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SETTLEMENT MONITOR

EDITED BY GEOFFREY ARONSON

This section covers items—reprinted articles, statistics, and maps—pertaining to Israeli settlement activities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Unless otherwise stated, the items have been written by Geoffrey Aronson for this section or drawn from material written by him for Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories (hereinafter Settlement Report), a Washington-based bimonthly newsletter published by the Foundation for Middle East Peace. JPS is grateful to the foundation for permission to draw on its material. Major documents relating to settlements appear in the Documents and Source Material section.

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GAZA DISENGAGEMENT AND THE SETTLEMENT ENTERPRISE

RETREAT FROM GAZA AND NEW FACTS IN THE WEST BANK

From Settlement Report, March–April 2005.

After almost five years of grim determination and little but promises of “blood, sweat, and tears,” Israelis and Palestinians sense the beginning of a new phase in their struggle. For the moment, dialogue and handshakes have replaced threats and armed confrontation. Yet Israelis and Palestinians have learned from hard experience that smiles and vague proclamations can conceal radically different agendas.

Israel's retreat from the Gaza Strip and its redeployment from an undetermined part of the northern West Bank continue to dominate its domestic agenda. Having established the political muscle to ensure the plan's execution, the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is now completing the operational aspects of evacuating settlements in

these areas and compensating those settlers affected by it.

Settlers now realize that the disengagement train has left the station. All but the most fanatical among them understand that the settlement enterprise in Gaza is ending and that the Gaza Strip will be foreign territory by year's end, all the more so if an Israeli-Egyptian agreement can be reached for Israel's surrender of the “Philadelphi” border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The most politically astute settlers continue to oppose the plan not because they believe that it can be stopped—20 percent of Gaza's 1,200 settler dwelling units are already empty—but because they suspect that their homes in West Bank settlements like Ofra and Elon Moreh and dozens of others deep inside the West Bank are next on Sharon's agenda. These are not the settlements that U.S. President George W. Bush has blessed as incontrovertible facts on the ground—Ma'ale Adumim, Mod'in Ilit, and others where the bulk of Israel's 415,000 West Bank and East Jerusalem settlers reside—but those that Yitzhak Rabin once called “political

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settlements" established along the hilltops that dot the West Bank heartland.

Indeed, the alliance that the settlement leadership built over many decades with politicians like Sharon (and before him Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres) and with Israel's security establishment has suffered a blow far more damaging as a consequence of Sharon's disengagement plan than anything that preceded it. Commentator Nahum Barnea [see *Outpost Observations*] noted on 21 February, "an authoritative military source, [described] this revolutionary change in the settlers' position: that after 37 years of gnawing away at the power of the state, the state is trying to return authority to itself."

Yet disengagement from Gaza does not signal the beginning of the end of the settlement enterprise—not by a long shot—nor does it portend an irrevocable split between the partisans of settlement on the one hand and Israel's security-political establishment on the other. The ties that bind these three critical power centers in Israel in a joint pursuit of territorial expansion in the West Bank have been forged over almost four decades. Just as it made no sense to expect the resolution of claims that had festered for half a century in a few days of discussions at Camp David, it would be wrong to interpret Sharon's disengagement plan as a mortal blow to the settlement lobby and the beginning of the end of Israel's commanding presence in the West Bank.

Sharon, more clearly than most of his predecessors, sees settlers as instruments in the execution of a geostrategic vision on the West Bank that accommodates Palestinian national demands only insofar as they do not contradict Israel's strategic domination of the area. That Sharon's preference to remain in the Gaza Strip was confounded by a combination of factors that he was unable to control only suggests the tremendous upheaval that will be required to establish minimal conditions for genuine Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Sharon's readiness to impose upon Palestinians authority over 50 or even 80 percent of the West Bank does not meet this test. Israel continues to expand settlements in the West Bank. President Bush's statements of a year ago are portrayed by Sharon as a U.S. certificate of approval for settlement expansion on the almost 10 percent of the West Bank west of the emerging security barrier. Occasional, muted U.S. disapproval has had no significant impact on

this effort. Witness the continuing consolidation of more than 100 new settlements—deceptively termed "outposts"—established during the last decade in an ongoing process that violates not only an international consensus embodied in the stillborn Road Map but also Israel's own laws and procedures.

These efforts, blessed by governments led by Likud and Labor over the last decade, reflect the conviction of Israel's military and political establishment that the continuing zero-sum struggle for control over land that lies at the heart of the conflict can be won. The return of Palestinian police to Tulkarm and the beginning of the IDF's withdrawal from other Palestinian urban areas do not alter Sharon's long-term ambition for the consolidation of Israeli control over critical areas of the West Bank—and all of Jerusalem—where the next chapter of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is being written.

SETTLEMENT EXPANSION AS NATIONAL ENTERPRISE

GRAB AND SETTLE: THE STORY OF MA'ALE ADUMIM

From Settlement Report, May-June 2005.

Ma'ale Adumim stands out as one of the most important achievements of Israel's settlement campaign. In the century-old battle between Arab and Jew, this town has amassed two of the conflict's winning ingredients, land and population. Today, with close to 30,000 inhabitants and control of an area of 60 km², it is the most populous of all settlements other than those located in East Jerusalem, with a land reserve that promises continued population growth. The five neighboring Palestinian villages currently have more residents, but expropriations favoring Ma'ale Adumim have left them with an area of only 4.6 km². These facts have won Ma'ale Adumim a much-coveted designation, not only as part of Israel's "national consensus," enjoying as a result the support of all major Israeli parties, but also recognition from the Bush administration as one of the "new realities on the ground" that an Israeli-Palestinian agreement must accommodate.

Ma'ale Adumim exemplifies Israel's use of civilian settlement as an instrument of national-strategic policy. The mission of settlement in the occupied territories was proclaimed by then defense minister Ariel

Sharon upon his return from the summit at Wye Plantation in October 1998, where a stillborn deal was struck for Israel's redeployment in the West Bank.

Sharon exhorted settlers to "move, run, [and] grab more hills, expand the territory. Everything that is grabbed will remain in our hands. Everything we don't grab will be in their hands."

Like the "outpost" phenomena that Sharon's remarks sparked, the creation and settlement of Ma'ale Adumim was born in a fog of deliberate obfuscation and little regard not only for international conventions prohibiting settlement but also of Israeli laws enacted to regulate it.

Ma'ale Adumim represents one of the first settlement achievements of Gush Emmunim, and it enjoyed the critical patronage of then-defense minister Shimon Peres at its birth. Originally a "work camp" of 22 families, the outpost was established in 1975 without formal government authorization but with Peres' active support. Once in place, Ma'ale Adumim's patrons argued against its evacuation, establishing a rationale that has now been used for more than three decades with great success. Along with Elon Moreh, the "laundering" of its status as a now "legal" civilian settlement was one of the first acts of the government of Menachem Begin in 1977. The lands of the E-1 area nearby that have recently come to public and international attention were originally expropriated during this period. In the 1980s, Israel classified the area as "state land" and thus available for Israeli settlement.

Ma'ale Adumim's location on a hilltop commanding the road between Jerusalem and the Allenby Bridge to Jordan was no accident. Rather, its placement there was the product of an emerging settlement strategy promoting the creation of numerous settlement "blocs" throughout the West Bank as the principal means for preventing Palestinian self-determination.

Settlement expansion was, and remains, at the heart of Israel's zero-sum contest against Palestinians for control of the occupied territories and its political destiny. In September 1980, head of the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization Matiyahu Drobless wrote in a report outlining the program of settlement expansion, "State land and lands that lie fallow in Judea and Samaria must be taken immediately, in order to settle the areas that are between centers of minority [i.e., Palestinian] population and around them as well, in an effort to

minimize as far as possible the danger of the development of another Arab state in these areas. If divided by Jewish communities, it will be difficult for the minority population to create territorial and political unity and continuity."

The Begin government marked Ma'ale Adumim as a magnet for population growth in 1978. In 1992, when its population reached 15,000, it was designated as the first Israeli "city" in the West Bank.

The inclusion of an adjacent 12,000 dunams known as E-1 as part of Ma'ale Adumim and the plan for its settlement was begun by Yitzhak Rabin, who on 2 February 1994 approved the application of an Israeli developer to construct a hotel in the area. This decision was soon expanded into a planning process for the entire area. In August 1994, the IDF commander declared that the entire area would be included within Ma'ale Adumim's boundaries. All subsequent prime ministers supported the plan as it made its way through Israel's serpentine planning bureaucracy. Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai approved the plan in 1997, after which it was endorsed by Israel's High Court in a decision rejecting a petition against it filed by Palestinians. The Netanyahu government, however, decided to freeze the process at a time when the plans for settlement at Har Homa and Ras al-Amud were moving forward. But a more detailed plan, now including new roads and buildings, was filed in mid-1999. This decision too survived a court challenge by Palestinians. The environmental aspects of the scheme were approved in June 2002, the last stage before approval by the minister of defense. In early 2005, Prime Minister Sharon and defense minister Shaul Mofaz authorized a land survey, after which the plan will be ready for final approval by Israel's Supreme Planning Council. The mayor of Ma'ale Adumim, Benjamim Kashriel, claims that large-scale construction will commence in 2007. But there is already a complex of buildings recently constructed there for Israel's Border Police, who currently occupy a site eyed by settlers in Ras al-Amud.

Harnessing this territory to the settlement enterprise accomplishes two complementary objectives. First, by linking Ma'ale Adumim through E-1 to the settlement areas of East Jerusalem, Israel, in the words of Meron Benvenisti, "creates Jewish territorial continuity from the approaches of Jericho to the coastal plain." Second, it "irrevocably splits the northern part of the West Bank

from the south, strangling 50,000 Palestinians residing in its environs” and denies them critical reserves of land for development and housing.

Jan de Jong, the *Settlement Report's* cartographer, has noted that “far more than construction at Har Homa, Israel’s implementation of the E-1 plan will confront Palestinians with a dramatic narrowing of options for Arab Jerusalem. If not challenged effectively, Arab Jerusalem’s current condition as a disconnected sprawl of predominantly squalid neighborhoods will become permanent, rendering it an essentially symbolic remnant of an Arab community.”

Palestinian opposition to the plan has been less decisive in delaying the plan’s implementation than reservations voiced by Washington. A series of American inquiries over the years, most recently at the Crawford summit between Sharon and Bush, elicited the standard Israeli refrain: “The plan is an old one, still far from execution, and no final decision has been made.”

Sharon observed that the E-1 plan poses a dilemma not for Israel, but for Washington, which has to rationalize its opposition to settlement expansion with Bush’s April 2004 letter supporting border changes to accommodate “major Israeli population centers” in the West Bank. In any case, Israel long ago discounted U.S. opposition to settlement expansion. As former State Department official Aaron Miller noted in a recent Washington appearance, during his almost twenty-five years in government there never was “an honest conversation about what the Israelis were actually doing on the ground. Nor were we prepared to impose, at least in the last seven or eight years, a cost on the Israelis for their actions.”

In a 22 April interview with the *Jerusalem Post*, Sharon explained,

The E-1 building plan is an old plan, close to 10 years old. As I recall, it was begun when Labor was heading the government. It’s true that the announcement of the plan recently created a storm all over the world, and in my opinion, let’s say, put the president in a far from simple position. But it’s a plan that still needs to be worked on for many years. I am sure we will speak about it with the Americans.

The United States has always, let’s say since 1968, opposed Jewish settlement. The United States was opposed to Jewish settlement in the Golan Heights. It opposed Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria and in the Gaza Strip. And it has never changed that position.

Israel, during those years, saw great importance in taking hold of strategically important

portions of Judea and Samaria. But even on those subjects of nonunderstanding, I think that the relationship—certainly the relationship that I have created—has enabled us to find ways to deal with all issues.

Aluf Benn reported in *Ha’Aretz* on 25 March that, “there has been no evident attempt by the American administration to stop the project. On the Israeli side they are saying that the building of E-1 is essential for the future existence of the Ma’ale Adumim bloc, and this is also understood in Washington. The main thing is that it be done quietly.”

Sharon has explained that Israel cannot “expect to receive explicit American agreement to build freely in settlements.” He also understands that Israel has no need of such an endorsement and can well live with the long-ineffective U.S. policy.

As the *Baltimore Sun* editorialized so cogently, “If the Bush administration wants to stop settlement expansion, it will have to do more than complain about it.”

STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT SETTLEMENTS

From *Settlement Report*, May-June 2005.

The expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is often misunderstood by its opponents, who are frequently unfamiliar with the extent to which this policy has become routinized throughout Israel’s national institutions during the last twenty-eight years. Its proponents, in contrast, have mastered the intricacies of this system to their advantage.

Settlement expansion during the last fifteen years has proceeded at a pace remarkable in its regularity and predictability. There is little correlation between the party in power and the rate of expansion, if only because the settlement process routinely spans years and the frequent changes in national political leadership Israel has experienced during the last two decades. The story of Ma’ale Adumim outlined in this issue is a typical example of this fact of Israeli political life. As regular readers of the *Settlement Monitor* will have noticed, many indices of settlement growth have been greater during periods of Labor rule—those of prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak—than under Likud leadership.

Settlers have always claimed that the government in power, no matter the party, is starving them of resources. This attitude reflects smart bureaucratic politics if nothing

else, particularly in the Israeli system, which rewards tempestuous protest and activism with increased budgets.

From the inauguration of the Oslo era on the White House lawn in September 1993 to June 2001, Israel completed construction on 20,371 settlement units, a number equal to 62 percent of all settlement housing built from 1967 to 1993. According to a survey conducted by Peace Now in May 1999, two months before the end of Benjamin Netanyahu's term in office, there were 6,500 dwelling units under construction in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip, a 14 percent increase over the previous year. By February 2000, one year before the end of Ehud Barak's tenure, there were more than 7,120 units in various stages of construction in these same areas. Barak left a legacy of more than 6,500 dwelling units under construction. At the end of 2003, in the middle of Ariel Sharon's tenure, there were 3,648 dwellings under construction, a number which increased to almost 4,000 by early 2005.

This legacy is no accident. Israel's settlement expansion is first and foremost a national enterprise, promoted and supported in everyday practice by all major political parties and political leaders. Yitzhak Herzog, the current Labor minister of housing and construction, for example, supports establishing territorial continuity between the Etzion Bloc and Ma'ale Adumim along a corridor to the east of Bethlehem. Plans for the E-1 area (see Grab and Settle: The Story of Ma'ale Adumim) are also proceeding apace in his ministry.

Settlers complain that no new tenders for settlement construction have been issued for many months. This observation is important less as an indicator of the continuing vitality of the settlement expansion enterprise than as an example of the constant tug of war for resources and attention conducted by settlement activists.

Among settlement opponents, the intuitive response to settlement expansion has long been support for a settlement freeze. The Carter administration first raised this concept at Camp David in September 1977. More recently it has featured as a key requirement of the Mitchell Plan and road map.

The idea is attractive in its simplicity. After all, if you oppose settlement expansion, it seems logical to freeze it. Yet what appears logical ignores the reality in which such an effort, no matter how well-intentioned,

would be all but impossible to implement, let alone monitor and enforce.

Promoters of a settlement freeze do not actually want Israel to freeze settlements as much as they want Israel to evacuate them. If nothing else, the freeze idea places Israel on the receiving end of an international popular demand. This fact alone may account for the idea's continuing resonance. As for the prospect that Israel will implement the freeze, however, the commitment of political capital and resources required to effectively end the provision of state and private resources for settlement growth will only be undertaken by an Israeli leader in the context of a decision to evacuate settlements. And in the event that such a decision is made—witness the disengagement plan—a freeze becomes irrelevant.

THE BATTLE FOR E-1

The article excerpted here, written by David Horowitz, appeared in the Jerusalem Post on 18 March 2005. The full text is available online at www.jpost.com.

At a meeting with the editorial staff of the *Jerusalem Post* last week, former and would-be prime minister Ehud Barak asserted that Palestinian building east of the city risked cutting off the capital from Ma'ale Adumim, the largest of all West Bank settlements with a population of 32,000.

Barak was thinking not only of 'Anata and 'Isawiya, which are part of municipal Jerusalem, but also of Palestinian villages like al-Zaym further down the highway, just outside the city limits.

The only way to thwart the sprawl and ensure that Ma'ale Adumim and adjacent settlements would be retained by Israel in any final accord with the Palestinians, he said, would be for the government to accelerate construction in the so-called E-1 corridor—a 13,000 dunam (3,250 acre) stretch west of Ma'ale Adumim that could link up to the capital.

Successive US governments have always opposed building there, and successive Israeli governments have proven shy of confronting Washington. Now, Barak claimed, he had seen draft maps, drawn up by American officials, that project territorial contiguity for the Palestinians in the West Bank—contiguity that runs counter to any Israeli construction aspirations in E-1 and, Barak asserted, that leaves Ma'ale Adumim's very future at risk.

Israeli building in E-1, connecting Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem, would cut the West

Bank in two for perhaps two thirds of the distance between Jerusalem and the Jordanian border—anathema to the Palestinians and much of the international community. Barak implored the government to get the bulldozers rolling right away, and to hell with Washington. “[Prime Minister] Sharon has already lost Ariel and Keddumim,” he claimed. “If he doesn’t take immediate action, even at the risk of friction with the Americans, he will lose Ma’ale Adumim, too.”

If the Palestinian construction sprawl in this area is subtle and incremental, Israeli building is nonexistent. E-1 was initiated as a building project more than a decade ago, with plans for 3,500 homes, by the late Yitzhak Rabin and his then-housing minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, within the framework of a wider “Greater Jerusalem Plan” to close the gaps between the capital and surrounding settlements. But absolutely nothing has happened since then on the ground—not even, strikingly, since last spring, when Sharon received a letter from President Bush about population changes ultimately requiring adjustments to Israel’s borders.

Sharon hailed this document as evidence that Washington was now prepared to sanction Israeli sovereignty in major West Bank settlement blocs like Ma’ale Adumim under a permanent peace accord. Yet, according to Barak, the prime minister is irresponsibly dragging his feet in capitalizing on that purported shift, failing to seize the moment and build in E-1.

If anyone might be expected to echo Barak’s alarm calls it would be Benny Kashriel, a founding developer of Ma’ale Adumim and its mayor since 1992. And he readily acknowledges both the Palestinian expansion on either side of the sleeve down from the capital to his city, and that bulldozers have yet to counter it by stirring up dust anywhere in E-1. Yet Kashriel purports to be sanguine. “Barak is worried that the government is going to cave in [to the Americans],” he says. “I’m not. I think he’s wrong. I don’t think the government will compromise.” His confidence is bolstered, he says, by the evidence of his own steadily growing city—where the arrival of 500 new families by the year’s end is set to lift the population to 35,000.

The U.S. government, he notes, has objected to every new neighborhood he’s constructed. “They got built anyway.” He’s sure the same will happen with E-1. Crucially, he notes, the government-approved route

of the security barrier encompasses his city and adjacent settlements. This confirms, to his mind, their eventual formal annexation to Israel. (Incidentally, this kind of talk, from a prominent settler mayor, also confirms the increasingly prevalent assessment that settlements on the “wrong” side of the barrier are in trouble.)

E-1, he adds, is proceeding smoothly through the various planning stages, “with no delays” and the explicit backing of Sharon. Full approval is anticipated “within eight months,” he says. That will immediately be followed by the arrival of the developers. And the first families should be moving in “within two to three years.”

Kashriel explicitly endorses the quid pro quo vision—the argument that, in conceding the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria, Sharon will prove to have secured the major West Bank settlement blocs, his own city first among them. But he stresses that he takes no pleasure in the prospect of his residents’ future being guaranteed at the price of those who will be forced to leave Gaza. He adds that “I’d love to have Israeli rule formally extended here now, but I understand this won’t happen until a final-status accord. It doesn’t matter, though. We’re here. We’re building. We’re part of Israel.”

OUTPOST OBSERVATIONS

The article excerpted here, written by Nabum Barnea, is from the 28 February 2005 edition of Americans for Peace Now’s Middle East Peace Reports, available online at www.peacenow.org, and was originally published in the 21 February 2005 issue of Yedi’ot Aharonot.

I would not be confiding a great secret if I were to tell you that the entire settlement enterprise in the territories, under both right-wing and left-wing governments, was promoted with a wink of duplicity: the governments wanted to maintain the facade of legality.

Under the table they financed, maintained, and secured a national enterprise that is, in its entirety, in violation of the law. It wasn’t the settlers who invented the duplicitous wink: they would have preferred to annex the territories, remove the residents and settle there openly. But they took this arrangement and turned it into an ideology. . . .

. . . And this is the situation: There are between 150 and 250 Jewish settlements in the West Bank. The numerical disparity is part of the duplicitous wink: since promises

were made to the Americans not to build new settlements, they established hump-settlements. Under the name Eli, ten new settlements were built: Eli A, B, C, D, etc. Under the name Talmon six were built. Tel-Zion, a Haredi town north of Jerusalem, is growing and expanding on the ground, right in front of the residents of Ramallah, but on the paper it is a nameless extension of a nearby settlement, which is smaller than it is, named Kochav Ya'acov.

Illegal settlement outpost, says the military official, is a phrase that was invented by journalists. There isn't a single settlement that is really legal. To be legalized, he says, settlements need to meet at least three criteria: they need to be built on state land, be subject to a planning process, and receive the government's approval. The Civil Administration passes on to the political echelon every settlement-related dilemma. Sometimes the political echelon decides, one way or the other. Often, however, it prefers not to decide, and all the parties interpret the wink as they see fit.

Migron, for example, the largest of the settlement outposts, sits on Palestinian land, has not been subjected to planning and has not received government approval. It is patently illegal. Nevertheless, the settler leaders swear that Migron was built with the explicit encouragement of Ariel Sharon. The main governmental tool wielded by the settlers is the regional councils. The councils both enforce the law and break it. In Kefar Oranim, for example, a secular settlement that abuts the Green Line in the Mod'in bloc, supervisors for the Binyamin Regional Council acted diligently and knocked down every wall that had been built in violation of the construction codes. That very same council, the Binyamin Regional Council, has established more illegal settlement outposts than any other regional council in the territories. . . The Binyamin Regional Council offices are located in the settlement Psagot, opposite Ramallah. I met there with the treasurer, Eli Peles. "The state restricts our land," he said. "It's a prison, and we're breaking out. If you starve someone and, at the same time, put a wallet filled with cash beside him, what do you expect him to do?"

The Civil Administration rejects that view of things outright. "The time has come to stop letting the cat watch over the cream," say Civil Administration officials. "The intention is that we will set the rules of the game from now on. There is law enforcement. There are the police. There are courts and

there are prisons. It is intolerable that people appointed to jobs by the state should allow themselves to do whatever they feel like, and then receive a salary from the state." Who are you referring to, I asked. "The security coordinators, for instance," he said. The security coordinators are responsible for security on the settlements and receive their salaries and vehicles from the state. "It is intolerable that that security coordinator should prevent the army from removing an illegally positioned trailer." The settlers are now waging a bitter battle against disengagement from Gaza, I said. If you really intend to change the rules of the game, you're pushing them up against the wall. He reassured me by saying: "In the past two years, construction plans that hadn't been approved for years were approved by the defense minister. They have what to spend their energy on."

ISOLATING EAST JERUSALEM

THE BATTLE FOR THE CAPITAL

The article excerpted here, written by Danny Rubinstein, appeared in Ha'Aretz on 31 March 2005. The full text is available online at www.baaretz.com.

The Palestinian public and leadership have no doubt that Israel and the Palestinian Authority are now engaged in a defining battle on Jerusalem. In about four months, when the disengagement is being implemented, the construction of walls and fences around East Jerusalem will be complete, and some 250,000 Arabs will be cut off from the PA.

Even a disinterested onlooker can see that the elimination of East Jerusalem as a metropolitan center for its Arab hinterlands is now proceeding apace. At some point facts will be created in the eastern part of the city and its metropolitan area that will, to an extent, obliterate the option of East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. Yet the demand that East Jerusalem be their national capital remains at the top of the Palestinian national agenda, perhaps even taking precedence over the demand for a solution to the refugee problem. It is clear to all that no final agreement on Jerusalem means no final agreement at all.

The first stage in the isolation of East Jerusalem from the West Bank was blocking the entry of West Bank residents into the city. Israeli security services have invested considerable effort in implementing this change, and now believe that there are few Arabs from the territories in East Jerusalem

without the appropriate permits. The Israeli Police and Border Police patrol the streets and West Bank residents who are caught without permits are arrested and punished.

Minibus drivers, who provide the main mode of transportation in Arab neighborhoods, are required to check the documents of their passengers. They do this with the knowledge that if they are found carrying passengers who lack appropriate papers their vehicle will be confiscated. This is true for drivers of private vehicles as well. West Bank residents need entry permits to work, study, or receive medical care in East Jerusalem. The permits are valid for three months with the option of extension, but it is no easy task to acquire permits. Closures are put in place a few times a week, or the journey suddenly takes hours. In recent years, most Arab institutions in East Jerusalem that employed West Bank residents have fired them and replaced them with Jerusalem residents. This is true, for example, of the large private schools in the city.

It is still possible to enter the city through the many gaps in the tortuous line of walls and fences. In Abu Dis several days ago, one could see many individuals climbing the fence through one of the gaps. Border police on hand ignored them and, according to the owner of the nearby Ikarmawi grocery, most of those climbing the fence have legal permits. Otherwise, they would not dare to enter. The wall, in this case, is not just an obstructive element of separation, it is an Israeli instrument of control. Its existence permits complete Israeli surveillance of the lives of Palestinians, of commercial activity, of services, of society in general.

New measures, to be implemented in coming months, will require Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem to obtain permits before visiting the West Bank. Until now, passage of Jerusalem Arabs into Ramallah, and Bethlehem, and from there to the northern and southern West Bank was virtually without restriction. Their blue Israeli identity cards granted them freedom of movement inside the territories. All this will change when the walls and fences are complete. Rules regarding such permits have yet to be issued, but everyone knows that they are in preparation. There will be approximately ten gates in the walls and fences surrounding the city.

At some checkpoints, like Erez on the northern border of the Gaza Strip for example, there is an "Israelis Office" which handles those holding Israeli documents,

including East Jerusalem residents. At Erez they are mainly the wives of Gaza residents. The regulations pertaining to these wives are referred to in military terms as "Divided Families Protocol." While there are hundreds of women who fit this description in Gaza, there are many thousands of divided families in East Jerusalem, and it is hard to imagine how similar protocol could be implemented there. According to demographic data, about two-thirds of the Arabs in East Jerusalem come from Hebron clans, and even a partial separation of these Jerusalemites from their families, their places of business, and their property in Hebron appears to be impossible.

Jews have been moving into East Jerusalem neighborhoods for many years. This phenomenon is manifest in a number of homes that have been purchased or allegedly seized by Jewish yeshiva students in the alleys that flank the Jewish Quarter on Haggai Street, Sha'ar Haprahim, the Sa'adia neighborhood, and at the St. John's Hospice near the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

In the Shiloah Village (Silwan) neighborhood, Israeli organizations continue to purchase and build homes, and a small Jewish neighborhood, Ma'ale Zeitim, has been built above Shiloah at Ras al-Amud. There is now talk of moving the Judea and Samaria police headquarters, and turning over the spacious compound to settlers.

Jews, mostly yeshiva students, have also moved into the Shaykh Jarrah neighborhood, in buildings adjoining the grave of Shimon Hatzadik and two buildings near the Musrara Market next to the U.S. Consulate. The latest venture of Jews into Arab neighborhoods in the city involves a transaction, the details of which are still unknown, involving the purchase by Jews, or to be more accurate, the 99-year lease to Jews, of large buildings and Arab stores in the Jaffa Gate plaza. The owner of this precious real estate is the Greek Orthodox Patriarchy, and the Jewish buyers remain anonymous.

Nikos Papadimas, who was responsible for the funds of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchy, and is now in hiding, said two days ago in an interview to a Greek newspaper that he leased this property to Jews for \$130 million.

Papadimas said he executed the transaction with the full knowledge and permission of Jerusalem Patriarch Irineos I, in an effort to save the Patriarchy from a severe financial crisis. Irineos, who had denied any connection to the transaction, went on a visit to

Jordan two days ago against the background of a wave of attacks in the media by the Palestinian Authority, the Jordanian government, and other Arab nations, demanding his immediate resignation.

In the heart of the Arab Jabal Mukabir neighborhood, on the hillsides of the Jewish Armon Hanatziv neighborhood, preparations have also begun for the construction of a new Jewish neighborhood, and plans exist for extensive building in the Waljah area in south Jerusalem and the large open area between Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim. Recent statements by Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz about a plan to build thousands of homes in this area have created diplomatic turmoil. The Palestinian public is well aware that building in this area would eliminate the option of using vacant land to expand East Jerusalem and large Palestinian settlements, including al-Azariyya (Bethany), Abu Dis, 'Anata, and al-Zaym.

Building in this area would also facilitate the completion of the separation fence around Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim and make it harder to create territorial contiguity between the northern and southern parts of the PA in the West Bank.

Yehezkel Levin of the B'Tselem human rights organization says that the combination of the construction of "facts on the ground," including the separation fence and building in this area, is a recipe for reaching a point of no return. In other words, fences and walls now being built may be taken down tomorrow, but if they are shored up by facts like Jewish homes based on the location

of these walls, an irreversible situation will have been created.

Complaints of mistreatment and discrimination in the allocation of budgetary funds and services to the Arabs of East Jerusalem are all too familiar. Karim Jubran, a B'Tselem researcher from the Shu'fat refugee camp, cites the existence of a relatively new term in the lexicon of discrimination in the eastern part of the capital, "Apartheid traffic lights."

There are almost no traffic lights in the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem. Stoplights exist mainly in those rare locations where there is Jewish traffic. In these cases, for example the stoplights north of the French Hill intersection, the time allotted to Arab traffic from the direction of Shu'fat is much less than the time allotted to cars coming from the Jewish neighborhood. As a result, during many hours of the day there are long lines of vehicles waiting at the intersection on the "Arab" roads.

The Jerusalem municipality says that claims of discrimination at the intersection are invalid, and the timing of the lights is set according to the volume of traffic.

The picture painted by the internal Palestinian debate on these matters is one of the destruction of the structure of Arab society in Jerusalem with the intention of unifying the city. Recently, a day has not gone by which has not included a conference, declaration, and speeches by the Palestinian leadership and Arab civic leaders in Jerusalem warning that, if Israel is allowed to continue to implement these measures, there will be no possibility of a future settlement.