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The Peace Monitor is a quarterly summary of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting the peace process.

BILATERALS

PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI TRACK

This quarter marked the continued, steady escalation of Israeli-Palestinian hostilities begun at the close of last quarter. The dynamics of the situation changed after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. and Pres. George W. Bush’s consequent launch of a “war on terror,” which emboldened Israel to step up assaults on Palestinian targets and ultimately to reoccupy six major West Bank cities. Two dramatic assassinations—of the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the most senior Palestinian figure to be targeted by Israel since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada (8/27), and of Israel’s Tourism M Rehavam Zeevi by the PFLP, the first assassination of an Israeli official by a Palestinian (10/17)—further embittered the sides, escalating the war to a cease-fire and resume peace talks, no new initiatives were offered and no progress was made.

As the quarter opened, Israeli-Palestinian clashes entered their eleventh month, with tensions increasing following Israel’s revived policy of assassinating leading Palestinian activists, Palestinian suicide bombings in Jerusalem (8/9) and outside Haifa (8/12), Israel’s seizure of Orient House in East Jerusalem (8/9), and its first military incursion into a major Palestinian West Bank city (Jinín 8/13–14). As of 8/15, approximately 630 Palestinians (including 19 Israeli Arabs), 43 IDF soldiers and security personnel, 42 Jewish settlers, 61 Israeli civilians, and 6 foreign nationals had been killed. As many as 25,000 Palestinians and upward of 1,000 Israelis had been injured. Though promising (8/16) to ease the economic blockade on the West Bank and Gaza, Israel continued to respond to Palestinian demonstrations and violence (including “life-threatening” incidents of stone throwing) with live fire and rubber-coated steel bullets; Palestinian gunfire, mortar fire, and roadside bombs met with the shelling of Palestinian residential areas, bulldozing Palestinian land, and house demolitions (see Chronology for details). Closures, curfews, an increased number of military checkpoints, destruction and blockage of roadways, and so on continued across the territories. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) privately assessed (ca. 8/17) that the al-Aqsa intifada could continue for another five years.

Israeli PM Ariel Sharon (Likud) had authorized (8/12) FM Shimon Peres (Labor), at Peres’s urging, to hold security talks with PA officials, with the stipulation that he seek explicit permission to meet with PA head Yasir Arafat. Peres confirmed (8/19) that Israel and the PA were holding talks “on various levels” (though apparently none at a senior level) regarding a cease-fire. The U.S., Egypt, and the EU were pressing Israel to agree to an Arafat-Peres meeting on implementing the Tenet cease-fire plan (see Peace Monitor in JPS 121), which they hoped would lead to implementing the Mitchell Comm. recommendations (see Peace Monitors in JPS 120, 121) for resuming peace talks. The U.S., however, seeing no hope for a quick resolution to the ongoing conflict following Scey’s state Colín Powell’s failed mission to the region (6/27–29), had backed away from mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, stating that the Tenet and Mitchell plans offered the path to peace but that only the sides themselves could make the decision to move forward. The EU and Arab states, notably Egypt (see Peace Monitor in JPS 121), were urging U.S. Pres. Bush to become more involved in halting the violence, specifically by offering a new initiative in his speech to the opening of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) session set for 9/24.

The U.S. and EU were in agreement on the need to demonstrate some progress in halting Israeli-Palestinian violence before the UN’s high-profile World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), scheduled to begin 8/31, during which the Arab states intended to raise Israel’s settlement policy and treatment

of the Palestinians (see below). German FM Joschka Fisher, in consultation with the U.S., visited the region and discussed with Peres (8/20) and Arafat (8/21) the possibility of a phased cease-fire that would begin in the hot spots of Bethlehem—Bayt Jala and Rafah, extend “gradually” to other areas, and “eventually” be followed by implementation of the Mitchell recommendations. Fischer invited Arafat and Peres to meet in Berlin to discuss the proposal further. Although Arafat and Peres were receptive, the Israeli government objected to Berlin as the venue on the grounds that it would give the PA leader undue prestige.

Hopes for the meeting faded quickly with an escalation in Israeli-Palestinian violence: the discovery and defusion of a large bomb in West Jerusalem (8/21); a serious exchange of gunfire near Netzarim settlement in Gaza, during which IDF undercover units fired on Palestinian Red Crescent Society medics attempting to reach the injured; Israel’s attempted assassinations of Izzeddin al-Qassam Brigades leader Muhammad Dayif (8/22) and senior Fatah member Jihad Mussaaimi (8/23); and Palestinian sniper fire on the Jewish enclave in Hebron (8/23), followed by the IDF’s three-hour incursion into the PA-controlled sector of Hebron, which left two Palestinians dead, ten injured, and two homes demolished. In response to the assassination attempts, some 20,000 Palestinians rallied in Nablus (8/24) for increased attacks on Israel. Although Arafat and Peres continued to express (8/24) interest in meeting, and whereas the U.S. had criticized the IDF’s 8/13-14 Jinin incursion, Pres. Bush suggested (8/24) that the 8/21-24 events showed that the PA was not serious about talks, saying, “If they are that interested in peaceful dialogue, they ought to do everything they can to stop the terrorist activity that has accelerated in recent months.” Egyptian pres. Husni Mubarak denounced (8/26) the “complete and utter American bias in Israel’s favor,” reiterating that Arafat would not be able to halt violence without U.S. pressure on Israel and that Israeli-Palestinian clashes would increasingly pose a threat to the region if the U.S. does not take action.

**The Abu Ali Mustafa Assassination**

The Israeli-Palestinian situation deteriorated markedly on 8/25, when two members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) staged an unprecedented raid on an IDF post in Gaza, killing three IDF soldiers and wounding seven before being fatally shot. The same day, the al-Aqṣa Martyrs Brigade (AMB), an offshoot of Arafat’s Fatah organization, took responsibility for an ambush of a Jewish settler vehicle near Givat Ze’ev in the West Bank that left three settlers dead and five wounded. In response, on 8/26 the IDF dispatched U.S.-supplied F-15s and F-16s to bomb the PA Military Intelligence headquarters outside Gaza City and the PA Preventive Security Force (PSF) headquarters in Salfit, shelled and destroyed the PSF headquarters and two PSF posts in Gaza City, and sent helicopters to hover over Arafat’s Gaza compound. That evening, Sharon met with Peres and DM Benjamin Ben-Eliezer—his “kitchenette”—who agreed to step up retaliatory attacks on PA targets and to shorten the time between incidents and retaliation, even if this meant striking occupied buildings.

The kitchenette also ordered the IDF to assassinate PFLP leader Abu Ali Mustafa (Mustafa Zibri). The IDF did so the next day, 8/27, firing missiles at his office. In response, 1,000s of Palestinians took to the streets in Bethlehem, Gaza City, Jinin, Nablus, and Tulkarm, and Palestinian gunmen stepped up firing on Gilo settlement and on IDF posts outside Rafah. Israel then sent tanks and bulldozers into PA-controlled Bayt Jala and Rafah. The U.S. criticized Israel (8/27) for “inflaming an already volatile situation and making it much harder to restore calm.” Israeli MK Ephraim Sneh also complained (8/28) that the inner cabinet should have been consulted on Mustafa, since he was a senior political figure and his killing marked a decisive escalation, and that Sharon was therefore in violation of the 5/20 full cabinet decision limiting the kitchenette’s ability to order operations unilaterally (see Peace Monitor in JPS 121). Justice M Meir Shitreet stated (8/28) that the kitchenette was justified since Mustafa was a “common terrorist.”

While the Rafah incursion lasted only hours, the IDF reinforced troops in Bayt Jala on 8/28, saying it would remain in the town indefinitely, marking Israel’s first reoccupation of West Bank area A. Among the buildings taken over by the IDF were five Palestinian homes and the Evangelical Lutheran Church of America’s orphanage, where the IDF turned the upper floors into a firing base for heavy machine guns. Residents of the occupied homes and the orphanage were barred from leaving the buildings and confined to a single room. The Lutheran bishop accused (8/28) the IDF of
using the 45 children in the orphanage as human shields. Meanwhile, 10,000s of Palestinians attended Mustafa’s funeral in Ramallah, and Palestinian demonstrations against his assassination spread to refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

The Bayt Jala operation was similar to the IDF reoccupation of the Bayt Hanun border area in Gaza on 4/17–18, which ended when Bush and Powell intervened directly with Sharon, stating that the U.S. could not allow a precedent to be set for the reoccupation of areas ceded under the Oslo agreements (see Peace Monitor in JPS 120). This time, however, the only public U.S. statement was made by State Dept. spokesman Richard Boucher, who warned (8/28) Israel that it was inflaming the conflict. Behind the scenes, Powell phoned (8/29) Sharon and Peres to urge them to withdraw, warning that the U.S. and Israel would be in a difficult position at the upcoming WCAR and at the opening of the UNGA session if the IDF continued to reoccupy the town. EU foreign policy dir. Javier Solana shuttled (8/29) between Arafat and Peres, suggesting a limited cease-fire in the Bethlehem–Bayt Jala area that would incorporate an IDF withdrawal. Meanwhile, the PSF set up new roadblocks around Bayt Jala to deter Palestinian gunmen from entering. Late on 8/29, Sharon and his cabinet accepted the Solana proposal. After a five-hour cease-fire, the IDF began redeploying to the perimeter of Bayt Jala, completing the pullout on 8/30.

From 8/30 to 9/9, Israeli-Palestinian clashes continued at a high level, bringing the toll since 9/28/00 to 677 Arabs and 162 Jews (see Chronology for details): Israeli assassinated senior PA intelligence official Taysir Khattab (9/1) and made attempts on the DFLP’s Qays Samurai (8/30), Hamas leader Anwar Aliya (8/30), AMB member Ra’id Karmi (9/6), and Fatah’s Muhammad Mansur (9/8); two other Palestinians may also have been assassinated (9/1, 9/8). The PFLP placed four package bombs in West Jerusalem, Gilo, and French Hill, lightly injuring five people. A Palestinian suicide bomber detonated a device in West Jerusalem on 9/4, injuring 15 Israelis; no group took responsibility, though the PFLP was suspected. The violence was overshadowed by the rancor at the WCAR in Durban, where the U.S. and Israel ultimately walked out in protest of the Arab positions on the Palestinian issue (see below).

Particularly in light of the negative WCAR outcome, the EU, Russia, and the U.S. continued to press Israel and the PA to build on the 8/29 Solana cease-fire arrangement by holding an Arafat-Peres meeting on a comprehensive cease-fire. Solana continued his shuttle mission between Arafat and Peres after 8/29, also consulting (9/4) with Pres. Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdallah of Jordan. On 9/5, Peres announced that he and Arafat planned to hold the first of three rounds of cease-fire talks the following week, but that the exact time and place had not yet been agreed. At the same time, the EU stepped up pressure on the U.S. to become more involved in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, with French FM Hubert Vedrine publicly stating (8/29) that the U.S.’s “wait-and-see policy risks making them look like Pontius Pilate.” On 9/6, Bush convened his National Security Council to discuss having Powell give a high-profile speech on U.S. Middle East policy around the time of the UNGA session.

On 9/9, the Israeli-Palestinian situation took another serious downturn when an Israeli Arab suicide bomber—the first ever—detonated a device at a train station in Nahariya, Israel, killing 3 Israelis and injuring 63. Sharon accused (9/9) Arafat of instigating the attack to scuttle the meeting with Peres and claimed that the bomber had crossed into Jenin to get explosives from Hamas. He also accused the PA of having ignored Israeli requests to arrest the man when he entered Jenin, though without explaining why Israeli authorities did not arrest him themselves. Later on 9/9, Islamic Jihad members ambushed a Jewish settler minibus in the Jordan Valley, killing two settlers; another suicide bomber detonated a car bomb next to a bus in the Israeli town of Bayt Lid, injuring three. Sharon convened the inner cabinet, which voted to step up attacks on Palestinian targets. On 9/10, at least 60 IDF tanks surrounded Jenin and shelled residential areas, killing one Palestinian and wounding four. Before dawn on 9/11, the IDF cut electricity to Jenin and intensified shelling of the town and the adjacent Aida refugee camp, killing two. The Israeli-Palestinian situation was once again on the verge of spinning out of control.

The 11 September Attacks on the U.S.

Milday Jerusalem time on 9/11, 19 Arab hijackers commandeered four wide-body passenger jets departing east coast airports for California, crashing two into the World Trade Center in New York and one into the Pentagon, killing an estimated 3,000 persons. The fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania,
killing those aboard. In the immediate aftermath, as news of the incidents spread, Egypt, Israel (see Doc. C1), Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the PA (see Doc. B1), and Hamas condemned the attacks. Former Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu called for an “international front” to “destroy terrorist regimes, starting with the Palestinian Authority.” Some Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and Lebanon greeted the news with what the Israeli and U.S. media widely reported as “glee” and “bloodthirsty joy,” sparking worldwide condemnations. Later reports clarified that the Palestinian demonstrations were isolated and occurred only in the first two hours of reports of the attacks, before the magnitude of destruction was known, and that the Israeli Foreign Ministry had distributed the footage to the press. Though Palestinians held candlelight vigils for the 9/11 victims, Arafat led a blood drive, and scores of Palestinian groups and village councils in the territories and abroad sent letters of condolence, the first images of Palestinians celebrating gravely undermined U.S. public opinion of the Palestinians and of Arabs in general.

On 9/12, the U.S., which had already identified wealthy Saudi dissident Osama Bin Laden and his Afghanistan-based al-Qaeda organization to be behind the 9/11 attacks, began organizing an “international coalition against terrorism” and vowing military action against Afghanistan, with the State Dept. saying (9/12) that foreign nations had to choose: “You’re either with us or against us.” On 9/14, Asst. Secy. of State for Near East Affairs William Burns met with 15 Arab envoys, including the PLO representative, to tell them that they must either declare their nations members of the coalition “or risk being isolated.” Among the membership requirements, the U.S. demanded that each state arrest and prosecute “terrorists” on its soil.

The international community immediately rallied to support the U.S., though only Britain initially agreed to provide troops. (Later Australia, France, and Turkey sent token forces.) NATO (9/12) and the Organization of American States (9/19) invoked their mutual defense clauses but did not approve joint military action. The UNGA passed a resolution declaring solidarity with the U.S. (9/13) and the UN Security Council (UNSC) a resolution compelling all UN member states to sever financial, political, and military ties with “terrorist groups” (9/28). The Arab League (9/18), EU (9/21), Gulf Cooperation Council (9/23), and Organization of the Islamic Conference (10/10) held special sessions to condemn the attacks and express support for curbing terrorism. The Vatican also endorsed (9/24) the U.S. campaign (see below). By 9/27, Iran, Hizbullah, and all Arab nations except Iraq had denounced the attacks, and Arab states had pledged in vague terms to give whatever assistance they could to help the U.S. (The U.S. generally asked for overflight rights, intelligence cooperation, and assistance in identifying members of al-Qaeda.) While stressing the tragic and exceptional nature of the 9/11 attacks, Arab and Muslim states also urged (e.g., 9/18, 9/28, 10/9, 10/10) the U.S. to differentiate between “terrorists” and “national liberation movements,” to avoid acting disproportionately or taking the opportunity to achieve other “regional goals,” and to take action against Israel’s “dangerous state terrorism” as well.

An executive order issued on 9/24, freezing the assets of 27 individuals and organizations with reported links to Bin Laden, defined “terrorism” broadly as an activity that involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure, and appears intended: (a) to intimidate or coerce a civil population; (b) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (c) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking.” Testifying (10/25) before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Powell acknowledged there are “gray areas” in the definition of “terrorism” where “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter, and that’s where you have to apply judgment.” As a guideline, he recommended asking whether questionable groups have a better way than violence to “express grievances,” “change the political problem,” and “gain their rights.” On 11/2, however, the U.S. added all groups on the State Dept. terrorism list to the order, including Hamas, Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP.

By 9/19, divisions among senior administration officials had developed over the scope and timing of the U.S. military response. One group, reportedly led by Dep. Secy. of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the chief of staff to VP Dick Cheney, I. Lewis Libby, was pressing for a quick, broad military campaign targeting not only Bin Laden but also sites in Lebanon’s Bïqa’ Valley and Iraq, including removing Iraqi pres. Saddam Hussein, regardless of whether there was evidence linking him to the 9/11 incidents.
Other officials, led by Powell, argued the need to focus on the 9/11 perpetrators and to take the time to collect evidence to justify any action under international law and to build diplomatic support for military action.

Among the steps taken to facilitate coalition building, the U.S. declared (9/26) support for Russia’s effort to bring “terrorists in Chechnya” to justice; promised (10/17) India that it would not ignore Pakistan’s support of Kashmiri separatists, stating that “terrorism in India, like that inside Israel, is a U.S. concern that will ultimately be addressed”; and informed Turkey (ca. 9/23) that the Cyprus issue was “no longer on our agenda,” at least for the time being. Meanwhile, Congress approved (9/24) payment of $582 m. in arrears to the UN, without restrictions (see Peace Monitor in JPS 121).

On 9/28, the U.S. acknowledged that U.S. and British commandos were already on the ground in Afghanistan. By 10/1, a full-scale deployment was underway, though Powell in his NATO briefing (10/2) had conceded that evidence supporting Bin Laden’s involvement in the 9/11 attacks did not constitute “evidence in the form of a court case.” The first week of 10/01, Defense Secy. Donald Rumsfeld toured the Middle East to meet with Arab leaders regarding U.S. efforts to build an international coalition; he did not stop in Israel. Upon his return on 10/7, the U.S. launched air strikes on Afghanistan, targeting al-Qa’ida and the ruling Taliban. The ground assault began on 10/18. At the start of the offensive, Bin Laden issued a statement (10/7; see Doc. A4) vowing that “America . . . shall not dream of security until security is a daily fact of life in Palestine” and “until all infidel armies depart from the land of Muhammad.” PA Information M Yasir ‘Abid Rabbuh quickly dismissed (10/7) the statement saying, “Any crazy person can claim he is for the rights of the Palestinian people. Let him say what he wants, but this is not the way to solve our problems.”

The Impact on the al-Aqsa Intifada

Meanwhile, Israel rushed to equate the 9/11 attacks with Palestinian violence and Arafat with Bin Laden so as to justify harsher military action against the PA and the Palestinians. Israeli analysts quickly concluded (9/12), “From the perspective of the Jews, this attack on the U.S.I is the most important public relations act ever committed in our favor” (New York Times, 9/13), providing “a window of opportunity that the Israeli army will use to push Arafat into a corner” (Washington Post, 9/13). Indeed, Israel expanded (9/12–13) its assault on Jinin and surrounding villages before withdrawing to points just outside Jinin’s area A on 9/13. Some 22 tanks entered the city and shelled targets while F-15s and F-16s dropped bombs, killing 11 Palestinians, wounding more than 70, and leveling the PSF headquarters and two Force 17 offices in Jinin as well as two PSF offices in Arraba and Tamun. Sharon spokesman Ranaan Gissin stated (9/12) that the operation “has to do with terrorist suicide bombers similar to those that attacked the World Trade Center,” stressing (9/13) that Arafat “is like Bin Laden; Bin Laden also has a coalition of terror.” Arafat, fearing a massive Israeli assault, began (9/14) making increasingly strong statements calling on Palestinians to adhere to a cease-fire. In Gaza on 9/14, undercover PSF officers infiltrated a protest by 100s of Palestinians denouncing U.S. threats to attack Afghanistan and confiscated reporters’ film.

The U.S., for its part, was eager for Israel to resume talks with the PA and for the sides to implement a cease-fire, which would facilitate U.S. coalition building for the war on Afghanistan. DM Ben-Eliezer argued (9/14) to the contrary that Arafat was on the defensive in the wake of 9/11 and should be pressed further, noting that since 9/11 “we have killed 14 Palestinians in [the Jinin area], with the world remaining absolutely silent. It’s a disaster for Arafat.” On 9/14, Sharon rejected personal appeals by Bush and Powell to resume talks with the PA, instead canceling tentative plans to hold the Arafat-Peres meeting on 9/16, saying it would be “inappropriate” in light of the 9/11 attacks. Sharon also said (9/14) that Israel would oppose the U.S. bringing the PA or Syria into the coalition. Peres and Powell countered (9/16) that Arafat’s weakened position made it a better time for Israel to resume talks. Arafat said (9/16) that he was willing to hold talks with Israel “any time, any place,” and reiterated calls on Palestinians to observe a cease-fire.

Under reportedly extreme U.S. pressure, Sharon said (9/16) he would allow a Peres-Arafat meeting to discuss a cease-fire, but only after 48 hours without a Palestinian attack. The U.S. then pressed (9/18) Israel to suspend assassinations, to halt incursions into areas A, and to pull its tanks and troops away from areas A (especially from Jinin, which Israel had surrounded since 9/13); and Arafat to order the PSF to use “maximum

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self-restraint”—holding their fire even if attacked—and to threaten opposition groups with harsh reprisals if they staged attacks inside Israel. Arafat also barred (9/20) the Palestinian press from reporting on Palestinian casualties in order to keep violence down and specifically ordered (9/21) Fatah members not to use their weapons. Hamas and Islamic Jihad stated (9/19) that they would halt operations in Israel if Israeli suspended assassinations, but that they would not cease attacks on Israeli forces (including settlers) inside the West Bank and Gaza. Leaders of the tanzim and the AMB issued similar statements on 9/24. Nonetheless, clashes tapered off dramatically as of 9/18, though sporadic violence continued.

Although Powell phoned Sharon, sometimes twice a day, and although Sharon allowed Peres to meet (9/20) with PA Local Government M Saeb Erakat and PC speaker Ahmad Qurai to discuss a joint statement by Arafat and Peres, reaffirming their commitment to the Tenet and Mitchell plans, Sharon continued to block the Arafat-Peres meeting. On 9/23, the IDF declared it had seen the calmest day since the al-Aqsa intifada began, but Sharon again said the meeting could not take place because the PA had not provided 48 hours of “absolute quiet,” adding that Arafat was a terrorist on the level of Bin Laden. Peres threatened (9/23) to “disappear on vacation” if Sharon did not let the meeting go forward, while right-wing MKs warned (9/23) they would pull out of the governing coalition if he did. After Islamic Jihad gunmen fatally shot a Jewish settler in the Jordan Valley on 9/24, Peres agreed that a meeting with Arafat could not go forward.

The U.S. Forces a Meeting

On 9/25, Arafat was in Amman, en route to Damascus (for the first time in ten years) for much-anticipated talks with Pres. Bashar al-Asad, when he received word that Syria had requested, without explanation, that the visit be postponed. Asked for preliminary comments on the change, a U.S. official stated, “Arafat now has free time on his schedule. . . . It would be good if he filled it by meeting with Peres.” Within hours, Peres announced that he and Arafat would meet the following morning, with Sharon’s approval.

[Reports suggest that Bush phoned Sharon directly on 9/24 and expressed deep frustration at the repeated delays in holding the Arafat-Peres meeting and that Sharon reluctantly agreed to convene it. The U.S. then phoned a Gulf leader and asked him to intervene with the PA. Unable to reach Arafat, who was already in Amman, the Gulf leader relayed the U.S. message to Information M ‘Abid Rabhba who agreed to the meeting but said that the PA could not be the one to cancel the Syria visit. The Gulf leader phoned Asad and explained the situation. Asad agreed to postpone. The message was relayed to Arafat on the tarmac in Amman without explanation; he was not briefed on the situation until he returned to Gaza.]

Arafat and Peres met at Gaza airport on 9/26 and issued a joint statement outlining steps to cement a cease-fire, essentially restarting the Tenet work plan (see Peace Monitor in JPS 121) as a first step toward implementing the Mitchell recommendations. During the 48-hour preliminary stage, the sides agreed to implement initial cease-fire measures to curb violence. This would be followed by a second five-day stage during which Israel would pull back troops from Palestinian towns and cities, lift the economic blockade, and issue a limited number of permits for Palestinians to work inside Israel. The PA, for its part, would resume trilateral security comm. talks with Israeli and CIA officials, cooperate on tracking and interdicting Palestinians planning attacks, and halt incitement against Israel on Palestinian-run TV and radio stations. A comm. led by Peres and Qurai would oversee implementation, and Peres and Arafat agreed to meet in a week’s time to assess progress. Israel also demanded that the PA immediately arrest 108 wanted Palestinians. PSF Gaza head Muhammad Dahlan said (9/27) the PSF would not conduct preventive arrests of suspected Palestinian militants without solid evidence they are plotting an attack.

While the meeting was taking place, a large bomb exploded at an IDF post on the Gaza-Egypt border, lightly injuring three soldiers. Despite the cease-fire arrangements agreed during the day, Israeli sent tanks and bulldozers into Rafah in an overnight operation in which soldiers shelled residential areas and demolished 14 Palestinian homes, killing three Palestinians and wounding 31. The U.S. criticized (9/27) the action.

From 9/27 to 10/3, Israel and the PA, obviously under continued pressure from the U.S., went through the motions of working through the initial cease-fire steps. They convened the trilateral security comm. (9/28), held senior-level talks on security coordination (9/30, 10/1), and convened a meeting...
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between Peres, Erekat, and Qurai’ to assess progress (9/30). Arafat again called on Palestinians (9/29) to adhere to the cease-fire. Israeli DM Ben-Elizer authorized (10/1) the IDF to remove roadblocks around Jericho, reopen the Rafah crossing into Egypt, ease Palestinians’ passage through checkpoints, and redeploy tanks from areas where quiet prevailed. Each side, however, repeatedly complained that the other was not making a serious effort. Clashes, if anything, grew worse. On 9/28 and 9/29, 10,000s of Palestinians across the West Bank and Gaza held demonstrations marking the first anniversary of the al-Aqsa intifada and were met with a harsh IDF response (see Chronology for details). (1,000s of Israeli Arabs held similar demonstrations in Arraba, Haifa, Jit, Kafr Manda, Kafr Qana, Nazareth, Sakhnin, and Umm al-Fahm. Rallies in Nazareth and Umm al-Fahm turned violent, with demonstrators clashing with police and vandalizing stores, but no injuries were reported.) On 9/29, after meeting with his inner cabinet, Sharon warned the PA that Israel would resume “initiated actions” in 48 hours in the absence of complete quiet.

On 10/2, two Hamas members raided Aley Sinai settlement in Gaza, tossing grenades into buildings and shooting at IDF soldiers and residents, killing two settlers and wounding seven soldiers and eight settlers. Sharon convened the inner cabinet, which on 10/3 decided to resume initiated actions against Palestinians, suspend security coordination with the PA, and cancel all meetings with PA officials. The U.S. said (10/3) that to maintain calm and restore trust the PA must take “preventive action” to preclude attacks, but also said that Israel must not make incursions into areas A or continue house demolitions. During the day, the IDF sent tanks and bulldozers to carve out a one-mile buffer zone around Aley Sinai, flattening 100 dunams of Palestinian agricultural land, demolishing seven PSF posts, and shelling a PSF jeep, killing four PSF officers and two Palestinian farmers. In the span of the initial cease-fire (9/26–10/3), 28 Palestinians and two Jewish settlers were killed, bringing the comprehensive death toll to 740 Arabs and 171 Jews (for statistics on the first year of the intifada, see Doc. A7).

Bush Endorses a Palestinian State

Perhaps in the hope of invigorating the cease-fire, or as a PR move to help Rumsfeld bolster the U.S. coalition on his Middle East tour (see above), Pres. Bush declared (10/2) that the creation of a Palestinian state “has always been a part of our vision, so long as the right of Israel to exist is respected.” Although this marked the first explicit support for statehood by a Republican administration, the State Dept. said (10/2) it did not mark a change in either U.S. or administration policy: the same day (10/2), press reports cited unnamed U.S. officials as stating that before 9/11, the U.S. was preparing to have Powell unveil a major new Middle East initiative at the opening of the UNGA session (see above). That initiative, in addition to endorsing the creation of a Palestinian state, would have offered proposals for a comprehensive peace agreement (including ideas on refugees, borders, and possibly Jerusalem) and for a U.S. role in implementation, but would have “stopped well short of” Clinton’s 12/00 proposals (see Peace Monitor in JPS 119).

While Palestinians welcomed Bush’s declaration, Sharon was reportedly angered, not only by the statement but because Rumsfeld had not come to Israel during his regional consultations on the U.S. “campaign against terror.” (Some Israeli diplomats also suggested that the U.S. had failed to give Sharon “a pat on the shoulder” for “taking a step he did not want to make” by agreeing to the Arafat-Peres meeting.) On 10/4, Sharon warned the U.S., “Do not try to appease the Arabs at our expense”—equating such action with former British PM Neville Chamberlain’s decision to let Hitler seize Czechoslovakia in 1938 in hopes of avoiding World War II (see Doc. C2). That day, after a Palestinian gunman opened fire in a bus station in Afula, Israeli, killing three, the Israeli cabinet authorized the IDF to “take all necessary measures” to defend Israeli citizens, and the IDF made a failed assassination attempt on senior Fatah member Rami Kamel. On 10/5, Israel initiated its largest military action since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada (in terms of area and the size of the force involved), sending IDF infantry, tanks, armored bulldozers, and helicopters into Hebron in a predawn operation to occupy 40 points in the PA-controlled sector (including 15 homes and a school) as IDF outposts, taking control of the entire neighborhoods of Abu Sunayna and Harat al-Shaykh, demolishing three homes, killing six Palestinians, and wounding at least 40. In wide-ranging operations in Gaza, the IDF demolished two Palestinian homes outside Netzarim settlement and eight in Bayt Hanun, occupied two homes in Kafr
Dik and al-Khadir as military posts, and bulldozed a PSF post in al-Sudaniyya.

The White House publicly rebuked (10/5) Sharon, saying his harsh statements on 10/4 were “unacceptable” and that it was time for Israel to resume peace talks, not to escalate violence. The White House also demanded that Israeli assassinations, incursions, and house demolitions cease. The same message was also delivered (10/5) by Powell in a phone call to Sharon, by U.S. Amb. to Israel Daniel Kurtzer in a meeting with Peres, and by the National Security Council. (Some U.S. officials said that the administration was “blindsided” by Sharon’s untimely criticism of the president, who had “gone out of his way in the first eight months of his administration to favor Israel.”) Sharon expressed (10/6) “sorrow” for the row with the U.S., saying he was “not understood correctly,” but neither offering clarification nor agreeing to resume talks with the PA.

Between 10/5 and 10/11, clashes continued at a relatively high level (see Chronology). The IDF continued to occupy the sector of Hebron under PA control, demolished one home (10/8), expelled nine bedouin families from an area of Gaza (10/10), and may have assassinated a senior Hamas member found dead on 10/11, but no further incursions were reported. Meanwhile, the PA made efforts to comply with U.S. demands (10/3) that it take “preventive action” to preclude attacks on Israeli targets. On 10/7, the PSF said it had detained six Palestinians on Israel’s wanted list, including a senior Hamas member and a senior Islamic Jihad member arrested on 10/6. The PA suspended the preventive arrests after serious clashes between Palestinian protesters and the PSF on 10/8 and 10/9, reportedly in exchange for Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s pledge to observe the cease-fire and to prevent demonstrations that could harm the Palestinians’ image (see below).

On 10/11, Bush reiterated his support for the creation of a Palestinian state through negotiations and praised Arafat for cracking down on “radical elements,” saying “the world ought to applaud” his efforts. Powell also praised (10/12) Arafat for making a “bold choice” in “demanding” that Hamas take part in the cease-fire. (Britain’s Blair echoed Bush’s support for a Palestinian state on 10/15). On 10/12, Peres met with PA officials, including Qura‘i, and announced that within the next two days, Israel would begin to lift closures and remove some restrictions on Palestinians entering Israel. Qura‘i said these would be the first in a series of steps over the next two weeks to alleviate Palestinian hardships. Explaining the surprise turn of events, Sharon spokesman Gissin said (10/12) that Israel had agreed to move forward with cease-fire implementation under pressure from the U.S., even though it did not believe the PA had fulfilled its pledges.

Between 10/12 and 10/16, clashes diminished markedly. The IDF eased closures in some Palestinian areas where there was no violence, agreed to open the main road in Khan Yunis (closed for months), reopened border crossings to Egypt and Jordan for several hours a day, reinstated VIP passage between the West Bank and Gaza for senior PA officials, issued 2,000 permits for Palestinians to work inside Israel, and eased restrictions on Palestinian fishermen. The IDF also withdrew from PA-controlled areas of Hebron (10/15), though troops vandalized several homes and cars before leaving. Jewish settlers attempted to storm the vacated areas, also vandalizing homes and shops, but were halted by the IDF, which arrested 21. (In protest over the withdrawal, the right-wing National Union–Yisrael BeItinua block, led by Tourism M Rehavam Ze’evi and Infrastructure M Avigdor Lieberman, resigned from the governing coalition, leaving Sharon with control of 76 of 120 Knesset seats.) Israel, however, also kept closures on most West Bank and Gaza population centers, tightened access to Jerusalem, conducted arrest raids, confiscated land, and routinely opened fire on Palestinians (see Chronology). Most notably, Israel assassinated two, possibly three, senior Hamas members (10/14, 10/15, 10/16), moves the U.S. denounced as “unhelpful.” Sharon adviser Zalman Shoval dismissed the criticism (10/15), saying Israel was only fighting “Palestinian terrorism” the same way the U.S. was waging war on Bin Laden.

The Ze’evi Assassination

On 10/17, at least one PFLP gunman assassinated Israeli tourism M Ze’evi in an East Jerusalem hotel, shooting him point blank outside his room with a pistol equipped with a silencer and escaping undetected. The PFLP, which the same day also staged a suicide car bombing in Gaza that injured two soldiers, said the murder was in retaliation for Israel’s assassination of PFLP Secy. Gen. Mustafa on 8/27. Arafat immediately (10/17) denounced Ze’evi’s murder, ordered the PSF to arrest the killers, and outlawed (10/21) the
armed wing of the PFLP. The PSF immediately (10/17) began arresting PFLP members, detaining 20 by 10/20 and 60 by 11/3. Powell phoned (10/17) Sharon to urge restraint, and the White House called (10/17) on the PA to take “vigorous action against terrorists.” The Israeli embassy in Washington asked rhetorically (10/17), “Are not both Syria and the PA, in giving safe haven and acquiescence to this terrorist group [the PFLP], acting in a similar way as the Taliban?”

After a lengthy meeting of the inner cabinet, Sharon issued (10/17) an ultimatum to the PA: arrest and extradite Ze’evi’s killers and the PFLP leadership and “dismantle terrorist organizations” or face a response more severe than any in recent memory. (Notably, the U.S. did not back Israel’s demand for extraditions.) He then addressed (10/17) the Knesset, vowing to “wage an all-out war on the terrorists, those who collaborate with them, and those who send them.” (MKs who had submitted their resignations on 10/15 rescinded them in light of Sharon’s toughened stance.) On 10/18, Sharon suspended all contacts with the PA, gave the IDF and Shin Bet the “green light” to step up assassinations, and told Arafat he had seven days to “impose absolute quiet in the territories. If not, we will go to war against him. As far as I’m concerned, the era of Arafat is over.” Some MKs also called (10/18) for Arafat’s expulsion from the West Bank and Gaza.

Within hours of the Ze’evi killing, the IDF deployed helicopter gunships over Palestinian cities and moved troops into the outer fringes of Jenin’s area A. On 10/18, Israeli forces reoccupied Jenin, Nablus, and Ramallah. Bethlehem and Bayt Jala were retaken on 10/19, and Qalqilya and Tulkarm on 10/20. The IDF stated on 10/20 that it had no plans to pull out of the cities; its deployment could last days, weeks, or longer. By 10/22, every major Palestinian population center was encircled by IDF troops. Israel also assassinated Hama’s Iyad al-Akhras (10/17) and Ayman Abu Halawih (10/22) and tanzim leader Atif Ubayyat (10/18). Instead of imposing calm, the Israeli incursions into PA-controlled areas sparked intense clashes (see Chronology), particularly in Bethlehem, where the IDF fatally shot (10/20) an altar boy outside the Church of the Nativity; two tank shells landed within 50 yards of the church on 10/21. Between 10/18 and 10/22, 29 Palestinians and one Jewish settler were killed, bringing the overall toll since 9/28/00 to 794 Arabs and 178 Jews. Israel’s Labor party warned (10/21) it would consider quitting Sharon’s government if he expanded the reoccupations. In Jerusalem (10/22), nearly 100,000 Israelis demonstrated in favor of increasing military attacks on the Palestinians, equating Arafat to Bin Laden and calling for the removal of Arafat and the PA.

The U.S. condemned (10/22) the reoccupations as “unacceptable” and demanded Israel’s immediate withdrawal. The State Dept. stated, “We deeply regret and deplore Israel’s actions, which had killed numerous . . . innocent civilians” and contributed to “a significant escalation in tensions and violence.” The U.S., Russia, EU, and UN quickly mounted a unified diplomatic effort (referred to as the “quadrumvirate”) to calm the situation, initially sending their envoys together to meet (10/22) with Arafat to press him to “address Israel’s security concerns” and to make “absolutely certain” that the PA arrested those responsible for the Ze’evi assassination. The U.S. also dispatched former U.S. special envoy Dennis Ross to the region for semiofficial talks on the deteriorating situation; Ross met with PC speaker Quraishi on 10/23.

Meanwhile, Peres went ahead with a long-planned trip to Washington (10/22–23) to consult with VP Dick Cheney, Defense Secy. Rumsfeld, Secy. of State Powell, and National Security Adviser (NSA) Condoleezza Rice. He restated Israel’s refusal to withdraw from the reoccupied areas A until the PA had cracked down on militants and arrested those responsible for Ze’evi’s murder. Peres was accompanied on his visit by a dozen Israeli officials and IDF officers (including cabinet minister Dan Meridor, Sharon adviser Zalman Shoval, and Israeli NSA Uzi Dayan) who were charged by Sharon (10/18) to brief U.S. officials and American Jewish leaders on the Israeli-Palestinian situation and specifically to draw parallels between the Ze’evi assassination and the 9/11 attacks, between Arafat and Bin Laden, and between Israel’s response to 10/17 and the U.S. response to 9/11.

Upon Peres’s return, there was no initial change in Israel’s deployment. The IDF staged a violent incursion into Bayt Rima (area A) on 10/24–25, killing five PSF officers, wounding dozens of Palestinians, arresting 11, invading and demolishing homes, interrogating residents, imposing a curfew, and sealing the village, barring medics, ambulances, and journalists from entering. The
IDF commander of the operation conceded (10/24) that two of those killed were armed but not firing and were attempting to flee when shot, justifying the killings with the statement, “You can’t allow armed Palestinians running inside the village while your forces are inside.” IDF Gen. Amos Malka admitted (10/24) that although two of those arrested were PFLP members who may have been involved in the Ze’evi assassination (Israel concluded on 10/29 that they were not), the raid on Bayt Rima had been planned long before 10/17 and that the assassination had “encouraged us to launch the operation.” The IDF was also involved in two apparent assassinations on 10/24 and 10/25.

On 10/25, Sharon briefed his cabinet on Peres’s visit to Washington and U.S. demands that Israel withdraw from areas A. Afterward, he reiterated that the IDF would pull back only if the PA adhered to Israel’s stringent cease-fire demands, including the arrest and extradition of “terrorists.” The cabinet issued a statement (10/25) that Israel “reserves the right to freedom of activity.”

Hints of New Peace Initiatives
With Israel indicating that a red line had been crossed with the Ze’evi assassination and that restraint was not an option, the U.S. and the quadrumvirate increased pressure on Israel and the PA. Efforts included the U.S. convening (10/25) a trilateral security comm. meeting to discuss withdrawal and cease-fire scenarios, and the quadrumvirate securing (10/25) a pledge from Arafat that areas A would not be used as staging points for attacks after an IDF pullout. After three days of lobbying, Sharon withdrew (10/28) troops from Bethlehem and Bayt Jala, agreeing to expand the pullout to other cities if a cease-fire there held. Sharon went through with the pullout despite a drive-by shooting (10/28) by Islamic Jihad gunmen in Hadera, Israel, killing four Israelis and wounding 30.

The U.S. began the next day (10/29) to press Israel to continue the withdrawals. Efforts included a personal appeal by Powell (10/30), which Sharon rejected, and a second trilateral security comm. meeting (10/29), which made no progress. Israel stated (10/29) that the U.S.’s repeated urgings were counterproductive and only encouraged Palestinian obstinacy. Instead, Israel assassinated two senior Hamas members (10/31), ambushed and killed six PSF officers (10/31), and demolished six Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem (10/30), an act the U.S. termed (10/30) “highly provocative.”

With Arafat in a weakened position, Sharon reportedly (10/25, 10/29) was considering offering the PA, in exchange for a total halt to violence, a “long-term interim agreement” under which Israel would recognize a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, without specified borders and with Israel maintaining air rights, an IDF presence in the Jordan Valley, and control of borders with Egypt and Jordan. The issues of defined borders, refugees, and Jerusalem would be resolved later, and there would be no timetable for reaching a final agreement.

On 10/30, Peres announced that he was preparing his own peace initiative but declined to give details so as not to cause a rift within the governing coalition. He also announced that he would probably meet with Arafat on the sidelines of an economic conference in Spain on 11/2–3. Sharon expressed (10/30) surprise, reminding Peres that he must coordinate plans for an Arafat meeting with the Prime Minister’s Office. In fact, Peres met with Arafat three times in four days (11/2, 11/3, 11/5) on the sidelines of Euro-Mediterranean meetings in Spain and Brussels. Although Peres lacked a mandate from Sharon to conduct negotiations, he and Arafat reportedly held “serious and intense” talks on how to extend the cease-fire and restart peace talks.

Between the Spain and Brussels meetings, Peres briefly (11/4) Sharon on his peace proposal, reportedly trying to convince him that the plan was similar to his own idea of a long-term interim agreement (see above). Peres reportedly suggested that Israel immediately recognize a demilitarized Palestinian state—but without defined borders—and make a “generous” third further redeployment (in keeping with the outstanding requirements of the Oslo agreements) that would withdraw all troops and Jewish settlers from Gaza. Then, once the PA halted all violence and arrested everyone on Israel’s most-wanted list, Israel would open negotiations on remaining issues, such as borders and Jerusalem. There would be no timetable for reaching a final settlement. Palestinian refugees would not be allowed to return to Israel proper. An international comm. would be created to arrange compensation for Palestinian refugees and Jewish refugees from Arab states. The U.S. would guarantee the borders once they were agreed and would enter into a defense pact with Israel (see Peace Monitor in JPS 116). Sharon strongly objected to the idea of dismantling settlements in Gaza but agreed to discuss the plan
further at a later date. There were no further meetings this quarter. Peres reportedly briefed the U.S. on his ideas and discussed them with PC speaker Quran on the sidelines of a conference in Sweden on 11/8. Responding to rumors about the Peres and Sharon plans, the PLO stated (11/14) that it would reject any interim agreements and would accept only a complete final status agreement that included resolutions of the border, refugee, and Jerusalem issues.

Meanwhile, as the date for the UNGA opening session approached (it had been rescheduled to 11/10–15 following the 9/11 attacks), Sharon was induced to evacuate troops from Qalqilya on 11/5 and from Ramallah on 11/7. (Once again, Sharon went ahead with the withdrawals despite an Islamic Jihad attack in the East Jerusalem settlement of French Hill on 11/4 that killed two settlers and wounded more than 50.) The withdrawals were offset by an IDF troop reinforcement in Jenin and Tulkarm (11/5, 11/8), the assassination of two wanted AMB members (11/6), and tightened access to Jerusalem (11/5).

In the end, little emerged from the much anticipated UNGA session. Sharon did not attend, citing security concerns (though Israeli officials said he actually wanted to avoid criticism for continuing to occupy PA areas). Arafat (11/11) and Peres (11/15) made bland statements calling for a cease-fire and resumption of talks. Bush declined to meet with and even pointedly refused to acknowledge Arafat (11/10), because, according to the White House (11/8), he had not done enough to stop "terrorism." Furthermore, the U.S. did not unveil a major new initiative, though Bush did use his speech (11/10; see Doc. D1) to declare that the U.S. was working "toward a day when two states—Israel and Palestine—live peacefully together within secure and recognized borders as called for by the Security Council resolutions," marking the first time a U.S. president has referred to a future Palestinian state as "Palestine." Arafat praised (11/10, 11/11) the statement, which Powell confirmed (11/11) was a deliberate gesture to the Arabs.

The U.S. also announced (privately to Arafat on 11/11, publicly on 11/15) that Powell would deliver a major address on the Middle East on 11/19 that would lay out the Bush administration’s principles on the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Afterward, special envoys, Marine Corps Gen. (ret.) Anthony Zinni and Asst. Secy. of State Burns, would head to the region to try to revive cease-fire talks, and Sharon would come to Washington (ca. 12/3) for consultations with Bush. According to administration officials, at the close of the quarter, the White House was still debating whether Powell’s speech would offer a new initiative or would constitute a “comprehensive statement” of policy, adhering to existing policy guidelines.

Back in the territories violence continued, though at a slightly lower level overall (see Chronology). Israel continued to occupy Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm and showed no signs of pulling out. Indeed, on 11/15, the IDF reinforced troops in Tulkarm and sent tanks and bulldozers into Khan Yunis in a predawn operation, killing one Palestinian, injuring at least 13, demolishing 15 homes, and damaging another 11. The IDF also assassinated most-wanted Hamas member Muhammad Reihan on 11/12.

**Overview of the Clashes**

At the close of the quarter, approximately 849 Palestinians (including 21 Israeli Arabs), 52 IDF soldiers and security personnel, 59 Jewish settlers, 76 Israeli civilians, and 6 foreign nationals had been killed. As many as 30,000 Palestinians and 2,000 Israelis had been injured. Israel kept up an aggressive policy of bulldozing Palestinian land and demolishing homes, particularly to create buffer zones around Jewish settlements and IDF posts. House demolitions seemed to be concentrated around Hebron (5), Jerusalem (14, plus an apartment building), Khan Yunis (17), and Rafah (41). Notably, Israel evicted some 130 bedouin families from the Hebron Hills on 9/17 and 9/25. Incidents of Palestinian mortar fire and grenades were low this quarter, with only one incidence (9/25) of a mortar fired from Gaza landing inside Israel. In only two reported incidents (8/22, 8/28) did mortars cause damage.

Israel seemed to carry out more assassinations this quarter, though many cases were ambiguous (e.g., an IDF sniper hitting a senior Hamas member during clashes). On 11/4, Sharon admitted that Israel had carried out “20–30 targeted assassinations.” There were 14 incidents that were certainly or almost definitely assassinations: tanzim leader Samir ‘Abd al-Aziz (8/19); PFLP’s Abu Ali Mustafa (8/27); PA intelligence officer Tayssir Khattab (9/1); Hamas’s ‘Abd al-Rahman Hamad (10/14); Hamas’s Hamad Marshal (10/15); Hamas’s ‘Iyad al-Akhras (10/17); tanzim leader Atef Ubarayt (10/18); Hamas’s Ayman Abu Halawih (10/22); Issa Jiryis Elali...
(10/24; affiliation unknown); Hamas's Jamil Jadallah Qawasmi and Abdallah Jarushi (10/31); two unnamed Hamas members (11/1); and Hamas's Muhammad Reihan (11/12). At least another 11 deaths (on 9/1, 9/8, 9/28, 10/11, 10/16, 10/25, 10/31, 11/6, 11/7, 11/11) had the markings of assassinations (see Chronology for details). Eight attempted assassinations were made against Ibrahim al-Habisha (8/16; affiliation unknown); tanzim member Ahmad Bisharat (8/18); Hamas's Muhammad Dayif (8/22); Fatah's Jihad Mussaimi (8/23); DFLP's Qays Samouri and tanzim member Anwar Aliya (8/30); AMB leader Ra'id Karmi (9/6); Fatah's Muhammad Mansur (9/8); and Fatah's Rami Kamel (10/4). Incidents on 10/17 and 10/31 may have been assassination attempts. Six deaths due to denial of medical services were also reported (8/21, 8/23, 9/12, 10/24, 11/7, 11/14). One woman gave birth (10/1) at an IDF checkpoint when she was denied passage to a hospital.

Palestinian suicide attacks were up slightly this quarter (8/25, 9/4, 9/9, 9/13, 10/2, 10/4, 10/7, 10/17, 10/22, 10/28, 11/4, 11/8), leaving a total of 18 Israelis dead. Contrary to the last quarter, most suicide missions were not bombings but cases of gunmen firing on Israelis until they themselves were taken down. Other types of bombings were down dramatically this quarter: only three car bombings (9/9, 10/1, 10/17), three incidents of roadside bombings (8/21, 9/3, 9/19), and six package bombs (8/21, four on 9/3, 9/26) were reported.

Like the last quarter, Jewish settlers, while more often the targets of attack (see Chronology), were also frequently the instigators of violence. They blocked roads (e.g., 9/20, 10/15); assaulted (e.g., 8/16, 8/29, 9/6, 10/5, 10/14, 10/15, 10/17, 10/27, 10/28, 11/11), fired on (e.g., 8/18, 8/29, 9/8, 10/24, 11/11), and even killed (10/16) Palestinians; as well as vandalized Palestinian property (e.g., 9/13, 9/28, 10/9, 10/15, 11/5, 11/10, 11/11). On 8/20, the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) withdrew its forces from the Jewish enclave of the city because of ongoing attacks on its vehicles by Jewish settlers. TIPH said it would not redeploy in the Jewish sector until the IDF provides enough protection for TIPH members to do their job (see Doc. A2). (In discussions last quarter on including an international monitor/observer mechanism in a cease-fire agreement, TIPH was mentioned as a successful model; see Peace Monitor in JPS 121.) At the end of the quarter a new pattern seemed to be emerging, with Jewish settlers running down Palestinians with their cars (two incidents on 11/8 and one on 11/11, injuring three Palestinians).

Peace Now reported (10/4) that ten new settlement enclaves, with 66 structures, had been established between 6/01 and 9/01. The report also stated that only one of 15 enclaves established between 2/01 and 5/01 had been removed and that 39 structures had been added to the 14 remaining sites. (The Israeli DMIn. previously said on 7/16 that 14 had been removed and one turned into an IDF post.) Israel's Interior Min. reported that between 12/00 and 6/29/01, the population of settlements in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and Gaza increased by 4,833, though the populations of 37 settlements had decreased. Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics reported (10/16) 832 settlement housing starts since the beginning of 2001 (506 in the first quarter, 326 in the second), as compared to a total of 4,500 in 2000. This quarter settlers set up at least seven new concentrations at Sa Nur (8/16), near Yatta (8/20), east of Kefar Darom (9/10), near Ma'on (9/29), near Kedumim (10/7), near Beit Hagai (10/7), and outside Jinin (11/11). Settlers said (10/2) that at least two other sites were planned.

At the opening of the quarter (ca. 8/18), Israeli and Palestinian human rights groups reported an increasing number of incidents of torture by the IDF (e.g., keeping a detainee bound and blindfolded for 8–9 hours, threatening the life of a detainee, forcing detainees to stand with weights hung around their necks until they confessed to throwing stones). The groups say the reports are a sign of "fraying discipline and an atmosphere of permissiveness in the ranks of Israeli security forces."

Similarly, the IDF said it was investigating reports by IDF soldiers (early 10/01) that they often took cameras with them on missions into the West Bank and Gaza and photographed themselves posing next to dead and sometimes mutilated Palestinians. They said that the photos are widely circulated, that it is considered a "badge of honor" to appear in one, that some company leaders use the photographs to motivate their soldiers, and that some regiment commanders carry them constantly. One soldier said he had seen 40–50 different photos.

The Red Crescent Society reported an incident (11/6) in Tal, near Nablus, in which medics arrived at the scene of a clash in
which an IDF soldier and two Palestinians had been wounded and one Palestinian captured. After medics failed to resuscitate the mortally wounded soldier, other soldiers barred the medics from treating the Palestinians. As the medics pressed for access, soldiers nearby shot the three Palestinians dead. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) director Paul Grossrieder condemned (11/7) the incident as “one of the worst human rights violations” imaginable and vowed to increase ICRC staff in the territories for better observation and more comprehensive reporting.

Rallies in solidarity with the Palestinians tapered off dramatically this quarter, especially after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. Many demonstrations that had been planned for late 9/01 to mark the anniversary of the Sabra and Shatila massacres were canceled. The rallies that were held after 9/11 tended to be in support of the intifada as well as against the U.S. war on Afghanistan. Most pre-9/11 rallies were held in Washington (8/18, 8/21, 8/28), London (8/16, 9/13), and South Africa (8/16 and during the WCAR). Most post-9/11 rallies were in the Arab states (e.g., 9/28, 10/13), Britain (9/13, 9/18, 10/13), and Canada (9/29, 10/11).

**Buffer Zones**

On 9/7, Sharon confirmed reports that the Israeli cabinet had secretly approved a plan in 6/01 to create a buffer zone along the Green Line. The buffer zone would be a closed military zone, not a defined border; Palestinians entering the zone without a special permit (to be issued to those living or working in the area) could be arrested for summary trial or shot. Sharon was essentially forced to admit that rumors of a plan were true when on 9/5, while he was in Russia, he was informed that the IDF had scheduled a press conference to announce the start of work on the zone. Sharon immediately canceled the press briefing and reprimanded the IDF. Though he claimed on 9/7 to have postponed implementation indefinitely, that same day the IDF sealed an entrance to Shu’fat, began digging ditches across roads along the Green Line northwest of Jerusalem, and reinforced roadblocks leading into the city. On 9/16, the IDF announced, apparently with Sharon’s permission, that it was beginning work on an 18-mile-long “closed military area” along the Green Line between Jinin and Tulkarm. The zone, which went into effect on 9/24, ranges from 11 yards to more than a mile in width (cf. Settlement Monitor in *JPS* 121).

**Jerusalem**

Israel, which seized Orient House in East Jerusalem on 8/9, continued to assert sovereignty over the city this quarter. Israel’s Dep. Internal Security M Gideon Ezra stated (8/28) that the Orient House takeover had been planned for months and Israel had only been waiting for the right time to carry it out. This quarter, the IDF sealed (9/10) the PA intelligence offices and PSF offices in Azariyya and a DFLP office in Abu Dis. For years, Israelis and Palestinians have informally discussed expanding the boundaries to Jerusalem to include Abu Dis and Azariyya, which could then be turned over to the PA under a final status agreement to enable the Palestinians to claim to have a capital in East Jerusalem. In 5/00, Barak promised to transfer the villages to full PA control but ultimately did not, under pressure from settlers and MKs (see Peace Monitor in *JPS* 116). Israel’s actions on 9/10, like its actions on the Halutza Sands area last quarter (see Peace Monitor in *JPS* 121), suggest the Sharon administration would not agree to such a compromise.

Israel’s Internal Security M Uzi Landau recommended (8/20) escalating demolitions of 1,000 “illegal” structures in the city, particularly in Shu’fat, near Pisgat Ze’ev settlement. This quarter, Israeli authorities confiscated (11/8) one Palestinian house and demolished 14 homes (8/20, 9/11, 10/22, 10/30) plus an apartment building under construction in Bayt Hanina (8/19). Landau also said (9/25) that the Jerusalem police force was drawing up plans to erect up to 12 km. of permanent fences between Jewish and Arab neighborhoods, separating, for example, Pisgat Ze’ev from Shu’fat. He stressed that the barriers would not divide the city.

The IDF made it increasingly difficult for West Bank Palestinians to enter Jerusalem. On 9/7, the IDF sealed an entrance to Shu’fat, dug ditches across roads leading into northwest Jerusalem, and reinforced roadblocks on the approach to the city. On 11/5, Israel deployed more border police in the city; placed new checkpoints near the “Greater Jerusalem” boundary at Anata, Bayt Hanina, Jaba’, and Shu’fat; closed the Bethlehem road checkpoint into the city; and placed a closure on Azariyya. A new Israeli police station was established (10/14) in East Jerusalem.

Israeli authorities also increased harassment of Palestinian officials in Jerusalem: Mufti of Jerusalem Ikrima Sabri was detained following Friday prayers on 9/14 for several hours questioning regarding a recent visit to
Beirut, where he met with Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Arafat’s Jerusalem affairs adviser Ziad Abu Ziad was arrested and expelled (9/9) from the city for allegedly entering without a permit. Palestinian Council (PC) vice chairman Bishara Daoud was arrested and detained for questioning (9/15) on his way to Jerusalem to attend the coronation of the new Greek Orthodox patriarch. PC member Ahmad Zagayr was arrested (9/13) in his Jerusalem office and taken to the Russian Compound prison. Israeli police also raided (10/15) the Jerusalem offices of several Palestinian lawyers and architects, claiming they owed back taxes. Police searched, photographed, and destroyed company files.

Moshe Amirav, chairman of the team of experts that advised former PM Ehud Barak on Jerusalem, stated (11/9) that at the 7/00 Camp David talks, Israel and the PA agreed on 99% of the problems related to Jerusalem. He claimed that all issues related to the division of “earthly Jerusalem” were settled and maps drawn, but that differences over the division of “celestial Jerusalem” (i.e., the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount) were not resolved.

**Palestinian Authority**

PA ministries virtually ceased functioning this quarter under the impact of the ongoing intifada. The Agriculture Min., for example, reported (8/21) that veterinary services for livestock had totally collapsed and that the ministry could no longer guarantee the quality of livestock. Officials also anticipated that many farmers would not plant crops next season because, in addition to difficulties in exporting and transporting produce due to closures, the Israeli merchants who sell fertilizer and medicine for plants were accepting only cash payments.

The Finance Min. reported (9/9) that the PA’s debt had reached $400 m., that revenues had dropped from $90 m./mo. before the intifada to $17 m./mo., that overall unemployment had reached 70%, and that Israel owed the PA $600 m. in VAT taxes collected on the PA’s behalf.

On 9/26, a PA court sentenced three Palestinians to death for collaborating with Israel. One Palestinian died (10/22) in PA custody, allegedly committing suicide.

**Intra-Palestinian Coordination**

This quarter, support for Arafat’s Fatah organization reached its lowest point since the start of the intifada, while support for Islamist groups rose slightly. In a poll conducted 10/4–6, 19.8% of respondents said they supported Fatah (down from 36.5% immediately after the 7/00 Camp David talks and before the outbreak of violence), while 20.9% supported Hamas (up from 10.3%) and 5.7% supported Islamic Jihad (up from 3.7%). Backing for the nationalist opposition groups remained low, with the PFLP having the highest percentage support (2.9%). The percentage describing themselves as unaffiliated also remained relatively unchanged at 32.3%. In Al-Najah University student council elections (11/12), a Hamas and Islamic Jihad bloc overwhelmingly defeated Fatah candidates, handing Fatah its poorest showing ever at the secular university.

Talks continued this quarter between the PA and the National and Islamic Higher Comm. for the Follow-up of the Intifada (NIHC) concerning the conditions under which nationalist and Islamist opposition groups would join the PC (see Peace Monitor in JPS 121). On 9/26, PFLP political bureau member Jamil Majdalawi said that the PC subcommittee formed to draft the proposal for a “provisional national leadership” incorporating all PLO and opposition factions had nearly completed a comprehensive political and social platform.

This quarter, members of the Damascus-based opposition groups announced (ca. 9/1) a movement to “revitalize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people, holding meetings on 9/3, 9/27, and 9/30. Unanimous in their belief that the al-Aqsa intifada should continue until Israel ends the occupation and in their opposition to Arafat’s cease-fire efforts, participating members called for separating the PA from the PLO and revamping the PLO Central Comm. to allow the participation of “all factions” (presumably including Hamas and Islamic Jihad) in decision making. It was unclear to what degree the leaderships of the opposition groups supported these meetings or how serious the efforts were, especially since the DFLP, PFLP, and Popular Struggle Front boycotted the 9/30 event.

Two very serious clashes this quarter between Palestinians and the PSF also raised questions as to the extent of Arafat’s control, particularly in certain regions. In Gaza on 10/8, Arafat, in effort to comply with U.S. demands (10/3) that he take “preventive actions,” ordered the PSF to disperse 2,000 Palestinians protesting U.S. strikes on Afghanistan. When demonstrators resisted, the PSF responded with tear gas, rubber bullets,
and live ammunition, killing three. Some armed protesters returned fire, leaving a PSF officer clinically dead. The exchange sparked riots across Gaza and in Nablus, which were directed at the PA and lasted into 10/9. Thousands of outraged Palestinians set fire to PSF offices and vandalized the Palestinian Airlines office, stores, and cars. In total, 200 Palestinians and 20 PSF officers were injured and 120 were arrested (all released by 10/11). Sharon spokesman Ranaa Gissin congratulated (10/9) the PA, saying, “We must hope that . . . Arafat will continue along this path.” In fact, the PA officials met (10/8) with representatives of all Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to draw up a joint statement calling for national unity and appealing for calm. Another meeting between the NHIC and PC members was held on 10/10 to discuss ways of preventing similar clashes in the future, and the PC agreed to appoint an inquiry committee to investigate the PSF’s actions. Hamas spokesman ‘Abd al-Aziz Rantisi said (10/8) that Arafat had agreed to suspend arrests of Hamas and Islamic Jihad members in exchange for their cooperation in halting further demonstrations and observing the cease-fire.

The second incident occurred in Jinin on 11/14, when the PSF’s arrest of senior Islamic Jihad member Mahmud Tawalbi, one of Israel’s most wanted, sparked a riot. Some 3,000 Palestinians, including local Fatah tanzim members, clashed with the PSF, exchanging gunfire with PSF members, throwing grenades at PSF offices, and burning PSF cars, leaving one protester and one PSF officer injured. Thousands of Palestinians demonstrated outside Jinin PSF offices on 11/15 and 11/16, demanding Tawalbi’s release.

Meanwhile, on 10/26, PSF Gaza head Muhammad Dahlan submitted his resignation, rejected by Arafat, in a symbolic protest of Arafat’s handling of the political situation with Israel, the mass arrests of PFLP members after the Ze’evi assassination, and his refusal to replace corrupt and ineffectual political and security personnel. In the wake of the crackdown on the PFLP, 11 senior PSF commanders reportedly also threatened to resign, and some 80 PSF officers in south Gaza were said to be disobeying Arafat’s arrest orders. On 11/7, the PA High Court ordered the immediate release of two PFLP members arrested in connection with Ze’evi’s murder, saying the PA had violated its own legal procedures in making the arrests and that there was not enough evidence to hold them. The PSF did not free the pair until 11/15.

Naseer al-Kidwa, head of the Mission of Palestine to the UN, reportedly threatened to resign in 11/01 when Arafat refused to take his advice not to attend the UNGA session, believing it would be a humiliating appearance for Arafat, since Bush would not meet with him.

Arafat appointed (10/12) Sari Nusseibe as the new PLO official for Jerusalem affairs, replacing Faisal Husseini, who died on 5/31. Nusseibe is a well-known Palestinian scholar and president of al-Quds University who advised the PLO negotiators in the 1991–93 peace talks. Nusseibe said (10/12) that his role would not be as broad as that of Husseini, who acted as an informal mayor of East Jerusalem. In his first public address (10/16), Nusseibe said that he personally thinks that the ongoing intifada is a waste and should be abandoned and that Palestinian refugees should forgo the right of return to areas inside Israel. On 11/14, he proposed that Israel vacate Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for Palestinian refugees dropping the right of return. (The official PLO position is that Israel must acknowledge the right of return and allow a set number of refugees to return to 1948 areas.) Israeli officials declared (10/16) his statements a “major breakthrough,” but many Palestinians were infuriated. The U.S.-based refugee group al-Awda initiated a petition calling on Arafat to fire him. On 10/24, Nusseibe said that his name should be added to the appeal since “this assignment seems to undermine my ability to express myself freely,” but he did not formally resign.

Palestinian Opinion

The following data are excerpted from a poll conducted by the Birzeit University Development Studies Program (DSP) between 4 and 6 October 2001. Results are based on a survey of 1,200 men and women from the West Bank and Gaza. The poll, fifth in a series, was taken from the DSP’s Web site at home.birzeit.edu/dsp.
1. Are you satisfied with how the intifada is proceeding?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West Bank &amp; Gaza</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. To some extent</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. No opinion</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
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2. In general, do you support or oppose Arab participation in the "International Coalition Against Terrorism" led by the U.S.?

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<th>West Bank &amp; Gaza</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Don't support participation under any circumstances</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td>75.3%</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Yes, if the U.S. becomes more involved in resolving the Palestinian issue in a just manner</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Yes, definitely</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. No opinion</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
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3. Do you think that Palestinian society is ready for prolonged and intensified confrontations?

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<th>West Bank &amp; Gaza</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Yes</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. No</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No opinion</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
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4. Do you support or oppose a cease-fire announcement by Arafat?

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<th>West Bank &amp; Gaza</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Support</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Oppose</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No opinion</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
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5. Do you believe that a U.S. military strike against targets defined by the U.S. as terrorist or hosting terrorism will resolve the problem of terrorism or will further escalate violence against the U.S.?

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<th>West Bank &amp; Gaza</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Will resolve</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Will escalate</td>
<td>90.2%</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
<td>91.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. No opinion</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JORDANIAN-ISRAELI TRACK

Jordan continued to keep its interactions with Israel to a minimum this quarter in light of the ongoing al-Aqsa intifada. Citing deteriorating conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan suspended talks (9/10) with Israel on building a desalination plant in the Beisan region that would provide Jordan with 50 mcm/year of water. Jordan also rejected (9/10) Israel’s request (made in light of the ongoing drought) to reduce the amount of water provided Jordan from Lake Tiberias as agreed under the 1994 peace treaty.

On 9/6, Israel allowed Jordan to resume deliveries (barred ca. 8/1; see Peace Monitor in JPS 121) of humanitarian aid to the PA across the King Hussein Bridge. Following the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., Israel increased security on the border, making it harder for deliveries to get through.

Despite the continued ban on demonstrations and public gatherings (see Peace Monitor in JPS 121), several rallies were held this quarter. Following Israel’s assassination of PFLP head Mustafa, 100s of demonstrators rallied in Amman (8/28) to demand the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador. On 9/7, 3,000 Jordanians attended a rally organized by the Muslim Brotherhood, calling on Jordan to break ties with Israel. Jordanian opposition parties held a rally (9/28) to mark the anniversary of the intifada, but it was held at the Islamic Action Front offices, making it a private gathering. Jordanian intelligence officers raided (9/29) the homes of at least 13 individuals who took part in an illegal rally in al-Baqa’ refugee camp on 9/28.
Ali Abu Sukkar, chairman of the Jordanian professional associations’ anti-normalization comm., admitted (10/26) that since the government brought a case against seven comm. members six months previously (which could result in death sentences for two; see Peace Monitor in JPS 120), the comm. has curbed its activities. It continues to hold small seminars but does not intend to take high-profile actions for the time being. Though the government has released the seven accused on bail, there is no statute of limitations on a trial, meaning that the case, according to Abu Sukkar, is “like a sword on our necks.”

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Jordan amended (10/9) its laws on the press and on terrorism to include a broader definition of “terrorism” and tougher penalties for violating either law. Under the new definition, border infiltration and attacks on industrial sites or telecommunications are acts of terror, and banking operations “linked to terrorist activity” are explicitly prohibited.

As part of the U.S. efforts to facilitate coalition building, Congress ratified (9/24) the U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement (FTA), which had languished since being signed by Pres. Clinton and King Abdullah on 10/24/00 (see Peace Monitor in JPS 120). Even after the FTA is completely phased in, it will require that goods have a 35% Jordanian input to qualify for customs exemptions. Under the qualified industrial zone (QIZ) agreement, which encourages Israeli-Jordanian joint projects, goods need only have 11.7% Jordanian inputs to be exempt, meaning the QIZs will still be relevant. Moreover, for goods not covered under the FTA, QIZ status will continue to offer an advantage.

**Syrian-Israeli Track**

The Israeli-Syrian track remained frozen this quarter. In late 10/01, the U.S. dispatched former U.S. Amb. to Syria Christopher Ross to Damascus as an adviser to the secy. of state to discuss regional issues in light of the U.S. war on Afghanistan and to urge Syria to curb Hizballah and the PFLP. Ross reportedly reiterated U.S. support for reviving the peace process based on the Madrid formula.

Pres. Asad gave British PM Blair a cool reception (10/31) when he stopped in Damascus on his tour to boost support for the “campaign against terror.” In their press briefing after their talks, Asad condemned U.S. military actions, praised Palestinian armed groups as freedom fighters, denounced Israeli state terror, and accused the West of double standards and an inability to distinguish terrorism from legitimate resistance.

Israel’s Golan Regional Council announced (11/7) that it had received government approval to launch a $1 m. “Populating the Golan” marketing campaign in 3/02 to sell and build up to 1,000 housing sites on the occupied Golan Heights.

Syria continued to clamp down on reformists, arresting and detaining (mid-8/01 to mid-9/01) a number of university professors, businessmen, doctors, and the general secy. of the Syrian Communist Party, all of whom were released fairly quickly, suggesting the actions were meant as harassment and a warning not to press the reform issue.

**Lebanese-Israeli Track**

Israeli-Lebanese relations remained relatively quiet this quarter, though the disputed Shaba’ Farms region continued to be a friction point, with Hizballah occasionally taking actions as “reminders” that Israel could not take control of the region for granted. Around 8/17, Hizballah began moving forces closer to the UN blue line in the divided city of Ghajar in the Shaba’ Farms region, reportedly in response to the IDF reinforcing positions in the occupied half of the village. Israel asked (8/25) the U.S. to send a message to Syria that Israel had no intention to escalate the conflict with the Palestinians into a regional one and to urge Damascus to rein in Hizballah. Hizballah temporarily pulled back but moved in again soon after, prompting Israel to shell Hizballah positions on 8/29, causing no damage. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) resolved the issue by 8/31 by increasing its patrols in the area, making Hizballah and the IDF back off. Hizballah fired mortars at IDF positions in Shaba’ Farms on 10/3 and 10/22, causing no injuries. Israel also continued to violate Lebanese air and sea space, overflying Lebanon 31 times and entering Lebanese waters seven times in the last week of 9/01 alone. On 10/3, Hizballah claimed to have recorded 2,923 violations since 6/17.

As noted above, Hizballah spiritual leader Shaykh Fadlallah denounced (9/16) the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. Nonetheless, when the U.S. released (10/10) the names of its 22 “most-wanted terrorists,” the list included three Hizballah members wanted for participation in the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 874 from Athens to Beirut. In addition,
Hizballah was included on an expanded list of organizations whose assets the U.S. ordered frozen on 11/2. Lebanon informed the U.S. (11/5, 11/8) that it would not comply. The State Dept. said (11/11) that it understood Beirut’s position but would continue to discuss the issue with the Lebanese government at different levels. NSA Rice warned (11/11), however, that Lebanon needs to “re-integrate into the international community in order to survive” and that it would not succeed in securing international financial assistance unless it met Washington’s demands, adding that “Lebanon’s very existence depends on such compliance.”

Israel announced (10/29) that it had received reliable intelligence that the three IDF soldiers kidnapped by Hizballah on 10/7/00 likely died of injuries incurred during their abduction. The IDF chief rabbi declared them officially dead on 11/2.

Ruling that humanitarian concerns override security concerns, the Israeli High Court approved (8/23) a motion allowing ICRC representatives to visit Hizballah’s Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karim Obeid and Amal’s Mustafa al-Dirani, who were kidnapped by the IDF in 1989 and 1994, respectively, and are being held under administrative detention in Israel. The ruling was later overturned.

In mid-8/01, Lebanese military authorities detained around 250 Lebanese in arrest sweeps, charging them with “promoting disunity.” At least 49 of them were supporters of exiled Christian militia leader Michel Aoun and other opponents of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon. At least one Christian activist and two journalists (Antoine Bassil of Middle East Broadcasting Corp. and Habib Yunis of al-Hayat) were charged with the capital crime of having had contact with Israel. (On 6/5, Lebanon indicted Lebanese American journalist Ragheda Dergham, the UN correspondent for al-Hayat, in absentia for “dealing with the enemy” for participating in a panel discussion at a pro-Israeli U.S. think tank with former Israeli DMin. coordinator for Lebanon policy Uri Lubrani.) Most of those taken into custody were released on bail by 9/1. Some reports suggested that the Lebanese government had ordered the arrests as a way to quell the opposition and discourage public disunity in light of the unstable regional environment created by the intifada. Other reports claimed that the military was acting unilaterally, without the approval of the political echelon, suggesting the government might not be fully in control of the situation. On 9/5, Maronite patriarch Nasrallah Sfayr reportedly made his strongest statement since the end of the Lebanese civil war, calling for the Syrian military to withdraw from Lebanon and accusing Damascus and its Beirut allies of destroying Lebanese independence.

**REGIONAL AFFAIRS**

**Relations with Israel**

This quarter, Israeli-Arab relations reached their lowest point in more than a decade. Even in the case of Egyptian and Jordanian mediating efforts on an Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire, there were no reports of direct communications, much less face-to-face meetings, between Israeli and Arab officials. Arab officials did attend forums where Israeli delegates were present (e.g., WCAR and the UNGA opening session), but no consultations were held on the sidelines. In the case of the World Trade Organization meeting hosted by Qatar (11/9–14), many Arab groups felt Doha should have barred Israeli participation or rescinded its offer to hold the conference.

Signaling Egypt’s displeasure with ongoing Israeli and U.S. policy toward the Palestinians, Pres. Mubarak ordered (9/5) the retrial of an Egyptian acquitted in 6/01 of spying for Israel. On 10/28, the Egyptian High Court adjourned the trial until 12/22.

**Inter-Arab Highlights**

Inter-Arab efforts continued to focus on supporting and mediating on behalf of the Palestinians. Egypt and Jordan again took the lead in this regard, staying in constant contact with the PA. Much of the coordination between 8/15 and 9/8 also focused on building a united Arab stand on the Palestinian issue for the WCAR (see below). Following the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., the Arab states also met (9/14) to coordinate their stands on the U.S. “campaign against terror.” The Arab states were unanimous in cautioning (e.g., 9/18, 9/28, 10/9, 10/10) the U.S. to differentiate between “terrorists” and legitimate national liberation movements.

Arab League FMs convened an emergency Follow-up Comm. meeting in Cairo on 8/22 to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian situation and efforts to secure a UN resolution on international observers (see below). Arafat called on the Arab states to take “firmer action” against Israel, but the FMs only called on Israel to withdraw from Orient House and
on the U.S. to stop providing Israel with offensive weapons. Further FM meetings were held in Cairo on 9/10–11 and in Damascus on 11/3–4; the FMs again denounced Israeli aggressions, called for international intervention to aid the Palestinians, and reaffirmed Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem. On the sidelines of the 9/10–11 session, Egypt, Jordan, and the PA met privately to discuss the deteriorating Palestinian situation and Israeli actions in Jerusalem (see above).

The International Development Bank (IDB), in charge of overseeing the two funds for Palestinian aid created at the 10/00 Arab League summit, held a meeting with Arab League representatives in Cairo (9/5–6) to discuss disbursements from the funds. The IDB sent the PA monthly payments of $45 m. (down from $55 m. last quarter) to cover PA salaries and other administrative expenses and promised (10/29) to continue doing so through 12/01. In addition, the IDB transferred $75 m. to the PA on 9/23. As of 11/10, the Arab states had pledged $693 m. to the IDB funds, (The Arab League's original target was $1 b.) Of the $693 m. pledged, $680.5 m. had been transferred to the IDB accounts, $468 m. had been allocated to specific projects, and $360 m. had been disbursed.

On 11/10, King Abdallah publicly suggested that the Arab states should be prepared to offer a collective guarantee of Israel's security as part of an Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement. He said he had already discussed the idea with Egypt, the EU, Russia, and the U.S.

Saudi Arabia was particularly vocal in support of the Palestinian cause this quarter. On a tour of Arab countries in early 9/01, Saudi FM Prince Saud al-Faisal repeatedly called for a united front on behalf of the Palestinians, marking an unusually high level of official Saudi effort on behalf of the Palestinians in the post–Gulf War period. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks (carried out by hijackers traveling on Saudi passports), Interior M Prince Nayif Bin 'Abd al-'Aziz risked stating (9/30) that it was extremely important for the U.S. and EU to reassess their unjust positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During a tour of the World Trade Center site with New York mayor Rudy Giuliani on 10/11, another Saudi prince, al-Walid Bin Talal, stated that the 9/11 attacks should prompt the U.S. to reexamine its policies, noting that Palestinians "continue to be slaughtered at the hands of the Israelis while the world turns the other cheek." In protest, an out-

raged Giuliani rejected Talal's personal $10 m. donation to the city's recovery efforts, stating, "such statements are wrong and are part of the problem" as well as being "highly irresponsible and very, very dangerous." The State Dept. also said (10/11) that the prince's comments were "highly inappropriate." As conditions in the PA areas deteriorated, Prince Saud angered the U.S. by remarking (11/9) that Bush's failure to offer a new peace initiative "makes a sane man go mad." He welcomed, however, Bush's reference to Palestine in his 11/10 speech to the UNGA.

In terms of bilateral Arab relations, PA Planning M Nabil Shaath held two days of talks (8/25–26) in Damascus about a possible Arafat-Assad meeting. In follow-up discussions soon after, the sides agreed that Arafat would meet Asad in Damascus 9/12, but the meeting was postponed because of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. The meeting was rescheduled for 9/25 but was postponed again so Arafat could hold cease-fire talks with Peres (see above). The PA's Palestinian Airlines made its first regular flight to Damascus on 8/26, taking a group of 90 Palestinian businessmen to participate in the Damascus trade fair (8/28–9/7). During the fair, Syria and the PA signed (9/5) an agreement exempting Palestinian commodities from Syrian custom fees. Of note: Senior Fatah member Muhammad Ibrahimm Miri was shot dead (9/6) by masked gunmen in 'Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camp in Lebanon. Reports suggested Miri was killed because he was "arousing friction between pro- and anti-Syrian groups in the camp" at a time when the PLO is attempting to normalize relations with Syria. No group took responsibility.

The PA and Egypt held economic talks in Cairo (8/25–26) and agreed to set up a joint chamber of commerce to boost bilateral trade. These talks were originally to be held on 8/19 but were postponed when Israel barred the PA delegation from leaving Gaza.

Jordan said (9/5) that it was willing to sign a FTA with the PA, provided Israel approved. Israel had not responded by the end of the quarter. The PA agreed (9/5) to waive two kinds of fees levied on Jordanian trucks. The PA also noted (9/5) that PA imports from Jordan had dropped 40% since 1/01.

Following preliminary talks (8/28), Jordan signed 12 cooperation agreements with Syria, including an FTA to be implemented in stages from 2002 to 2005. The other agreements covered media, health, labor, and the environment.
INTERNATIONAL

UNITED STATES

At the opening of the quarter, the U.S. maintained a generally hands-off approach toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, being unwilling to put forward new ideas in a situation where there was little hope for a cease-fire and return to talks in the short run. The U.S. repeatedly urged both sides to halt violence and implement the Tenet and Mitchell recommendations but otherwise remained passive, except when an escalation of violence threatened to jeopardize other Bush administration policy interests (e.g., domestic political standing, UN meetings, coalition building for the war in Afghanistan). The 9/11 attacks placed the U.S. in a quandary: On the one hand, Bush’s “war on terror” required at least tacit support from the Arab and Muslim states, but these states, which viewed Israeli actions against the Palestinians as state terrorism (see below regarding WCAR), were reluctant to legitimize U.S. military action against Bin Laden and the Taliban unless the U.S. made efforts to rein in Israel. At the same time, it was hard for the U.S. to call for Israeli restraint when U.S. actions toward Afghanistan so closely paralleled Israel’s actions toward the Palestinians—in their disproportionate and reactionary responses, the often tenuous nature of their evidence against the accused “terrorists,” their overwhelming military might versus comparatively weak adversaries, their refusal to negotiate on anything but their own terms, the selective application of the rule of law, their with-us-or-against-us demands for support. Thus, as shown above, even after 9/11 the U.S. continued to take action on the Israeli-Palestinian situation only when necessary to protect other policy goals.

In response to a letter sent to Bush by Sen. John Conyers (D-MI) questioning whether Israel’s use of U.S.-supplied weapons since 9/28/00 has violated the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Powell said (8/17) that the State Dept. “believes that a report [to Congress regarding possible Israeli violations] under section 3c of the AECA is not required” but that the State Dept. would continue to monitor Israel closely (see Doc. D3 on the AECA in JPS 120).

On 10/5, the State Dept. released its annual updated list of terrorist organizations. The amended list added the Real Irish Republican Army and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia and combined the Jew-

ish groups Kach and Kahane Chai, but did not add the tanzim or Fatah as Israel had encouraged.

On the bilateral U.S.-Israeli front, the U.S.- Israeli Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) held (8/27–28) a regular semiannual meeting to discuss bilateral strategic coordination in light of Israel’s regional security situation. The level of representation was significantly higher than in JPMG meetings under the Clinton administration: Dep. Secy. of State Richard Armitage, Dep. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, and Dep. Secy. of Defense Wolfowitz led the U.S. team; Amb. to the U.S. David Ivri and NSA Dayan led the Israeli team.

Israeli defense companies urged (11/9) the Israeli DMin. to reduce the amount of U.S. military aid, arguing that the aid, most of which must be spent on American goods, undermines their business and harms the Israeli economy.

On 8/19, 39 Jewish American students ended the first three-week seminar in Israel sponsored by the new group Emet to groom them to be Israel’s “ambassadors” on U.S. campuses. Emet is funded jointly by the Israeli government and wealthy American Jewish donors and was set up as a PR vehicle explicitly to promote Israel’s positions on the al-Aqsa intifada (see Peace Monitor in JPS 120). Emet is modeled on the Birthright Israel program, established by the Netanyahu administration in 11/98, which aims to rebuild Jewish identity among young Jews by paying for any Jew age 15 to 26 to make a ten-day visit to Israel.

Sharon adviser Yuri Stern met (ca. 11/12) with Christian members of Congress to emphasize that Christians in Egypt, the PA areas, and Sudan, among other places, are being persecuted and to encourage them not to allow Arafat to speak on behalf of Palestinian Christians.

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) sent (10/23) a letter to Powell saying it was “extremely troubled” by the State Dept.’s 10/22 demand that Israel immediately withdraw from Palestinian cities. The ADL said it considers “such comments to be inappropriate and contrary to the long-standing American policy that Israel has the right to defend itself.” Similarly, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE), speaking (11/4) at the Zionist Organization of America’s annual dinner, asserted that U.S. criticism of Israel’s incursions into PA-controlled areas and its assassination policy only “emboldens those in the Middle East and
around the world who still harbor as their held, must take into account progress sacred goal the elimination of Israel.”

On 9/5, the FBI raided Infocom Corp., an Internet service provider in Richardson, TX, owned by the cousin of Hamas political leader Musa Abu Marzuq’s wife, who reportedly is an investor herself. Among the 500 companies and organizations whose Web sites were temporary shut down were the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), al-Jazeera TV, the Islamic Society of North America, the Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP), and the Muslim Students Association. The move came a week after Bank One closed HLF’s account. HLF and IAP previously have been accused of having links to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The FBI, which has been trying to prove the groups’ terrorist links since 1996, said (9/5) only that it was executing a federal search warrant.

RUSSIA

Russia continued actively attempting to secure an Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire this quarter. Once again, special envoy Andrei Vdovin spent most his time in the region shuttling between Israeli, Palestinian, and other Arab officials (see Peace Monitor in JPS 121).

Israel’s Sharon traveled to Moscow (9/3–5) to meet with Russian pres. Vladimir Putin and Russian Jewish leaders. He stressed that Israel expected “a more balanced attitude from Russian representatives in the UN” and appealed to Russian Jews to immigrate to Israel. Soon after Sharon’s visit, senior PA negotiator and PLO Exec. Comm. secy. Mahmoud Abbas arrived in Moscow for talks (9/7–8) with FM Igor Ivanov regarding the Palestinian situation. Arafat met with Ivanov in Oslo on 10/31.

EUROPEAN UNION

The EU continued efforts this quarter to try to secure an Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire. In addition to its intensive mediation efforts as part of the quadrumvirate mentioned above, the EU also issued a statement (11/5) declaring that the “establishment of the Palestinian state as soon as possible is an urgent necessity.” Similarly, British PM Blair voiced (10/15) the need for the creation of a “viable Palestinian state.” French pres. Jacques Chirac proposed (ca. 11/15) holding roundtable discussions on the Arab-Israeli conflict, bringing together Israel, the PA, the U.S., Russia, the EU, Egypt, and Jordan. Egypt stressed that such a meeting, were it to be held, must take into account progress achieved in negotiations to date.

Following heavy lobbying from the Israeli mission to the EU, the European Parliament passed (ca. 10/29) its budget including a rider barring the EU from giving money for Palestinian textbook development if the books contain material that is “anti-Semitic” or “incites hatred.” The PA textbook project is largely funded by the EU.

On 9/11, Israel cut all contact with French amb. to Tel Aviv Jacques Huntzinger, saying his comments that the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. cannot be compared to those carried out by Palestinians against Israel constitute “absolute chutzpah” and “illustrate the European perception that we are an occupying nation and that the terror is consequently justified.” Huntzinger clarified that France absolutely condemns all terror but that no comparison should be made between Arafat and Bin Laden.

UNITED NATIONS

The UN event of the quarter was the WCAR in Durban, South Africa (8/31–9/8). The WCAR had been controversial in 7/01, when two items on its agenda became known: Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, which threatened to revive the Zionism-is-racism equation, and reparations for slavery and colonialism. While the slavery reparations issue had been resolved last quarter (see Peace Monitor in JPS 121), the Arab states, Israel, and the U.S. failed in preconference negotiations to agree on wording for sections of the draft final statement covering Israel and the Palestinians. The Arab states insisted on a text that called settlements a “crime against humanity” and “foreign occupation” and that recognized “the emergence of racial and violent movements based on racism and discriminatory ideas, in particular, the Zionist movement which is based on racial superiority.” On 8/24, Bush warned that there would be no U.S. representation at the WCAR if delegates continued to “pick on Israel.” On 8/27, the administration invited American Jewish Comm. exec. dir. David Harris to be part of the U.S. delegation if one were sent to Durban.

In the end, 166 countries participated in the WCAR, with Canada, Israel, and the U.S. the only ones not sending high-level delegations. In his address to the opening session (8/31), Arafat denounced Israel for practicing racial discrimination and ethnic cleansing. To protest Arafat’s participation, the U.S. low-
ered its representation to the opening session further, sending its chargé d’affaires of the Pretoria embassy as its delegate. Debates on the wording of the final statement continued, with Norway presenting (9/2) a compromise text that still contained “a reference” to Palestine. The U.S. could accept the text but Israel could not. When the Arab states rejected (9/3) a further revision by Norway, Israel and the U.S. withdrew from the WCAR, saying the conference had been “hijacked” by the Arab states.

The EU states continued negotiations on the statement, extending the conference an extra day (to 9/8) to reach an acceptable version. (Syria failed at this time to reininsert deleted passages criticizing—in general, without specific mention of Israel—“foreign occupation founded on settlements,” protecting “peoples under foreign occupation,” and declaring “settler ideology a crime against humanity.”) The final text (see Doc. A3) expresses concern over the “plight of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation,” endorses the right of Israelis and Palestinians to live in secure and independent states, and recognizes the right of refugees to “freely return to their homes.” Western governments (especially Australia and Canada) condemned the statement, saying references to the rights of refugees implicitly questioned Israel’s right to exist. Israel, however, said it was “satisfied.”

On the sidelines of the WCAR, 6,000 international NGOs held talks (8/28–9/1) on preventing racism. The NGOs’ closing statement called Israel a “racist, apartheid state” that should end its “systematic perpetration of racist crimes,” including segregation, separation, dispossession, and restricted land access. Jewish groups walked out of the meeting in protest. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch dissociated (9/1) themselves from the statement. UN Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson refused (9/1) to accept or endorse the NGO statement per the agreed WCAR procedures.

The UNSC met on 10/25 and 11/12 to discuss escalating Israeli-Pa tensions, issuing a statement (11/12) urging Israel to pull out of Palestinian cities reoccupied since 10/17, the PA to do everything possible to halt violence, and both sides to implement the Tenet and Mitchell recommendations. The U.S. blocked efforts to vote on a resolution condemning Israel’s reoccupation of areas A.

Switzerland announced (11/7) plans to convene a meeting of the signatories of the Fourth Geneva Convention on 12/5 to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian situation. Israel and the U.S. said they would boycott. A full conference of the signatories was last held in 7/99 but was suspended on the first day under tremendous pressure from the U.S. (see Peace Monitor in JPS 113).

The Mission of Palestine to the UN revived (8/20) a draft resolution in the UNSC calling for a “monitoring mechanism” to protect the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and to guarantee a cease-fire (see Peace Monitors in JPS 119, 121). The U.S. said (8/20) that the action was inappropriate and unbalanced, and threatened to veto the measure. The Mission of Palestine withdrew the draft on 8/23, after Singapore, under pressure from the U.S., said it was unable to back the initiative, leaving the Palestinians without the nine supporters needed to force a vote on the resolution. China, the EU, and Russia were prepared to abstain.

Syria was elected (10/8) to a rotating seat on the UNSC, taking 160 of 177 secret ballots. Some members of Congress and American Jewish groups had urged the U.S. to lobby against Syria’s election, but the U.S. believed a battle over the issue would be too costly politically. The Asia group nominated Syria well before 9/11; the U.S. acquiescence was not seen as a way of soliciting Arab cooperation with U.S. antiterrorism efforts.

UNRWA made (9/25) its fourth emergency appeal for funds since the start of the intifada, saying it needed $31 m. to meet regular expenses through 12/01. On 8/30, IDF soldiers blocked a marked UNRWA convoy from entering Rafah to inspect six demolished Palestinian homes and threatened to shoot UNRWA chief Peter Hansen when he got out of his jeep to speak with them. After 20 minutes, the convoy turned back from the checkpoint and took back roads into the camp, risking drawing IDF fire.

**Vatican**

In 9/24, the Vatican issued a statement with potentially far-reaching ramifications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It suggested that the U.S. resort to violence in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks could be justified if it would prevent similar attacks in the future, stating, “If someone has done great harm to society and there is a danger that if he remains free he may be able to do it again, you have the right to apply self-defense for the society you lead, even though this means you may choose to be aggressive.”
Turkey

The U.S. war on Afghanistan complicated Turkey’s ongoing efforts to strike a balance between maintaining amicable relations with its Arab and Muslim neighbors and its need for U.S. and Israeli backing in its continuing quest to join the EU. Turkey was one of the few countries to send (11/15) a token force (100 troops) to support the U.S. campaign. Turkish FM Ismail Cem visited (9/21) Tel Aviv and Ramallah to consult with Peres, Sharon, and Arafat on the Israeli-Palestinian situation.

An unnamed Israeli source reported (ca. 8/31) that 12% of Israel’s military aircraft were permanently based in Turkey, that Israel keeps a large naval force at Turkish bases, and that the two countries have agreed that a portion of Israel’s armored corps would be stationed in Turkey and some of Israel’s Chariot-3 tanks would be sent to southeastern Turkey to help man the border with the Kurdish enclave of Iraq. The information could not be corroborated.

Israel and Turkey convened (10/15) the first meeting of their joint comm. on antiterrorism, drug trafficking, and serious crimes since the two countries signed a cooperation agreement on these issues in 1994. By agreement, the comm. does not meet regularly, but only at the request of one of the parties.) Turkey reported (9/15) that police had arrested five men on charges of making fake passports ($1,500–2,000 apiece) for people seeking to enter Israel.

Other

Ukraine announced plans (10/15) to open a diplomatic mission in Gaza and for the PA to open a mission in Kiev. No time frame was specified.

Donors

The donor’s Local Aid Coordination Comm. (LACC) held (11/5) a donor-only meeting in Jerusalem; since Israel and the PA would not sit together at the meeting, neither was invited to attend. The LACC discussed reenergizing donor efforts despite the ongoing intifada and agreed to convene a meeting of the “shepherds” of each of the sector working groups (e.g., agriculture, education, electricity, health, housing, telecommunications, water and sewerage, urban development) in late 11/01 to discuss resuming regular consultations, which have been sporadic since the outbreak of fighting in 9/00. There have been no full donor group meetings since the Ad Hoc Liaison Comm. session in Lisbon in the summer of 2000.

Compiled by Michele K. Esposito