

French Language Teaching in Palestine:

A Diplomatic Stake

Clementine Rubio

The Holy Land, once called the “most French of Oriental lands,” has a long history of diplomatic relations with France.¹ From the Crusades to the more peaceful capitulations, these relations found an embodiment when the French consulate in Jerusalem opened in 1843.² Those relations have been studied in a number of works, which did not fully analyze the centrality of language to French diplomacy.³ This paper, written from a sociolinguistic and, more specifically, a language policies approach, focuses on how language is used by societies or states in social and international relations. This language-focused approach adopts a historical perspective on French diplomacy in the Holy Land from 1843 to 2000, and looks at the place given to French language in institutional policies, based on the interpretation of diplomatic archives.⁴

It is almost impossible to determine the precise moment when the French language was introduced in the Holy Land. Though the Crusades might be considered the first occurrence of the spread of French in the Levant,⁵ it seems that the language remained within the Frankish community, and did not spread significantly in local communities. Later, the history of the French language in Palestine is similar to that in many other territories. The first period of language instruction and its spread among the local population coincided with the migration of French Catholic congregations in the mid-nineteenth century.⁶ During France’s secularization after French Revolution, many religious congregations were either forbidden inside the country or prevented from carrying on their main activities in schools, orphanages, or hospitals. Many were therefore forced toward exile and had to settle in Central Europe, Latin America, North Africa, and the Levant. As one can

imagine, Ottoman Palestine was more than just another destination. For these Catholic groups, it was the Holy Land, the home of biblical towns such as Jerusalem, Bethlehem, or Nazareth, where their missions were of an even greater symbolical nature. When these religious groups landed in Ottoman Palestine, French had already been present (as mentioned above), and was in the Ottoman era, the second official language of administration. The establishment of those congregations enhanced its presence via “propagation” through numerous institutions (schools and orphanages where classes were taught in French). According to consular letters found in the diplomatic archives, French was the most widely spoken foreign language in Palestine at the end of the Ottoman Empire.⁷

The centrality of language in French diplomatic strategies, can be addressed through the concept of “soft power.” Joseph Nye first conceptualized the notion of soft power by dividing state action aiming to control other nations into two kinds of power: hard and soft.⁸ Traditionally, powerful states used military and coercive power (hard power) to “get others to do what they otherwise would not.”⁹ A shift toward soft power occurred when war, conquest, and military intimidation extracted too great a cost—human, but above all economic (in part because greater economic interdependence led to increased local repercussions of distant troubles). Simultaneously, private actors grew to have a more central role in global politics at a time when technologies, communications, and products became new instruments of power. These contemporary factors made power relations between states more complex and led Nye to conceptualize the notion of soft power. Rather than coercive force, soft power is about “co-optive power”: that is to say, “getting others to want what you want,” rather than “ordering others to do what you want.”¹⁰ The underlying conception is that “if [a state’s] culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow.”¹¹

Nye’s analysis stemmed from the drastic changes in international relations and world trade, and the shift in U.S. policies, in the 1980s, in the historical and geopolitical context of the end of the Cold War. Nye’s definition thus drew mainly on U.S. examples, as it was theorized for that country’s foreign policy. Although it has become more common to apply the notion of soft power to French policy, one could argue that the French conception of power has to be bent to fit into Nye’s understanding.¹² This gap between U.S. and French understandings of soft power is not surprising if we think of the gap between France’s and the United States’ foreign policy and maybe even the way each conceives of politics. Indeed, if the two countries share a similar notion of hard power (wielded by the state through the channels of military coercion, diplomacy, and economic threats), Nye’s soft power fails to fully transfer to the reality of French politics, though both countries politics have also been characterized by cultural and linguistic imperialism.¹³

Soft power’s focus on co-optive power and influence allows us to reevaluate French strategies. This analysis of the spread of French language in Palestine also relies on the concept of influence strategies. The specifics of the French language instruction network in Palestine (a territory never under official French authority) will help us define the exceptional quality of the relationship between French language and French policy. The Holy Land is quite an interesting case to address those policies, given the long history of relations with France, the long history of French language presence, and the fact the France

never had an official mandate over the country. Drawing on French diplomatic archives, the spread of French is to be understood here from the point of view of the “spreaders” or planners, rather than its effects – defined by Robert Phillipson as “the adoption of a given language by individuals.”¹⁴ Specific to French diplomacy and particularly pregnant in Palestine is the paradox that resides in the ties between secular France and French religious congregations, a paradox that revolves around the French language.

Diplomacy and Religion: A French Paradox

In the early years of the existence of a French consulate in Jerusalem, state and religion were not separated in France, nor in its institutions abroad. France even had a religious function in the Holy Land: secular France was the protector of Catholics. When the consulate opened in 1843, the first French consul in Jerusalem, Jean de Lantivy, was tasked with defending Christian interests. As he stated in one of his addresses:

The King’s government, when it assigned me the mission to go to Palestine and defend the rights and interests of Christians, also gave me the order to pass through Rome and receive the Holy See. It is therefore as a consul and as a Christian that I lay down at the feet of the Holy Father my respectful and filial tribute and implore His benediction so that heavens give me the strength and courage to fulfill with success the high yet difficult mission that was confided in me.¹⁵

The title of Protector of Christians and of Christian Holy Places was mainly inherited from the capitulations signed by French and Ottoman leaders, which granted a number of privileges (tax privileges, judicial privileges, and a certain protection) to French merchants.¹⁶ Those privileges were extended to French nationals, including those belonging to a French congregation and, as a consequence, that religious role grew to include a certain ambiguity in the definition of whether a congregation was French or not. Patrick Cabanel phrases this ambiguity as follows: “To be Catholic is to be French, protected by or a client of France (and vice versa) and even more to speak French.”¹⁷

France never denied this religious role, though it diminished to become mainly symbolical nowadays, and the separation between state and religion in the twentieth century did not affect the bonds that had tied France to the congregations. The strongest of these bonds was, and still is, the French language. In the first decades of France’s diplomatic development after the establishment of the consulate, the French language was the third side of a triangle uniting language with religion and politics. In that sense, the roles played by school and catechism were not so different and both religion and language were considered part of a “civilizing mission.” A conference held in Jerusalem in 1900 was entitled “La mission civilisatrice de la langue” (the Civilizing Mission of Language), indicating the centrality of language in the implementation of French colonial ambitions and ideology in Palestine.¹⁸

At the turn of the twentieth century, France officially became secular and it became impossible to speak publicly of an undifferentiated French and Catholic influence. However, even though France distanced itself from religion, relations with the congregations were unhindered. In fact, though they had been forbidden or expelled from France, these communities were largely supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the consular missions, in Jerusalem and the rest of the world. Léon Gambetta, a late nineteenth-century statesman, described this discrepancy between secular domestic and religiously supportive foreign policies by stating: “Anticlericalism is not an article of exportation.”¹⁹

Diplomats saw in the presence of French language a powerful tool of influence, and that was significantly more important than the revolutionary creed of protecting state decisions from the church’s intrusion. As we will see, what happened was the opposite, with the intrusion of the state in religious affairs. For France, what was meaningful was that congregations made possible the spread of French language. Catholic schools, orphanages, and, to a lesser degree, hospitals were considered powerful instruments. In 1934, the French consul in Jerusalem said of les Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes, one of the first French congregations to open a French school and one of the most prolific in that regard: “These schools, though they are not as important and as well-handled as the ones in Egypt, are nevertheless quite useful to support our culture. Thanks to them, the knowledge and the use of French language continues in the business sector and in what can be called the elite of society.”²⁰

Religious schools were perfectly relevant institutions due to the fact that they welcomed not only Christians but also Muslim and Jewish students. The latter community’s presence decreased with the creation of Jewish schools by European Jewish immigrants at the beginning of the twentieth century and during the British Mandate. Among these schools were those created by the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU), a French association and an important partner for France until the creation of Israel in 1948. Though relations between the consulate and the AIU were less advertised than those with Christian congregations, they were also considered an asset in the spread of French among the Jewish population.²¹ It is worth noting that, though it played an important role in Lebanon and in French colonies, the Mission Laïque (the “Secular Mission”) never really managed to settle in Palestine.²² This failure might be explained in part by the central role of religion in Jerusalem and other Palestinian cities where French was then taught.

The paradoxical bond between France and the religious instructors of French language can be explained by the strategy of influence. The French language was considered the bearer of significant potential power. Language had become a fundamental element of the definition of the French nation inside France’s borders (in a time when those borders were expanding),²³ it was also a fundamental element of the imperialist ideology outside its borders.

Language and Soft Power

Compared to the American conception of soft power, France uses one main channel of co-optive power: cultural diplomacy. Indeed, the very concept of *diplomatie culturelle* was imagined to describe this French approach of diplomacy.²⁴ This French diplomatic strategy emerged prior to the United States' emergence to superpower status.²⁵ In this conception of cultural diplomacy, the "products" are of a specific kind: networks of French cultural centers, academic scholarships, lectures, and, above all, as a star product, the French language. It is, therefore, understandable that when the notion of soft power is brought forward to speak about France, it almost inevitably refers to this cultural diplomacy, if not to French language itself. Two factors lie underneath this: the centrality of French in France's identity and the centrality of France in the spread of the French language. It seems almost unconceivable in most consuls' discourse that France's influence could exist if not through French or in French.

Though U.S. soft power also relies on language, it does so to a significantly lesser extent. This can be partly explained by the variety of goods the United States spreads: cultural products are just one among a range of soft power instruments. Further, though the universality of the English language is an incontestably important instrument of power, it is not associated with a single source (though the United States has a stronger influence in the world, the British Council remains an important instrument for English language instruction), whereas France retains a central role in the spread of the French language and in the Francophonie itself. One could also argue that it is no longer necessary for the United States to engage in costly policies to promote English, since it is widely considered an essential, almost vital language. Therefore, though the United States and Great Britain had and still have an active role in the propagation of English, its spread is not as dependent on these countries' policies as the spread of the French language is on French policy.²⁶

The second difference between U.S. and French mobilization of soft power that is apparent in the case of the Holy Land is the target of these policies. The most emblematic present-day examples of American soft power are McDonald's restaurants, Coca Cola products, blue jeans, Hollywood movies, and American music. These consumer products (including cultural ones) are widespread geographically and socially. They manage to impact all social layers, especially popular classes, and enter even those countries most politically opposed to the United States. Nye qualifies the effects of these products, which do not necessarily produce a direct and univocal outcome, but which can impact behaviors: "Of course there is an element of triviality and fad in popular behavior, but it is also true that a country that stands astride popular channels of communication has more opportunities to get its messages across and to affect the preferences of others."²⁷ France's politics, meanwhile, have always had a more restricted target: "elites." This is made particularly clear in the consulate's archives, where the strategy that emerges is to teach French to future economic and (primarily) political leaders. This choice of target is closer to the policy pursued by Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than the one pursued by the United States.²⁸

In 1881, for instance, the French consul in Jerusalem insisted, in a letter sent to the minister of foreign affairs, that schools were able to influence “the youth, who will modify the political destiny of their country.”²⁹ Over the following decades, this policy never changed in Jerusalem, and though a few initiatives targeted refugees or non-urban citizens, they were never at the center of the French political agenda. As Jacques d’Aumale, consul in 1929, explained:

French has never been the vehicular language of the common people, it will never be and it does not matter to our country’s prestige that some village girl or boy can recite “Le loup et l’agneau” or ask for a gratuity in French. . . . French can and should only be the language of the elite, as it has always been since the British occupation.³⁰

Until today, this is still the central target of France’s language strategy in Palestine. The main objective is quite clear: to have direct access, relations, or even control over potential future decision-makers in Palestine. This objective meets those describes by Nye in his definition of soft power, but the target is more restricted and more likely to have a direct effect on the country’s politics.³¹

The difference in terms of the channels used (language and cultural products in France’s strategies, consumption and cultural goods in the U.S. case) and the public targeted (the elite versus all social classes) results in a more restricted scope of power. That limited scope is also a result of a centralized conception of power and control. When the French language became a substitute for what used to unite state and religion, it became not only the embodiment of a peaceful relationship, but was often leveraged to maintain or extend what is fundamental to French cultural diplomacy: control.

Diplomatic Leverage

The aforementioned gap between domestic and foreign policies meant that the consulate had to struggle with authorities at home and in country: with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to justify the contributions to religious bodies, and with local and religious authorities who might see French funding as a form of political interference. For the French authorities in Jerusalem, French language instruction was the one argument that could be used with all of these actors to justify support for these schools. France’s support materialized diplomatically and financially. On the diplomatic side, relying on (and reactivating) the consulate’s role as the protector of Christians, the consulate intervened in administrative matters, such as tax exemptions and judicial affairs. A significant example of this diplomatic action happened in 1945, when René Neuville, French general consul, sent a memorandum to the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine arguing that whatever should happen to Palestine (given the uncertainty that accompanied the end of British Mandate), the *oeuvres françaises* should be preserved.³²

On the financial side, the consulate made decisions regarding grants and material

supplies. Financial support, which came either from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or from organizations like the Alliance Française, was awarded to congregations through the consulate. With each decade, the application form that schools and centers had to fill became more precise, and the place and status of French became more important. French thus became the cornerstone of all negotiations between the consular mission and the members of the French teaching network. France turned the teaching of French into a condition for financial support. The amount of financial support was decided according to what schools declared in forms and reports and consular agents' observations. Among the information sought was the number of hours of French language instruction and other school subjects taught in French, the number of French nationals on the teaching staff, the number of French diplomas delivered, and so on.

The schools themselves were talented in using this matter as leverage. In the Christian schools, the directors sometimes referred to their love of the motherland and mother tongue, then at other times threatened to “take shelter” in the protection of other nations if France’s support were to weaken. Indeed, this leverage game is to be understood in the context of competition between European powers in Palestine, and around the world more broadly. Colonial expansion, the French defeat in Prussia in 1870, and the weakening of the Ottoman Empire help explain this race for domination in “a powder keg of rival imperialisms.”³³ Indeed, languages other than French were also used as leverage in a struggle for influence fought by the powers trying to obtain influence in Palestine (Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and so on).

The Israelite schools experienced the same process. In 1911, for instance, Germany offered a Jaffa school protection in exchange for the suppression of French in favor of German in its programs.³⁴ The school chose French protection but they used this offer to underline how easily they could leave a realm of protection to join another. But these educational institutions did not hold all the cards. In fact, French language teaching was not only used to maintain ties between the consulate and religious schools, but could also be held up to remind these institutions of the frailty of this relationship. In 1914, for instance, when a Jewish school, the Gymnase Ibrit, asked for French protection, the consul responded: “I hear that French language teaching does not reach the intensity that we could expect in exchange for French protection.”³⁵

State Control

Of course, French language alone was not enough to achieve influence and it is obvious that behind the “propagation of the language” lay the propagation of control. In other words, for this language spread to have the desired influence, France had to maintain some form of control. Consequently, French authorities considered the few attempts to run an institution partly independent from the consulate to be a threat. Indeed, France saw such initiatives, though they could be seen as another instrument to “spread” French (without spending any money), as a true problem. In 1906, the French vice consul in Jaffa wrote to the consul in Jerusalem regarding the creation of a Greek school. He described how

this could arouse fears regarding the future prosperity of the Frères' school because of the Greek school's "curriculum, which gives a significant place to the study of French language."³⁶ In this case, it is obvious that French language instruction was not enough to rejoice, for it was not accompanied by some form of control over the institution.

The "language struggle in schools," as a local newspaper called it at the time,³⁷ was the frame in which the consulate's attempts to keep and increase its authority and domination over the French language teaching network developed. However, the underlying imperialism that motivated those considerations faced drastic changes in the mid-twentieth century. The British Mandate over Palestine, followed by the creation of Israel in 1948, and Egyptian and Jordanian control over what was left of Palestinian lands, meant tighter institutionalization of schools and cultural institutes by post-Ottoman sovereigns. Local authorities took control of educational programs and started questioning or even forbidding private and foreign funding. A number of France's traditional partners started to distance themselves in order to be integrated into the new order: Catholic schools, to survive, often had to put English first during the British Mandate, then Arabic or Hebrew after the creation of Israel, in order to receive funds and the authorization to stay open and teach; and the Alliance Israélite Universelle, which was originally anti-Zionist, integrated Israel's national educational system into its curricula (one reason being that Israel forbade registration in foreign schools).

To counterbalance the exclusion or marginalization of French institutions, the consulate undertook a Francization movement: locally founded cultural associations teaching French were turned into French-managed Centres Culturel Français from the 1950s until the 1990s, while cooperation programs with universities were started to keep an eye on newly founded French language departments. This process of centralization is a symptom of another key difference between American soft power and French cultural diplomacy, which lies in France's desire for control.

A core aspect of Nye's soft power lies in the weight given to private actors. In the original understanding of the notion, power depends only partially on the role of state and is in the hands of a variety of actors: private companies, transnational actors, non-governmental organizations, cultural companies, immigrants, and so on.³⁸ In the case of France, the decentralized conception of power is almost completely missing. As seen with French language teaching in Palestine, the network includes non-state actors (congregational schools, private schools, but also transnational organizations like Alliance Française or, more recently, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie or Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie), but the tendency has been toward centralization rather than the diversification of actors.³⁹ Of course, this has to be put into perspective with France's deeply centralized conception of state as opposed to a decentralized, federal, and more liberal U.S. model. Though France is a world economic power, its private actors are far less implanted worldwide than U.S. companies. For the latter, the private sector has become a strong stakeholder. This makes an essential difference when we think in terms of diplomacy, for the French version includes more political voluntarism, while the American understanding depends on more than one institutional planner. This is why former minister of foreign affairs Laurent Fabius speaks of French "influential power" rather than soft power.⁴⁰

Conclusion

Due to the relationship between France and the Holy Land, an analysis of the entanglement between the dissemination of language and the desire for influence and control is particularly interesting in this case. Previous research has addressed the relationship between France and former colonies and the role played by language in these relations. In Palestine's case, though it played a role as the protector of Christians, France was never an official authority. Focusing on soft power policies performed by an exogenous power (which never held sovereignty) thus sheds a different light on these political and linguistic strategies. Such attempts at ensuring control over a territory where one has no mandate to act raises the question of interventionism. French language is a core element of France's definition of its identity; thus, wherever France's imperialism reaches, French is present and even an active part in this process. The linguistic ideologies underlying these schemes imply that language, as an instrument of influence, is capable of producing change and ensuring control. In that regard, the bond between language and diplomacy, though it applies to other states as well, is certainly at its deepest in France's case. Moreover, the specific historical case of a powerful country whose linguistic prominence declined explains both the scope of the cultural and linguistic network and the political voluntarism needed for that network to remain attractive and efficient. The spread of language through political voluntarism can be considered a strategy of soft hegemony, an intervention without violence; it exploits, however, not just any instrument, but one that is profoundly related to culture and identity and which can therefore affect deep national structures.

Clementine Rubio is a PhD candidate in Language Sciences and Language Didactics in Tours Francois Rabelais University, France, and a research associate at the French Research Center in Jerusalem. She is interested in the diplomatic history of French language teaching in Palestine. More specifically, her work examines the strategic and symbolic stakes and conceptions underlying France's language policies in Palestine.

Endnotes

- 1 "La plus française des terres d'Orient." See Karène Sanchez, "Les Catholiques Palestiniens et La Langue Française (1870–1950)," *Documents pour l'histoire du Français langue étrangère ou seconde* 45 (2010): 17–42, quote at 18.
- 2 The consulate opened in 1843, but French diplomatic missions had existed earlier, though discontinuously.
- 3 See for instance: Dominique Trimbur and Ran Aaronsohn, *De Balfour à Ben Gourion: Les Puissances Européennes et la Palestine, 1917–1948* (Rennes: CNRS Éd., 2008); Ordre du Saint Sépulcre, *La France et la Terre Sainte: mille ans d'histoire* (Paris: Parole et silence, 2010). The presence of French before the opening of
- 4 the French consulate in Jerusalem was not as intertwined as after 1843. Cyril Aslanov and Bernard Cerquiglini, *Le français au Levant, jadis et naguère: à la recherche d'une langue perdue* (Paris: H. Champion, 2006).
- 4 Diplomatic Archive Center (CADN) in Nantes, France.
- 5 At that time it was the *parlers d'Oil* or dialects of northern France.
- 6 French language was already present and to a certain degree spread in the Holy Land, but language planning policies were elaborated and carried out mainly from the mid-nineteenth century on.
- 7 French was the lingua franca in the region until the establishment of the British Mandate.

- 8 Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1991); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power, Reviews and Responses,” *Foreign Affairs* 88 (2009): 160–63.
- 9 This is how Nye defines “power” in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy* 80 (Autumn 1990): 153–171.
- 10 Nye, “Soft Power,” 167.
- 11 Nye, “Soft Power,” 167.
- 12 For examples of the application of the concept to the French context, see the articles in *Revue internationale et stratégique* 89, no. 1 (2013); Didier Billion, Frédéric Martel, and Laurent Fabius, *Diplomatie d’influence Entretien avec Laurent Fabius* (Paris: IRIS, Armand Colin, 2013).
- 13 François Chaubet and Laurent Martin, *Histoire des relations culturelles dans le monde contemporain* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2011).
- 14 Robert Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 78.
- 15 Quoted in Rina Cohen-Muller, “De la Restauration au Second Empire: Quatre Consuls, une Seule Politique,” in *De Balfour à Ben Gourion: Les Puissances Européennes et La Palestine, 1917–1948*, ed. Dominique Trimbou and Ran Aaronsohn (Rennes: CNRS Éd., 2008), 45–57.
- 16 Karène Sanchez-Summerer, “Linguistic Diversity and Ideologies among the Catholic Minority in Mandate Palestine: Fear of Confusion or a Powerful Tool?” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 2 (2016): 191–205.
- 17 Patrick Cabanel, *Une France en Méditerranée: écoles, langue et culture françaises, XIXe–XXe siècles* (Grane, France: Créaphis, 2006), 20.
- 18 Letter from the Alliance Française to the Consul, 1900, CADN, Jérusalem, Série A, dossier 120.
- 19 Quoted in Jean-Philippe Mochon, “Le Consul Général de France à Jérusalem; aspects historiques, juridiques et politiques de ses fonctions,” *Annuaire français de droit international* 42, no. 1 (1996): 929–945, quote at 934.
- 20 CADN, Jérusalem, Série B, dossier 187.
- 21 During the first years of existence of the AIU schools in Palestine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised the Consulate to give an unofficial support to its schools. That support, which was mainly material until the 1930s, became official and financial up until the creation of Israel.
- 22 The exception was a French cultural center (the Centre de Culture Française de Jérusalem) in the 1930s, which was closed a few years after opening.
- 23 Daniel Baggioni, *Langues et nations en Europe* (Paris: Payot and Rivages, 1997).
- 24 Anne Gazeau-Secret, “‘Soft power’: l’influence par la langue et la culture,” *Revue internationale et stratégique* 89, no. 1 (2013): 103–110.
- 25 Chaubet and Martin, *Histoire des relations culturelles*.
- 26 Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism*.
- 27 Nye, “Soft Power,” 169.
- 28 Edward Said, in “Between Worlds,” describes in those terms the British school he attended in Cairo: “All my early education had, however, been in élite colonial schools, English public schools designed by the British to bring up a generation of Arabs with natural ties to Britain. The last one I went to before I left the Middle East to go to the United States was Victoria College in Cairo, a school in effect created to educate those ruling-class Arabs and Levantines who were going to take over after the British left.” Edward Said, “Between Worlds,” in *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 556.
- 29 CADN, Jérusalem, Série A, dossier 88 (1881).
- 30 Courneuve, Service des Œuvres Françaises à l’étranger, Série D, dossier 172 (1929).
- 31 However, much as in the original meaning of soft power, targeting a wider and more popular public, the effects are almost impossible to measure.
- 32 CADN, Jérusalem, Série C, dossier 26.
- 33 Cabanel, *Une France en Méditerranée*, 12.
- 34 Lycée de Jaffa, CADN, Jerusalem, Série A, dossier 137.
- 35 CADN, Jérusalem, Série A, dossier 137.
- 36 Letter of Jaffa’s vice consul to the consul in Jerusalem, 1906, CADN, Jérusalem, Série B, dossier 31.
- 37 “Lutte des langues dans les écoles.” Traduction d’un extrait du journal Haberouth, 1912, CADN, Jérusalem, Série A, dossier 137 (245).
- 38 Frédéric Martel, “Vers un ‘soft power’ à la française,” *Revue internationale et stratégique* 89, no. 1 (2013): 67–76, quote at 67.
- 39 This is in keeping with French language teaching networks elsewhere in this regard.
- 40 “Entretien avec Laurent Fabius, Ministre des Affaires étrangères et européennes,” *Revue internationale et stratégique* 89, no. 1 (2013): 51–65.