

# Communal Impoverishment in Jerusalem

UNCTAD Secretariat

In the last two decades, compounding the increasing fragmentation and hollowing-out of the once vibrant and well-connected urban economy of East Jerusalem, social conditions have deteriorated in an unprecedented manner. The economy is battered by the same shocks affecting the rest of OPT (Occupied Palestinian Territory) in downturns, but hardly benefits from OPT's recovery in upturns. Furthermore, social conditions remain bereft of the same attention and resources that public authorities provide to Jewish communities in the western sector and in settlements in the east. An assessment of the complex and myriad challenges of East Jerusalem social development (welfare, municipal and social services, housing and related factors affecting Palestinian society) is beyond the scope of this report. However, to provide further context for understanding the distinct challenges faced by the Palestinian economy in East Jerusalem, some pertinent aspects of social conditions are reviewed below.

## **Palestinian Labour and Poverty in East Jerusalem**

Like any urban economy, Jerusalem has historically exercised a strong pull on Palestinian job-seekers from different regions of the West Bank, before and after the Israeli occupation. A Palestinian agrarian population from the surrounding villages, especially of the southern Hebron region, has looked to East Jerusalem as an alternative to increasingly limited land and rural employment opportunities. This rural-urban migration over the decades sustained the Palestinian Arab character of East Jerusalem even while other pressures were pushing a significant percentage of

the East Jerusalem white-collar labour force to seek employment in labour markets elsewhere in OPT (especially in nearby Ramallah and Bethlehem), mainly in the services sectors, civil society organizations and the public sector. Other lower skilled occupational categories of the East Jerusalem labour force also found employment in the Israeli economy (in West Jerusalem or further afield), mainly in the industrial and services sectors, as well as in the construction sector (Khawaja, 2009). PCBS data show that in 2009 about two-thirds of the East Jerusalem labour force worked in East Jerusalem and elsewhere in OPT, while the remaining 35 per cent worked in Israel and its settlements (PCBS, 2010).

There are several factors that contributed to the rise of this pattern of workforce distribution. The most important one is the diminished capacity of the East Jerusalem economy to create job opportunities. The complicated procedures to obtain building licences make it too difficult for Palestinians to construct new units either for residential or investment purposes, while the closure of the city to Palestinians from the remaining OPT resulted in the closedown of about 25 per cent of East Jerusalem enterprises (Khawaja, 2009). The difficult labour market conditions are compounded by a growing labour force, where about 9,000 Palestinians enter the labour force annually, exacerbating the pressure on East Jerusalem's job market.

The size of the labour force in East Jerusalem in 2010 was approximately 56,000 workers (PCBS, 2010), which represents around 6 per cent of the total Palestinian labour force. The overall labour force participation rate was 39 per cent in the same year. As Hever (2007) noted: "Successive policies of limiting Palestinian workers, curfews, closures (since 1991) and immigrant labour inflows to replace Palestinian workers were blows to the Palestinian domestic income and have created a large increase in unemployment."

Prior to the second intifada, unemployment rates in the West Bank and East Jerusalem were largely similar. PCBS data shows that unemployment rates in 2000 were 12.1 per cent and 11.5 per cent in the West Bank and East Jerusalem respectively (PCBS, 1999–2011). However, as with other areas of the West Bank, East Jerusalem was affected by the Israeli measures implemented since then, and unemployment rates rose sharply in 2002 to a record 28 per cent in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. This pushed Palestinians to resort to various coping strategies such as self-employment, especially in agriculture and family business, moving across economic sectors, and part-time work.

Along with renewed growth in Israel and OPT in recent years, this "flexibility" of the Palestinian labour market allowed unemployment to decrease gradually and by 2010 the unemployment rate was at 17.2 per cent in the West Bank and back to pre-2001 levels of around 12 per cent in East Jerusalem (PCBS, 2011). The greater reduction in East Jerusalem than in the West Bank may be attributed to the absorption of part of the Palestinian labour force into the Israeli labour market, an option not available for West Bank workers and one of the few premiums that East Jerusalem workers may be seen to enjoy compared to their compatriots.

A shared characteristic of the unemployed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem

is the high percentage of the educated among them. In 2009, the percentage of those East Jerusalem unemployed who had completed 13 years of education or more was 25 per cent, while it was 39.5 per cent for those who had completed between 10 and 12 years of education (PCBS, 2010). In spite of broad similarities with the rest of the West Bank, there are two unique characteristics of the labour force in the Jerusalem Governorate. The first is the higher rate of full employment in East Jerusalem, 84 per cent in 2009, compared to 70 per cent in the rest of OPT, with 16 and 30 per cent respectively of the employed labour force considered underemployed.<sup>1</sup> The second is the relatively low unemployment rate among women in East Jerusalem, 13 per cent, compared to the West Bank at 18.8 per cent (PCBS, 2010).

The past decade witnessed a structural shift in the employment status of working persons in East Jerusalem. On the one hand, the percentage of self-employed persons dropped from 15.4 per cent in 2000 to 8.4 per cent in 2009. On the other, the percentage of wage employees increased from 76.2 per cent in 2000 to 80.6 per cent in 2009. This is explained by the fact that in the aftermath of the second intifada a number of self-employed shop owners were forced to close down their businesses and seek wage employment elsewhere (PCBS, 2010c).

Meanwhile, in East Jerusalem the participation rate of the female labour force is low, even in comparison to the West Bank, at 11.4 per cent in 2009 compared to 67.6 per cent male participation rate in the same year. Though this might seem surprising for an urban population, this is mainly due to the difference in size of the agricultural sectors of East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank. In previous years, the agricultural sector in the West Bank has contributed between 5 and 8 per cent of GDP and accounted for more than 10 per cent of the employed workforce, whereas this sector plays a minor role in the economy of East Jerusalem, accounting for less than 2 per cent of the employed workforce (PCBS, 1999–2011). Another reason for low female participation in the labour force is that Palestinian women in East Jerusalem are reluctant to seek employment in the unfamiliar and challenging Israeli economy, a key source of employment for the Palestinian male population of East Jerusalem.

The distribution of employed persons among economic sectors also witnessed several changes in the new circumstances created by the increasingly distinct growth path of the East Jerusalem economy. The percentage of workers employed in the construction sector dropped from 20.9 per cent in 2000 to 12.2 per cent in 2006, but increased again to 20.4 per cent in 2010, while the percentage of workers absorbed by the services sector and other branches increased from 27.2 per cent in 2006 to 28.2 per cent in 2010.

There are several forms of discrimination against East Jerusalem Palestinians that characterize their relations with the Israeli labour market. According to Jerusalem non-governmental organizations, employment conditions of East Jerusalem Palestinians

---

<sup>1</sup> Underemployment exists when there is insufficient volume of employment. According to PCBS, it includes persons who worked less than 35 hours during the reference week. One example of this is persons who work part-time.

are harsh and manipulative, and Palestinian workers are not allowed to participate in Israeli labour unions. In addition to being paid less than Israeli workers, East Jerusalem Palestinian workers have a longer working day, the average length of which exceeds 10 hours, often with no compensation for the extra work hours as provided for in Israeli labour law (Khawaja, 2009).

Palestinians traditionally form the lowest rank in the Israeli labour market; they work in jobs categorized as least desirable, difficult, and dangerous. Manual labour, such as construction workers hired on a daily basis, is dominated by Palestinians. Although Palestinians constitute about 30 per cent of the total population of the city of Jerusalem, they form 43 per cent of the unskilled labour force. While facing the same cost of living and market conditions as Israelis in East Jerusalem, the average monthly wage for East Jerusalem Palestinians working in Israel and its settlements was NIS 4,032 in 2009 (PCBS, 2010), which is less than half the average monthly wage in Israel – NIS 8,131 in 2009 (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010).

Data vary on the poverty rate among Palestinians in East Jerusalem because of the different standards and poverty thresholds used by Israeli and Palestinian statistical sources. According to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS 2012), poverty among Palestinians in East Jerusalem has been rising steadily over the past decade, whereby 77 per cent of “non-Jewish” households<sup>2</sup> in Jerusalem were under the Israeli poverty line in 2010, compared to 25.4 per cent of Jewish families who lived below the poverty line in the same year. The East Jerusalem data mirror the poverty divide between Arab and Jewish citizens of the State of Israel, whereby according to the same source, 53.2 per cent of non-Jewish households in Israel were classified as poor, compared to only 14.3 per cent of Jewish families. Indeed, poverty is almost fourfold as prevalent among Palestinian households in East Jerusalem as it is on average in Israel as a whole and well above the rates prevalent among Arab citizens of Israel proper.

The picture is even bleaker when it comes to children. In 2010, 84 per cent of Palestinian children in East Jerusalem were poor, compared to 45 per cent of Jewish children. Though Palestinians accounted for a third of the city’s population and had such a high proportion of their children living under the poverty line in 2010, only three welfare offices were operating in East Jerusalem compared to 18 in western Jerusalem serving Israelis.

The average daily wage in 2007 was lower in Jerusalem (NIS 232) than in the rest of Israel (NIS 269.7), and almost 40 per cent of workers in Jerusalem receive the minimum wage. Yet the average daily wage of Palestinian Jerusalemites working in Israel and Israeli settlements was NIS 137.5 in 2007, or half of the Israeli average and 59 per cent of the Jerusalem average. Furthermore, the annual average per capita income of Jewish Israelis was \$23,300 in 2007, or eight times the average income of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem (JIIS, 2011).

---

2 The classification used in Israeli statistics, the overwhelming majority of these households being Palestinian.

## **Restricted Access to Educational and Health Services**

Because of OPT's limited natural resources, human capital has special importance as a key asset for the economy. Persistent economic adversity has forced Palestinians to rely on emigration and education to cope with high poverty and employment (Hilal and Johnson, 2003). Alongside access to health and cultural rights, educational opportunities play significant roles in the development of human capital, and consequently the development of the economy as a whole.

The education system in East Jerusalem has been greatly affected by Israeli policy neglect. It is run by multiple authorities: some schools are under Israeli education authorities, many others are private providers, while the Palestinian Authority or the Jordanian administration (Ministry of Awqaf Islamic Affairs and Holy Places) run public schools and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East provides education up to secondary level for residents of the two refugee camps located within East Jerusalem municipal boundaries (Shu'fat and Qalandiya). Given the variety of educational services providers, there is no standardized curriculum, with both Palestinian Authority and Israeli curricula competing for primacy; as such, the quality of education varies widely across institutions.

According to the Israeli compulsory education law, all children between the ages of 5 and 18 years are entitled to free education and the Israeli Ministry of Education is responsible for overseeing and providing education in East Jerusalem. All Palestinians who hold valid Jerusalem identification cards should be entitled to the option of enrolment in municipal schools. But less than half of school-age children needing to attend municipal schools actually are able to do so; East Jerusalem faces a severe classroom shortage and many students are turned away from municipal schools, forcing families to seek alternatives that are often costly.

According to a report of Israel's State Comptroller, in the academic year 2007/2008, there was a shortage of at least 1,000 classrooms in East Jerusalem at all levels and only 257 classrooms had been added since 2001 (OCHA, 2007). Moreover, the provision of new schools in East Jerusalem is frustrated by zoning and planning restrictions that hinder construction of educational facilities. Approximately 5,000 Palestinian school-age children are not enrolled in any institution, while some sources state that the post-elementary dropout rate in municipal schools could be as high as 50 per cent (ACRI, 2010). This has fostered child labour in informal activities and higher rates of juvenile delinquency. Meanwhile, seeking proper schooling in bordering communities of the West Bank can jeopardize residency rights in the city for students and their families, who must be able to demonstrate that they are studying in East Jerusalem establishments.

The effects of restricted access to education are compounded by the lack of recreational and cultural services and outlets for the youth of East Jerusalem. For example, West Jerusalem has 1,000 public parks compared to only 45 in East Jerusalem; 34 swimming pools compared to 3 in East Jerusalem; 26 public libraries compared to a mere 2 libraries in East Jerusalem; and 531 sports facilities against only 33 in East

Jerusalem (B'tselem 2011). The discrepancies even in such sociocultural services highlight the entrenched disadvantages of the Palestinian population of Jerusalem.

Difficulties related to access to education in East Jerusalem are indicative of the wider discriminatory policy against Palestinians living under Israeli control. The lack of equality in educational opportunities is captured by the Equality Index of Jewish and Arab citizens in Israel published by the Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality (Sikkuy, 2009).<sup>3</sup> Although the Index is an indicator of equality between Jewish and Palestinians citizens within all of Israel, it can be a strong indicator of the situation in East Jerusalem. In fact, as has been seen with poverty, the Arab-Jewish disparity in East Jerusalem is usually much higher than that generally in Israel. In 2007 the education index was 0.34, indicating high inequality and disadvantage to Palestinians.

Primary education faces numerous difficulties in East Jerusalem. While Israeli law stipulates that all children aged 5–18 are entitled to free education, one of the most pressing issues in access to education in East Jerusalem is the shortage of classrooms. In the past decade only about 260 new classrooms were built. As a result of classroom shortage, schools have resorted to double shifts, and “alternative” non-official physical structures are used as classrooms (OCHA, 2011b). According to Jerusalem municipality figures, about half (704) of East Jerusalem classrooms were “substandard” in 2009, of which 221 were housed in “unfit” buildings (ACRI, 2010).

Physical access is one of the main impediments facing Palestinian students in East Jerusalem, where 20 per cent of students faced difficulties reaching their schools in 2007. The separation barrier affected school times by increasing the journey time for many students, while other schools suffered from overcrowding (OCHA, 2007). This has contributed to a high dropout rate among Palestinian students in East Jerusalem. Israeli western Jerusalem has a 7.4 per cent dropout rate, while in East Jerusalem the rate is a staggering 50 per cent.<sup>4</sup> No doubt these dismal outcomes reflect the differential budget allocation for elementary school students: in East Jerusalem these are estimated at NIS 577 per student, less than one quarter of the per-student budget allocated in western Jerusalem (Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem, 2009).

Not only have primary and secondary education, which are key to the development of human capital, been affected by occupation, but higher education also has been restricted. A case in point is the Al Quds University in Jerusalem, which had more than 10,000 registered students in 2009. The main campus is located in the village of Abu Dis in the J2 area of the Jerusalem Governorate. The university was not only severely affected by checkpoints and the separation barrier, which physically passes through the campus and required the establishment of several campuses within J1, but students

---

3 The Equality Index includes several sectors such as health, housing, education, employment and social welfare. The education equality index contains more than 17 indicators and variables, including enrolment rates, dropout rates, education infrastructure, output, etc. The Index ranges between 1, indicating inequality in favour of the Jewish population, and -1 indicating inequality in favour of the Palestinian population in Israel, while zero indicates complete equality.

4 The second highest dropout rate in Israel was in the Arab village of Jisr-Zarka, with an 11.8 per cent rate.

from J1 area also suffer from the fact that Israeli authorities do not recognize the degrees issued by the university. This further complicates the prospects for a growing youth population, educated under one (Palestinian Authority) system but unable to seek and keep suitable employment within that economy, while educationally unsuited to integration into the theoretically accessible, but effectively out-of-bounds, Israeli labour market.

While Palestinians living in the J1 area, inside the wall, have access to health services provided by the Israeli health care system, including the six hospitals in East Jerusalem, others from OPT as well as those who now live behind the wall have limited access to such services. Moreover, even those on the J1 side of the wall face a number of difficulties, as explained below. According to the Fourth Geneva Convention, article 56, “the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory”. Under Israeli law, East Jerusalem residents are entitled to Israeli health services since they pay monthly instalments to the Israeli National Insurance Institute. However, significant access problems persist (OCHA, 2011a).

Historically, residents of the West Bank and Gaza relied on health-care providers in East Jerusalem for more specialized and urgent care.<sup>5</sup> However, often patients are either severely delayed or denied entry into East Jerusalem for treatment. The combinations of checkpoints, separation barrier, difficulty in obtaining entry permits and ongoing blockade on Gaza have stifled access to health care and in turn reduced the potential market for East Jerusalem’s relatively advanced private health-care providers. (Al-Maqassed and Augusta Victoria Hospitals in the city remain among the more advanced Palestinian hospitals in the West Bank.)

East Jerusalem residents who live on the West Bank side of the separation barrier also face difficulties in accessing health care as they must pass through checkpoints to reach health-care providers. Moreover, the imposition of a quota on the number of permits issued to health-care staff with West Bank identification cards has made it difficult for hospitals in East Jerusalem to hire new staff as applications for permits are often denied. As a result, the number of health-care staff in East Jerusalem hospitals with West Bank identification cards dwindled from 1,168 (about 70 per cent of all staff) in 2007, to 915 (about 62.5 per cent) by March 2009. Furthermore, according to OCHA, hospitals and patients in East Jerusalem are denied access to the much cheaper pharmaceutical products manufactured in the West Bank since they are not allowed entry into East Jerusalem even if prescribed by East Jerusalem doctors.

As the Palestinian Ministry of Health cannot operate in East Jerusalem, Palestinians have no choice other than resort to the Israeli health-care system, and Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem are similarly obliged to link to the Israeli health

---

5 Since 1967 East Jerusalem has been the main secondary and tertiary health provider for all Palestinians in OPT, and the allocation of the main hospitals, specialized clinics and high-skilled staff has been concentrated in the Jerusalem area.

system in order to provide (and be reimbursed for) the services covered by Israeli health insurance schemes. Most of these hospitals have recently tried to establish mobile clinics in the West Bank to meet the needs of the population not able to access the services in East Jerusalem. However, the ongoing restrictions on movement fostered financial crises; hospital revenues declined significantly while costs remained very high (operational costs and staff salaries). The Palestinian Authority is indebted to these hospitals by several million dollars, which makes it more difficult for these hospitals to survive. There are no mental health clinics in East Jerusalem – the one that existed before was recently moved to western Jerusalem. As a result, the ensuing distance, transportation costs, linguistic barriers and lack of staff who speak Arabic have undermined the access of Palestinian Jerusalemites to mental health care (Physicians for Human Rights, 2008).

Palestinians from the rest of OPT need permits to access medical treatment in East Jerusalem. For those patients who request financial assistance from the Palestinian Ministry of Health the process includes several steps. First “a request is submitted by the patient’s physician to the Referral Abroad Department ... of the [Palestinian Ministry of Health], which determines the eligibility of the patient and designates a hospital. The patient then sets up an appointment with the hospital following which, the [Referral Abroad Department] or the hospital sends a request to the Israeli Civil Administration to issue a permit for the specified period of the appointment or operation” (OCHA, 2011b). This is not to mention the suffering of patients through delays incurred in crossing checkpoints even after they have received those permits. Palestinians who were separated from the service areas relatively recently by the separation barrier also spend efforts and time and need permits to access health services, in addition to which most medical forms are in Hebrew only, constituting another barrier.

Access for patients and staff is not the only constraint affecting the East Jerusalem health system. Hospitals require the same difficult-to-obtain permits needed for construction, which makes it extremely hard for them to renovate or expand facilities. This led East Jerusalem hospitals to seek alternative solutions, including renting hotels, to accommodate patients.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, hospitals are obliged to buy Israeli products which can cost up to five times more than Palestinian-produced pharmaceuticals (OCHA, 2011b).

### **Economic Vulnerability and Social Fragility: the Old City as a Microcosm<sup>7</sup>**

At the heart of the story of the East Jerusalem economy lies its greatest potential

---

6 For more, see the interview with Dr. Tawfiq Nasser in OCHA (2011b).

7 Information in this section is adapted from Glass and Khamaisi (2005) and JIIS (2009, 2010 and 2011).



strategic asset, the Old City of Jerusalem, a walled off area of less than 1 km<sup>2</sup> (actually 900 dunums). Today's Old City streets, buildings and walls were constructed in the Mamluk and early Ottoman periods, from the fourteenth century A.D. onwards, giving the whole area a medieval and largely Islamic architectural and cultural landscape.<sup>8</sup> Within its boundaries are to be found some of the holiest religious sites. Over 100 religious institutions in the Old City impart an additional sense of the City's spiritual sanctity. A significant proportion of the residential and commercial property in the Old City is owned by Islamic private endowments in perpetuity managed for centuries by Jerusalem families, or public charitable and religious institutions administered by Jordanian, Israeli and Christian Church authorities.

The busy markets of the Old City cater to tourists, worshippers and shoppers visiting from nearby West Bank villages and from around the globe, comprising some 2,400 establishments, of which 200 are manufacturing or other crafts workshops. Around 2,000 commercial properties (around half of which traded in tourist goods, foodstuffs, restaurants and various services) are spread along the main avenues of the Old City and largely in its historic commercial zones. The small number of manufacturing workshops in the Old City are microenterprises, often producing goods for sale in nearby tourist shops, a longstanding though increasingly fragile intersectoral link. Less than 10 per cent of commercial and manufacturing establishments are Jewish-owned, though half of the Old City's educational institutions were Jewish.

The Old City is an employment centre, insofar as many proprietors live elsewhere in East Jerusalem and many of the educational, religious and social service institutions are staffed by employees from elsewhere in East Jerusalem or the West Bank. But it is a population centre as well (see appendix 1), notwithstanding its crowded conditions. Some 6,000 families live in the Old City in 5,600 housing units. The Old City population has continued to grow over the past decades, reaching 40,600 by 2010, up from 32,300 in 1995. The Jewish share of the Old City population also rose in that period, from 8.6 per cent to 11.4 per cent by 2002, but in subsequent years the total Jewish population stabilized at under 3,900 (since 2008), a share of around 10 per cent of the Old City population. The strong pressure for Palestinian repopulation in the Old City to preserve and renew neglected properties or to safeguard residency status made the Palestinian Arab population grow to over 35,000 by 2010. Given the Old City's extreme shortage of space and limited possibilities for vertical construction, this strong Palestinian population growth appears to have constituted a counterweight that places limits on further Jewish settlement of the Old City.

Palestinian Arabs (Muslims and Christians) live almost exclusively in the so-called Muslim, Christian and Armenian "Quarters". Today's "Jewish Quarter" is a zone that was constituted by the Israeli authorities in the aftermath of the 1967 war (Ricca, 2007). When some 200 homes in area known as *Harat al Magharabi* ("Moroccan Quarter") were demolished by the Israeli Army to make way for the Western Wall

---

8 For a popular and accessible history of Jerusalem, see Armstrong (1997).

plaza, a swath of adjacent properties in *Harat al Sharaf*, *Harat al Ghazaleen* and *Bab al Silsilah* (“Muslim Quarter”) were expropriated and consolidated with the nearby area where a Jewish community in the Old City had resided for centuries. This established the new “Jewish Quarter” in the Old City. The majority of the Jewish population of the Old City resides there, with a total population growing slowly, to 2,500 by 2008. Preliminary JIIS estimates indicated a relatively large increase by 2010 to 3,100, indicating intensification of Israeli residential and educational/religious projects in that part of the Old City.

Sustained Israeli settlement of the Old City since 1967 and its intensification in recent years especially outside the “Jewish Quarter” has transformed the regulation of commerce and property rights in the Old City. Israeli jurisdiction has been imposed over civil affairs and property rights, while the local economy is more oriented towards the Israeli economy than other areas of East Jerusalem. As Israeli settlement has extended into the mainly Arab areas of the Old City, it may be deduced from available data that as many as 1,000 Israelis had set up residences and religious institutions in purchased or expropriated properties outside the “Jewish Quarter” by 2010. Though their demographic significance is minimal amidst some 35,000 Palestinian Arabs living in the Old City (and thousands more who work there but live outside the walls), these 1,000-odd settlers have established residences and religious institutions throughout the Old City, which form part of the wider Israeli security presence and control of the Old City.

The resident Palestinian population of the Old City is one whose composition continues to change over time, as more affluent Jerusalemites move out of the cramped space of the Old City to other areas of East Jerusalem, and lower-income workers and Jerusalemites from outside the barrier move in. The rate of poverty among Arab households was estimated at above 50 per cent in the mid-2000s. Similarly the composition of the Jewish population has shifted over time with a greater preponderance of Orthodox families, who often are lower-income in comparative Israeli terms. More than any other segment of the East Jerusalem Palestinian population, of which the Old City accounts for almost 15 per cent, these Jerusalemites are caught between the front lines of interaction with Israeli settlers and authorities on a daily basis and the front lines of the struggle to preserve and assert Palestinian cultural and political identity and its Islamic and Christian roots. This has entailed a growing sense of siege and conflict for indigenous Palestinian residents who perceive their lifestyles, livelihoods and social cohesion to be at risk in the discordant climate reigning in the Old City, with religious fervour easily degenerating into communal tensions.

Social tensions have been aggravated by a duality in housing conditions and in social and cultural services between the Jewish and other “Quarters” of the Old City. This shows up, for example, in certain vital statistics such as higher Arab infant mortality; higher housing density in Arab areas especially in the “Muslim Quarter” (53 persons/1,000 m<sup>2</sup> compared to 19 persons in the “Jewish Quarter”); and a less renovated/maintained housing stock, with 30 per cent of Palestinian dwellings in

2002 still lacking running water, 40 per cent unconnected to the sewage system and dampness a major problem for most buildings owing to defective plumbing systems. Public health concerns remain high in Arab-inhabited areas owing to inadequate garbage collection services, sewage and drainage networks and lack of public spaces (parks, sports facilities and playgrounds). In addition to the above constraints, limited cooperation between Palestinians and Israeli security and social service authorities has also meant inadequate systematic attention to critical weaknesses in social cohesion and conditions, such as drug use and addiction, correlated to weak socioeconomic status, family violence and child neglect, youth in distress and high dropout rates from school, and intolerance and racism (Glass and Khamaise, 2005).

In short, however similar to the challenges faced by the Palestinian economy and population in East Jerusalem and the Old City might be, the latter represents an extreme case of the adverse and complex social and economic impacts of annexation without integration and with isolation and prolonged decline. The endurance of these Palestinians under duress also offers a glimpse into the survival, coping and adapting strategies to which Jerusalemites have resorted in maintaining a distinctive, if dependent and vulnerable, Arab economy at the heart of the Old City's "global" market, while striving to maintain links with the rest of the Palestinian economy. This precious heritage also constitutes the supreme resource for a future Palestinian economy and its core, emanating from Jerusalem and integrated with all markets – east, south, north and west – as explored further in the following section.

## **Conclusions**

Israel's occupation and unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, followed by its incorporation into Israel in 1980 by law, have gone in tandem with economic separation from the rest of the Palestinian economy and at an increasing pace during the last decade, which witnessed deep physical and demographic alterations to the City. Measures to this effect include expansion of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem as well as the construction of the separation barrier, in a manner that effectively has erased the so-called "Green Line" which had defined the borders of Israel until 1967. Of special concern is that recent years have witnessed an acceleration of the processes which have stymied East Jerusalem's development since 1967: further impoverishment, increased demolitions of Palestinian infrastructure (especially homes) and the expansion of Israeli settlements particularly in the areas surrounding East Jerusalem and Bethlehem (Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, 2011). This has added to the existing physical fragmentation between different Palestinian "bantustans" – drawing on South African experience of economically dependent, self-governed "homelands" existing within the orbit of the advanced metropolis, which has been applied in studies on the economic

geography of occupation in the Palestinian case.<sup>9</sup>

It should be recalled that East Jerusalem is merely living one version of the socioeconomic impact of confrontation with prolonged occupation in the context of an expanding settler/colonial-type enterprise (Jabary et al., 2012), which is widely accepted as the main cause of the failure of Palestinian economic development efforts (UNCTAD, 2012). As has been discussed in this special report, economic separation resulted in the contraction in the relative size of the East Jerusalem economy, its detachment from the remaining OPT and the gradual redirection of East Jerusalem employment towards the Israeli labour market. One clear result has been that the contribution of the East Jerusalem economy to the Palestinian economy has been limited to its two basic sectors, services and tourism, while other productive sectors, especially construction and manufacturing, languish or disappear. The growing detachment has negatively affected both the economies of East Jerusalem and the remaining West Bank.

Indeed, what this examination of the East Jerusalem economy demonstrates is that however singular its development experience, its evolution cannot be understood in isolation from its changing relations with the other economies to which it is, or has been in the past, more or less connected. The shocks to which the East Jerusalem economy has been subjected over half a century rarely came from within: external integrative or disintegrative pressures have exerted a powerful influence on the path and structure of its development which has left it with much-reduced domestic productive capacity. From a vibrant city which was largely Arab prior to 1948 and trading with other Palestinian and regional markets to the east, south, north and west, a divided Jerusalem after 1948 implied an abrupt disconnect with most of its historical trading partners. This provided a relatively impoverished economic landscape as Jerusalemites struggled to reorient their lives under Jordanian rule until 1967.

The next adverse shock to East Jerusalem's socioeconomic fabric and structural integrity came with the occupation and the Israeli unilateral annexation in 1967 and its sudden incorporation into the economy and State of Israel. While this did not cut East Jerusalem's existing economic links with its natural hinterland in the West Bank, links with Jordan and Arab countries became severely strained. Israeli control of border crossings restricted the flow of persons and goods across them, a structural constraint which endures until today. Nevertheless, Jerusalemites picked up the pieces and made the best of two less than second-best worlds, namely preserving economic links with the West Bank and Jordan as best as possible, while not ignoring new opportunities offered by access to Israeli markets. While the following 30 years or so did not witness a major shift in these orientations, the lopsided incorporation of East Jerusalem into the Israeli economy of greater Jerusalem and long-term neglect by public authorities meant that it lagged behind all its "comparators": Israelis in both sectors of Jerusalem, Arab citizens of Israel and even the Palestinians under Palestinian

---

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Farsakh (2005), South Africa Human Sciences Research Council (2009) and Israeli Committee against House Demolitions (2012).

Authority jurisdiction. By the end of the 1990s, the new growth, investment and national economic reconstruction opportunities enjoyed by the rest of OPT after the Oslo Accords had largely bypassed East Jerusalem and contributed to its growing detachment from the general economic and social trends enveloping it.

With the latest shock to East Jerusalem since 2001 coming through the construction of the barrier and intensification of aggressive Israeli settlement in the eastern part of the city, it is a wonder that the Arab “non-permanent resident” population has remained in place and a largely cohesive, if leaderless, community. The East Jerusalem economy began to recover from this downturn in the second half of the 2000s. But its exclusion from Palestinian Authority jurisdiction in the rest of the West Bank deprived it of much of the positive spin-offs of the 2008–2011 boom, largely focused in Ramallah and some other West Bank cities. Increasingly, East Jerusalem finds itself on a fragile economic trajectory of its own.

Nevertheless, Jerusalemites have against all odds safeguarded the core of their economy concentrated in the Old City and extending through its eastern and northern suburbs, stubbornly resisting further encroachment on the limited resources they can still muster and adapting to changing circumstances as best they can. Jerusalemites have developed a degree of dependence on employment opportunities in the Israeli market, providing a much-needed offset to the closing of economic opportunities towards the east. But for its sustenance and strategic depth the East Jerusalem economy is still able to rely primarily on exploiting its most precious and inalienable asset: the enduring Arab/Islamic/Ottoman heritage of its Old City with its equally compelling Holy Places and the tourism flows, related services and revenues that they generate. This implies that for all the conflicting pressures that the East Jerusalem economy faces from different sources, it maintains a distinct identity, purpose and potential that must be reflected and strengthened as part of any survival and development strategy or programme for the city.

A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG), published since the completion of this UNCTAD report, has explored many of the aspects of East Jerusalem’s complex relations with the forces engulfing it that have not been covered here, in particular the political and social pressures from without and within (ICG, 2012). The conclusions of the ICG investigation, indicatively subtitled “the withering of Arab Jerusalem”, echo one of the key themes of the preceding analysis of the city’s economy and are no brighter than those sketched out by UNCTAD: “After some 45 years of occupation, Arab Jerusalemites suffer from political and cultural schizophrenia, simultaneously connected with and isolated from their two hinterlands: Ramallah and the West Bank to their east, West Jerusalem and Israel to the west” (ICG, 2012, p. 25).

It is natural that in attempting to better understand the economic challenges faced by East Jerusalem, the preceding analysis has resorted, as needed, to comparisons with the other markets and economies with which it has interacted over the years: first Jordan, then the rest of OPT including Gaza and most recently only the West Bank, not to mention Israel and its settlements in East Jerusalem and the economy of the Arab citizens of Israel.

This has been necessary not only because these other markets constitute the main economic partners of East Jerusalem and their weight has ultimately determined the development path of an East Jerusalem economy adrift in a multifaceted legal, demographic and political limbo. No less pertinent is that Palestinian development elsewhere under Israeli sovereignty offers lessons in economic survival and social steadfastness that are reflected in the East Jerusalem context. Jerusalemites have much to learn from their compatriots' experiences of a century of confrontation with adversarial "settler colonial" forces: from "de-development" of the Gaza Strip under Israeli occupation, to "individual prosperity and communal impoverishment" in the West Bank, to the socioeconomic experience of Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel that have been analysed as "internal colonialism", "disadvantaged regional economic development", "partial inclusion" or "incorporation without integration".<sup>10</sup>

They also have much to impart, as a variety of strategies have been employed by Palestinians in East Jerusalem and elsewhere to cope, adapt and endure Israeli occupation and settlement. Despite the myriad obstacles that exist, the East Jerusalem economy is not yet, and need not become, a lost or solitary cause. In fact, it constitutes a formidable front in a broader Palestinian strategy of economic "steadfastness" and maintenance of a distinct social, cultural and political identity. While Palestinian Authority, international, Arab and Islamic support and funding will be needed if East Jerusalem is to do better than simply survive, there is little certainty of salvation coming from external sources, in the light of the past two decades of gradual disconnection of East Jerusalem from the development fortunes of the rest of OPT. However, drawing on its core human resources and sociocultural assets and on the inviolability of the status of the city of Jerusalem under international law, Jerusalemites still have resort to a range of survival measures within the existing legal and regulatory framework, even while awaiting the funds that have been pledged over the years to East Jerusalem social, economic and cultural development, but not so often delivered, by donors and friends near and far.

While there is clearly a need for economic interventions to ease the constraints on the economy of East Jerusalem, economic and social development requires political progress and improved horizons for ending occupation in line with relevant United Nations resolutions. By the end of 2012, 45 years after the unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem, such a prospect seems dim indeed and the limited support that East Jerusalem has received from donors has had at best a palliative effect and largely been unable to stem socioeconomic decline. That being said, targeted interventions designed to have a catalytic effect are urgently needed and can always be helpful to indigenously-led efforts to survive and develop. There is no dearth of sectors identified by Palestinian sources for support and there are adequate preliminary studies and plans of the feasibility of possible interventions.

Given the absence of any broadly representative and functional political

---

10 Roy (1997), Khalidi and Samour (2011), Zureik (1979), Khalidi (1988), Rosenhek (2010), Sa'adi (1995) and Jabary et al. (2012), respectively.

representation of Palestinians in East Jerusalem in their dealings with public and international authorities, such interventions in the current environment may be more usefully focused on how to assist the private sector and non-governmental social service providers in East Jerusalem. The absence of Palestinian legislative or executive authority in East Jerusalem, and the neglect of Israeli authorities of the various Israeli and international reports on the dire socioeconomic conditions that Palestinians Jerusalemites face, calls for an especially creative and flexible approach, which makes the best of the legal opportunities within the de facto Israeli framework to protect, sustain and nurture Palestinian economic interests in the city. This is of paramount importance with respect to alleviating hardship in the Old City.

Alongside such efforts, the Palestinian Authority has highlighted the need for new sustained investment to safeguard East Jerusalem's critical role as the capital of a future Palestinian State and has undertaken indicative planning exercises that assume the possibility to guide investment in East Jerusalem, and rebuild its economy and infrastructure (Palestinian Authority, 2010 and 2011). Palestinian Authority planning (without any corresponding resources having been identified) envisions a mix of investments by government, private sector and donors. The plan indicates a total investment over three years in the range of \$428 million, out of which the private sector would contribute \$210 million. Investment would be allocated among three main clusters reflecting broadly the key socioeconomic challenges in East Jerusalem today: social protection and development (\$75 million), economic development (\$328 million), and human rights (\$25 million). The economic development cluster includes three sectors: the economy (\$77 million), tourism (\$127 million) and housing (\$124 million).

Private investment funds have also emerged; one is the holding company Al Quds Holding, recently launched with an initial capital of \$20 million. By May 2012, 33 shareholders had contributed between \$25,000 and \$1,000,000 each. The company intends to invest in multiple sectors including the housing, tourism, health, education and housing sectors (Al Quds Holding, 2011). Development in East Jerusalem stands to benefit from feasibility studies of investment in specific strategic sectors – such as tourism, education, housing and services – for targeted support and removal of constraints on their growth (Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, 2011). The Old City economy represents an especially worthy beneficiary in such an eventuality.

Housing is a key problem facing Palestinians in East Jerusalem that calls for a more significant (and costly) intervention, including legal aid for impoverished homeowners under threat of expropriation or demolition or trying to obtain building permits. There is also a need for developing alternative sources and mechanisms for providing housing loans and mortgage financing and while the company Padico Holding has recently initiated a housing project in Sharafat, it will only provide 128 new housing (Partners for Change, 2008). In any case, developing alternative sources for general consumer and business financing can potentially play a major role in attracting investment in housing and construction, and in the business climate in general.

The Palestinian Authority should also consider a mechanism with the Palestinian Monetary Authority and Palestinian banks in the rest of OPT to enable those banks to extend loans for investment in East Jerusalem, with investment risk properly managed and shared. The financing gap can be overcome through the establishment of a well-managed and funded agency whose task is to guarantee loans for business and investment projects in Jerusalem. Alongside the need to revitalize various professional associations, trade unions and chambers of commerce, reviving the “Higher Council for Tourism” as the local focal point on tourism is an option worth pursuing. Such a body could be responsible for supporting tourism and its subsectors, including hotels, restaurants, tour guides and tourism agencies, and handicrafts and channelling private investment and international support.

Needless to say, if it were so inclined, the Israeli Government could go much further in meeting its obligations as an occupying power by acting with vigour to improve the economic conditions in East Jerusalem and the well-being of its Palestinian residents, as well as ending settlement activities and the occupation of East Jerusalem. In the meantime, steps forward could include removing restrictions on the movement of people and goods, reconsidering patterns of taxation, services provision, investment laws, building permits and procedures, as well as the promotion of equal access to health and education. For example, in November 2012, civil rights advocates on behalf of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem pursued their claims all the way to the Israeli Supreme Court. As a result of their successful appeal, the Court obliged the Jerusalem municipality to provide adequate garbage bins and collection services for Palestinian neighbourhoods, considering the high *arnona* municipal taxes they pay and the debilitated state of their communal infrastructure. There is an entire programme of such possible measures that are incumbent on Israeli authorities, but the record to date suggests that they are less interested in integrating the Palestinian East Jerusalem economy than in excluding Jerusalemites from the city and replacing them with Israeli settlers. Daily confrontations between aggressive settlers in outposts in the Old City and in small implantations in other predominantly Palestinian Arab quarters of the city, alongside the intensification of government-funded settlements ringing the city from the east, imply nothing less.

While Palestinian Jerusalemite non-governmental organizations, social and religious institutions and civic groups certainly could do more to enhance their coordination with each other and with the Palestinian Authority and other authorities, especially the Israeli municipality and social service providers, they also need to maintain unity of vision and coherence of action, given the many divisive forces operating in their midst. Taking into account the multiple jurisdictions and government authorities (Israeli, Palestinian Authority and Jordanian) with which Palestinians in East Jerusalem must maintain the validity of personal status documents and deal on a daily basis professionally and otherwise, the challenge of simply remaining a Jerusalemite is in itself a development strategy. Similarly, building economic links with Palestinian Authority employers and investors (or clients/markets) offers Palestinians in East Jerusalem attractive alternatives to second and third class status



in the Israeli labour market and preserves the historic economic relation with the Palestinian and Arab hinterland. This too implies long-term policies to reinforce and deepen such trends where they exist and to encourage them when feasible.

More pressing, however, is the need for more effective coordination among various organizations involved in providing support to Palestinian Jerusalemites, especially given the constraints on the Palestinian Authority in delivering development, humanitarian relief or services in East Jerusalem. There are several entities (non-governmental and bilateral donors, the United Nations and other international organizations) operating in East Jerusalem, separately or in coalitions. The effectiveness of their interventions in favour of Palestinian Jerusalemites can be enhanced by greater harmonization, prioritization and coordination to maximize synergy and complementarities. This is not to mention the need for more vigorous representations to the concerned Israeli authorities regarding different aspects of socioeconomic discrimination affecting Jerusalemites.

Indeed, unlike donor relations with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and with development and relief needs in Gaza which are programmed, coordinated and monitored in sectoral working groups, East Jerusalem is either grouped together with other areas or simply not treated as a distinct issue with its own sets of problems and needs. As with its economic relations, East Jerusalem is in a “development cooperation limbo”. The nominal Palestinian Authority has no executive powers in Jerusalem, the sovereign Israeli authorities consider East Jerusalem an obstacle or at best peripheral to their core concerns and programmes in the city and international agencies are unable to catalyse development interventions in a coherent or effective way. These are all urgent shortcomings that need to be addressed candidly in any future programmes to relieve and develop the East Jerusalem economy.

The disputed status of Jerusalem under international law means that external interventions are not only legitimate, but also incumbent upon the international community which in 1949 assumed the moral responsibility for the city’s future. For example, the United Nations and the international community are in a unique position to help fill the Jerusalem data gap through monitoring and compiling socioeconomic data in a systematic way for occupied East Jerusalem as defined by the post-1967 configuration, within the broader context of it as part of the city of Jerusalem, as defined in the relevant United Nations resolutions. The PCBS could also consider reissuing national account estimates for East Jerusalem, as needed for any strategic planning for the reintegration of the city into the Palestinian national economy. But the need for such assistance goes beyond data, research and planning, and calls for a formalized mechanism such that donor aid is more effectively targeted, channelled and managed in close consultation and cooperation with the Palestinian people in East Jerusalem and their representative institutions and/or authorities.

It cannot be ignored that the history of the city of Jerusalem over the millennia has been one of strife, bloodshed, conquest, and dramatically shifting fortunes for those changing populations who have resided there. Drawn into this maelstrom have been not only the three monotheistic religions, but at one time or another many

of the nations and peoples of the world. This bare historical truth and the harsh socioeconomic realities endured today by Palestinian Jerusalemites should not obscure that for all those deeply attached to Jerusalem, it is also the city of divinity and ascension of atonement and redemption, the “City of Peace”.

When recommending partition of Palestine in 1947, the assembled nations of the world could not recommend dividing the city of Jerusalem, which they believed should be administered for the benefit of all Jerusalemites, regardless of their nationality, religion or race. The course of events since then imposed a new reality on the ground if not in the law books, first of Israeli-ruled western and Jordanian-ruled eastern Jerusalem and afterwards of Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem. But an international consensus persists (in Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 478) that the occupation/annexation of East Jerusalem must be reversed, notwithstanding “facts on the ground”.

This unique status of the city of Jerusalem in history and in international law should provide a moral compass and realistic vision to guide any Palestinian or other strategy for the survival and prosperity of Palestinian East Jerusalem. This in turn should serve above all to ensure the reintegration of the East Jerusalem economy into its historical hinterland to the east, the north, and the south, while ensuring a more balanced exchange with the west; indeed this should pave the way for Jerusalem to resume the natural course of its history.

*The UNCTAD secretariat provides substantive and technical services to the intergovernmental bodies of UNCTAD in their discussions and deliberations. <http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Home.aspx>*

The preparation of this report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) secretariat was led by Mr. Raja Khalidi (Division on Globalization and Development Strategies), with research contributions by the Assistance to the Palestinian People Unit and consultant Mr. Ibrahim Shikaki (Al-Quds University, Jerusalem), and statistical advice by Mr. Mustafa Khawaja (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Ramallah). JQ is grateful to Raja Khalidi and UNCTAD for permission to publish this piece.

## References

- Al Quds Holding (2011). See <http://alqudsholding.com/> (accessed 9 May 2012).
- Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (2009). Report on the Israeli Colonization Activities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Monitoring Reports, volume 134.
- Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) (2010). Human Rights in East Jerusalem: Facts and Figures. May.
- B'tselem (2011). East Jerusalem: Neglect of infrastructure and services in Palestinian neighbourhoods. See [http://www.btselem.org/english/Jerusalem/Infrastructure\\_and\\_Services.asp](http://www.btselem.org/english/Jerusalem/Infrastructure_and_Services.asp) (accessed 4 May 2011).
- Farsakh L (2005). *Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel: Labour, Land and Occupation*. Routledge, New York.
- Glass, J B and Khamaisi, R (2005). Report on the socio-economic conditions in the Old City of Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Project Munk Centre for International Studies (University of Toronto), Toronto.
- Hever S (2007). *The Separation Wall in East*

- Jerusalem: Economic Consequences*. Alternative Information Center, Bethlehem.
- Hilal J and Johnson P (2003). Poverty in Jerusalem. *Jerusalem Quarterly*. Issue 17 (February).
- International Crisis Group (2012). Extreme Makeover? (II): the Withering of Arab Jerusalem. Middle East Report No. 135.
- Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (2010). Statistical Abstract of Israel No. 61. Jerusalem.
- Israeli Committee against House Demolitions (2012). Demolishing Homes, Demolishing Peace. Jerusalem.
- Jabary Salamanca O, Qato M, Rabie K and Samour S (2012). Editors' introduction. Past is present: Settler colonialism in Palestine. *Settler Colonial Studies*. 2(1):1–8.
- Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS) (2004–2012 editions). *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem*.
- Khalidi R (1988). *The Arab Economy in Israel*. Croom Helm: London.
- Khalidi R and Samour S (2011). Neoliberalism as liberation: The statehood program and the remaking of the Palestinian national movement. *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 11(2):6–25.
- Khawaja H (2009). *Jerusalem Workers under the policy of Judaization and annexation*. \* Civic Coalition for Defending Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, Jerusalem.
- Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (2011). Palestinian State-building: An achievement at risk. Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Meeting New York. September.
- Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (2011). Private Sector Recommendations for Reviving the Economy of Jerusalem. Policy Roundtable 4. Ramallah. See <http://www.mas.ps/2012/sites/default/files/round4.pdf> (accessed 5 May 2011).
- Palestinian Authority (2010). Strategic Multi-Sector Development Plan for East Jerusalem. Office of the President. Ramallah. November.
- Palestinian Authority (2011). National Development Plan 2011–2013. Establishing the State, Building Our Future. Ramallah. April.
- Partners for Change (2008). Palestine investment conference: Project and concept profiles. Bethlehem. May.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (2011) Labour Force Survey Fourth Quarter Results. Press Release. Ramallah.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (2010). Labour Force Survey Annual Report. Ramallah.
- Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) (1999–2011). *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook*. No. 1–13. Ramallah.
- Physicians for Human Rights (2008). The Right to Health among Palestinian Arabs in Israel. April. Jaffa–Tel-Aviv.
- Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (2004). Occasional Bulletin No. 18. Bethlehem.
- Ricca S (2007). Reinventing Jerusalem: Israel's reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter after 1967. I.B. Tauris, London.
- Rosenhek Z (2010). New developments in the sociology of Palestinian citizens in Israel. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 21(3):558–578.
- Roy S (1997). The Gaza Strip: A case of economic de-development. *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 17(1):56–88.
- Sa'adi A (1995). Incorporation without integration: Palestinian citizens in Israel's labour market. *Sociology*. 29(3):429–451.
- Sikkuy (Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality) (2009). The Sikkuy Report 2008. *The Equality Index of Jewish and Arab Citizens in Israel*. Jerusalem.
- South Africa Human Sciences Research Council (2009). Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? A reassessment of Israel's practices in the occupied Palestinian territories under international law. May. Cape Town.
- UNCTAD (2012). Report on UNCTAD assistance to the Palestinian people: Developments in the economy of the occupied Palestinian territory. July. (UNCTAD TD/B/59/2.)
- United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2011a). West Bank access restrictions – Jerusalem. July.
- United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2011b). Special Focus, East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns. March.
- United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2007). The Humanitarian Impact of the West Bank Barrier on Palestinian Communities: East Jerusalem. June.
- Zureik E (1979). *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.