THE PEACE PROCESS


[The PLO’s committee on the peace talks met in Tunis 15-17 May 1993 to review the ninth round of bilateral Arab-Israeli peace talks, which ended in Washington on 13 May 1993. The following committee statement was published by the East Jerusalem newspaper al-Quds on 20 May 1993 and translated by FBIS on 24 May 1993.]

The ninth round of bilateral talks between the Arab delegations, including our Palestinian delegation, and the Israeli government’s delegation ended in Washington.

The ninth round was convened after a break of about five months because of the Palestinian leadership’s insistence on its declared stance since the end of the eighth round as a result of Israel’s deportation of 415 Palestinian residents to Marj al-Zuhur in south Lebanon. During this time the PLO waged a large-scale political battle on all fronts, the direct result of which was Security Council Resolution 799 relating to the repatriation of the deportees to their homeland.

In light of subsequent political developments and the agreements reached with the U.S. administration, and with the knowledge of the Arab states, the PLO decided to return to the peace talks in Washington provided that the political and practical undertakings would be realized on the eve of and during the negotiating round. Indeed, an Israeli announcement accepted Faisal Husseini’s inclusion at the negotiating table after he and our other brothers from Jerusalem were deprived of sitting at this table in the past. Along with Faisal Husseini some brothers from outside entered the working committees for the first time. Undoubtedly, this represents a break in the Madrid formula over Palestinian representation, although not in the form that we would have preferred, namely, Palestinian representation through the PLO.

The Israeli decision to repatriate 30 citizens from among the brothers deported from June 1967 until 1987 set a precedent with an important political implication. Pressure should be used to conclude this process and achieve the return of all the deportees as a national Palestinian right, in parallel with our continued struggle and contacts for the repatriation of the brother deportees in Marj al-Zuhur.

The Palestinian decision to go to the talks was not the outcome of foreign pressure nor a response to the appeals of some countries. It was in harmony with our political understanding of the negotiating process, especially since we are waging it as an intense political battle that is more complicated than our military battles. While we are engaged in this battle, it is being accompanied by an escalating struggle inside our occupied homeland. Despite all the complexities involving a return to the talks, the decision by our people’s political leadership was also in harmony with the Arab position, epitomized by the cordon states ministers’ Damascus statement, which maintained the unity of joint tendency to go to the talks.

The Negotiating Track

Our delegation went to the talks armed with the negotiating plan adopted by the political leadership during the previous rounds, with a clear definition of our goal in

this round, which was to reach agreement on a "declaration of principles." This, so that the talks would have a defined framework and as an essential step for discussing substantive issues and ensuring serious and real progress in the talks.

With the start of the talks, agreement was reached on forming working committees for land, water, and substance. In addition, a human rights committee was set up not as part of the negotiations but parallel to them, stemming from our concept that Palestinian human rights are not subject to a negotiating process.

The Committees' Work

A. The substance committee: This committee's work covered a number of basic concepts relating to the substance of the negotiating process, including the talks' aim and terms of reference; the scope of Palestinian authority; elections; the Palestinian interim government's authority, legislative powers and general responsibilities; security; economy; and the liaison and arbitration committees.

The committee's work involved a discussion of all these concepts during which the viewpoint of each party was defined. A great difference appeared between our two viewpoints on the different substantive issues.

B. The land and water committee: This committee dealt with one of the talks' basic issues whose delineation will determine the concept of a political settlement from the viewpoint of linkage between the transitional and final stages. Defining the Palestinian government's territorial unity constitutes a basic factor since in previous rounds the Israeli delegation revealed its own concept of land based on dividing and separating the land, which deprives the interim stage of the content for which we are striving.

Our delegation stressed the fact that Palestinian land is a single unit whose ownership and control belongs to a Palestinian authority, whereas the Israeli delegation tried to deal in a new way with its old concept by presenting general terms but with the same previous content.

C. The human rights committee: Our delegation insisted that this committee was not part of the negotiations, but parallel to them. The committee held two meetings during which it transpired that the Israeli delegation was attempting to use this committee to exert pressure on the work of the other committees and on the negotiations. It made the achievement of any progress in this committee conditional to the achievement of progress in other committees. This forced the Palestinian leadership to suspend this committee's work in order to block the Israeli maneuver.

The Presented Plans

A. The Israeli plan on a declaration of principles: On 6 May, at the end of the second week, the Israeli delegation presented an "unofficial" draft plan for a declaration of principles.

The draft considered that the aim of the talks was the establishment of a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The talks are to be conducted in two phases interlocked in a time frame, with all options remaining open.

The draft noted that the vast majority of the functions of the Civil Administration, which will be dissolved, will be transferred to the Palestinians, while Israel will maintain responsibility for overall security.

The draft called for the election of a Palestinian executive council through elections under agreed supervision.

The draft stressed that some legislative powers delegated to the executive council will be subject to agreed principles and should conform with the agreement.

Jurisdiction: The territories are a territorial unit. Authority within the territories will be applied, as appropriate, in accordance with the operational-functional responsibilities.

The draft called for the establishment of a Palestinian police force as a law enforcement organ.

B. The Palestinian plan on a declaration of principles: On 10 May the Palestinian delegation presented a draft "declaration of principles" affirming that the aim of the talks was to implement Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

The draft affirmed that the two phases are interlocked.

The draft stressed that the authority of the Palestinian interim government will be established through internationally supervised elections in which all Palestinians registered on 4 June 1967 will participate.

The Palestinian authority will assume legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The powers of the Civil Administration and the military government will be transferred to this authority. Israeli withdrawal will take place in accordance with an agreed timetable and international supervision.

Palestinian land is a single unit and has a single judicial system. Our draft stressed the need of setting up liaison committees to dis-
cuss the resolution of disputes, and also called for the formation of arbitration committees.

Palestinian Steps

Upon the Israeli delegation’s presentation of its plan and in view of its continued refusal to engage in substantive negotiations and violation of the agreements reached before the talks regarding some steps essential for the talks’ progress, the Palestinian leadership decided to reduce the Palestinian negotiating delegation’s members from eleven to three, to suspend the work of the land, water, and substance committees, and to concentrate on discussing the “declaration of principles.”

The last week of negotiations actually concentrated on discussion of the “declaration of principles” plan. Our delegation presented a full rebuttal to the Israeli plan and considered it to be an extension of the previous Israeli concept of avoiding determination of the talks’ aim and terms of reference, trying to separate the two phases, insisting that the final options remain open, dividing the land, and preventing Palestinian jurisdiction over it.

The U.S. Plan

In the last two days of the talks, the United States presented “a joint statement” plan to be issued by the Palestinian and Israeli delegations. Initially, the U.S. administration refused to hand over to our delegation the proposed text and insisted on doing so during a tripartite meeting with the Israeli delegation. In view of the delicate situation and the available information that the plan had been discussed in detail with Rabin personally, the Palestinian leadership rejected the tripartite meeting and insisted on receiving the draft before such a meeting. After about a 16-hour delay, the U.S. administration handed over its proposed draft to our delegation.

The follow-up committee, chaired by brother Abu Ammar [Yasir Arafat], held a special meeting at dawn on Thursday, 13 May, to study the proposed draft. Consequently, a memorandum was sent to the cosponsors in which our position on the U.S. plan was spelled out. The memorandum considered “the statement in its different clauses to reflect the Israeli government’s viewpoint,” with an intentional omission of Jerusalem and an end to the occupation. Moreover, the statement contradicts the letters of assurances and invitation and President Bush’s initiative, in addition to adopting Israeli expressions and terms in full.

The memorandum called on the U.S. side to continue consulting with the two parties in a bid to reach agreement on “a declaration of principles” agreed on by the cosponsors.

Summary

First: It became possible during the ninth round to get acquainted with the new U.S. administration’s concepts on the peace process as well as its means of action. This administration fulfills its role in a very different way from the previous Bush-Baker administration. Coordination with the Israeli side seems to be deeper and more cohesive. This confronts us with a negotiating situation that demands from us further awareness and concentration.

Second: As far as Israel is concerned, it became clear that it is still relying on its old tactics in dealing at the negotiating table. The Israeli negotiator uses three languages: the first, behind the scenes, which is very generous. The second, at the negotiating table, which is more cautious. The third, on the documents, which is extremely intransigent and hard-line.

It became obvious that since the beginning of the second week the Israeli negotiators had hit the brakes on all tracks. Apparently, the reason for this was a major preoccupation with the domestic crisis and the uncertainty of its resolution during that period.

Third: With regard to the papers presented at the negotiating table—the Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. ones—what is noteworthy is the great convergence between the U.S. and Israeli papers. There were attempts to make those two papers the basis of negotiations, but our position foiled those attempts.

The greatest danger is if we are drawn into discussing such papers at the negotiating table because they will become, should such a thing occur, an alternative to the main negotiating basis, namely, the Madrid invitation, Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the letter of assurances, and Bush’s initiative.

Fourth: The ninth round also revealed defined and clear signs of the limits of U.S. and Israeli commitment to the promises made during the preparatory stage for the ninth round. The line separating promise from enforcement seems delusive. From now on it will not hurt to be wary of the goodwill and credibility of promises. Despite this, some initiatives were realized, such as the repatriation of some old-time deportees and the modification in our favor of the formula of Palestinian representation—Jerusalem. Moreover, there were some political terms which Israel tried to empty of content but was obliged to ac-
knowledge, such as the unity of the land and dealing with the peace process as a single process. We have to work very hard in order to wrest more from Israel.

Fifth: No and yes. At the time, our delegation said no because all the world, including important circles within Israel itself, was convinced that the "no" was justified and was presented in a considered way out of concern for the success of the peace process. The ball was thrown into the Israeli court. The Israeli press has been almost unanimous that the reason for the lack of sufficient progress in the ninth round was Israeli stinginess in offering initiatives and U.S. negativism in active participation.

Conclusion

All of us must wage a large-scale campaign, the aim of which is to consolidate and activate our position on the issue of human rights. The U.S. administration, which gained a large number of votes because it advocated human rights, has done nothing worthwhile to stop Israeli maltreatment of the Palestinians. Rather, some administration figures tried to barter a small step on the road to Palestinian human rights with other steps required from us at the negotiating table. Palestinian human rights must be outside the framework of negotiating blackmail. The U.S. administration must understand this because of the moral, political, and human importance.

The coming stage will be a difficult one for us, but our adherence to the bases of our national and negotiating policy will be the solid wall on which we will rely and through which we will prevent attempts at containment, deception, and extortion.


[The following statement, in the form of a memorandum to Secretary of State Warren Christopher from Palestinian delegation head Faisal Hussein, summarizes the Palestinian understanding of the ninth round of bilateral Arab-Israeli peace talks, the Palestinian reaction to the 12 May 1993 U.S. draft of an Israeli-Palestinian joint statement (see JPS 88, Doc. D5.), and human-rights conditions in the occupied territories. At the document's core are ten points—concerning the negotiations' terms of reference, the territorial scope of the talks, the status of Jerusalem, the jurisdiction of the Palestinian interim self-governing authority, and issues to be raised in the final status talks—on which the Palestinians sought clarifications from the United States. It was published by the Amman daily al-Dustur on 13 June 1993 and translated by FBIS on 14 June 1993.]

Thank you for your message of May 24 and for your invitation to pursue talks on a joint Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles in Washington. I also appreciate your words of encouragement, and recognize that a challenging task lies ahead which requires serious commitment and joint work. In order for the Washington visit to be fruitful, the following issues have to be seriously addressed:

1. As you may recall, our discussions prior to the ninth round addressed several key areas which required immediate and effective intervention. We were reassured by your commitment to resolve the issues which had formed serious obstacles in the peace process. These included the lifting of the economic blockade imposed on the Palestinian people and leadership and the leveling of the playing field in terms of Israeli human rights abuses which Israel has been using as a means of pressure in negotiations—particularly the issues of deportation, the siege of Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, prisoners and detainees, taxes and fines, house demolitions, and the use of live ammunition against Palestinian civilians, including children. In addition, we were promised a more serious Israeli approach to and presentation of the substantive issues of negotiations consistent with the terms of reference and with the principles and objectives of the peace process. To that end, the U.S. pledged to play an effective and constructive role as an impartial "full partner."

2. On that basis, the Palestinian leadership, and in particular President Arafat, took the courageous and difficult decision to return to negotiations in the ninth round despite adverse and painful circumstances. Having fulfilled its promises, the Palestinian leadership looked forward to reciprocal moves from the U.S. to implement steps in the areas mentioned above in good faith and as a positive affirmation of the integrity of the negotiations and of the credibility of the U.S. as an impartial full partner.

3. The ninth round, which we viewed as a test of commitments and promises signaling a new and qualitatively different phase in the negotiations, was a source of intense disappointment and let down. The beginning of negotiations was promising in that Israel began the return of 1967 deportees and the use of a more flexible discourse in negotiations. On our part, we came prepared with serious proposals on a joint Declaration of Principles
and immediately formed two formal working groups on land and concept, in addition to the group on human rights on the periphery of the talks. We also responded positively to the U.S. request for a one-week extension of the round, and President Arafat personally persuaded the other Arab parties to do the same.

The second week, however, witnessed serious backsliding as Israel adopted a more hardline position in negotiations and stubbornly refused to carry out any of the other steps promised. It escalated its repressive measures in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and turned the work of the human rights working group into a mockery. Even by Israeli assessments, May 1993 was the "bloodiest month" since the beginning of negotiations.

4. At the same time, the U.S. role, which had started out with a promise of greater active involvement, did not produce any results. We repeatedly reminded State Department officials that the situation cannot bear any further delays: the economic blockade must be lifted and a more persuasive approach must be taken with the concerned parties to save our institutions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and to release Palestinian funds. We stressed that while we actively mobilized for a jubilant reception of the first batch of returnees, this had to be followed quickly by further groups in order to sustain the atmosphere. We also urged the immediate release of a sizable list of names of the December 1992 deportees to be returned, as per your agreement with the Israelis. The belated announcement of a mere 23 names towards the end of the round struck at the credibility of the U.S. and exposed Israel's bad faith and lack of seriousness. In addition, no steps whatsoever were taken to lift the siege of Jerusalem or to release prisoners and detainees. At the same time, conditions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories continued their drastic deterioration and brought about a reversal in the public mood, exacerbating tensions and generating further hostility and mistrust.

The sequential approach which you had presented to us in Washington and which we reluctantly accepted on the basis of your own guarantees did not materialize. A positive response from us, you promised, would produce a list of human rights measures; immediately upon resumption of talks, implementation would begin. To date, we still do not have a list, nor have any additional steps been taken beyond the return of the 30 deportees. Their jubilant welcome has been overshadowed by the mournful funeral processions of the new victims. The economic blockade continues despite your promise to relieve the economic hardships in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and to rescue our collapsing national institutions. Israel persists in exploiting the painful human rights situation for political coercion and blackmail. The peace process is demonstrably not a vehicle for positive changes, but an excuse for further unjust, illegal and repressive measures. The U.S. protestations of inability to influence the relevant parties are neither realistic nor persuasive. At this stage, it is the credibility of the U.S. that is at stake and its willingness to act in good faith to fulfill its commitments.

5. The promised U.S. role of full partnership in negotiations was also a source of disappointment. While we had repeatedly sought trilateral meetings, the one you proposed came rather late and for the sake of form, rather than substance. U.S. involvement must be invested to bring about genuine progress in the core issues that need to be resolved, not to give the appearance of progress where none exists. The "joint statement" drafted by the U.S. clearly exhibited bias towards Israel in language and substance and violated both the terms of reference and U.S. policy. The lack of parity in the treatment of both sides was also alarming to us since it indicated that the full partner was taking sides to the advantage of the Israelis.

The issue of parity and fairness was also tested in our first experience of information-sharing pertaining to Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Our "meeting of experts" turned out to be an empty exercise carried out as a matter of form without content, Israeli pressures and priorities must have exerted more influence than fairness in responding to our need and our right to gain access to crucial information.

6. In view of the PLO role in the process, and despite the fact that the U.S.-PLO dialogue was "suspended" and not severed, we fail to understand continuing U.S. resistance to the resumption of the dialogue. The PLO has selected and appointed the delegation and granted it the legitimacy it requires to carry out its tasks. The PLO also has sustained Palestinian participation in spite of tremendous difficulties. All decision-making and policy decisions are taken by the PLO. All the delegation's expenses are being met by the PLO. The U.S. has accepted these realities and deals with them indirectly. It is time for a direct and honest approach which would redress a situation which has adversely affected the peace talks and U.S.-Palestinian relations.
It is inexplicable to us that the U.S. as a cosponsor and full partner addresses the leaderships of all parties involved in the negotiations with the exception of the Palestinian side. Such an attitude is neither fair, practical, nor constructive. It is thus essential that we receive a positive response from you on the resumption of the dialogue in order to redress this inequitable situation and to serve the interests of peace.

7. We view the U.S. role and responsibility, both on the functional and substantive levels, as emanating from the broad outlines of ongoing U.S. policy, as well as from the more specific terms of reference for the peace process. In this context, and in preparation for our visit and talks in Washington, and in the interest of the future of the peace process as a whole, we wish to posit the following questions for immediate consideration and response:

1. Since you have repeatedly reiterated that the bases of the whole process are UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace, is there any question as to the applicability of these terms of reference to both the negotiations and the outcome? Isn’t the implementation of these resolutions the purpose of the whole process as a means of achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace?

2. Since the reference in UNSCR 242 is to the land occupied by Israel in 1967, is there any reason to question the fact that the land is actually occupied, hence subject to the principle of withdrawal and de jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention?

3. Since the term ‘occupied territory’ as used by the U.S. refers to the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, is there any reason for violating the territorial integrity of the land or fragmenting it?

4. Since the U.S. does not recognize Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and the expansion of its municipal boundaries or any other illegal unilateral act to change the status of Jerusalem, is it not imperative on the U.S. to prevent Israel from carrying out such actions, particularly the settlement activities in and around the city of Jerusalem, and the city’s siege and isolation as a form of de facto annexation?

5. Since the U.S. believes that it is the Palestinian side’s right to bring any subject to the table of negotiations, particularly the issue of Jerusalem, and in view of U.S. policy on Jerusalem as part of the Occupied Territories, does the U.S. continue to support the inclusion of Jerusalem in interim phase negotiations, while recognizing that the fate of the whole city will be determined in final status negotiations? Should not East Jerusalem be part of the interim self-government arrangements?

6. Since the purpose of interim phase negotiations is to bring the occupation to an end and to effect the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinians, does this not mean the establishing of a genuine self-governing authority with legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, and not just partial functional or executive tasks?

7. Since the interim phase is a transitional period which is required to break down the walls of suspicion and mistrust and lay the basis for sustainable negotiations on the final status of the Occupied Territories, does this not establish an interlock in substance (in addition to the temporal connection) which should rule out any steps or agreements that would preempt or prejudice the final status? As a period of adjustment as well, isn’t the transitional phase clearly preparatory for permanent status?

8. Since the interim phase must not be prejudicial to permanent status, should not all options remain open, provided they do not contravene UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace?

9. Since settlement activities are not only illegal (by both international law and international humanitarian law) but also obstacles to peace, as well as being unilateral actions that violate the terms of reference and preempt the final outcome, should the U.S. accept such actions or allow Israel to continue their perpetuation knowing that they threaten to sabotage the whole peace process?

10. Since the U.S. position continues to be that this process should achieve the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people, how does the U.S. define these rights?

8. We wish to reiterate once again our commitment to the peace process as a genuine means of conflict resolution to bring a just, comprehensive and lasting peace and stability to our region. We also wish to serve the continuity and successful outcome of the process by ensuring respect for its terms of reference and safeguarding its integrity. It is within this commitment that we are studying your invitation to carry out discussions in Washington, and are thus presenting the above issues for your consideration and responses.


[The foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
the PLO, and Syria met in Amman, Jordan on 6 June 1993 to review the ninth round of bilateral Arab-Israeli peace talks. They issued the following statement, broadcast on Syrian Arab Republic Radio on 7 June 1993 and translated by FBI's the same day.

At the invitation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the foreign ministers of the Arab states participating in the bilateral peace talks—the Syrian Arab Republic, Palestine, the Republic of Lebanon, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan—held a meeting in Amman on 6 June 1993. The foreign minister of the Republic of Egypt also took part in the meeting, which was part of ongoing coordination and consultation among the ministers. Several heads and members of the Arab delegations to the bilateral peace talks also took part in the meeting.

The meeting mainly addressed the ninth round of the bilateral negotiations, held from 30 April to 13 May 1993, in light of intensive contacts and consultations with the cosponsors of the conference, in order to eliminate the obstacles that obstructed the convening of the round as a result of the failure to make real progress in the previous rounds and Israel's noncompliance with Resolution 799, which stipulates the immediate return of the deportees.

The ministers noted that despite the assurances given prior to the start of the ninth round, Israel did not abide by its overall commitments to the United States. This casts further doubts on the extent of Israel's seriousness and obliges the cosponsors of the conference to ensure that all parties adhere to the bases of the peace process.

While welcoming the U.S. announcement about its plan to assume the role of a full partner in the peace process—which could have constituted progress in the U.S. contribution had the outcome of the previous round risen to the aspirations accompanying the announcement of the convening of the round—the ministers reaffirmed that the United States should undertake a full-partner role to ensure the implementation of the bases, principles, and decisions on which the peace process depends, in line with the principles of international justice and legitimacy.

The ministers denounced the Israeli policy of repression against the Palestinian people and Arab citizens in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, noting in particular the siege of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the isolation of holy Jerusalem, the rise in the number of innocent civilian victims, and the continued building of settlements and demolition of homes.

The ministers warned of the serious consequences of such practices on the future of the peace process and the situation in the region in general. They held Israel fully responsible for all consequences, calling on the cosponsors of the peace process to make Israel immediately stop all its human rights violations in the occupied Arab territories and urge it to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.

The ministers also denounced the continued Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, noting this would only increase tension in the region.

In light of this, the ministers agreed on the following:

1. To reaffirm abidance by solidarity and coordination among the Arab parties participating in the peace process and their commitment to the attainment of comprehensive and just peace in accordance with the bases of this process and its terms of reference represented by the principle of the return of land in exchange for peace; the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories that were occupied in 1967, foremost the city of Jerusalem; the recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate political and national rights on their national soil; UN Security Council Resolution 425 on Israel's withdrawal from the Lebanese territories to the internationally acknowledged Lebanese borders without any preconditions; and the reaffirmation of the commitment to a comprehensive solution on all fronts and for all parties.

2. To denounce all the Israeli practices, violations, and attacks in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, which are a blatant violation of international law and the bases of the peace process and its terms of reference and actually endanger the chances of success of this process. The continuation of these violations and practices will undermine the entire process, for which Israel will be held responsible before the international community.

3. To warn against the consequences of Israel's continued avoidance of discussion of basic issues and matters in accordance with the bases and terms of reference of the negotiations and its adoption of methods of procrastination and prevarication through its emphasis on marginal issues.

4. To call on the United States to exercise the role of a full partner and effectively and objectively develop this role in a manner that
THE PEACE PROCESS

will secure full and faithful abidance by the bases and principles of the peace process, particularly the principle of land in exchange for peace, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 425 in a manner that prevents prevarication or procrastination in implementing these resolutions.

5. To call on the cosponsors of the conference and the international community to compel Israel to take the immediate necessary steps and measures to provide the suitable atmosphere for the success of the current negotiations. These are headed by the following:

— Ending the siege imposed on the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including the closure of holy Jerusalem.
— Ending the fait accompli policy being pursued by the Israeli government.
— Respecting human rights in these territories through the implementation of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.
— Implementing UN Resolution 799.
— Ending the continued Israeli violations of Lebanon’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity.

6. To work for attaining and bolstering Arab solidarity, given that this is the appropriate framework to defend the legitimate Arab rights, protect the future of the individual in the Arab homeland, and guarantee the success of the current process of negotiations and have it attain its goals.

7. Proceeding from their serious commitment to the peace process and out of their desire to give a further opportunity for the efforts being made to help this process attain its aspired goal, represented by the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace that puts an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of complete withdrawal for complete peace and in reference to the invitation by the cosponsors of the conference to all parties to participate in the tenth round, the ministers have agreed to intensify contacts with the cosponsors of the peace process during the remaining time before the beginning of that round, with the aim of securing the cosponsors’ serious intervention to achieve substantial progress in the negotiations.

8. The ministers agreed to hold the next coordination meeting in Beirut.


[This draft statement was presented by the United States to the Israeli and Palestinian delegations to the Arab-Israeli bilateral peace talks on 30 June 1993, one day before the end of the tenth round of the talks. The Palestinian reaction was extremely negative, since the draft suggests that the Palestinian interim self-governing authority have functional rather than territorial jurisdiction—in essence the Israeli position. Israel also took exception to the document, due to its mention of the status of Jerusalem as an issue that the Palestinians may raise in the final status talks. It was published by Mideast Mirror on 5 July 1993.]

The Palestinian and Israeli sides reaffirm their commitment to the peace process launched at Madrid. They seek to negotiate their differences and create a peaceful and just future in which Israel and Palestinians will live side by side, in peace, for generations to come. Toward this end, the two sides will negotiate a Declaration of Principles to guide the negotiations on interim self-governance arrangements. The following principles and/or areas of emerging agreement could be included in the completed Declaration of Principles, subject to agreement on the full Declaration.

The goal of the negotiations:

The two sides agree that the objective of the peace process is to reach a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement achieved through direct negotiations based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian sides will be conducted per the Madrid letter of invitation, in two phases: the first phase of the negotiations is directed toward reaching agreement on Palestinian interim self-government arrangements for a period of five years; and the second phase of the negotiations, beginning the third year of the period of interim self-government arrangements, will be directed toward reaching agreement on permanent status. The two sides concur that the agreement reached between them on permanent status will constitute the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects.

The two sides agree that the negotiating process is one and that its two phases are interlocked. They further agree that neither the negotiations nor the agreements reached for the interim period nor anything done in the interim period will be deemed to preclude or prejudice the outcome of permanent status negotiations. Furthermore, both sides will make their best efforts to avoid actions during the interim period that undermine the environment for the negotiations. The two sides agree that all options for permanent status within the framework of the agreed basis of
the negotiations—UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338—will remain open. Once negotiations on permanent status begin, each side can raise whatever issue it wants, including the question of Jerusalem.

The nature of the Palestinian elected authority:
The two sides agree that a Palestinian elected interim self-government authority (whose name will be agreed) will be established through fair, free, general and direct elections. These elections will be held under agreed supervision and with international observers and monitors. Negotiations will take place concerning the modalities and timetable for elections. Once election modalities are agreed upon by the two sides, East Jerusalem Palestinians will vote in the elections.

The Palestinian elected authority will have the necessary powers and responsibilities to carry out the authorities transferred to it under the agreement. It will assume executive authority. It will have legislative authority in the areas of responsibility transferred to it, subject to the agreement to be negotiated. There will be independent judicial organs. Legislation in force will be reviewed as appropriate.

The two sides agree that one of the key goals of the interim period is the transfer of authority to Palestinians. Powers and responsibilities of the Israeli civilian administration will be transferred to the Palestinians as agreed. This process will bring about a fundamental change in the existing situation on the ground and in the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. An important outcome of this phase will be the empowerment of Palestinians through the establishment of interim self-government arrangements which will give the Palestinians real control over decisions that affect their lives and fate. It should also put an end to the confrontation between Israel and Palestinians and create a new relationship between them of mutual respect, tolerance, peace and reconciliation, in which both sides eschew violence.

Security:
The Israeli and Palestinian sides agree that the security of both sides must be respected and enhanced as a result of the negotiating process. The objective of security arrangements during the interim period is to respond to mutual needs, as well as to create the conditions for real peace. Recognizing Israel’s responsibility for its nationals and for overall security of the territories (Hague Regulations of 1907), and recognizing the interim self-government’s responsibility concerning Palestinians during the interim period per the agreement to be negotiated, there will be arrangements and mechanisms, particularly related to security, such as police functions, that will enhance mutual security and address the needs of both sides.

Jurisdiction:
The two sides agree that discussion of the issue of jurisdiction as it relates to the interim period starts from the premise that issues related to permanent status are outside the scope of the interim status negotiations. Thus, the inclusion or exclusion of specific spheres of authority, geographic areas, or categories of persons within the jurisdiction of the interim self-government will not prejudice the positions or claims of either party and will not constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying any party’s claim to territorial sovereignty in the permanent status negotiations. As such, the issue of jurisdiction over the territories will only be resolved as an outcome of the permanent status negotiations.

For the interim period, the interim self-government authority will as appropriate exercise its authority, i.e., jurisdiction, in the territories, to the extent necessary to fulfill its responsibilities and as agreed between the Israeli and Palestinian sides.

Land:
The two sides have agreed that the territories are viewed as a single territorial unit. They agree that issues related to sovereignty will be negotiated during talks on permanent status and that negotiations on the land issue during the interim period will take place without prejudice to territorial integrity, that is, the territories will be treated as a whole even while the two sides negotiate the difficult issues of land ownership, registration, planning, zoning, usage and management.

Cooperation and coordination:
The two sides will conclude agreements and establish agreed arrangements for cooperation and coordination in specific areas of mutual and common concern. These areas of cooperation and coordination will take into account the mutual needs of both sides. The two sides will also establish a joint committee to consider and deal with matters of common concern and to resolve outstanding problems that may arise between them.

Implementing mechanisms:
The Palestinian and Israeli sides seek early completion of the Declaration of Principles and a full agreement on interim self-gov-
ernment and early empowerment. Toward that end, the two sides will discuss a timetable and mechanisms for elections in the territories. They will also discuss early empowerment, i.e., the early exercise of power by Palestinians, which will change the situation on the ground and the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. Such early empowerment could cover such issues as economic development, training for a local police force, health, education, welfare, tourism, and labor, and budgetary authority in all of these areas.


[This document, the official Palestinian response to the U.S. draft of an Israeli-Palestinian joint declaration of principles of 30 June, was presented to U.S. Secretary of State Christopher in Jerusalem on 3 August 1993. An earlier version prepared by the PLO in Tunis had been shown by Egyptian President Mubarak to Secretary Christopher in Cairo on 2 August 1993 and sent to the Palestinian delegation in the occupied territories for formal presentation to the secretary. This version touched off a crisis between the PLO and the delegation: the delegates, objecting to not being consulted on the draft and to several of its elements, refused to pass it on to the Americans at their first scheduled meeting on 3 August. Following consultations between the delegation and Tunis, several clauses pertaining to the delegation's ability to raise certain points in the final status talks and to the integrity of the occupied territories were amended slightly, and the delegation gave the final version to Secretary Christopher at their second meeting two days later. The document was published in Mideast Mirror on 9 August 1993 along with the earlier version and an analysis of the differences between the two texts.]

The Palestinian and Israeli sides reaffirm their commitment to the peace process launched at Madrid. They seek to negotiate their differences and create a peaceful and just future in which Israelis and Palestinians will live side by side, in peace, for generations to come. Toward this end, the two sides will negotiate a Declaration of Principles to guide the negotiations on an interim self-government authority.

The Goal of the Negotiations

The two sides agree that the objective of the peace process is to reach a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement achieved through direct negotiations based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace.

These negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian sides will be conducted, per the Madrid letter of invitation, in two phases; the first phase of the negotiations is directed toward reaching agreement on a Palestinian interim self-government authority; and the second phase of the negotiations, starting not later than the beginning of the third year of the period of interim self-government arrangements, will be directed toward reaching agreement on permanent status. This agreement is to implement Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects.

The two sides agree that the negotiating process is one and that its two phases are interlocked. They further agree that neither the negotiations nor the agreements reached for the interim period nor anything done in the interim period will preempt or prejudice the outcome of permanent status negotiations. Furthermore, both sides will make their best efforts to avoid actions before and during the interim period that undermine the environment for the negotiations. The two sides agree that all options for permanent status based on the provisions and principles of the agreed basis of the negotiations—United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338—will remain open. In negotiations each side can raise whatever issue it wants. The agenda for the permanent status negotiations will include the final status of Jerusalem.

The Nature of the Palestinian Elected Authority

The two sides agree that a Palestinian elected interim self-government authority will be established through fair, free, general and direct elections. These elections will be held under agreed international supervision and with international observers and monitors. Negotiations will take place concerning the modalities and timetable for elections. Once election modalities are agreed upon by the two sides, the Palestinians of East Jerusalem will participate in the elections. The Palestinians of the West Bank including East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip as on June 4th, 1967 and their descendants have the right to participate in the elections.

The Palestinian elected authority will have the powers and responsibilities to carry out the authorities transferred to it under the agreement. It will assume executive authority. It will also assume legislative authority in the areas of responsibility transferred to it, subject to the agreement to be negotiated. There will be independent judicial organs to
be appointed by PISGA. Legislation in force in areas of responsibility not assumed by PISGA will be reviewed as appropriate.

The two sides agree that one of the key goals of the interim period is the transfer of authority to Palestinians. Powers and responsibilities of the Israeli civilian administration and other relevant Israeli organs will be transferred to the Palestinians as agreed. This process will bring about a fundamental change in the existing situation on the ground and in the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. An important outcome of this phase will be the empowerment of the Palestinian people through the establishment of interim self-government authority which will give the Palestinians real control over decisions that affect their lives and fate. It should also pave the way to put an end to the confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians and create a new relationship between them of mutual respect, tolerance, peace and reconciliation, in which both sides eschew violence.

Territorial Jurisdiction
The two sides agree that discussion of the issue of territorial jurisdiction as it relates to the interim period starts from the premise that issues relating to the exercise of sovereignty are outside the scope of the interim status negotiations.

Consequently, nothing agreed regarding the issue of jurisdiction in the interim status negotiations shall prejudice the outcome of the permanent status negotiations. Both negotiations, as provided for above, are designed to achieve the implementation of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, in all their aspects.

Thus, for the interim period, the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority will exercise its territorial jurisdiction on the occupied Palestinian territories which were not under Israeli control on June 4, 1967 including Jerusalem.

The two sides have agreed that these territories are viewed as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period, under one system of law.

General Security
The Israeli and Palestinian sides agree that the security of both sides must be respected and enhanced as a result of the negotiating process. The objective of security arrangements during the interim period is to respond to the needs of both sides, as well as to create the conditions for real peace. The agreement will include appropriate security arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order during the interim phase, taking into account the security concerns of both sides. The PISGA will establish appropriate security organs to maintain internal security and public order including a strong police force. The interface between internal and external security, particularly as related to bridges, border crossings . . . etc. should be under the control of PISGA, unless otherwise stipulated by the agreement. The agreement will also take into account trilateral issues relating to border crossings and the movement of people and goods. Withdrawal of the Israeli forces shall begin during the interim phase according to an agreed timetable, with appropriate verification mechanisms. The Israeli army will withdraw from populated areas and redeploy in mutually agreed security locations.

Cooperation and Coordination
The two sides will conclude agreements and establish agreed arrangements for cooperation and coordination in specific areas of mutual and common concern. These areas of cooperation and coordination will take into account the mutual needs of both sides. The two sides will also establish a joint committee to consider and deal with matters of common concern and to resolve outstanding problems that may arise between them. Disputes which cannot be resolved or settled by agreement between the two sides will be submitted to international arbitration or an agreed standing committee.

Implementing Mechanisms
The Palestinian and Israeli sides seek early completion of the Declaration of Principles and a full agreement on interim self-government. Toward this end, the two sides will agree to a timetable and mechanisms for election of PISGA.

Gaza-Jericho First
"Gaza-Jericho first" as a form of disengagement would constitute a real breakthrough both in negotiations and on the ground. This first step would provide tangible and viable expression of the true transfer of full authority to the Palestinians with a concrete territorial base integrally linked to the rest of the occupied territories which remain an integral whole.

F. PLO and Israeli Letters of Mutual Recognition, Tunis and Jerusalem, 9 September 1993.
[The mutual recognition letters were signed almost three weeks after the PLO-Israeli draft Declaration of Principles (DOP) was initiated in Oslo]
on 20 August, and over a week after the draft was made public. Finalized in Paris by the same Israeli and PLO negotiators who had worked out the DOP (led on the Israeli side by Israeli Foreign Ministry Director-General Uri Savir and legal expert Yoel Singer, and on the Palestinian side by Ahmad Qurai', head of PLO economic department, and Hassan Aşfour), the letters opened the way for the signing of the final agreement in Washington, D.C. on 13 September (see Special Document C). Chairman Arafat’s letter to Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst, who oversaw the negotiations for both the DOP and the mutual recognition, forms an integral part of the package by virtue of its implicit commitment to help end the intifada, an Israeli demand. The letters, on plain paper without letterheads (an Israeli requirement because of the two parties’ unequal status), were all dated 9 September but were signed by Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin respectively on 9 and 10 September. The texts of the letters were published in the New York Times of 10 September 1993.

1. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

Mr. Prime Minister,

The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following P.L.O. commitments:

The P.L.O. recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.


The P.L.O. commits itself to the Middle East peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.

The P.L.O. considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the P.L.O. renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all P.L.O. elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.

In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the P.L.O. affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel’s right to exist and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the P.L.O. undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

Sincerely,
YASIR ARAFAT
Chairman
Palestine Liberation Organization

2. PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst

Dear Minister Holst,

I would like to confirm to you that upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles I will include the following positions in my public statements:

In light of the new era marked by the signing of the Declaration of Principles the P.L.O. encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation.

Sincerely,
YASIR ARAFAT
Chairman
Palestine Liberation Organization

3. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to PLO Chairman Arafat

Mr. Chairman,

In response to your letter of Sept. 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that in light of the P.L.O. commitments included in your letter the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the P.L.O. as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the P.L.O. within the Middle East peace process.

YITZHAK RABIN
Prime Minister of Israel


[The text of the agreement, initialed in Oslo on 20 August, was signed at the White House following the Israeli-PLO mutual recognition (see Special Document F) by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO Executive Committee member Mahmud ‘Abbas (Abu Mazen) in the
presence of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat. The final agreement is identical to the draft except for one change, added just before the ceremony: in the preamble, the words "the Palestinian team" changed to read "the PLO team (the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the 'Palestinian Delegation')."

The draft was the product of "back channel diplomacy" carried out totally independently of the official peace process continuing in Washington under U.S. sponsorship. Its unveiling toward the end of August apparently took the U.S. government, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams that had just arrived in Washington for the eleventh round of the official talks, as well as the Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese governments completely by surprise.

The secret diplomacy was reportedly initiated in September 1992 when Norway's State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Jan Egeland, suggested to Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin in Tel Aviv that Norway help create a secret bridge between Israel and the PLO leadership in Tunis. The resulting "bridge" reportedly involved fourteen meetings in Norway, the first of which took place 20-22 January 1993, as well as meetings in other venues; while the early meetings were between Israelis outside the government and PLO representatives, by March high-level Israeli officials were participating. For most of the meetings, the Israeli team was headed by the director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Uri Savir, and the PLO team by Ahmad Qura'i, the PLO official in charge of the multilateral talks and directly representing Arafat.

A photocopy of the signed agreement was made available by the State Department. It should perhaps be clarified with regard to the last item in the DOP, item B. of the "Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements," that the articles and annexes included are not new items but merely glosses on the articles and annexes earlier in the agreement where elucidation was felt to be necessary; the lack of sequence in numbers, therefore, does not denote any "missing" or "secret" provisions.

Following the text of the agreement, JPS has constructed for the benefit of its readers a chronology showing the sequence of phases for implementing the accord as laid out in the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and its annexes.

The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) ("the Palestinian delegation"), representing the Palestinian people agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles.

Article I

**Aim of the Negotiations**

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council, (the "Council") for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II

**Framework for the Interim Period**

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III

**Elections**

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will insulate public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV

**Jurisdiction**

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for.
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V

Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations
1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI

Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities
1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII

Interim Agreement
1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement").
Redeployment of Israeli Forces
1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV

Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV

Resolution of Disputes
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through reconciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI

Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Programs
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan," the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII

Miscellaneous Provisions
1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

Annex I

Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections
1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the follow-
ing issues:

a. the system of elections;
b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and
c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

Annex II

Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area

1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

3. The above agreement will include, among other things:

a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.
b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except external security, settlements, Israeli, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.
c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian–Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.

f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.
g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

a. Gaza—Egypt

5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

Annex III

Protocol on Israeli–Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This program may also provide for the construction of a petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of interna-
tional investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.

7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

Annex IV

Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Development Programs

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a development program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:
   a. an Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   b. a Regional Economic Development Program.

   A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:

   1. A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.
   3. An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.)
   5. Other programs.

   B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:

   1. The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.
   2. The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.
   3. The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza)–Dead Sea Canal.
   4. Regional Desalination and other water development projects.
   5. A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.
   6. Interconnection of electricity grids.
   7. Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.
   8. A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.
   9. Regional cooperation in other spheres.

   C. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards its success. The two parties will encourage inter-sessional activities, as well as prefeasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

4. General Understandings and Agreements

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.
THE PEACE PROCESS

B. Specific Understandings and Agreements

Article IV
It is understood that:
1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI(2)
It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:
1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorized Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism and any other authorities agreed upon.
2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.
3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.
4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII(2)
The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII(5)
The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII
It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X
It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee.

It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

Annex II
It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

CHRONOLOGICAL MAP OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP)
N.B. The following chronology is based on JPS's reading of the DOP. It shows the deadlines specifically mentioned in the document and, where no timetable is spelled out, infers the sequence of processes from the text. In the interests of clarity, the chronology also makes three assumptions:

1) that the transition period (and the transfer of authority) begins after the Israeli force withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area begins rather than when the withdrawal ends.
This matter is ambiguous in the text, which uses the formulation "upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area" for both the beginning of the transition period and for the transfer of authority [Art. V § 1, Art. VI § 1];

2) that the transition period will last five years, as in Art. V § 1, even though Art. I characterizes the transition period as "not exceeding five years";

3) that the permanent status negotiations will start at the beginning of the third year of the interim period, even though Art. V § 2 states that they will begin "as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year."
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 September</td>
<td>Signature of Declaration of Principles (DOP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 October</td>
<td>DOP enters into force “one month after its signing.” [Art. XVII]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 13 October</td>
<td>Israeli and Palestinian delegations immediately begin negotiations on detailed plan for transfer of authority in fields of education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other spheres agreed upon. [Article VI § 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 13 December</td>
<td>Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee is established to deal with issues of common interest, matters requiring coordination, and disputes. [Art. X, Art. XV]; “Conciliation mechanism” to be agreed on to resolve disputes that cannot be settled by negotiations. [Art. XV § 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latest 13 December</td>
<td>Agreement on withdrawal of Israeli military from Gaza Strip and the Jericho area is concluded and signed “within two months from the date of entry into force” of DOP. [Art. XIV, Annex II § 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December</td>
<td>Israel implements an “accelerated and scheduled withdrawal” from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, “beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.” [Annex II § 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 13 December</td>
<td>Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes. [Annex II § 3 § f]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December</td>
<td>Beginning of 5-year transitional period “will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.” [Art. V § 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December</td>
<td>Transfer of authority from Israeli military government and Civil Administration to authorized Palestinians occurs “upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area” and pending formation of elected Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (“Council”). [Art. VI § 1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December</td>
<td>Transfer of authority (with a view to promoting economic development in West Bank and Gaza Strip) in spheres of education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. [Art. VI § 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 December</td>
<td>Pending inauguration of Council, the two parties may negotiate transfer of additional powers and responsibilities. [Art. VI, § 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latest 13 April</td>
<td>• Palestinians will commence building police force. [Art. VI § 2] Transfer of power to police force to be accomplished &quot;in a phased manner.&quot; [Agreed Minutes B, Art. VIII]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| After 13 April | 1994
| Before 13 July | • Withdrawal of the Israeli military from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area "to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement." [Annex II, § 2]
| Late 13 July | • Interim Agreement to be concluded on structure, numbers of members, powers, and responsibilities of the Council and the transfer of these powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and Civil Administration to the Council (no time frame specified). [Art. VII, § 1 and § 2]
| After 13 July | • Redeployment of the Israeli military forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip outside populated areas takes place after entry into force of DOP and "not later than the eve of elections for the Council." [Art. XIII, § 1 and § 2]
| Latest 13 July | • Elections for formation of Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority ("Council") will be held "not later than nine months after the entry into force" of DOP. [Art. III § 2, Annex I]
| After 13 July | • Formation of Council as agreed to in Interim Agreement (no time frame specified). [Art. VII]
| 1994-1995 | • The Council establishes a "strong" Palestinian police force. [Art. VIII]
• Further redeployment of Israeli military forces to be implemented gradually, commensurate with Palestinian police force's assumption of responsibility for public order. [Art. XIII § 3]
• Council assumes executive and legislative powers within transferred authority, laws and military orders in other areas to be reviewed jointly by Israelis and Council. [Art. IX]
• Establishment of Palestinian Electricity Authority, Gaza Sea Port Authority, Palestinian Development Bank, Palestinian Environmental Authority, Palestinian Land Authority, Palestinian Water Administration Authority, other Authorities as specified in Interim Agreement. [Art. VII § 4]
• After establishment of Council, joint Israeli-Palestinian Committee for Economic Cooperation initiates programs in water, electricity, energy, finance, transport and communications, trade, industry, labor relations and social welfare, human resources, environmental protection, and the media. [Annex III]
• After inauguration of Council the Civil Administration will be dissolved and military government will be withdrawn. [Art. VII § 5]
• Cooperation in joint programs.
Cooperation in multilaterals and regionally.
Functioning of Economic/Continuing Committees, Liaison Committee/Counciliation Mechanism.
Continuing redeployment. (?)
Transfer of additional powers. (?)

1995

13 December
Permanent status talks to begin "not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period." [Art. V § 2]\(^1\)

1998

13 December
Interim Period ends; permanent status agreement to be reached by that time. [Art. V. § 1, Annex II § 2]\(^1\)

\(^1\)Given the ambiguity of the DOP's formulation (see note 1 above) the transition period could begin as late as 13 April 1994 if it is understood to begin when the Israeli forces complete their withdrawal.

\(^2\)The same ambiguity concerning the beginning of the transitional period applies here, as both depend on the interpretation of "Upon the withdrawal" of forces" (see note 1 above). Like the beginning of the transitional period, the transfer of authority could be as late as 13 April 1994.

\(^3\)This presumes that the interim period began 13 December 1993. If the interim period begins 13 April 1994, then the final status talks would begin 13 April 1996 (see note 1 above).

\(^4\)Depending on when the transitional period begins, the interim period may end as late as 13 April 1999 (see note 1 above).