

Further Issues for Clarification by the Defense Minister
(Apparently listed by the Kahan Commission's Staff)

8 October 1982

1. Did the Defense Minister discuss with the Prime Minister (via telephone or some meeting) and inform him about the intention to insert the Phalanges into the camps?

Was the authorization of the Prime Minister for this (operation) requested? Was the Prime Minister's authorization a conditional or limited one? Specifically, the reference is to a conversation or conversations which were held (if at all) between midnight of the 14 to 15 September till the deliverance of a report to the Cabinet meeting of 16 September 1982.

2. Precise reenaction of the conversations held by the Defense Minister on Friday evening (September 17, 1982) with: the C-o-S, the officer on duty at the situation room, Ron Ben-Yishai (from Israel Radio). Determination of the precise timing of each conversation.

3. Was the Foreign Minister aware of the introduction of the Phalanges into the camps when he met the Defense Minister in Dov Airport (near Tel Aviv) on 15 September 1982 at 16:00 (4:00 PM). Did the two talk about this issue?

4. On 16 September 1982, the Defense Minister toured the North (of Israel)--did he discuss the introduction of the Phalange into the camps (aside from the operational discussion held in his bureau the same morning).

5. Which conversations were held by the Defense Minister with the Prime Minister, the C-o-S and Gen. Drori pertaining to "Iron Brain"--from the start of operation "Iron Brain". (Arrange a detailed record of the discussions and their timings).

6. The talk between the Defense Minister and Avi Duda'i on 17 September 1982 regarding the lack of reporting about the situation in West Beirut.

7. Reconstruction of the DM's talk with the C-o-S, Chief of IDF Intelligence (Aman) and Chief of the Personnel Branch at Dov Airport on 17 September 1982 at 11:00 AM. Was West Beirut discussed in that instance?

8. The discussion held by the Defense Minister with Aman's Chief, Chief of Mosad, the C-o-S and the Director General of the Foreign Ministry, on 18 September 1982.

December 1982

December 8, 1982. The negotiations between Israel and Lebanon are frozen. An American source in Tel Aviv is responsible for the delay.

Shultz to Begin (in a letter): We hope that you will not allow this golden opportunity to pass.

Begin to Shultz: Israel has already compromised on the question of a peace treaty. We cannot allow the Lebanese to boycott Jerusalem as the site for the negotiations.

December 16, 1982. A breakthrough in Beirut.

Direct negotiations in Beirut between Israel and Lebanon led to a breakthrough which would guarantee Israel's interests in Lebanon. The Americans knew about the negotiations but were not familiar with its details.

Shamir is in Uruguay on the verge of a heart attack because of the leak. However, the leak did not destroy everything (the agreement).

President Reagan: If Israel does not withdraw it would become an occupier, therefore, this is the time to act.

Sharon: The US committed a mistake when it combined the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon and an agreement regarding Judea and Samaria.

The Background (Sharon's)

1. Hatred toward the Americans--"I hate them."
2. The desire to reach an agreement immediately.
3. The background: public opinion and the Kahan Commission.

Sharon's moves were done without the knowledge of other governmental agencies. Only Begin and Shamir knew about them. (The Mosad was happy to cooperate because of their hatred of David Kimche.)

A Chronology of meetings between senior Israeli officials with the Phalange concerning military cooperation.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Relevant Subjects for Discussion</u>	<u>Participants</u>
1. 13 Jan. 1982	Examination of the possibility of deployment of Christian forces in Beirut, parallel to the IDF's actions up to the Zaharani river.	Sharon, Deputy Chief of Staff General Tamir, Pierre, Bashir, Pres. Chamoun
2. 9 June 1982	A plan to conquer West Beirut by 2000 Lebanese army soldiers.	Representative of Mosad, Bashir
3. 11 June 1982	A meeting with head of the Tanatum (?) organization concerning the ability of the Lebanese Forces to enter West Beirut.	Head of Tanatum, Rep. of Mosad
4. 15-16 June 1982	Idea was raised that the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese Forces enter West Beirut.	Bashir, Rep. of Mosad
5. 16 June 1982	Entrance of Lebanese Army together with Bashir's forces into West Beirut.	Johnny Abdu, Bashir Chief of Staff

<u>Date</u>	<u>Relevant Subjects for Discussion</u>	<u>Participants</u>
6. 19 June 1982	A condition was put forward whereby the IDF would enter West Beirut only with Bashir's forces.	Sharon, Bashir
7. 21 June 1982	A plan to deploy the Lebanese Forces into West Beirut.	Rep. of Mosad, Bashir and advisors
8. 20 June 1982 [sic]	Setting up a date and modus operandi for " <u>operation spark</u> ".	Sharon, Reps. of Lebanese Forces
9. 22-23 June 1982	Bashir agrees to join " <u>operation spark</u> " but points to the negative implications of the move.	Sharon, Bashir
10. 24 June 1982	Bashir expresses caution concerning the participation of his forces in "operation spark" and points to the negative political implications emanating from such a move. It was agreed that his forces would participate in the operation.	Sharon, Chief of Staff, Bashir
11. 24 June 1982	An agreement on "operation spark", date set--June 28.	Begin, Bashir

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Relevant Subjects for Discussion</u>	<u>Participants</u>
12.	26 June 1982	Bashir claims that all joint efforts will not bear fruit if West Beirut will not be conquered.	Rep. of Mosad, Bashir
13.	27 June 1982	Operative and logistical cooperation between IDF and Phalange.	Chief of Staff, Bashir
14.	3-4 July 1982	Coordination and cooperation between IDF and Phalange concerning fighting in Lebanon.	General Drori, Bashir
15.	6 July 1982	Sharon asks that "ugly actions" by the Phalange be prevented.	Sharon, Bashir
16.	21 August 1982	A plan to "cleanse" the refugee camps in West Beirut by the Lebanese Army and Lebanese Forces.	Chief of Staff, Bashir
17.	21 August 1982	A discussion concerning the entrance by Lebanese Forces into West Beirut in the near future.	Director of Mosad, Rep. of Lebanese Forces

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Relevant Subjects for Discussion</u>	<u>Participants</u>
18.	21 August 1982	A request by Sharon--not to enter West Beirut without coordination with Israel.	Sharon, Rep. of Mosad, Bashir, Pierre
19.	31 August 1982	A demand that the Lebanese Forces start cleaning the city once evacuation is completed. IDF intends to start a similar operation in cooperation with the Lebanese Forces.	General Drori, Fadi Frem, Toto
20.	1-2 September 1982	(blank)	Begin, Sharon, Shamir Bashir
21.	13 September 1982	Coordinating the entrance of IDF into West Beirut.	Chief of Staff Leadership of Phalange.
22.	16 September 1982	Coordinating the entrance of the Phalange into the refugee camps.	General Drori, Leadership of Phalange

Col. Elkana Harnof:

On 22 November Col. Harnof testified before the Commission's staff as follows:

It was possible to surmise from contacts with the Phalange leaders what were their intentions towards the Palestinians: "Sabra would become a zoo and Shatilah Beirut's parking place." There were several descriptions of acts of brutality. When they participated in actions east of Bahamdun--when they operated against the Druze. They ran straight to the villages and committed massacres. Specific case of a pregnant woman in southern Lebanon. There was mention of massacres by Eli Hobeika and his men and this was raised in the meeting with the Minister in the last days of June--23/25 June, the day of the capture of Aley.

Specific references to acts of elimination of locals "most likely Palestinians".

The meeting which Harnof mentions took place at Kela Fortress above Beit Meri "and among other topics which were discussed the issue was raised as to Eli Hobeika's activities in south Lebanon, from the context it was

apparent that it refers to elimination of locals. Almost certainly Palestinianians".

(These are notes written by the staff about their interrogation of various witnesses. Citations are direct references to testimony. The rest are staff notes.)

A document of 23 June 1982:

A report passed to the Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and others

It notes that the Christians had detained some 500 people during the evacuation of West Beirut--and they were terminated. Also it is said that the Christians are keeping a record of those captured.

A meeting between: Bashir Jumail, Karim, Nader, Yudi, Phadi, Josef, Eli, Zahi, N. Admoni; Menahem Navot, Avner Zaulai and the undersigned.

Nahum (Admoni) maintains that Lebanon is Bashir's country and it is his right to get assistance from the Shi'as at a certain stage and then handle them differently. Bashir adds it is possible that in this context they will need several "Dir Yassins". But N. Admoni stresses that as long as the IDF is around, the Christians will have to refrain from this type of action. Bashir explains once again that he will act at a later stage since a Christian

state would not be able to survive if the demographic aspect will not be dealt with.

Admoni's Testimony:

More than once, the need for joint operations was discussed with the Phalangists. The Phalangists have gravely disappointed in all battlefield operations. On several occasions we demanded that they will hit the terrorists' leaders. They promised but had done nothing.

In a specific instance they drew a concrete plan and for this purpose they marked locations and people to be hit.

However, nothing came out of it again.

Our thinking was that this resulted from a lack of capability. Regarding Bashir, he (Admoni) distinguishes between two conceptual levels. He knew Bashir well. They met frequently during the years 1974-75.

Bashir had a very spontaneous speaking style. He was preoccupied with Lebanon's demographic balance, and discussed it a lot. When he (Bashir) talked in terms of demographic change--it was always in terms of killing and elimination. This was his instinctive style. At the same time, Bashir was a political human being, and as such he had an extremely cautious thinking process and thus he avoided taking part in various warlike actions.

Yitzhak Hofi

20 October 1982

"I cannot hate Arafat the way I see they (the Christians) hate the Palestinians, and they talk about solving the Palestinian problem with a hand gesture whose meaning is physical elimination". "This is not unilateral on the Christian side, it was completely bilateral, the Palestinians acted no less brutally than they had".

"They are concerned as they say: the Shia's--they have large families. They have 10-12 children per family. We the Christians have 2-3 kids per family. We do not have any prospect in this area unless we reduce the number of Shi'as, and again, 'reduce' with a hand gesture which made it clear as to what they intended".

". . . we knew they had eliminated them. I am talking about terrorists, not about women and children, but terrorists

. . . this was their way. I don't think that regarding the issue of brutality and approach and treatment, I don't think anybody had any doubts about this issue."

Kahan:

Were there any plans or discussions, whether prior to the war or at its outbreak, pertaining to the fate of the civilian Palestinian population, women, children, not terrorists, in the camps as a result of the development of

the war, lets assume as a result of the men having been mostly arrested or detained or killed. What will happen to this population? Was this issue raised?

Hofi:

It was raised, raised. I had mentioned it from the first meeting. They (the Phalange) raised the issue of Lebanon being unable to survive as long as this size of population exists there.

Kahan:

The Christians raised it?

Hofi:

The Christians raised it. I am talking about Shamoun, I am talking about Bashir, I am talking about Dani, and about Pierre Gemazel.

". . . that as long as such a Palestinian concentration exists inside Lebanon, Lebanon has no chance of surviving as an integral and independent state. It was raised at later stages by the older Shamoun especially, who would bring it up together with a proposal that we take them. That as part of the solution we would take them . . .

Kahan:

What was our position?

Hofi:

We told him we thank him very much, but that we have no intention that the solving of the Lebanese Palestinian problem would be made at the expense of the State of Israel . . .

That is to say: their opinion was determined, not necessarily in the sense of a massacre, but their desire to get rid of this element in Lebanon, because--as I have mentioned--this was the strongest military force inside Lebanon and in reality it was stronger than the Phalanges themselves. The Phalanges were unable to cope with it and this strengthening (of the PLO) had developed clearly from 1976 on.

Navot Cont'd

Pierre came in. The Defense Minister opened the discussion and apologized for coming but said he had come to convey his condolences and to talk about concrete plans. Talked again, to the best of my recollection, on the decision to continue and support and very briefly talked about the mission for today, on the decision to enter Beirut, and on the need for them to take part in this operation, this is what I have discussed with your forces just one or two hours ago, in the morning.

That's it. I think that following the meeting we went down (back) not far from the Majles.

Kahan:

One moment.

Navot:

Following the meeting which lasted some 30 minutes we went back to the Majles area and their HQ, and each went his own way. I went down to their HQ and the DM went to his business, I don't know, I did not accompany him to the (air?) field. This was on Wednesday around noon.

Kahan:

So when was it that you were informed about the role the Phalagists were to play during the entering of Beirut?

Navot Cont'd

Navot:

To the best of my recollection, I heard about it, without it making a specific impression on me, on the camps issue, on Friday at 11:00 A.M. I have to see the document in the file. I believe there was a meeting with Tutu. I believe so.

Kahan:

You did not know about the Phalanges roles till Friday at 11:00AM?

Navot:

I did not know their role. Enter after the IDF but the role I did not know. Further, I was not told by an officer of ours which attended one or two meetings. I already told you that I am uncertain, I know about a meeting by reading the material afterwards, I know it reports on two such meetings. There is a report of a meeting attended by a liason officer of ours which we stationed (at the Christian HQ?) at a certain stage. According to the report this (the meeting) took place on Thursday AM.

Kahan:

Was this Arazi?

Navot:

Phadi, yes. Phadi told Arazi--listen I got a call from Drori and he summoned a meeting for this purpose with

Navot Cont'd

me. And he goes on to detail, in Uri's report, what he remembers of this meeting. In another report it was stated that within 24 hours there were two meetings, that is Wed. or Thu. I did not hear.

Kahan:

But you did not participate?

Navot:

I did not participate and I had not heard about them.

Kahan:

So, how did you first find about the going into the camps?

Navot:

Really I found out by sensing something, it was on Friday PM.

Kahan:

In what way did you find out?

Navot:

There was a meeting with Raful at 4:00 PM. Raful came together with Uri Saguy Amir Drori I believe so, and Phadi, I assume it was Phadi, because there was another meeting with the C-o-S on Sunday, where Phadi was not present.

Navot Cont'd

Barak:

There was a meeting with the General (Drori) on Thursday at 11:00 AM. Did you take part in it?

Navot:

No. This did not place at the HQ. This meeting with Fizi did not take place at the HQ, to the best of my recollection. This was a meeting whereby the General (Drori) summoned Phadi directly, and Phadi, whose office was directly across from the room where Yossi Arazi was sitting, told him come.

Kahan:

He took Arazi to the meeting?

Navot:

Yes. There was no meeting with Drori on Thursday. There was another thing in the material regarding taking control of key roads and intersections. This was an issue which the IDF had to deal with and the C-o-S of the Northern Command told me send the men. I believe that somewhere in this report Tutu, on Friday, told me about the good work they have done which also won the praise of the commander of the 96th Division. I believe Tutu does talk about the camps, I am not certain. I need to check the papers.

At any rate regarding the meeting of the C-o-S on Friday: During the meeting Rafal told Phadi, listen the

Navot Cont'd

Americans are pressing, stopping the operation in the camps is necessary. ✓

Kahan:

Was this the only reason given?

Navot:

The one and only. I will detail and in retrospect I was wondering a lot as to this and there it was: American pressure and you've got till tomorrow at 5:00AM. For the sake of discussion I remembered for some reason that in appearing before the sub-committee on Lebanon of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset I said 6:00AM. I do not recall why but I wrote 5:00AM. Why 5:00AM, it is important to--

Kahan:

Yes. We have the minutes of this meeting if you can verify it. Exhibits 80 and 80A. At this meeting (of Rafal and Phadi) did you hear anything pertaining to unusual conduct or. . . .

Navot:

Nothing at all. The problem which preoccupied them and me, which does not appear in the report, was what would they accomplish till Saturday morning. And they said, look the camps are empty, everybody fled to Burj al-Barajneh and there are still weapons stores inside the camps. They (those who fled to Burj al-Barajneh) would return will

Navot Cont'd

reequip themselves, there was a feeling that we did not accomplish anything.

Kahan:

Was this what the Phalangists argued?

Navot:

It was a mutual feeling. They talked about the camps being empty as everybody had fled to Burj al-Barajneh, and if we failed in cleaning the weapons stores they will return and reequip themselves. I cannot commit myself as to whether they actually said weapons. Why? Because this is in retrospect. But we did not accomplish anything. And they asked for tractors.

Kahan:

For what purpose did they say?

Navot:

As I understood it to open up and search for more weapons, because arms were hidden underground. And I asked them, do you have tractor drivers? What do you need these for?

Kahan:

What was the response?

Navot:

I do not believe there was an answer on this issue.

Navot Cont'd

Kahan:

What was agreed?

Navot:

Afterwards it was said, possibly at the same meeting, that they talked about it being necessary for them to wait until after the elections for them to carry on with the operation. I believe this was during the meeting on Sunday, I don't remember. But this was the situation: the concern was that the camps were empty, the problem was how to secure them until 5:00AM.

Kahan:

Was there any word uttered on the issue of the civilian population?

Navot:

Not a word.

Efrat:

What does it mean not a word. It was said that the camps were empty. This also includes civilian population.

Navot:

Yes, but I remember what was the image I had of these camps. I remember that I had visited the area with Arens.

Kahan:

When?

Navot Cont'dNavot:

It was either the 11th or 12th of August. This was the first time for me to be as close to Burj al-Barajneh. It seemed to me that it was empty.

Kahan:

You did not hear of any return of the population in the meantime?

Navot:

No.

Kahan:

You did not hear.

Barak:

You've also talked about inhabitants fleeing from Sabra/Shatilah to Burj al-Barajneh.

Navot:

The camps are empty, everybody went to Burj al-Barajneh, if we evacuate now they will return to the camps where arms are available, they will reequip.

Barak:

But this was Friday PM, did you in your own eyes saw any civilians fleeing on the access route?

Navot:

Saw physically?

Barak:

Yes.

Navot Cont'd

Navot:

Entirely not. Physically we were in the area of IDF operations, we were never active. At least not me. So physically I have not seen. I thought perhaps you were asking about me visualizing this, no.

Kahan:

Aside from this meeting, have you ever heard, about the same time, possibly in some side remark or private conversation.

Navot:

No.

Kahan:

On unusual conduct in the camps?

Navot:

Nothing at all. Nothing at all. The only thing, just a moment, but this was afterwards, I saw some brief reporting around that hour that somebody was reporting that they are acting out of coordination. This was on Friday also around 11:00AM. But this was a report which I had not necessarily seen. But for the sake of accuracy I want you to find the minutes of the talk with Tutu. What did Tutu say on Friday at 11:00AM? I remember that I have relied on Tutu's saying that he also got it (the report). This was possibly the first time that the word "camps" was mentioned.

Navot Cont'd

Kahan:

Just a minute. Do you recognize this document?

Navot:

I saw it.

Kahan:

Afterwards?

Navot:

Very late, yes afterwards.

Kahan:

Perhaps on the same day?

Navot:

No. Explicitly not.

Kahan:

You did not see this document?

Navot:

Absolutely not.

. . . .

Navot:

Tutu's full name is Antuan Baridi, he was the chief inspector (commander?) of the Army and acting deputy to Phadi Frem.

. . . .

Kahan:

All right, when was the first time that you've heard the about the civilian population?

Navot Cont'dNavot:

All this time I was handling political activity to insure the elections (of Amin?), including a talk with Shamoun on Saturday at noon. On Saturday evening I came to the liason office.

Kahan:

I.E. on the 18th.

Navot:

On Saturday the 18th around 7:00PM and I made two phone calls one home and the other to Nahum Admoni. I currently am unable to remember which was the first. Afterwards there was another chapter of Abu Hali, which I will detail subsequently. I distinctly remember that I spoke with my wife, and she told me--Nahik, what is going on out there? What's happening at your place? I replied--I don't know what are you talking about. And, my son the pilot picks up the phone and tells me--Dad, pack up and come home, you've nothing to look for out there. And I said: Ram, what's happening? and he says: Don't you know what happened at your place? I replied that I didn't know. Later I called Nahum (Admoni), and he asked me--what is happening there?

Kahan:

You didn't hear from members of your family as to what had happened?

Navot Cont'dNavot:

No, there is, it is said there is a massacre in the camps or something like that.

Kahan:

You heard it first from them?

Navot:

What they've been doing in the camps.

Kahan:

This was on Saturday at 7:00PM?

Navot:

Yes, and then Nahum asked me: Nahik what is happening there? Have you (plural) done anything? I then replied--I don't exactly know what are you referring to, indeed I have just been informed. And he says, very irritated--but I had cabled you. Amnon is sitting by me and I asked him--is there any cable?

Kahan:

Who was sitting by you?

Navot:

Amnon was the chief of the liason office. Amnon shaked. He said yes a cable had arrived. Still while talking to Nahum I picked up the cable and told him (Nahum), I am reading it now. And (Nahum?) said we also asked you (plural) to report what did you do in response (to the cable). I asked Amnon what have you done (in response).

Navot Cont'd

This irritated me because of my family's reaction which up to now has identified with my work. So he (Amnon?) says yes I called, I talked and I acted and here is a report about my response. It was then that I demanded from him a report--it was there that I heard about it for the first time and still not the magnitude of the issue. On another occasion still on the same day I was driving to a meeting, I don't remember whereto, and received a phone call in the car from Josef Abu-Halil, who is the editor of Al-Amal. And he asked me what are you doing to us: I've just heard on Israel Radio that you (Israelis) accuse us of conducting a massacre in the camps. I replied: Josef, I don't know. I heard something but I have no idea about a massacre in the camps. I was even trying to be a bit evasive about it, at the maximum deny (apparently telling abu-Halil to deny the story). This was the second, third instance I heard about it during the same day plus the cable which had spoken about a massacre in the camps which I read and a cable which arrived at the same morning from Nahum, at the request of Rafal, it talked about Gaza Hospital and about the guys conducting a massacre or something like that. I do not recall the exact version.

Efrat:

When was the cable received at the liason office?

Navot Cont'd

Navot:

The cable from home which Nahum dispatched saying Raful told him about (massacre) in the Gaza Hospital, where is it?

Efrat:

Was this a cable or a phone call?

Navot:

A cable. "Pursuant to our telephone request from this morning. . . ." That's it. Here is the cable No. 7052 which was sent at dusk, "Pursuant to our telephone request pertaining to the massacre conducted by the Lebanese forces at the Gaza Hospital, requesting that an immediate circular be sent demanding categorically he stops his men from running wild at the refugee camps as well as in other places. Request that you update us as to your contacts and their version of their present activities inside the city." So, from this one I really do not know. This was the cable which was there when I arrived about the time, perhaps there was a telephone version, I do not know.

Kahan:

When was the cable received?

Navot:

According to this at 19:28, but just a minute, we have a schedule of activities, however the liason office's diary ends on the 15th.

Navot Cont'd

Kahan:

The cable was marked exhibit 83.

Navot:

Is there 7052? And later as a result of Nahum complaining that there was no reporting, I asked Amnon to report and so there is a report of the same day which was sent on 18 Sept. at 23:00 (11:00PM) which details Amnon's activities (in response).

Kahan:

This report was marked No. 84.

Navot:

I recognize this report from what he (Amnon?) told me verbally. He then told me what was his reaction and I asked him why haven't you reported about those activities? As a result of Nahum's complaint that you failed to respond to 7053.

Efrat:

Nahik, you were there. The morning phone call was nevertheless, apparently, made with a measure of excitement, a complaint had come through on an issue of considerable sensitivity. How come no one called, nobody told you till that evening many hours later?

Navot:

I think I was in touch with Amnon, I think I had communication with the liason office, I don't remember. I

Navot Cont'd

had several meetings that morning. Among other things I hurried to meet Shamoun the same Saturday at 12:00PM, about the same time the telephone call arrived.

Kahan:

Amnon had not briefed you about that telephone conversation at 10:00PM. Now, I understand that for a prolonged period you had intimate ties with the Phalangists

(INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT)