and PSF Gaza head Dahlán to meet with Ben-Eliezer on 2/20; Rashid to meet with Omri Sharon on 4/20; Peres on 5/12, and U.S. officials in mid-5/02; and Dahlán to meet with Ben-Eliezer ca. 4/29. Such meetings, combined with indications that Israel and the U.S. wanted to sideline Arafat (see above) and Gaza's having been spared during Operation Defensive Shield, fed rumors (beginning in mid-4/02 and repeated prominently in the Hebrew and Iraqi opposition press) that Israel's grand goal was a Palestinian state in Gaza with Arafat as a figurehead, Rashid as de facto leader, Dahlán as head of a unified security structure, and possibly with Erakat as head of the judiciary and Gaza-based PA NGO Affairs M Hassan Asfour as spokesman. Rumors flew (e.g., 5/3, 5/11, 5/13) that Asfour, Dahlán, Rashid, and possibly even Arafat were complicit in the Israeli plan and that a counteralliance was forming among Abbas, Qurai', and PSF West Bank head Rajib. Existing animosities between Dahlán and Rajib, played out in interviews and leaflets on the streets (ca. 4/25–29, 5/11), and Dahlán's statement (5/2) that he would be willing to take the job as the head of a unified security structure gave weight to these stories (see above). Some AMB leaflets (ca. 4/25) threatened Dahlán with assassination. On a visit to Ramallah on 5/13, Asfour was attacked and beaten by five masked men, reportedly members of the tanzim.

Popular support for Arafat fluctuated. While the Ramallah siege and Israeli expulsion threats galvanized his support, compromises he made to end the Bethlehem and Ramallah sieges were deeply unpopular. Arafat was seen as trading the six Palestinians turned over to U.S. and British custody to gain his own freedom, and the "voluntary exile" of the 13 Palestinians to Cyprus was seen as setting a precedent for Israeli expulsion of loyal Palestinian fighters. Fatah's Bethlehem branch was among the many groups that denounced (5/7) the Church of the Nativity deal. During Arafat's first tour (5/13) outside Ramallah after his confinement, only a few 100 Palestinians in Bethlehem turned out to greet him. The night before Arafat's planned visit to Jenin, angry camp residents, feeling deserted by the PA, set fire to a welcome stage, leading the PSF, unable to guarantee his safety, to cancel Arafat's stop at the camp, which only angered the residents further.

The massive scale of the IDF attacks heightened the debate among Palestinians everywhere regarding the armed uprising, the benefits of suicide bombings in particular, and the need for PA reform. Palestinians across the political spectrum had long called for reform but wanted it from within, not imposed by Israel and the U.S. Immediately after Arafat's confinement was lifted, the National and Islamic Coordinating Committee (the umbrella group of the Palestinian factions) and the Palestinian Council held (5/3) a conference attended by more than 150 PC members, PA officials, and Palestinian NGO reps. to discuss an action plan to achieve an independent Palestinian state, rebuild after recent Israeli attacks, and defend against future Israeli incursions. The main discussion centered on the need to reform the Palestinian leadership. Though there were no calls for Arafat's replacement, many complained of corruption among his senior advisers and called for their replacement. Participants also called for recomposition of the civil police force, separation of powers, and elimination of corruption. Afterward, Arafat met (5/3) with the PA Executive Authority to discuss reform demands. Arafat re-
jected (5/3) demands for an immediate cabinet shuffle (prompting Parliamentary Affairs M Nabil ‘Amr to submit his resignation in protest) but approved (5/14) a law securing the independence of the judiciary, expedited (5/14) the third reading of a new penal law, and endorsed (5/15) a call to hold new elections for the PC and the presidency.

After Operation Defensive Shield began, Hamas organized a number of huge rallies in Gaza supporting continuation of the armed intifada: 10,000 demonstrated in Gaza City on 4/5; 30,000 in Jabaliya on 4/12; and 15,000 in Gaza City on 4/26. Claiming to speak on behalf of the entire movement, Hamas’s Abu Shanab stated (4/26) that Hamas would be willing to “cease all military activities,” “postpone the right of return until later,” and accept an arrangement for Jerusalem that would “enforce access to worship for all” if Israel accepts the Arab League Saudi initiative and withdraws to the 1967 borders: “That would be satisfactory for all Palestinian military groups to stop and build our state, to be busy in our own affairs, and have good neighborhood with Israelis.”

**Palestinian Opinion**

The following data are excerpted from a poll conducted by the Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) between 15 and 18 May 2002. Results are based on a survey of 1,317 men and women from the West Bank and Gaza. The poll, fourth in a series, was taken from the PSR’s Web site at www.pcpsr.org.

1. **There are internal and external calls for wide and fundamental domestic reforms and changes in the institutions and authorities of the PA. Do you support or oppose these calls?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Strongly support</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Support</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Oppose</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Strongly oppose</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Do not know</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Concerning armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel, I . . .**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Strongly support</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Support</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Oppose</td>
<td>46.4%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Strongly oppose</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Do not know</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Do you support changing the Palestinian presidential system to a parliamentary system in which power resides in the hands of a prime minister while the position of the president is ceremonial?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Strongly support</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Support</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Oppose</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Strongly oppose</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Do not know</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Jordan-Israel**

Once again this quarter, Jordan kept interactions with Israel to a minimum, concentrating instead on its own security and preventing crossborder attacks on Israel from its territory. Overnight on 3/23–24, Jordanian security forces fired on a suspicious car near the border, killing two unidentified Arabs. Four other Arabs escaped and fled into Israel, where they were tracked and fatally shot by the IDF. No group took responsibility. An uncorroborated Israel Radio report 5/2 said Jordan had thwarted an attempt to fire five Katyusha rockets at Elat.

Throughout the quarter, protesters at the many demonstrations held called on the government to abrogate the peace treaty with Israel and expel Israel’s ambassador, but the kingdom argued that since Jordan was the principle conduit of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, it could not even symbolically sever diplomatic relations with Israel as Egypt had done on 4/3 (see below), since Israel would shut the borders to aid shipments in response. Jordanian FM Marwan Muasher summoned (3/31) the Israeli ambassador to formally denounce Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield and warned that Jordan might take “bilateral measures.” He did not specify what measures those might be but said that Jordan would break diplomatic relations “only if it is forced to do so.”

The PA complained (2/26, 4/10) that food aid donated to Palestinians and being shipped through Jordan was rotting while Israel delayed its clearance to enter the West Bank. The PA said Israel seemed to be targeting goods from Iran, Iraq, and Syria in particular; some items (e.g., rice, cooking oil) had been in storage for 14 months. Israel did allow Jordan to send five helicopter loads of food into the West Bank on 4/13, and by the end of the quarter more goods reportedly (e.g., 4/25, 4/29) were getting through.
SYRIA-ISRAEL

Though Damascus denounced Israeli actions and raised concerns about the Saudi initiative (see below), it generally tried to keep a low profile this quarter, so as not to attract the closer attention of the U.S., which was already hinting that Syria could become a target of its war on terror. In 4/02, Syria redeployed its troops in Lebanon toward the Biqa' Valley as a sign that it had no intention of opening a second front (see below). On 5/7, however, army forces in the Biqa' symbolically fired antiaircraft missiles at Israeli war planes flying high-level reconnaissance missions over their positions.

LEBANON-ISRAEL

Israel's punishing assaults on the Palestinians had destabilizing effects on Lebanon, raising concerns that a second front could open. The most significant incident occurred on 3/12, when two unidentified Arab gunmen opened fire outside the n. Israeli town of Shlomi, killing five Israelis and one IDF soldier before being shot dead. On 3/14, Israel announced that it believed the gunmen were Hizballah members who had infiltrated from Lebanon, noting that they did not carry anything with identifying marks and were wearing outfits that resembled IDF uniforms but had no manufacturer tags. Though the border fence had not been cut, a free-standing ladder was found in the brush on the Lebanese side of the border. As many as four crossborder attacks may have been carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), including the firing (4/4) of nine armor-piercing Grad rockets at an IDF radar post in the disputed Shaba' Farms that caused damage but no injuries. Lebanese authorities announced (4/5) that they had arrested nine PFLP-GC members with a rocket launcher in s. Lebanon. Powell stated (4/15) that Lebanese officials had told him they had recently arrested 24 Palestinians.

Palestinian refugees in Mieh Mieh camp held (3/3) a rally declaring formation of an AMB wing named AMB-Forces of Return. An AMB leader from Gaza addressed the rally by phone.

While he did not admit to the 3/14 attack, Hizballah secy.-gen. Hassan Nasrallah said (3/8) that his group attempted to smuggle Katyusha rockets to the Palestinians across Jordan but were discovered by Jordanian security forces, which arrested four Hizballah members. On 3/25, just before the Arab League summit, Nasrallah addressed a rally of 10,000s of Lebanese in Beirut, calling on Arab leaders to arm the Palestinians. Hizballah also reportedly offered (4/10, 4/28) to exchange an IDF colonel kidnapped from the Golan Heights in 10/00 for Palestinians trapped in Jenin and the Church of the Nativity.

Hizballah continued (e.g., 2/17, 2/28, 5/11) to fire antiaircraft shells at high-flying Israeli reconnaissance planes violating Lebanon's airspace, as it has done intermittently since 1/31/02. The shells had no chance of hitting the planes and were meant as symbolic harassment, but pieces of one fell (5/11) within n. Israel and lightly injured one woman. Hizballah also exchanged fire with the IDF across the UN blue line marking the unofficial border between Israel and Lebanon (e.g., 3/10, 3/11), dramatically stepping up attacks on Shaba' Farms after Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield (e.g., 3/30, 3/31, 4/2, 4/6, 4/7, 4/8, 4/9, 4/11, 4/13). Most attacks did not cause damage or injuries but were met with IDF shelling and air strikes. Hizballah also fired (4/1, 4/10) Katyushas into n. Israel for the first time since the IDF withdrawal in 5/00, causing minor damage and lightly injuring one IDF soldier. After visits to Lebanon and Syria by Powell (4/15) and Iranian FM Kamal Kharrazi (4/13), who both called for restraint in s. Lebanon, the border was quiet for nearly two weeks (4/14–24). Strikes then resumed and continued to the end of the quarter (e.g., 4/24, 4/26).

The Lebanese army announced (4/3) that Syrian troops had begun redeploying in compliance with the 1989 Ta'if accord. By 4/19, Syrian troops were out of the heavily populated areas of Mount Lebanon and some of Beirut's southern suburbs, as the accord directs. Although Lebanese officials denied it, political commentators believed Syria implemented the redeployment out of fear of Israeli air strikes in retaliation for recent Hizballah shelling. Indeed, Sharon convened a late-night inner cabinet meeting on 4/3; no details were released but some rumors suggested that the possibility of striking Syrian targets was discussed.

Israel resumed (2/18) building a fence south of the village of Ghajar, which straddles the blue line. Israel began the construction on 11/28/01 but halted it two days later, after Ghajar residents protested to the UN.

A Lebanese court issued (3/19) guilty verdicts against three Lebanese charged with il-
legal contact with Israel (see Peace Monitor in JPS 122). Christian activist Toufic Hindi and al-Hayat journalist Habib Yunis were sentenced to three years in jail, and Middle East Broadcasting Corp. journalist Antoine Bassil was given four years. On 4/16, all three were granted new trials based on accusations that they had confessed under torture. The new trials were expected to begin in 6/02.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

The Saudi initiative for full Arab normalization in exchange for full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, which Israel dismissed, was the only new opening this quarter. Aside from contacts related to the peace process, the Arab states had no interaction with Israel.

Egypt's decision (4/3) to suspend all diplomatic contacts with Israel except those benefiting the Palestinians was largely a symbolic gesture since Cairo had already reduced its dealings with Tel Aviv to a minimum in 5/01, in response to Israel's first use of warplanes to strike Palestinian targets during the intifada. On 4/17, Egypt halted agricultural cooperation projects with Israel. An Egyptian court convicted (3/23) engineer Sharif al-Filali of spying for Israel and sentenced him to 15 years in jail. On 4/2, Egyptian Anwar Tawfiq was arrested for spying for Israel. He reportedly confessed at the opening of his trial on 5/13 but a final ruling on his case was not expected until 6/02.

Lebanon and Syria boycotted a Euro-Mediterranean meeting (4/22–23) in Valencia, Spain, attended by Israel. Arab reps. who participated walked out during Israeli Dep. FM Michael Melchoir's address and refused to participate in a group photo with him.

INTER-ARAB HIGHLIGHTS

Most inter-Arab meetings this quarter were to coordinate on the Saudi initiative in preparation for the Arab League summit in Beirut on 3/27–28 and to discuss regional affairs in light of Israel's Colorful Journey and Defensive Shield operations. Most contacts were among Egypt, the PA, and Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser degree Jordan. Arab leaders also held intensive coordination talks in advance of trips to the U.S. by Mubarak (3/4–7), King Abdullah (5/1–14), Crown Prince Abdullah (ca. 4/25–27), and King Muhammad of Morocco (ca. 4/23).

The 3/27–28 Arab League summit, planned nearly a year in advance, had been expected to focus on rehabilitating Iraq and reviving inter-Arab relations in light of the U.S. counterterrorism campaign, until Crown Prince Abdullah unveiled (2/17) his proposal for normalization with Israel in an interview with the New York Times. While the idea was not a surprise, Abdullah's unilateral presentation of it was, and Egypt and Syria, in particular, were irked that Saudi Arabia had officially endorsed the proposal without consulting with other Arab states. Before reacting to the plan officially, a concerned Syrian pres. Bashar al-Asad made (3/3) an unscheduled trip to Lebanon, his first since becoming president, for consultations. Syria and Lebanon issued (3/3) a joint statement saying that a just and lasting peace must rest on UN Res. 194 (right of return) and 242 and 338 (complete withdrawal from s. Lebanon and the Golan Heights). Asad then went to Jeddah to confer (3/5) with Abdullah, who assured him that Saudi Arabia envisions a full withdrawal from the Golan as a precondition for full normalization with Israel. Asad then endorsed (3/5) the initiative, but tensions persisted.

The summit itself was notable for its successes—the unanimous adoption of the Saudi initiative (see Doc. B1), pledges of $480 m. in aid to the Palestinians, Iraq's recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty and pledge never to rein invade, and a unified statement denouncing any plans to attack Iraq—but ultimately was marred by squabbles. Nearly half the Arab heads of state, including Egypt's Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah, sent lower-level representations to protest Israel's decision to prevent Arafat from attending and/or the marginalization of the Iraq issue, thus weakening the symbolic power of the unilateral endorsements. (Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qaddafi stayed away because of his anger at Lebanon for accusing him of involvement in the 1978 disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr.) Two moves by Syria offset the goodwill the backing of the Saudi initiative engendered with the U.S.: Syria demanded a companion measure to the Saudi initiative expressing support for the intifada until Israel ends its occupation; and Asad's address to the summit (3/27) stated that Syria considers all of Israel an "armed camp," meaning Palestinians have no obligation to distinguish between military and civilian targets in their legitimate armed struggle against occupation. In addition, Lebanese
pres. Emile Lahoud initially barred (3/27) Arafat from addressing the summit by video link, prompting the Palestinian delegation to walk out. Lahoud said he feared that Israel would hijack the feed and air an address by Sharon, but many participants assumed Syria was behind the stunt. Arafat read (3/27) his address over al-Jazeera satellite TV, which rebroadcast it to the summit on 3/28.

At Arab League FMs meetings in Cairo after the summit (4/4, 4/5–6, 5/9, 5/10), FMs declared that Israel’s military offensives rendered the Saudi initiative irrelevant. They called on the U.S. to intervene immediately to restrain Israel and stressed the Palestinians’ right to resist with force. On 5/11, Crown Prince Abdullah, Asad, and Mubarak met in Sharm al-Shaykh to reaffirm their commitment to the Saudi initiative.

On 4/7, Syrian VP ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, PM Mustafa Miro, and Ba’th party secy.-gen. Abdallah al-Ahmar led a massive Palestinian solidarity march through Damascus (estimated by the government at 800,000 people) that caused tensions with Cairo when some of the demonstrators ended up at the Egyptian embassy and made speeches denouncing Mubarak for not canceling the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

At the outbreak of Operation Defensive Shield, Mubarak reportedly offered to send his helicopter to Ramallah to retrieve Arafat, but Arafat refused.

INTERNATIONAL

Israel’s International PR Campaign

In late 3/02, when Operation Defensive Shield began, U.S. PR firms hired by Israel began running television ads (up to 20 times a day on cable networks and during prominent talk shows, such as “Fox News Sunday” and “This Week”) to “educate Americans about why they should support Israel and the importance of the U.S. relationship with Israel.” The ads also ran on local DC channels in hopes of influencing “Congress, government officials, journalists, and others interested in politics and policy.” These ads were still running at the same pace at the end of the quarter. The ads were sponsored (at $40,000 per week) by two U.S. nonprofits: the Center for Security Policy and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. The ads portray Palestinians as wanting to destroy Israel and create a Palestinian state in all of the 1948 areas and allege Palestinian links to Osama Bin Laden.

During Operation Colorful Journey, the IDF sent TV crews along with soldiers during house-to-house searches to document the IDF’s “humane” execution of the offensive. On 3/15, however, Israel TV 2 aired a video that escaped the IDF censors, showing soldiers raiding a house in Aida camp, blowing off the door with an explosive, killing a Palestinian mother in front of her children, then breaking through a wall to reach a neighbor’s home. Israel TV 2 rebroadcast the footage on 3/16, despite government protests. As a result, the Israeli DMin. banned (3/18) independent TV crews from accompanying soldiers on missions, though IDF cameramen continued to tape operations for distribution to the media.

Sharon dispatched (4/4) his Likud rival, former PM Benjamin Netanyahu, to the U.S. on an “empathy tour” to promote support for Operation Defensive Shield. Netanyahu received (4/10) a “warm reception” on Capitol Hill, where he warned legislators that Israel was “being pressed to back down just when it is on the verge of uprooting Palestinian terror,” that the U.S. should not “selectively abandon” its counterterror policy by criticizing Israel, that Arafat must be expelled, and that Powell’s mission “won’t amount to anything.” Cheney and Rice requested a meeting with Netanyahu at the White House (4/11), where he reportedly advised them not to wait for calm in the territories before hitting Iraq. One misstep of the tour was a comment in an address to a local policy group in Dallas (ca. 4/15) equating the Palestinian demographic “problem” in Israel with illegal Mexican immigration to the U.S. Netanyahu made a similar tour of Britain beginning 5/6.

Sharon held (4/1) a conference call with 700 Jewish leaders from around the world to explain the reasons for launching Defensive Shield. Among the groups lending Sharon their full support are the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the Jewish Agency, the United Jewish Appeal, and the United Jewish Communities.

United States

The Bush administration continued to prefer outlining broad goals and approaches for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without charting practical steps and addressing specific hurdles. As in previous quarters, the U.S. disdained hands-on involvement in moving the peace process forward in favor of prodding Israel and the PA to find their own
compromises. The U.S. also continued to calibrate its policy according to foreign and domestic pressures, increasing criticism of Israel and giving more consideration to Palestinian demands when the international community grew too critical, moving the opposite direction when Congress and the American Jewish community declared the administration was going too far in support of Arafat. The administration was further marked by differences of opinion between the State Dept. (which sought more direct intervention) and the Pentagon (which sought either less involvement or direct support for Israel). Especially during Operation Defensive Shield, Bush was widely perceived as weak and indecisive.

Some analysts believed that Bush had agreed to the Powell mission as a way of giving the State Dept. a last chance to prove its case for increased intervention. The White House said (4/12, 4/16) that Powell had been given “maximum flexibility” to exercise his own judgment during his tour, suggesting that if he could not move the parties toward a cease-fire and renewal of negotiations, administration advocates of a hands-off policy would gain the upper hand in future policymaking. A GOP strategist suggested (4/16) that the flexibility story was a cover so that the White House, which was “exquisitely sensitive” to the effects of the mission among Jewish voters, could distance itself from Powell if necessary.

The administration’s main Middle East concern continued to be Iraq, meaning that the aim with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was to calm the situation so as to move on with plans to unseat Saddam Hussein. Cheney’s international tour (3/11–20) to rally support for a strike on Iraq included Britain, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Israel, and Turkey, where he also met with Iraqi opposition leaders. Arab and Turkish leaders were unanimous in arguing against a strike on Iraq, urging the U.S. to intervene quickly to restrain Israel. U.S. Dep. Defense Secy. Paul Wolfowitz dismissed (3/12) the unified Arab/Turkish message, asserting that “in the Middle East...people say one thing in public and another to you in private.” The White House denounced (4/9) the Arab press for its “virulent anti-Jewish propaganda,” complaining that its portrayal of Israeli incursions as a “holocaust” and of Sharon as a mass murderer was encouraging Palestinian suicide bombings, undermining Powell’s visit to the region, and hampering U.S. efforts to turn Arab sentiment against Iraqi pres. Hussein.

In an off-camera briefing, White House press secy. Ari Fleischer blamed (2/28) former President Bill Clinton for the current wave of Israeli-Palestinian violence, stating, “As a result of an attempt to push the parties beyond where they were willing to go, [you can make the case] that it led to expectations that were raised to such a high level that it turned to violence.” When criticized by Democratic officials, Fleischer initially refused to retract his statement, but after a phone call from Rice, he issued (2/28) a letter stating that his comments did not reflect the position of the Bush admin., “No United States president, including President Clinton, is to blame for violence in the Middle East. The only people to blame for violence are the terrorists who engage in it.”

Soon after Operation Defensive Shield began, Israel started releasing (e.g., 4/2, 4/4, 4/6, 4/11) copies of documents it claimed to have confiscated in raids of PA offices “proving” that the PA, Arafat, Fatah tanzim leader Barghouti, and various PA officials directly approved and funded terrorist attacks. The PA claimed the documents were forgeries and/or taken out of context. (For example, Israel argued that personnel records showing salary payments to PSF officers who had been arrested by Israel for staging attacks constituted proof that the PA was funding terror.) When Sharon visited Washington on 5/5, he gave the U.S. a 100-page report on the documents along with copies. The U.S. said (4/3, 5/6) it would examine Israel’s claims. When the U.S. renewed (4/16) the PLO Commitments Compliance Act for another six months (see Doc. C6), it stated it had made “no specific determination of whether PLO compliance has, or has not, occurred during the period. . . . To make such an explicit determination at this time would not serve the national security interests of the United States.” Israel also claimed (5/6) that documents seized from mosques during Defensive Shield proved Saudi Arabia financed Palestinian “terrorism” by funneling money to suicide bombers’ families and Hamas. The U.S. said (5/6) that it received credible assurances from Saudi Arabia that this was not true.

On 3/14, the U.S. announced that it had rejected Israel’s request to “repackage” $800 m. initially pledged by the Clinton administration to the Barak administration to cover...
the cost of the IDF’s withdrawal from s. Lebanon as supplemental aid to help cover the costs of current Israeli military deployments. The House Appropriations Authority, however, approved $200 m. in supplemental economic aid for Israel and $50 m. for the Palestinians as part of a $30 b. supplemental appropriation bill to fund counterterrorism efforts in the wake of 9/11.

More than 230 members of Congress wrote (3/14) to Bush, requesting that he add the AMB, Force 17, and the tanzim to the State Dept. list of terrorist organizations. Sen. Diane Feinstein (D-CA), Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA), and Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) also called (ca. 4/11) for declaring the PLO a terrorist group. The U.S. added the AMB on 3/27. Despite White House objections (e.g., 4/24, 4/26), the House (352-21) and Senate (94-2) passed (5/2) pro-Israel resolutions, endorsing Israeli incursions into PA areas and denouncing Arafat as a leader of a “terrorist organization” (see Doc. C4).

As many as 100,000 Americans (mostly Jews but also conservative Christians) attended a pro-Israel rally in Washington on 4/15 to urge the U.S. to support Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield. Organizers brought in 1,200 bus loads of demonstrators from around the country. Among those addressing the rally were Netanyahu and a “plethora of U.S. politicians,” including the House minority and majority leaders, Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-NY), former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani, Governor of New York George Pataki, and Dep. Secy. of Defense Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz was cheered for expressing “solidarity” with Israel on Bush’s behalf but was booed repeatedly for urging the crowd not to forget that “innocent Palestinians are suffering and dying in great numbers as well.” Many demonstrators, draped in Israeli flags and with faces painted blue and white, equated Arafat with Osama Bin Laden and Adolph Hitler, portrayed 9/11 as a “day in the life of Israel,” carried signs proclaiming “Kahane was Right,” and called for “Death to Arabs.” More than a dozen U.S. cabinet members, nearly 100 House reps., and 50 senators attended (4/22) the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) annual dinner (see the report on the AIPAC conference in this issue). Some 100,000 marchers also took part in a “Salute to Israel” parade in New York City on 5/5.

In an ABC-Washington Post poll of 1,207 adults conducted between 4/18 and 4/21, 68% of respondents believed that the U.S. should recognize an independent Palestinian state; 61% said Israel should have done more to control civilian casualties; 90% said Arafat had not done all he reasonably could to end “terrorist” attacks; 49% said they supported Israel; and 14% said they supported the Palestinians.

Also of note, the U.S. canceled (4/5) plans to hold joint military exercises with Israel beginning on 4/15. On 4/6, the PLO was evicted from its offices in Washington, reportedly for failure to pay rent. By 5/9, the UAE had lent the PLO office space. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an offshoot of AIPAC, announced on 3/7 that former U.S. special envoy Dennis Ross would become its new director in spring 2002.

On 3/10, the New York Times reported on a new classified Pentagon nuclear review that describes contingency plans for reconfiguring U.S. nuclear weapons to strike deep bunkers in China, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and Syria. The plans mark the first time the Pentagon has recommended that the U.S. prepare to execute first-strike nuclear attacks on non-nuclear powers.

**Russia**

This quarter, Russia participated in the peace process mainly through Quartet meetings (see above). Special envoy Andrei Vodovin spent long stretches in the region (ca. 2/17–20, ca. 3/16–25, ca. 4/15–20, 5/9–15), meeting with leaders in an effort to secure a cease-fire and revive peace talks.

**European Union**

The EU suffered some of the same difficulties and internal divisions as the U.S. in charting its policy on the peace process. Although more active and willing to engage than the U.S., the EU lacked a practical plan for securing a cease-fire and a just final status agreement. Without a viable and innovative strategy, the EU had no hope of assuming the U.S.’s role as central mediator.

On 2/18, EU FMs resumed talks on a 2/9 French peace initiative (see Quarterly Update in JPS 125) calling for Palestinian elections and the immediate creation of a Palestinian state with undefined borders to be quickly recognized by Israel and admitted to the UN, with final status talks on a state-to-state basis. Britain and Germany convinced the FMs to put the initiative on hold pending further discussions with Israel and the U.S., which
rejected the plan. The EU states agreed on the outcome of any process (i.e., creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel) but were at odds over implementation, some supporting Israel's position that security issues must be addressed before political discussions can begin and others supporting the PA's position that security and political issues must be dealt with simultaneously.

EU FM s convened (4/1) an emergency session to discuss Israel's escalating Operation Defensive Shield. FMs offered to take over mediation of the peace process from the U.S., which they criticized as inactive, and agreed to send a high-level delegation to the region. On 4/4, Pique and Solana arrived in Israel for a mediating mission but cut short their trip and returned to Europe hours later, canceling a planned meeting with Sharon when he denied them permission to meet with Arafat in Ramallah.

On 4/10, the EU parliament approved (296-208, with 22 abstentions) a nonbinding resolution calling on EU states to suspend trade and political ties with Israel to protest its continued military actions. On 4/16, the EU FMs ignored the resolution, ruling sanctions against Israel as "inappropriate" at the present time and agreeing not to take any actions that could undermine Powell's ongoing mission. Individually, Britain, Germany, Spain, and Sweden each discussed imposing sanctions on Israel. Spain and Sweden did not take decisions; Britain cut (4/17) arms sales; and Germany suspended (4/9), but did not cancel, arms sales. In 2000, Germany sold Israel $170 m. of military equipment, including tank engines and spare parts, APCs, and sniper rifles. Britain previously supplied spare parts.

The EU also adopted (3/16) a statement (see Doc. A3) calling for a "viable and independent" Palestine living in peaceful coexistence with an Israeli state, supporting the Saudi initiative, strongly condemning Israel's excessive use of force during Operation Colorful Journey, and stating that the PA "bears the full responsibility for fighting terrorism with all legitimate means at its disposal." Britain and Germany blocked inclusion of a demand that Israel abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention.

**UNITED NATIONS**

At a UNSC emergency session in New York on 2/21, Secy.-Gen. Annan warned that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was "sliding toward a full-fledged war," that the Mitchell and Tenet plans had not succeeded, and that an active international effort and "new thinking" were necessary to revive the peace process. The Israeli and U.S. reps. said (2/21) that they would strongly reject any mediation other than by the U.S. Similarly, during a UNSC debate (2/26-27) on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the U.S. argued against the UN taking any action and pledged to send special envoy Zinni back to the region "as soon as possible."

As Israel escalated Operation Colorful Journey, the UNSC convened (3/12) another emergency session during which Annan told Israel, "You must end the illegal occupation... You must stop the bombing of civilian areas, the assassinations, the unnecessary use of lethal force, the demolition and daily humiliation of ordinary Palestinians." He also called suicide bombings "morally repugnant," saying the Palestinians had "played their full part in the escalating cycle of violence." Britain and the U.S. blocked the UNSC from issuing a statement endorsing Annan's speech on the grounds that Israel's initial invasion of the Palestinian territory in 1967 was not necessarily illegal (Gaza and the West Bank not having been the sovereign territories of Egypt and Jordan). Loath to veto a UN measure on the eve of Cheney's tour of the Middle East, the U.S. submitted its own res., which was passed (14-0, with Syria abstaining) and which for the first time explicitly calls for the creation of "two states, Israel and Palestine," living side by side in secure and recognized borders (see Doc. A1). It also calls on both sides to ensure the safety of civilians and to implement the Tenet and Mitchell recommendations. It refers to UN Res. 242 and 338 but does not cite them as the basis for the peace process. Israel called (3/12) the res. "balanced."

On 3/30, the UNSC passed (14-0, with Syria abstaining) Res. 1402, demanding that Israel withdraw from Ramallah but (at U.S. insistence) not giving a deadline. On 4/7, the UNSC unanimously passed Res. 1403, repeating demands that Israel withdraw immediately from Palestinian areas. The UNSC also held closed-door meetings (4/2, 4/8) with the Israeli and Palestinian ambassadors to the UN. The Israeli ambassador was asked for explanations for Israel's refusal to implement UNSC Res. 1402 and 1403, as well as for its treatment of Palestinian civilians and confinement of Arafat. The Palestinian ambassador...
was asked why the PA had not implemented a cease-fire.

As mentioned above, the UNSC approved (4/19) a U.S. draft res. authorizing Annan to send a team to Jenin to investigate Israeli actions there during Operation Defensive Shield (see Doc. A6). Israel, with U.S. acquiescence, refused to cooperate with the team and blocked its arrival, leading Annan to disband it on 5/1. On 5/7, the UN General Assembly passed (74-4, with 54 abstentions) a resolution condemning Operation Defensive Shield and asking Annan to produce a report on Israel’s assaults on Jenin and other Palestinian cities. The U.S., Israel, Marshall Islands, and Micronesia voted against it. The EU states unanimously abstained after receiving word of the Rishon Letzion bombing. The overwhelming majority of UN General Assembly (UNGA) members expressed support for the report on Jenin when the UNGA invoked a rare procedural maneuver that provided for a separate vote on each paragraph of the res.

On 3/12, Annan privately sent Sharon a blunt letter, accusing Israel of waging “all-out conventional war” on Palestinian civilians and noting “disturbing patterns” in the IDF’s treatment of civilians, including aid workers. When Israel did not acknowledge the letter, Annan made it public on 3/18 (see Doc. A2). Israel denounced (3/19) Annan’s action, stating that exerting “pressure on those combating terror rather than on the terrorists and those states supporting them is at the least counterproductive.”

Annan also called (4/12, 4/18) on the UNSC to issue a res. calling on the international community to deploy a substantial peacekeeping force in the territories (see Doc. A5). He said (4/18) that he expected the U.S. to play a key role in forming an international force and giving it a stiff mandate, adding that sending a handful of American observers would be inadequate. The U.S. said (4/18) that Israel and the PA would have to approve of the idea. Israel immediately (4/18) rejected it, saying a peacekeeping force would “serve no useful role.”

The UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) adopted (40-5, with 7 abstentions) a res. condemning Israel’s “mass killings” and endorsing the Palestinians’ “legitimate right to resist.” The EU was divided, with Britain and Germany strongly opposing; Austria, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden approving; and Italy abstaining. The UNHRC agreed (4/5) to send a team to the occupied territories to assess the human rights situation but canceled (4/19) the mission after being told by Peres that Israel would not cooperate. On 3/28, UNHRC special rapporteur John Dugard stated that Israel was subjecting some 1,000 Palestinian children detained since 9/00 to inhumane treatment that may amount to torture. He estimated that 90% of the children were held on suspicion of throwing stones.

UNRWA discussed (3/21) asking Israel for compensation to cover the $3.8 m. in immediate repairs to shelters and infrastructures in the refugee camps caused by Operation Colorful Journey.

Under pressure from the U.S., Italy and Spain withdrew (3/14) their candidates for open seats on the UNHRC, allowing the U.S. candidate to run uncontested in the 4/29 elections. The U.S. had lost its seat on the UNHRC in 5/01, when other nations voted for other candidates to protest Bush administration policies on the environment and missile defense and the U.S. nonpayment of UN dues (see Peace Monitor in JPS 120).

The UN inaugurated (4/11) the new International Criminal Court, with 66 countries signing the ratifying treaty (see Peace Monitor in JPS 121). Lebanese pres. Lahoud and several EU reps. said (4/11) that the current Israeli leadership should be among the first to be brought before the court on war crimes charges. The U.S., which had considered revoking its pledge to sign unless the treaty included provisions automatically exempting American soldiers from prosecution, signed with “serious reservations.” On 5/6, the Bush administration withdrew its signature, declaring itself free of any obligation to comply with the treaty and vowing to seek bilateral accords barring U.S. citizens from being extradited to the court.

**Vatican**

At the start of Operation Colorful Journey, Pope John Paul II appealed (3/3) to Israelis and Palestinians to “silence the guns and listen to the voice of reason.” He issued a similar statement at Easter services on 3/31, at the start of Operation Defensive Shield. On 4/3, the Vatican summoned the ambassadors of the Arab League, Israel, and the U.S. to relay the pope’s denunciation of the “unjust conditions and humiliations imposed on the Palestinian people, as well as reprisals and revenge attacks, which do nothing but feed the sense of frustration and hatred.” The Vatican also condemned (4/3) Israeli incursions
into Palestinian cities, especially Bethlehem. On 4/9 and 4/21, the pope criticized Israel and the Palestinians for the siege of the Church of the Nativity and called on both sides to respect the holy sites. The Vatican dispatched special envoy Cardinal Roger Echegaray to Bethlehem on 4/30 to help broker the deal that ended the church stand-off on 5/10.

**Iran**

Outrage at Israeli military campaigns sparked demonstrations in Iran as elsewhere. Iranian conservative and reformist political groups organized rallies and petitions but reportedly would not attend each other’s events. Reformists for the first time in over a decade put Arafat’s picture on the cover of their newspapers, supporting him during the siege of Ramallah and advocating his stands, whereas previously they did not dare do so because of hard-line conservative support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Meanwhile, conservative criticism of Arafat reportedly grew stronger, blaming him for the Palestinians’ predicament and accusing him of acting as Israel’s security stooge.

Iranian cabinet ministers donated (4/7) 15 days of their salaries to fund Palestinian relief efforts. The money will be sent via the ICRC.

Efforts to link Iran to “terrorism” continued (see Quarterly Update in JPS 123). The *New York Times* reported (3/24) that U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials had concluded that Arafat has “forsworn a new alliance with Iran” that includes Iranian shipments of heavy weapons and millions of dollars to aid the fight against Israel. The Israeli intelligence officials claim that the deal was struck in meetings between senior Arafat aides (Fuad Shubaki, Fathi Razim) and Iranian officials during Arafat’s visit to Moscow in late 5/01 for consultations with Russian pres. Vladimir Putin. U.S. and Israeli officials reportedly believe that Arafat personally sanctioned the alliance and claim that meetings between the Palestinians and Iranians were held in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Israeli intelligence sources also claim that Iran is funding Hamas and Islamic Jihad and has allowed al-Qaeda members, including senior officials, to escape Afghanistan through Iran and use Iran as a “staging area.” The PA and Iran denied (3/24) the reports.

**Turkey**

Turkish reactions to Operations Colorful Journey and Defensive Shield highlighted the schizophrenic nature of the country’s policy toward Israel. As in other states, Israel’s assaults sparked numerous public protests, though demonstrations in Turkey were smaller (usually in the 100s rather than 1,000s). Yet on 3/29, the day Israel attacked Arafat’s Ramallah compound, Turkey quietly signed a $668 m. contract for Israel to modernize Turkish tanks. Once news of the deal was revealed, many Turks and Turkish parties called for the agreement to be annulled in light of Israeli actions. The Turkish military seemed almost surprised at the criticism, and the government argued (4/5) the accord should stand, since Turkish-Israeli relations must be considered separately from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and since Turkey’s relations with Israel were not directed at any third party. The tank agreement stood, and criticism seemed to wane.

On 4/4, Turkish PM Bulent Ecevit denounced Israel for committing “genocide” against the Palestinians and the U.S. for its inactivity. Within 48 hours, Ecevit received a stern call from Cheney and letters from nine Jewish organizations (including the ADL and B’nai Brith) condemning his statement as “absolutely wrong as fact and offensive.” Ecevit downplayed (4/5) his comments, saying he only meant to reflect the concerns of the region, and publicly and privately assured Israel and the U.S. that Turkey’s policy toward Israel remained unchanged. The Turkish FM issued (4/5) a “correction,” saying that the PM’s use of the term “genocide” was “interpreted in some circles in a manner that exceeded what has intended.” After two weeks of continued criticism, Ecevit announced (4/15) that he was launching a campaign to assure Israel of Turkey’s continued cooperation, stating, “Apparent...” a single word that I have used... has led to consternation among our Jewish American and Israeli friends.” Also on 4/4, 25 Turkish NGOs issued a statement condemning Israeli actions; Israel called (4/4) the groups misguided and biased.

Israel and Turkey mutually agreed (4/3) to cancel plans to hold joint military maneuvers with the U.S. scheduled for 4/22/5/6. The maneuvers were to be the first of three stages. The countries still plan to hold the other two stages, set for 6/3–16 and 10/14–25.

The U.S. agreed (4/3) to expand the qualified industrial zone (QIZ) program, currently restricted to Israel and Jordan, to Turkey, pending Israel’s approval. The U.S. created
the program in the mid-1990s to strengthen ties between Israel and Jordan and to create jobs for Jordanians by offering goods produced by Israeli-Jordanian joint ventures operating from specific “zones” in Jordan duty-free import status to the U.S. New QIZs in Turkey are expected to strengthen Israeli-Turkish ties and create jobs for Turks. By 4/25, Israel has approved the deal and opened talks with Turkey regarding where zones would be located and what the joint ventures might produce.

**OTHER**


**DONORS**

On 3/18, the World Bank released a report based on a series of informal (donors only) meetings held between 11/01 and early 3/02. The aim of the report was to provide a comprehensive assessment of the damage Palestinians incurred during the al-Aqsa intifada through the end of 2001 and to chart a path forward that would provide logical short- and medium-term assistance to the Palestinians. (For damage assessments, see Overview of the Clashes above.) Donors studied the Palestinian economy sector-by-sector, imagining three scenarios for the near future: violence ends and talks resume, the status quo continues, the PA totally collapses. They concluded that under any scenario they would need to concentrate on seven areas: budget support, support for delivery of basic services (e.g., hospitals, food, fuel), private sector support (assist business to stimulate economic recovery), employment and welfare services, physical reconstruction (agriculture, infrastructure, urban damage, private housing), student scholarships, support for UNRWA. As of 3/18, donors estimated that covering these seven areas for FY 2002 would cost $1.1 b.–$1.7 b., depending on how the conflict developed.

As the situation deteriorated, donors met again on 3/22 and 4/10 to plan how they would respond to Palestinian needs once Operation Defensive Shield ended. They assigned a donor committee for each city to assess damage and identify needs. Assessments were made by using aerial photos and, in some cases, walking streets block by block. Preliminary assessments completed by 4/24 suggested the PA would need $1.7 b.–$1.8 b. for FY 2002, with donors already having pledged about $1 b. for the year.

The Ad Hoc Liaison Comm. (AHLC) held (4/24–25) an informal, donors-only pledging conference in Oslo. More than 50 countries participated (including the U.S., EU, Japan, Canada, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia), plus the World Bank, the IMF, and UN Special Coordinator’s Office. Donors were asked to give an additional $750 m. to cover the anticipated budget gap; they pledged $440 m. Some “Western aid donors” were reportedly very angry at having to rebuild donor-funded projects that Israel had “repeatedly destroyed” and questioned whether it was proper to spend 8–9 times the amount of money per capita on Palestinians compared to sub-Saharan Africans only to have the projects deliberately destroyed.

Donors presented (5/15) their final assessment of physical damage in the West Bank caused by Operation Defensive Shield. They estimated damages at $361 m., excluding lost income. By comparison, donors estimated that the physical damage from the first 15 months of the conflict amounted to $305 m., with income losses due to closures reaching $2.4 b. The hardest hit area was Nablus, which suffered $114 m. in damages, followed by Jenin ($83 m.) and Ramallah ($51 m.). Reconstruction of the Old City of Nablus was estimated at $42.5 m. The hardest hit sectors were private housing ($66 m.), roads ($64 m.), private sector buildings and equipment ($50), and ancient cultural sites ($48 m.), followed by water and electricity networks, schools, and clinics.