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SETTLEMENT MONITOR

The JPS Editorial Board is happy to announce the addition of a new regular feature in our pages entitled "Settlement Monitor." This covers items—reprinted articles, statistics, and maps—pertaining to Israeli settlement activities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Major documents relating to the settlements will continue to appear in the Documents Section. An agreement with the Foundation for Middle East Peace has given us permission to reprint material from its bimonthly Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories, for which we thank the Foundation's trustees and the publication's editor.

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SETTLEMENTS AND THE DOP

Geoffrey Aronson, "Rabin Will Have to Clarify Settlement Preferences," *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories* (hereinafter *Settlement Report*), January 1994 (excerpts).

In the first round of negotiations with the PLO on the implementation of the Declaration of Principles, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin secured settlements and settlers from any measure of Palestinian control during the interim period. No party to the negotiations, however, and certainly not those who oppose them, is content with the formulae agreed upon by negotiators.

Rabin long ago created a hierarchy of settlements based on ideological and political considerations . . . The Rabin government favors and anticipates annexing to Israel the following settlements as part of a final agreement:

- *The 10 settlements of Jerusalem with a population of 160,000.* Rabin is adamant about the continuing viability of these suburbs under Israeli sovereignty.

- *The settlements of greater Jerusalem, including the Etzion Bloc of settlements south of Bethlehem, Ma'ale Adumim on the road to Jericho, and Givat Ze'ev, west of Ramallah.* The outposts have a population of about 40,000. In 1967, Rabin wanted to expand Jerusalem's boundaries to include much of this area. Labor governments have been responsible for the construction of most of these outposts.

Like areas of East Jerusalem already annexed, this region is within Rabin's vision of future Israeli sovereignty. It is by no means clear that Palestinian negotiators are aware that a tremendous amount of planning by Israeli civilian authorities is now under way for this area. Politically, many of these settlements are inhabited by Israelis with wide-ranging and long-standing ties to the Labor party or its affiliates.

During the interim period, the consolidation of the outposts, including roads and housing construction, will continue, particularly the road from Jerusalem south to Efrat—a key artery that will open up the region to another Israeli suburb of Jerusalem. Rabin can be expected to maintain his low-key efforts to consolidate settlements in East Jerusalem and beyond, efforts that will inevitably distinguish the Jerusalem region from other areas in the West Bank.

- *The 27 Jordan Valley settlements with a population of 5,000 created by Labor in the 1967-77 period.* None is economically viable, mainly because of keen European Community competition with the settlements' exports of winter flowers and vegetables. In the context of peace, the future of these outposts is doubtful. Israel's security border is already the Jordanian frontier with Iraq.

Under the best of circumstances (which certainly no longer prevails) these settlements failed to expand. Furthermore, the settlers in the valley are Labor party stalwarts who, like their Golan counterparts, can be expected to be good soldiers and leave as the price for peace.


During the interim period, however, they will fight to keep their rich agricultural lands in the Jordan Valley, almost all of which were taken from refugees from the 1967 war. Restitution of these lands will be on the Palestinians' diplomatic agenda.

Settlements not favored by Rabin have been defined by him as "political" settlements—outposts founded by the Likud party and, more particularly, those championed by the religious zealots of Gush Emunim [that] go back to Elon Moreh, near Nablus, from 1974 onward. Their success came at [Rabin's] personal and political expense, capped by his resignation as prime minister in 1977. He would not lose any sleep if their outposts "dried up." They number nearly 50, with a total population of less than 20,000, and are located along the central mountains north from Ramallah and a few in or near Hebron.


Alex Fishman, "The Role of Settlements in Israeli Security under the DOP," *Hadashot*, 15 October 1993 (excerpts).*

. . . Security as envisaged by the Israeli army under the conditions of autonomy in the Gaza Strip and Jericho has three aspects. The first is the security of the autonomous areas' borders from outside, from across the Jordan River, from the Egyptian territory into the Gaza Strip, or from Israel. The army intends to isolate the Strip from the Negev by a towering fence system, and to keep the Jordan River crossings and the crossing [between the Strip and Egypt] in Rafah under tight Israeli

* Originally titled "One Step Forward, One Step Backward," this article was translated and reprinted in Israel Shahak's December 1993 *From the Hebrew Press*.



Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace



Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace

controls. Moreover, the Israeli army is to retain its control of the skies above the Strip and the sea, except that it has to be exercised somewhat furtively, so as not to detract from the symbols of Palestinian autonomy and from its delusion of sovereignty over the ships entering the Gaza harbor. The control of border crossings will require no new deployment of troops, because it will be done in the same way as to date.

Jewish settlements are the second aspect, of a different nature. The security classification of the Jewish settlements near Jericho and in the Gaza Strip has already been revised by the army authorities. Most of those settlements have until now been classified as posing low security risks, because they were hardly expected to be attacked. Now they have to be reclassified as posing high security risks and needing appropriate precautions, because the probability of attack becomes high. This is why most troops now deployed in the Gaza Strip need to be redeployed in the Katif Bloc, which will also be surrounded by a military fence and a road for the patrols. Incidentally, the army troops will not be stationed in the settlements themselves, but in bases to be constructed nearby. This was decided in response to the settlers' request.

The third aspect is the necessity to maintain access to new Katif Bloc strongholds. Here begins the problem—the highways. Several new highways will link the Katif Bloc with the Gaza Strip settlements not included in it, namely Kfar Darom, Netzarim,* and the whole bloc of Jewish settlements at the northern tip of the Gaza Strip. Those highways

must be extended so as to ensure a direct link between Israel and the Egyptian border in Rafah. Also needed is a highway to the [Jordan River] crossing which could bypass Jericho. But the problem is not the construction of those highways nor obtaining sufficient budget allocations for them. The problem is: How to ensure that the Israelis can drive safely on those highways for 24 hours a day? This is why joint patrols of the Israeli army troops with the Palestinian police are needed. They need to patrol together those highways and to oversee together the entry points to areas under the autonomy.

Civilian Israeli Settlements in the Gaza Region, 1993

<i>Settlement</i>	<i>Population</i>
Aly Sinai	220
Bedolah	150
Dugit	70
Etzmona	280
Katif	120
Kfar Darom	120
Gadid	210
Gan Or	200
Ganne Tal	330
Morag	80
Neve Degalim	1300
Netzarim	60
Nezer Hazani	350
Nisanit	120
Pe'at Sadeh	80
Rafiah Yam	120
Total	3810

Source: Peace Now

Civilian Israeli Settlements in the Jericho Region, 1993

<i>Settlement</i>	<i>Population</i>
Almog	100
Beit HaArava	40
Kalya	250
Ma'ale Adumim	15,000
Mitzpe Jericho	580
Naama	100
Naaran	70
Vered Jericho	140
Yeitav	N.A.

Source: *Settlement Report*.

* In his report #129 of 26 November 1993, Israel Shahak quotes a *Yediot Aharonot* article of 1 October 1993 by Nahum Barnea describing Netzarim as a "decaying kibbutz now inhabited mostly by Gush Emunin extremists studying the Talmud, for which they have all their expenses covered by the government." According to Barnea, the "original intention" of founding Netzarim "was to wedge a Jewish settlement between Gaza and huge refugee camps located south of it." Barnea cites "a senior in the [Israeli] Security System charged with overseeing arrangements for the Israeli army withdrawal from the concentrations of Palestinian population" as saying that because the Oslo Agreement "stipulates that all settlements are to stay on, every single settlement will turn into a fortress of military value. Had Netzarim been merely an Israeli army base, the Palestinians could demand its abandonment along with other bases located in the midst of the densely inhabited portions . . . But since Netzarim is plainly defined on the map as a kibbutz, the Israeli presence there is assured" and the army can "turn this settlement into a roadpost concealing the fortress containing sizeable Israeli army forces."

Obviously, this is one of the most sensitive issues of the agreement's implementation. The Israeli army wants to cooperate with the Palestinian police as thoroughly as possible

by performing joint operations in every locality, joint patrolling and exchange of intelligence. But in the event this doesn't work, at least in some respects, the army has also prepared contingency plans which do not depend on the Palestinians. If the joint patrols prove to be not to their liking, the army will patrol whatever spots it may consider necessary without them. If they refuse to pursue the wanted in the autonomous areas together with the Israeli army, the latter will pursue them there alone . . .

GREATER JERUSALEM

Geoffrey Aronson, "Israel Builds Greater Jerusalem at the Site of the Eternal City," *Settlement Report*, February 1994 Special Issue

Jerusalem is a city of many, often competing definitions. It is a spiritual center for Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, the "reunified" capital of the State of Israel, and the focus of Palestinian aspirations for political independence.

In the wake of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, West Jerusalem, the portion captured by Israeli forces, was declared the capital of the new state. The Arab sector of the city, East Jerusalem, which included the walled Old City and major religious shrines, was annexed by Jordan. Neither Israel's declaration of West Jerusalem as its capital nor a similar Jordanian declaration on East Jerusalem in 1960 were recognized by the international community. Those views continued to be expressed by the United Nations General Assembly's Partition Resolution (181) of November 1947 calling for Jerusalem's internationalization: "The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. . . ."

Israel's June 1967 conquest of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, created the opportunity to "reunify" East and West Jerusalem under exclusive Israeli control.*

Annexation provided Israel with the opportunity for residential construction for Israelis in the newly acquired Arab sector of the city. During the last quarter century, the pro-

gram has aimed at creating a permanent Israeli presence there; today, 168,000 Israelis

**Population of East Jerusalem
by Neighborhood, 1993.**

Israeli Neighborhoods			
Neve Ya'acov	18,800	Mt. Scopus	2,500
Pisgat Ze'ev	29,000	French Hill	6,500
Ramot	37,200	Ramat Eshkol	6,600
East Talpiaz	15,000	Ma'alot Dafna	4,700
Gilo	30,200	Old City	2,300

Total Israeli Population: 152,800

Palestinian Neighborhoods			
Kufr Aqab	5,200	Old City	25,900
Beit Hanina	16,900	Wade Hilwa	2,400
Sho'fat	11,600	Silwan	6,400
Shoufat Refugee Camp	6,900	Ras al-Amoud	9,600
Al Atsawiya	4,700	Abu Tor/Jebel Mukaber	9,400
Sheikh Jarrah	2,400	Sawhreh Gharbiyeh	8,300
Wade El-Jouz	6,000	Sur Bahir/Im Touba	7,200
Bab al-Zahra	4,100	Beit Safafa/Sharafat	4,600
Mt. of Olives/Shayyah	12,700	Others	6,300

Total Palestinian Population: 150,600

Source: *Hu'Are'tz* (11 August 1993) in *Settlement Report*, February 1994 Special Issue. These figures are the latest showing breakdowns by neighborhood. *Settlement Report* notes that more recent overall estimates are 168,000 for Israelis and 154,000 for Palestinians.

live in ten principal settlement neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, a number approximately equal to the Palestinian population.†

**Population of Jerusalem
(East and West) 1967-93
(Israeli estimates)**


	1967	1980	1993
Israelis	196,400 (74%)	379,000 (72%)	400,000 (72%)
Palestinians	70,000 (26%)	146,000 (28%)	155,000 (28%)
Total Population	266,000	525,000	555,000
Israelis in East Jerusalem	0	120,000	160,000

Source: *Settlement Report*, September 1993.

Although housing construction for Israeli buyers has enjoyed broad political support within Israel, government officials have recently revealed that for twenty years Israel has enforced a strict quota on Palestinian construction in Jerusalem for the purpose of

* The *Settlement Report* noted in its September 1993 issue that the 1967 annexation, which included large portions of the West Bank as well as the Jordanian municipality of Jerusalem, tripled the city's area from 9,500 acres to 27,500 acres.

† Elsewhere in the February 1994 Special Issue, the *Settlement Report* specified that 154,000 Palestinians live in East Jerusalem, but that when Palestinians living in the city without residence permits are included, the figure reaches 180,000.



SOURCE: Foundation for Middle East Peace; *Jerusalem Post*, *Peace Now*.

maintaining the city's percentage of Palestinian residents at around 26 percent. The government's ministerial committee on Jerusalem explicitly adopted this limitation in 1973.

Since 1967, only 12 percent of all new construction in the city has taken place for Palestinians in the Arab sector. During the 1977–1983 period, for example, 90 percent of all construction was for Israelis. The figure translates into annual construction of 2,170 apartments for Israelis and only 230 for Palestinians. Housing construction for Israelis in East Jerusalem has been critical to the overall growth of the city. The 168,000 Israelis who live in this area today comprise a startling 76 percent of the total increase in Jerusalem's Jewish population since 1967. Government restrictions on Palestinian housing construction, and the complementary boom in Israeli construction that has seen more than 40,000 apartment units built in East Jerusalem settlement communities, have ensured that Palestinians today comprise no greater share of the city's population than they did in 1967.

Israeli planning programs envision an additional 46,300 housing units for the entire city, more than 10,000 of which are to be built on the 3,500 acres of Israeli territory added to West Jerusalem in May last year. An additional 17,710 units will be located in East Jerusalem settlement communities. The Arab sector has a capacity of 15,210 additional units for its Palestinian residents.

In contrast to extensive planning and infrastructure preparation for the Israeli sector, plans for Arab housing construction have been curtailed for years. In view of this fact, government planners expect that in coming years the Israeli majority in East Jerusalem will increase at a relatively faster rate than in the past.

During a visit to the United States in October 1993, Minister of Housing Benjamin ben Eliezer announced construction of 13,000 additional housing units, principally in the East Jerusalem neighborhoods of Har Homa, Ramot, Gilo, and Pisgat Ze'ev.

"I refuse to accept the concept of East Jerusalem," explained ben Eliezer. "There is just one Jerusalem. My plans . . . are meant to strengthen Jerusalem and answer its needs. . . . I definitely plan to create the conditions to build about 13,000 units within Jerusalem in the near future."

Palestinians naturally oppose Israel's determined effort to transform the geography and the character of the city.

"These are the blackest of days for Jerusa-

lem," said Khalil Tufakji, a Jerusalem geographer who advises the PLO negotiating team. "In two years it will all be over."

Geoffrey Aronson, "Greater Jerusalem Absorbs West Bank Area," *Settlement Report*, February 1994 Special Issue

The term "Greater Jerusalem" has entered the lexicon of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States acknowledged this when, for the first time, the State Department, in an April 1993 report to Congress, noted that "the [Rabin] Government also has affirmed its intention to continue settlement construction in a 100-square mile surrounding area termed 'Greater Jerusalem.'"

The increasing use of this expression by Israelis, who originated it more than a decade ago, is a testament to the nation's continuing effort to expand Israel's permanent borders well into the West Bank.

As Israel's appetite for territory has grown, so too has the definition of Greater Jerusalem, which now is the address for 70 percent of the total settler population and includes approximately 10 percent of the land area of the West Bank.

In the 1970s, the term was used to describe the boundaries of the city, including newly constructed suburbs—French Hill, Gilo, and Neve Ya'acov, for example—which were built in annexed territory.* Today the term encompasses a far greater expanse of the West Bank.

"The area from Ramallah in the north to Bethlehem in the south, Ma'ale Adumim in the east, and Mevasseret [an Israeli suburb of Jerusalem] in the west is one metropolitan area," explained Moshe Amirav, a former member of the Jerusalem city council.

The Rabin government has not formally defined the territorial reach of greater Jerusalem. Unlike the government's concept of sovereignty over the entire West Bank held by the Likud Party when it was in power, Rabin's Labor-led coalition is establishing settlement priorities that reflect a more limited, but equally determined, vision of Israel's sovereign borders. This narrower concept, together with the countdown to final status negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), has added a sense of urgency to

* The September 1993 issue of *Settlement Report* noted that the Meir Labor government confiscated 4,250 acres in the annexed portion of the city in the early 1970s.

**Population of Settlements in
"Greater" Jerusalem, 1993**

Abir Ya'acov	360
Adam	300
Allon	120
Alon Shevut	1,500
Bet Horon	530
Efrat	3,500
El'azar	280
Givat Ze'ev/Givon	7,100
Giv'on ha Hadasha	600
Hada Betar/Ilit	3,080
Har Adar	1,420
Har Gillo	300
Karmeit Tsur	210
Kedar	180
Kfar Adumim	780
Kfar Etzion	470
Ma'ale Adumim	17,000
Migdal 'Oz	170
Rosh Zurim	280
Tekoa	600
East Jerusalem	168,000
Total Population	206,420

Source: Peace Now in *Settlement Report*, February 1994 Special Issue.

an ambitious and expansive program of de facto annexation in the region between Ramallah, Hebron, and Jericho.

Long-range planning reports completed during the previous Shamir government had already targeted Greater Jerusalem as an area where demographic facts were to be created to protect and secure Israel's permanent hold on Jerusalem.

A *Jerusalem Post* summary of the 1991 "Ordnance Plan for Population Dispersal in Israel," which projected a settler population of 250,000 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by 2010, noted that "a large percentage of Jewish West Bank residents would be living in the 'non-ideological' suburbs of Jerusalem like Ma'ale Adumim [current population 17,000, planned population of 60,000], Pisgat Ze'ev [current population 29,000, planned population 70,000], and Betar [population 1,800]," where, the paper reports, a population of 60,000 by the year 2000 is forecast.

"In two or three years it might be too late to set up a Palestinian state because of the policy of continued settlement building around Jerusalem," warned Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, former head of the Palestinian delegation to the Washington peace talks.

Greater Jerusalem's West Bank region fits the Labor party's criteria for continuing vibrant settlement activity: successful and growing towns supported politically by the vast majority of Israelis as a natural part of Israel. Communities like Ma'ale Adumim, Givat Ze'ev (population 7,100), four miles from Ramallah, and the Etzion Bloc of ten settlements closer to Hebron than to Jerusalem are not viewed by Israelis as "settlements" in the conventional meaning of the term. Rather they are accepted as "normal" communities no different than similar communities within Israel's borders.

The settlement priorities of the Rabin government, which are allocating a greater percentage of development resources to this area than did Likud, will result in enlarging the importance of Greater Jerusalem relative to other West Bank settlement areas.

"No one worries especially about the peace process," noted a newspaper portrait of the Efrat settlement, southwest of Bethlehem. "No one—in the Etzion Bloc and even more in the government—believes that this area will be returned."

"I don't believe that we will return the [Etzion] Bloc. The fact is that this [Rabin] government encourages settlement here," observed Rabbi Riskin, one of the founders of the greater Jerusalem settlement of Efrat.

Geoffrey Aronson, "Rabin Builds on the Vision of a Permanent Jewish City," *Settlement Report*, February 1994 Special Issue


"Greater Jerusalem" is a political rather than a geographic concept—rooted in Israel's vision of a metropolitan Jerusalem extending well into the city's West Bank environs, beyond even those areas annexed in June 1967.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin has a long-standing interest in this view. As chief of staff in June 1967, he advised his country's government to annex a larger portion of the West Bank for Jerusalem than was decided by his political superiors.

"I proposed to Prime Minister [Levi] Eshkol and to Defense Minister [Moshe] Dayan to apply Israeli law to a much larger area," Rabin said recently. "If my proposal had been accepted, today there would be no Jerusalem problem. Eshkol and Dayan said they did not want to swallow too many Arabs."

Rabin's policy of consolidating the successful West Bank settlement communities is particularly apparent in the area of greater Jerusalem. Rabin has declared this region to be

beyond political debate, and new large-scale construction continues unabated.



Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace

"Jerusalem and outlying areas cannot be defined by us as a political issue or as a security issue," Rabin declared soon after taking office in 1992. "United Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty will remain our capital forever. For us it is the heart and the soul of the Jewish people."

The Rabin government exempted from financing and building cutbacks major construction projects in East Jerusalem where thousands of units are currently being built.

The Jerusalem settlements supported by the Labor Party include suburbs like Gilo and Pisgat Ze'ev, where 70,000 residents are projected—the large housing developments built in annexed portions of the city that now house one-third of Jerusalem's Jewish population.

But the Labor government opposes, and has canceled, four small path-breaking projects begun by the Likud for the construction of Jewish enclaves within Arab areas. It has also discontinued all covert and overt government funding of the purchase of properties

in such areas of East Jerusalem, notably the Old City's Muslim Quarter.

The government has instead set its sights on consolidating Israel's demographic grip on East Jerusalem by expanding existing housing developments and beginning large-scale construction in these new settlement communities: Har Homa, along Jerusalem's southern perimeter where construction for 4,500 units will soon commence; Rekhes Shoufat, opposite Neve Ya'acov, where 2,200 units are planned; and Ras Omar, southeast of Pisgat Ze'ev, which will create a continuous swath of Israeli housing between the city and the nearby West Bank settlement of Ma'ale Adumim.

Housing Minister Benjamin ben Eliezer has also confirmed that "there are no limitations on building" in the area of greater Jerusalem. "We have not touched and we have no intention of touching the area of Ma'ale Adumim, Efrat, Betar, and Ma'ale Efriam. Construction there continues as planned," he said.

To Jerusalem's east, the government is moving forward with plans to tie the Adumim bloc of settlements, anchored by Ma'ale Adumim—the largest West Bank outpost—to Jerusalem, four miles away. The purpose of this effort is to consolidate the existing "territorial continuity running from [the settlement of] Vered Jericho overlooking Jericho through Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem, an achievement which Israel will present to Palestinian negotiators as a geographic fact," according to Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Gur.

During an October visit to Ma'ale Adumim, Gur declared that "Ma'ale Adumim is part of Jerusalem" and, according to the Jerusalem weekly newspaper, *Kol Ha'Ir*, he promised that the extensive construction under way in the city will continue and even increase.

As a demonstration of the government's commitment to the permanent retention of the West Bank area between Jerusalem and the Etzion bloc of settlements, Rabin approved completion of the \$42 million Gilo-Etzion Bloc road linking the settlements south of Bethlehem with Jerusalem.

Ben Eliezer recently presided at the inauguration of a new neighborhood in the settlement of Efrat, south of Bethlehem. "The government regards the Etzion Bloc as an integral part of Jerusalem's defensive perimeter," he announced. The highway, he added, "is of prime security importance."

Continuing Labor's efforts to rationalize its settlement policies as dictated by security considerations, Gur has noted that "past experi-

ence has proven that in order to defend Jerusalem one must have a strip of defense surrounding it in the north, south, east and west."

In December, Rabin approved the creation of "municipal continuity" between Jerusalem and the West Bank settlements of Givat Ze'ev and Ma'ale Adumim, principally through the construction of new roads, tunnels, and bridges.

At Givat Ze'ev—close to Ramallah—the town's southern border has been extended south toward Jerusalem by the annexation of hundreds of acres of West Bank land near the Palestinian town of Bet Ikksa. The addition of these lands to Givat Ze'ev, where 2,200 apartments are under construction, is intended to create "territorial continuity" between the settlement and Jerusalem.

THE LOAN GUARANTEES

[On 5 October, the Clinton administration recommended that \$437 million be deducted from the \$2 billion in U.S. loan guarantees to Israel for FY 1994 as the dollar-for-dollar penalty for Israeli spending on settlements in the occupied territories. Ya'ir Fidel's article provides a detained analysis of how the penalty was arrived at, as well as an account of the meeting between Prime Minister Rabin and President Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine, where the deal was struck. It is interesting to compare Assistant Secretary of State Djerjian's testimony on the penalty, which was provided by the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Security.]

Edward Djerjian, Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, 21 October 1993.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON. OK. Let me just take up one final point. Congress was notified of the Presidential determination to deduct \$437 million in loan guaranty authority from the amounts authorized by Congress for fiscal years 1994 and 1995 with respect to Israel.

What does that figure represent? Where does that figure come from?

MR. DJEREJIAN. Which figure was that specifically?

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON. The \$437 million in loan guaranty that we had said would be deducted from the amounts authorized.

MR. DJEREJIAN. Yes, that figure basically comes from our own independent assessment of the amount of construction activity that was

done for nonsecurity purposes.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON. That is the amount of all nonsecurity related Israeli Government expenditures outside the 67 borders of Israel; is that correct?

MR. DJEREJIAN. That is correct. What we have is that it states, sir, that the amount authorized shall be reduced by an amount equal to the amount estimated to have been extended by the Government of Israel during the previous year for activities which the President determines are inconsistent with the objectives of this section or understandings reached between the U.S. Government and the Government of Israel regarding the implementation of the loan program.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON. Did we—

MR. DJEREJIAN. The amount deducted reflects information provided to us by the Government of Israel and our own independent analysis. It reflects Israeli Government non-security related expenditures in areas not under Israel control prior to June 5, 1967 pursuant to understandings reached by the previous administration with the Israeli Government.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON. Now, what portion of that \$437 million represents Israeli expenditures in East Jerusalem? Can you identify that?

MR. DJEREJIAN. I can't identify that specifically.

CHAIRMAN HAMILTON. Was there any allowance made for natural growth of existing settlements?

MR. DJEREJIAN. Everything was taken into account in coming to this conclusion. And I think it is interesting to note that the American figures and the Israeli figures were very close.

Ya'ir Fidel, "The Loan Guarantees and Government Settlement Funding," *Hadashot*, 29 October 1993.*

August 1992, the summer house of George Bush in Maine. Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's new Prime Minister, arrives for the first meeting with the U.S. President. Bush was then in the midst of the White House election campaign and Rabin wanted him to release the loan guarantees, ten billion dollars, which the Bush Administration had frozen several months earlier because of the Shamir government's investments in the settlements in the territo-

* Originally titled "Why is Uri Ariel Polite?," this article was translated and reprinted in Israel Shahak's December 1993 *From The Hebrew Press*

ries. Following the usual salutations at meetings of that sort, the two leaders addressed the issue which concerned them.

One of the Prime Minister's inner circle reconstructed the meeting from memory as follows: "Immediately on reaching the subject of the guarantees Bush raised the issue of the settlements and of the immense sums of money that Likud government spent on them. He wanted to know what Rabin intended to do. Rabin laid the cards on the table. 'Mr. President,' he said, 'I can put a stop to the planned construction of some 7,000 housing units in the West Bank at once, but I cannot stop the construction of another 10,000 housing units which are already in various stages of construction. That will cost me a lot of money.'

Bush: 'And what about private construction? Not only government-financed construction is going on there.'

Rabin: 'I cannot stop the private construction. If private people construct, I have nothing to do with that.'¹

Bush: 'But so much money is being transferred there, what about that?'

Rabin: 'I have no intention whatsoever to starve the settlements in the territories. We will continue to supply them with education, health, religion and whatever they need. What I am willing to guarantee is that we will not expand the settlements beyond those which already exist.'

Bush: 'And what will happen if currently there are five classes of children in an elementary school and in two years' time they will advance to a high school and you have to build high school class rooms? Are you calling this an expansion beyond what already exists, or not?'

Rabin: 'I mean that I will not expand the settlements beyond the natural growth of the settlers already living there today.² I will build high school classes.'

Bush: 'Then I will take that sum out of the total of loan guarantees. According to the agreement I have with the Israeli government dating from the Likud administration, we will

cut from the loan guarantees everything that Israel invests in the territories.'

Rabin: 'If you take off just what we transfer to there, we agree.'"

That is how Yitzhak Rabin orally confirmed the written agreement concluded by Yitzhak Shamir, stating that the U.S. would cut from the loan guarantees the moneys which Israel invests in the territories. From that conversation Bush also learned that Rabin intended to continue pouring a lot of money into the settlements. Bush, however, did not demand that Israel should cease doing so, but only stressed that such moneys would be cut from the loan guarantees. . . .

Data gathered in ministries during the preparation of this article show that the Rabin government has only slightly reduced the enormous budgets which previously were pouring into the settlements and it is far from starving them. Declarations are one thing and reality is quite another. The change in priorities, which Rabin declared upon establishing his government, did not affect at all the size of settlers' expenses. The settlements in the territories continue to thrive and prosper through state budgets. The cuts that the government made concerned only the infrastructure of unfinished projects: the number of construction beginnings was reduced, the investment in new industrial factories was cut, government aid to existing factories wanting to expand was reduced, but not abolished, and the rate of paving new roads decreased.

All that did not prevent the settlers from using their resources for transportation of demonstrators against the government's policy. Thousands of them, not only the settlers themselves, reached [anti-government demonstrations] using buses and other cars belonging to regional councils in the territories, purchased with government funds. A source within the government, who wanted to remain anonymous, estimates that the government financed the demonstration against itself to the tune of over half a million shekels. The government knows it, and so do the settlers. It is perhaps because of this that the settlers are³ maintaining a low profile in their protests against the agreement with the PLO. This estimate, that the settlers are quiet in order not to harm the flow of funds from the treasury, may be supported by the activity of

1. This is a deception. Every house in the territories needs a permit for its construction. The Palestinians are being systemically denied such permits, while every Jew can get a permit to construct (as he cannot in Israel) for whatever purpose and reason.

2. This is again a deception. Rabin has encouraged further settling in the areas designated by him as "security settlements." They include the so called "Great Jerusalem," extending over 15-20% of the entire West Bank area, the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, Katif Bloc and much else.

3. He means in the absence of killing of a settler. After such a killing their demonstrations are indeed most violent, since the government allows them "to relieve their feelings." But without this excuse their behavior has been, indeed, relatively quiet.

two committees recently established by the government. Those committees may deeply affect the settlers' mood, no less and perhaps even more than the committees meeting at Taba and Cairo.

The discussions of two committees, held in government offices in Jerusalem, do not attract the attention of the Israeli and foreign media, and even the identity of their participants is known only to few. Heading one of the committees is Yehezkel Harmeleh, a former Likud mayor of Rehovot, a crony of Yitzhak Moda'i [the former finance minister]. His committee is supposed to determine at what rate the Sheves Committee resolutions [which formally decided half a year ago to cut the settlers' special benefits] are to be implemented, at what rate the faucet pouring funds and benefits into the settlements is to be shut off.

It turned out, however, that during the past year the government granted the settlers new tax deductions to the tune of 25 million dollars. Since the Likud government defined the settlements as grade AA development areas, they receive huge tax benefits. The Sheves Committee brought most of the settlements down from their lofty definition. A speedy implementation of its resolutions will directly hit the pocket of every settler. Simple arithmetic shows that if those recommendations [were ever] implemented, the average settler family would lose \$1,000 annually since the family would have to pay taxes equivalent to what an average Israeli family pays.

The Su'ari Committee is supposed to determine uniform criteria according to which municipal authorities will be aided by the government. In the past year the government transferred over \$85 million to the settlers' local councils in the territories. The Interior Ministry transferred about \$60 million, mainly for paying the salaries of the councils' employees. For comparison, the Interior Ministry transfers about \$500 million per year to all local councils and municipalities in Israel. This means that the settlers, although constituting only 2.4 percent of the Israeli population, receive 12 percent of the municipal budgets. The consequence of the large budgets of the local councils in the territories is that almost half of the settlers are civil servants, receiving salaries from the government either directly or via the local councils. According to a rough estimate prepared by government ministries [but not published], about 45 percent of the Jews living in the territories are employed in the public sector. In Israel, according to the data of the Central Bureau of

Statistics, the percentage of public sector employees is only 25 percent. However, there are many populous settlements where the percentage of civil servants is similar to that inside Israel. Those are, for example, all the towns and other settlements situated near Jerusalem, or the towns and settlements located along the Green Line. Most of the inhabitants in such locations work inside Israel at regular jobs and their social profile is similar to other Israeli Jews. Therefore, in the hard-core ideological settlements of Gush Emunim, the percentage of civil servants earning their livelihood directly from the state must be much higher.⁴ If the Su'ari Committee ever fixes clear and precise standards for funding of local authorities by the government, for example, according to the number of residents, socio-economic conditions, etc., the axe of budget cuts will be raised over the hard-core settlers and many of them will be left unemployed.

But the Su'ari and Harmeleh Committees are tools of the government, working according to its instructions. It seems that if the settlers behave as the government wants them to behave, both committees may yet deliberate for an indefinite time. If the settlers misbehave and the government really gets angry with them, it will change the pace of the committees' work and start turning off the faucets. That is how the Rabin government succeeded in maneuvering the settlers into a position in which, prior to each statement or demonstration, they must decide—ideology or bread.

In the meantime the settlers are attempting to kill two birds with one stone. In a position paper which they have recently formulated on security in the autonomous areas, they demanded that the government would raise again all the settlements to the category of the most preferred development areas, and that this would operate in the formulation of all government budgets. Security for them means also huge tax benefits.

It is difficult to compare exactly the funds which the settlers receive from the Rabin government to those they got from the Shamir government. Under Shamir the funds were channeled through the ministries in all kinds

4. Some quasi-official estimates spoke about 70%. In my view, if one adds those employed in all kinds of religious institutions (which are also financed by the State of Israel) to the civil servants proper, one would arrive at a figure of 90-95%. Those who disbelieve this statement should take a walk in Kiryat Arba and compare the number and size of businesses there with the size of the town and the number of its inhabitants.

of ways. Moreover, the Shamir government prevented any attempt to calculate the total amount of these moneys. The current government was, however, forced by Bush to prepare a detailed list of all expenses in the settlements, in order to submit it to the Americans and obtain the loan guarantees from the U.S. government.

Many background conversations with sources inside the government were held in connection with the publication of this article, but not one of the senior government spokespersons, at the level defined as political-economic, would agree to be quoted by name on this subject. According to the latter, the funding of the settlements has greatly declined since Rabin became prime minister. The obvious fact [that] the huge sums are still being given to the settlers is being explained as solely because the government is forced to honor the obligations made by the Likud, mainly in house construction. "Within one year," they say, "when the construction begun in Sharon's era is completed, there will be a drastic decline of investments in the territories." According to them, the changes made by the Sheves Committee in dividing the entire country [Israel and the territories] into different development areas will reduce the flow of money to the settlers.

It is therefore interesting to examine how, and on the basis of what data, the U.S. administration cut the amounts Israel invested beyond the Green Line from the loan guarantees. After the meeting between Bush and Rabin in Maine, in the course of which Rabin heard of Bush's intention to carry out such cuts, additional meetings were held between Israeli representatives and those of the U.S., Dennis Ross and Edward Djerejian, discussing the details—which investments, budgets and other benefits would be taken into account for the purpose of making the cuts.

Afterward, a low-ranking American team visited Israel, the members of which met twice with the heads of the Finance Ministry, Aharon Fogel and David Brodet, and with the prime minister's financial advisor, Ilan Plato. They came to determine the method of calculation, what would be included and what would not, which period would be accounted for and who would prepare the calculations. The bottom line was that, from the calculation of Israel's investments in the territories, would be deducted all the funds that Israel would have spent even if there was not one Israeli settler there. For example, the budgets of the local councils would be taken into account as well as the salaries of the council employees, but the salaries of the teachers, which Israel

would have had to pay anyway, because the settlers' children would have received education even if they lived within the Green Line, would not be taken into account. The construction of classrooms, and the construction of houses in general, would be taken into account. Child allocations paid to Jewish residents of the territories would not be included. All the security expenses would not be included.

The result was a sort of crossbreed, defined by a senior official in Jerusalem as "investments due to the territory." The period of accounting was determined, as agreed upon between Bush and Rabin, as from beginning of October 1992 to the end of September 1993 [corresponding to the U.S. federal fiscal year]. It was also decided that the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics would carry out all the calculations and that there would be absolutely no American intervention in them. This decision made it clear that the Americans were granting Rabin a significant discount. First of all, they let it prepare alone all the data. Second, they accepted the Israeli position that not all of the money Israel spent in the territories should be taken into account and that, in effect, it would be Israel which would divide the funds into the two categories. Even more significant was the Americans' silent agreement to leave open the question of Israel's investments in the parts of Jerusalem annexed in 1967. At the second meeting the Americans were presented with the sum reached by the Israeli calculators: \$430 million. The Americans did not attempt to argue. In contrast to their previous behavior under Bush, they did not produce satellite photographs in order to compare them with the figures on construction in the territories which they were given. They received explanations about the various parts of the data, according to ministries and subjects, said "yes," took the papers and returned home. But it turns out that the figure which the Americans received was lower by \$270 million than the figure calculated by the [Israeli] Finance Ministry when the latter did not yet know that the Americans would agree to ignore Israel's investments in East Jerusalem. At that time the Finance Ministry arrived at the sum of \$700 million per year invested by Israel beyond the Green Line. That calculation was carried out according to the same criteria as used by the Central Bureau of Statistics.

The American bomb fell about three weeks ago. Washington announced that it was cutting \$437 million, seven million more than reported by Israel. The Americans defined the addition as accounting for Israel's

investments in East Jerusalem.⁵ Despite the surprise, Israel remained silent. The government ministers knew that the Americans had been extremely lenient with Israel and had cut only \$7 million from the guarantees instead of the \$270 million Israel says that it actually invested in East Jerusalem. There was an attempt on the part of some Likud MKs, mainly Dan Tichon, to create an uproar. The government has rapidly silenced them, evidently after explaining the secret to them. A senior Israeli official explained that, by such a symbolic cut, the Americans managed to kill two birds with one stone. They clearly signaled to the Israeli government that it can construct in East Jerusalem without incurring any financial penalties, while granting the Palestinians what they like so much, namely symbols, by explicitly stating that East Jerusalem was considered occupied territory.

But the Americans still managed to harm the Israeli government by their insistence on deducting the sum from the guarantees, and the suddenness with which they decided to announce it. "In a proper relationship such as we have with the Americans you don't do such things," said a very senior Israeli official who is fond of the loan guarantees. "They did not discuss it with us at all. They took our figures, did not argue, and suddenly they toss that new figure into the air without notifying us. In addition, previously they told us that the settlements were an obstacle to peace and therefore they would cut the funds, but now that argument is obsolete. Now we are making a peace and having the settlements too, but, nevertheless, they made the cuts. We are taking the risks on the road to peace and therefore they should have been considerate and not cut any money."

Another senior official, very close to Yitzhak Rabin, who is not fond of the loan guarantees, said: "I do not care about the cut. Let them cut even more, since they give us so much. But they should grant us funds to cover the heavy expenses of withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho and for the new military redeployment. We have to pay back the guarantees in any case, so that perhaps the less there are the better. For this reason, we should receive grants. Besides, Christopher has already told us that all cuts for the settlements might be canceled altogether." According to him, Israel is soon going to request the U.S. for grants to finance the Israeli redeployment of troops. Until the grants arrive,

Israel continues to calculate the expenditures in the territories. And in the meantime there has not yet been a clear answer to the question: Has Israel really reduced its investments in the territories? When asked about this, the officials tend to note the fact that out of the \$430 million invested in the settlements, over half was invested in construction. According to calculations, in its first year in power, the Labor-Meretz government paid about \$250 million for construction in the settlements. Most of that sum was indeed spent on fulfilling the obligation of the former housing minister, Ariel Sharon, by purchasing empty apartments from contractors. But included in those budgets are also many new construction starts, housing assistance, local loans, mortgages on most comfortable terms, etc. The identity of the minister has changed, from Sharon to Binyamin Ben-Eliezer [Fud]. He continues to favor the settlers.

The identity of the Interior Minister has not changed. Under the Shamir government the Interior Ministry was in the hands of Ariyeh Der'i and it remained in his hands during the first year of Rabin government. He simply continued doing what he did before and perhaps that is not surprising. The Ministry of Religion transferred some millions of dollars, the Industry and Trade Ministry transferred \$30 million as support and incentive. Tsur, the agriculture minister and long-time political hawk, supports agricultural and rural construction in the settlements to the tune of \$22 million dollars per year. No one raises his eyebrows. But who would believe that an extreme dove, the Tourism Minister Uzi Bar'am, transferred \$1.5 million for developing tourism in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. And Shulamit Aloni did so as well. A paltry sum of \$5 million for building new classrooms. Ya'ir Tsaban, Immigration Minister, spent in the settlements several million dollars to aid immigrants from Russia and Ethiopia who settled there. In short, every minister helps.

From the time of the Bush-Rabin meeting in August 1992, there have been many changes in the Middle East. In the U.S.A. Bill Clinton has replaced Bush in the White House. Israel has signed an agreement with the PLO and soon the Israeli army is to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho, but there has been no change at all in the funds flowing to the settlements. There is even the possibility that in the coming year there will be an increase in the funds funneled to enhance the settlers' living standards in order to bribe them to keep quiet. The budget proposal of the Agriculture Ministry for 1994, for

5. The Israeli investment in East Jerusalem is much greater!

example, includes the following sums under the title of "New Settlement": Jordan Valley, 20 million shekels; West Bank and Gush Etzion, 22.5 million; the Golan Heights, 15 million; Katif Bloc, 15 million. In conclusion, Rabin may be predicted to continue to refrain from cutting settlement subsidies. And the Americans? They will continue to understand him.

SETTLEMENT BRIEFS

Jewish Immigration into Israel 1993, *Jerusalem Post International Edition*, 8 January 1994

Some 77,000 immigrants arrived in Israel in 1993, about 8,000 from North and South America and other Western countries, Jewish Agency chairman Simcha Dinitz said last week. The number from the CIS was approximately 65,000—about the same as arrived in 1993—and another 1,000 came from other eastern European countries, he said.

Palestine Human Rights Information Center (PHRIC), Occupation Indicators since the DOP, 24 January 1994

[Four organizations connected to the Arab Studies

Society of Jerusalem—the PHRIC, the Land Research Committee, and the Palestine Geographic Research and Information Center—together with the Society of St. Yves (a Catholic legal resources center) issued a joint statement on 24 January listing Israeli actions relating to settlement activity since the signing of the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993. Documentation for all the categories was provided, but due to space constraints we are reproducing only those relating to land confiscations.]

- Over 46,000 dunums of West Bank land expropriated from September 13 through the end of 1993, mostly along the Green Line and around Jerusalem;
- Direct expansion of settlements on 1,025 dunums, entailing the uprooting of 5,540 fruit trees;
- The initiation of eight new nature reserves projects in the West Bank;
- Construction on eight new roads connecting settlements;
- The establishment of two settlement investment projects, on 5,520 dunums of land in the Hebron region;
- The forced eviction of 46 extended families from the affected land, in addition to 63 other house demolitions.

West Bank Land Confiscation 13 September - 31 December 1993

The table shows the area and location of land confiscated by the occupation authorities after the signing of the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles.

13 September 1993 - 31 December 1993

Date	District	Location	Dunums	Type of confiscation				Settlement seizure	Military seizure	Establishing public projects	Notes
				Declared closure	Confiscation decision						
					State Land	Military Use	Objections committee				
12/9/1993	Hebron	Dura, Tarqoumia, Beit Ola	4526	—	—	—	—	—	—	4526	Establishing a stone mill for settlers
15/9/1993	Bethlehem	el-Khader	199	—	—	—	—	119	—	—	Expansion of Daniel settlement
22/9/1993	Nablus	Awarta	105	105	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
26/9/1993	Tulkarm	Hares	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	Widening road going through Sarta, Bidya, and Azoun land
9/1993	Ramallah	Bier Liqya	2000	2000	—	—	—	—	—	—	No-man's land expropriated by Israel from one side
12/10/1993	Ramallah	Hizam	21	21	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
16/10/1993	Tulkarm	Hares	4.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.5	Widening main road (Trans-Samaria Highway)
16/10/1993	Bethlehem	Jab'a	683	—	—	—	—	683	—	—	Expansion of Beit Ein settlement
30/10/1993	Jerusalem	Jerusalem	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	For a parking lot
10/1993	Hebron	Yatta	200	—	—	—	—	200	—	—	For a garbage dump
1/11/1993	Nablus	Naqoura	300	—	—	—	—	300	—	—	Expansion of Shavei Shomron settlement
4/11/1993	Ramallah	Shuqba, Deir Ballout, Abboud, Lubban, Rabutis, Bodras	16300	—	16300	—	—	—	—	—	—
4/11/1993	Tulkarm	Zawiya, Rafat	16300	—	16300	—	—	—	—	—	—

Date	District	Location	Dunums	Type of confiscation				Settlement seizure	Military seizure	Establishing public projects	Notes
				Declared closure	Confiscation decision						
				State Land	Military Use	Objections committee	High Court				
5/11/1993	Ramallah	Dura el-Qare'	15	—	—	—	—	15	—	—	Expansion of Bel El settlement
10/11/1993	Nabulus	Deir Sharaf	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	16	Road made around Shavei Shomron settlement
13/11/1993	Hebron	Hebron	1.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.5	Road made to join Hanina settlement
15/11/1993	Tulkarm	Hares	25	—	—	—	—	—	—	25	Widening junction to Yakir settlement
11/1993	Ramallah	Bir Nabala, Jib, Beit Hanina, Nabi Samuil	3500	—	—	—	—	—	—	3500	For a national park
1/12/1993	Nabulus	Qaryout	65	—	—	—	—	65	—	—	Expansion of Shilo settlement
1/12/1993	Nabulus	Qaryout	143	—	—	—	—	143	—	—	Expansion of Eli settlement
2/12/1993	Ramallah	Dura, el-Qare'	4	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	Expansion of Bet El settlement
2/12/1993	Bethlehem	Irras	6	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	Expansion of Aloa Shvut settlement
12/12/1993	Qalqiya	Azzoun, al-Itma	20	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	Expansion of Oramit settlement
19/12/1993	Qalqiya	Jinsafur	1230	—	—	—	—	1230	—	—	Expansion of Khaveli Shomson settlement
28/12/1993	Bethlehem	Wadi Fouqin	18	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	Road made to protect Hadar Betar and Hadar Elit settlements
12/1993	Jerusalem	Anata	430	—	—	—	—	430	—	—	For water tank to supply Annior settlement
12/1993	Ramallah	Turnus Ayya	139	—	—	—	—	139	—	—	Expansion of Shilo settlement
TOTAL			46083	2126	32500	—	—	3354	—	8103	

Source: Field work, Land Research Committee, Arab Studies Society, Jerusalem, January 1994.