On 19–21 December 2000, the Institute of Policy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya held the first of what is to be a series of annual conferences dealing with the strength and security of the Israeli state. With welcoming remarks by Israeli president Moshe Katsav, the conference was sponsored by eight institutions, including the American Jewish Committee, the Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress, the Israeli Defense Ministry, the Israeli National Security Council of the Prime Minister’s Office, the Jewish Agency, the National Security Center of Haifa University, and the World Zionist Organization. Among the some fifty speakers were Moshe Arens, Uzi Dayan, Galia Golan, Ronald Lauder, Dan Meridor, Shaul Mofaz, Benjamin Netanyahu, Robert Saftel, Uri Savir, Shimon Peres, and Ariel Sharon (see conference program below). The 300 participants were said to constitute a veritable who’s who of the Israeli establishment (government, security, academic, business, and media) as well as Jewish leaders from the United States and elsewhere in the Diaspora.

The significance of the conference, as it emerged when its report was published in March 2001, was the extent to which the ideas and findings of an Israeli mainstream elite appeared to coincide with views traditionally associated with the country’s far Right. Most noteworthy were the recommendations concerning ways to address the “demographic threat” posed by the Arab citizens of Israel, which involved the principle of population transfer.

The fifty-two-page conference report, Policy Directions, was written by Conference chairman Uzi Arad, with the assistance of Ilan Amit, Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilboa, and Maj. Gen. (Res.) Aviezzer Ya’ari. Issued in English in April, it is divided into seven sections: the geodemographic aspect, the political aspect, the military aspect, the economic aspect, the technological aspect, and the social aspect. Reproduced below are the “Main Points” of the conference, the entire geodemographic section, as well as the conference program and list of task forces charged with the preparation of the conference.

Main Points

1. Israel is the country of the Jewish people. The security problems of the state and its need for national strength result from the Jewish-Arab conflict, which has accompanied the Zionist movement since its inception. The concepts “national strength,” “unity of purpose,” “collective memory,” and “mutual responsibility” refer to the members of the Jewish majority in Israel and not necessarily to the state in general. From the perspective of enhancing national security and strength, Zionist values and the Jewish Zionist collective memory must be pro-

moted and embedded through the state education organs and manifested in national symbols.

2. From the socioeconomic perspective, two separate populations exist in Israel: four million people who mostly reside in a Western technological society, and two million Arabs, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and foreign workers who mostly reside in a society with third world socioeconomic characteristics. One difference between these two populations is demographic: The birthrate among Israeli Arabs and ultra-Orthodox Jews is among the highest in the world. The birthrate of non-ultra-Orthodox Jews is only slightly higher than the average among Western countries. The high birthrate brings into question the future of Israel as a Jewish state. It also entrenches poverty and delays socioeconomic development among these groups and exerts pressure on infrastructure and resources.

3. The present demographic trends, should they continue, challenge the future of Israel as a Jewish state. Israel has two alternative strategies: adaptation or containment. The latter requires a long-term energetic Zionist demographic policy whose political, economic, and educational effects would guarantee the Jewish character of Israel. Similarly, there would be a need to work toward the institutionalization, enhancement, and intensification of the relationship with the Jewish people worldwide, who constitute a vital home front and provide strategic depth for Israel.

4. Three potentially mutually amplifying circles of conflict confront Israel: The innermost circle consists of low-intensity conflict with the Palestinians (including within Israel itself) and the Lebanese, i.e., terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and civil unrest. The second circle is made up of Syria, with possible support from Egypt, Iraq, and maybe even Jordan, engaging in a high-intensity land, sea, and air war. The third circle comprises the farthest parts of Syrian territory, and Iraq and Iran, conducting a war of attrition against the home front using ground-to-ground missiles, with the possibility of escalation to the use of nonconventional weapons. The IDF is seeking to achieve defensive and deterrence capability in the second circle, and defensive, deterrence, and retaliation capability in the third circle as well. Today, as in the past, Israel is in the midst of a conflict in the internal circle, implementing a combination of military, economic, and political means to achieve calm and to promote a political settlement. The ability to cope in a conflict of this sort demands patience and durability from the entire public.

11. In the foreseeable future, Israel must confront directly developments that manifest existential dangers. Failure in this confrontation or an attempt to avert it are liable to lead to the demise of the Zionist enterprise. Therefore, Israel is compelled to reinforce its strength and to adopt a strategy of augmenting all of its power components. This strategy also necessitates the stabilization and reinforcement of the sociopolitical order, the improvement of the government and the regime, the consolidation of the rule of law, and the dissemination of a spirit of service and national mobilization.
THE GEO DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECT

General

Assuming that present demographic trends continue, two significant changes will transpire in our generation: [First,] for the first time since its establishment, more than half of the Jewish people will live in the State of Israel, with the majority continuing to grow with time. Second, the Palestinians will become the majority of the population west of the Jordan River, and the Arab minority will reach one-quarter of the Israeli population and will continue to grow.

Jews and Palestinians

The demographic trends in Israel and its surroundings and their ramifications pose a severe threat to Israel in terms of its character and identity as a Jewish state belonging to the Jewish people. The demographic threat to the continued existence of the State of Israel is the most immediate and most likely to materialize. The threat is developing rapidly, while the pace of designing a national policy dealing with the threat is slow.

The birthrate among Muslims in Israel (4.6 children per woman) is almost twice that of Jews in Israel (2.6 children per woman). Consequently, today, approximately one of every five Israeli citizens is Arab Muslim. Within twenty years, the ratio will be 1:3. These processes have significant ramifications:

- The increase in the demographic share of the Arab minority in Israel tests directly Israel’s future as a Jewish-Zionist-democratic state.
- The security and social challenges connected with Israel’s Arab minority will probably worsen as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict is still simmering.
- The sense of discrimination extant in the Arab population is a fertile ground for increasing tensions and inquietude. In conjunction with political estrangement and sustained frequently by incitement, it is liable to manifest itself in a series of dangerous and hostile actions in terms of law enforcement and public safety.

As for the Palestinian population in the Palestinian Authority, the total population on the West Bank and Gaza is 2.8 million.

- The birthrate in this population is even greater than among Israeli Arabs; in fact, the rate of increase among the Palestinians is the highest of all Arab countries (twice that of Egypt). The Palestinian population doubles every twenty years.
- United Nations agencies have granted unlimited special status to Palestinian refugees, including all descendants of the 1948 refugees. According to these agencies, the number of refugees today stands at 4 million, and the natural annual increase of this population is 3.5 percent. Half of the Arab population in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is considered to be refugees.
- About half of the Palestinian population in the West Bank consists of children below the age of fifteen. Participation of women in the workforce is minimal. The rate of unemployment is 25 percent in Gaza and 15 percent in Judea and Samaria. During periods when there are no restrictions on their movements, more than one-quarter of those employed work in Israel.
- Since the signing of the Oslo accords, the per capita GNP in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza has decreased by 20 percent. The economic predicament in Gaza is more severe than in Judea and Samaria. The GNP in Gaza is half the GNP in Judea.
and Samaria, and the salary level in Gaza is one-quarter less than that in Judea and Samaria. Most sources of livelihood in Gaza are external: work in Israel, direct aid from UNRWA, and salaries to employees of the Palestinian Authority (most of whose budget comes from external sources). Assuming that no change takes place in these sources or with the high rate of population growth, the GNP per capita can be expected to drop further. There are no natural resources in Gaza, the population density depletes the environment, and circumstances there do not attract foreign investment. The Palestinian Authority ignores the problem of natural population growth, and in contrast to Egypt, has not adopted any policy directed at limiting the birthrate, precluding the possibility of receiving foreign aid to cope with resultant problems.

- The Gaza Strip refugees are in the most problematic situation. They constitute half of the Gaza Strip population so that the totality of the difficult economic and social conditions in Gaza is tied to the refugee problem. A political agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority will not substantively change the condition of these refugees even if the Palestinian state will “host” them, so to speak.
- The harsh reality in the Palestinian Authority territories creates a steady and significant flow of illegal Palestinian emigration into Israel. Since 1967, 100,000 Arabs have entered Israel legally. The illegal emigration from the Palestinian Authority territories is gradually increasing and can be expected to intensify both due to demographic trends there and due to the socioeconomic gaps between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

**Alternative Strategies**

The fundamental dilemma that Israel faces as a result of demographic statistics and trends among the Palestinians is between a policy of adaptation, political or otherwise, and a policy of containment. The choice between the options depends on the perception of Israel’s future political identity and image. The adaptation policy is the one propounded by those who view Israel as a country of all its citizens—adapting its national character, its symbols, and institutions to the changing demopolitical balance.

Conversely, those who support the preservation of Israel’s character as it was when it was founded—a Jewish state for the Jewish nation—and they still constitute a majority among the Jewish population in Israel, are forced to proffer a counterstrategy that will provide an effective response to the aforementioned trends, while recognizing that in a democratic country, the Jewish character of Israel can only be preserved if the Jewish majority does not dip below approximately three-quarters of the total population.

The attraction of adaptation is that it is primarily passive, does not call for conflicts or any real action other than gradual concessions concerning Israel’s Jewish identity. Alternatively, the containment option calls for, as mentioned, an active, comprehensive strategy that combines within it steps in different areas, with most, if not all of them, involving overcoming difficulties and opposition, and, to one degree or another, internal and perhaps even international discord.

The following are possible components of a containment option:

- A birthrate and development policy.
- An accelerated policy of encouraging and absorbing immigration.
• A policy of demarcating the future borders of the country that will take into consideration the preservation of the Jewish majority.

• A position on the issue of refugees enabling, maximally, their return to Palestinian Authority territories.

• Adopting a policy of distribution of the Jewish population in Israel in a manner that will guarantee a Jewish majority in the various regions of the country.

As to the birthrate and family planning policy in Israel proper: It is feasible to move toward the implementation of a family planning policy that will encourage three to four children per family, while canceling subsidy payments to families with many children. Of course, the outlawing of polygamy should be enforced. One can expect international organizations to support a policy of birth control in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, as they do in Jordan, by, among other methods, making aid contingent upon limiting the birthrate—as was accomplished in Egypt. This would be in line with the explicit goal of contributing to Palestinian prosperity and easing the economic-political pressure stemming from high birthrates.

Regarding immigration: The general demographic strategy and, in part, the demand for workers in the advanced technology sector both warrant the intensification of promoting immigration from the Diaspora to Israel. It is important to remember that Diaspora Jewry has always constituted a traditional human reserve in preventing the creation of a Palestinian majority in Israel.

Regarding the demarcation of the country’s borders: The history of the Jewish-Arab conflict is abundant with partition plans, usually based on demographic-settlement criteria. Presumably, the same criteria will apply to any future agreement. The apparent direction seems to be toward separation, which preferably would be implemented in a controlled manner and based upon mutual agreement. In any case, the effectiveness of separation depends on different means of enforcement, including prevention of illegal migration. The high rates of Palestinian natural increase will in the future require multilateral regional cooperation to resolve the issue of Palestinian refugees, perhaps in the context of an agreed international regime. In the framework of a future agreement in which permanent borders will be agreed upon and drawn, it may be possible to include within the State of Israel Jewish population blocs east of, and adjacent to, the Green Line, and to include Arab population blocs west of, and adjacent to, the Green Line in a sovereign Arab state. Thus, the territorial exchanges might include parts of the “small triangle” and East Jerusalem. These exchanges will be feasible through agreement in the context of a comprehensive and final settlement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. In the absence of an agreement, it will be possible to implement some of the above-mentioned steps as part of a unilateral redeployment. Clearly, such action will have to be undertaken with broad public support and the provision of specific solutions to the problems encountered by those persons directly impacted by an exchange of territory.

Regarding the issue of Arab refugees: Consenting to the return of refugees to the Palestinian state territories would constitute an appropriate realization of the right of return, but would worsen the economic situation there. Similar to the plight of the refugees already living in those territories, their return would create a situation of perpetual refugee status for them. At the same time, permitting the return of the refugees to the State of Israel would be an extreme interpretation of the right of return and destructive in terms of Israel’s Jewish identity. Limiting the scope of the returnees to
Israel to 100,000–150,000, even if calibrated, would add to the negative demographic trends in Israel itself and would be liable to serve as a precedent, arousing expectations. The provision of international aid for the purpose of rehabilitating Palestinian refugees is a worthy and warranted cause. Nevertheless, the current demographic trends and features impede substantially upon the efficiency of such aid and its ability to attain its stated objective.

As to the distribution of the Jewish population in Israel: The encouragement of Jewish settlement in demographically problematic regions, especially in the Galilee, the Jezreel Valley, and the Negev, among others, is necessary in order to prevent a contiguous Arab majority that would bisect Israel.

Regarding the rights and obligations of Israel’s citizens: Consideration should be given to granting Israeli Arabs a choice between full citizenship in the State of Israel and citizenship in the Palestinian state, with the rights of permanent residents in Israel, contingent upon the agreement of the Palestinian state. At the same time, Israelis who permanently reside abroad should be allowed to participate in Israeli elections by absentee ballot (by mail or at a diplomatic mission), as is the case with citizens of other countries (for example, the United States).

The World Jewry

Today 13.3 million Jews live in the world, about 5 million of them in Israel (37 percent). About 47 percent of the Jews in the world between the ages of 0-14 live in Israel: by the year 2005, a majority of the Jews in that age group will live in Israel. In 2010, Israeli Jews will constitute about half of the number of Jews in the world and thereafter, the majority of the Jewish people will reside in Israel.

The accumulated contribution of world Jewry to Israel’s strength and security is significant to the extent that it serves as Israel’s strategic “home front.” The partnership between world Jewry and Israel contributes to the national strength of Israel in a number of ways:

- The political and international arena: American and other Diaspora Jews influence their countries in a manner beneficial to Israel; the gates of the USSR opened, enabling Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel, thanks to American Jews. By the same token, the State of Israel, when making policy decisions, factors in the potential benefit or harm to world Jewry. Thus, for example, Israeli military actions are considered, at times, in light of their potential effect on Jewish communities around the world.
- The economic realm: In the past, the impact of Jewish contributions to Israel was enormous. Today, it totals a billion dollars a year. More important than the money is the principle that guides the donors—identification with the State of Israel.
- The immigration issue: Without immigration, there would not be a Jewish majority in the State of Israel. In 1948, there were 600,000 Jews in the State of Israel. Without Jewish immigration, the number of Jews in Israel would today have reached just 1.2 million, and it is doubtful whether the State of Israel would exist. Had it not been for the large wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union, the Jewish majority in Israel would have already significantly eroded.
At the same time, events in Israel and Israel’s standing in the international arena have an impact on the status, the image, and even the security of Jewish communities around the world.

Demographic trends (low birthrates) and assimilation are the factors that create the primary erosion in the size of Jewish communities the world over. This trend is especially conspicuous in the Jewish community in America, a community whose importance from Israel’s perspective is distinctive, both because it is the largest Jewish community in the world and because of the United States’ position as a superpower. American support of Israel, due to Jewish influence and other reasons, is still very significant, relative to support for the Arab countries and positions, both in Congress and public opinion. The organized nucleus of American Jewry has enormous power. This is a nucleus of two million active, influential Jews who identify with Israel more than in the past, and can be found in all important elite groups in the United States. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons for concern:

- The demographic weakness that affects the political influence of American Jews.
- Decline in American interest in foreign policy.
- Growing reservations in the United States regarding foreign aid.
- The tendency in Congress toward a domestic agenda due to the growing influence of ethnic groups.
- The increasing strength of Muslims and Arabs in the United States. Their numbers are estimated at approximately 6 million and their lobby strives to lessen the aid to Israel, reduce Israel’s strategic importance to the United States, and end sanctions on Iraq.

The issue of Jewish people in the Diaspora—the most important resource for the existence of Israel other than the people living in Israel—is not on Israel’s security agenda. To date, the Israeli government has not conducted even one serious debate about the future and security of the Jewish people. A joint national policy is necessary for the State of Israel and world Jewish institutions (central among them the Jewish Agency and the WZO) to guarantee the future of the Jewish people, their security, and their ties to Israel. This topic must be placed on the agenda and in that context, actions must be taken to achieve the following central goals:

- Increasing immigration to Israel, as stated, as part of a comprehensive demographic policy.
- Intensifying the Jewish-Zionist identity, to draw the young generation closer to the Jewish people and Israel.

Possible examples of concrete initiatives to achieve these goals:

- Doubling the number of students enrolled in Jewish educational frameworks in the Diaspora from 25 percent to 50 percent.
- Tripling the number of Jewish educators (today 150 are trained every year and we should aim for more than 400).
- Tripling the number of Jewish youth who visit Israel.
The State of Israel should become far more involved in the life of the Jewish people in the Diaspora, and it should strengthen its ties to them. Israel should consider to gradually grant a more significant role to the Jewish people, for example, in making decisions with significance for the Jewish people and Judaism. A “Seat of Government of the Jewish people” common to all the institutions and organizations in Israel and the Diaspora should be established in order to create a rich fabric of links and encourage familiarity between Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora, leading to the development of a shared sense of mutual identification, joint fate, and destiny.

**SCHEDULE OF HERZLIYA CONFERENCE 2000**

**Tuesday, December 19, 2000**

*Opening Session: The Essence of National Strength*

**Chair:** Dr. Uzi Arad, Director, Institute of Policy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, and Conference Chair

“Conference Guidelines and Approaches”

**Prof. Uriel Reichman,** President, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya

Greetings

Greetings: **Moshe Katsav,** President of Israel

**Prof. Yehezkel Dror,** Department of Political Science, Hebrew University

“Domestic Bases of Israel’s National Security”

**Prof. Gabriel Ben-Dor,** Chairman of the National Security Center, Haifa University,

*Task Force Chair*

“Israeli Attitudes on National Strength”

**Dinner**

Greetings: **Maj. Gen. (Res.) Meir Amit,** Chair, Center for Special Studies

**Maj. Gen. Uzi Dayan,** National Security Advisor and Head of the National Security Council, Prime Minister’s Office

“The Essence of National Security”

**Wednesday, December 20, 2000**

*Second Session: The Balance and Stability of the Peace Process*

**Chair:** Dr. Alon Liel, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**MK Uri Savir**

“The Balance Sheet of the Peace Process”

**Brig. Gen. Amos Gilead,** Head of Research Section, Intelligence Division, IDF

“Arab Positions toward the Peace Process”

**Ambassador Dr. Dore Gold,** President, The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

“An Alternative Policy in the Peace Process”

**Prof. Arnon Soffer,** Vice Chairman of the National Security Center, Haifa University,

*Task Force Chair*

“Geodemographic Aspects in the Peace Accords”

**Discussion**
Prof. Sammy Smooha, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Haifa University

Coffee Break

Third Session: United States—New Administration, New Directions

Chair: Shula Bahat, Associate Executive Director, The American Jewish Committee

Dr. Robert Satloff, Executive Director, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
“The Incoming Administration’s Middle Eastern Policy”

Ambassador Zalman Shoval
“Israeli Expectations of the New Administration”

David Harris, Executive Director, The American Jewish Committee
“The Status of the Jewish Community in America”

Discussion

Dan Halperin, CEO, Iptich

Dr. David Wurmser, Research Fellow, The American Institute for Public Policy Research

Lunch

Greetings: Prof. Uriel Reichman, President, The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya

Former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu
“Strength, Power, and Policy”

Fourth Session: The Economy and National Strength

Chair: Prof. Yaakov Neeman, Senior Partner, Herzog, Fox, and Neeman

Daniel Doron, Director, The Israel Center for Social and Economic Progress
“Gaining Economic Power—How?”

Pinchas Landau, Co-Director, I-Biz—Israel Business Information Services Ltd., Task Force Chair
“Measures Enhancing the Economic Product”

David Boas, CEO, Business Promotion and Consultation Ltd.
“Resource Allocation in the Defense Budget”

Yaakov Lifshitz, Chairman of the Board, Israeli Military Industries Ltd.
“The Defense Industry’s Contribution to National Strength”

Discussion

Dr. Leora Meridor

Prof. Amir Barnea, Dean, Arison School of Business, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya

Coffee Break

Fifth Session: Technological Power and National Strength

Chair: Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Yaron, Director-General, Ministry of Defense

Dr. Shlomo Kalish, CEO, Jerusalem Global Group, Task Force Chair
“Advanced Technology as a Foundation of National Strength”

Maj. Gen. Dr. Isaac Ben-Israel, Director, Defense R&D Directorate, Ministry of Defense
“The Link between Defense and Civilian Research and Development”

Avi Berger, Managing Partner, Kesselman & Kesselman PWC
“A Favorable Environment for Advanced Technology”

Dan Vilenski, Chairman, Applied Materials
“Development of Human Resources”

MK Moshe Arens
“Technological Independence for Israel”

Discussion

Dr. Orna Berry, Gemini Capital Fund Management Ltd.
Yossie Hollander, Chairman of the Board, Jacada

Dinner

Greetings: Prof. Galia Golan, Lauder School of Government, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya

MK Shimon Peres, Minister of Regional Development
“Grand Strategy for Israel”

Thursday, December 21, 2000

Sixth Session: The Future Strategic Environment

Chair: Maj. Gen. (Res.) Yitzhak Hoffi

Maj. Gen. Amos Malka, Head of Intelligence Division, IDF
“Strategic Threats—An Assessment”

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eitan Ben-Eliahu, President and CEO, East West Ventures Ltd.,
Task Force Chair
“From Low Intensity Confrontations to Comprehensive Deterrence”

Col. (Res.) Dr. Shmuel Gordon
“Low-Intensity Warfare”

Discussion

Prof. Eliot Cohen, School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Coffee Break

Seventh Session: The Balance of Defense and Deterrence

Chair: Shabtai Shavit, CEO, Maccabi Health Services

Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz, Chief of General Staff, IDF
“Challenges Facing the IDF”

MK Dan Meridor, Foreign and Defense Committee Chair
“Elements in the Deterrence Concept”

Discussion

Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilboa

Lunch

Greetings: Maj. Gen. (Res.) Aviezer Yaari

MK Maj. Gen. (Res.) Ariel Sharon
“Israel’s Security—Past and Future”

Eighth Session: Society, Education, and National Strength

Chair: Prof. Haim Harari, President, Weizman Institute

Prof. Yadin Dudai, Brain Research Department, Weizman Institute
“The Social Dimension of National Security”

Prof. Avishay Braverman, President, Ben-Gurion University
“Social Disparities and National Strength”

Dr. Shimshon Shoshani, CEO, Birthright Israel, Task Force Chair
“Maximum Utilization of Education Systems”

Maj. Gen. (Res.) Matan Vilnai, Minister of Science, Culture, and Sports
“Science and National Security”

Discussion

MK Yoseph Lapid, Head of Shinui Party

Prof. Nechamia Levtzion, Chair, The Planning and Budget Committee, The Council for Higher Education

Coffee Break

Ninth Session: The Zionist Enterprise and the Jewish People

Sallai Meridor, Chair, The Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization
“The Jewish People Component in Israel’s Strength”

Ephraim Halevy, Head of the Mossad
“The Zionist Ethos and the Security of Israel”

Closing Session of the Conference and the Inauguration Ceremony of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy

Ambassador Ronald S. Lauder, Chairman, The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations

Prof. Ehud Sprinzak, Dean, The Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy

Dr. Uzi Arad, Director, The Institute of Policy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, and Conference Chair

Conference Conclusion

Prof. Uriel Reichman, President, The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya

Lt. Gen. (Res.) Ehud Barak,* Prime Minister and Defense Minister
“The Balance of National Strength and Security”

Lighting of the First Candle of Hanukkah

*Prime Minister Barak canceled his participation due to unexpected developments.
TASK FORCES

Security and Strategy Task Force

*Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eitan Ben-Eliahu, Chair*
Col. (Res.) Amir Bar-Or
Ron Ben-Ishai
Boaz Ganor
Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amos Gilboa
Col. (Res.) Dr. Shmuel Gordon
Prof. Efraim Inbar
Dr. Reuven Pedatzur
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