

PALESTINE'S ARAB POPULATION: THE DEMOGRAPHY OF THE PALESTINIANS

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INTRODUCTION

The Palestinian people¹ have long been subjected to a wide variety of exploitative actions for reasons almost as diverse as the actions themselves. Although they have not withstood the multifarious forces well, the Palestinians have gradually become aware of the need to examine themselves in a rational and pragmatic manner in order to survive the weapons in the arsenals of their enemies. Since science begins wherever one can formulate a problem in numbers, the science of the Palestinians begins with their numbers.

This paper deals with Palestinian demography and human geography. The study of demography provides invaluable information on a society, adding an important dimension to its history, and at the same time providing options for its future. The size, structure and natural rates of growth of a people provide important guidelines to its capabilities and human resources. Its birth rate, infant mortality and life span indicate fairly clearly what measures for improvement must be taken in the health and medical fields, while the degree of access to education and the rates of graduation inform those concerned with its potential how to develop a more secure and productive community.

The Palestinian people have rarely taken stock of their strengths or weaknesses, and have thus been unable to chart any course of action to mobilize their potential. They have overlooked the importance of such studies, and

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¹ For the purpose of this study we shall assume a Palestinian to be any person born in Palestine who claimed at one time to be Palestinian, or any descendant of such a person. We shall only discuss Arab Palestinians.

therefore have not been sufficiently prepared for the series of disasters that have befallen them. For example, throughout the mandatory period there is no record of a Palestinian concern for the high rate of infant mortality, the elimination of which would have contributed substantially to the natural increase of the Arab population of Palestine; the majority of the people suffered without protest the ill-effects of a poor standard of public health, and only a privileged few availed themselves of the limited medical facilities.

The wealth of a nation is measured today by the education, health and consequent productivity of its people. The fact that no education, private or public, was available on a significant scale to the Arabs of Palestine, and that mass secondary school education was virtually non-existent, resulted in a population poorly qualified to shoulder the immense responsibilities facing it. Today, twenty-five years after the beginning of their dispersal, mass education on a secondary level is still denied to the bulk of the Palestinians. Half the Palestinians are still economically destitute and dependent on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) facilities; UNRWA, just like the British government of Palestine, provides elementary education and limited access to secondary schools. It is most disturbing to note the lack of any individual or public rejection of these conditions either before or since 1948. The health, educational and demographic welfare of the Palestinian people — a *sine qua non* of any struggle — has received little attention, if any at all.

The information presented in this paper has been drawn from official documents which hitherto have usually been quoted as part of the Palestinian case in relation to the Zionist colonization of Palestine, because of the Palestinian claims to land and property which they support. We use them here instead in an attempt to understand the relationships between the numbers and movements of Palestinians, their health, education and planning. It became clear to us in the course of the study that there is an acute shortage of demographic field data and statistical analysis of the Palestinian people. We would like to call attention to this lacuna. We do not claim that education and planning alone would have radically altered the course of events; if both had been available in the past, however, or could be utilized in the future, the course of events might have been, and still could be, substantially different.

Since this paper traces the demographic behaviour of the Palestinian people throughout the twentieth century, it is divided into the following five periods that correspond with the major phases of their experience:

1. The period prior to 1918
2. The period from 1919 to 1948
3. The period from 1948 to 1952
4. The period from 1952 to June 1967
5. The period after June 5, 1967

1. THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 1918

The earliest figures available on the various districts within the Ottoman Empire that later coalesced into mandatory Palestine date back to the middle of the nineteenth century when the total population numbered around 500,000 people.² Of these, more than 80 per cent were Muslims, 10 per cent Christian (Arab) and 5-7 per cent Jewish.³ Since Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire, it fell under the ultimate jurisdiction of the central government in Istanbul, but under the *millet* system that had evolved over the years, each religious community retained a certain amount of internal autonomy. From the latter part of the nineteenth century, Palestine was divided into the following administrative units: the autonomous *sanjak* (district) of Jerusalem which took in the southern part of Palestine and, because of its special religious significance, was governed directly from Istanbul; and the *vilayet* (province) of Beirut which, in the case of Palestine, included the *sanjaks* of Nablus and Acre. It is necessarily difficult to obtain a precise breakdown of the Palestinian population because of its inclusion within the larger unit of geographical Syria; the Ottoman records for the numbers in the provinces show simply that during the three decades preceding World War I the population of the *sanjak* of Jerusalem grew from 234,000 to 397,000.

Before further reference to the population figures of Palestine is made, a brief glance at the social composition of the people is necessary in order to understand the ebb and flow of their movements. The predominant element during the nineteenth century was rural, with the vast majority of the people of Palestine engaged as peasants who either owned and cultivated their plots or served as tenants for the small landed aristocracy that was to assume an

² See Janet Abu Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine," in Ibrahim Abu Lughod (ed.), *The Transformation of Palestine* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 140.

³ *Ibid.* The purpose of Janet Abu Lughod's paper is to present a factual account, based on the most authoritative and unbiased statistical sources available, of the process by which the Jews succeeded in transforming the predominantly Arab population of Palestine to one that became mainly Jewish.

important political role during the mandatory period. Despite the fact that the land was the most important economic factor of Palestine, with cereals, vegetables, oranges and olive oil the main products,⁴ farming was carried on with primitive simplicity, and modern agricultural techniques were almost unknown; the annual rainfall, for example, was practically the sole means by which the soil was irrigated, and productivity suffered accordingly.⁵ Thus, even in a good year, the crops in the *sanjak* of Jerusalem amounted to one million bushels each of wheat and barley, 300,000 of beans and 400,000 of sesame.⁶

The life of the Palestinian peasant was one of hardship and poverty. As often as not, the peasants were in a state of overwhelming debt, and they became tied to the whims of the money lenders in the towns and cities.

These and not the Ottoman authorities were the real oppressors of the peasants. Thus when a beginning at land registration (*tābu*) was made, some of the city merchants, money lenders and absentee landlords sought to divert its benefits to themselves. They misrepresented the measure as a device both to register the men for military service and to increase the taxes. The peasants, who dreaded both contingencies, were easily persuaded to sell their prescriptive rights to the land they cultivated for nominal prices, to the rich who grew richer in the process. It was members of this rich class of absentee landlords who made large profits by selling to the early Zionists extensive lands acquired in this way or by other means.⁷

The three major urban centres — Jaffa, Jerusalem and Haifa — were still small, mass immigration to the cities not having started yet. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, many Christians from the Jerusalem district emigrated to places like the United States because of the limited means available at home. Rather than become a complete loss to their society, these same emigrants, however, were either to return in about a decade, or to send remittances to the relatives they had left behind. In either case, the money

⁴ E. Weakley, "Report upon the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Syria," (London, 1911) *G.B. Accounts & Papers, 1911*. This article is mentioned in the substantial work of Charles Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1900-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), in which many primary sources on the economic history of the era are given, p. 271.

⁵ One of the Zionist ideological justifications for dispossessing the Palestinians of their land is based on Western nineteenth century cultural Darwinism whereby the low productivity of Palestinian farmers has been held by Zionist propagandists to justify their colonial activities.

⁶ E. Weakley, *op. cit.*

⁷ A.L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria* (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 176.

was used to develop the towns by the building of new houses or by extending family agricultural projects.⁸ A relative burgeoning of the towns before the outcome of the war took place, in marked contrast to the rural areas where little or no development occurred. By 1915 Jerusalem had 80,000 dwellers, Jaffa 40,000 and Haifa 20,000, as compared with the figures of 35,000; 10,000; and 5,000 respectively in 1880.⁹ A large majority of the city dwellers, who made up 20 per cent of the total population of Palestine, were Christians who benefited from the emigration of their relatives at the turn of the twentieth century, and who were to form the nucleus of the middle class of the Palestinian state. While many of them were labourers, a number were engaged in commerce or the native industries, such as tourism, soap-making, pottery, carpentry and textiles. In addition to the rural and urban populations, a third, nomadic, sector existed; living in the semi-desert area of the south, the bedouin reared sheep and engaged in simple forms of agriculture.

Thus, by the eve of World War I, according to the results of an Ottoman census summarized in the *British Census of Palestine, 1922*,¹⁰ the population of Palestine was 689,275 people. They were distributed as follows:

Jerusalem District:	398,362
Nablus:	153,749
Acre:	137,164

These figures do not include a population of some 65,000 nomads living in the south which would have then given a total figure of 754,275. It is unfortunate for historical purposes that this Ottoman census did not have any indication as to the varying religious groups within the country, but it can be assumed that the Muslims still formed the overwhelming majority at about 80 per cent, while the Christians constituted 10 per cent and the Jews 7 per cent.

Education Prior to 1918

Any understanding of the educational evolution of the Palestinian people must emphasize their uneven distribution over the rural and urban areas. We have already noted that the Muslim majority of the population during the

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-76.

⁹ Arthur Ruppin, *Syrien als Wirtschaftsgebiet* (Jaffa, 1916), p. 186.

¹⁰ The 1922 census was the first census to be taken by the British authorities in Palestine. This census is a must for any student of Palestine's population. Far from substantiating Zionist claims that the region they sought for the Jewish national home was virtually unpopulated, this first official census enumerated about three-quarters of a million inhabitants.

Ottoman period lived in the rural areas, poor peasants controlled by a handful of rich and powerful landlords. The Christian minority by contrast provided the impetus that led to Arab urban development in Palestine in the present century, and were also exposed to the Westernizing influence of the foreign, cultural and religious missions that were competing with each other for a secure footing within the Ottoman Empire. This distribution was carried into the school system of Palestine, whereby the urban centres provided the best and most complete schooling with the rural areas trailing far behind.

During the Ottoman period, three different types of school system existed: the state schools, the private Muslim schools, and the religious (Christian) mission schools. The state schools were part of the Ottoman public system of education that was first established in 1847 when a Ministry of Public Instruction was created in Istanbul that was later strengthened by the educational law of 1869. Provincial government authorities supervised the operation of the system in the higher elementary, lower secondary and higher secondary schools; the lower elementary schools were managed by local education committees almost entirely independent of direct state control. Except in the lower elementary schools, Turkish was the sole medium of instruction and even Arabic was taught to Arab children through that medium in all schools under direct state control. Although elementary schools were comparatively numerous in the principal towns and villages, secondary schools were restricted to certain centres, usually in the chief city of each district.

In 1914, for example, the figures of the state school system in Palestine were as follows:

95 elementary schools
 3 secondary schools
 234 teachers
 8,248 students (of whom only 1,480 were girls)¹¹

The private Muslim schools provided much more extensive facilities although they only reached the primary and post-primary levels. They were

¹¹ A.L. Tibawi, *Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine* (London: Luzac & Co., 1956), p. 20. Tibawi's book is the standard reference on Arab education in Palestine. His figures for 1914 were partly supplied by the Turkish Ministry of Education, and partly by the Cultural Adviser of the Arab League in Cairo, Prof. Sati al-Husri.

Another substantial book on Palestinian education is the more recent book by Nabil Ayoub Badran, *Education and Modernization in Palestine, 1918-48, Part I*, Palestine Monograph No. 63 (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Centre, 1969), in Arabic.

generally of the traditional *kuttab* type that functioned in mosques or public buildings, and according to a 1914 Ottoman estimate the figures for this kind of education were:

379 schools
 417 teachers
 8,705 students (of whom only 131 were girls)¹²

The third category of schools were those of the Christian foreign missions to which the Christian Arabs of Palestine had the greatest access, especially because of Sultan Abdul Hamid's policy of the 1880's which forbade Muslim children to attend Christian schools.¹³ The European powers in the nineteenth century found an excellent means to channel their interests and activities in the Ottoman Empire through the establishment of these schools,¹⁴ which were maintained and controlled by such varied bodies as the Church Missionary Society, the Jerusalem and East Mission, the Scots Mission, the Swedish Mission and numerous Roman Catholic missions. In addition, other schools were maintained by local ecclesiastical and lay authorities,¹⁵ notably the Roman Catholic and Orthodox. The Order of the Friars Minor, for example, claims to have founded the earliest missionary educational institution in Palestine when it created a school in Jerusalem in 1645, well before the period of intensive competition amongst the European powers. In the nineteenth century, the first foreign mission school was founded in 1853 by the Church Missionary Society. Named the Bishop Gobat School (for boys) after the second Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem, it was the first of seventeen similar schools that were established during the Ottoman period. Some of these were:

Pensionnat St. Joseph (girls), 1848, in Jerusalem
 Collège des Frères, 1875, in Jerusalem
 Schmidt's Girls' College (German Catholic) in Jerusalem
 Friends Girls School, 1884 (American) in Ramallah

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ A.L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, pp. 181-82.

¹⁴ For an account of the establishment of the Church of England and its related educational missions, see A.L. Tibawi, *British Interests in Palestine, 1800-1901* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

¹⁵ For more information on education in Palestine during the Ottoman Empire, see Shahin Makarios, "Education in Syria," *al-Muqtataf*, vol. 7 (1882-83), pp. 385-92, 465-76 and 529-40. In this article, the author describes the cultural and educational activities in Syria and Palestine. He also gives a list of the mission, ecclesiastical, Christian and Muslim schools in Jerusalem and lists the dates of the forming of each school and the number of teachers and students in them.

Friends Boys School, 1901, in Ramallah
 Terra Sancta College in Jerusalem
 St. George's School, 1899, in Jerusalem

These schools went well beyond the primary level, providing the largest and most comprehensive educational programmes available in Palestine. They were, again, largely concentrated in the main urban centres where most of the Christian population lived. Higher education was almost non-existent and only a few could afford to avail themselves of the universities in Cairo, Beirut and Istanbul.

2. THE BRITISH MANDATORY PERIOD: 1919-1948

Reliable data on the whole population of mandatory Palestine was collected only twice. The first time was in 1922 when the British authorities, having consolidated their hold on the country, conducted the first modern census of Palestine. "Despite its flaws," says Janet Abu Lughod, "this census constitutes a critical bench mark for any student of Palestine's population."¹⁶

The second census, undertaken in 1931, was more detailed and better designed, giving a comprehensive picture of the demography of the country. After 1931, regular quarterly and annual *estimates* of the population, classified by religion, were tabulated; these, of course, were not very reliable since the rate of increase of the total population in Palestine was so great that in 1946 the number of inhabitants was almost 75 per cent higher than it had been in 1931.

Table 1 shows the population of Palestine classified by religious communities, according to the censuses of 1922 and 1931, and the end-of-year estimates from 1931-1947. These estimates were based on the figures of the 1931 census and calculated according to the natural increase and the net migratory increase in the period between 1931 and the year for which the figures were prepared.¹⁷

It is clear that the population of all the communities during the mandatory period had increased very rapidly. The Muslims had grown from 589,177 in 1922 to 1,157,423 at the end of 1947; the Jews from 83,790 to 589,341; the

¹⁶ Janet Abu Lughod, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

¹⁷ Figures from 1922 to 1945 inclusive are based on Palestine Government, Department of Statistics, *Vital Statistics Tables, 1922-45* (Jerusalem, 1947), p. 1.

Christians from 71,464 to 146,162; and the "others"¹⁸ from 7,617 to 15,849. The population of Palestine, as a whole, had increased from 752,048 in 1922 to 1,908,775 at the end of 1947.

A glance at the figures for the population density during part of the same period will serve to heighten the reader's awareness of the extent of change registered in fourteen years. The average density of population over the whole of Palestine was 40.6 persons per square kilometre in 1931; this figure is estimated to have increased to about 69.3 persons per square kilometre in 1945.¹⁹ When comparing this figure with that of European countries, one should always remember that Palestine, in common with its neighbours, had a large area of desert. Beersheba sub-district, for example, which is around 48 per cent of the total area of Palestine, had a population of only 4 persons per square kilometre. The remainder of the country had, in 1931, an average density of 72 persons per square kilometre, and this density is estimated to have increased to 125 persons per square kilometre in 1944.

This phenomenal increase can be attributed to a number of reasons. The Jewish population grew, of course, mainly because of immigration; constituting only 7 per cent of the population just before World War I, it accounted for 30.9 per cent of the total in 1947. The Muslims, and the Christians to a lesser extent, increased as a whole because their birth rates were higher than their death rates. Because of the nature of the available statistics, it will be necessary to separate the Muslim from the Christian communities of Palestine in order to obtain some understanding of the more specific reasons for the change in their population statistics.

The natural increase of the Muslims was very high. Table 2 shows that 96 per cent of their growth from 1922 to 1945 was due to natural increase, in contrast to a corresponding figure of 28 per cent for the Jews during the same period of time. In Table 3, one notes that the rate of natural increase for all three communities fluctuated from year to year depending on the circumstances, but that the Muslims reached their highest peak in 1945 with a natural increase rate of 37.87 per 1000. The higher birth rate of the Muslims was, of course, the principal reason for this; a study of the estimated distribution of

¹⁸ Such as Druzes, Baha'is, Samaritans, etc.

¹⁹ Palestine Government, Department of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1944-45* (Jerusalem, 1946), p. 16.

the Christian and Muslim population by age and sex reveals that 42.6 per cent of the total Muslim population was aged between 0 and 14.²⁰

Despite the high birth rate, infant mortality amongst the Muslims, particularly during the early years of the mandate, was also very high. Although the situation improved in the early 1940's, this was largely due to the fact that many of the Muslims had moved away from the rural areas and had started the process of urbanization. Statistics for the decrease of mortality in each of the first five years of life between 1927-1929 and 1942-1944, show that the percentage decrease was very high (60 per cent) amongst the Jewish population which had the fairly low child mortality rate of 63 per 1000 (cf. 1973 figures in Sweden and the USA that average 20 per 1000). The Arab communities also fared well. The Christian infant mortality decreased by 51 per cent from 283 per 1000 to 138 per 1000; the Muslims' by 39 per cent, from 412 per 1000 to 251 per 1000. A closer look at the latter figure will reveal that during the 1942-1944 period, the Muslim child mortality rate was over 300 per 1000 births in the rural areas, such as in the towns of Majdal, Beersheba, Hebron, Ramleh and around the Safed sub-district; in the more urbanized places, such as Tulkarm, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, the figure was under 200 per 1000 births.²¹ Thus, once again, the recorded improvement indicated the benefits accruing from urban life.

Like all other populations, the Palestinians gradually migrated to urban centres, where the facilities were relatively more advanced, but by no means very sophisticated. Since the Christians had been largely urbanized to begin with, it was the shift of the Muslims that was more significant. Although the size of the Arab towns was very small — hence the underdeveloped condition of the usual urban infrastructure (hospitals, newspapers, schools) — they accounted for 80 per cent of the Christian Arabs. The Muslims, by contrast, while still retaining their predominantly rural character, had clearly started to migrate to the major towns and cities of Haifa, Jaffa, Gaza and Jerusalem. In 1944, about 33 per cent lived in town as opposed to about 29 per cent only thirteen years earlier. In the towns they were able to avail themselves of the limited public health facilities which in turn gave them a higher life expectancy.²²

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POPULATION OF PALESTINE
DURING THE BRITISH MANDATE

<i>Year</i>	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Total</i>
1922 ²³ (Census)	589,177	71,464	7,617	83,790	752,048
1931 ²⁴ (Census)	759,700	88,907	10,101	174,606	1,033,314
1931 (31.xii)	761,922	89,134	10,145	175,138	1,036,339
1932 (31.xii)	778,803	92,520	10,367	192,137	1,073,827
1933 (31.xii)	798,506	96,791	10,677	234,967	1,140,941
1934 (31.xii)	814,379	102,407	10,793	282,975	1,210,554
1935 (31.xii)	836,688	105,236	11,031	355,157	1,308,112
1936 (31.xii)	862,730	108,506	11,378	384,078	1,366,692
1937 (31.xii)	883,446	110,869	11,643	395,836	1,401,794
1938 (31.xii)	900,250	111,974	11,839	411,222	1,435,285
1939 (31.xii)	927,133	116,958	12,150	445,457	1,501,698
1940 (31.xii)	947,846	120,587	12,562	463,535	1,544,530
1941 (31.xii)	973,104	125,413	12,881	474,102	1,585,500
1942 (31.xii)	995,292	127,184	13,121	484,408	1,620,005
1943 (31.xii)	1,028,715	131,281	13,663	502,912	1,676,571
1944 (31.xii)	1,061,277	135,547	14,098	528,702	1,739,624
1945 (31.xii)	1,101,565	139,285	14,858	554,329	1,810,037
1946 (31.xii) ²⁵	1,143,336	145,063	15,488	583,327	1,887,214
1947 (31.xii) ²⁶	1,157,423	146,162	15,849	589,341	1,908,775

The growth of the Christian population can be attributed to a variety of interlocking factors. Their natural increase, that accounted for 72 per cent of the growth of the entire community, was, of course, very significant, as demonstrated in Table 2. Table 3, which enumerates the rate of natural

²³ Figures from 1922 till 1945 inclusive taken from *Vital Statistics Tables, 1922-1945*, p. 1.

²⁴ Estimates of settled population have been prepared by adding the recorded natural and migratory increase to the figures of the settled population at the census of 1931. Estimates of total population are obtained by adding to the settled population the number of bedouin recorded in the census of 1931, i.e., 66,553.

²⁵ Based on figures from France, Institut National de la Statistique, *La Palestine* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), p. 34.

²⁶ The last officially released figures, quoted in Janet Abu Lughod, "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine," *op. cit.*, p. 155.

TABLE 2
INCREASE OF TOTAL POPULATION OF PALESTINE²⁷

	<i>All religions</i>	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Others</i>
Population at the census of 1922	752,048	589,177	83,790	71,464	7,617
Estimate of Pop. at the end of 1945	1,810,037	1,101,565	554,329	139,285	14,858
TOTAL INCREASE	1,057,989	512,388	470,539	67,821	7,241
Natural Increase	677,061	491,855	129,989	48,724	6,493
Migratory Increase	380,928	20,533	340,550	19,097	748
% Natural Increase	64	96	28	72	90
% Migratory Increase	36	4	72	28	10

TABLE 3
RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE PER 1000
OF MEAN SETTLED PALESTINIAN POPULATION²⁸

<i>Year</i>	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Jews</i>
1922	24.95	19.16	16.71
1932	22.66	20.53	19.46
1942	25.31	15.66	14.13
1945	37.87	22.80	23.61

TABLE 4
BIRTHS AND BIRTH RATES, CLASSIFIED BY RELIGION²⁹

	<i>Total</i>		<i>Muslims</i>		<i>Jews</i>		<i>Christians</i>		<i>Others</i>	
	<i>Number</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Rate</i>
922-1925 average	32,356	46.36	26,035	50.20	3,309	33.89	2,663	36.29	349	42.85
926-1930 average	41,838	48.60	33,036	53.52	5,297	34.33	3,084	38.48	421	45.90
931-1935 average	47,146	44.67	36,366	50.34	6,895	30.19	3,415	35.85	470	44.90
936-1940 average	55,119	40.60	40,332	48.86	10,515	25.83	3,732	33.33	540	45.84
1940	56,571	38.72	41,423	47.42	10,817	23.72	3,701	31.11	630	50.75
1941	57,879	38.58	44,009	49.22	9,714	20.67	3,589	29.06	567	44.54
1942	56,415	36.67	41,560	45.16	10,884	22.73	3,514	27.79	457	35.00
1943	68,820	43.48	49,621	52.40	14,317	29.04	4,225	32.63	657	48.98
1944	73,055	44.40	52,710	53.66	15,583	30.22	4,142	30.99	620	44.64
1945	76,554	44.83	55,052	54.23	16,358	30.26	4,489	32.65	655	45.00

²⁷ *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1944-45*, p. 17.

²⁸ Based on reports in *Vital Statistics Tables, 1922-45*, pp. 84-85. Annual figures for the period 1922-1945 are given in the source, as well as the annual natural increase.

²⁹ *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1944-45*, pp. 25-26.

increase per 1000 people, shows the close proximity in the rates between the Christian and Jewish populations. Furthermore, the decrease in infant mortality, referred to above, grew with time and reached a percentage reduction of 51 per cent. Female fertility is one indication of population growth, and the figures for the average fertility of the Christian women show that they remained stable at 4.1 to 4.3 children, a figure that was also reached by the Muslim middle classes.

One of the least known reasons for the growth of the Christian population was the migration of other Christian Arabs into Palestine during the mandatory period. Table 2 shows that 28 per cent of the increase of the Christians from 1922 to 1945 was due to immigration. It was, generally speaking, the nationals of neighbouring Lebanon and Syria who flocked to Palestine, which held out much greater economic opportunities for them. Those with some capital of their own managed to become established in petty trade, while others found employment in schools and similar institutions.

A general reference to the progressive decline of the mortality rate of both the Christian and the Muslim communities of Palestine during the mandatory period should be made in conclusion. In order to measure the actual decline in mortality, tables are constructed on the basis of which the average expectation of life at birth can be calculated. Table 5 is one such table, showing that the life expectation of the Jews in Palestine approached that of Western countries while that of the Arabs lagged behind. An improvement occurred in the early 1940's as a result of the growing urbanization of the population and the consequent access to public health facilities in the major towns and cities. The life expectancy of the Christian man that had been 52.57 in 1933-35 reached 57.4 in 1942-44. The Muslim figure for the corresponding period was 42 in 1933-35 and 49.35 in 1942-44, showing a net improvement over the years and a life expectancy rate that far exceeded those of India and Egypt.

Education 1919-1948

Education did not change very radically in scope or availability during the mandatory period. Christians continued to benefit from the large number of sectarian and private schools in the major cities to which more Muslims were now attracted. A wide discrepancy in facilities between the rural and urban areas continued and the status of the public or state schools remained vastly incongruous with the needs of the society. Social differences in the various groups — the Muslims and Christians, the rural and town dwellers, the rich and

TABLE 5
LIFE EXPECTATION (IN YEARS) AT BIRTH IN PALESTINE³⁰
AND OTHER COUNTRIES, 1926-1944

Religion	1926-27		1930-32		1933-35		1936-38		1939-41		1942-44		Net Gain	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Muslims	37.10	37.92	41.51	42.34	42.01	4.00	46.70	48.53	46.12	46.85	49.35	50.40	12.25	12.48
Jews	54.09	54.74	59.90	62.68	59.47	61.83	60.79	64.47	62.34	64.55	64.13	65.87	10.04	11.13
Christians	—	—	—	—	52.57	54.18	—	—	57.21	59.40	57.44	60.10	4.87	5.92
Other	—	—	—	—	40.68	44.84	—	—	47.21	51.02	54.83	51.30	14.15	6.46

2. IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Country	First year avlb.		Last year avlb.		Net Gain		
	Year	M	Year	M	Years covered	F	
Non-Western:							
India	1911	22.59	1931	26.91	20	4.32	3.25
Egypt	1917-27	31.00	1927-37	34.20	10	3.20	-4.5
Brazil	1920	37.43	—	—	—	—	—
Bulgaria	1900-05	42.08	1925-28	45.92	24	3.84	4.44
Japan	1921-25	42.06	1935-36	46.92	12.5	4.86	6.43
Western:							
England & Wales	1910-12	51.55	1937	60.18	26	8.63	9.05
Australia	1901-20	55.20	1932-34	63.48	27.5	8.28	8.30
Sweden	1911-15	56.49	1936-40	64.30	25	7.81	7.68
US (White)	1929-31	59.12	1942	63.65	12	4.53	5.94

³⁰ Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1944-45, p. 27.

the poor — were thus enhanced, radically decreasing the possibilities of cohesion and integration. Some commentators on the Palestinian revolutionary movement of the 1930's have observed distinct class differences in attitudes and in participation, thus reinforcing the argument that a democratic and cohesive society cannot exist until all barriers to education are eliminated.

The mandatory power did little to foster a widespread educational movement, and the state schools were remarkably poor in quality and quantity. During the first fifteen years of British rule, no public school in Palestine, with the exception of the Arab College in Jerusalem, provided education beyond Secondary II; until 1930, for example, there were only 25 public secondary classes in the entire country with an enrolment of a mere 353 students. Table 8 throws more light on the public school system. There was a vast difference in the number of elementary school students in the rural areas as compared to those in the urban centres: in 1944, there were 37,299 elementary school children (of whom only 7 per cent were girls) enrolled in the schools provided by the government in the rural areas, and, by contrast, 26,484 (of whom 42 per cent were girls) students in the urban areas. With the overwhelming majority of the population in the rural areas, the schools provided by the government for their education were not enough. Fifty-eight per cent of all villages had no elementary schools, and 95 per cent of them had no schools for girls. The most depressing fact, however, is that no public education in the rural areas for secondary students existed; the only secondary education available was in the urban centres, and in 1944 only 959 students were enrolled. Since the majority of children in Palestine attended public schools (see Table 7), the paucity of the facilities gains more perspective. Since it was the Muslim children especially who were living in the rural areas, the fact that only 25 per cent of all Muslim children attended school³¹ in Palestine becomes understandable.

Private Muslim schools increased in number, from 45 in 1925 to 160 in 1944, as did the number of students, from 3,445 in 1925 to 14,995 in 1943. While the Christian private schools decreased slightly in number, from 183 in 1925 to 177 in 1943,³² the students enrolled there increased from 15,154 to 27,232, and 90 per cent of Christian school-age children were receiving education, in marked contrast to the corresponding figure for the Muslims of 25 per cent.

³¹ *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1944-45*, p. 186.

³² The decrease was mainly due to the amalgamation of a number of tiny schools into large units that consequently improved in quality.

TABLE 6
EDUCATED PALESTINIAN ARABS ACCORDING TO 1931 CENSUS³³

<i>Number of Formal Years of Education</i>	<i>Above 21 years of Age</i>			<i>All Ages</i>		
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
MUSLIMS						
0 ³⁴ -5 years	26,580	2,225	28,905	54,259	7,217	61,476
6-7 years	4,257	453	4,710	6,222	1,006	7,228
8-9 years	1,825	185	2,010	2,509	380	2,889
10-11 years	1,828	149	1,977	2,185	241	2,426
12 years and above	1,324	59	1,383	1,421	79	1,500
TOTAL	35,914	3,071	38,985	66,596	8,923	75,519
CHRISTIANS						
0-5 years	7,477	4,530	12,007	14,674	10,211	24,885
6-7 years	2,358	1,568	3,926	3,586	2,150	6,096
8-9 years	2,886	1,374	4,260	3,728	1,877	5,605
10-11 years	2,249	1,107	3,356	2,637	1,381	4,018
12 years and above	1,824	777	2,601	1,945	864	2,809
TOTAL	16,794	9,356	26,150	26,570	16,843	43,513
GRAND TOTAL	52,608	12,427	65,275	93,166	25,766	119,032

TABLE 7
DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS³⁵

<i>Year</i>	<i>Totals</i>		<i>Public Schools</i>		<i>Private Schools</i>				<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Pupils</i>	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Pupils</i>	<i>Muslim Schools</i>	<i>Muslim Pupils</i>	<i>Christian Schools</i>	<i>Christian Pupils</i>	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Pupils</i>
1925-26	587	38,327	314	19,737	45	3,445	183	15,145	273	18,590
1934-35	719	67,387	350	36,005	190	11,788	179	19,594	369	31,382
1935-36	754	76,760	384	42,765	183	12,275	187	21,720	370	33,995
1936-37	738	78,147	382	42,713	175	12,537	181	22,897	356	35,434
1937-38	779	87,498	402	49,400	184	14,052	193	24,046	377	38,098
1938-39	768	88,189	395	50,020	181	14,172	192	28,997	373	38,169
1939-40	775	94,123	402	54,367	128	14,204	195	25,274	373	39,478
1940-41	780	94,809	403	54,645	191	15,505	186	24,569	377	40,164
1941-42	770	96,928	404	56,558	177	14,751	189	25,619	366	40,370
1942-43	745	98,800	403	58,325	161	14,567	181	25,908	342	40,475
1943-44	749	105,368	422	63,141	150	14,995	177	27,232	327	42,227

³³ Government of Palestine, *Census of Palestine, 1931* (Alexandria, 1933), vol. 2, p. 124.

³⁴ Zero means less than one year of formal education.

³⁵ *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1944-45*, pp. 185-86.

TABLE 8
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY STUDENTS
IN ARAB PUBLIC SCHOOLS FOR 1944³⁶

	<i>Urban</i>			<i>Rural</i>		
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
ELEMENTARY						
1st Elementary Cycle (Kindergarten & Elem. 1-5)	13,333	10,293	23,626	32,739	2,912	35,651
2nd Elementary Cycle (Elem. 6-7 grades)	1,966	892	2,858	1,595	53	1,648
Total Elementary	15,299	11,185	26,484	34,334	2,965	37,299
SECONDARY						
1st Secondary Cycle (1st & 2nd Secondary Classes)	616	130	746	—	—	—
2nd Secondary Cycle (3rd & 4th Secondary Classes)	171	42	213	—	—	—
Total Secondary	787	172	959	—	—	—

The 1931 census paints a grim picture of the state of education in Palestine as indicated in Table 6 which shows the number of educated Palestinians. While 47.5 per cent of the Christian community was educated, only 11 per cent of the Muslims had a similar background, for a mere 75,619 out of a total population of 693,000 could claim a formal education of anywhere from one to twelve years. The table also shows that around 81 per cent of the educated Muslims had not had more than six years of formal education; thus, by 1931, only 2.1 per cent of the Muslims of Palestine had been educated past the 5th elementary level. The number of educated in the age group above 21 was 39,125 persons, the majority of whom (73 per cent) had had less than 6 years of formal education. Since the number of Muslim Arabs above 21 was 363,620 (i.e., 47.5 per cent of the total Muslim population), the percentage of educated above 21 years of age was therefore 10.7 per cent, which means that 89.3 per cent of the adult population of the Muslim Arabs of Palestine in 1931 were illiterate.

The majority of the public schools in 1944 were elementary. Ninety-three per cent of all students in public schools were in the lower elementary classes.

³⁶ Palestine Government, Department of Statistics, *Survey of Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1946), II, p. 664.

Thus the great majority of public school students left school after finishing the 5th elementary, sometimes even before. Entering public secondary schools was very difficult and selective, since there were only three public secondary schools up to and including the matriculation class and they were all in Jerusalem: The Arab College, al-Rashidiya and the Jerusalem Girls' College.

We do not have a full picture of the numbers of students actually receiving the Palestine matriculation or school certificate during the mandate. In July 1944, 78 persons received the Arabic matriculation, and 35 the English matriculation, while 46 received the Arab School Certificate and 25 received the English School Certificate.³⁷ Less than 1 per cent of Arab children of terminal secondary school age actually sat for the matriculation examination! The number of youth who completed a high school education may have been several times this figure, but it is still very low indeed.

It was not until much criticism was levelled at the educational policy, especially in the rural areas, of the mandatory authorities that an effort to introduce academic and practical agricultural schools was made. In 1931, for example, Hiba Kaddouri contributed to the opening of an agricultural school. In 1935/36, the number of students enrolled there was 60, and in 1944/45 they became 67. Commercial and industrial classes were also opened in Haifa. Furthermore, the educational facilities of the rural and urban areas underwent some improvement, albeit minor, after 1942, with the rate of increase of the number of schools growing at between 5 per cent and 15 per cent per annum.

The education of the Palestinian Arabs was achieved despite the indifference of the British authorities, whose educational policy was directed towards the production of modestly educated clerical civil servants. An increase in the number of students during the mandatory period is a clear indication of the desire for learning, for while in 1930/31 only 5.57 per cent of the population were students, the figure had grown to 8.68 per cent in 1943/44. Illiteracy among school age children, especially those living in the cities, decreased. Since 47.5 per cent of the Palestinians at the end of the mandatory period were under 20 years of age, it may be deduced that the number of literate people increased and might have reached 30 per cent by 1948.³⁸

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

³⁸ See Nabil A. Badran, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-37.

3. THE PERIOD 1948-1952

It is difficult to make an exact portrayal of the Palestinian population on the eve of the 1948 diaspora. The turmoil was too great, and the mobility of the people in search of peace and security was too confusing. In 1947, the total number of Palestinian Arabs was 1,303,585,³⁹ 70 per cent of whom were from the rural areas. For a more precise breakdown of the whereabouts of the population, particularly in the urban centres, the 1945 figures⁴⁰ are useful: only about 60,000 lived in Jerusalem;⁴¹ 62,500 in Haifa; 66,000 in Jaffa; 16,700 in Lydda; 14,000 in Nazareth; and 10,000 in Safed. The figures show that the major cities had grown since 1922 (Jerusalem from 28,600 to 60,000, Jaffa from 27,400 to 66,200 and Haifa from 18,400 to 62,500) at a rate somewhat higher than the natural growth rate of the entire population, which in 1947 was one of the highest in the world.⁴² But the overwhelming majority of the Arabs, the Muslims in particular, still lived in the outlying rural areas of the country where secondary education was totally inadequate, and this contributed enormously to the debacle of 1948. When the final showdown for possession of Palestine was at hand, the Palestinians discovered their woeful insufficiencies, and realized that they lacked all the factors that could have enabled them to emerge victorious in their war with the Zionists. They lacked education, sophisticated weapons, a cohesive society, and appropriate leadership. Above all, and paradoxical as it may sound, they discovered that they lacked manpower. The ratio of Arab to Jew had changed drastically from 13:1 in 1914 to just over 2:1 in 1947. Furthermore, the ratio of educated Jews to Arabs was inversely proportional to their population ratio. Consequently, the better and more extensive education available to Jewish youth enabled the Zionist movement to mobilize and produce a much greater force than the numerically superior Arabs could marshal. The consequence was that in a few weeks most Palestinians were uprooted from their lands and redistributed in Palestine and abroad.

³⁹ Janet Abu Lughod, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

⁴⁰ *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1944-45*, p. 21.

⁴¹ Surprisingly the Arab population of Jerusalem apparently remained constant between 1948, 1967 and 1973!

⁴² Nabil A. Badran, "Census of the Palestinian People towards the End of 1969" (Arabic unpublished manuscript kindly lent by the author; henceforth, MS), pp. 5-6.

TABLE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES BY COUNTRY⁴³
AND TYPE OF SETTLEMENT IN NOVEMBER 1952

Country, District & Locality	Area	Type of dwellings			Total
		In stone houses	In wooden barracks	In tents	
PALESTINE	Total	324,402	125,662	114,798	565,872
WEST BANK	Total	245,398	60,654	57,637	363,689
NABLUS	Nablus Town	96,231	—	—	
	Balata	—	147	3,965	
	Al-Fara'a	—	2,007	2,063	
	Nablus Camp	—	—	1,726	117,934
	Nour al-Shams	—	727	2,886	
	Tulkarm	—	2,431	2,994	
	Askar	—	61	2,686	
JERICHO	Jericho Town	10,036	—	—	
	Aqabat al-Jaber	—	23,944	6,414	
	Ain al-Sultan	—	4,427	1,196	
	Al-Nouaiama	—	3,219	1,995	76,184
	Al-Badou	—	—	5,094	
	Al-Karamat Camp	—	15,542	3,317	
JERUSALEM	Jerusalem City	50,437	—	—	
	Al-Dhaisha	—	351	2,949	
	Aida	—	46	541	58,822
	The Camp	—	4,498	—	
HEBRON	Hebron Town	45,919	—	—	
	Al-Fawar	—	—	4,511	
	Al-Aroub	—	—	5,354	56,513
	Halhoul	—	—	89	
	Beit Jibreen	—	—	640	
RAMALLAH	Ramallah Town	42,775	—	—	
	Al-Amari Camp	—	412	1,244	
	Deir Amaar	—	635	2,213	
	Ain Arik	—	1,273	132	55,246
	Ain Sinia	—	—	415	
	Al-Jalazon	—	309	3,857	
	Qalandia	—	625	1,356	
GAZA STRIP	Total	79,004	65,008	57,161	201,173
GAZA	Gaza	13,074	—	—	
	Deir al-Balah	—	5,408	306	26,494
	Al-Maghazi	—	6,038	1,688	

⁴³ Arif al-Arif, *Al-Nakba* (Beirut and Sidon, 1956-1960), vol. 5, pp. 1122-1126. Taken from UNRWA documents of November 25, 1952. The table contains some minor arithmetical inconsistencies, which could not be corrected owing to our inability to trace the source quoted by al-Arif, a report by the Comte de Briey. According to al-Arif, if we add the number of refugees living in Egypt and Iraq, and those who did not register their names and did not receive relief from any source, the number of Palestinians who left Palestine as a result of the war is close to 1,000,000.

Country, District & Locality	Area	Type of dwellings			Total
		In stone houses	In wooden barracks	In tents	
KHAN YUNIS	Khan Yunis	17,296	4,791	2,722	} 56,303
	Al-Badon	—	—	31,594	
AL-NUSAYRAT	Nusayrat	—	12,350	650	} 25,103
	Al-Baridge	—	11,825	278	
RAFAH	Rafah	2,775	—	—	} 25,345
	Rafah Camp	—	16,812	5,758	
AL-RIMAL	Al-Rimal	18,684	—	—	} 33,177
	The Blue House	—	1,797	6,864	
	The Beach	—	586	5,246	
AL-ZAITOUN	Al-Zaitoun	27,175	—	—	} 34,651
	Jabalia	—	5,401	2,075	
OUTSIDE PALESTINE	Total	218,553	25,798	40,043	284,404
LEBANON	Total	65,900	13,220	22,522	100,642
BEIRUT AREA	Beirut	15,723	—	—	} 19,165
	Mar Elias	—	42	400	
MOUNTAIN AREA	Mountain	11,716	—	—	} 18,711
	Bourj al-Barajneh	—	—	2,611	
	Shatila Camp	—	—	1,240	
	Jisr al-Basha	—	—	673	
	Al-Dikwane	—	494	966	
	Dabaya	—	341	670	
SIDON	Sidon	13,979	—	—	} 24,194
	Mieh-Mieh	—	1,390	901	
	'Ain al-Hilweh	—	103	7,821	
TYRE	Tyre	17,078	—	—	} 21,529
	Al-Rashidiya	—	757	1,231	
	Al-Bus	—	2,552	11	
TRIPOLI	Tripoli	4,737	—	—	} 11,275
	Nahr al-Bared	—	—	5,998	
	Khan al-Askar	—	540	—	
AL-BIQA'A AREA	Al-Biqa'a	1,667	—	—	} 8,668
	Anjar	—	1,838	—	
	Wavell	—	1,488	—	
	Ghouran	—	2,675	—	
SYRIA	Total	66,081	9,829	6,871	82,701
DAMASCUS AREA	Damascus	39,170	—	—	} 45,519
	Khan al-Shaikh	—	844	2,387	
	Al-Aliance	—	—	2,100	
	Khan Danoun	—	1,018	—	
NORTHERN AREA	North	4,161	—	—	} 9,451
	Al-Nairab Camp	—	4,634	23	
	Khan Abu-Bakr	—	392	—	
	Karantina	—	165	—	
	Latakia Castle	—	76	—	

Country, District & Locality	Area	Type of dwellings			Total
		In stone houses	In wooden barracks	In tents	
HOMS & HAMA AREA	Homs & Hama	3,886	—	—	6,998
	Homs Camp	—	2,046	294	
	Hama Camp	—	—	773	
SOUTHERN AREA	South	18,864	—	—	20,913
	Al-Swaida Camp	—	754	—	
	Dir'a Camp	—	—	1,295	
EAST BANK JORDAN	Total	87,572	2,749	10,650	100,981
AMMAN	Amman City	58,778	—	—	70,471
	Jabal al-Hussein	—	824	6,134	
	Zarqa Camp	—	1,925	2,810	
IRBID	Irbid Town	28,794	—	—	30,500
	Irbid Camp	—	—	1,706	
GRAND TOTAL		542,975	151,460	155,841	850,276

TABLE 10
STATISTICS CONCERNING REGISTERED REFUGEES⁴⁴

Year Ended (June)	Grand Total	Year Ended (June)	Grand Total
1950	960,021 ⁴⁵	1962	1,174,760
1951	904,122 ⁴⁵	1963	1,210,170
1952	915,411 ⁴⁵	1964	1,246,585
1953	916,761	1965	1,280,823
1954	941,851	1966	1,317,749
1955	969,389	1967	1,346,086
1956	996,338	1968	1,364,294
1957	1,019,201	1969	1,395,074
1958	1,053,348	1970	1,425,219
1959	1,087,628	1971	1,468,161
1960	1,120,889	1972	1,506,640
1961	1,151,024		

Table 9 gives a candid picture of the whereabouts of the Palestinians after the war of 1948. Two parts of Palestine only remained in the hands of the Arabs: the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip. The West Bank became the home of 363,689 additional Palestinians, thus making the total population of the three districts of Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus about

⁴⁴ Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, July 1, 1970 - June 30, 1971, p. 67.

⁴⁵ This grand total included refugees receiving relief in Israel who were UNRWA's responsibility through June 30, 1952.

TABLE 11
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL REGISTERED REFUGEE POPULATION
AND OF CAMP POPULATION (1972)⁴⁶

Area	Total	Number of Camps		Number of persons officially registered ⁴⁷ in established camps	Number of persons in established ⁴⁸ camps	Actually living in emergency camps ⁴⁹
		Established	Emergency			
East Jordan	551,612	4	6	76,626	110,448	112,834
West Bank	278,255	20	—	68,125	71,850	—
Gaza	324,567	8	—	198,662	205,734	—
Lebanon	184,043	15	—	87,586	95,372	—
Syria	168,163	6	4	26,641	31,275	15,820
Grand Total	1,506,640	53	10	457,640	514,679	128,654

775,000 people. About 100,981 refugees went to Transjordan and later became politically unified with the West Bank when the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was created. Around 201,173 refugees went to the Gaza Strip, while Syria became host to 82,781, and Lebanon to 100,642. The total number of refugees in 1952 was 850,000.⁵⁰ If, however, we add the number of refugees who went to Iraq and to Egypt, those who did not register as refugees, and those who received no relief from whatever source, the total number would be closer to 1,000,000.

According to UN figures, around 80 per cent of the refugees were farmers, unskilled workers, and their dependents. The remaining 20 per cent were business and professional men, skilled workers and owners of property and their families, most of whom became self-supporting and economically integrated in the countries they moved to. But it was the first and larger category of

⁴⁶ *Report of the Commissioner-General of the UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, July 1, 1971 - June 30, 1972, p. 76.*

⁴⁷ Persons officially registered in these camps are refugees eligible for UNRWA assistance and appear in UNRWA records as living in camps, irrespective of their category of registration, although some may have moved to villages, towns or cities in other parts of the country and their removal has yet to be reported to the agency. The figures do not include refugees in camps who are not given shelter by UNRWA but benefit from sanitation services only.

⁴⁸ Of the persons actually living in these camps, 506,911 are UNRWA registered refugees (including 457,640 officially registered refugees who are eligible for shelter) and 7,768 are neither registered with UNRWA nor eligible for UNRWA assistance. Also included are so-called refugee "squatters" who live in or on the fringes of the camps, but have never been officially admitted to or registered in the camps.

⁴⁹ Persons actually living in these camps comprise 87,101 UNRWA registered refugees and 41,553 other persons, all of whom were displaced as a result of the June 1967 war.

⁵⁰ Reference should also be made to the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, *Final Report of the UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, Part I — The Final Report and Appendices, Appendix I (B)* (New York, 1949), p. 22, which states that there were 751,000 refugees in 1948.

refugees that was helpless and completely at the mercy of the host country where circumstances had led them.

Tables 10 and 11 give a detailed statistical picture of the Palestinian refugees. The first indicates their development in number, starting from 960,021 in 1950; the second gives a detailed analysis of the 1,506,640 refugees existing in June 1972. The lot of these refugees was one of hardship and disappointment, for many found it nearly impossible to obtain productive employment in the host countries. The Arab countries had just obtained their political independence and were only beginning to establish some form of control over their national resources. Economic planning was almost lacking and unemployment was widespread. The arrival of about 280,000 Palestinians with skills equivalent to the local population thus posed serious problems. Under the increased conditions of poverty, the standards of health among Palestinians decreased substantially. Although hard facts are not available, Badran⁵¹ quotes UNRWA sources that give an infant mortality rate of 172/1000 for infants less than one year old in the Qalandia camp during 1954-1955.

There is a direct relation between per capita income and infant mortality.⁵² At incomes above \$ 600 per capita, infant mortality is constant and reaches 20/1000. Below this income level, the rate increases rapidly and progressively, reaching 150/1000 at a per capita income level of \$ 250.

Other factors contributed to the unhealthy conditions of the refugees. Even in the best of the fifty-four camps run by UNRWA, where around 40 per cent of the Palestinians live, living conditions are far too crowded. At least, however, UNRWA prevents starvation; it provides each person with dry rations (mostly flour) of a mere 1,500-1,600 calories a day.⁵³ The Agency offers assistance that is meagre by any standard: about \$ 37 per person per year, or about 10 US cents a day, of which 5 cents are spent on food, 1 on health and 4 on education.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Nabil A. Badran, MS, p. 14.

⁵² Leslie Corsa Jr. and Deborah Oakley, "Consequences of Population Growth for Health Services in Less Developed Countries — An Initial Appraisal," in *Rapid Population Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications* (Baltimore: US National Academy of Sciences, 1971) pp. 268-402. Interestingly, Taiwan at this low income level has the same rate of infant mortality as the US or Sweden. The reason for this may be the unusually high standards of cleanliness prevalent in Taiwan, intestinal diseases and malnutrition being the chief causes of infant mortality.

⁵³ See Usama Khalidi and Amin Majaj, "A Special Report on the Palestine Refugees," *Middle East Forum*, XLI, 2 (1965), p. 31.

⁵⁴ United Nations Relief and Works Association, *Health for Palestine Refugees* (Beirut, 1970).

The Palestinians were not all living in camps. As we have already seen, many were skilled and adapted themselves well to life in the host countries. A number achieved prominence, thus acquiring the citizenship of their host country, while others emigrated to Western Europe and the USA. The computation of non-refugee Palestinians thus becomes a difficult task. In order to make it simpler, we will discuss the Palestinians in each of the major host countries separately.

TABLE 12

THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PALESTINIANS (AVAILABLE DATA)

	1969 <i>Arab source</i> ⁵⁵	1972 <i>Israeli</i> ⁵⁶ <i>and</i> <i>other sources</i>	1972 <i>Arab sources</i>
East Bank	900,000		1,100,000 ⁵⁷
West Bank	670,000	716,000 ⁵⁸ (including Jerusalem)	
Gaza Strip	364,000	357,000	
Arabs of Israel	340,000	400,000	
Lebanon	240,000		
Syria	155,000		186,705 ⁵⁹ (1971)
Kuwait	140,000		147,696 ⁶⁰ (1970)
Egypt	33,000		—
Saudi Arabia	20,000		32,313 ⁶¹ (1971)
Arabian Gulf	15,000		
Iraq	24,000		16,300 ⁶² (1972)
Libya	5,000		—
USA		25,000 ⁶³	

⁵⁵ N. Badran, *The General Picture of the Present State of Palestinian Education* (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Planning Centre, 1971), p. 2.

⁵⁶ Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, vol. XXIV, No. 7, Table B/1 and quarterly statistics of the *Administered Territories*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1973), p. 3.

⁵⁷ Kamel Al-Doudeen, Jordan Ministry of Development, *The Palestinian Arabs Including Refugees of 1948 and 1967 in the Arab Countries and Occupied Palestine*.

⁵⁸ The 716,000 figure includes the population of Arab Jerusalem and the West Bank.

⁵⁹ Government of Syrian Arab Republic, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract, 1972* (Damascus, 1972), p. 51.

⁶⁰ Government of Kuwait, Planning Board, *Annual Statistical Abstract, 1972*, p. 36.

⁶¹ Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Passports and Nationalities, Census Bureau, "Foreigners with Residence Permits According to Nationality, Type of Residence Permit and Profession... for 1970 and 1971" (Arabic, mimeographed).

⁶² Ghassan Atiyeh (Director of Palestine Studies in Baghdad University), "Census of the Palestinians living in the Republic of Iraq and Registered in the Ministry of Social Affairs, March 8, 1973" (Arabic manuscript).

⁶³ According to the US Department of Immigration and Naturalization, about 25,000 Palestinians immigrated to the US between 1958 and 1973. At the time of writing this paper we do not have the number of "resident aliens."

A. *Transjordan*

During the Ottoman period, Jordan, which was part of the province of Syria, had a low density of population, being virtually empty because of the great insecurity of the desert areas. Before 1870, for example, there were no villages anywhere east of Salt.⁶⁴ After the powerful Beni Sakhr tribe was humbled, sedentary life began to be developed. Peasants from Palestine cultivated land for the Beni Sakhr and other tribes, both partners sharing in the crop. Around 1870, a certain Saleh Abu Jaber established himself at Yadudeh (9 miles south of Amman), bringing Palestinian peasants to till the land. A few years later, Christians from Karak established themselves in the site of Madaba, about 25 miles south-west of Amman. By 1878, Circassians had arrived, at first to shelter in the ruins of the Roman theatre at Amman, later to build and cultivate. Two years later a second group settled in Wadi Sir, eight miles to the west. Between 1900 and 1905, cultivation was pushed eastwards. In 1902 the Hijaz railway reached Amman and, to protect it, the Ottomans settled people in the town and surrounding areas. With the collapse of the Hashemite dynasty in the Hijaz after World War I, the British government set up the Emirate of Transjordan under Abdullah ibn Faisal al-Hashimi. In 1930, when settlement schemes began to be implemented, the population was still predominantly nomadic; according to one estimate, the total population in 1943 was around 340,000.⁶⁵

After 1948, 119,816 Palestinians went to the East Bank, the indigenous population of which was 506,184 in 1951. Thus the East Bank became the home of 626,000 people, or 45.63 per cent of the total population of the Kingdom of Jordan, which included the West Bank. The population of the latter, on the other hand, became 745,654 or 54.37 per cent of the total population. The number of Palestinians in the whole of Jordan thus became 63.9 per cent of the total population (the 745,654 of the West Bank plus the 119,816 of the East Bank), constituting a definite majority.⁶⁶ Jordan provided citizenship to all Palestinians who requested it. Agricultural and employment opportunities became available to some of the Palestinians who moved to the East Bank, but the majority of the refugees were left in their camps under UNRWA supervision, many remaining there today.

⁶⁴ For an analysis of the growth of Jordan, see Norman N. Lewis, "The Frontier of Settlement in Syria, 1800-1950," *International Affairs*, XXXI, 1 (January 1955), pp. 48-60; also Charles Issawi, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-66.

⁶⁵ A. Konikoff, *Transjordan: An Economic Survey* (Jerusalem: Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, 1946), p. 18.

⁶⁶ Information based on the Jordanian Department of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook, 1951*.

B. *Syria*

Around 82,781 Palestinians went to Syria: 45,519 were in the Damascus area and 39,170 in Damascus proper, 9,351 in the northern area, 6,998 in the Homs-Hama area and in the southern area there were around 20,913 Palestinians (Table 9). They were given the rights of a Syrian citizen to employment (in and out of the government), but were not allowed citizenship, although they were eligible for military service. Their movements were restricted. The *laissez passer* which the Palestinians in all of Syria, Lebanon and Gaza were granted as travel documents became one of the instruments for their control; Palestinians, for example, would not be granted visas to visit Lebanon or Jordan unless these were requested by an acquaintance or relative living there.

C. *Gaza*

In Gaza, which fell under Egyptian military rule, the Palestinians found themselves in a very narrow strip, 363 sq. km. in area, to which a total of 201,173 refugees flocked. They were distributed in the following fashion. In Gaza town only 13,074 of the 26,494 lived in the city, the others, i.e., 50.6 per cent, were placed in the camps of Deir-al-Balah and al-Maghazi; in Khan Yunis, 31,594 were bedouin and 17,296 lived in the town; in the camps of Nusayrat and al-Baridge there were 25,103 refugees; in Rafah town 2,775 Palestinians were residents and in Rafah camp there were around 22,500; in al-Rimal there were 33,177, and in al-Zaitoun the total number was 34,651, of which 27,175 were in the town and the remainder at the Jabalia camp. All these Palestinians were severely restricted by the military authorities, particularly when it came to travel abroad or even to Egypt.

D. *Lebanon*

In 1949-50, around 100,642 Palestinians became refugees, many in camps which were under the rule of the security forces, in Lebanon. In the Beirut area there were around 19,165 Palestinians, while in the mountain area, including the camps at Bourj al-Barajneh (2,611), Shatila (1,240), Jisr al-Basha (673) and al-Dikwane and Dabaya, there were around 18,711. In Sidon there were 24,194 Palestinian refugees, 14,000 of whom were in the town while the rest were in the Mieh-Mieh and 'Ain al-Hilweh camps. In Tyre there were 21,529 Palestinians; and in Tripoli there were 11,275, of whom 4,737 lived in Tripoli and the rest in the camps of Nahr al-Bared and Khan

al-Askar. In the Biqa' area there were 8,668 Palestinians. The two largest camps, then, were 'Ain al-Hilweh and Nahr al-Bared.

The relationship between the Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese government was complicated by the fact that a large percentage of the refugees were Muslims and government policy decried any change that might upset the delicate confessional balance of the country. Furthermore, work opportunities were limited and personal conditions in refugee camps were humiliating and restrictive.

E. Israel

According to the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, the Arab population in 1948 numbered 165,000 persons who remained under Israeli rule and as such did not fare any better. They were subjected to political and security control, deeply infiltrated to prevent any potential resistance movement, and experienced systematic expropriation, oppression and suspension of their human rights, as has been ably described by Sabri Jiryis.⁶⁷

Thus in 1949 the 1,400,000 Palestinians found themselves in five different "camps," their mobility severely restricted and their economic status at subsistence level.

4. THE PERIOD 1952-1967

By 1952, the three West Bank districts of Jerusalem, Nablus and Hebron had a total population of 742,289: 301,402 in Jerusalem, 315,236 in Nablus and 125,651 in Hebron.⁶⁸ During the years that followed, the population did not increase much because of a continuous wave of emigration to Arab and other countries. In the 1961 census,⁶⁹ the Jordanian government found that the population of the West Bank numbered around 790,530. The distribution between the different districts was as follows:

District of Jerusalem: 339,454

District of Nablus: 333,191

District of Hebron: 117,768

⁶⁷ See his *The Arabs in Israel and Democratic Freedoms in Israel*, published by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, in 1968 and 1971 respectively.

⁶⁸ Government of Jordan, Department of Statistics, *First Census of Population and Housing, 1961* (Amman, 1963), No. 7, pp. 76-90.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Although Hebron's population had actually decreased, most of this was probably due to internal migration to Jerusalem as well as to countries abroad. On the eve of the June War, i.e., in 1967, Jordanian estimates put the population of the West Bank at around 977,000 persons,⁷⁰ of whom around 278,255 were refugees. On the basis of the 1961 census, Jordanian analysis shows that the rate of population increase was around 31/1000.⁷¹

In the Gaza Strip, Palestinian demography continued to develop along the same lines, with the rate of natural increase in 1954 reported at 26/1000. According to Badran,⁷² two factors in the 1950's contributed to Palestinians' early marriage and thus their rising birth rates. First, their desolate economic conditions made it easy for fathers to accept a small dowry (*mahar*) for their daughters, thus encouraging the men to marry young. Second, the UNRWA gave additional rooms to each newly-wed couple, once again encouraging the youth to marry. But other factors counteracted these effects, for the death rate also increased. Furthermore, as young men continued to spend more time on their education, their sisters also entered secondary schools, consequently decreasing their fertility rates by postponing marriage for a few years.

The development of the Palestinian population in Lebanon is quite impossible to ascertain. To begin with, some Palestinians received Lebanese identity cards; then many left the country and settled in Kuwait and the Gulf area. According to Badran, the rate of natural increase of Palestinians was as follows: 30/1000 from 1951 to 1955; 33/1000 from 1956 to 1960; and 36/1000 from 1961 to 1969.⁷³ It would follow then that at the end of 1955 there were around 152,600 persons; that at the end of 1960 there were around 190,600 persons; and that at the end of 1969 there were around 248,500 persons. If we subtract around 25,000 Palestinians who had supposedly migrated to the Gulf area from this number and add around 16,500 persons who entered Lebanon after the census of 1951 was taken, we will have a number close to 240,000 persons.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Government of Jordan, Department of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1967, p. 2.

⁷¹ For a more precise indication of the constantly decreasing population of the West Bank during the 1948-1967 period, see Basheer K. Nijim, "Spatial Aspects of the Sex Ratio as an Indication of Population Pressure in pre-1967 Jordan," unpublished paper presented at the 1973 meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America.

⁷² Nabil A. Badran, MS, p. 29.

⁷³ Badran, MS, p. 36.

⁷⁴ This figure does not take into account the number of Palestinians who entered Lebanon after June 1967 from Gaza and Jordan.

Badran⁷⁵ reviews the published figures on the number of Palestinians in Syria. There appears to be a discrepancy in the estimates quoted for 1960 that ranged from 112,571 to 126,662. If one takes into consideration that the 1960 estimates were probably inflated to account for considerable emigration and negligent statistical registration, according to Badran, the 1969 figures would therefore be closer to 155,000 rather than the official figure of 174,850.⁷⁶

According to the Kuwait census of 1961, the majority of the Jordanians in Kuwait came from the West Bank or from Amman and Irbid; thus many of them were Palestinians. According to the 1970 census of Kuwait, the number of Palestinians and Jordanians reached a total of 147,696, which represents 47 per cent of the non-Kuwaiti Arab community, and 20 per cent of the total population of Kuwait. It is clear from the Kuwait *Statistical Abstract* that most of these Palestinians have settled in Kuwait, as the female population almost equals that of the men.

5. THE PERIOD SINCE 1967

As their dispersal grows, so too does the complexity in the geography of the Palestinian people. After the 1967 war, an additional 400,000 residents of the West Bank fled from Palestine and there was a corresponding 50,000 reduction in the population of the Gaza Strip. According to Israeli sources, there were 600,000 Arabs in the West Bank and 350,000 in the Gaza Strip in August-September 1967.⁷⁷ Table 12 summarizes the data that is presently available on the dispersal of the Palestinians.

Within the past six years (June 1967-June 1973), the Palestinian population has grown by natural increase to an estimated total of 3,300,000 persons. Between 1,350,000 and 1,400,000 live in occupied territories. Of these, 400,000 are Israeli citizens, while 1,000,000 others have the status of a conquered people. If no changes in the pattern of movements occur, it now appears that the Arab population of Palestine will maintain itself at about 1,400,000 with approximately all the natural increase emigrating.

The Palestinian population of Jordan (East Bank) will probably decrease at about a 2 to 3 per cent rate. The Gulf and Saudi Arabia, which had attracted 200,000 to 250,000 Palestinians by 1970, will probably double their Palestinian population once every three to four years as a consequence of the

⁷⁵ Nabil A. Badran, MS, p. 37.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ Janet Abu Lughod, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

quadrupling of oil revenues over the 1973 period. One would expect to find about one million Palestinians in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia in the early 1980's. Thus, of the total expected population of 4,250,000 in 1980 the remainder (1,250,000) will be localized in Lebanon (500,000) and Syria (250,000) with the balance of 500,000 scattered in 100 nations around the world.

There are considerable variants in the dispersal of the Palestinians. The US and Europe attract more of the skilled and university-educated, while more of the middle-level skilled gravitate towards the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. All in all, the Palestinian community itself — no matter where it is located — is being deprived of its educated youth, its doctors, nurses, teachers and engineers. Although Palestinian manpower and skills have contributed to the development of several Arab states, the Palestinian community is not deriving any of the benefits of its substantial reservoir of manpower. In the face of the growth in oil revenues in the region, and in the absence of vigorous and total development planning, it is most likely that the Palestinians will continue to be divested of their unique and invaluable resources.

Education, 1949-1973

Although considerable changes in the access of Palestinians to all levels of education have been brought about during this period, the situation leaves much to be desired. Secondary school education is still severely limited and access to higher education is low. There are two good studies on Palestinian education which should be cited for reference.

Sabri Jiryis⁷⁸ discusses the education of Arabs in Israel. He discovered that although the number of Arab pupils in Arab elementary schools had increased to 66 per cent in 1963-64, and to 75 per cent in 1970-71, these figures compare poorly with either the UNRWA performance in refugee camp schools, or with Lebanon, where more than 90 per cent of the same age group attends school. The quality of education also leaves much to be desired. There are shortages in qualified teachers, suitable textbooks, programmes and facilities. These factors have also had a damaging effect on Arab secondary education. In the year 1962-63, there were only ten Arab secondary schools with 1,425 pupils, as compared with 132 Jewish schools and 41,425 Jewish pupils. The low level of elementary education resulted in a corresponding decline in the standard of Arab secondary schools. This is exemplified by the

⁷⁸ *The Arabs in Israel*, pp. 146-156. See also his updated Arabic edition with the same title (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1973), pp. 343-364.

58 per cent failure rate in 1963-64, which grew to 66 per cent in 1970-71, of Arab pupils in the secondary school certificate examination.

Table 13 provides information on Arab general secondary school certificate holders. These results underline the difficulties facing Arab youth in Israel; it is in a depressed condition and frequently unemployed. Arab higher education also suffered, with only 171 Arab students (out of a population of more than 250,000) receiving university education in Israeli institutions in 1963-64, compared with 14,000 Jews during the same period. In 1970-71, the number of Arabs enrolled in Israeli universities was 607. It is not surprising that the Arab population is made up disproportionately of labourers and small tradesmen. Uri Lubrani, former adviser on Arab affairs to the Israeli Prime Minister, is reported to have said: "If there were no pupils the situation would be better and more stable. If the Arabs remained hewers of wood it might be easier for us to control them."⁷⁹

TABLE 13
NUMBER OF SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS,
HOLDERS OF GENERAL SECONDARY SCHOOL CERTIFICATE
AND THEIR RELATIVE NUMBERS AMONG ARABS AND JEWS⁸⁰

Year	Total Population		Enrolment of Secondary School Students				Graduates of Matriculation Examinations			
	Jews	Arabs	Jews	Arabs	Number / 1000		Jews	Arabs	Number / 1000	
					Jews	Arabs			Jews	Arabs
1954-55	1,590,519	198,556	14,469	710	91.0	35.8	2,520	38	15.8	1.9
1957-58	1,810,148	221,524	16,728	945	92.4	42.6	2,698	60	14.9	2.7
1960-61	1,932,357	247,134	30,015	1,086	155.3	43.9	3,464	94	17.9	3.8
1963-64	2,239,177	286,385	42,296	1,340	188.9	46.8	7,173	82	32.0	2.9
1966-67	2,383,554	324,582	53,577	1,846	224.8	56.9	10,588	144	44.4	4.4
1968-69 ⁸¹	2,496,438	422,734	59,033	2,961	236.5	70.0	10,347	164	41.4	3.9
1970-71	2,636,600	458,500	58,199	6,933	220.7	151.2	10,693	250	40.6	5.5
Average: 1954-55 to 1970-71	2,126,685	296,599	37,557	1,838	176.6	62.0	6,228	112	29.3	3.8
Total Number of Holders of General Secondary School Certificate from 1954-55 up to 1970-71							105,868	1,903	401.5	41.5

⁷⁹ Quoted by Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 155.

⁸⁰ Table from Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel, 1973* (Arabic), pp. 356-357.

⁸¹ Part of the increase in the number of Arab students and holders of the general secondary certificate among them is due to the fact that the number of Arab students in Arab Jerusalem has been added to the number of Arab students in Israel, for whom there is no specific statistic. Note the higher educational levels attained in Arab Jerusalem as compared to pre-1967 Israel.

TABLE 14
TECHNICAL EDUCATION IN ISRAEL⁸²

Type of School	Number of Schools				Number of Students			
	Arabs		Jews		Arabs		Jews	
	1964/65	1970/71	1964/65	1970/71	1964/65	1970/71	1964/65	1970/71
Apprentices	2	7	121	116	99	226	4,443	4,836
Vocational training	5 ⁸³	19	160	265	215	1,048	25,601	53,847
Agricultural	1	1	36	30	65	393	7,684	7,462
Teacher training	1	1	47	38	118	358	5,048	5,091

In Table 14 a brief description of the state of vocational and technical education is presented. The small number of schools and enrolled Arab students may be noted.

It should be added that Jewish programmes have been developing beyond the strictly technical in line with modern educational trends. It is now well established that, due to the rapid rate of technological change, technicians should be provided with good academic foundations.

Ibrahim Abu Lughod has presented a detailed study of the education of Palestinians outside Israel.⁸⁴ He finds that Palestinians continued to make commendable progress in education mainly because Arab educational institutions were open to them, and also because competitiveness in the Arab labour market promoted the desire for education. The estimates are as follows: out of a total Palestinian population of almost 3,000,000 in 1970, there were about 600,000 students in pre-university education. Of these, UNRWA was educating slightly more than half (310,687) at only the primary and preparatory levels. The rest were being educated by the governments of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with a few in private schools. Abu Lughod remarks that education of the Palestinians was always dependent on UNRWA or the Arab states and never on a Palestinian authority that could further Palestinian culture and national consciousness.

Jiryis and Abu Lughod present a factual picture of the shortcomings and limitations of the present system. Although access to education increased from

⁸² Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1971* (Jerusalem, 1971), pp. 546,548.

⁸³ Vocational 'classes' not schools.

⁸⁴ Ibrahim Abu Lughod, "Educating a Community in Exile," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, II, 3 (Spring 1973), pp. 94-111. Abu Lughod's figures are taken mostly from UNRWA yearbooks, and yearbooks from Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan.

9.2 per cent of the total population in Palestine to 20 per cent today, this figure falls far short of the 40 per cent which should be expected from full enrolment of the school-age group (5-18). Abu Lughod estimates that in 1969 there were about 33,000 Palestinian university students. Assuming a continuation of the same rate of increase, the 1974 figure is of the order of 70,000.

DISCUSSION

It is a notable fact that the Palestinian people, despite their enormous hardships, have shown a steady and positive increase in their numbers. In the following section, we shall review briefly some of the implications of this for:

1. The Arab population of Palestine
2. Urbanization
3. Health and infant mortality
4. Education
5. Economic activity
6. Population and manpower policy objectives

1. *The Arab Population of Palestine*

The Arab population of Jerusalem was 59,900 in 1944, 70,800 in 1956, and 81,600 in 1971, dramatically underlining the failure of the Jordanian government to strengthen and develop an Arab presence in Jerusalem over a period of 19 years. This is to be contrasted with the Jewish effort to colonize the Jerusalem area, where in 1915 the Jewish population was trivially small; by 1948, it had grown to 84,200; it then became 225,700 in 1967 and 252,800 in 1971.

Thus far, then, the demographic battle that worries the Israelis has been solved for them by the massive emigration from the West Bank and Gaza since 1948. If one projects the Arab population of the West Bank in 1952, which was about 750,000,⁸⁵ and that of the Gaza Strip in 1953, which was about 310,000,⁸⁶ at an estimated natural growth rate of 3.3 per cent,⁸⁷ one finds the following:

⁸⁵ Jordan, Department of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook 1953*, pp. 3-4.

⁸⁶ Egypt, Ministry of Defence, Governor General of Gaza, *Official Statistical Bulletin, 1953*, p. 1.

⁸⁷ The most comparable growth rate is that of Jordan (3.5 per cent between 1965 and 1970), so this is a relatively conservative estimate. See the rates given in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's *World Bank Atlas* (New York, 1972).

	1967	1973
West Bank	1,216,000	1,475,000
Gaza Strip	485,000	590,000

The Arab population of Israel was around 325,000 in 1967 and 400,000 in 1972. Thus, if all the Palestinians that were still residing in all areas of Palestine in 1949 had remained there up to 1973, they would have numbered some 2,500,000 or 1,100,000 more than they do at present.

From the near constancy of the population under occupation in Palestine before and after 1967, we deduce that the Israelis have won the first phase of the demographic battle for control of Palestine: they have increased the ratio of Jews to Arabs from 1:2 in pre-1948 Palestine to 2:1 in 1973, a period in which the Arab population has remained at a level similar to that of 1947. Between 1967 and 1973, the Israelis experimented a great deal with the people of the West Bank and Gaza as a cheap source of labour for the Israeli construction sector, for it has been claimed that as many as 70,000 Palestinians worked on Israeli projects in 1971-72. The response to preliminary testing by the Israelis has been positive: the Gaza Strip population is potentially willing to work on Israeli projects, at the same time being susceptible to emigration to the West Bank and to other areas.

TABLE 15

ARAB POPULATION IN PALESTINE

1914	1947 ⁸⁸	1952 ⁸⁹	1967 ⁹⁰	1973 ⁹¹
c. 690,000	1,319,344	1,035,030	1,600,000 1,650,000	1,400,000

It is a common phenomenon of migration that persons who make the move once are prone to emigrate again; thus the increasing mobility of Palestinians in all regions of Palestine will, in the absence of a substantial development programme, increase the susceptibility of Palestinians to leave their country. The Israelis are past masters at manipulating the economic and political factors that induce the movement of Arab farmers away from their land. They

⁸⁸ Janet Abu Lughod, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

⁸⁹ Arif al-Arif, *al-Naqba*, v. 5, pp. 1122-26.

⁹⁰ Janet Abu Lughod, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

⁹¹ Kamel al-Doudeen, Jordan Ministry of Development, *op. cit.*

have achieved this within Israel by granting selective farm produce subsidies to Jewish farmers, at the same time maintaining Arab villages without the basic infra-structure in health services, electricity and water.⁹² The present Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, once also declared his support for the employment of economic methods to depopulate areas of the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967.⁹³

The current objective of Israeli strategy is to effect a steady decrease in the total number of Palestinians in Palestine. This may be achieved by as small an increase in the annual rate of emigration as 30 per cent. The patterns for achieving such large scale emigration and depopulation are now firmly established. One finds that approximately 25 per cent of the 18-44 working age group in Gaza and West Bank have left,⁹⁴ probably leaving their wives and children behind. The next step will be when their families reunite with them wherever they are established, in the US, Brazil, Kuwait or Jordan. This process is already well advanced in Kuwait. Whereas in 1965 the ratio of Palestinian adult male to female was about 2.6:1, it was about 1.3:1 by 1970.⁹⁵ The plans to expand Abu Dhabi from some 150,000 (1974) to 850,000 (1985) will attract substantial numbers of Palestinians. It has been estimated that some 350,000 Palestinians may emigrate to Abu Dhabi by 1985.

It is most probable that if the present population movements and economic conditions remain unchecked the massive outflow of wives and children will begin around 1976 (once the male wage earner is economically established) and will be complete by 1985. Since the average Arab family consists of six to eight others, it is clear that for every working male six to eight others will emigrate out of Palestine.

2. Urbanization

It is striking that in 1944 no Arab urban centre in Palestine had more than 66,000 people. At this level of agglomeration, it is impossible for a poor society, at a sub- \$ 200 per capita income, to develop the various characteristics of an urban society such as colleges, universities, hospitals, and publishing

⁹² See Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, especially pp. 156-163.

⁹³ See *Maariv*, February 16, 1973.

⁹⁴ Government of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population (1967) West Bank of the Jordan, Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai, Golan Heights*, Publication No. 1, Table F, p. xv. The emigration level of males is calculated from the difference in number between males and females.

⁹⁵ Government of Kuwait, Central Statistical Office, *Statistical Abstract, 1970*, p. 25 and 1973, p. 20. Computation of these ratios is based on the statistical information plus the fact that about 50 per cent of Arab population is below 18.

houses. Palestinian society was predominantly rural (66 per cent) and small town (34 per cent) and the events of the 1948-1973 period prevented the creation of a *single* Palestinian *urban* agglomeration. Thus the Palestinians and their overseers, both Jordanians and Egyptians, have failed to develop urban centres. The Ramallah-Bethlehem-Jerusalem, Gaza and Nablus areas could have very easily been developed to become agglomerations with 300,000 to 500,000 people, based on tourism, industry, agriculture, and labour-intensive manufacturing. The 1,100,000 Palestinians who emigrated from Palestine during this period (1950-1973) could have been productively absorbed in these urban centres. Irrespective of the current developments in the region, every effort should be made to develop these three promising urban centres. A Palestinian university with three campuses, in Beir Zeit (Arts and Sciences, and Medical Sciences), in Nablus (Agricultural Sciences) and in Gaza (Engineering Sciences) should be established immediately on the basis of a total enrolment of 9000 students, 80 per cent of them in the pure and applied sciences. A school of agricultural sciences should have an important station in the Jordan Valley to accelerate its development. Four medical complexes as well as capital investment in agriculture and agricultural industries should be made simultaneously. If an appropriate socio-economic environment is created on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, it is most likely that at least 1,000,000 Palestinians from the camps of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon could be restored to the land.

The struggle for Palestine will always depend on the number of Palestinians in Palestine, on their educational attainments, urban organization and technological development.

3. *Health and Infant Mortality*

An examination of the available data on birth rates and infant mortality shows that there is considerable elasticity in the natural growth rates of the Palestinian population. Since Palestinian knowhow in sewage disposal, intestinal diseases and *inexpensive* public health technologies exists today, it could be combined with the available under-utilized manpower and the existing "popular organizations" ("Tanzimaat al-Sha'abiya"), that are presently devoid of *functional* content to reduce the Palestinian mortality rate in little time to 20/1000.

4. *Education*

The educational implications of the demographic situation of the Palestinians may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. The literature on the subject of demography shows very little Palestinian concern. Awareness of a problem is an essential precondition to finding solutions and coping with it.

2. Resistance to the pressures of emigration can be achieved only by imaginative and large-scale development programmes. A lack of awareness and direction has produced large numbers of Palestinian planners and social scientists whose professional activities and intellectual orientation have little or no concern with Palestinian development planning.

3. Palestinian research centres have been in existence for only a short period, but they too have shown little interest in these problems.

Palestinian higher education throughout the past half-century has been divorced from Palestinian realities. As a result, there have been no Palestinian institutions to use the energies of thousands of university graduates to cope with Palestinian problems.

TABLE 16
NATIONAL INCOME AND PER CAPITA NATIONAL INCOME⁹⁶
IN PALESTINE 1936-1945
(Current money values)

	1936	1939	1942	1943	1944	1945
National Income mn. £ P.	34.80	30.24	75.89	90.00	123.04	141.85
National Income mn. US \$ ⁹⁷	172.99	141.31	305.84	362.70	495.85	571.66
Total Population (000) ⁹⁸	1366.70	1502.00	1620.00	1677.00	1739.60	1810.00
National Income per capita US \$	126.60	94.00	188.80	216.30	285.00	315.80

⁹⁶ See United Nations, Statistical Office, *National Income Statistics of Various Countries 1938-48* (New York, 1950). Figures for 1936 taken from L. Greenbaum, *National Income and Outlay in Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1941); 1939-1945: P.J. Loftus, *National Income of Palestine, 1944* (Jerusalem, 1946) and P.J. Loftus, *National Income of Palestine, 1945* (Jerusalem, 1948).

⁹⁷ The Palestinian pound was interchangeable with the sterling and the same exchange rates were used to convert it to US dollars:

1936	497.1	cents / £P.
1939	467.3	cents / £P.
1942-45	403.0	cents / £P.

Taken from United Nations, Statistical Office, *Statistical Yearbook 1948*, 1st Issue (New York, 1949), p. 375.

⁹⁸ *Vital Statistics Tables 1922-1945*, p. 1.

5. *Economic Activity*

The data shown in Table 16 tend to indicate that during the mandatory period the population in Palestine did enjoy a fairly high living standard, with per capita income rising from \$126.6 in 1936 to \$ 315.8 in 1945. Viewed in their historical and regional context, these figures reflect a relatively high degree of prosperity when considered in relation to income levels generally prevailing at the time, and particularly in the Middle East or other underdeveloped regions.

In the absence of adequate data relating to the West Bank and Gaza prior to the 1967 war, per capita income figures for Jordan, as presented in Table 17, may be viewed as a reasonable approximation of the West Bank Palestinians' average income, since the latter accounted for roughly one half of Jordan's total population. Similarly, Jordan's per capita income figures for the post-1967 period may be reasonably assumed to reflect a rough approximation of the West Bank Palestinians' income levels, had the West Bank not been occupied by Israel after the 1967 war.

With the above in mind, two significant observations may be inferred from the data shown in Table 17. First, as a result of the expropriation of their land following the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the Palestinians suffered a marked decline in their living standards. This unquestionable impoverishment of the Palestinian people following 1948 is all the more outrageous when West Bank and Gaza Strip income levels for the 1970's are compared with those of 1945.⁹⁹ In real rather than monetary terms, accounting for the high rates of inflation occurring between 1945 and 1970, there has been a clear decline since 1948.

As for the second observation, it is evident from the data shown in Table 17 that the Israeli claim that Israel's occupation of the West Bank has been beneficial for the Palestinians' standard of living is totally unfounded. On the contrary, the West Bank per capita income of about \$ 260 reached in 1971 was still lower than that of \$ 273 recorded in Jordan in 1970, despite the depressive impact of the amputation of a vital segment of the Jordanian economy, subsequent to Israel's occupation of the West Bank. Such improvement as has taken place in the West Bank since 1967 has merely restored income to the level prevailing in Jordan before 1967, after a disastrous slump caused by the war and the Israeli occupation itself.

⁹⁹ P.J. Loftus, *National Income of Palestine, 1944*, p. 25 has computed a per capita income of \$ 165.1 and \$ 559.5 for the Arab and Jewish populations in Palestine, respectively, for the year 1944.

TABLE 17
PER CAPITA INCOME OF THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION
IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA DISTRICTS, 1963-1971

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Per capita GNP (US\$): ¹⁰⁰									
— Jordan — including West Bank until 1967 ¹⁰¹	207.5	237.5	258.1	256.8	275.6	255.3	289.6	273.7	—
— Gaza ¹⁰²	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Israeli Occupied West Bank GNP (mn. US\$) ¹⁰³						93.1	116.9	140.3	163.1
Israeli Occupied Gaza and North Sinai GNP (mn. US\$)						36.0	43.4	58.6	66.7
Population (000) ¹⁰⁴ :									
— West Bank						584.1	599.6	610.3	625.6
— Gaza and North Sinai						357.8	365.5	372.4	381.8
Per Capita GNP (US \$):									
— Occupied West Bank						159.5	194.9	229.9	260.7
— Occupied Gaza and North Sinai						100.6	118.8	157.4	174.7

¹⁰⁰ Sources: a) United Nations, *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1971*, Vol. I & II (New York, 1973), p. 601; b) United Nations Economic and Social Office in Beirut, *Studies on Selected Development Problems in the Middle East, 1971* (New York, 1971), pp. 111, 112.

¹⁰¹ Per Capita GNP figures refer to all of Jordan, including the West Bank prior to the 1967 war, and excluding the West Bank after Israeli occupation.

¹⁰² Data not available for Gaza prior to Israeli occupation.

¹⁰³ Figures converted from Israeli pounds to U.S. dollars at the rate of £ 3.5/\$1 (1968-70), and £ 4.20/\$1 for the year 1971. Original figures from: Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1972*, Table XXVI/9, p. 656.

¹⁰⁴ Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Quarterly Statistics of the Administered Territories*, vol. III, no. 2 (1973), Table A/1, p. 3.

It is this depressed economic condition that has driven 70,000 Palestinians to work on Israeli projects, and that has stimulated the outflow of able-bodied men and women in search of a livelihood.

6. *Population and Manpower Policy Objectives*

The purpose of this study was to enquire into the present demographic behaviour of the Palestinian people. A considerable amount of detailed field work is still required to develop a more accurate micro-picture. We believe, however, that the broad outlines of the situation are clear. Although it is outside our scope here to enter into discussions of population and manpower policies and objectives, we feel that it is necessary to touch on the subject now mainly because it has not received adequate attention to date.

The Palestine resistance movement conceives of the Palestinian population as a source of manpower and support but not as a major resource which requires considerable management and planning. As mentioned elsewhere, immense improvements in the standards of public health in the camps, villages and cities could be achieved with modest means, thus altering the rate of infant mortality. Most of all, however, the lack of awareness of the development of this population for purposes of politicization, skill development and group activity must be overcome.

Some of the pressing and basic issues that should be examined are:

1. *Natural population growth*: should there be an attempt through education to increase, decrease or stabilize this figure at about 4 per cent annually?

2. *Dispersal*: should the Palestinian population continue its diffusion out of Palestine to the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon?

3. *Agglomeration*: should there continue to be no Palestinian urban centre with all the attributes of a city?

4. *Employment*: should Palestinian *de facto* employment behaviour continue to be service-oriented to non-Palestinian communities? Should there be an organized effort to direct the interest of Palestinians to their own socio-economic problems both within the camps and in Palestine itself?

5. *Level of Education*: should Palestinians be satisfied with the current achievements of barely 50 per cent access to elementary and secondary education? Several advanced countries have not only attained the 99 per cent level, but are approaching 70 per cent access to higher education.

6. *Quality of Education*: should Palestinians continue to accept a fourth-rate education completely defined by others?

7. *Female Emancipation*: should Palestinians continue to segregate, under-utilize and exploit their female population when it is a critically important segment of the manpower pool and the major determinant in child formation?

8. *Manpower Agglomeration*: should Palestinians continue to neglect the development of all the necessary institutional forms (co-operatives, private, public, and mixed) destined to integrate manpower with specific economic activity? It is virtually impossible to generate effective manpower policies unless some organization exists.

Unless the Palestinian people can rapidly and effectively develop their intellectual resources and institutions to chart their future course of action, and until they become aware of their options and the ways and means to attain them, very valuable time and opportunities will be irrevocably lost. A consequence of the lack of concern with their socio-economic well-being resulted in *de facto* actions that were the worst options the Palestinians could have chosen. The events of the past six years have shown that there is sufficient sophistication among the Palestinian people today to enable them to distinguish between their goals, objectives, options, time-phased programmes, national institutions, processes and integrity. But in the meantime, both the rural and semi-feudal quality of Palestinian organizations, together with the very low quality of management expertise, militate against the belated growth, diversification and deepening of Palestinian institutions.