Revolt in Galilee
Published by: [University of California Press](http://www.ucpress.edu) on behalf of the [Institute for Palestine Studies](http://www.ipstudies.org)
Accessed: 28/03/2014 16:33

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at [http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp](http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp).

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
in Lebanon lead to similar cooperation in solving the conflict between Israel and Syria, if Syria adopts a moderate attitude to this issue?" He felt, however, that Israel might win or lose from the "game" going on in Lebanon: "She may lose if the whole of Lebanon is turned into a country attached to Syria and a 'confrontation country.' But Syrian intervention in Lebanon also involved certain advantages for Israel — "In the short run it makes it more probable that the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Forces will be renewed," and "In the longer run there may be Syrian-American cooperation." Although he said that this might confront Israel with new problems it would at the same time open the door to a political settlement. "As a result of this, Israel has decided to disregard the entry of Syrian troops into Lebanon, so long as they are not in very large numbers and so long as the aim is to achieve a political settlement in Lebanon and not to constitute a threat to Israel." He concluded optimistically: "The Syrians have got themselves into a jam in Lebanon. They are obliged to draw closer to the Americans, thereby arousing the disapproval of other Arab countries, and all this will make it difficult for the Arab countries to enter the war beside Syria, if she decides to take military action in the Golan."

Finally, Davar (April 12, 1976) put the Israeli position in a nutshell: "Israel is concerned that Lebanon should maintain some degree of internal equilibrium and that the safety of the Christians and their influence in the power structure should be maintained. In the light of the balance of forces that has now arisen in Lebanon, it is impossible to ensure all this and there is every indication that Syria is seeking... to achieve these objectives. The regular 'threat force' which has crossed the Lebanese frontier, though it has not penetrated in depth, is intended to perform this role. Since this is its role and since these are Syria's objectives, Israel has no interest in eliminating it.... However Syria certainly knows where the 'red line' runs and that if she crosses it, either by exploiting the opportunity or tempted by circumstances, Israel will have no option but to move."

REVOLT IN GALILEE

The Israeli press viewed the violent disorders and explosion of popular resentment that took place this spring in Galilee as distinct from the West Bank uprising which had been gathering momentum since the end of last December. The former was a domestic affair, to be settled between the Arab and Jewish peoples of Israel, while the latter was by and large seen as a temporary foreign affair to be settled within the context of a Middle East settlement. If this can be seen as the official Israeli line, it was often admitted that the disturbances had common grounds and displayed a marked identity of sentiment. What is ironic — and was the source of bitterness among the Arabs of Israel — is that the official distinction called in effect for greater severity in repressive measures against Arab citizens of Israel than against those under occupation in order to nip in the bud any ambitions the former might have to link their fate in the future with that of their Palestinian brethren in the West Bank. In a single day of protest by the Galilee Arabs seven of them were shot dead and scores arrested and unceremoniously beaten, whereas the more extensive and more violent protests in the West Bank had not resulted in such a casualty figure over a period of several months. The difference in approach, whatever the motives, was not likely to increase the loyalty of Arab citizens to the Israeli state.

The immediate cause of the Galilee revolt was the project to confiscate several thousands of dunums of Arab land as part of a larger plan known as the Judaization of Galilee. It is important to put this project in its proper political and even regional context. The Arabs of Israel had always resisted most strongly the confiscation of their lands, carried out on a massive scale in the early years of the state of Israel and practically ended in the 1960's because of
Arab resistance and the state's desire to normalize its relations with the Arab minority. Many Israelis linked the pushing through of the Judaization plan at this time with the growth and power of Palestinian nationalism and the possibility that Galilee might be joined one day to an independent Palestinian Arab state, as had been proposed in the UN Partition Plan of 1947, if it was not massively J udaized in the interim.

At the end of February 1976 the Israeli cabinet took a decision to confiscate large areas of Galilee. Taken together with the government's earlier decision to transfer sections of the armament industry to Galilee, this was seen as aiming at the obliteration of the Arab character of Galilee in the shortest possible time.

Daniel Bloch reported on these projected moves in D avar (January 22, 1976). After writing that the Knesset Working Committee had recently tabled its conclusions on the settling and development of Galilee, he quoted Knesset member Abraham Givelber, of the Labour Alignment, as saying that the committee recommended "the speedy removal of the war industry from the centre of the country to central Galilee... because the removal of these factories, all of which depend on Jewish labour, would result in thousands of employees and their families moving to Galilee and these, in addition to the employees of the services sector, would effect a great change in the demographic structure of Galilee. The important point here is the Jewish labour on which these factories depend, because other factories can absorb non-Jewish labour and investment in them does not bring in any gains in the demographic field."

Yoel Dar, writing in D avar (March 2, 1976), discussed the aims of the confiscations in Galilee: "The real aim of the confiscations is to strengthen Jewish settlement in Galilee and the Arabs are aware that this is the case. From official data it is clear that the percentage of Jews in the population of Galilee has declined in the last fifteen years from 58 percent to 52 percent. Last year, for example, the Jewish population of the northern area increased by 780 only, as against 9,000 Arabs. These facts have led the committees concerned with this matter to study the possibility of confiscation."

Such clear statements of the problem were often more diplomatically framed by official sources. D avar (March 1, 1976) quoted from the government statement on the confiscation plan it agreed upon on February 29: "In regard to the decisions on the development of Galilee in the interests of its Jewish and Arab population, and in conformity with the housing projects approved by the Ministry of Housing, the government has decided to accept the Minister of Finance's statement on combining lands, including the compulsory confiscations necessary for the implementation of the plan. The operation will be carried out within the framework of the law, the owners of the land will be paid suitable compensation in accordance with the law, and the possibility of those who wish to do so being allowed, as far as possible, to exchange their lands for other plots will also be studied."

In an editorial on the same day D avar said: "The decision to confiscate land to a total of twenty thousand dunums is an important practical step for the settlement of Galilee. This decision merits extensive support, for it is quite clear that there is no alternative to confiscation and no objection to action for the strengthening of Galilee."

The Israeli press did report on the Arab objections to this action, however. Arab opposition was particularly fierce to the con-

---

1 See pp. 229-36 for the implications of the Galilee revolt on PLO discussions concerning a Palestinian state limited to the West Bank and Gaza — Ed.

2 Israeli Arabs are not employed in these factories because of the 'security risk' — Ed.

3 Palestinian Arab sources often refer to an outright Arab majority in Galilee — Ed.
fiscation of lands in two areas, the “Zone 9” area near the village of Sakhnin in southern Galilee and the area of Kafr Qasim. Al Hanishmar (February 6, 1976) wrote about the former: “‘Zone 9’ covers tens of thousands of dunums, and although some years ago it was declared a training area, the Israeli Army authorities gave its owners passes which made it possible for them to cultivate their land. Recently they stopped giving passes, fenced the zone and erected notices saying that it was dangerous to enter the area. This measure was a first step towards confiscation.”

According to al-Ittilhad, the Rakah Israeli Communist Party newspaper (February 17, 1976), a popular conference of protest was held in Sakhnin which was attended by more than five thousand persons, delegations of the Arab local authorities and councils, members of the Regional Committee for the Defence of Lands, Knesset members Tawfiq Ziyad and Hammad Abu Rabia, and a number of lawyers and students’ representatives. The paper reported on the resolutions adopted by the conference which said that “the government’s decision to close the said area and then to confiscate it is a step towards dispossessing Arab peasants of their lands.” The conference “demanded that these areas be demilitarized and returned to the jurisdiction of the local councils of the three villages.” This organized opposition of the Arab peasants and their representatives appeared to meet with some success, since al-Ittilhad later reported (February 27, 1976) that the Israeli authorities had promised to exclude most of the agricultural land from the military manoeuvres area and to classify it as an area open to its owners.

The confiscations in Kafr Qasim were often associated in press reports with the massacre by Israeli soldiers that took place there in 1956, on the eve of the Israeli invasion of Sinai. Rakah’s Hebrew-language newspaper Zu Haderekh (January 17, 1976) had this to say on the subject: “Twenty years after the terrible massacre and twenty-five years after the confiscation of more than four thousand dunums of the land of Kafr Qasim, the authorities took another arbitrary step last week when they decided to confiscate three thousand more dunums. They have started to fence off this area, paying no heed to the violent opposition of the inhabitants of the village and of its council.” The inhabitants had learned of the confiscation order on December 29, 1975, the paper reported, and had immediately held a meeting in the local council to oppose it. The paper quoted the head of the council, Zaki Jibril, as saying: “Ever since the authorities told some of the inhabitants that they were to appear in court on charges of building houses in an area not allocated for that purpose, we have been on our guard against the confiscation schemes aimed at plundering what is left of the village’s land and even some of its houses. A number of these houses against whose owners charges were brought were built in this area in 1937 — before the establishment of the state — on the authority of official permits and land registration documents issued by the then authorities and retained by the owners of these houses.”

The paper also noted that the residents of Kafr Qasim intended to resist the confiscation order “whatever the cost.”

Little attention was given to the Arab opposition to the confiscations outside Rakah, whose membership is mostly Arab. A few members of the left-wing Mapam Party were also opposed to the confiscation measures, however, and this seemed to have some effect in delaying some of the measures which the cabinet had intended to take. According to Danny Rubinstein (Davar, January 16, 1976), the Minister of Finance,

---

4 Some critics of Israeli policy towards the Arab minority have maintained that the very strict zoning regulations applicable to areas where Arabs live are intended to discourage all building that would enable a quickly growing population to remain in the countryside and to force them to migrate to the cities where Jews dominate — Ed.
Yehoshua Rabinovich, had deferred the execution of the confiscation order of thousands of dunums of land belonging to villages in the Nazareth and Karmiel areas, leaving it to the government to take the final decision in this respect. He added: “The Minister of Finance is empowered to sign the confiscation order and the decision to confiscate these lands was taken by a committee which includes representatives of the different ministries, working in this field under the chairmanship of the Director General of the Israel Lands Directorate, Meir Zoria... It appears that the decision to confiscate, made public several weeks ago, led to tension in the villages of Galilee and it was decided not to publish the confiscation order before the elections in Nazareth. And as a number of ministers in the government have reservations about the decision and many voices have been raised against it in Mapam, the Minister has decided to postpone signing it and to refer the matter to the government.”

A Haaretz correspondent reported (January 19, 1976) that the Minister of Health had raised the question of confiscating the lands of Kafr Qasim inhabitants at a cabinet meeting and that the Prime Minister replied that “the government is prepared to reach the highest degree of understanding with the inhabitants of the village.” Nevertheless, according to the Haaretz reporter, Knesset member Yosef Sarid intended to present a proposal to the Knesset Speaker which would prevent confiscations in this village and which noted: “It is a dangerous mistake to allow Kafr Qasim to return to the headlines as the result of land confiscation. The wounds that healed twenty years ago are now opening again and it is to be expected that the world will certainly recall the massacre. For this reason alone the Israel Lands Directorate must be told to keep its hands off the lands of Kafr Qasim immediately...”

Throughout the month of March, following the government’s decision of February 29, Arab opposition to the confiscations mounted and minor incidents of protest took place. A public rally held in Nazareth in early March called for a general strike and the holding of rallies and demonstrations to protest against the Judaization of Galilee and the confiscations of Arab land. The idea was quickly picked up, and approved by a number of municipalities and the chosen day, “Land Day,” of March 30, promised to call out large numbers of the Arabs of Galilee.

The general Israeli public was, if concerned, not seriously alarmed. Some specialists concerned individuals noted the broad implications of organized Arab solidarity and discussed the factors behind it in a debate held at Shiloah Institute on the eve of Land Day. The debate was reported by Yedioth Aharonot on March 21, 1976. One of the speakers, Professor Shimon Shamir, was quoted, in part, as saying:

“A new reality is emerging in the Arab sector which is, essentially, much more significant than the current incidents. In the first place let us consider the demographic aspect. The Arabs of Israel number more than half a million and constitute an important bloc. It must be recalled that the Jewish population, on the eve of the establishment of the state, did not number much more than half a million. This is not a secondary minority but a population bloc that requires serious attention.

“Secondly... the emergence of the Palestinian factor as central to the conflict and the rise of the PLO have created a problem from which the Arabs of Israel were exempt before 1967: the problem of identity and loyalty.

“Thirdly, there is a natural sequence in the turnover of generations — one generation rises, the other declines. The patterns of political activity of the younger generation are different from those of the generation of the elderly notables...”

“There is also the question of qualitative changes. The Arabs of Israel are no longer those inhabitants whom we inherited from the Mandate in 1947, who were fundamentally a population of villagers without urban centres and with no middle class. Today about 60 percent of the Arab inhabitants of Israel live in towns and enjoy
a certain standard of living and a higher standard of education.

"Apart from all this there is another factor that cannot be ignored: Israel is passing through a new stage and is on the threshold of what we might call the 'lean years.' The State of Israel no longer emits the image of strength and confidence that it did previously. This situation has had its effect in the Arab sector and it will have repercussions in the future too. Therefore the concepts that were permissible and meaningful as regards the Arabs of Israel in the past may not be meaningful in the future, and this requires serious thought."

Another speaker, Zvi El-Peleg, a researcher at Shiloah Institute, looked at the psychological or identity problem of the Israeli Arab. He said: "I believe that the curve of the relations between the state and the Arabs of Israel has been constantly declining since the fifties. There are two reasons for this. The first is the continuing conflict, which influences the Israeli Arabs' view of Israel since she is a party to the conflict. The second is Israel's failure to solve the problems of her Arabs: so far she has produced no solution that satisfies them, has not told them who they are or what position they occupy in the state. Issues such as the confiscation of land, guards in the university or grants to the local councils are only an expression of the situation.

"The [Israelis] once thought that the Arabs of Israel would have a positive influence in the occupied areas, but it is now clear to all that this is not so, that this is not what has happened. The Arabs of Israel have suffered as a result of the relations that have been created between the state and the inhabitants of the occupied areas, for the enforcement of security measures has inevitably affected Arab citizens. I am talking about the searching of houses, when the Arab citizen suddenly stops being like other citizens; they suddenly haul him out of a cinema queue, they suddenly make him get out of a bus five times during a trip to check his belongings. Suddenly he is an Arab again and the rights acquired by living in and being incorporated in the state for twenty-nine years no longer exist."

If some Israeli Jews saw the roots of the Israeli Arabs' problems, many others remained insensitive or obvious, not expecting much trouble and willing to use force at the first sign. The rallies and demonstrations of Land Day on March 30 which were intended to be a massive but peaceful protest were greeted with opposition from the authorities and led to bloody clashes which were worse than anything seen up till then in the West Bank towns. Not only were the Arabs of Israel bitter and outraged at the brutality of the security forces who shot into crowds, bludgeoned anyone in sight and dragged people out of their homes to arrest them, but the Jews of Israel were themselves astounded, although often pitting all the blame on the Arabs. From press reports surprise and dismay were often expressed and Land Day served notice to the country at large that the Arab policy had proved a failure. The inference sometimes drawn, however, was that more firmness was required.

On the official level the reactions covered the whole range from superficial understanding, to outrage and putting the blame on outside forces. Yediot Aharonot (April 4, 1976) quoted the Foreign Minister Yigal Allon as saying on Israeli television: "The disorders are an expression of accumulated bitterness which has been quickly exploited by professional propagandists inspired by quarters outside the borders of the Middle East. Policy vis-à-vis the Arab minority should not be revised on the basis of a single isolated incident; the subject should be studied and specialists consulted to provide a background for practical deliberations in the future." The paper also quoted the Minister of Labour, Moshe Bar'am as saying that "Israel cannot permit the infringement of law and order but, on the other hand, we must not draw the opposite inference that a solution is only possible through the use of force."

Davat's reporter quoted (April 2, 1976) the Minister of Defence Shimon Peres as declaring to a group from the Labour Party: "We shall tear up all Arab violence
by the roots.” The reporter added that Peres “does not expect the Arabs of Israel to become Zionists, but they must keep the rules.”

On the other hand, Yeroham Meshel, Secretary-General of the Histadrut, was quoted by Davar (March 31, 1976) as concluding from the Arab strike that “the state and Histadrut must make positive decisions if relations on a basis of equality are to be established between the Jewish public and the Arab sector in Israel.” The labour leader added: “It cannot be said that Rakah alone is to blame; we must do something positive and realize our mistakes in the Arab sector... evading reality will not solve the problem.”

Commenting on the general strike in Davar (March 31, 1976) Minister of Justice Haim Tsadok said: “We should not talk of a rebellion by the Arab population as the press is doing. What we have witnessed is an attempt to upset the relations between Jews and Arabs... We seek a normal life whereas the PLO is trying to prevent it.”

Shmuel Toledano, the Prime Minister’s Adviser on Arab Affairs, at the same time underplayed the incidents and said he had seen them coming, and although he had no solution to the problem beyond economic inducements he defended the government’s policy for which he was responsible. Haaretz (March 31, 1976) quoted him as saying about Land Day that “this sad day’s events will certainly leave their mark, in the short run, on relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel.” In an interview he gave to Yedioth Aharonot several days later (April 2, 1976) he said he had expected “disturbances” in the Arab sector and had submitted many verbal and written recommendations to the proper authorities. He called again for extensive support to be given to “positive elements” among the Israeli Arabs but did not see the need for a radical new policy. “I have heard and read proposals for a new policy too,” he declared, “but so far I have not met anyone who had a magic solution to offer and I can promise you that you are never going to come across such a magician... To make things clear I should like to say that there cannot be a policy unless efforts are made to incorporate the Arabs of Israel in the political, economic and social set-up of the state. The more we succeed in giving the Israeli Arab the feeling that the state is giving him many advantages in various fields, the more we try to make him feel equal, the more difficult it will be for him to take action against the state. This applies to the incorporation of Arabs in the parties, government departments, Jewish society, economic life, sports, the Histadrut, public institutions and all fields of life. The implementation of this policy, which the government has approved, faces many difficulties in daily life because of the war with the Arabs that is lurking at our gates and is interlocked with every aspect of our life. So far this policy has succeeded in deterring, extinguishing, assuaging and subduing the feeling of national attachment which the Arabs of Israel have, but it never for a moment boasts of having eradicated this feeling...”

Some politicians put most of the blame for Land Day on Rakah and a few demanded that this party be outlawed. The most vocal and persistent was Knesset member Amnon Lin, of the extreme right-wing Likud grouping. He warned: “This is the first time we have found ourselves confronted not only with grave dangers from outside, but also with the internal danger of a convulsion in the country’s security situation. The Arabs of Israel since the Yom Kippur War are not the Arabs of before the Yom Kippur War. Arab propaganda has convinced them that Israel was defeated in that war and the Arabs victorious. The majority of the Arab public believes that Israel is going to pieces and declining, while the Arab world is becoming more powerful and advancing towards a glorious future” (Yedioth Aharonot, April 1, 1976). He said that Land Day was “an attempt to organize a general strike with the object of preparing an organizational base in anticipation of the role that Rakah has assumed — preparing the Arabs of Israel for real acts of military violence.
against Israel in the days of trial’” and urged that this be stopped by outlawing that party.

Press commentaries were only slightly more willing than the officials to look critically at the causes of Israeli Arab disaffection in the Jewish state but they tended often to limit themselves to generalities and to avoid certain sensitive fundamentals. Maariv (April 11, 1976) criticized Shmuel Toledano for his statement that there was not really a feasible policy other than the one he had already proposed, particularly on the eve of the planned government meeting decided on to discuss the issue after Land Day. The paper said: “What happened last Tuesday cannot be regarded as a fortuitous incident after which we can go back to the old patterns of thinking in the hope that the problems will somehow disappear of their own accord.” The paper demanded a new policy which it said should be “stern and wise.”

Many press comments joined official statements blaming Rakah, at least to some extent, for inciting the uprising. This view was expressed by Maariv (March 30, 1976) and Haaretz (March 31, 1976). But the claim made by some ministers and some Knesset members that Rakah was the main moving force behind the troubles and should be outlawed brought forth some harsh comments from a sector of the Israeli press.

Aharon Geva gave the example of an unhappy precedent in this respect in an article in Davar (April 6, 1976): ‘An Arab nationalist group called ‘Al-Ard’ was formed here in the past and we banned it. Rakah is in a stronger position than Al-Ard; if we outlaw it... a secret organization may come into being. Many security men believe that it is easier to control a legal organization than an illegal one.” This was a practical argument from the domestic viewpoint. He made a few more points too: “Moreover banning Rakah will not improve our image abroad.... The important thing is that it would not eliminate the real cause of the disturbances in Nazareth and the Triangle, which is the existence of an Arab nationalist movement. As I have heard from a large number of soldiers: ‘They stone us because they do not want us here.’ The difficult and fateful question is: how are we to confront the existence of this movement which is obviously growing stronger within the Arab community of Israel too?”

Elie Tabor appeared exasperated by the accusations against Rakah as the major culprit. Writing in Haolam Hazeh (April 7, 1976) he exclaimed: “The attempt to make out that Rakah was responsible for the bloody incidents in Galilee can be taken no more seriously than the accusation that Israeli television was responsible for the disturbances in the West Bank.” He went on: “By trying to suppress every respectable independent political organization, within a legitimate political framework, of the Israeli Arabs, the Israeli government has by its own hand driven the country’s Arabs into the fold of Rakah, which is still the only means of expressing sympathy with Arab nationalism.”

Y. Ronkin, writing in Al Hamishmar (April 1, 1976) warned of the seriousness of the outbursts. “No one anticipated that the strike would be so violent or that we should witness an explosion of profound feelings of anger and hostility — especially on the part of youth — after thirty years of common life between the Jews and Arabs of Israel. This requires penetrating self-examination and appraisal to open the eyes of both parties.” He also urged that Israel’s Arabs be integrated in the life of the state “in both word and deed” and that provocation and confiscation be eliminated or reduced to a minimum.

In the view of Zvi El-Peleg (Yediot Aharonot, April 6, 1976) “the state must turn over a new leaf and on it record that the non-Jewish citizen has equal rights and obligations with the Jew. Jewish society must learn not merely to talk about development and advancement but achieve them, in both word and deed. The option today is not good relations, in one form or another, with the non-Jewish inhabitants of Israel but whether these are

This content downloaded from 66.134.128.11 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 16:34:00 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
to be part of the State of Israel or to continue to belong to the administered areas.”

Another important implication of the Galilee uprising was frankly stated by Levy Yitzhak Yerushalami in Maariv (April 8, 1976): “The Land Day incidents were more serious than they appear at first sight. Some people have said that they take us back to 1948 and that it is as if everything that has been done since then had not been done at all. I believe that a more dangerous objective lies behind the campaign: that it is intended to restore Galilee to its pre-1948 status, that is to its status under the United Nations Partition resolution.” He expressed doubts about the strikers’ intentions and accused them of trying to detach Galilee from Israel, but also blamed the government for failing to settle Galilee. These events called for “the development of the land of Galilee with a view to achieving prosperity for all its inhabitants, without religious or national discrimination, and to erecting a solid barrier in the face of any attempt to restore Galilee to its status under the 1947 Partition resolution.”

Another writer, Zvi Shiloah, appeared even more alarmed. He said, in an article in Yediot Aharonot (April 4, 1976): “March 30 has made it clear to every Jew that the Arabs of Israel in Galilee and the Triangle are Palestinians like the Arabs of Nablus and Hebron, and that Israeli relinquishment of Judea and Samaria would not turn Little Israel into a uni-national state but would immediately put ‘the liberation of occupied Arab Galilee’ on the agenda…” Of the conclusions he reached from his analysis of the Land Day incidents, one was that “we must accept Sadat’s theory that it is not possible, at least in our generation, to make peace between Israel and the Arab countries, nor between Israel and the Arabs of the Land of Israel.” Another was: “We must recognize that the 1948 war has not yet ended: as far as the Arabs are concerned, it has not ended from the point of view of their goal to liquidate the Jewish state and, as far as the Jews are concerned, it has not ended from the point of view of the desired demographic character of the Land of Israel.”

Eliahu Agris pointed to the main factors causing the incidents in Davar (April 5, 1976) in these terms: “What happened on March 30 was the result of many factors: the removal of the barriers between the Arabs of Israel and the Arabs of the [occupied] areas after the Six Day War, the feeling of Arab victory after the Yom Kippur War, and the emergence of the PLO as a recognized political factor in the world. All these factors have had a great influence on the general mood of Israeli Arabs. But these are obviously not the principal factors leading to tension, which involve rather the relations between the Israeli regime and the Arab minority… The fact that there are educated Arabs in Israel who do not have suitable work, that Arabs cannot get jobs in government offices and public institutions, [are subjected to] discrimination in housing, development and so on — the accumulation of these factors has created fertile soil for the call to strike and demonstrate which ended in the disorders.”

While many called for more force to be used, Elie Tabor criticized the strong-arm policy that had already shown itself in Galilee. Writing in Haolam Hazeh on April 7, he declared: “When an independent, militarily strong state speaks the language of force to a national minority that lives in it, as happened in Galilee last week, it is not a display of strength but obviously derives from weakness and shows that the Israeli government is afraid of the Arabs of Israel whom it does not treat as citizens with equal rights. It employs repressive measures against them as if they were a people under occupation, exactly as it did some weeks ago in repressing the protest demonstrations in the West Bank.”

Tabor ridiculed those who shed crocodile tears over the “Arab-Israeli understanding that lasted 28 years,” saying: “Such understanding never existed except in the idle chatter of the advisers and all the alleged experts on Arab affairs.” He saw the last twenty-eight years as “28 years of plundering, theft of abandoned property,
confiscation and national persecution, economic and social backwardness, and encouragement of feudalism. They have provided a fertile soil for revolution and there is no need for either Moscow or the PLO to agitate for it.”

Tabor concluded: “The policy of a show of strength pursued by the Israeli government has produced results which are exactly the opposite of what was intended. In spite of the cries of joy of the men of the ‘Whole Land of Israel’ [movement], who maintain that the Arabs have at last learned a lesson ‘because they only understand the language of force,’ the government has been wrong again. Last week, by the use of bayonets and machine guns, it made the Arabs of Israel a significant factor on the map of political confrontation in the Middle East.”

A WAY OUT?

As pressure for a political solution to the Palestine problem mounted on the international and regional level, the moderates within Israeli society found greater ability to speak up in the face of the still very strong hawkish and expansionist elements in the country. They also found a greater audience for their limited recognition of some Palestinian aspirations and were encouraged to organize their efforts and spell out their proposals for a solution.

One such group was the newly-formed “Israeli Committee for Israeli-Palestinian Peace” which included a number of prominent politicians and academicians, among whom were found Uri Avneri, Arieh Eliav, Aharon Cohen, Eliahu Elishar, Matityahu Peled, Raul Tattelbaum, David Shaham and Meir Pa’el. The committee was formed for the purpose of propagating a programme which was described in Haolam Hazeh on March 3 of this year.

‘The ‘Israeli Committee for Israeli-Palestinian Peace’ has issued a political statement signed by one hundred persons active in political and academic fields in Israel and eleven prominent members of Mapam, calling for recognition of the Palestinian people and approval for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. According to the statement the signatories resolve: 1) That this land is the country of our two peoples — the people of Israel and the Palestinian Arab people... 3) That the one road to peace is coexistence between two sovereign states, each with its own national identity: the State of Israel for the Jewish people and a state for the Palestinian Arab people embodying their right to self-determination within a political framework chosen by them. 4) The establishment of the Palestinian Arab state alongside the State of Israel will be the result of negotiations between the government of Israel and recognized and authorized representatives of the Palestinian Arab people, negotiation with the Palestine Liberation Organization, on the basis of mutual recognition, not being ruled out. 5) The frontiers between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Arab state will be the cease-fire lines, as they were before the June 1967 war, with modifications agreed on by the parties, and after the solution of the problem of Jerusalem... 10) Each of the states will have full sovereignty in all fields, including immigration and return, and the State of Israel will maintain its incontestable link with Zionism and the Jewish people throughout the world and the Palestinian state its links with the Arab world.”

This programme is, from the Israeli point of view, notable in the sense that it at least envisages negotiations with the PLO and supports the idea of a “third state” between Israel and Jordan, both points having been vigorously opposed in Israel. It is of course very far from the view of the non-sectarian democratic state of Palestine which the PLO has as its ultimate goal.

Nevertheless the publication of this programme raised a minor tempest in Israel as a result of the modest concessions it contained. Mapam was greatly chagrined when it discovered that eleven of its members had signed the programme. The Political Committee of Mapam issued a statement rejecting the programme on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Mapam Party