Introduction
The Hebrew State came into being at a moment of cumulative transformations in the geostrategic sphere that occurred in the wake of World War II. Accordingly, its continued existence as a state and as a vital project in the Middle East still depend upon geostrategic balances and their aftereffects. This being so, Israel in all its manifestations, from its beginnings as a historical concept to its becoming a political project, then a military polity, and finally a nuclear state with broad ambitions, have caused it to appear as a political entity born from the womb of geopolitics.[1]
On the other side of the Middle East, Iran appears as a state imprisoned in a geopolitical logic, though with an important difference having to do with history and cultural heritage, in addition to the diverse political regimes that governed that state. Ever since its historical formulation, when Iran was an empire and even after it embraced Islam, or under the Safavid, then Qajar, then Pahlavi dynasties, and now as an Islamic Republic, it has always been a captive of geopolitical realities, given its geographical location, its location on the map of the world’s political economy, its being a crossroads of trade and energy transfer, and its own definition of its national security. If one does not, at a minimum, determine the geopolitical equation or define it, Iran would not have assumed the shape it does today nor the shapes it assumed throughout its long history.[2]
These words of an Introduction attempt to understand what is currently happening between Iran and Israel. One of its most important features is to regard it as moment of direct and violent confrontation witnessed by Middle Eastern geopolitics in the wake of the Tufan al-Aqsa operation led by HAMAS’s military wing on October 7, 2023 and subsequent and escalating Israeli allusions to moving forward to creating “a new Middle East.”
The geopolitics of confrontation: From escalating shadow battles to open warfare
If one examines the ups and downs of the struggle between Iran and Israel, one will note the appearance of several levels that determine the dynamism of that struggle in its most important arenas. Foremost among these levels is the particular character of Iran’s exceptional national security configuration. This consists of a non-traditional construction of horizontal blocks and successive defensive lines rather than a deterrent force clearly centralized. It follows that Iran’s regional influence proceeds on different fronts and is multinational and thus performs a role of providing a thick cover for the concept of Iranian national security in its geostrategic meaning. This Iranian configuration of its concept of national security is the opposite of that of Israel since any progress or success for Israel’s concept of its national security means a regress in Iran’s regional influence and power, and vice versa.[3]
From beyond the actual scene of this military and political confrontation, two other factors determine the mechanisms of confrontation and agreement:
1- Iran’s nuclear program which continues to grow as an alternative strategy in case Iran views its current security as being no longer effective.
2- The US determinant which is committed to Israel’s security and which translates into a certain degree of confronting Iran in its zones of influence but without going as far as open war.
This type of national security configuration, complex and restricted by geo-political considerations, has forced a particular character on the confrontation between Iran and Israel, represented by shadow battles on several fronts. Both sides, the Iranian as well as the Israeli, had relied upon the cumulative results of acts of confrontation. This understanding of the conflict between them remained the same for many years, even at its most extreme junctures. However, following the Tufan al-Aqsa operation, it has become clear that Israel’s adherence to a shadow confrontation with Iran is no longer valid. Israel’s assessment of Iran’s denial of any knowledge of that operation was not granted any credence or importance. Equally ignored by Israel is the US assurance that there is no evidence to link Iran to the operation. That Israeli assessment was determined by four factors which together constituted the very heart of Israel’s doctrine of action in the arena of its response, and Iran was present at the very center of that doctrine:[4]
1- Tehran, as a regional player leading the axis of resistance, cannot be divorced from HAMAS. Therefore, part of Israel’s response would be to attack Iran geographically and not Iran as a revolution in its various spheres of influence.
2- Bringing out from the shadows and into the open a vitally strategic part of the confrontation with Iran.
3- The need to deconstruct the concept of “Unity of Arenas.”
4- A drive towards an open confrontation provided this ends with an open war between Iran and the USA, providing a rare opportunity to neutralize the Iranian threat at one go and with American hands.
A new Middle East: Netanyahu and destroying the grounding principles of resistance
Israel translated its understanding of these principles by effectively embracing a graduated strategy that began by demolishing what one might call the “geopolitics of resistance” as a vital part of the regional umbrella covering Iranian national security. The object was to drive Iran back to its own state frontiers and rob it of its most effective geostrategic power. To that end, Israel has moved on four levels:
1- Violent strikes against fire circles built by Iran over many years in the shadows, whether it be against Gaza, and to a lesser extent against the West Bank, or against Hizbullah in Lebanon, in addition to attacking the lines of military supplies in Syria.
2- Targeting Iran itself to convince it that the Tehran-led axis of resistance is of no effect in defending its national security.
3- Ending the rules of engagement hitherto in play in the period of shadow warfare.
4- Adopting a policy of intensive assassinations to dispose of leaders, military and political, of the first rank in the resistance axis.[5]
A review of policy carried out by some Iranian elites concluded that the viewpoint and calculations of the axis of resistance as regards Israel’s collective capabilities, political, military, economic and social, were not sufficiently accurate. This led to some doubts being expressed about the validity of what might be called the grounding principles of resistance for the decisive battle to come. It became apparent to these analysts that Israel as a state, army, society, economy, and its web of regional and international ties was not fragile enough to allow it to collapse from within. The points listed below are an attempt to summarize these principles:
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The resistance capturing tens of Israeli civilians and military.
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A long-term war.
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Confrontation on several fronts.
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Israel’s economy is fragile and can collapse.
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Israeli society is not a war society.
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Families of prisoners as an instrument of pressure.
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The stability and coherence of Israel’s domestic front.
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International law and Israel’s narrative of the struggle.
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The splintering of political life in Israel.
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The differences between Israel and the US as regards the future of the Middle East.
More than a year after the Tufan al-Aqsa operation, Israel appears to be intent upon undermining all these grounding principles despite the enormous losses it has suffered on the military, security, strategic, economic, and social levels. Israel persists in attempting to create a new Middle East, a matter which strongly impacts Iran’s strategic nerve center and forces it to adopt a new confrontation doctrine that lies outside its historic caution, a doctrine one might call “strategic patience.”[6]
Tehran beyond the bounds of strategic caution: striking with an Iranian arm
To understand Iran’s strategic thinking and how Iran behaves in moments of complexity and danger on the geostrategic level, two basic principles need to be kept in mind:
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The first is the centrality of the idea of survival. The Iranian regime is not suicidal. It prefers to survive pragmatically while upholding an acceptable level of revolutionary ideas, and to pursue its own objectives as opposed to revolutionary adventurism that creates a model of heroism which literally adheres to slogans.
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The second may be summarized as a constant striving aimed at domesticating the geostrategic location for the benefit of national security so as to preserve Iranian national identity within the framework of a national state.
Given this framework, a fundamental part of the Iranian assessment of the period following Tufan al-Aqsa is limited by three constraints as to any future move:
1- For the first time in four decades, Israel has adopted a pragmatic viewpoint that elevates the level of danger from Iran which it now considers an existential threat.
2- Treating Iran as an existential threat has created a state of instability in the balance of the geostrategic conflict, thus forcing upon Iran the need to formulate a new balance of confrontation that rearranges the elements of its geostrategic power.
3- The urgent need to reinforce and redefine Iran’s red line and to demarcate what is acceptable from what is not. In this sense, judging between surrender and open war will inevitably lead to war. However, pragmatism must also be practiced in dealing with specific issues and in determining when to retreat or bend.
The assessment process outlined above has concluded that it is a strategic necessity to confront Israel with Iranian power openly and officially and from Iranian territory.[7] For Iran to do so in practical terms it needs, to begin with, to strategically fortify its national security doctrine. This has led the Iranians, for the first time officially, to link their national security to its existential dimension and their nuclear doctrine.[8] In putting into effect Iran’s new understanding of deterrence, the military concept of “Truthful Promise” has come into being as a graduated deterrence:
The first “Truthful Promise” operation/A display of force:
The Iranian strike on April 13, 2024, was a direct response to the Israeli raid on the Annex of the Iranian Consulate in Damascus on April 1 of that year, which had killed a number of commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Iran’s response took place under a broad strategic umbrella, namely, a display of power.[9] It assumed the following dimensions:
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Massive scale.
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Limited in losses.
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With an implicit message that Tehran is serious.
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Clean and bloodless.
The second “Truthful Promise” operation/The use of force:
Israel responded to the First “Truthful Promise” operation in a graduated manner but with a strong impact on Iranian influence and its geostrategic centers in the Middle East. On April 19, 2024, Israel raided an air defense system in the Eighth Base of the Iranian army, an air defense unit located near the Natanz nuclear establishment in Isfahan, thereby sending a message that Israel could reach Natanz itself if it wanted. A little more than two months later, on July 31, Israel assassinated Isma`il Haniyya, head of HAMAS’s Political Bureau while on a visit to Tehran. Barely two months later, and on September 27, 2024, Israel assassinated Hizbullah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrullah in Beirut.
Tehran interpreted Israel’s strategy in two ways:
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A clear and obvious Israeli strategy that no longer observed any red lines hereafter, and was intent upon redrawing in blood the frontiers of a new Middle East, especially the elements of Iran’s geostrategic power.
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Israel was imposing on Tehran a certain logic whereby it is a choice between an open-ended confrontation and the likelihood of open war or else a declared surrender.[10]
Tehran adhered to its strategic policy that it had drawn up and, on October 1, 2024, decided to proceed to the second stage of the “Truthful Promise” operation, which carried the following features:
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The actual use of force rather than its mere display.
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The need to achieve an immediate military success rather than sending political messages. This became apparent through the targets selected, from Mossad HQ, to the main depot of F35 fighters, the runways at Novatim airbase, the Hitzarim airbase, the Tall Nov military base, directional radar stations, and tank concentrations.
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The use of the most effective part of the missiles system represented by hypersonic missiles like FATTAH 1 and FATTAH 2, which needed less than 13 minutes to reach their targets deep inside Israel.
The third “Truthful Promise” operation/The possibility of transcending forbidden limits:
Israel considered that Tehran had crossed a red line by launching the second “Truthful Promise” operation and that its forthcoming response could take in energy centers, harbors, airports, gas and oil installations as well as nuclear establishments and assassinations of front rank leaders. However, Israel refrained from carrying this out but instead and on October 26, 224, launched a different military strike. It targeted an important section of Iran’s strategic doctrine by shelling military positions where a program of ballistic missiles was being developed, in addition to targeting the Barjin military establishment east of Tehran, an establishment that is of vital importance if Iran wished to introduce certain changes to its nuclear doctrine.
Tehran responded by deciding to move on to the third version of the “Truthful Promise” operation. According to official statements, this Iranian response is designed to be completely unexpected in form and content and in its level of destruction and the targets to be reached.[11] Hence, the third “Truthful Promise” operation appears to be the touch stone in Tehran’s advance to a new stage of deterrence and its position in any new Middle East. Quite part from the shape, content and date of this response, this third version of the “Truthful Promise” is constrained within the following boundaries:[12]
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The political situation arising from the return of Trump to the White House.
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The importance of the target and the centrality of losses instead of multiple targets and the field of targeting.
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The strategy of bloodless strikes can no longer be pursued.
The Lebanese Hizbullah: the central importance of survival and the bounds of influence
The Lebanese Hizbullah is unlike any other organization for Iran and its current model as represented by the Islamic Republic, nor is it like any other in its origins, doctrinal structure or paramount role, making it the jewel in the crown of Iranian influence in the region. This being so, Hizbullah occupies in practical terms a place in Iran’s doctrine by performing three simultaneous roles:
1- It confronts Israel from zero distance according to the doctrine of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.[13]
2- It controls the internal balance of power in Lebanon to the point where it prevents other schemes from affecting Lebanon’s situation in the Middle East.[14]
3- The regional dimension of Hizbullah, in military and organizational terms, which performs certain vital roles in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere.[15]
Tehran does not look upon these three roles with one eye or one logic. In fact, it attaches enormous importance to differentiating between them on the principle that what might be acceptable as its role in one arena may be a red line in another. Given this logic, it would be worthwhile to ask how Iran will deal with Hizbullah’s future role in the era that followed October 7 and its limits and constraints.
To attempt an answer to this question, Tehran’s anxiety revolves around the first or military role, that is, confronting Israel militarily, this being the role that uundergirds and guarantees the other two roles in an effective manner. In this regard, strategic analysts in Tehran find themselves forced to deal with the future of that role from two basic constraints:
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Resolution 1701 as a prerequisite for any truce.
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The future of Hizbullah’s weapons as per that Resolution.
Distinguishing between strategy and tactics, Tehran gave its blessings to the ceasefire declared in accordance with Resolution 1701, quite apart from its conflict with traditional Hizbullah slogans or its lack of conformity with Iran’s understanding of the confrontation with Israel. It is thus unclear as to how Tehran will react with the consequences of accepting that Resolution, the following being its most salient results:
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Ending the battle in support of Gaza and HAMAS.
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Disabling the concept of the unity of resistance fronts.
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The prospect of disarming Hizbullah.
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Israel’s continuing genocide in Gaza.
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A tight siege which prevents Iran from rearming Hizbullah through Syria.
Essentially, it appears that it would be difficult for Tehran to accept such an outcome since it would constitute a gradual regress that leads to a strategic retreat, and this at a moment of dire peril that would permit the creation of an Israeli version of the Middle East.
Iran and Israel: From geopolitics to individual deterrence
As Iran reviews the period following October 7, one urgent question has arisen regarding the efficacity of current instruments being used in the geostrategic confrontation with Israel. This questioning has taken four forms, all of which call for a review of the country’s defense doctrine:
1- First is a theory that stresses the need to introduce radical changes in the defense doctrine, especially since part of the confrontation with Israel has turned from war by proxy to an open and declared war.[16]
2- Another theory calls for prioritizing the principle of self-deterrence as a means of filling the gaps in a multi-staged deterrence that uses the tactic of incompatible war.[17]
3- A broad spectrum of opinion exists that calls for a change in the country’s nuclear doctrine and for embracing the principle of nuclear deterrence.[18]
4- There is a composite view which calls for combining all the points above with the aim of constructing a confrontation strategy that conforms with the requirements of the moment. There are certain pragmatic considerations which favor the adoption of this view even if its outlines are still in the preliminary stages and have not been finalized. These include the following elements:
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A radical transformation has taken place in Israel’s status in Iran’s military doctrine. It has moved from being part of Tehran’s wider doctrine to do with confronting the US and its military presence in the Middle East to being a confrontation with Israel directly.
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A separation in scenarios in dealing with the US and Israel.
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Prioritizing an increase in self capability in deterring Israel and investing in fields which support and protect that option. This became clear in the recent increase in the defense budget,[19] in addition to its focus on what are called “mother technology” in its military applications, the most important of these being:
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Investing in a special satellite program and developing it across the coming twenty years as a strategic necessity.
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Enhancing the accuracy of the missile system to remove any margin of error.
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Increasing the range of missiles.
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Enhancing the capabilities of missiles to carry non-conventional heads as to weight and destructive effect.
Conclusion
The Tufan al-Aqsa operation created deep repercussions that impacted the confrontation between Iran and Israel. In Tehran’s view, Israel has crossed every red line while in Israel’s view Iran has become bolder and more adventurous by deciding to overstep the forbidden limit and attack deep inside Israel, openly and in an official manner. The ruling political and military circles in Tehran realize that a new Middle East is coming into existence and is an inevitable development so has decided to concentrate on foiling Israel’s understanding of that new Middle East.
In any strategic review of events in the wake of the Tufan al-Aqsa operation, the Middle East continues to witness violent confrontations in the geostrategic struggle between Iran and Israel but without slipping into open warfare even if at times they appeared on the verge. But what has become very clear in the context of current events is that Iran after Tufan al-Aqsa has radically changed its influence and its definition of national security, and Israel too has radically changed as it wages its various wars to recover its regional prestige and protective shield.
This is where the American component will come into play with the return of Donald Trump to the White House. This will be the most decisive and most complex and threatening factor that will determine the future character of the geostrategic struggle between Iran and Israel. It will either move the region in the direction of a far-reaching and decisive war, even if gradually, or else in the direction of political pragmatism and the negotiating table.
[1] حسينى, سيد حامد, (1401), اسرائیل و معماری نوین ژئوپلیتیکی (اسرائيل والبناء الجيوسياسي المعاصر) (2022)، مرکز پژوهش های علمی و مطالعاتی استراتژیک خاورمیانه, تاريخ انتشار در سایت مرکز: 28 خردماه 1401 (يونيو 2022).
[2] سمنانى, عليرضا عباسى (1397) (2018)، موقعیت ژئوپلیتیکی ایران در مناسبات قدرت منطقه وجهان (الموقع الجيوسياسي لإيران في الأحداث الإقليمية والعالمية), اطلاعات جغرافیایی(سپـهر)، فصلنامه ای, دوره 22 ، شماره 86, ص 98, ص 99.
[3] جمشیدی, محسن یحیی بنی هاشمی مریم اصغری, (1402) (2023)، سیاسی تهدیدات نفوذ خاورمیانه ای رژیم صهیونیستی و تاثیر ان بر امنیت ملی – منطقه ای جمهوری اسلامی ایران (نفوذ الكيان الصهيوني وتداعيات تهديداته الساسية على الأمن القومي والاقليمي لايران)، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی, دوره 1 بهار و تابستان 1402 (2023) شماره 1, ص 24.
[4] جعفری, امیرحسین, (1403) (2024)، هفتم اکتبر، جنگ سایه میان ایران و اسرائیل را پایان داده اما آیا ایران برای جنگ مستقیم آماده است؟ (انتهاء حرب الظل بين ايران واسرائيل بفعل 7 اكتوبر لكن هل ايران مستعدة لحرب مباشرة ؟)، سايت خبرى وتحليلى رويداد 24, تاریخ:08 آبانماه 1403 (ابريل 2024).
[5] رهبر, عباسعلی, (1403) (2024), بازخوانی مواجهه محور مقاومت با اسرائیل (مراجعات للمواجهة بين محور المقاومة واسرائيل)،موسسه آینده پژوهی جهان اسلام, تاريخ انتشار 04 مهرماه 1403 (سبتمبر 2024).
[6] سیاست «صبر استراتژیک» خط قرمزهای ایران را شامل نمیشود (سياسة الصبر الاستراتيجي لا تضمن خطوط إيران الحمراء)، سايت خبرگزاری جمهوری اسلامی, تاريخ انتشار 06 فروردین 1403 (مارس 2024).
[7] ایران چگونه میتواند مانع تکرار عبور اسرائیل از خطوط قرمزش شود؟ (كيف يمكن لايران منع اسرائيل من تجاوز خطوطها الخمراء مرك أخرى)،سايت خبرگزاری دانشجویان ایران, ايسنا, تحليل خبرى, تاريخ انتشار 14 مهرماه 1403 (اكتوبر 2024).
[8] المرجع السابق رقم 7.
[9] جابری انصاری: عملیات وعده صادق یک نمایش قدرت بزرگ بود (جابري أنصاري: عملية الوعد الصادق 1 استعراض كبير للقوة)، سايت خبرگزاری جمهوری اسلامی, گفتگوی تفصیلی, , تاريخ انتشار 06 اردیبهشت 1403 (ابريل 2024).
[10] وعده صادق 2 " عبور از نمایش قدرت به سوی اعمال قدرت (الوعد الصادق 2 والعبور من استعراض القوة إلى استخدام القوة)، سايت قوه قضائيه, دادگستری استان یزد, تحليل خبرى, تاريخ انتشار 13 مهرماه 1403 (اكتوبر 2024).
[11] سردار فضلی: وعده صادق ۳ پاسخ دندانشکن به دشمن خواهد بود (الجنرال فضلي : الوعد الصادق 3 سيكون حاسما ومدمرا)، خبرگزاری صدا و سیما, تاريخ انتشار 17 آبانماه 1403 (نوفمبر 2024).
[12] گزینه های ایران برای عملیات وعده صادق ۳ (خيارات ايران المطروحة خلال الوعد الصادق 3)، سايت مسير اقتصاد, تحليل خبرى, تاريخ انتشار 09 آبانماه 1403 (اكتوبر 2024).
[13] موسوی, سید صالح, مرتضی علویان, (1401), پرســى وجوه افتراق واشتراك انديشه سياسى جنبش حزب الله لبنان با انديشه سياسى انقلاب اسلامى ايران (دراسة المشتركات والاختلافات بين الفكر السياسي لحزب الله في لبنان والفكر السياسي للثورة الاسلامية في ايران)، فصلنــامه اندیشهسیاسی در اسلام, شماره 31, بهار 1401, ص 114.
[14] المرجع السابق رقم 13 ص 117.
[15] لمرجع السابق رقم 13 ص 120.
[16] رئیس هیأت عامل صندوق توسعه ملی : لزوم تغییر دکترین دفاعی برای ایجاد بازدارندگی کامل (ضرورة تغيير العقيدة الدفاعية للبلاد بهدف صناعة الردع الكامل)، سايت روابط عمومی صندوق توسعه ملی, تاريخ انتشار 28 مهرماه 1403 (اكتوبر 2024).
[17] تغییر در دکترین دفاعی ایران با فرمان رهبر انقلاب؛ افزایش برد موشکها کلید میخورد؟ (تغيير العقيدة الدفاعية للبلاد بعد أوامر المرشد.. زيادة مدى الصواريخ)، سايت خبرى وتحليل هاى سياسى تابناك, تحليل راهبردى, تاريح انتشار تاريخ انتشار 13 ابانماه 1403 (نوفمبر 2024).
[18] المرجع السابق رقم 17.
[19] سخنگوی دولت: افزایش ۲۰۰ درصدی «بودجه نظامی» کشور (المتحدثة باسم الحكومة: زيادةحجم ميزانية الدفاع بنسبة 200 في المئة)، سايت حبرى انتحاب, تاريخ انتشار 08 ابانماه 1403 (نوفمبر 2024).