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SETTLEMENT MONITOR

This section covers items—reprinted articles, statistics, and maps—pertaining to Israeli settlement activities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Major documents relating to the settlements appear in the Documents and Source Material section. JPS is grateful to the trustees of the Foundation for Middle East Peace for permission to reprint material from its bimonthly Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories as well as to the publication's editor.

In the Wake of the Gaza-Jericho Accord

- Geoffrey Aronson, "Historic Israeli-PLO Accord Leaves Settlements Intact," *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories* (hereinafter *Settlement Report*), July 1994 114
- Geoffrey Aronson, "Rabin Stirs Debate on Value of Settlements," *Settlement Report*, July 1994 116

Jerusalem

- Mikhal Peleg, Report on Judaization of Jerusalem, *Ha'Aretz Supplement*, 3 June 1994 (excerpts) 117
- Palestine Human Rights Information Center (PHRIC), East Jerusalem Indicators Relating to Israeli Policies, 7 June 1994 119

Hebron Settlements

- Palestine Human Rights Information Center (PHRIC), "Israeli Settlements and Settlers in Hebron," May 1994 (excerpts) 120

Settlement Briefs

- Land Confiscations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 15 February–15 April 1994, Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC) 122
- Settlement Activity in the Gaza Strip since the 13 September 1993 Agreement, *In One Bloc: The Newspaper of the Settlements in the Gaza Strip*, 2 July 1994 122
- Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert on Land Confiscations, *Ha'Aretz*, 6 May 1994 . . 122

IN THE WAKE OF THE GAZA-JERICHO ACCORD

Geoffrey Aronson, "Historic Israeli-PLO Accord Leaves Settlements Intact," *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories* (hereinafter *Settlement Report*), July 1994

After decades of enmity and armed confrontation, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization have taken another

important step in their historic effort at reconciliation, but the status of settlements remains unchanged.

On May 4 in Cairo, Israel and the PLO initialed the "Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area." The accord details the mechanisms, and limitations, of Palestinian autonomy according to the "Gaza-Jericho first" framework outlined in the Declaration of Principles signed on September 14, 1994, in Oslo. It secures a broad range of protection for settlements and settlers that includes

- Exclusion of settlements, settlers, and settler-related resources (land and water) from any Palestinian jurisdiction, interference, or control; and
- Limitation on Palestinian land use near settlements ("Yellow Areas") and continuing Israeli control over Palestinian zoning and land-use decisions.

The agreement also commits the Palestinian authority to maintain the existing system of Israeli military orders. This body of law—numbering more than 1,400 statutes—is the legal basis of the occupation established by Israel. It details the broad powers of the military government over Palestinians and their resources and reaffirms the protected status of settlements and settlers.

The Palestinian authority, however, has won some power to redraft these laws to fit the interests of the Palestinian community. Israel, however, retains a veto over all new legislation. Under the Cairo agreement, Palestinian legislation cannot "deal with a security issue which falls under Israel's responsibility," nor can it "seriously threaten other significant Israeli interests protected by this agreement."

The Declaration of Principles specifically excludes the issues of Israeli settlements and settlers from consideration during the five-year interim period, after which a permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians is supposed to be reached. But their status during the current stage was clearly and precisely addressed by the May 4 Gaza-Jericho accord. As Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin himself acknowledged in his presentation of the agreement to the Knesset on May 11, "the concern for Israel's security and the security of Israelis and the settlements is evident in every line and word."

Under the agreement, Israel will retain exclusive control over approximately 20 percent of the Gaza Strip. This territory is composed of two areas of Israeli settlement—a northern area comprised of three settlements and surrounding land; and the southern "Katif" bloc of 12 settlements and the environs.

"The agreement includes arrangements which allow reasonable protection of the settlements and the settlers," Rabin explained to the Knesset. "Placing the settlements in blocs, that is, demarcating the settlements that can be put in blocs, allows blanket protection of most of the settlements in the Gaza Strip, with the exception of two isolated settlements." One of

these is Netzarim, whose approach road separates Gaza city from the southern Gaza Strip. A large contingent of Israeli border police will be based permanently in this settlement.

The Israeli Defense Forces will withdraw from Palestinian areas throughout the rest of Gaza and redeploy into the settlements.

There are no settlements in the autonomous area of Jericho. Nearby settlements in the Jordan Valley will receive specific "security packages" customized to their particular needs.

IDF soldiers manning roadblocks at the entry to Palestinian areas, especially in Gaza, will warn both settlers and Israeli visitors that entry into these areas is their own responsibility. Settlers known to be "troublemakers" will probably not be allowed to enter the areas.

"The defense system we have devised creates a physical barrier between Jews and Arabs," explained an Israeli military official. Each bloc of settlements will constitute an independently defended area with separate headquarters, observation and guard posts, a circumferential electronic fence, and security roads. The Palestinian police force will not be permitted to enter these areas or use roads passing through them.

This creation of territorially unified blocs of settlements is an important precedent for future discussions on extending Palestinian rule to the remainder of the West Bank. A central objective for both Rabin and the right-wing opposition is to create contiguous blocs of Israeli settlements amidst noncontiguous blocs of Palestinian autonomy.

Israel retains the freedom "to do whatever is necessary to provide for the security of Israeli traffic on the main routes to the settlements and the adjacent areas," explained Rabin. Joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols will enable Israel to maintain a permanent presence on major transportation routes.

"The maintenance of the electricity, water, and telephone infrastructures in the Israeli settlements and IDF camps in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli infrastructure in the Jericho region will remain in Israel's hands," explained Rabin to the Knesset. "The supply of those services to the Israeli settlements and the IDF camps will, therefore, be independent of the Palestinian authority"

The Cairo accord also embraces the principle that settlers and Israelis will not be subject to Palestinian authority, even in criminal matters within the autonomous areas. . . .

(See Doc. C4.)

Geoffrey Aronson, "Rabin Stirs Debate on Value of Settlements," *Settlement Report*, July 1994

Israelis are now engaged in one of the most difficult, and potentially revolutionary, debates in the country's 46-year history. The Oslo accords, the February massacre of Palestinians in Hebron, and the recent Cairo agreement on the implementation of Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho have forced an extraordinary national debate on the role and value of Israeli settlements not only as political instruments, but also as the barometer of the strength and vitality of Zionism itself. The debate exposes the extent to which traditional notions about settlements are now being challenged by those at the center of Israeli politics, but it also reveals the practical limits of this "new thinking" on the Rabin government's settlement policies.

"The new reality which is unfolding these days demands that we restructure virtually all areas of our life," declared Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on June 5, in a speech marking the 27th anniversary of the 1967 war.

Jewish settlement in the "Land of Israel" has traditionally been understood by Israelis as an expression of the enduring vitality of Zionism and its moral vision. Security, sovereignty, and settlement were, according to Israel's compass, inextricably linked. To challenge the bond between security and settlement is to contest not only a key lesson of the Jewish historical experience in Palestine but also a basic commandment of Israel's national mythology. And that is exactly what Rabin is doing.

Rabin has begun the tortuous process of persuading Israelis that the "truths" about settlement they once held dear are no more relevant today than passages in the Palestinian Covenant that Yasser Arafat committed the Palestine Liberation Organization to renounce in the September 1993 Oslo agreement.

"Let's put things, once and for all, in the context of the new reality of a great and strong country," Rabin said on April 21. "This is not the eve of the War of Inde-

pendence when every settlement was vital."

Rabin now admits that a generation of settlement since 1967 has failed in its mission to transform the territories into part of Israel. The intifada made clear to Israel the cost of attempting to build in the hills around Nablus and in Hebron what an earlier generation of Zionist pioneers did in the Negev and Galilee regions of Israel. The Israel Defense Forces, he observed recently, remains an "occupation army" in the territories captured in June 1967.

Rabin's aversion to continuing rule of the occupied territories by force of arms is the direct source of his desire to reshape the popular view of settlements. If the army of occupation has no role to play in some parts of the territories, then, in Rabin's view, little rationale can be found beyond vague social and economic reasons for maintaining settlements in these areas.

For decades Israelis argued that settlements were agents of peace because they forced a hostile Arab world that rejected the idea of Jewish sovereignty to become reconciled to its existence. This notion, so absurd to foreign observers, was nevertheless one of the central truths learned by Israelis from the interminable struggle against their Arab opponents.

Today Rabin has begun the process of standing this myth on its head. In the Middle East at the dawn of the 21st century, he argues, settlements may well endanger rather than promote peace by undermining the prospects for rapprochement at a time when Arabs have become reconciled to Israel's existence.

West Bank settlements have not only failed in their historical role of marking out the perimeter of Jewish sovereignty, but most have only marginal security value, and those established by the Likud governments from 1977 to 1992 have none. "The security contribution of what I have described as 'political settlements' is zero," Rabin said in May. "It is a mistake to give a central security role to settlements."

By describing the settlement enterprise in such scathing terms, Rabin rejects the premise that settlement is an end in itself—an idea at the heart of traditional Zionism.

"Once settlement was the glory of the Zionist enterprise," lamented a settler from the Jordan Valley outpost of Vered Jericho, "but now I feel like a burden."

It is widely understood in Israel that the 400 settlers scattered throughout the

West Bank city of Hebron, and their 5,000 neighbors in the nearby settlement of Kiryat Arba, impede prospects for rapprochement between Israel and the Palestinians. But Rabin's failure to remove the settlers of Hebron in the wake of the February massacre demonstrates the practical limits to his "new thinking."

In the weeks after the killings, Rabin confronted a majority in his own cabinet who favored the removal of the Hebron settlers and a U.S. administration that supported this option as well as removing the IDF from part of the city center.

Rabin also faced a furious right wing that threatened to bring down his government through massive popular opposition and civil disobedience. His opponents included a religious establishment that instructed soldiers to disobey any order to evacuate settlements. "If this government gives an order to dismantle a settlement and expel Jews from their homes," explained a prominent rabbi, Nahum Rabinovitz of the settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, "it is necessary to refuse it as one would a Nazi order."

Rabin often has said that he does not want to confront the settlement movement. His sense of what was politically possible after Hebron outweighed remonstrations from his cabinet, Israel's security echelon, the U.S. State Department—and his own preferences. The status quo that permits the continuation, and even expansion, of the settlements in Hebron would remain undisturbed.

Rabin invoked the Oslo accords as the primary rationale for his decision. Deputy Minister of Defense Mordechai Gur explained that they could not be breached; therefore no Israeli settlement would be moved during the interim period.

But Israel Harel, leader of the Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, was closer to the mark when he lauded Rabin's decision as a "great achievement for the national camp that united to defend Jewish settlement in Hebron."

"There has never been a political camp in Israel so broad, active, and ready for great action, as there is today for the Land of Israel," noted Harel.

Rabin believes that the recently signed Gaza-Jericho agreement gives him a respite from considering the prospect of dismantling settlements. He continues to redefining settlements around Jerusalem as part

of the city itself and, hence, nonnegotiable.

But the dynamics of events that Rabin himself has set in motion will not permit such a luxury. Gaza-Jericho cannot survive as an experiment in genuine Palestinian self-rule without an expansion of its autonomous authority to the West Bank. Settlements will have to be evacuated, and the fury of Israel's religious and secular right wing defied, for this to occur.

JERUSALEM

Mikhal Peleg, Report on Judaization of Jerusalem, *Ha'Aretz Supplement*, 3 June 1994 (excerpts)

[The following are excerpts from an English summary of the 5,000-word Ha'Aretz article published in the FBIS on 9 June.]

Peleg asserts that in the 27 years since East Jerusalem was conquered, "Israel has done all it could to make the city one—and Jewish. Yet one united Jerusalem—the only national consensus that survived the evils of conquest—does not exist in reality. In real life, the capital is a patchwork of Jewish neighborhoods densely interspersed with enclaves of alienated Arab population surviving in dire conditions. The border which once separated the two parts of Jerusalem has disintegrated into dozens of border lines of an elusive yet very tangible nature, and they are never crossed. The alienation between the two populations has created a situation no Israeli Government ever intended; construction and development were invested in the Judaization of Jerusalem, and the discrimination practiced against the city's Arab residents made them a separate entity. Now it is easy for the Palestinians to demand separation because separation is already there."

Peleg goes on: "The battle for Jerusalem did not end with military occupation. It has been going on since 1967 through vast investments in infrastructure and the expedited construction of Jewish neighborhoods over the entire annexed territory, even at the expense of irreversible damage to scenery and the city's special character. Today, East Jerusalem alone is inhabited by 160,000 Jews, versus about 155,000 Arabs. The takeover campaign is complemented by several steps: a wide-scale expropriation of Arab lands—26,200

dunam to date; systematic restrictions on Arab construction; and the deliberate disregard for basic services to the Palestinian population. Over the years, Jerusalem's Arab residents have opted for passive resistance, which was mainly reflected in the scant participation in municipal elections (6 percent after the outbreak of the intifadah in 1989, less than 10 percent in the last elections)."

Peleg states that Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert believes the unofficial separation between the two parts of Jerusalem is "a temporary situation. Olmert plans to invest in improvements in the Arab city, and he accuses Teddy Kollek of neglecting and totally ignoring the Arab population's needs. He says he needs 140 million shekels of government funds to bring that part of the city up to date."

"Two cities exist side by side in Jerusalem: In one of them, new neighborhoods are built at a rate unparalleled in the entire State of Israel. Thousands of housing units are built and enormous investments are made in infrastructure, roads, landscape planning, street illumination, shopping malls, industrial and trade regions. Israel has built 60,000 housing units for Jews in areas annexed in 1967 alone, and 10,000 more are currently under construction. On the other side, there is another city, which can be hardly called a city. It is made up of isolated enclaves which look like dusty rural areas; one- or two-story houses, hardly any sidewalks, many unpaved roads, few street lights, most of which do not work, several streets sharing a single garbage collection receptacle, no playgrounds or parks."

"Jewish neighborhoods receive electricity from the Israeli Electrical Corporation. Arab neighborhoods receive theirs through the mediation of the East Jerusalem Electricity Company, a Jordanian-owned firm whose plants near Shu'fat were deserted when it was forced to stop producing power and made to buy it from the Israeli corporation. To reach West Jerusalem and the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, one uses Egged buses; the Palestinians have buses operated by small private companies from nearby villages, such as Abu-Dis and al-'Ayzariyah."

Peleg maintains that to facilitate Jewish construction in Jerusalem, the government has been expropriating and freezing Arab land. "In addition to the 73,000 dunam annexed in 1967," "26,200 dunam of privately owned Arab land were expropriated

in 1968, 1970, 1980, and 1990." To accommodate construction plans, another 2,300 dunam will be expropriated in the near future; tens of thousands of housing units for Jews were built on that land. That was how Gilo, Talpiyyot East, Neve Ya'aqov, Pisgat Ze'ev, and other neighborhoods sprouted. Another 35,000 dunam of unused Arab-owned land in East Jerusalem were frozen, that is, construction is prohibited on them. The Arabs have been left with a 9,500-dunam area on which they may build.

"A method of transferring lands to Jews was established under Teddy Kollek. The method consisted of marking map areas featuring privately owned Arab land in green. This was the sign allegedly indicating that the land was earmarked for public use and parks, and that construction was prohibited there. A few years after the land was marked green, some of it was expropriated and Jewish neighborhoods were built on them. For example, the Rekhes Shu'fat neighborhood, to be inhabited by Canadian ultra-Orthodox Jews, is in initial stages of construction, and planning has begun for two new neighborhoods, Har Homa and Sha'ar Mizrah between Neve Ya'aqov and the French Hill as well as a residential Jewish area in the heart of the Arab Ra's al-'Amud neighborhood."

Peleg adds that while "West Jerusalem has a master plan, all East Jerusalem has are local master plans which, for years, referred only to the Jewish neighborhoods. Only six Arab neighborhoods have received official license to date, while eight others have been waiting for approval for 10 years. In 1980, a municipal committee submitted a plan which indicated a need for 18,000 additional housing units for the city's Arab population. Nothing of this materialized. The Arab population grew from 114,000 in 1980 to 155,500 today. On the basis of five persons to an apartment, about 26,000 housing units for Arabs should have been built in East Jerusalem. As a result of the shortage and the overcrowded conditions, 5,000 housing units were built—many without a license. In 1990, for instance, 3,000 building permits were issued; of these, only 150 were for Arabs. Former city council member Sara Kaminker, who had been Kollek's adviser on Arab neighborhoods until her protest resignation, has amassed information indicating that about 21,000 Jerusalemite Arab families are homeless."

Peleg maintains that "the war over Jerusalem has changed after the Palestinians began, for the first time, to take action to improve their positions. Last November, a committee initiated by Faysal al-Husayni was set up. Its objective is to establish the National Council for Jerusalem-Palestine and to outline an action plan for the interim period. The committee, which is headed by Dr. Mahdi 'Abd-al-Hadi from PASSIA (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs), has practically drafted a plan for every municipal council department, from construction planning and infrastructure down to services, such as education, health, culture and religion, public security, and tax collection, including a blueprint for a Palestinian police force in East Jerusalem. PASSIA holds workshops from which local leaders and professional teams are gradually emerging." "In other offices related to Orient House, such as the Palestinian Geographical Center, Israeli takeover of Arab lands is meticulously documented, and each change is immediately noticed. In addition, they draw maps for future negotiations."

Khalil Tufakji, the Palestinian Geographical Center director, "claims that Ehud Olmert is trying to continue the Jewish expansion eastward, to the area outside metropolitan Jerusalem's boundaries, through the Sha'ar Mizrah neighborhood due to be built beyond road No. 9, linking Ma'ale Adumim to Pisgat Ze'ev."

"Palestinians have a vested interest in launching the debate on Jerusalem before the two years stipulated in the agreement are out: Their argument is that by then, they may have no land to discuss. The Israeli Government is also aware of the fact that the mounting tensions in the city and the operation of its Palestinian institutions—most notably Orient House, which even today is acting as a Palestinian municipal center and a quasi Foreign Ministry—will force it to deal with the problem earlier than expected."

East Jerusalem Indicators Relating to Israeli Policies

[The following statistics were released by the Palestine Human Rights Information Center (PHRIC) on 7 June 1994]

Palestinian homelessness

- An estimated 21,000 Palestinian families are homeless or inadequately housed in East Jerusalem and are forced to live in

caves and tents or double and triple-up with other families, as a direct result of Israeli house demolition, land expropriation, and restrictive and discriminatory housing policies.

Demolitions

- PHRIC has documented over 210 Palestinian homes demolished by the Israeli authorities in East Jerusalem since mid-1986 for licensing reasons.
- Demolitions of Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem are currently carried out at a rate of about 50 per year.

Land expropriation and restrictive land use policy

Of the 73,000 dunums in East Jerusalem:

- 29,000 dunums have been expropriated, or will soon be expropriated, for the building of illegal Jewish settlements. (Article 49 of the IV Geneva Convention).
- 10,000 dunums remain on which Palestinians can build.
- 35,000 dunums are left unplanned.

Palestinians are permitted to build on only 14 percent of the land in East Jerusalem, and much of this land has already been built upon.

Building height restrictions

- Building height in Palestinian neighborhoods may not exceed two stories whereas buildings in the Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem are permitted as many as eight stories.

Services and municipal property taxes

- Jerusalem's Palestinian population pays 26 percent of the total cost of municipal services but receives just five percent of these services.

Discriminatory policies in favor of Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem

- The Israeli government has provided subsidized housing for 70,000 Jewish families in East Jerusalem settlements alone, in contrast to subsidized housing for only 555 Palestinian families.
- The Jerusalem area Master Plan sets aside over half of the extended area of East Jerusalem for Jewish settlements and Israeli institutions.

Forced Palestinian emigration from East Jerusalem

- A sample study conducted in 1993 by Dr. Bernard Sabela, political scientist at

Bethlehem University, estimated that the following numbers of Palestinians have emigrated with their families since 1967:

- 16,917 who emigrated abroad since 1967;
- 12,080 who emigrated outside the borders of illegally annexed areas;
- 12,500 who currently live in the North Jerusalem area; and
- 7,630 who were outside the country in 1967 and therefore were never issued Jerusalem identity cards.

HEBRON SETTLEMENTS

Palestine Human Rights Information Center (PHRIC), "Israeli Settlements and Settlers in Hebron," May 1994

[The following overview is taken from PHRIC's 152-page *Special Report entitled The Massacre in Al-Haram al-Ibrahimi al-Sharif: Context and Aftermath.*]

Kiryat Arba: Kiryat Arba, the major stronghold of Israeli ultra-right extremism, was the first settlement established in the Occupied Territories after the 1967 war. It was established in a *fait accompli* by four families of militant Jewish settlers, led by Gush Emunim Rabbi Moshe Levinger in April 1968 when they illegally occupied Hebron's Park Hotel under the pretext of being Swiss tourists and then refused to leave. The next day the militants announced their intention of remaining in Hebron and occupied two buildings near the military governorate for the Hebron area.¹ Six months later, the Israeli government acquiesced to the settlers' demands and began discussions on establishing a settlement, Kiryat Arba, near Hebron city.²

In 1970, the government officially approved the creation of Kiryat Arba settlement east of Hebron as a compromise which would appease the Gush Emunim

while directing settlers out of the city of Hebron.³ Kiryat Arba was initially established on 1,200 dunums of privately-owned Palestinian land; the area was "emptied" by uprooting grapevines and demolishing houses.⁴ The construction of Kiryat Arba was also part of the Israeli policy of "mixing" Jewish settlements with Arab residential areas even if it meant that such settlements were "being overbuilt and undersettled."⁵

Kiryat Arba has been steadily expanded by successive Israeli governments since its establishment; it now has a population of more than 6,000 settlers. It has remained a center of Gush Emunim activity and right-wing ideology. On April 16, 1989, Kiryat Arba settlers announced the formation of a "rapid intervention force" comprised of seven men and four attack dogs, to be used in "serious" or "life threatening" situations (i.e. stone-throwing). Uri Ariel, chairman of the Council of Settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, stated that the lack of official criticism regarding the establishment of such units proved that the military "had no problem with them."⁶

Kach leader Rabbi Meir Kahane had an apartment in the settlement, which he used occasionally. The settlement has a local council and is a religious urban settlement. Its economy depends on light industry and tourism. Kach had one seat on Kiryat Arba's nine-member council, which was occupied by Baruch Goldstein.

Between 1991 and 1993 settlement expansion of both Kiryat Arba and nearby settlement Givat Harsina began with the purpose of joining both. This entailed more land seizure and leveling, tree uprooting, and construction of housing units near Palestinian houses in the Wad Frous valley situated between both settlements.

Givat Harsina: In 1982 Givat Harsina was established about four kilometers north of Kiryat Arba. It was built on Hebron city land and only several meters from Arab houses. It comprises 400 housing units. Between 1991 and 1993, Givat

1. *Jerusalem Post*, February 28, 1994; *The West Bank and Gaza Atlas* by Meron Benvenisti and Shlomo Khayat, WDBP, 1988, p. 139; MERIP: #60 (717) September 1977, pp. 17.

2. *Partners in Crime: The Collusion of Israeli Authorities in the Hebron Settler Violence* (Alternative Information Center, April 1994).

3. Abu-Lughod, Janet. "Israeli Settlements in Occupied Arab Lands: Conquest to Colon." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Winter 1982), 32.

4. Matar, Ibrahim. "Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Autumn 1981), p. 106.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Jerusalem Post*, April 17 and 21, 1989.

Harsina was expanded to link with Kiryat Arba in order to form a settlement block on the eastern edge of Hebron city.

PHRIC documented the following chronology of settlement activity between 1991 and 1993 joining Givat Harsina with Kiryat Arba:

- In April and May 1991, 150 units were added to Kiryat Arba and Harsina settlements for Ethiopian and Soviet Jews.⁷
- In August 1991, construction workers said 200 additional prefabricated housing units; 50 were brought by truck during the night of August 29 alone. On Shayeb Hill near Kiryat Arba, next to the Border Police headquarters, foundations were dug for 40 houses, on previously confiscated Arab land.⁸
- During October through November 1991, Kiryat Arba and Harsina settlements were further expanded.⁹
- Through February 1992, construction on land bordering both settlements continued. An additional 35 dunums of privately-owned land was occupied and leveled. A wall was built, a road opened, and a sewage system was installed.¹⁰
- From March through April 1992, fifty housing units were constructed between both settlements; land of al-Jabris, near Kiryat Arba, was leveled to initiate its confiscation.¹¹
- In August 1992, 15 housing units added; continued leveling for new housing units adjacent to Arab residential area.¹²
- Through September 1992, expansion of Kiryat Arba and Harsina continued in the form of digs and construction.¹³
- Through November 1992, more housing units were built, added, and inhabited in the Wad Frous valley to join Kiryat Arba and Harsina settlements.¹⁴
- In December 1992 the expansion was turned into a new Jewish settlement with 20 buildings inside Hebron city. Construction continued adjacent to Palestinian houses at the expense of land belonging to the local residents.¹⁵

7. PHRIC Update: May 1991.

8. PHRIC Update: August 1991.

9. PHRIC Updates: October and November 1991.

10. PHRIC Update: February 1992.

11. PHRIC Updates: March and April 1992.

12. PHRIC From The Field, September/October, 1992.

13. *Ibid.*

14. PHRIC, *Clever Concealment*: February 1992.

15. *Ibid.*

- In January and February 1993, expansion continued on settlement in Wad Frous to join Kiryat Arba and Harsina and to link with road from the East.¹⁶

- In November 1993, PHRIC fieldworkers documented settler bulldozing of 1.5 dunums of land adjacent to Givat Harsina settlement.

Bet Hadassah: Forced settlement in the center of Hebron began in 1979 when Miriam Levinger, the wife of Gush Emunim militant rabbi Moshe Levinger, led a group of settler women in a takeover of a Palestinian building called Dabboyya, which the settlers claimed was once Jewish-owned. The Israeli government allowed the settler-squatters to remain in the building, renamed Hadassah, and agreed to reconstruct the city's old Jewish neighborhood. Settlers have led a campaign since then to take over buildings once owned by Jews in the 1920s, and evict their Palestinian occupants. Some 60 families, or about 400 settlers, live in Hebron city. The Palestinian population of Hebron city is about 80,000.

Bet Haggai: In 1984 Bet Haggai settlement was established south of Hebron city and is only tens of meters away from the Arab houses of Hebron city. Between 1992 and 1993 PHRIC documented ground leveling, further construction, and transport of mobile homes during the night to the settlement.¹⁷ Bet Haggai has a settler population of at least 200 according to an October 1992 Peace Now settlement report.

Tel Rumeida: In 1984, Israeli Defense Minister at the time, Moshe Arens, approved the establishment of Ramat Yashai settlement in the center of Hebron city over Muslim graves.¹⁸ The settlement is on a hilltop and overlooks Hebron city as well as Shuhada [Martyrs'] Street which was closed off to Palestinians by the military authorities after the Ibrahim massacre. Eyewitnesses told PHRIC fieldworkers that two settler families moved into Tel Rumeida on March 20, 1994. Six to eight families now live in the settlement which consists of several caravans. Palestinian residents of the area con-

16. *Ibid.*

17. See PHRIC Update: February 1992; From the Field: September/October, 1992; *Clever Concealment*: February 1994.

18. *Ibid.*

tinue to be subjected to settler and soldier attacks.

"Jewish Quarter:" In 1985 a large settlement complex was built as a central settler neighborhood overlooking the Hebron vegetable market. Access to the vegetable market has been sealed off for Palestinians since the Ibrahimi massacre by military posts and by T-shaped concrete blocks which divide the main street in two: one section for settler use, the other for Palestinian pedestrian use.

Former Hebron Bus Station: In 1981, the Hebron Central bus station was occupied by the Israeli military authorities on "security" pretexts that stones and molotov cocktails had been thrown from that area.¹⁹ In August 1991, the Israeli Defense Ministry gave approval to 160 Yeshiva Shavei Hebron religious students to move into ten mobile homes in what was Hebron city bus station. This is part of the expansion of Bet Romano settlement.²⁰

Usama Bin Munkez Preparatory School: In 1982 the Usama Bin Munkez School (Bet Romano) was confiscated by the army (Update: August 1991). In 1983 it was taken over by settlers.²¹ In August 1991, Israeli soldiers and settlers began digging what Palestinian residents believed were underground tunnels on the grounds of the school to the Ibrahimi mosque and the Old City settlements.²²

Givat Ha'apot: After the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, militant settlers from Kiryat Arba expanded the settlement by constructing homes on the other side of the Border Guard center next to the main settlement southeast of the city and very close to Palestinian homes. The settlement, called Givat Ha'apot or Mountain of Ancestors, was an alternative residence for Baruch Goldstein.

19. *Ibid.*

20. PHRIC Update: August 1991.

21. *Ibid.*

22. PHRIC Update: August 1991.

SETTLEMENT BRIEFS

Land Confiscations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 15 February-15 April 1994, Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC).

Ramallah District:	160 dunums
Jerusalem:	370 dunums
Yatta, Hebron District:	20,000 dunums
Gaza Strip:	100 dunums
Total since 13 September 1993:	62,595

Settlement Activity in the Gaza Strip since the 13 September 1993 Agreement, *In One Bloc: The Newspaper of the Settlements in the Gaza Strip*, 2 July 1994

According to the settlers' newspaper of the Gaza Strip, 140 new families have settled in the Gaza Strip from the signing of the Declaration of Principles through June 1994. Of these, 61 families had settled in Nisanit (northern Gaza Strip). The newspaper added that more settlers were expected during the summer.

Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert on Land Confiscations, *Ha'Aretz*, 6 May 1994

In an interview with *Ha'Aretz* on 6 May 1994, Mayor Olmert supported annexing more of the West Bank to Jerusalem "in the near future."

"If you want to know whether I support confiscation of land where necessary for construction and development in Jerusalem, the answer is: absolutely yes I believe Jerusalem should expand eastward, because further westward development would soon turn Jerusalem into a suburb of Tel Aviv Naturally this planning concept has political ramifications."