The day that followed the Tufan al-Aqsa operation on October 7, Hizbullah announced that a new war front had opened on the Lebanese border with Israel and affirmed that the aim was to provide support to the HAMAS movement in Gaza and to reduce Israeli military pressure on it. Beginning with October 9, Hizbullah began shelling Israeli military outposts in the border region in tandem with the progress of the fighting in the Gaza Strip. On that same day, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Galant recommended evacuation to begin of Israeli settlements close to the border with Lebanon, and moved military units in support towards that border, thereby starting a round of reciprocal military actions between Hizbullah and Israel.
The question raised from the first day of these confrontations was: Could these military activities on the Lebanese frontier develop into all out war? When the Israelis hesitated as to how to handle the front with Lebanon, and when the Israeli government rejected Galant’s suggestion made on October 11 to direct a preemptive strike against Hizbullah fighters deployed near the frontier, it became clear that the military and security leadership in Israel preferred to focus on their assault on Gaza and to treat the northern front as secondary. In response, Hizbullah Secretary General Hasan Nasrullah announced on November 3, and in his first speech after the start of the war on Gaza, that his party’s objective in its fight against the Israeli army on the border was to offer “support” and reduce Israeli military pressure on HAMAS. He added that the party had no intention of involving Lebanon in a destructive war, being a country suffering from a grievous economic and social crisis.
Today, however, three months having elapsed since the start of the war on Gaza, and following the great escalation that has taken place in confrontations between Hizbullah and the Israeli army in recent weeks, especially in the aftermath of the assassination of HAMAS official Salih al-`Aruri in the southern suburb, the heart land of Hizbullah, the party responded by shelling the Israeli military airbase at Meron. This was followed by the assassination of Wisam al-Tawil, commander of Hizbullah’s Ridwan brigade and an Israeli drone on the following day targeting a car carrying some Hizbullah fighters then followed by the assassination of a senior Hizbullah officer responsible for the drone section. Fear now began to grow that what was happening signaled an escalation towards a wider conflict.
Recent statements by Israeli officials emphasize their calling for a “radical transformation”[1] of the situation on the Lebanese side of the frontier, withdrawal of Hizbullah fighters beyond the Litani river, disarming it and removing its bases in the region, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1701 which ended the Israeli war of July 2006. They affirm that they have now given the chance for a diplomatic solution to succeed, but in case this fails they will resort to force.
BY way of contrast, and in a speech on January 5, 2024, Hizbullah Secretary General Hasan Nasrullah responded to the Israeli statements and to talks about redrawing the land frontier in return for withdrawal beyond the Litani river by stating that redrawing these borders was “a historic opportunity” for Lebanon but that negotiations are conditional upon the ending of Israel’s war on Gaza.
The dimensions of the crisis in southern Lebanon three months after the war on Gaza become clear when we compare statements made by Israeli officials with those made by Hizbullah Secretary General Hasan Nasrullah and the large gap that separates them. At present, the Israelis are giving a chance to diplomatic efforts for a solution to Hizbullah’s military presence near the “Blue Line” whereas Hizbullah links its withdrawal to the ending of the war on Gaza, which has now moved to a “third stage.” According to the Israelis, this may last many months and will not stop until the situation in Gaza is “radically transformed.”
This policy paper seeks to analyze Israel’s military strategy used in recent clashes with Hizbullah and armed Palestinian groups in southern Lebanon, and to assess Israeli intentions as regards the future of this front. It further deals with the diplomatic efforts of the US and other states aimed at achieving a political settlement of the crisis on the border with Israel and averting the danger of war from Lebanon.
Israel’s strategy in dealing with Hizbullah’s military presence (2006-2024)
Since the ending of the July war in 2006 and until today, Israeli military strategy in dealing with the threat to Israel’s security presented by Hizbullah has passed through three stages:
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The first stage was a political stage of “red lines” (2006-2013) which was based upon a “balance of terror” or “mutual deterrence.” Israel’s objective was to prevent Hizbullah from boosting its military capabilities through targeting the smuggling of arms from Iran by way of Syria and on to Lebanon and preventing that party from obtaining advanced weaponry dubbed by Israel “balance breaking.” During that stage, Israel refrained from launching assaults on Lebanese territory to avoid a violent response from Hizbullah, thus exposing their own domestic front to danger. This last is the primary point of weakness for Israel.
Efraim Anbar and Etan Shamir call this strategy “mowing the grass,” its aim being to “deal with continuous and unresolvable conflicts, and to use force, not to achieve political objectives but to affect the behavior of armed non-state groups, hoping that this would lead to temporary deterrence.”[2] To prolong the period of calm as long as possible, resort is had to uninterrupted preemptive strikes in expectation that the cumulative effect of these strikes will deter Israel’s enemies. Later, however, Israel realized that the deterrence ensuing from this theory was in fact temporary, and was based upon circumstances that might change, thus changing that deterrence. The theory further failed to prevent Israel’s enemies from enhancing their weaponry, a matter that applies to both Hizbullah and HAMAS.
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The second stage is the stage of the “battle between wars”, which began in early 2013, two years after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Foremost among those who formulated this new security doctrine was Gadi Eisenkot when he was Israeli army Chief of Staff. The aims of this theory can be defined as follows: “to weaken the enemy, decrease his military capability and create the right circumstances to achieve victory in a future war.”[3] The theory also involved fighting any entrenchment of the Iranian military presence in Syria, especially near Israel’s border, and preventing Hizbullah from acquiring precisely guided missiles and developing its military capabilities. But ten years after employing this doctrine, the Israelis have admitted that the “battle between wars” has failed to bring about change on the Middle East scene and has had no positive effect on Israel itself. Contrary to Israel’s expectations, this stage witnessed such growth in Hizbullah’s military capabilities to the point where Israeli head of military intelligence Aharon Haliva was forced to admit “that Hizbullah has not, for a long time, been an Iranian arm but instead has become an inseparable part of decision making in Tehran. Discussion no longer centers on whether Hizbullah is Lebanon’s shield or the shield of the Shi`ite sect or the shield of Iran or of any part of that axis. It has itself become the axis.”[4]
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The third stage is the current stage in Israeli military operations directed against Hizbullah, which might from the strategic point of view be called “destruction in return for destruction,” to quote Nir Dfuri, military correspondent of Canal N 12[5]. This consists of very violent reciprocal assaults, targeted assassination of Hizbullah figures and creating a situation of terror and destruction in a geographical region, 15 kilometers in area, on both sides of the Israel/Lebanon border, while remaining on the edge of war but without slipping into it.
What do the Israelis mean when they call for a “radical change” of the security situation in southern Lebanon?
HAMAS’s sudden attack on the Gaza envelope proved the inaccuracy of Israeli expectations that the enemy was “deterred.” What took place in the settlements in that Gaza envelope offered a terrifying example as to what might happen to Israeli settlements located just a few meters away from the wall with Lebanon. Thus, it was no longer possible to rely upon the security impediments placed along the frontier, which had cost Israel hundreds of thousands of dollars, nor upon superiority in cyber technologies. It reached the point where an Israeli citizen living in northern Israel reacted to what happened in the Gaza envelope as if it affected him personally. This explains why Israel is so keen on the return of more than 60 thousand Israeli refugees to their homes on the frontier with Lebanon, whereas these refuse to return unless the Ridwan brigade, Hizbullah’s elite force, withdraws from the frontier region.
In its confrontations with Hizbullah, Israel’s objective was a “radical change in the security status” in southern Lebanon. This is similar to its objective in the war on Gaza which consists of destroying the military and political capability of HAMAS and creating a new situation in Gaza. But today, three months after the start of a brutal wave of killing, genocide and massive destruction, there is still no inkling as to how this objective that Israel seeks to achieve in Gaza would look like. And here one might pose two questions: In case US diplomatic efforts fail to settle the conflict with Hizbullah, how will Israel be able to change the status in southern Lebanon when Hizbullah’s military capability exceeds by tens of times those of HAMAS? And is “changing the status” in southern Lebanon another impossible objective through which Israel seeks to prolong clashes in the south with no end in sight, to turn eventually into a long-term war of attrition?
There are several reasons that at present hold Israel back from waging a large-scale war against Hizbullah, among which are:
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Israel needs to complete its military objectives in Gaza, especially with the start of the third stage of that war.
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Several Israeli military experts estimate that the strikes against Hizbullah contribute to wearing down its military capability, and that the war of attrition waged by Israel has changed the rules of the game.[6] Some Israeli reports speak of the withdrawal of the Ridwan brigade from the frontier line lying north of Jabal al-Shaykh (Mount Hermon) and the withdrawal of other units such as the `Aziz unit in the western sector, the Nasir unit in the central sector and the Haidar unit in the northern sector.[7]
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There is no majority among Israeli public opinion that supports waging a large-scale war in Lebanon for the sake of returning the northern settlers to their houses.[8]
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The firm US position which is opposed to the present confrontations turning into a wider war against Lebanon, while US efforts persist to bring about a diplomatic solution acceptable to both sides.
Chances of success for US mediation
From the very start of the Israeli war on Gaza, the US has stood firmly against any widening of the war to involve the Lebanese front. US President Biden addressed a clear warning to both Hizbullah and Iran not to widen the conflict. As confrontations became more severe an American mediation effort appeared, undertaken by special US envoy Amos Hochstein, who carried a clear proposal to both sides which was reported in the Israeli and Lebanese press. In his latest speech on January 5, 2024, Hizbullah Secretary General Hasan Nasrullah alluded to that proposal which included Israel’s withdrawal from the Shib`a Farms, the hills of Kfar Shuba and the northern part of Ghajar village, drawing the frontier line starting from point b1, plus settling some other points at issue on the “blue line”, in return for creating a separation zone on the Lebanese side of the border.
But the Hochstein mediation undertaken during his latest visit to Tel Aviv and the proposal he carried, which was also most likely the subject of discussions held by US Secretary of State Blinken on his latest visit to Israel on January 8, has yet to receive a clear and official Israeli response, at least not a public response, except what was reported, namely, that Hochstein did not propose an Israeli withdrawal from the Shib`a Farms.
While the US emphasizes the need to solve the crisis on the Lebanese frontier through diplomatic means, the Israelis are pessimistic as to the chances of success of these means. They argue that these efforts are insufficient and must be accompanied by a “real and palpable threat.”[9] Meanwhile, they have indicated to their settlers in the north that their return to their houses is not imminent and may take some time.
Conclusion
It could be argued that no party to the confrontations taking place in southern Lebanon has any interest at present in a wider war. This is true of both the military and political leaderships in Israel, despite all their threats, as well as Israeli public opinion which has no desire to wage war in the north. It is also true of Hizbullah in Lebanon and of Iran which regards Hizbullah as the “jewel in the crown” of Iran’s national security. Iran has no wish to plunge into an extremely expensive war in support of HAMAS.[10] This assuredly is true of the US Administration which is afraid that Israel might involve it in a regional war that does not serve its interests.
What is clear up until the present moment is that Israeli policy in southern Lebanon mixes, in a well-studied and precise manner, between diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis and an unprecedented escalation of the fighting designed to create new facts on the ground, such as emptying Lebanese territories adjacent to the border with Israel of their inhabitants and turning them bit by bit into a zone of military operations, prior to disarming Hizbullah by force in that region.
[1] قال بنيامين نتنياهو خلال اجتماعه مع الموفد الأميركي الخاص عاموس هوكشتاين مؤخراً إن: "إسرائيل ملتزمة إحداث تغيير جذري في الوضع الأمني على حدودها الشمالية، سواء بالوسائل الدبلوماسية أو بأي وسيلة أُخرى." أمّا وزير الدفاع يوآف غالانت فقال إن: "النافذة الزمنية للحل السياسي تضيق، ونحن ملتزمون إعادة سكان الشمال إلى منازلهم، بعد تغيير الوضع الأمني على الحدود." (نقلاً عن "يديعوت أحرونوت"، 6/1/2024).
[2] إفرايم عنبار وإيتان شامير، "ʾجز العشبʿ- استراتيجيا إسرائيل لمواجهة نزاعات مستمرة لا حلول لها"، مركز بيغن - السادات التابع لجامعة بار-إيلان، تموز/يوليو 2023 (بالعبرية).
[3] عوفر شيلح وكرميت فالنسي، "المعركة بين الحروب 2013-2013 على مفترق طرق"، مذكرة رقم 225، تموز/يوليو 2023 (بالعبرية).
[4] مقابلة مع رئيس الاستخبارات العسكرية أهرون حليفا خلال المؤتمر الذي عقده معهد دراسات الأمن القومي بعنوان: "إيران، وإسرائيل، والمحور الشيعي: هل عام 2023 هو عام المواجهة؟" 21/11/2022 (بالعبرية).
[5] نير دفوري، "المعادلة الجديدة مع حزب الله: تدمير في مقابل تدمير"، 10/1/2024 (بالعبرية).
[6] رون بن يشاي، "لسنا بحاجة إلى حرب كبيرة لإبعاد حزب الله عن الحدود"، "يديعوت أحرونوت"، 12/11/2023، في نشرة "مختارات من الصحف العبرية"، بتاريخ 13/11/2023.
[7] إيهود ياعري، "نصر الله أطلق تهديداً، لكنه يسعى للتسوية عندما يكون مطالَباً بالحسم"، "قناة N12"، 5/1/2024، في نشرة "مختارات من الصحف العبرية" بتاريخ 6/1/2024.
[8] في دراسة نشرها معهد دراسات الأمن القومي في 8/1/2024 بعنوان: "هل شنُّ حرب في الشمال شرط لعودة المهجّرين إلى منازلهم"، أظهر استطلاع للرأي أُجري في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2023 وجود أغلبية تؤيد زيادة حجم الردود الإسرائيلية على هجمات حزب الله من دون توسعها إلى حرب واسعة النطاق، و20% فقط يؤيدون الحرب الشاملة، و29% مع بقاء الردود الإسرائيلية في حجمها الحالي.
يمكن مراجعة ترجمة النص الكامل للدراسة في نشرة "مختارات من الصحف العبرية" بتاريخ 10/1/2024.
[9] إيال زيسر، "بدأ العد العكسي للانفجار الذي لا مفر منه على الحدود الشمالية"، "معاريف"، 9/1/2024، في نشرة "مختارات من الصحف العبرية" بتاريخ 9/1/2024.
[10] كوبي مروم، "أزمة إسرائيل الاستراتيجية في الساحة الشمالية"، "قناة N12"، 9/1/2024، في نشرة "مختارات من الصحف العبرية" بتاريخ 10/1/204.