This essay looks at the hearing held by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in April 1922 on the subject of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, as well as the broader congressional debate over the Balfour Declaration at that crucial time. The landmark hearing, which took place against the backdrop of growing unrest in Palestine and just prior to the League of Nations’ formal approval of Britain’s Mandate over Palestine, offers a glimpse into the cultural and political mindset underpinning U.S. support for the Zionist project at the time as well as the ways in which the political discourse in the United States has, or has not, changed since then. Despite the overwhelming support for the Zionist project in Congress, which unanimously endorsed Balfour in September 1922, the hearing examined all aspects of the issue and included a remarkably diverse array of viewpoints, including both anti-Zionist Jewish and Palestinian Arab voices.

In late April 1922, almost four-and-a-half years after Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour put the weight of the British Empire behind the creation of a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives convened its own hearing on the subject. The focus of the hearing, which lasted four days and included statements from ten external witnesses as well as several members of Congress, was a joint congressional resolution endorsing the Balfour Declaration that was sponsored by Representative Hamilton Fish Jr. of New York and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts (both Republicans). The Fish-Lodge resolution, as it became known, easily won the committee’s approval and was subsequently adopted unanimously as H.J. Res. 322 of 1922 by both houses of Congress and signed by President Warren G. Harding.1 Although nearly a century has passed since it was convened, the hearing offers some useful insights into what has, and has not, changed since then. The hearing record along with the broader congressional debate over Balfour offer a revealing glimpse into the cultural and political mindset underpinning U.S. support for the Zionist project at the time, much of which still permeates political thinking in the United States today. Moreover, notwithstanding Capitol Hill’s overwhelmingly favorable attitude, the hearing provided an opportunity for genuine debate and included a remarkably diverse range of viewpoints, features that are largely absent from congressional hearings on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict today.
The timing of the hearing was highly significant. The British had taken control of Palestine in late 1918, shortly after the end of World War I, and began implementing their Jewish National Home (JNH) policy forthwith, leading to protests and bouts of unrest by the country’s Arab majority in 1920–21. The Palestine Mandate had been assigned to Britain at the 1920 San Remo Peace Conference, and would be formally approved by the League of Nations in July 1922, a few months after U.S. legislators had wrapped up their debate. President Woodrow Wilson was strongly sympathetic to the Zionist cause and had already declared his unofficial support for “a Jewish Commonwealth” at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. However, in keeping with the State Department’s policy of neutrality with regard to the fate of the Turkish Empire, with whom the United States was not at war, the administration stopped short of officially endorsing the Balfour Declaration. Meanwhile, the findings of the King-Crane inquiry, which had been commissioned by Wilson in early 1919 to ascertain the wishes of the local populations in the Arab areas of the former Ottoman Empire and whose recommendations were known to be opposed to Balfour, had been held up for nearly three years and were only released in July 1922. Among other things, the inquiry found that Palestine’s Arabs were “emphatically against the entire Zionist program” and that to “subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle” of self-determination.

The Case in Favor

The congressional resolution’s easy passage was not entirely unforeseen. Even at this early stage, sympathy for the Zionist cause ran high on Capitol Hill, for both domestic political and cultural/sentimental reasons. By 1919, the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), the largest and most influential pro-Zionist voice in Washington at the time, had already secured statements in favor of Balfour from some 300 U.S. lawmakers, including 61 senators and 239 representatives. Congressional enthusiasm for the Zionist project was evident in the language of the resolution itself. Unlike the carefully crafted words of the Balfour Declaration, which had merely expressed “favor” for a Jewish national home “in” Palestine, the original text of the resolution (H. Con. Res. 52) spoke of “the re-creation of Palestine as the national home of the Jewish race” (emphasis added). Although this language was subsequently removed from the final version of the text, committee members also modified Balfour’s prescription to state that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine” (emphasis added). Although most of the bill’s sponsors belonged to the Republican Party, which at the time enjoyed substantial majorities in both houses, there was little if any evidence of a partisan divide on the subject. Virtually all of the thirty representatives to register an opinion on the resolution, whether at the April hearing or during the subsequent floor debate on 30 June, clearly expressed support for the JNH idea. The bill’s sponsors managed to further skew the proceedings in their favor by convincing the committee chairman to break with normal procedure of hearing from the bill’s opponents after each of its proponents had completed their testimony. This allowed the resolution’s supporters to rebut the arguments of their opponents, a privilege they would not normally have had. In the process, the proponents’ lead witness, Louis

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Lipsky of the ZOA, used the opportunity to insinuate himself into other aspects of the hearing, offering unsolicited commentary on the statements of other witnesses, and in a few instances directly questioning them himself.

The hearing was replete with the familiar theme of pioneering Jewish colonists making the land fertile and bringing civilization to an underpopulated and otherwise desolate wasteland. Biblical justifications were frequently interspersed with notions of manifest destiny and mission civilisatrice to affirm Jewish (and hence also Christian) claims over the Holy Land. Palestine was, in the words of the ZOA’s Lipsky, “a deserted country,” an “underdeveloped and underpopulated” land, that “has not been made fruitful because nobody was working on it.” For the resolution’s chief sponsor, Hamilton Fish, Palestine had become “a comparatively sterile country,” as well as “a devastated and sparsely settled land, due to the wanton and deplorable policy of desolation systematically carried out by its [Ottoman] rulers.” Zionist settlers were depicted as the equivalent of Jewish Puritans working to redeem the land from the backward native Palestinian Indians. “The resettling of Palestine has created a situation somewhat akin to that of the American colonist in his struggle with the American Indian,” explained Congressman Albert B. Rossdale, another Republican from New York, in which, “The Nomadic Arab raiders, on a smaller scale are fighting the civilization of the Jewish settler as the Indian fought the American settler on this continent in the early days.” The committee’s ranking Democrat, J. Charles Linthicum of Maryland, likewise claimed that “the Arabs and the other inhabitants—comprising the bulk of the population there—have led a beggarly existence until the coming of the Jewish colonists commenced to change things for the better,” in addition to which, “there has been no civilization there” worthy of mention.

For his part, ZOA representative Abraham Goldberg maintained that there was “something providential in the fact that Palestine for 1,800 years was not conquered by anybody or settled . . . as if waiting for the return of its people.” Palestine, Goldberg asserted, “is still waiting in desolation for an industrious people to come in and make a real land in accordance with the picture in the Bible.” Indeed, the case for a Jewish national home in Palestine relied heavily on such appeals to religious sentiment and sensibilities. Biblical events and personalities were often taken as historical fact, and the Bible itself was often presumed to offer clues into everything from the racial origins of Palestine’s native inhabitants and their ancestral ties to the Holy Land to the country’s absorptive capacity for new immigrants. Palestine was depicted as a sort of living manifestation of the Bible, even as it was simultaneously divested of its Arab history, identity, and heritage. Not only was the Holy Land steeped in biblical history, but even modern Palestine, it was claimed, had remained essentially Jewish right up until the present day. “If you go to Palestine,” insisted Goldberg, “you would see that whatever there is yet of the culture in that land it is still the reminder of what the Jews have done there. It is still Jerusalem, still Jaffa, still the Mount of Olives, still Carmel, and the other names remain yet. It is still Bethlehem, it is still Nazareth; nothing has changed.” Congressman Linthicum furthered the narrative by observing that, “Although various alien people succeeded them at different periods, the Jews left an indelible impress upon the land. Even unto the present it is yet a Jewish country. Every landmark, every monument, every name, and every trace of whatever civilization is there is still Jewish.”

Support for Zionism and Jewish colonization was presented as natural, inherently just, and even uncontroversial. “There is very little opposition to the resolution throughout the country,” insisted
Representative Fish. “This is not like a disputed question, where there are two sides, or where there are two evenly divided sides.” The Balfour Declaration and Jewish ascendancy were likewise depicted as harmless endeavors that posed no discernable threat to Palestine’s Arab inhabitants—even if the Jews were to someday dominate the country. As Fish explained, there was no reason to believe that if Palestine “became a Jewish state, and the Jews became a majority that they would not take care of the Arabs and give them the same right to hold property and live in peace with the rest of the community.” The local Arab population, it was asserted, had nothing to fear from the Zionist project, which promised only economic and cultural advancement. As Ambrose Kennedy of Rhode Island asked forthrightly, “Why should they oppose the influx of the Jews through the process of immigration when the productivity that exists in Palestine to-day comes as a result of Jewish activity?”

Arab opposition to the Zionist project was discounted as the work of outside “agitators,” the product of a stubborn resistance to “civilization,” or as an irrational hatred of Jews. There would be few problems between Arabs and Zionists in Palestine, insisted Goldberg, “were there not special men who go around egging the population on and advising them not to allow the Jews to come in there—were there not these anti-Semitics.” Congressman Rossdale echoed the sentiment, noting that “friction between the colonists and the other inhabitants who are mostly Moslem Arabs steeped in ignorance and extreme poverty has been fomented by the small number of Arab intellectuals, the Effendis, chiefs of tribes and large landowners who ruled the country during the Turkish regime. These near-Turks naturally object to the newer Western civilization which the colonist Jew is bringing to Palestine.”

Attitudes toward Palestine’s indigenous Arab inhabitants varied from general indifference to open hostility. Most of the resolution’s supporters—though by no means all of them—sought to strike a moderate, conciliatory tone with regard to the native inhabitants who at the time made up well over 90 percent of Palestine’s population. “What are you going to do with them?” asked Iowa congressman Cyrenus Cole of Lipsky on the first day of the hearing, “Leave them in the country or expel them?” Lipsky replied in the negative, quoting the words of a founding father of Zionism, Chaim Weizmann: “There is land enough and room enough in Palestine to sustain a population many times larger than the present population. All fears expressed openly or secretly by the Arabs that they are to be ousted from their present position are due either to a fundamental misconception of Zionist aims and intentions or to the malicious activities of our common enemies.” For his part, Rabbi Morris S. Lazaron of Baltimore insisted in his testimony that since the Jews themselves had “been subjected to oppression and tyranny . . . there is no reason to believe that even should the Jew ultimately achieve a majority, the rights of any group would be impaired. There is every reason to believe they would not.”

The views of Palestine’s Arabs were in any event irrelevant, it was argued, since they were neither the true owners of the country nor the legitimate political authority responsible for it. As Lipsky explained to the panel, the future of Palestine had already been decided in discussions “not with the Palestinians in Jerusalem or Palestinians in Jaffa” but “with the representatives of the Arab people,” the Emir Faisal and the Hashemites, who, he claimed, had given their blessings to the Zionist project in Palestine. Thus there would be no harm in imposing the JNH policy against the wishes of the Arab majority, Lipsky continued, since the “territory in Palestine does not belong to
Palestinians as territory belongs to individuals who own the land. There was no nation in Palestine before the war. There was the Turkish Government that was ruling over Palestine.” Simply put, Palestine’s Arab population had no national or political rights. Rather, Lipsky explained, they were “entitled to what is called ‘individual rights,’” which extended only to their “civil and religious rights.” By contrast, “the self-determination principle” did not apply to the “Arabs in Palestine” because it had been established during World War I that “the inherent right of self-determination had to do not with groups of people who happened by accident to be occupying a certain territory; it had to do with races, with nationalities.”

A few of the bill’s more strident supporters had no patience for such convoluted arguments. Among them was Republican congressman Walter Marion Chandler of New York who, despite having skipped the hearing, had a great deal to say about the resolution when the measure came up for a vote on the House floor later in the summer. In a passionate and long-winded statement encompassing nearly half of the congressional record for that debate, Chandler dispensed with the pretense of fairness altogether. “I must insist,” he declared, “that it does not become the American Congress or the American Government to prate too loudly at this time about the sacred rights of the Arabs in Palestine, in the light of our treatment of the Filipinos during the last quarter of a century, and in view of the fact that every civilized nation of the earth, excepting the United States, has acknowledged the independence de jure of Estonia and Latvia upon principles of self-determination.” The Arabs, Chandler insisted, should therefore be required to choose from among three options: “If they will not consent to Jewish government and domination, under conditions of right and justice, or to sell their lands at a just valuation and to retire into their own countries, they shall be driven from Palestine by force.”

Anti-Zionist Views

Such views did not go uncontested. Despite the procedural irregularities and the strong pro-Zionist sentiment within the committee, the hearing included a remarkably diverse array of viewpoints which probed the issue from almost every angle, whether the legal and foreign policy implications of a congressional endorsement of the Balfour Declaration for U.S. interests or Zionism’s impact on Palestine’s Arab majority. Although there were no members of Congress who explicitly opposed the resolution, opponents of the measure made up half of the total witness list that appeared before the panel. Those speaking against it included a university professor, two rabbis representing the Reform movement, which at the time was still predominantly anti-Zionist, as well as two native-born Palestinians who were naturalized U.S. citizens. The debate was sufficiently lively that a correspondent for the American Hebrew, an anti-Zionist publication (whose editor was among those who testified against the resolution) described the hearing as containing “nothing of the pork barrel politics which usually savors most hearings. There was nothing personal or selfish sought by any of the witnesses. Each man desired to establish a principle, evidently very dear to him. There were oratory and logic, passion and cool-headedness, impertinence and self-control, clever quizzing and answers that covered wide fields of knowledge of history and religion, of local, national and international politics.”

Other than for the two Palestinian witnesses, the most powerful and articulate voice of opposition to the resolution—and the one to whom the bill’s proponents felt most compelled to
respond—was that of Edward Bliss Reed, a professor of English literature at Yale University. Reed, who had spent several months in Palestine as a volunteer with the American Red Cross, described himself as a former Zionist who had been converted by what he had witnessed during his time in the country. He rejected the depiction of Palestine’s Arabs as backward and unfit to govern themselves, sarcastically noting the presence of two “half-civilized” Palestinians in the hearing room. He also expressed frustration with the delayed release of the King-Crane report, a matter which he had personally taken up with the State Department, only to be “told that there was no chance of seeing that report, and that it probably never would come out.” Reed denounced Zionism as a form of “imperialism” and an “attempt to take away from the non-Jewish Palestinians the right to rule their own country” by force. The pledge to preserve the “civil and religious rights” of non-Jews in Palestine was meaningless, he argued, in light of the nature of Balfour itself, which involved an inherent preference for the Jewish minority over the Arab majority. As such, both Balfour and the Zionist movement ran contrary to basic American values and principles. “That is why I do not want you to vote for this resolution,” insisted Reed, “because it is un-American. All men are equal before the law. If any man has preference he is not equal before the law.”

Balfour, in Reed’s view, sought to deny the Palestinians the same right to self-determination as was afforded to others. The British “are doing it in Ireland, in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, in India,” Reed insisted, “and yet they say, for this one strip of land we have made the Balfour declaration, and that precludes giving you a voice in your government; that precludes us from hearing your wishes. That is why I think this Balfour declaration is very un-American and that is why I think we want to go very slowly before we underwrite it.” Reed went on to state that he was “absolutely opposed to political Zionism,” explaining that he did “not think any State will ever prosper founded by such means because people are the same all over, and the fact that 2,000 years ago a certain people lived there does not very much impress the minds of those who live there now. . . . How would you feel if the German troops were holding you down until enough Frenchmen came in to take possession of the State.” Reed’s passionate rebuke of Zionism earned him the ire of the resolution’s supporters, including Goldberg, who accused the professor of playing into a generalized suspicion of Jews and likened Reed’s warnings about Balfour to the infamous anti-Semitic forgery, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

The committee also heard from two Reform rabbis, Isaac Landman of Long Island and David Philipson of Cincinnati, who contested the view that Zionism was a matter of consensus—particularly within the Jewish community. Philipson noted that American Jews remained deeply divided over the question of Zionism, which was still overwhelmingly opposed by the nation’s leading Reform bodies such as the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the Central Conference of American Rabbis. Moreover, both men argued, Zionism ran counter to the universal values of Judaism and they took issue with the claim that Jews constituted a distinct race entitled to a state of their own. While Jews were not necessarily opposed to the “restoration of Palestine,” argued Landman, most remained opposed “to political Zionism, to the idea that the Jews all over the world constitute a nation.” Philipson likewise claimed “that the Jewish nationalistic movement or Zionism misreads the entire significance of the Jew in the world; it has turned the clock backwards thousands of years . . . this Jewish question is going to be solved, not by the Balfour Declaration, but by full freedom for the Jews to live everywhere as well as in Palestine.” Furthermore, Philipson
observed, the U.S. government had no business taking a position on an internal matter over which Jews were themselves deeply divided; Congress had no more right to endorse Zionism than it had to “take sides . . . in the Catholic controversy on the question of papal infallibility.” The fact that Palestine was already inhabited was another factor. “I know these Arabs have been living in those countries for centuries,” noted Philipson. “Six hundred thousand Arabs live in that country and only 80,000 Jews. All those things ought to go together, and this Palestine ought to be named a refuge for everybody and not simply the Jews.”

Capping the hearing were the testimonies of Fuad Shatara, a Jaffa-born surgeon residing in Brooklyn, and Selim Totah, a young law student and native of Ramallah representing the Palestine National League. The inclusion of Palestinian voices in the hearing at a time when there was no Arab-American political constituency of any consequence was remarkable in itself—and remains fairly rare even today.

The two men spent much of their time attempting to refute the negative depictions of Palestine and Palestinians presented during the first three days of the hearing, but met with little success. “Palestinians are not as backward as Zionists portray them,” said Shatara. “They are entitled to a chance to build their own homeland under a just and helpful administration.” And Totah insisted, “The land is not desolate. The natives cultivated the land there. We have intelligent, law-abiding people and can develop the country if given a chance. We were never given a chance.” He also pointed out that there were “several thriving cities,” in Palestine, including Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Lud, Ramleh, and others. While “it is the common impression in America that Palestine is a Jewish country,” observed Shatara, “nothing is further from the truth. There are about 70,000 Jews in Palestine, about 7 per cent of the existing population and about 5 per cent of the number of Jews in New York City. The overwhelming majority of Palestinians are uncompromisingly opposed to Zionism and the orthodox Jews of Palestine look with disfavor upon the Zionist movement.” Like Reed, the men referred committee members to the King-Crane Commission’s findings to help ensure the release of the long-delayed report. “The Crane commission went over there and got an expression from the entire population,” said Totah. “That ought not to be neglected. Money was spent for the purpose of sending the commission. It was not for the purpose of putting it in the files of the State Department. Why should it not be published?”

Thus, the two men argued, it was to the Arabs that priority ought to go. Since Balfour, Totah maintained, the Jews had received preferential treatment at the hands of British authorities, even though they comprised a small fraction of the population. “You gentlemen and your forefathers have fought for the idea, and that is taxation with representation,” continued the young law student.

We are asking for the same principles. By the operation of the Balfour Declaration a majority of Jews will be established in Palestine, and after a while by their majority they will govern the native people. Would you stand for things like that in California if the Japanese should come in and after 20 or 30 years become a majority and establish a republic of their own? Not for a moment. How would you expect 93 per cent of the people in Palestine to stand for that? . . . We are a majority now, but we do not want any people to come into Palestine and become a majority. This is our national home, the national home of the Palestinians, and I think those people are entitled to priority as the national home of the Palestinians and not aliens who have come in and have gradually become a majority.
Representative W. Bourke Cockran, a Democrat from New York, objected to Shatara’s line of reasoning. “Carrying that out,” said Cockran, “the Indians would have the right to object to the coming here of the whites.” To which Shatara responded, “If you carry that out, you will notice you will allow the Arab to claim Spain.”

Still unable to impress members of the committee, however, the two Palestinians were pressed on the socioeconomic condition of Palestine’s Arabs. What proportion of the Arab population could read and write? What was the state of Palestine’s economy before the arrival of the Jews? What improvements had the Arabs made in manufacturing or agricultural production since then? The two Palestinians attempted to respond, listing various economic activities and citing relevant data where they could, but failed to convince their questioners, who remained dismissive or incredulous that any notable economic advancements could be anything but the result of the influx of Jews. The panel pressed on. How long had the present inhabitants of Palestine been there? Where did they come from originally, and how did they gain possession of the land? Once again, the responses failed to satisfy the representatives, who continued to insist that the Palestinians had done little to earn their independence.

Meanwhile, the mere assertion that the Arab majority be given a say in determining the policies of the country, including immigration, was met with hostility and derision, as demonstrated in this final exchange of the hearing:

MR. TOTAH. If they come to establish a majority, the natives have a right to limit immigration as this country has a right to control immigration.
MR. KENNEDY. But we are an organized government. There is no one over there.
MR. TOTAH. But that does not cut out the equities of the situation.
MR. KENNEDY. These Jews are making this land fertile where it was sterile.
MR. TOTAH. No, sir; I disagree with that in its entirety.
MR. KENNEDY. The places that are fertile are not sterile now. The lands that those Jews have taken, this report states, have been lands that were sterile when they got them and they have turned them into fertile lands.
MR. TOTAH. We could do that ourselves.
MR. KENNEDY. That is another matter. That is a fact that the Jews are doing that. There is no doubt. It is conceded that what you want is to be yourselves given control of this land.
MR. TOTAH. To develop it.
MR. COCKRAN. And not allow the Jew to enter in, peacefully or otherwise.
MR. TOTAH. We do not say that.
MR. COCKRAN. Peacefully or otherwise, even to buy it, no matter what the result, if they should become a majority.

Plus ça Change

The examples above suggest that while official U.S. policy and public opinion have evolved considerably in the century since Balfour, the cultural and political forces that helped to shape the United States’ overall approach toward the Palestinians have remained relatively unchanged. Unlike at the time of the hearing, the United States now officially acknowledges Palestinians’ political aspirations, including their right to an independent state. Likewise, U.S. public opinion has become considerably more attuned to Palestinian rights and concerns than it was a century ago—a phenomenon that appears to be intensifying in recent years. At the same time, however,
the influence of pro-Zionist political forces on American decision-making, the prominence of sentimental and religiously based prejudices, the requirement that Palestinians “prove” that they are fit to govern themselves, and a tendency to view Palestinian opposition to the Zionist project as manufactured or irrational are all still very much part of the present-day U.S. outlook, especially in policy circles.

On the other hand, the fact that such a highly contentious debate even took place in 1922, in contrast to the carefully choreographed and largely one-sided hearings on Israel/Palestine that have become the norm on Capitol Hill today, points to an even more curious paradox: even as official policy and public attitudes toward Israel/Palestine have become more varied and inclusive, the political space for debate in Washington remains fairly exclusive and in some ways may even have narrowed. If nothing else, however, the April 1922 hearing demonstrates that it is possible to have an open and honest discussion on the subject of Palestine and Israel in Washington, which as of this writing remains long overdue.

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ENDNOTES

5 Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from the hearing record: Expressing Satisfaction at the Re-Creation of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish Race: Hearings on H. Con. Res. 52 before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 67th Cong. (1922), https://www.loc.gov/resource/conghear08.00144277569/7st=gallery.
6 Joint Resolution Favoring the Establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People.
7 A single representative, Texas Democrat Tom Connally, seemed to express some skepticism in his line of questioning at the hearing, though he did not explicitly oppose the resolution.