The policy of reverting back to settlement in the northern West Bank (hereafter WB) was one of the most prominent objectives of the 37th government of Israel. All wings of the settlement movement coalesced to achieve that aim, starting with “Hilltop Youth” who created facts on the ground and settled the land and including powerful settler movements that cooperated with various ministers and political elites to change or amend laws, and down to the army which approved these amendments and provided protection to the settlers. This paper will attempt to trace the course of the return to resettlement in the northern WB after the settlements in that region had been evacuated in accordance with “Disengagement Law” of 2005. In keeping with that plan and law Israel disengaged from the northern WB settlements and Gaza and redeployed its army. In keeping with that law also Israelis were forbidden from returning to these areas and settling them anew. Thus, when that law was amended on March 20, 2023, this constituted the first legal step in the resumption of settlement in the northern WB.[1]
"The Disengagement Plan" and the religious school (Yeshiva) in Homesh
Within the framework of the “Disengagement Plan” of 2005, Israel vacated its settlements in Gaza together with four settlements in the northern WB: Sanor (founded in 1977), Kadim (!983), Ganim (1983) and Homesh (1978), this last being the final settlement vacated from the northern WB. Unlike other settlers who simply moved to other places, the settlers of Homesh were religious and members of the ideological “Religious Zionist” movement and regarded themselves as living in a “diaspora.” Starting in 2007, they strove to organize an annual march to that settlement and built a synagogue there and some mobile homes which justified these visits[2]. In 2009, these settlers founded the religious-military school at Homesh and began to try to expand it by adding new buildings only to have the army remove them once again. It is important to note in this context that the army in accordance with the “Disengagement Plan” had decided to forbid settlers from staying in that settlement but did not prevent them from visiting it, nor did it rescind the land seizure order according to which the settlements had originally been built. This state of affairs, i.e. attempts to settle followed by evacuations by the army lasted until 2021, when the settlers seized the chance afforded by some Palestinians having murdered a student at that religious-military school to prevent evacuation and create new facts on the ground. Offering full support, the security minister ordered an army detachment to be permanently stationed there to protect the religious school and its students.[3]
In this regard one should add that, in 2017, the Israeli Military Commander of the WB issued a military order forbidding the settlers from remaining in that settlement only to be revealed later that that order was not carried out. In addition to forbidding settlers, that same order forbad the Palestinian owners of that same land from accessing their lands, an order that was enforced. In other words, that military order forbad Palestinians from accessing their own lands but did not forbid the settlers from remaining where they were, since they now enjoyed military protection despite that same military order.[4] Here in effect is a prime example of how a religious school came to constitute the most salient instance of the settlers succeeding in preserving a tiny, limited and illegal settlement which came to constitute the nucleus that allowed resettlement to mushroom throughout the entire northern WB.
The other legal obstacle before the religious school in Homesh was that it was built on private Palestinian land, placing difficulties in the way of “legitimizing” the land seizure before the Israeli Supreme Court. That Court was in the habit of ordering evacuation of settlements built on private land following a lengthy period of litigation before various courts. If it ordered evacuation, this constituted a legal obstacle to their legitimacy, the claim which Palestinians relied upon when presenting their legal case before Israel’s Supreme Court. So, on 29 May 2023, the settlers during the night moved the religious school to what is known as “state land” which lay next to the private lands, being only a few hundred meters away from its previous location, a move approved by the Minister of Defense Yoav Galant.[5] What now happened was that in August 2023 the Supreme Court, and following years of deliberations, annulled the legal case brought by the Palestinians against the settlement, arguing that their case rested on the fact that the settlement was built on private Palestinian land but once that settlement had moved to neighboring state land, there was no longer any need for further deliberation.[6]
In this regard, one should note that moving the religious school to a neighboring land did not mean protection of private Palestinian lands. Quite the contrary, since moving it meant that it enjoyed legal protection, as actually happened. At the same time, and in order for the army to protect it, the army besieged private lands, forbidding access to them, which meant that Palestinians are now forbidden from reaching their lands by a military order. This in effect means that moving the settlement effectively protects it while also seizing private Palestinian lands. The school’s new location is no less strategic since it is built on a hill between four Palestinian towns, obstructing Palestinian movement, especially with repeated settler attacks on Palestinians in the vicinity of the school itself and of the mobile homes constructed by the settlers, attacks which include throwing stones, opening fire and destruction of property. According to the Yesh Din organization, the Israeli police have annulled all complaints presented to them about settler violence in the region, these amounting to 23 reports and complaints.[7]
First steps until the return to Gaza
A great deal of importance attaches to the resumption of settlement in the northern WB and this on two levels: The first is geographical. The northern WB is a region where there is Palestinian geographical continuity and is practically devoid of settlements. This being so, amending the law will allow the settlers to return gradually to all four settlements vacated in that region. In fact, Israel, seizing the chance afforded by the events of October 7 and the genocidal war on Gaza, carried out its plans for the northern WB where settlements are now expanding and the religious school acts as a magnet to draw more settlers who grab more land and whose continuous attacks serve to drive out or besiege the Palestinian population. This is in fact what happened, for on May 22, 2024, Israel’s Defense Minister Yoav Galant signed another military order permitting resumption of settlement in the four settlements, including Homesh.[8]
The second level is ideological. The resumption of settlement in the northern WB is seen as an important objective by the Israeli right wing settler movement, which regards a return to regions previously vacated as feasible, and that it is possible to go back on the Disengagement Plan” according to which Israel for the first time had vacated Palestinian lands. In Israel that plan is seen as a strategic mistake since both the opposition and the ruling coalition in Israel regard it as such.[9] The leaders of the settler movement, the local councils and the Knesset have all publicly stated their intention to regard the return to Homesh as a first step towards a return to Gush Katif in Gaza. Thus, eleven settler societies declared the formation of a coalition which links the return to the northern WB to settlement in Gaza, considering Homesh to be simply the starting point to rectify the mistake by returning to Gaza.[10].
In the period prior to October 7 and the genocidal war on Gaza, settlement in the northern WB was creeping and slow. To avoid a clash with the US, the Israeli army attempted to quell settlement on the media level. Thus, the commander of the central sector issued a decree preventing settlers from remaining, despite the fact that the law had been amended and despite the new directions taken by the legislative process.
With the start of the genocidal war and with Israel exploiting to the full the attack of October 7, and with world attention centered on Gaza, the settlers and their field and political leaders seized the chance of war to speed up settlement on the ground. The religious school began to receive settlers who then remained in it and even demanded a military operation in the northern WB to break up Palestinian resistance and pave the way for the widespread expansion of settlement. Concurrently, the settlers worked hand in hand with ministers and Knesset members to enact legislation that prepares the legal grounds for annexation. Both things in fact took place, The Israeli Defense Minister in a joint communique with the head of the Shomron regional Council announced the implementation of the amendment to the “Disengagement Plan” to apply to all settlements previously dismantled in the northern WB, holding that “Jewish control over Judea and Samaria guarantees security.” Simultaneously, Israeli army assaults in the northern WB in particular began to escalate. Right wing ministers were not content to speak only of the northern WB but went further by affirming that this was the first step towards resuming settlement in Gaza. According to a report in Yediot Aharonot, the success achieved by settlers in returning to the northern WB constituted a motive for going ahead to resume settlement, at least in the northern Gaza Strip.[11] This is clearly the import of remarks made by the Minister of Settlement and National Missions Orit Strook who, once the law was amended, stated: “What we achieved today is stopping the course of evacuations and starting the course of forward progress,” alluding to settlement rebuilding in areas from which Israel had withdrawn. The other person who took the initiative to amend the law was Limor Son Har-Melech, a Knesset member representing the “Jewish Power” party who used to live in Homesh and who stated: “The mission is as follows: To return to the four settlements in the northern WB and then return to Katif which was abandoned and turned into a cradle of terrorism,” referring to the Gaza Strip.
A step towards stifling a political solution
Projects of settlement in the northern WB do not solely depend upon a law being amended or settlers returning to one settlement. Ready made plans exist, the most salient being the one advocated by prominent Israeli cabinet ministers, the so-called “Million for Shomron” plan, its aim being to increase the number of settlers in the northern WB to one million by 2050. This plan, prepared and introduced by
Yossi Dagan, head of the council of Shomron settlements, is not new, but has now acquired importance and urgency due to the wide spectrum of support for it inside the government. Among its fervent supporters are prominent cabinet ministers such as Minister of the Economy Nir Barakat, Minister of Culture and Sport Micky Zohar, Minister of Tourism Haim Katz from the ruling Likud party, together with others representing the Religious Zionists party and Jewish Power. Both parties are enthusiastic supporters of settlement, and both have expressed their backing for that plan in their political programs.[12] This indicates that the plan extends far beyond a few settlements, that it is long term, and that it seeks to spread settlements throughout the northern WB.
In this regard it is important to keep in mind that a return to resettlement in the northern WB , and later to Gaza, in accordance with the plans and aspirations of the settlers, constitutes yet a further step in sundering and disconnecting the largest and last remaining Palestinian territory which is geographically contiguous. The settlement project, besides being the principal instrument of land seizure, is also a well planned and organized scheme of domination aimed at sundering Palestinian communities and simultaneously building contiguous geographical settlements. This will create isolated Palestinian islands amid a sea of settlements connected to one another by fast ring roads as well as to major Jewish towns inside the ’48 territories, especially those on the coast where the economic hub is located. Hence, targeting the northern WB as one territory, in addition to Gaza, represents the dismantling of the last two Palestinian territories that are geographically contiguous with the aim of connecting together all settlement projects and also disconnecting Palestinian geographical contiguity in historic Palestine.
Therefore, we ought to regard resettlement in the northern WB as an additional step that complements openly declared political views that reject the creation of any independent Palestinian polity. This is the position officially adopted by the Israeli Knesset in in its resolution of 18 June 2024 which forbids the creation of a Palestinian state. Resuming settlement in the north, together with ongoing discussions of resuming settlements in Gaza, constitute the practical application on the ground of a policy that makes it impossible to create a Palestinian state and a contiguous Palestinian political entity. At a time when the Israeli political elite is working politically and vocally to totally reject the rights of the Palestinian people, the settlement movement is concurrently creating facts on the ground that cannot be undone in future, rendering the creation of a Palestinian state impossible through seizure of lands and developments in the field.
[1] "الهيئة العامة للكنيست تصادق على تعديل قانون ’فك الارتباط‘"، "واينت"، 21/3/2023 (بالعبرية).
[2] وليد حباس، "ما هي دلالات العودة إلى مستوطنة حومش في شمال الضفة الغربية"، المركز الفلسطيني للدراسات الإسرائيلية – مدار، 19/9/2023.
[3] المصدر نفسه.
[4] "المعرفة قبل الحديث عن تنظيم المدرسة الدينية في حومش"، مؤسسة سلام الآن، 20/12/2021 (بالعبرية).
[5] إليشع بن كيمون، "بعملية سرية ليلية، وبشكل غير قانوني: تم نقل المدرسة الدينية إلى أرض جديدة"، "واينت"، 29/5/2023 (بالعبرية).
[6] هاجر شيزاف، "المحكمة قامت بمحو الدعوى القضائية لأخلاء مستوطنة حومش"، "هآرتس"، 2/8/2023 (بالعبرية).
[7] "المعرفة قبل الحديث..."، مصدر سبق ذكره.
[8] حنان جرينوود، "غالانت: يمكن الاستيطان في مناطق السامرة التي تم إخلائها خلال فك الارتباط"، "يسرائيل هيوم"، 22/5/2024 (بالعبرية).
[9] أوريل ياري، "يائير لابيد يعترف: ’خطة الانفصال كانت خطأ‘"، "سروغيم"، 19/3/2019 (بالعبرية).
يهودا شليزنجر، "هيرتسوغ: فك الارتباط كان خطأ"، "يسرائيل هيوم"، 21/7/2015 (بالعبرية).
[10] "11 جمعية تشكّل ائتلافاً للعودة إلى غوش كاطيف"، "سروغيم"، 16/11/2023 (بالعبرية).
[11] إليشع بن كيمون، "’غير واقعي‘؟ ويخطط زعماء المستوطنين لبناء مستوطنة في شمال غزة"، "واينت"، 16/11/2023 (بالعبرية).
[12] إليشع بن كيمون، "برنامج ’المليون من أجل السامرة‘: وزراء الليكود يدعمون توسيع البناء – ’واجب الدولة‘"، "واينت"، 29/8/2023 (بالعبرية).