
The sequence of events since October 7, 2023, have not only caused immense human suffering in Gaza, Lebanon, and Israel but also fundamentally damaged the EU’s credibility as a foreign policy actor. Its policy toward Gaza and Lebanon has been widely dismissed as one-sided in the region and beyond. To recall, one day after Hamas’s deadly October 7 attack on Israeli communities, Hezbollah began targeting Israel’s north with rockets, mortars, and anti-tank missiles. The party declared its intention to continue the “support front” in the north to pressure Israel into a ceasefire. Both parties’ military confrontations remained somewhat contained for ten months—although over 120,000 Israeli and Lebanese civilians were forced to flee the border areas—until the Israeli government unexpectedly escalated the war in mid-September 2024.
The so-called pager and radio attacks killed several dozen people and injured thousands, including civilians.[1] In the wake of this attack, Israel carried out massive bombardments across Lebanon and targeted killings of numerous high-ranking Hezbollah militants, most prominently its long-time leader Hassan Nasrallah.[2] Until a ceasefire deal reached on November 27, 2024, Israeli attacks had killed over 3,700 people, including large numbers of civilians, and displaced from their homes over one million Lebanese citizens and Palestinian and Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon, particularly in South Lebanon, the Bekaa, and the southern suburbs of Beirut.[3] Despite being severely weakened, Hezbollah’s capacity to attack was not completely destroyed; its rockets and drones killed at least 40 civilians in Israel prior to the ceasefire.[4] Starting on October 1, the IDF’s ground invasion into south Lebanon increasingly resembled its conduct of war in Gaza and led to the forceful depopulation of Lebanon’s border region. Coupled with the decimation of entire villages, including civilian houses, mosques, schools, and factories, this rendered parts of southern Lebanon unlivable, where up to 40 percent of buildings had been damaged or destroyed.[5]
The European Union and its member states, including the two most influential ones, Germany and France, failed to develop or implement effective policies and strategies aimed at mitigating the military conflict and returning to peaceful diplomacy during the year-long limited-intensity warfare and the ensuing months of massive military escalation. This policy paper takes stock of European positions on the war between Israel and Hezbollah. After a brief overview, it addresses the detrimental effect of Israel’s conduct of war on already crisis-ridden Lebanon and critically discusses the policies of the EU and its member states toward Lebanon following October 7. It then details the repercussions of this situation on the perception of the EU and its member states among Lebanon’s civil society; and finally, it offers policy suggestions.
EU Policy toward Lebanon
Prior to October 7, the position of the EU and most of its member states toward Lebanon had followed largely consistent patterns since the establishment of the EU’s 2006 neighborhood policy framework that promised a partnership of mutual, shared interests.[6] At their core, EU policies toward Lebanon proclaimed to deliver economic support, sustainable development, and state-building, reform, and stabilization. This framework entered into force at a critical moment before the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war and became the basis of the EU’s commitment to Lebanon’s stabilization after UN Security Council Resolution 1701 had ended the 2006 war and defined a crucial role for the international community in ensuring a lasting end to hostilities. However, the EU’s objective to reduce the migration of Syrians to Europe from and through Lebanon, especially since 2014, increasingly contradicted its commitment to reform and good governance and revealed differences between member states. Under pressure from growing populist, anti-immigration parties represented in member states’ parliaments and governments, as in Hungary and Italy, the EU relied on third states to curb migration. These so-called “migration pacts” effectively disregarded domestic human rights deficits or even grave violations as seen in Libya or Egypt.
The EU’s humanitarian relief and economic support for the growing needs of Syrian refugees and Lebanon’s host population became increasingly tied to improving Lebanon’s border security—and documented incidents of illegal pushbacks and deportations to Syria by the Lebanese state ensued.[7] Over the years, despite continuous calls for reforms, the EU continued to indiscriminately cooperate with Lebanon’s overtly corrupt political class, a collaboration that—in the absence of apparent alternatives—reinforced the political elites’ potential to exploit the Lebanese state and society for their own benefits.[8] Since 2015, the support and financial aid of the EU and its member states has amounted to over US$2.3 billion,[9] besides the more than US$3 billion spent by the EU on supporting Syrian refugees and host communities in Lebanon.[10] Yet its long-standing economic support for Lebanon, delivered at international donor conferences such as the Conference for Economic Development and Reform through Enterprises (CEDRE) hosted in Paris in 2018 by France due to its claim to a “special relationship” as a former colonial power, did not entail the often addressed and much needed effective measures aimed at reform and accountability.
The bubble finally burst in 2019/2020. Lebanon’s ultimately failed democratic uprising against the corrupt political class, the ensuing spiraling economic crisis that deepened socioeconomic cleavages, and the resulting paralysis of state institutions laid bare many of Lebanon’s fundamental issues. Lastly, the 2020 Beirut port blast constituted a dramatic wake-up call for European policymakers, signaling that their approach toward Lebanon required fundamental changes.[11] Lebanon’s civil society begged the EU and the international community to circumvent the political class in their support for the country and to enforce lasting reforms.[12] But the country’s sectarian ruling class proved to be as resilient as efficient in thwarting any substantial reform efforts. Lebanese politicians were all too happy to exploit the EU’s fear of being confronted with increasing numbers of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean toward Europe. The European Union’s Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s signing of a three-year deal in May 2024 provided Lebanon with one billion Euros for curbing immigration,[13] but again refrained from enforcing tangible reform measures, which further undermined the EU’s strategic agenda.[14]
The EU’s Lebanon Policy after October 7, 2023, and since September 2024
The EU’s response after Hamas’s deadly attack on Israeli communities on October 7 2023, most memorably in the person of von der Leyen, and that of most of its member states, has been one of strong solidarity with and full-blown diplomatic support for Israel—a carte blanche for the latter’s devastating military campaign in Gaza, as critics had pointed out from the beginning.[15] The EU leaders reacted only cautiously to Israel’s conduct of warfare in Gaza, which has caused the death of over 47,000 Palestinians, the displacement of most of the strip’s 2.3 million inhabitants, and an almost complete destruction of its infrastructure, [16] and has since been plausibly categorized as a genocide by the world’s leading human rights organizations.[17] The EU’s silence—or open support for the Israeli government—has severely harmed its global reputation and contradicted its stated mandate as a protector of rights-based values. Germany has been particularly in the focus of criticism for what continues to be perceived as an unrelenting de facto exculpation of Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition and for its growing domestic restrictions to the right to protest.[18]
During the intensification of the war, more than half a million people, mostly Syrian refugees as well as Lebanese citizens, had taken the risk to flee to Syria, and more than 800,000 people were displaced internally. Israel repeatedly targeted UNIFIL troops. The IDF destroyed UNRWA structures and bombed the immediate surroundings of UNESCO-protected heritage sites, which willfully endangered cultural heritage. Thus, the dramatic impact of Israel’s offensive contradicted the declared EU policy goals in Lebanon and threatened to accelerate the economic and political collapse in Lebanon as well as further regional escalation.
However, as in the case of Gaza, the EU’s reactions to Israel’s conduct of war might best be likened, in the words of political scientist Reinoud Leenders, to “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde”[19]: The EU and its member states increased their humanitarian aid to Lebanon amid Israel’s recent offensive,[20] reiterated their “strong support for the state institutions of Lebanon,” and urged “both parties to urgently implement a ceasefire,”[21] but refrained from condemning the Israeli offensive and applying effective pressure toward ending the hostility. This is particularly striking as the EU, in contrast to the US, had not listed the political arm of Hezbollah as a terrorist entity and had maintained contacts with the group. Yet it failed to use this leverage to pursue diplomatic efforts, instead relying on the US to perform the role of the key ceasefire broker. This lack of action is irritating at best, given the past EU involvement in Lebanon, including its role in the post-2006 arrangements, Resolution 1701, and UNIFIL.
Josep Borrell, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from 2019 until December 2024, adopted a more critical line toward the end of his term and after the Israeli government refuted all his prior demands and appeals, even recommending a termination of the EU’s political dialogue with Israel. Yet punitive measures are consequently ruled out by Germany and a block of states considered to be staunch supporters of the current Israeli government, including Austria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The latter in fact prevented a common position demanding an immediate ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel and condemning the number of Lebanese civilians killed.[22] The EU remained silent while Netanyahu’s government toppled what appears to have been an already agreed upon ceasefire in Lebanon by killing Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, 2024,[23] except for occasionally voiced dissent by individual states such as Ireland, Belgium, or Spain.[24] As most EU member states like Germany, Italy, or Spain hold ambiguous positions regarding arms sales to Israel—the growing body of evidence for the latter’s unlawful and even genocidal conduct of war presented by human rights organizations, independent experts, and international courts notwithstanding—French President Emmanuel Macron’s call for halting arms sales in early October was but an individual initiative, not a coordinated response.[25] Borrell’s successor, the EU’s new chief of foreign policy Kaja Kallas, has already toned down her critique and indicated that she would consider resuming meetings of the EU-Israel Association Council.[26]
The EU largely remained on the sidelines watching a relentless attack on the very Lebanese state and society it had tried to support: from safe environments for Syrian refugees to education, healthcare, agriculture, infrastructure, cultural heritage, or the Lebanese state and its army. The union even refrained from a strong reaction to the attacks on its own forces serving within UNIFIL, apart from expressing “grave concern” and condemning the attacks.[27] While some observers have described the EU as a “mere spectator in the imploding Middle East,”[28] the perception of the EU in Lebanon differs quite markedly from that of a mere spectator. To large parts of the population in Lebanon—political elites, civil society, academics, and the general public—and the Global South more broadly, the EU’s betrayal of its own values is strikingly apparent. In their eyes, member states like Germany, if not the EU itself, have not only acted in the most hypocritical manner but effectively become a party to the conflict through the active and incessant support for and defense of Israel’s war efforts. If the EU and its member states—including Germany—had previously been seen as relatively trustworthy, impartial brokers, and supporters of Lebanon and its civil society, they have now squandered much, if not all, of this trust.
Summary and Recommendations
To summarize, the EU’s (in-)actions toward the war in Lebanon have had at least three consequences detrimental to the EU’s standing and policy objectives: First, the EU has further divided member states in an already divisive debate about its Middle East policy and relationship with Israel. Second, the war on Lebanon and the subsequent destruction have severely harmed the EU’s own long-standing interests and priorities in Lebanon and the wider Middle East, including its declared goals of stabilizing Lebanon and advancing a “two-state solution” to the Palestine conflict as well as its overall capacity to influence the situation on the ground. Third, the EU’s failure to stand up for the universal application of values and frameworks that lie at the core of its own identity and self-perception, such as human rights, international law, accountability, peaceful diplomacy, and democracy, has contributed to their partial discrediting as empty rhetoric in the eyes of many. This equally emboldens autocrats and despots to deride universal values as “hypocritical Western frameworks.” The erosion of international frameworks and norms, which have been at the heart of the EU’s soft power for decades, might prove to be among the most far-reaching consequences of the EU’s policies toward Lebanon.
Following the attack on Lebanon, the current EU’s provision of humanitarian aid and promises for reconstruction, though important, are by far not enough. Decisive actions need to be taken to advance a “sequenced de-escalation” in Lebanon, and, ultimately, Gaza in order to stop the dramatic effects on all civilians.[29] Therefore the EU needs to mobilize support for the consolidation of the ceasefire and the implementation of Resolution 1701, including a resolute mandate to effectively empower the Lebanese army and make sure citizens in Israel’s north and Lebanon’s south will not again be victims of future rounds of violence—a goal which all Lebanese actors, including Hezbollah, seem to accept as long as steps leading to internal Lebanese divisions can be avoided.[30] The EU should intensify its effort to foster an inclusive political process and strengthen a civil society which has suffered greatly under the recent offensive. Finally, with the removal of the Assad dictatorship, a new beginning in Syria, and the declared end to Syrian interference in neighboring countries, there is a new window of opportunity for Lebanon as well. Some refugees have already returned to Syria, and if the EU can accompany a productive economic and political reconstruction process in the country, there could be manifold positive spillover effects for Lebanon.
With the second Trump presidency on the horizon, now is the time for the EU to act more independently and decisively to uphold and rehabilitate the values and international law frameworks it espouses and contribute toward peace in the Levant. In this context, the EU needs to strengthen the role of the UN and other international bodies, including courts that will likely face severe funding cuts under US President Trump, such as the ICC and ICJ. It needs to protect them against increasing attacks, particularly if they emanate from its allies, as is the case when the Israeli government recently declared UN Secretary General António Guterres “persona non grata.” If the EU wants to reclaim its political influence and credibility in the region it is also high time to use its leverage over Israel, a country it considers a key economic and political ally, to advance de-escalations of the wars in the Levant and an end to illegal occupations, thus paving the path toward justice.
The EU needs to advance and adhere to the very universal values it claims to promote in Lebanon, the Middle East, and beyond. A failure to do so will not only circumvent its influence in the region but might fundamentally threaten its ability to act in the international arena.
[1] https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/doctors-describe-the-horror-of-israels-pager-attack-in-lebanon/
[2] http://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v46/n20/adam-shatz/after-nasrallah
[3] Statistics in this article refer to the time of publication in January 2025. Current information is available at:
https://www.unocha.org/lebanon
[4] https://www.timesofisrael.com/2-injured-as-hezbollah-fires-100-rockets-at-north-beirut-shuts-schools/
[5] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/11/29/in-maps-satellite-imagery-reveals-massive-destruction-in-southern-lebanon_6734520_4.html
[6] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2018-12/eu_lebanon_partnership_priorities_2016-2020_and_their_annexed_eu-lebanon_compact.pdf
[7] Peter Seeberg, “EU Policies Concerning Lebanon and the Bilateral Cooperation on Migration and Security – New Challenges Calling for New Institutional Practices?,” Palgrave Communications 4, no. 1 (November 13, 2018): 1–9.
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0192-7
[8] See, for example, the numerous International Crisis Group (ICG) reports devoted to the topic over the years:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/lebanon
[9] https://www.thepolicyinitiative.org/article/details/276/how-the-many-become-a-few
[10] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/f4e84dca-e127-491b-ad92-21bb070c73f7_en?filename=factsheet_eu_support_lebanon_en.pdf
[11] https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/eus-lebanon-policy-no-easy-way-forward-35013
[12] https://ecfr.eu/publication/people-before-politicians-how-europeans-can-help-rebuild-lebanon/
[13] Kelly Petillo, “Strategic Aid: How the EU-Lebanon Migration Deal Can Work,” ECFR (blog), May 3, 2024,
https://ecfr.eu/article/strategic-aid-how-the-eu-lebanon-migration-deal-can-work/
[14] https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/eus-lebanon-policy-no-easy-way-forward-35013
[15] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/20/eu-staffers-criticise-von-der-leyens-uncontrolled-support-of-israel
[16] René Wildangel, “The EU and German Position on the Events of October 7 and the War on Gaza,”
https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1655315
[17] Amnesty International issued its report, “You Feel Like You Are Subhuman – Israel’s Genocide Against Palestinians in Gaza,” on December 5, 2024. Human Rights Watch followed on December 19 with its report, “Israel’s Crime of Extermination, Acts of Genocide in Gaza.”
[18] Marcus Schneider and Jannis Grimm, “Germany’s Fall from Grace, IPS, June 5, 2024,
https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/germanys-fall-from-grace-7536/
[19] Reinoud Leenders, “The Strange Case of the EU’s Partnership as Lebanon Is Ravaged by Israel’s Machine of Death,” The Policy Initiative, accessed on October 12, 2024,
[20] In early October 2024, the EU raised its annual support for Lebanon to €104 million,
https://x.com/EU_Commission/status/1841758195548667948; Germany, https://www.bmz.de/en/news/press-releases/development-minister-schulze-in-beirut-germany-supports-idp-234190
[21] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/09/26/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-military-escalation-between-israel-and-hezbollah/,
October 18, 2024; Josep Borrell speech: “It Is Time to Give Peace a Chance,”
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/it-time-give-peace-chance_en
[22] https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/10/01/czech-republic-blocks-joint-eu-statement-urging-immediate-ceasefire-in-lebanon
[23] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/06/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-ceasefire-talks.html
[24] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-lawmakers-slam-israel-over-attacks-on-lebanon-gaza/3370752
[25] https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/10/09/are-european-countries-still-supplying-arms-to-israel
[26] https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/european-union-to-resume-association-council-meetings-with-israel/
[27]https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/10/13/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-recent-attacks-against-unifil/
[28] Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt, “Israel’s Unwinnable Wars: The Path to De-Escalation in the Middle East,” ECFR (blog), September 26, 2024,
https://ecfr.eu/article/israels-unwinnable-wars-the-path-to-de-escalation-in-the-middle-east/;
Luigi Scazzieri, “A Mere Spectator? Europe and the Imploding Middle East,” Centre for European Reform (blog), October 9, 2024,
https://www.cer.eu/insights/mere-spectator-europe-and-imploding-middle-east
[29] Rym Momtaz, “Now Is Europe’s Time to Act on Lebanon,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (blog), accessed on November 4, 2024,
[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/truce-talks-progress-lebanons-army-cornered-by-politics-funding-2024-11-19/