The Clinton Administration and UN Resolution 242
The Clinton team has turned out to be more hospitable to Israel's basic policies than any administration before it. In less than a year in office, it has already significantly changed, diluted, or signaled its willingness to modify at least four important U.S. policies on the Middle East. First, it openly allowed the use of U.S. funds to finance the growth of Jewish settlements in Arab East Jerusalem and the other occupied territories.  Second, it acquiesced in Israel's contention that Israeli rule over Arab Jerusalem is non-negotiable.  Third, it effectively endorsed Israel's right to deport Palestinians.  And fourth, it has seemed to accept Israel's contention that the Arab territories captured by Israel in 1967 are "disputed" rather than "occupied." 
Now there are indications that the administration is considering deserting what has been the very cornerstone of U.S. policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict for the past quarter century-United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. As the world community's overarching summation of the land-for- peace formula, the resolution has provided the legitimacy and the framework for all attempts at finding peace since its passage in 1967.
It is the erosion of the Clinton administration's positions on the specific issues mentioned above-positions that moreover were derived from the broad precepts of Resolution 242-that gives rise to concern that the resolution as a whole is about to be jettisoned. The resolution directly refers to occupied territories, Israeli withdrawal therefrom, and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. Over the years, the United States had made clear that it believed the captured territories were indeed under military occupation and that Israel's withdrawal should be total except for minor and reciprocal border adjustments. Yet in its two draft papers on an Israeli-Palestinian declaration of principles, submitted during the peace talks on 14 May and 30 June 1993-before the September 1993 Israeli-PLO accord-the United States consistently failed to describe the territories as "occupied." It made no mention, in fact, of the occupation. Nor did it mention Israeli withdrawal, redeployment, or an exchange of land for peace. 
Most chilling was an indication in the 30 June draft that the Clinton ad- ministration had completely abandoned any commitment to honor the United States' original concept of 242. In the June draft, the United States wrote: "The two sides concur that the agreement reached between them on permanent status will constitute the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects." While the language is so legalistically ambiguous as to defy clear interpretation, certainly one reading of it is that the United States has no position at all on the meaning of 242. Desertion of Resolution 242 by the Clinton administration would be a portentous event for the current peace efforts between Israel and the Palestinians. As the weaker party, the Palestinians need an "honest broker" to assure that they get as fair a deal as possible. Without justice, the Palestinians will not be able to agree to a final settlement. There are too many rejectionists among them (and among the Arab states) for them to be able to accept a settlement that is patently unfair. Yet if the United States no longer supports the major tenets of the resolution, the prospects for resolving the conflict are dim indeed.
Administration Supporters of Israel
The Clinton administration has outdistanced all its predecessors in terms of strong Israel supporters at the highest levels. These include President Clinton himself and Vice President Al Gore. Clinton has repeatedly shown himself sensitive to a fault to the Israeli part of the conflict. He seldom seems to miss a chance to retell the anecdote about his old preacher who, on his death bed, warned the future president that if he ever "let Israel down, God would never forgive me," as Clinton describes it, adding, "I'll never let Israel down."  Gore has described Israel as America's "strongest ally and best friend, not only in the Middle East, but anywhere else in the world." He takes pride in the fact that on matters of the Middle East he is the protégé of Martin Peretz, the man who became editor of the New Republic after his wife bought it and managed to transform it into an apologist organ for Israel. 
As antithetical to achieving an evenhanded policy as the president himself is the dedication to Israel's interests of many of the highest officials in his administration. Under Clinton, the bureaucracy's most influential officials include Martin Indyk, head of the Middle East desk at the National Security Council; Samuel W. Lewis, head of the State Department's policy planning staff; and Dennis B. Ross, the chief U.S. negotiator in the Arab-Israeli peace talks. These three men have prominent roles in the most sensitive U.S. policy-making on the Middle East.
An Australian national who began working for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Israel's American lobby, in the early 1980s, Indyk is widely known as a supporter of Israeli Likud leaders such as Yitzhak Shamir. In 1985 he cofounded an AIPAC spin-off, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, of which he was executive director until his appointment by Clinton. He is reported to have said that the purpose of the institute was to "counter Arabist views."  He has been astonishingly successful. Every study and activity undertaken by the institute has advanced that stated ambition.
Lewis was ambassador to Israel for eight years, where his sympathies to the Israeli cause were rewarded by lavish honors and lucrative appointments upon his retirement in 1985. He was named the first International Fellow at the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, appointed to the board of overseers of the Truman Institute for International Peace at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and made a board member of the New York branch of Bank Leumi, Israel's largest bank. At the time, Lewis said he so admired Israel that he planned to spend about half his time living there and helping in Israel's fund-raising drives. 
Ross keeps a low profile as a behind-the-scenes player who has been active in both Republican and Democratic administrations. But while he has a less-public image than Lewis or Indyk, his sympathies are no secret: according to the Washington Post, he has "strong pro-Israel convictions."  Or, as author Robert Kaplan reported, Ross "traveled in pro-Israel, Neo-Conservative circles."  He has been active for years in promoting pro-Israel positions in various studies and forums, in which he has had no kind words for what he called back in 1985 "traditional Arabists and their media supporters," a quaint-sounding phrase these days.  Ross' pro-Israel credentials were sufficiently impressive that the patrons of the Washington Institute found him more than acceptable as one of their own. He was slated to replace Indyk as the director of the institute before he was given his job by Clinton as the director of the peace talks. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher has remained something of a cipher in terms of the Middle East. But his personal views barely matter, since he is boxed in between a chief executive and a bureaucracy that share the same biases favoring Israel. He can hardly retain his post without following their lead. Whatever Christopher's personal outlook, a number of the highest national-security officials of the Clinton administration are more than usually sympathetic to Israel. This is the case of a group who served as members of a commission that wrote a highly pro-Israel report calling for a "U.S.-Israel partnership" in the post-cold war era. The report, Enduring Partnership, was commissioned and guided by the Washington Institute in 1992, while Indyk was its head.  It was supported by a grant from Edgar M. Bronfman, chair- man of the Seagram liquor giant and active in Zionist causes.
The Clinton officials associated with this study include such administration luminaries as Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, and the head of the National Security Council W. Anthony Lake and his chief deputy, Samuel "Sandy" Berger. Others are Leon Fuerth, assistant to Vice President Gore on security affairs; Clark Murdock, assistant to the secretary of defense; and Walter Slocombe, principal deputy undersecretary of defense. Lewis, Indyk, and Ross also participated in one form or another.  Most of the commission's work had been completed by early 1993, but the work actually came out after Clinton appointed his team. A footnote on the participants explains that those who joined the Clinton ad- ministration terminated their membership "and do not, therefore, endorse the report."
The study called for deeper and closer ties between Israel and the United States in the post-cold war period. It supported the continuation of aid to Israel at the current (huge) levels, urged the United States to share more satellite reconnaissance data with Israel, and endorsed the kind of "quiet diplomacy from which the U.S.-Israel understandings on the deportation of Palestinian Islamic activists emerged in February 1993." (This last was a reference to the deal worked out by Secretary of State Christopher which ignored the U.S. vote in the UN Security Council demanding Israel's immediate return of 413 Palestinians deported in December 1992 in order to privately agree Israel could deport them for a limited period-as already mentioned, a significant policy change on U.S. opposition to deportations.) The study went so far as to make a special plea for Israel to maintain its nuclear monopoly in the region: "Ideally, Israel would like to retain its exclusive nuclear deterrent while proliferation is prevented-either through diplomacy or joint military action or, if necessary as in 1981, action by Israel's military forces."
The Original Meaning of Resolution 242
With such a network of Israel supporters throughout much of the Clinton administration's national-security apparatus, it is important to examine the long-held U.S. interpretation of Resolution 242. The resolution, unanimously passed by the United Nations Security Council on 22 November 1967, was deceptively simple.  If one more word had been added to the 242 of the brief resolution, much of the quarreling still going on about its meaning would have been avoided. That one word is either "the" or "all." Without either of these clarifying words, the resolution calls simply for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied."
Failure to call for Israeli withdrawal from "the" or "all" territories occupied was considered at the time to be an exercise in creative ambiguity, a hedge aimed at giving both parties a chance to straighten out awkward frontiers left by the armistices of 1949. Although most council members wanted to demand Israel's total withdrawal, the United States had bought into the idea encouraged by Israel that the postwar period was a time when the frontiers could be rationalized to both sides' advantage with minor and reciprocal changes.
The land captured by Israel in 1967-the territories from which Resolution 242 sought Israel's withdrawal-was of significant extent: the Old City of Jerusalem (1 /2 square miles), the Golan Heights (500 square miles), the Sinai Peninsula (18,100 square miles, including 135 square miles of the Gaza Strip), and the West Bank (2,270 square miles). To put these figures in perspective, Israel's size as envisioned by the 1947 UN partition plan was 5,900 square miles; in the 1948-49 fighting Israel expanded its area of control to 8,000 square miles.
The Johnson administration had been the major player in selling to the Arabs the idea of using indefinite language in the withdrawal clause. As a State Department study of the issue completed in 1978 reported: "Support for the concept of total withdrawal was widespread in the Security Council, and it was only through intensive American efforts that a resolution was adopted which employed indefinite language in the withdrawal clause. In the process of obtaining this result, the United States made clear to the Arab states and several other members of the Security Council that the United States envisioned only insubstantial revisions of the 1949 armistice lines. Israel did not protest this approach." 
One example of how the United States sold the resolution to the Arabs involved the Latrun Salient, a small protrusion of land held by Jordan in the Latrun Plain that blocked direct road travel between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem through the Wadi al-Bab. On 6 November, less than three weeks before the passage of 242, Secretary of State Dean Rusk privately assured King Hussein of Jordan in a Washington meeting that if Jordan gave up the Latrun Salient, "the United States would then use its diplomatic and political influence to obtain in compensation access for Jordan to a Mediterranean port in Israel." Arthur J. Goldberg, America's ambassador to the United Nations, gave Hussein similar assurances at the same time, also citing Latrun as the kind of minor change contemplated. 
When Hussein met on 8 November with Lyndon Johnson, who had been briefed by Rusk on the U.S. interpretation, the Jordanian monarch asked how soon Israeli troops would withdraw from most of the occupied lands. The president replied: "In six months."  After these assurances from the top echelons of the government, King Hussein pronounced himself "extremely satisfied" with the U.S. interpretation of withdrawal by Israeli forces. 
Israel gave every indication at the time of the vote on Resolution 242 that it agreed with the U.S. interpretation. The 1978 State Department study re- ported: "There was no overt conflict between the United States and Israel over the U.S. views on withdrawal, and in several respects the U.S. position coincided with that of Israel.... At no time during this period did Israel argue that it would withdraw only on selected fronts. To the contrary, in conversations with American officials the Israelis consistently discussed the concepts of withdrawal and secure borders in terms of three fronts.”
Israel's Opposition to 242
The resolution had barely been passed before Israel began challenging its generally accepted meaning, sometimes in quite extraordinary terms. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, for example, argued that the "central and primary" concern of the resolution was not really withdrawal at all, but the need for a "just and lasting peace." (He did not explain how a "just and lasting peace" could be attained with a continuing military occupation.) At another time Eban and other Israeli officials argued that the principle of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" was not relevant to Israel since the phrase appeared only in the preambular paragraph or, alternatively, because it applied only to wars of aggression. The fact that it was Israel that had launched the 1967 war was ignored. 
Among the arguments with at least the appearance of seriousness was that maintained by Eban and succeeding Israeli officials to the effect that the ex- tent of Israel's withdrawal was vague and undetermined since the resolution allowed for "territorial revision." This argument was carried to the point of asserting that withdrawal was not "applicable to all the territories involved."  In fact, Eban had been directly involved in the UN discussions in New York prior to passage of the resolution and was not only perfectly aware of the U.S. interpretation, but indicated that Israel agreed with it. Nonetheless, the alleged vagueness of the resolution remains to this day Israel's major argument for retaining occupied territory.
Another argument used by Israel is that some or all of the territories were not actually occupied because they belonged to Israel by right. The assertion was consistently applied to Arab East Jerusalem from the outset, causing the United States finally to protest in 1969. In a statement before the Security Council on 1 July, U.S. Ambassador Charles W. Yost defined Arab East Jerusalem as "occupied territory [similar] to other areas occupied by Israel." 
Since that time Israel's claim that Arab Jerusalem is not occupied has been extended by inference to embrace all of the territories, now generally characterized as "disputed" and therefore subject to negotiations. This imaginative interpretation was reached by maintaining that Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in 1950 had been recognized by only two countries, Britain and Pakistan, leaving the implication that Arabs ruling Arabs under Jordan was no more legitimate than Israel's military occupation. Although this interpretation had been rebuffed by all previous administrations, the Clinton administration appears to accept the Israeli position.
Israel has been able to perform these verbal acrobatics in large part because of Washington's refusal in recent years to take a public position on its own interpretation of Resolution 242. Indeed, the first-and last-time the U.S. interpretation has received detailed, official, and public airing was late in 1969. On 9 December of that year, Secretary of State William Rogers, notably evenhanded on the Arab-Israeli conflict, remarked in an address that Resolution 242 "calls for withdrawal from occupied territories, the non acquisition of territory by war, and recognized boundaries. We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established, and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the preexisting lines should be confined to insubstantial alternations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism."  For his fair efforts at fairness, Rogers was ridiculed out of office by Henry Kissinger and a president weakened by a scandal called Watergate.
Other officials became candid and outspoken only after they were out of office. For instance, Dean Rusk, the secretary of state who personally negotiated with King Hussein concerning 242 and approved its passage, later wrote: "Resolution 242 never contemplated the movement of any significant territories to Israel."  In his memoirs, Rusk repeated that formulation, explaining that "we thought . . . certain anomalies could easily be straightened out with some exchanges of territory, making a more sensible border for all parties." 
Similarly, Lord Caradon, author of the resolution, wrote in 1981, long after his retirement: "It was from the occupied territories that the Resolution called for withdrawal. The test was which territories were occupied. That was a test not possibly subject to doubt. As a matter of plain fact East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and Sinai were occupied in the 1967 conflict; it was on withdrawal from occupied territories that the Resolution insisted." 
Even Henry Kissinger told essentially the same story. In his memoirs, he wrote: "Jordan's acquiescence in Resolution 242 had been obtained in 1967 by the promise of our United Nations Ambassador Arthur Goldberg that under its terms we would work for the return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications and that we were prepared to use our influence to obtain a role for Jordan in Jerusalem." 
Despite such authoritative statements and the persuasive evidence of the 1978 State Department study on the meaning of Resolution 242, Israel and its supporters have maintained for well over a quarter century that the resolution does not say, or does not mean, what is clearly written. Arthur Goldberg, an avowed Zionist, later went so far as to claim that he and other officials had never supported the idea of minor and reciprocal changes. 
Clearly such statements are not the result of a misunderstanding. They are a deliberate misrepresentation by Israel and its supporters of the record in an effort to justify Israel's continued occupation. Lucius D. Battle, the assistant secretary of state for the Middle East at the time and intimately involved in passage of 242, reaffirmed in an interview in 1993 the original U.S. interpretation. He added that Goldberg had proven over the years to be, on the issue of 242, "a slippery character." 
Carter's Catastrophic Mistake
As already mentioned, it is the White House's refusal to set the record straight that has enabled Israel and its supporters to succeed in such deliberate obfuscation. The fault for this must be placed largely with Jimmy Carter and the timorousness of succeeding presidents. There is a deep irony in this outcome, because Carter came to office in 1977 talking publicly and loudly about Resolution 242. In his first months in office, he referred to minor and reciprocal border changes,  the only president to do so, as far as I can determine. A position paper revealing Carter's Middle East views released on 27 June 1977 endorsed 242 in the following terms: "We consider that this resolution means withdrawal on all three fronts-that is, Sinai, Golan, West Bank-Gaza. . . . no territories, including the West Bank, are automatically excluded from the items to be negotiated." 
But then Carter made a catastrophic miscalculation. Still relatively new in office, naive in foreign affairs, overly trusting, and already desperately concerned about reelection, he sought to win the confidence of Israel's new leader, Menachem Begin, in their first meeting in 1977. In a private upstairs session at the White House on 19 July, Carter pleaded with Begin to halt the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories while Begin asked the president to stop talking in public about Resolution 242 meaning minor adjustments to the frontiers. In a note on the meeting, Carter wrote that Begin "asks that we not use phrase 'minor adjustments' without prior notice to him-I agreed. He will try to accommodate us on settlements." 
Begin's "accommodation," it turned out, was an empty promise. Less than a week later Begin's government conferred legal status on three Jewish settlements, and in the years ahead he went merrily on his way establishing more and more settlements despite Carter's increasingly frustrated complaints that they were illegal. (In another example of U.S. backtracking, the word "illegal" to describe the settlements is no longer uttered.) Astonishingly, despite Begin's failure to honor his commitment, Carter did not respond in kind.
Thus, as a result of this willingness to keep one side of a broken bargain, Carter was the last president to voice in public the provocative phrase "minor and reciprocal border changes" with regard to the U.S. interpretation of Resolution 242. When Arab and other interlocutors have questioned various administrations over the years since 1977 about U.S. policy on withdrawal, they have been soothingly assured that "there is no change in policy." Reagan, Bush, and Clinton are on record as asserting that the United States stands firmly behind Resolution 242. Even Reagan characterized it "as the foundation stone of America's Middle East peace effort." 
The presidents, at least through Reagan and Bush, have been vocal in asserting that withdrawal must come on "all three fronts" and that peace must come in exchange for land. But the response was silence when they or their officials were pressed on whether the United States still believed withdrawal should include only minor and reciprocal adjustments.
While such tactics may salve the guilty conscience, it clearly is an abdication of America's long-held position. Since Carter, the United States has indicated in public, in effect, that it has no position on what Resolution 242's withdrawal clause means. The endless reiteration of the litany that the United States stands solidly behind the resolution is all but meaningless without Washington saying precisely what it means by that commitment. But still there remained the slender assurance to the Arabs that privately the United States continued to support its original interpretation.
Now, with the Clinton administration hinting that it is ready to abandon even the pretense of a separate interpretation of 242, the determination of its meaning would be left up to the parties themselves, who are so unequal in strength. This retreat from policy would be catastrophic for the unorganized and weak Palestinians. Yet it would not be the only retreat on policy committed by the Clinton administration in less than a year in power. It is thus no surprise that the Palestinians in 1993 had to flee the embrace of Clinton's administration to find an accommodation with Israel-not through Washington but via Norway. The Clinton administration, it had turned out, was more hard-line than the Israeli Labor government. Since Carter, the United States has indicated, in effect, that it has no position on what Resolution 242's withdrawal clause means.
Donald Neff is author of the Wariors trilogy (Amana Books), a study of how U.S. policy related to Israel and the Arabs during the wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973, and of the unpublished data base, Middle East Handbook, on which this article is based.
1. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Edward P. Djerejian testified before Congress on 9 March 1993 that the administration approved of Israel's use of the $10 billion in loan guarantees granted in 1992 to finance the "natural growth and basic, immediate needs" of existing settlements in the occupied territories, including Arab East Jerusalem; see excerpts of the hearings in "Documents and Source Material," Journal of Palestine Studies, 22, no. 4 (Summer 1993), pp. 157-58.
2. The State Department's annual report on Israel's settlements noted that Israel has "made no commitment to halt or reduce construction in East Jerusalem [and] has affirmed its intention to continue settlement construction in a 100 square mile surrounding area termed 'Greater Jerusalem.' " Nonetheless, the administration's response has been silence; see U.S. State Department, Settlement Report, quoted in Foundation for Middle East Peace, Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories, July 1993.
3. On 1 February, 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher hailed an Israeli offer to take back 100 of the 413 Palestinians deported 17 December 1992 as a "breakthrough," adding: "As a consequence of the steps that Israel will take, we believe that further action by the Security Council is unnecessary and could even undercut the process which is under way;" see text of Christopher's remarks in "Documents and Source Material," Journal of Palestine Studies, 22, no. 3 (Spring 1993), p. 159.
4. See below in reference to two U.S. papers on an Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles, submitted during the peace talks on 14 May and 30 June 1993.
5. Texts of the papers are in "Documentation," Middle East Policy, 2, no. 2 (1993), pp. 155-56, 158-60.
6. From his speech to the Jewish Leadership Council in Washington, DC, 30 June 1993.
7. Lloyd Grove, Washington Post, 20 January 1993.
8. John Law, "Martin Indyk Lays Out the Clinton Approach," Middle East International, 11 June 1993, p. 3.
9. "Washington Talk," New York Times, 5 September 1985.
10. David Hoffman, Washington Post, 28 October 1991.
11. Robert D. Kaplan, The Arabists. The Romance of an American Elite (New York: Free Press, 1993), p. 287.
12. See, for instance, his study Acting with Caution. Middle East Policy Platnning for the Second Reagan Administration (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1985).
13. Frank J. Murray, Washington Times, 19 June 1993; Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post, 19 June 1993.
14. Commission on U.S.-Israel Relations, Enduring Partnership (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993).
15. Other members of the commission were officials in previous administrations or members of Congress and academic and media personalities. They included William Brown, a former ambassador to Israel now on the board of the Truman Institute at Hebrew University; former Secretary of State Alexander Haig; Charles Hill, former executive assistant to Secretary of State George Shultz; columnist Charles Krauthammer; Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona; former Vice President Walter Mondale, former Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco; and Mortimer Zuckerman, owner of US. News & Word Report. Sisco, incidentally, is the official widely blamed for beginning the process of diluting the concentration of Arabists in the State Department's Near East Affairs bureau starting as far back as 1971.
16. The text of Resolution 242 in full: The Security Council, Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories* occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their righto live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
[* The French version said "des territoires occupes."]
17. Quoted from a State Department study of the U.S. interpretation of Resolution 242 by Nina J. Noring of the Office of the Historian and Walter B. Smith 11, director of the Office of Israeli and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Department of State, The Withdrawal Cause in UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, February 1978; Secret/Nodis,
24. The study was based on contemporaneous secret U.S. reports from 1967 and was undertaken at the request of the Carter administration to determine if there was any justice to the Israeli position that the resolution did not include all the occupied territories; it concluded there was not. Also see Donald Neff, Warriors Against Jerusalem The Six Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: Linden Press/Simon &Schuster, 1984, and Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988), which discusses in detail U.S. tactics used in gaining passage of the resolution.
18. Noring and Smith, The Withdrawal Clause in UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, pp. 12-13.
19. Noring and Smith, The Withdrawal Clause in UN Security Council Resolution 242 (q 1967, p. 13; also author interview with King Hussein, Amman, Jordan, 7 August 1983.
20. Noring and Smith, The Withdrawal Clause in UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, p. 14.
21. Noring and Smith, The Withdrawal Clause in UN Securiny Council Resolution 242 of 1967, p. 23.
22. Norman G. Finkelstein, "To Live or Perish: Abba Eban 'Reconstructs' the June 1967 War," unpublished manuscript, 1993, p. 19.
23. Finkelstein, "To Live or Perish," p. 19.
24. The text is in Jody Boudreault and Yasser Salaam, US. Official Statements. The Status of Jerusalem (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), pp. 3 1-33.
25. Jody Boudrealt et al., US. Official Statements. UN. Security Council Resolution 242, (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), p. 123.
26. Letter to the author, 23 August 1983.
27. Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), p. 389.
28. Lord Caradon et. al., UN. Securiny Council Resolution 242, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1981), p. 9.
29. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (New York, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 345.
30. See, for instance, his article "Hussein's Misreading of History," Jerusalem Post, 28 May 1983.
31. Interview with the author, Washington, DC, 7 July 1993.
32. One such reference came in Carter's 9 March 1977 press conference; the text is in Meron Medzini, Israel's Foreign Relations. Selected Documents, 1974-1977 (vol. 3) (Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1982), p. 543.
33. The text is in State Department, American Foreign Policy 1977-1980, pp. 617-18; New York Times, 28 June 1977.
34. William Quandt, Camp David (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 81. Also see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983) p. 100, who reports the same account.
35. Boudrealt et al., US. Official Statements: UN. Security Council Resolution 242, p. 133.