The Soviet Attitude to the Palestine Problem: From the Records of the Syrian Communist Party, 1971–72
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THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

[EDITOR'S NOTE: The following three documents, which throw light on the differing attitudes to the Palestine problem of the Soviet Union and members of the Syrian Communist Party, have come into the open following a recent dispute within the Party on Palestine and a variety of other subjects. The documents comprise a series of remarks by Soviet theoreticians and politicians on the Palestine problem made during an attempt by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to settle the Syrian dispute (below, p. 188); a speech made in November 1971 by Khaled Bekdash, the Syrian Communist Party Secretary-General, on the Palestine aspect of the dispute within his Party (below, p. 202); and a communiqué published by the section opposed to Bekdash stating its position during a subsequent phase of the dispute (below, p. 207).

The Syrian communist dispute arose over a draft programme on Party policy commissioned by the Third Congress of the Syrian Communist Party in 1969 and given approval, after some debate and changes, by the Party’s Central Committee in 1970. When the programme was subsequently circulated for discussion within the Party, a group led by Khaled Bekdash put forward severe criticisms of it for being too nationalistic in orientation and insufficiently concerned with class struggle in the area.¹ In the attempts to settle the ensuing dispute, the programme was finally referred to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for advice. In May 1971, a Syrian Communist Party delegation led by Bekdash visited Moscow, where it was received by Mikhail Suslov, the leading Soviet expert on doctrinal matters, and Boris Ponomarev, member of the Secretariat of the Soviet Party’s Central Committee.²

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¹ The chronology is derived in part from al-Raya (Beirut), June 12, 1972.
It was apparently during this visit that a group of Soviet experts made the long set of remarks on Palestine, dated May 1971 and critical of aspects of the Syrian programme, which comprise the first document. The remarks, which appear in note form, seem to have been extemporaneous, and, according to Bekdash,³ were transcribed and edited by the Syrian delegation from the oral discussions which they had with the Soviet delegation. Although these minutes were later released by elements within the Syrian Communist Party, they were clearly not originally intended for publication. The transcription of the comments of the Soviet experts thus offers a rare inside picture of the Soviet position on key aspects of the Palestine problem.]

**Document 1: Remarks by Russian Theoreticians and Politicians on the Draft Programme⁴ of the Syrian Communist Party (Excerpts on Palestine), May 1971⁵**

4. *On the Palestine Problem and the Elimination of the Consequences of the Aggression: The View of the Theoreticians.*

1. *The Three Possibilities [Open to the Arab World]:*

   a: The first possibility: Some people maintain that the problem of eliminating the consequences of aggression must be solved through war, but without preparation this would lead to the liquidation of the progressive regimes. — It could also lead to a confrontation between the Soviets and the Americans.
   — We do not conceal the fact that we are not in favour of this except in the case of extreme necessity.
   — Our opposition is not to a military solution per se, but arises only because we are realistic.
   — This does not prevent us from working to increase the military fighting capacity of the Arab countries.

   b: The second possibility: No peace and no war; this is the attitude of the Syrian Ba'th.
   — Objectively this is to Israel's advantage. For example, it was on the basis of this attitude that the conspiracy to liquidate the resistance movement was carried out by the Americans, who took advantage of the fact that no peaceful settlement had been achieved.
   — Every government that shows that it is incapable of either war or peace is destroying its own foundations, and this is what the Israelis depend on.
   — Thus, the Israelis are taking advantage of this attitude to consolidate

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³ *al-Balagh,* September 4, 1972.
⁴ At time of going to press, no version of the programme had been published.
⁵ *al-Raya,* June 26, 1972.
their positions in the occupied territories, either by bringing in Jewish immigrants and establishing Nahal and kibbutz settlements on the Golan and the West Bank, by leaving these areas as advance bases for their own use, or using them as bargaining counters.

— In the future there may be people like Kisang [Quisling?].

c: The third possibility: Struggle on behalf of a political solution on a just basis. This is the attitude of the USSR.
— This will lead to the strengthening of the progressive regimes, without which there can be no possibility of any kind of Arab unity or of eliminating the consequences of aggression.
— A further consequence will be that the international climate will change in favour of the Arabs. This is of considerable importance, because Israel is dependent on foreign investments, immigration to Israel, strong American support and armaments from the major capitalist countries, all of which would be difficult to obtain with the international atmosphere changed in the Arabs' favour.
— On the basis of the wise policy of certain Arab countries, Israel would be shown up at international level.
— Formerly the opposite was the case, when the statements of Shuqairi and others were the order of the day.
— A political solution and the subsequent possibility of opening the Canal would increase the conflicts between the colonialist powers.
— A political solution would also make it easier to take advantage of the conflicts between the monopolies in America itself.
— Thus it is not only because we do not want war, but because war would lead to disasters for the progressive Arab regimes, that we advocate certain settlements, taking into account the interests of the Arabs and the benefit to be derived from strengthening the progressive Arab regimes.

2. The Palestine Problem

B6: In the light of the above, as regards the elimination of the consequences of aggression, what is the attitude to the Palestine problem?
— It can be maintained that it is essential to return to the situation that prevailed before 1947 — that is to say that the State of Israel must be eliminated.
— But the elimination of the State of Israel as a slogan, in spite of the fact that Israel exists, has no class basis.
— If the problem is posed in isolation, that is, as constituting no more than

6 The Arabic letter φ, which can indicate 'P' as well as 'B'. The theoreticians are referred to throughout only by the initial letters of their last names.
the problem of defending the Palestinians in this way, where does this lead us?
— Steps can be taken on their behalf on the basis of the Security Council resolution. The problem can be stated as follows:
— The Security Council resolution provides a solution to the Palestine problem on the basis of the United Nations resolutions to the effect that those who want to return should be allowed to do so and that those who do not want to return should be compensated. This is the solution of the Palestine problem — from our point of view the Palestine problem lies not only in the attitude to Israel, but also in the attitude to the Jordanian authorities and to the resistance movements.
— The question of establishing a Palestinian state raises many problems — How big? Where? When? etc.
— In some parts [of the proposed programme] the Palestine problem, and not only the elimination of the consequences of aggression, is seen as constituting three-quarters of the tasks of the Syrian people.
— The problem of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people is important, and it was a mistake on the part of certain political parties to ignore it.
— But at the same time there is a tendency to try to deal with the problem as if it existed on its own, unconnected with any other problems.
— It is impossible to solve the Palestine problem without profounder changes, without strengthening the revolutionary aspects of all the progressive revolutionary regimes, without democracy, without effectively strengthening and co-ordinating the policies of the Arab countries. Moreover, the impression is given that the solution of the Palestine problem is the most important task of every Arab country and every Arab people. The danger of seeing the Palestine problem as the most important problem is that it may lead to the neglect and disregard of those very major problems without which the Palestine problem cannot be solved.
— Naturally the USSR is a great power, and its strength does not depend on its attitude to the Palestine problem. But things are different for you. There must be a sense of proportion; without it you will fall into nationalist tendencies and there will no longer be any distinction between the Party and the nationalists.
— Obviously the draft gives too much importance to the Palestine problem.
— There is also too much emphasis on armed struggle to the exclusion of all other solutions.
— The inflation of the Palestine problem is linked with and derives from the attitude which advocates no peace and no war.
— Naturally it is impossible under any circumstances to disregard the Palestine problem, but is it permissible to see it as a principal problem and to subordinate all the Party’s problems to it? Such a line of action is not correct,
whatever its motives, such as winning over the masses, etc. This is because, first such a course of action weakens the Party’s struggle as regards basic problems — supporting the progressive regimes, increasing fighting capacity, intensifying the revolutionary process, etc., and secondly because if the Party’s principal trend, as regards the progressive regimes, etc., is weakened, this will be of no assistance to the Palestine problem itself.

— To separate the Palestine problem from the revolutionary process, from the strengthening of the progressive regimes as regards the building up of the economy and strengthening friendship with the USSR, is to move towards nationalist positions.

— There is a danger of seeing all changes and events in the Arab world through spectacles tinted by the Palestine problem.

— To sum up: It is not permissible to see all problems in the Arab world through Palestinian spectacles, but also, of course, it is not permissible to forget or disregard the Palestine problem or to abandon activity among Palestinians.

— The draft talks about “reactions to wrong attitudes.” Mao Tse-tung says: “To correct a deviation it is necessary to lean over to the other side” — that is to say, deviation is to be corrected by deviation in the opposite direction. This, of course, is not true.

— It is dangerous both to overestimate and to underestimate the Palestine problem. Overestimation leads to isolationism, and underestimation leads towards dependence, towards dissolution in nationalism, etc.

3. The Slogan of the Elimination of Israel

B: The connection between the elimination of the consequences of aggression and the Palestine problem: It is absolutely impermissible, when talking about the elimination of the consequences of aggression, to classify it in one numbered category, in isolation from the Palestine problem, which is classified in another numbered category.

— Israel is a fact. There was not a Jewish nation or a Jewish nationality — this is obvious. But now an Israeli nation is arising. Israel has arisen on artificial foundations, and I do not want to justify it historically. But let us start from existing facts.

— The slogan of the elimination of Israel is unsound not only tactically but also as a matter of principle.

— All this does not mean that we are to say: An Israeli nation is coming into existence, or that we are to advocate brotherhood with Israel, etc. Certainly not; that would be a mistake.

— You must consider whether it is possible to realize things; this is a slogan that it is not possible to realize. The Arab leaderships understand this, even the
Iraqis, who say better things in their speeches than those who call themselves leftists. As regards the logic of struggle: if the Arabs employ the slogan of the elimination of Israel and the liberation of their usurped homeland, they can never gain the support of world public opinion or the support of the USSR or the support of the World Communist Movement. They will not even gain the support of the United Arab Republic. Of course, after the consequences of the aggression have been eliminated the struggle will have to continue and aim its bayonets at the Zionists.

— An important observation: Jarring’s memorandum of February 8 [1971], says that the territories of a state must not be exploited for aggression against another state. Of course this is a condition that is not respected, but that is something that cannot and should not be stated in a document. Why then do we say and announce in advance that the struggle will continue after the consequences of the aggression have been eliminated?

— To say “the liquidation of Zionism in Arab territory” means the elimination of the State of Israel; the correct thing is to talk about strengthening and intensifying the struggle against Zionism.

— To employ the slogan “their usurped homeland” means setting the problem within a purely national framework and making it a question of an incomprehensible hostility between two nationalisms.

— The aim of the struggle must be to change the colonialist character of the State of Israel, not the elimination of Israel as a state.

— Westerners, for example the American William Polk of Chicago, have written and said that it is a collision between two nationalisms — Arab and Jewish, that is to say Zionist.

— We regard it as a collision between colonialism and the national liberation movement, and appraise it on a class basis.

— The programme recognizes the right of all nationalisms; does this not imply that the Jews have this right?

— Yasser Arafat has said: 1,600,000 Jews in Israel are from Arab countries and 900,000 from European countries.

— As regards the Palestinians, if you mean the right to return, that is clear and in keeping with the USSR’s policy and with the United Nations resolutions, and it must be struggled for.

— Thus the slogan of “the right to return” must be retained, and after return there will be the right to self-determination — meaning, to determine their own administration, to determine the form and character of the state, and, perhaps, determine it in whatever form they want, etc.

— The demand for a unified state also comes within the category of the right to self-determination; the right to self-determination does not necessarily imply a separate state.
May 3 [sic] was indisputably prejudicial to the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. It is impossible to ensure one people’s right to self-determination at the expense of another people’s right to self-determination and the right to return, and the right to self-determination after their return. This is absolutely obvious not only to communists, but also to progressives. It is not a problem of recognizing or not recognizing the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination; the problem must not be presented in this form. Not only do we recognize their right to self-determination; we must also struggle on behalf of that right.

But in what forms and under what slogans? Who are our allies in this? And what objectives do we set ourselves in this field? On these considerations depend not only the destiny of the Palestinian people, but also the destiny of the Arab liberation movement. And all this is connected with the problem of the consequences of aggression.

Everything depends on the correct solution of all these problems.

For all these reasons the draft must include precise formulas which take all these factors into account, so as to give prominence to the class and international attitude, and to avoid dealing with the problem in a manner liable to lead to slipping into nationalist positions.

Such slipping into nationalist positions is injurious both to the Syrian Communist Party and to all the Arab Communist Parties.

The importance of the Palestine problem must not be underestimated or ignored, nor must it be overestimated; both these dangers must be avoided. It is not permissible to struggle against one of them on behalf of the other.

Faqi said in the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party that the slogan of the elimination of Israel is not a class slogan or a class attitude. This is true, and I agree with it.

Ehrenburg and what he said against the whole German people: The Central Committee endorsed it, but later would not even let him write. Pravda wrote against him, under the name of Alexandrov, which is a collective name.

In the Second World War Stalin talked of Russia's heritage and its national and cultural past. But he also said: Hitler will go and the German people will remain and the German state will remain.

It is permissible to struggle against the racialism of the State of Israel, its reactionary qualities, its colonialist character, but it is not permissible to talk about eliminating the State of Israel.

It is necessary to reconsider certain expressions which can be interpreted as meaning the elimination of Israel.

The expression “the liquidation of Zionist institutions” means the elimination of Israel.

We must either say nothing or adopt a clear class attitude.

Egypt’s attitude as regards the State of Israel and its existence has shown a tendency to improve.
— (In reply to a comrade): The formulas will be explained by enemies in a way that tends to distort them. This is only natural. But at the same time the formulas are the slogans of the masses, and they must make the masses understand what we are calling for, what we are advocating.
— Similarly, what is important is how allies interpret these formulas, in particular, of course, allies in the international field.

4. Partition and the Attitude to the USSR's Attitude

B: The passage means that the establishment of the State of Israel was artificial from the start.
— The draft is not talking about differences in the various ideas and attitudes as regards this subject.
— It is talking exclusively about the conspiracies of colonialism and reaction as a result of which this state was established, and it states that these conspiracies achieved their aims at the United Nations. For example, it is stated that the United Nations recognized Israel by virtue of the 1947 Partition resolution, and reaction and the agents of colonialism participated in the conspiracy. This brings the USSR into the conspiracy. Nothing is said about the USSR's attitude in 1947, only its attitude to the '56 and '67 aggressions is mentioned. Frankly, this implies that the USSR took part in the conspiracy; the praise of the USSR immediately afterwards is only to divert suspicions from the USSR. This is merely to justify co-operation with the USSR; it is not a real justification of its attitude.
— If this was intended what should have been said was that the problem was a problem of the right of all peoples to self-determination; this was the essence of the USSR's attitude.
— It is true that nice things are said about the USSR, but here I want to refer to the formulas which mention the conspiracy, and from which it can be deduced that the USSR took part in the conspiracy.
— When the USSR voted in favour of the establishment of the State of Israel it voted on the basis of the right to self-determination, not to implement a colonialist scheme.
— The Soviets proposed a dual state, but both Arabs and Jews rejected this outright.
— Thus resolutions are rejected and then others worse than them are accepted. For example, after the 1967 aggression the USSR tried to get a proposal by Latin American countries accepted. But the Arabs rejected it at the last minute, although it was better than the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967.
— The historical section does not give a realistic and objective view of the policy of the USSR. The text contains no mention of Arab reaction; it even
ignores the role played by Arab reaction in the 1947-1948 War. This is not a class attitude. Arafat has said: It was Arab reaction that built Israel.
— The programme should certainly not contain formulas that are capable of being interpreted in two ways as regards the USSR.

5. On the Passages Dealing with the Essence of the Palestine Problem

B: Phrase No. 1 on page 47: It is right to mention their right to return and to self-determination in their own land.
— But “the liberation of their homeland” means the elimination of Israel as a state; there can be no other interpretation.
— The phrase “build a state in whatever manner they choose” should not be used by communists.
— Several slogans are employed in connection with this subject. For example, there is the slogan of the expulsion of two and a half million Jews and the establishment of a purely Arab state. There are even slogans advocating the extermination of the population. How then can we say “in whatever manner they like”? Either we do not go into detail, or we give our views on the manner in which the state should be established; that is to say, they have the right to self-determination and our view is such and such; that is to say, either we make clear the guiding role of the Party, or say nothing at all.
— Then there is the phrase “they have the right to use all forms of struggle.” But there is a Palestinian movement and a Palestinian people and in this movement there are representatives of all groups of the population, that is to say, the movement represents all. The communists say in advance: We support all forms of struggle and everything that all groups of the population want, and this is not true.
— Instead of “part of the world revolutionary movement” we should say “part of the national liberation movement.”
— Sentence 4 on page 46 is a clear statement of the question of the elimination of the State of Israel, though other words are used. Perhaps you mean something else by these passages; if so they should be changed, for the objective reader will immediately understand them as meaning the elimination of Israel.
— Sentence No. 5 is correct as far as “armed struggle to achieve their objectives,” but after that, the phrase “and it is the duty of the Arab nation to make every effort to ensure conditions which will enable them to achieve their legitimate objectives” is a nationalist formula. Better say “the duty of the Arab toiling masses and the Arab workers.”
— Sentence No. 6 is correct and contradicts sentence No. 1. But it is not correct when it says “to self-determination in whatever manner they want.”

7 No published version of the passages commented upon was available at time of going to press.
— The Palestinians go further than you in certain formulas. For example, *Fateh* advocates a binational state, which you do not even mention.
— In this section we are aware of the dispute, of the internal argument with certain forces which are believed either, first, to be shelving the Palestine problem, or else to be underestimating it. Nationalist deviation arises from this argument, and there is also a tendency to appropriate certain Ba'thist slogans.

6. *Concrete Proposals for Amendments Connected with the Essence of the Palestine Problem.*

B: Point No. 1 should read: “the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their land and there to recover their right to self-determination.”
Point 6 should be added to it, with the exception of the last sentence, that is to say except for: “and to self-determination in whatever manner they want.”
Thus point 1 will be attached to point 6, so that the passage will read as follows:
“the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their territories (or their homeland) and to self-determination, and that the achievement of their national rights by the Palestinian people is not incompatible, but in harmony with the interest the Jewish masses have in living under the auspices of a just and democratic peace which has nothing to do with colonialism and Zionism.”
— Point 4 should be amended to read: “the Palestinian Arab people’s road to the achievement of their national rights runs through struggle without quarter against colonialism and Zionism and their expansionist and aggressive ambitions, and against Arab reaction.”
— Point 4 should be attached to point 2 — i.e., add: “the enemy confronting the Palestinian Arab people in this struggle is the same enemy who usurped their rights — Imperialism and Zionism.” (Or perhaps the second phrase could be put first.)
— Point 5 should be amended to read: “it is the duty of the Arab masses to provide all aid and assistance to the Palestinian movement.”
— Point 3 should be put at the end, i.e. “the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people is just and forms an integral part of the Arab world liberation movement.”

7. *The Attitude to the Palestinian Resistance Movement*

B: Is it true that the Party supports all forms of struggle employed by the Palestinian Arab people, as the draft programme suggests? Adventurist movements could arise, etc.
K: The proletarian Party cannot support every Palestinian movement of whatever kind.
B: We did not wipe out Makhno⁸ but co-operated with him against the Whites. But we did not know who he was...later we wiped out his movement as a movement of highwaymen.

Ya: The Palestinian resistance movement is not homogeneous. The Party cannot support it indiscriminately. Habbash, for example.

B: It is true that one of the aims of striking at the Palestinian movements is to weaken the progressive regimes. But it is not true that all support for the Palestinian movements of whatever kind and however it is provided will lead to the strengthening of the progressive regimes.

— Extremist trends in the Palestinian resistance movement must be combated, by criticizing them in speeches and otherwise. Even the Egyptian leadership, which is less class conscious than the Communist Party, has condemned the actions of George Habbash — the hijacking of planes, and so on.

— (In reply to a comrade) who said “The commandos’ mistakes must not be allowed to result in our not being associated with the commando movement.” I say, Are we to be associated with George Habbash in the hijacking of the four planes? It is not a question of not being associated with the commando movement; the question is, Are we to be associated with it and dissolve, or can we be associated with it without dissolving? This is the question, this is the problem...that is why the question of whether we support all kinds of struggle has to be clarified.

— The important thing is to maintain independence, not only organizational independence, but also ideological independence, as Lenin always insisted.

— Are we to follow the national course, which is perhaps the easiest in Syria, or are we to follow the international course?

— There will always be people more nationalist than you in any attitude we adopt, and, as K said, we cannot compete with them in that field.

— Activity among Palestinians — includes infiltration of their organizations, and influencing their policy from the inside, without announcing it; it also includes contacting the Palestinian organizations openly and frankly, and stating our views; this is an extremely important principle. Uncritical support is also a danger — the danger of dissolution, not only organizational but also ideological dissolution, which is just as dangerous.

— On page 49 it says: “the resistance movement is a movement of the masses.” This is not true. The right thing to say is: “it must be a movement of the masses.” Otherwise nothing should be said about it.

— The resistance movement has had no military (or serious?)⁹ effect. Israel could even have ignored it.

⁸ Nestor Makhno: Ukrainian peasant rebel leader in the Russian Civil War.

⁹ The parentheses are from the original document as printed in al-Raya.
— Appraisals based on propaganda are not permissible; they must be based on principles and be objective. This should be the case in the programme.
— The mass character of the movement is one thing, heroism is another.
— Why was it possible to wipe out the resistance movement in this way in Jordan, where 60 per cent of the population are Palestinians?
— Why did the Palestinians not go over from Hussein’s army to the resistance movement en masse?
— Does it do any good to say that everything is as it should be? Or is it our duty to make the resistance movement a movement of the masses?
— Our appraisal of it as being part of the world national resistance movement is a positive one.
— There have been changes among the Palestinians; they have undergone great changes. The future development of the Palestinians depends upon the attitude of the communists.
— Ahmad Jibril was asked during an interview: “What does liberation mean? What will you do with the two million and a half Jews?” He answered: “We shall send away those that came from European countries.” Of course, this is a step forward in comparison with Shuqairi’s attitude.
— Arafat has said: “Our plan is to try to ensure that the Jews from the Arab countries support us.”
— A Palestinian leader has said: “We must contact the democrats in Israel with a view to common struggle against the Zionist leadership.”

8. The Palestine Problem and Strategic and Tactical Issues

[The section opens with a digression by B on whether Arab unity (and the Palestine problem) should be classified as strategic problems or matters of immediate concern in the context of communist aims.]

[B.].... Then there is the Palestinian Arab people’s right to return and to self-determination: is this not a strategic objective? Similarly, as a matter of strategy we cannot say that it is necessary to support all forms of struggle by the Palestinian movement.
— (In reply to a comrade): It is not permissible to replace concepts by others and then discuss them. No one casts doubts on the Palestinian resistance movement; that is tilting at windmills.
— The class attitude does not mean that if there is no working class in the movement...etc. we shall turn our backs on it. Even if the most important force in it was the bourgeoisie it could have a progressive character. But to say every anti-colonialist force is at the same time anti-capitalist and pro-socialist is not permissible except in the widest sense.
— The struggle of the Palestinian Arab people is extremely important, but it is not the most important part of the world revolutionary movement.
— We must take into account the interests of the world communist movement as a whole. As regards socialism, its victory will solve everything.

9. The Need for a Precise Definition of Zionism and Certain Formulas

Ya: The word Zionism comes several times, and every time it has a different meaning.
— In defining Zionism there must be a class attitude: It is a nationalist movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie and it is an instrument of world imperialism. Perhaps it would be a good thing to give a profounder and wider definition of Zionism: economically, socially and internationally — indicating that it is capitalist, colonialist, etc.
— But it is not permissible to confuse it with the people of Israel.

Gha: We must be brief. There must be a more precise definition of Zionism from a class attitude, showing that its principal content is combatant chauvinism and hostility to communism, and that “it began at the end of the 19th century with the outbreak of the class struggle and the emergence of imperialism.” For a definition of Zionism we can refer to the second edition of Ivanov’s book. Here I agree with B and have the same impressions. Furthermore, instead of “the flood of Zionist immigrants” on page 44 we should say “Jewish immigration.”
— On page 44 instead of “the Jewish nation” it should read “the alleged Jewish nation.”

K: Zionism — can it be called a movement? The Jews are not a nation, they are a nationalism with certain secondary aspects, etc. Zionism is worse than a national movement: (it is as if hostility to Jews was something positive). It is true that there are quarters which enjoy a world-wide influence not enjoyed by any other racist national movement.
— Among Jews in general: power, the bourgeois influence is very strong.
— Through Zionism Israel is an instrument of world imperialism. The important thing is to cut this link, which can be done through a political settlement of the problem when Israel is denied the possibility of appealing to world public opinion and world Jewry to rescue it from its alleged danger.

B: The expression “to defend the Arab character of Palestine”: the basic idea can and should be kept. But the present formula has a nationalist tinge. We could say: “The struggle against colonialism and Zionism on behalf of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to self-determination,” etc. “The Arab character of Palestine” includes all classes, so it is not a class attitude.
— On page 45 we read: “the reactionary elements, the bourgeois and the feudalists make a pretense of concern for the Palestine cause and of hostility

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10 The Arabic letters ة، which can indicate ‘Ga’ as well as ‘Gha’.
to Zionism.” That is, Arab reaction is mentioned, but it is not permissible in this form.

Gha: Page 45. Instead of this it should read: “Israel, whose leadership is in the hands of Zionism, which is assimilated to American capital, etc.”
— Starting from the end of page 46 the text can be greatly compressed, as there are repetitions and contradictions.

B: Page 46. It says “a source of danger to the future of world peace.” This is an exaggeration.
— Page 44. It is absolutely impermissible to couple the 1948 and 1956 wars; they were utterly different.
— From the end of page 44 to the middle of page 45 the text can be greatly compressed.
— Page 49. Also the expression “to achieve the goal of the Palestinian Arab people of liberating their usurped homeland” — there too it should read: “their right to self-determination.”
— This is an attempt to evade and neglect the decisions of the Third Congress, thereby falling in the category of nationalist formulas. In general there should be greater space given to class and international attitudes.

Ya: I agree with B and I have nothing to add.

B: On page 48 there is the phrase “the claims that try to assert...etc.” Is the intention here to refer to Egypt’s attitude to the elimination of the consequences of aggression? Then there is also the phrase: “the idea that by eliminating the consequences of aggression the Palestine problem will be ended...etc.” and the following phrase is also confused and also contains “the liberation of their homeland.”

**Views of the Politicians.**

O 11: Views on the Palestine problem are very close; this gives us much pleasure.
— The objectives of the Palestinian movement must be stated more concretely. They are the right of self-determination. But it is difficult to define them and to say what form they will actually take and the stages they will pass through.
— The existence of Israel is a fact. The idea of annihilating it as a way of achieving self-determination for the Palestinian Arab people is self-contradictory; this can only be solved by a world war.
— The way is popular struggle against colonialism, that is, that the Israeli people too should turn against Zionism. The first stage in the establishment of

11 Arabic letters ى, which directly transliterated are ‘Aw’.
the State of Palestine is the liquidation of the Zionist tendencies of the State of Israel.
— All forms of struggle against the occupiers, including armed struggle, are legitimate and necessary against the occupiers.
— The Palestinian resistance movement is not homogeneous; there is a leftist democratic wing and a rightist chauvinist wing, even if they are united at the moment.
— The important thing is that the leftist wing and the democratic elements should crystallize and come closer to their counterparts in Israel.
— I repeat, it will be difficult for you to find a final formula for the Palestine problem.
— The important thing is a movement supported by all and enjoying world support against occupation.
— The Palestine problem can unite Arab communists if it is put on a class basis and if extremist expressions are not allowed.
— Some Arab comrades tell us that the Palestine problem is the pivot of the Arab liberation movement. In fact the Palestine problem is an integral part of the Arab liberation movement, not its pivot.
— The pivot is the formation, strengthening and expansion of Arab progressive democratic movements in all the Arab countries and the victory of socialism in those countries.

Bu: Your countries are under Israeli occupation and the problem has not been solved. The aggressor is at the gates of Damascus. The Israelis are behaving insolently and basely, and the situation of the progressive regimes in Egypt and Syria is difficult, because they suffered a serious defeat.
— We are helping these countries in all fields. In the estimate of our experts the two armies are incapable of defeating the Israeli army. What will happen if the Israelis decide to attack again on land and in the air? How will the two armies behave? Is it possible to guarantee that there will be no repetition of June 1967?

Bu: That is why we are seeking a political settlement, to stem Israeli aggression and impose withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, through political pressure by all to compel Israel and America to withdraw the Israeli army.
— When the progressive regimes are capable of developing along the course of anti-imperialism and social progress and socialism.
— Life shows that, if it is possible to restrain the enemy, as is the case at present, it will be possible to advance along the course of social progress.
— In the circumstances of Israeli aggression the Communist Party must play

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12 The Arabic letters ٢١ which could indicate 'Po', 'Pu', 'Bo' as well as 'Bu'.
its role as the defender of independence and insofar as fighting is concerned, it must be in the forefront of effective struggle.

**Position of Secretary-General Bekdash**

[At the end of November 1971 a national conference of the Syrian Communist Party assembled to discuss and evaluate the Soviet comments in preparation for the Fourth Congress of the Party. During this conference, Bekdash, although outnumbered by five of the seven members of the Syrian Politburo, reaffirmed his previous stand. The second document consists of excerpts from his speech to the conference criticizing the draft programme and defending his own and the Soviet attitude to the Palestine problem.]

**Document 2: Khaled Bekdash on the Palestine Aspect of the Dispute in the Syrian Communist Party, November, 1971.**

So can any of us condemn the attitude of the USSR to the Palestine partition proposal? Can any of us condemn its present attitude as regards the solution to the Palestine problem?

Certain comrades quote what I said about the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International to justify their claims that it is possible, and indeed necessary, that their attitudes should differ from those of the USSR, not in tactics, but rather in objectives, indeed as regards the general strategy of the world revolutionary movement of which the USSR forms the vanguard.

This claim was not valid when the Seventh Comintern Congress was held in 1935, when the USSR was the only socialist country, and had had no great or decisive influence on the development of humanity. How then can it be valid now, when the USSR is the giant power of the socialist camp and, as such, plays an increasingly fundamental role in developing the whole of international life, in developing human society as a whole?

Is it permissible, for example, that in a problem that is so great as to have assumed world dimensions, we should be expected to differ with the Party of Lenin, not on tactics, but on objectives, on essential strategic objectives?

Lenin's Party says, as does the World Communist Movement in the 1969 document which was signed by our Party, that "the objective is to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression supported by American colonialism, and to safeguard the right of the Palestinian people to return to self-determination.”

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13 A full Arabic text of this document can be found in al-Rayā (Beirut), June 12, 1972, June 19, 1972 and June 26, 1972.

14 The "main document” adopted by the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, Moscow, June 17, 1969.
These comrades, however, as far as solving the Palestine problem is concerned, are not content with the major strategic objective, which is the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return and to self-determination; they set themselves another objective, which they call a strategic objective — the elimination of Israel as a state, under the slogan either of the “liberation of Palestine” or the liberation of “their usurped homeland,” or under the slogan of the “liquidation of Zionist institutions,” or something of the kind.

Such talk is not only at variance with the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, which called for identity of objectives; it is also at variance with proletarian internationalism; it is at variance with the class attitude and, consequently, with the interests of the Arab people and with our interests as a party.

Such talk, the employment of such extremist, unrealistic and non-class slogans, whatever is intended by them, can only serve the aims of Zionist colonialist propaganda.

If you will permit me, I want to say in a completely brotherly way that all talk to the effect that we are friends of the USSR but that we differ from it as regards the strategic objective, is not communist talk.

Naturally, identity of objectives does not exclude disparity in tactics. We must not employ the slogan of the elimination of Israel as a state, for it is neither a realistic nor a class slogan, and is injurious both to us and to the Arab peoples. We must employ the slogan of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return and to self-determination. In this way we shall have identity of objectives with the major, leading and decisive force in the world revolutionary movement.

From the point of view of tactics, we do not say, for example, that we must recognize Israel, because the USSR has recognized Israel as a state and says that it voted for the establishment of this state in 1947 as a matter of principle, as the Soviet Prime Minister stated at the United Nations after the 1967 aggression.

Another example: the revolutionary democrats, as Gamal Abdul Nasser affirmed, say: No recognition, no peace and no direct negotiation with Israel. But the USSR keeps silence, and neither condemns nor supports their attitude in this respect.

There is thus disparity of tactics, but one single objective — to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli-colonialist aggression and to safeguard the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return and to self-determination.

*Some Conclusions Regarding the Problem of Eliminating the Consequences of the Aggression and the Palestine Problem.*

The principal task is to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli-colonialist aggression of June 1967 and to liberate the Arab territories that were
occupied as a result of this aggression. How? By struggle for a just political solution on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 which stipulates, first and foremost, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories. Such an attitude will change the international atmosphere in favour of us Arabs, and this is no small thing. At the same time there must be serious and unremitting efforts to raise the fighting capacity of Arab forces, especially in Egypt and Syria, and there can be no doubt that such efforts to raise fighting capacity, if accompanied by support for a political solution, will make it impossible for colonialist and Zionist propaganda to claim that the object of raising Arab fighting capacity is to wipe out Israel as a state and to throw the Jews into the sea.

The political solution is the solution adopted by the USSR, with the support of Egypt and other Arab countries, and we for our part support this Soviet policy. But any kind of military adventure without sufficient study and preparation may spell disaster for the progressive Arab regimes, and it is obvious that unless these progressive Arab regimes are strengthened it will be impossible either to eliminate the consequences of aggression or to solve the Palestine problem.

Many of the nationalists who used to attack the Security Council resolution and employ the slogan of the liberation of the whole of Palestine, rather than that of the elimination of the consequences of aggression, are now revising their attitude; they no longer attack the Security Council resolution or persist in rejecting it. On the contrary, they declare that the task is to liberate the Arab territories occupied after the June 1967 aggression, and they specify these territories by name — the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza and Sinai. This is very clearly indicated in the attitude of the Ba'ath Party in Syria, headed by General Hafez al-Asad.

Obviously, our Party cannot adopt attitudes which even the progressive nationalist movement have started to relinquish as they advance to more realistic positions which cannot be exploited by colonialist and Zionist propaganda against the Arab people.

Naturally, too, alongside struggle on behalf of the principal slogan — the elimination of the consequences of aggression — there must also be struggle on behalf of a solution of the Palestine problem. This is important, and it was a mistake to ignore or neglect it in any way. There is a group of nationalists who say the Palestine problem will be solved by a return to the pre-1947 situation — in a word, the elimination of the State of Israel. But this slogan has no class basis, nor is it realistic.

One of the views and observations we are discussing today is to the effect that we must not imagine that we can enter Israel with bayonets, smash it and establish a Palestinian Arab state in its place. This is not realistic, and it
means a third world war. Some comrades have told us that they do not imagine
that employment of the slogan of the liberation of Palestine will lead to the
outbreak of a third world war. It is true that the mere employment of the
slogan will not have that effect. But the way to the achievement of this slogan
is the way to a third world war, and those who employ such extremist slogans,
whether they mean to or not, are helping colonialist quarters which are
trying to push things towards a third world war.

The way to a solution of the Palestine problem is struggle on behalf of
the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return and self-determination in
their own land. This slogan is sufficient for the moment.

To work out detailed final formulas for the Palestine problem at the
moment is very difficult. The important thing is that a slogan should be
adopted and that a movement should arise to work on behalf of it, both of
which enjoy extensive support at both internal and world levels. All this has
been fully explained to us by the comrade who represents the Palestinian
organization of our Party.

It is difficult at the present moment to determine what actual forms the
right to self-determination will take and the tangible stages through which
it will pass, because this depends on many factors — on the balance of power
in the area and in the world, and so on.

_Some comrades have asked: What is the strategic position in the Palestine
problem? But is it not clear that this slogan, the slogan of the right to return
and to self-determination is a major strategic slogan? Certainly it is a strategic
slogan, and for it to be realized there must be profound changes in the balance
of power between socialism and capitalism at world level, and profound
changes in the political and social structure in the area, and also in Israel
itself._

It may be objected that employment of the slogan of the right to self-
determination is not practical and that it is not clear how it can be applied.
But Lenin always used to say that the important thing in national problems
was to adopt the right principles. At one stage it seemed that the right to
self-determination was not practical but the important thing is that it is right
in principle. The way things develop will show it can be applied. This is
what Lenin said in his discussion of the right to self-determination with Rosa
Luxemburg. She said: “It is not practical.” To which he replied: “No, it
is not, but it is right in principle, and the way things develop will show how
it can be applied and the stages of its application.”

Thus, the slogan of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return
and to self-determination is the major strategic slogan in which is latent
the essence of the solution of the Palestine problem. Naturally and obviously
it is our duty to support the Palestinian resistance movement, to join it, to
make every effort to strengthen it and to guide it in the right direction — that is, to ensure that its bayonets are directed, first and foremost, against the Israeli occupiers and their forces, and that its objective and slogan should be “the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return and to self-determination.” But of course all this does not mean absolute support for all kinds of resistance movements; there must be struggle to guide the movement in the most advantageous, necessary and correct direction.

Even the commando organizations themselves are today criticizing many of their own political attitudes, slogans and courses of action. How then can we communists claim to support all the Palestinian resistance movement’s slogans and all its forms and methods of struggle? It is quite out of the question.

Before going on to the next problem, I should like to tell comrades and members of our Party’s National Assembly of the following incident, which is not without significance. As you know, we went as a delegation to Bulgaria to represent our Party at the Tenth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party. While we were there our student comrades proposed that a meeting be organized with Arab students studying there. The meeting was arranged; it was open to all and was attended by more than five hundred Arab students from various Arab countries, and of various parties and trends. The meeting was successful; in the course of it I delivered a report, at the request of the comrades, on the policy of our party in Syria and its attitude to various Arab problems. Question time followed; more than fifty questions were asked, all of which were answered. One was: “If the Israeli Communist Party came to power, what would your attitude be to Israel?” This gave rise to a good deal of argument among the student officials sitting on the platform. Some of them proposed that the question be ignored and not answered. But eventually we decided that it must be answered in order to explain the principles of our Party. The answer I gave was as follows:

“If the Israeli Communist Party came to power the problem would be solved, because this would mean, first, that the power of the Jewish bourgeoisie and the big Jewish landlords had been destroyed, and, secondly, that the chain which unites Israel with world Zionism and world imperialism had been broken. Thus there would no longer be either colonialist or Zionist control, or aggression, and the door would be open for the Palestinian Arab people to return and exercise their right to self-determination, so that the problem would be one between Arab and Jewish toilers. Obviously, under the auspices of socialism they would have no difficulty in reaching agreement on everything, including nomenclature.”

This was my reply, and it was received with applause. The significance

\footnote{In April 1971.}
of this is that the Arab people and Arab youth have achieved awareness and are not interested in overbidding and extremist talk. Life itself, and their awareness and experience will show them the way.

Position of the Syrian Communist Party Politburo on the Palestine Problem

[The conference failed to heal the breach within the Party and, reportedly, further mediation by a Soviet delegation headed by Kyril Mazurov of the Soviet Politburo in February was also unsuccessful. The victory of the opposition to Bekdash in the elections for the Damascus Regional Committee of the Party in March brought the crisis out into the open again, and provoked Bekdash, in a communique issued on April 3, to attack the opposition group as "deviationists" and guilty of "suspect and anti-Soviet activities." The Politburo subsequently issued the communique printed below.]


The June 1967 Setback and its Effect on the Party Crisis

As is well known, when major setbacks befall a popular struggle movement, they usually have two conflicting effects or give rise to two conflicting attitudes. One is the attitude which responds to the challenge, mobilizes forces, revises attitudes and transcends errors so as to ensure a more resolute confrontation with the enemy. The second is characterized by flight and surrender; those who adopt this attitude generally shirk responsibility for what has happened and call the "advice" they offered. After the 1948 setback, that of 1967 was probably the severest setback that has ever befallen our Arab people and nation in their struggle against imperialism and Zionism to ensure that our countries should advance towards socialism. Whereas this setback aroused the determination of the Arab masses to liquidate its consequences, in certain quarters it gave rise to the desire for flight and surrender, and most regrettably this is only too frequently the case with some of the leaders of comrade Khaled's bloc. Some of them have said that, as far as they were concerned, an increase of one quarter of a lira in workers' wages was more important than unity and Palestine, and others have said the same sort of thing. The important thing is that our Syrian Communist Party has resolutely rejected such attitudes, and pursued its advance towards greater involvement in the problems of the

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16 See, e.g., Edouard Saab's report from Beirut in Le Monde, April 12, 1972.
17 Ibid.
18 The full text of the Politburo reply is contained in al-Muharrir, July 9-11, 1972.
masses, their social, local, national and international problems. However, it must be pointed out that the names of those who adopt such attitudes are to be found in the list of those who signed the secessionist communiqué of April 3, but this time their signatures were appended to attitudes that were carefully veiled behind such words as "prudence," "objectivity," "class consciousness," "internationalism," etc.

The aggression of June 5 was directed not only against the Palestinian Arab people but also against the Arab people as a whole, against the Arab liberation movement in general and its progressive organizations in particular. Our party believes that the elimination of the consequences of aggression will play a basic role in promoting the advance of the Arab liberation movement and strengthening its progressive tendency to liquidate imperialist influence, to eliminate backwardness and to advance towards socialism and Arab unity. It also believes that the performance of this task is a step that must be taken if the Palestine problem is to be solved on the basis of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homeland and to self-determination on their own land.

For the consequences of imperialist-Zionist aggression to be eliminated, all the resources of the Arab people must be mobilized. This involves:

1. Strengthening the national economy by intensifying progressive measures, especially in the public sector.
2. Strengthening the army, improving its armaments and training, and increasing its fighting capacity.
3. Protecting and supporting commando action and taking part in it.
4. Co-ordination between the Arab armies, especially in the case of the progressive Arab countries.
5. Establishing the three-country federation on a sound basis and making its political and social content more profound.
6. Mobilizing the popular masses and establishing a progressive national front in every country and at Arab level.
7. Consolidating co-operation in all fields with the socialist countries and especially with the USSR.

Both the Third Congress and the resolutions of our Party's Central Committee have affirmed the importance of Arab political struggle both at home and in the international field, the importance of developing the fighting capacity of the regular armies and the necessity of supporting and taking part in commando action, on the assumption that there is no contradiction between the various forms of political and military struggle aimed at eliminating the consequences of aggression. Moreover, the Third Congress not only affirmed the necessity of taking the greatest possible advantage of all the aid provided by supporters and allies of the Arab liberation movement to the struggle to
eliminate the consequences of aggression; it also pinpointed the great importance and the fundamental role played by the Arab element — which includes commando action — referring to the possibilities available to the Arab countries and the necessity to make the best possible use of them on behalf of the achievement of this great objective.

Credit for the modest part played by the Party in commando action must be allotted to the Third Congress itself and to the Central Committee appointed by it. Before the Congress we played no part worth mentioning, and indeed our view of commando action was negative. In fact, as the secessionist communiqué shows, there was disagreement on the subject of commando action in the Central Committee. To be precise, the disagreement was not about whether the importance of the role of commando action was being exaggerated or not, but about whether or not the Party should take part in it, about whether it was the duty of communists to fight the occupying enemy alongside their brothers the commandos and, consequently, about the enforcement of the resolutions of the Third Congress.

It is much to be regretted that, to justify their secessionist action, those who signed the communiqué of April 3 should have decided to misrepresent the attitude of the majority of the Party and the comrades to commando action. The Third Congress affirmed that to eliminate the consequences of aggression, struggle must continue:

— through activity in the political field
— through increasing the fighting capacity of the Arab armies
— through supporting and strengthening commando action.

It also affirmed that there must be a precise formulation of the manner in which these elements must be co-ordinated. Those who signed the communiqué of April 3 chose to accuse the majority of the party of exaggerating the role of commando action and of regarding it as the vanguard of the Arab liberation movement and of the Palestinian revolution in the struggle to eliminate the consequences of aggression and to liberate the territory — regarding it as more important than the Arab armies. We said, and we still say, that the sections of the resistance are the vanguard movement of the Palestinian revolution and of the Palestinian national liberation movement. It is legitimate to ask what those who signed the April 3 communiqué intend by misrepresenting the attitude of the Party to commando action and the role of the Arab armies. Do they intend to incite the Arab armies against commando action or against the Syrian Communist Party? What respect do they have for the intelligence and discernment of the masses?

The accusations published in the secessionist communiqué on the nationalist question are thrown back at the authors and signatories of the communiqué. We are concerned with the problems of our people and our nation —
the problems of our people's national liberation, of their development towards social progress and non-capitalist development, of finding solutions for the Palestinian Arab problem, of reflecting on the destiny of the displaced Palestinian Arab people and of searching for the necessary and possible forms of struggle. We are seeking and struggling to achieve the rapprochement of the Arab countries and the unity of the progressive Arab countries. We Syrian communists believe that neither the working class and its Communist Party, nor the masses of peasants and revolutionary intellectuals should allow themselves to be turned aside from dealing with their national problems by slogans to the effect that these are "nationalist" or "non-class" problems; as certain comrades who lay claim to Marxist-Leninist understanding like to suggest.

Concern with these problems is a national, class and international duty, and there is no contradiction between these duties. Why, then, are the comrades who signed the April 3 communiqué afraid to deal with the problems that concern the Arab people and to put them in their right place? Is their motive a class spirit, an internationalist spirit, or what?

The exclusive concern of communists with the problems of the world liberation movement does not exempt them from concern with the local, national and class problems of their people, and cannot justify their neglect of these problems, and their failure to participate seriously in attempts to find the correct solutions for them. For their concern with these problems to go further than the mere placing on record of an internationalist attitude, communists must do all in their power to make the process of anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist revolution more profound and to ensure that it plays a greater part in the world revolutionary process. We believe that the interests of the Party and the country, the interests of the nation and the working class, the interests of socialism, lie in increasing the Party's concern for finding solutions for the local [wataniya] and national [qawmiya] problems of its people and nation on a Marxist-Leninist basis. The vulgar accusations levelled by the signatories of the April 3 communiqué at the majority of the Party are an expression of a spirit that is alien to a national [watani], international and class spirit; the expression of a cosmopolitan spirit, of an un-Arab and fanatically national [qawmi] spirit.

Instead of dealing with the cautious attitude of the non-Arab national minorities as regards the Arab liberation movement and its tasks on an internationalist basis, on a basis of the interests of the legitimate struggle of these minorities to obtain their rights, on a basis of the interests of these minorities' common struggle with the Arab liberation movement, the signatories of the the April 3 communiqué are trying to subordinate the Party's policy to a cautious attitude. While it is essential to confront manifestations of chauvinism in the Arab liberation movement and to struggle against them in every way,
it is also essential that communists should deal with manifestations of nationalist isolationism and caution in a truly internationalist spirit, in a spirit of sympathy with the progressive movement in the Arab liberation movement, and seek to co-ordinate with its democratic revolutionary representatives in order to fight the common battle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction. The promotion of the Arab national liberation movement is in the interests of both the Arab masses and of the other nationalities that live with the Arabs, and it is not in the interests of these national minorities that any other course should be followed. It is regrettable that there should be in our Party comrades who regard a positive appraisal of the Arab national liberation movement as being a manifestation of nationalist fanaticism and of fanatical nationalist tendencies. And this in spite of the fact that the World Communist Movement appraisal of this movement is a positive one, as was made clear at the Congress of Communist Parties in 1969. And while disregarding the positive aspects of the Arab liberation movement — struggle against imperialism, friendship with the USSR, the socialist camp and the world liberation movement, pursuit of the course of non-capitalist development, the striking of serious blows at imperialist monopolies, as happened recently with the nationalization of the oil company and its pipelines in Iraq and Syria, the formation of progressive national forces, etc. — they exaggerate the deficiencies and negative aspects which attend on the advance of the Arab liberation movement. For example, if al-Qadhafi makes an undesirable statement, they take it as showing the whole of the Arab liberation movement in the most unfavourable light.

This is the place to quote the appraisal of the Arab national liberation movement made by the Congress of Communist Parties held in Moscow in 1969. It reads as follows:

“The Arab liberation movement plays a role in the battle against world imperialism, and it has a positive influence on the movement against imperialism and neo-colonialism in the Middle East and throughout Africa. Israeli aggression is part of the general struggle between the forces of freedom and socialism in all parts of the world on the one hand, and world imperialism on the other.

“The growth of the movement for national liberation and for the social progress of the peoples of this strategically important and oil rich area arouses the violent hatred of the imperialists and the oil monopolies, which are weaving a network of conspiracies against this movement which do not stop short of wars and aggressive actions.

“If these activities are to be frustrated and these conspiracies defeated, and if all gains so far achieved are to be maintained, intensification of social and economic changes, progressive national fronts, the democratic freedoms of the masses and activity on the part of the progressive national forces are of the greatest importance.”
The Third Congress of our Party held in 1969 also appraised the liberation movement as follows:

"At the same time it (i.e., Israel) is being used by American colonialism as a hammer to strike at the Arab national liberation movement which is growing ever richer in new progressive socialist content, which is being directed towards the total liquidation of the positions both of the remnants of feudalism and of the upper bourgeoisie — that is to say, the liquidation of all possibility of colonialist, imperialist and economic influence ever returning to the area in the future."